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S/PV.8203 Chemical Weapons Attack in the United Kingdom 14/03/2018

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S/PV.8203 Chemical Weapons Attack in the United Kingdom 14/03/2018 United Nations S/ PV.8203 Security Council Provisional Seventy-third year 8203rd meeting Wednesday, 14 March 2018, 3.25 p.m. New York President: Mr. Van Oosterom ............................... (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ..................... Mr. Inchauste Jordán China ......................................... Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d’Ivoire ................................... Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea ............................... Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia ....................................... Mr. Alemu France ........................................ Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan .................................... Mr. Umarov Kuwait ........................................ Mr. Alotaibi Peru .......................................... Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland ........................................ Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Nebenzia Sweden ....................................... Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .. Mr. Allen United States of America .......................... Mrs. Haley Agenda Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 ([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-07096 (E) *1807096* S/PV.8203 Chemical weapons attack in the United Kingdom 14/03/2018 The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m. It is so dangerous that it requires the highest-grade State laboratories and expertise. Adoption of the agenda Based on the knowledge that Russia has previously The agenda was adopted. produced this agent, and combined with Russia’s record of conducting State-sponsored assassinations, including Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé against former intelligence officers whom it regards as d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the legitimate targets, the United Kingdom Government United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern concluded that it was highly likely that Russia was Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the responsible for this reckless act. We saw only two President of the Security Council (S/2018/218) plausible explanations. Either this was a direct attack by Russia on my country, or Russia had lost control of a The President: The Security Council will now military-grade nerve agent that it had developed. begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. We requested the Russian Government to provide I wish to draw the attention of Council members an explanation by the end of Tuesday, 13 March, on to document S/2018/218, which contains a letter dated how this Russian-produced nerve agent could have 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the been deployed in Salisbury. It has provided no credible Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great explanation, which could suggest that it had lost control Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations of its nerve agent. We therefore have no alternative but addressed to the President of the Security Council. to conclude that the Russian State was responsible I shall now give the floor to those members of the for the attempted murder of Mr. Skripal, his daughter Council who wish to make statements. and police officer Nick Bailey, and for threatening the lives of other British citizens in Salisbury. This was Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I thank you, Sir, for no common crime. It was an unlawful use of force and arranging this urgent meeting of the Security Council a violation of Article 2 of the Charter of the United today to give the United Kingdom the opportunity to Nations — the basis of the international legal order. update Council colleagues on our investigation into a nerve agent attack in Salisbury. The United Kingdom is proud to have been one of the States that played an integral role in drafting the On Sunday, 4 March, Sergei Skripal and his Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a landmark daughter Yulia Skripal were found in the town piece of international law. We are therefore dismayed centre, slipping out of consciousness on a public that Russia has suggested that our response fails to bench, and were taken to hospital by our emergency meet the requirements of the Convention. Article VII services, where they remain in very serious condition. of the Convention calls on States parties to implement Investigations by world-leading experts of the Defence the Convention under their own legislation. The United Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down, Kingdom has enacted the Chemical Weapons Act accredited by the Organization for the Prohibition of in order to fully comply with this obligation. That Chemical Weapons (OPCW), discovered that they had legislation, together with relevant criminal law, is now been exposed to a nerve agent. British police officer guiding our investigation into this incident, as the Nick Bailey was also exposed and remains in hospital Convention was designed to ensure. in serious condition. This was an attack on United Kingdom soil. Under Hundreds of British citizens have been potentially the Convention, we have the right to lead our response, exposed to this nerve agent in what was an indiscriminate engaging the OPCW and others, as appropriate. On and reckless act against the United Kingdom. We have 8 March, the United Kingdom formally notified the deployed our military to secure and decontaminate Technical Secretariat of the OPCW that a chemical numerous sites. The police continue an exhaustive, attack had taken place on United Kingdom soil. wide-scale investigation. Through those investigations, we have concluded that Mr. Skripal and his daughter The Russian Federation has complained that we were poisoned with a Novichok — a military-grade are not acting under article IX of the Convention. On nerve agent of a type developed by Russia. It is not a the contrary, on 12 March, once it became clear to weapon that can be manufactured by non-State actors. us that the United Kingdom had been attacked, the 2/12 18-07096 14/03/2018 Chemical weapons attack in the United Kingdom S/PV.8203 Foreign Secretary summoned the Russian Ambassador used would be traced back to them or mistakenly and sought an explanation from his Government, as believed that they could cover their tracks. article IX clearly sets out we have the right to do. We Russian officials and media channels have have received no meaningful response. It is therefore Russia that is failing to comply with the provisions repeatedly threatened those whom they consider traitors of the Convention. The Council should not fall for even after the attack on 4 March. Russia has a history their attempt to muddy the waters. In addition, the of State-sponsored assassinations, including that of United Kingdom has welcomed the offer of technical Alexander Litvinenko, who was poisoned by radioactive assistance from the Director-General of the OPCW. We materials in my country a decade ago. Russia has a have invited the Technical Secretariat to independently history of interfering in other countries — whether verify our analysis. We are making every effort to the failed coup in Montenegro, repeated cyberattacks expedite that process. on other States or seeking to influence the democratic processes of other countries. Russia has a history Let us now turn to the part of the Chemical of flouting international law, most egregiously in Weapons Convention that Russia is not talking about, Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Georgia. Russia shows which requires States parties to declare chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities that have been used disregard for civilian life. We all remember Flight at any time since 1946 to produce chemical weapons. MH-17, shot down by Russian proxies supplied with Chemical weapons were to be verifiably destroyed and Russian weapons. In its repeated protection of the use production facilities destroyed or converted, subject of chemical weapons by Al-Assad, Russia has shown to approval, within 10 years of the entry into force of that it has different standards when it comes to the use the Convention. Russia completed the destruction of of those terrible substances. its declared stockpile in September 2017, 10 years later We have not jumped to conclusions. We have than required by the Convention and five years beyond carried out a thorough and careful investigation, which the single five-year extension period. Russia did not continues. We are asking the OPCW to independently declare Novichok agents or the production facilities verify the nerve agent used. We have offered Russia associated with them, as it was required to do under the the chance to explain but Russia has refused. We have Convention. No development facilities were declared. therefore concluded that the Russian State was involved Yet we know from the testimony of the Russian scientist Vil Mirzayanov that Novichok agents were developed and we have taken certain measures in response. In as part of the Soviet Union’s offensive chemical taking such measures, we have been clear that we warfare programme and that they were inherited by the have no disagreement with the people of Russia, who Russian Federation. Such facilities associated with that have been responsible for so many great achievements programme should have been declared under the CWC. throughout history. It is the reckless acts of their Even today, a Russian politician said that Russia had Government that we oppose. destroyed the Novichok nerve gas. We are grateful for the support of so many countries From all I have said, we can conclude that Russia is around the world.
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