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Four Scenarios for Electoral Violence

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Four Scenarios for Electoral Violence OCTOBER 2020 Four scenarios for electoral violence: Policy Brief the 2020 Ivorian Presidential and Parliamentary elections Presidential and parliamentary elections in Cote d’Ivoire are scheduled for October 31, 2020. The past months have seen serious acts of violence during the campaign. As more violence is expected, the central question is where this violence is taking and will be taking place and which conditions are encouraging it. This policy brief explores the election violence literature and derives four scenarios to explaining and show which of Cote d’Ivoire’s 31 regions will be affected for what reasons by electoral violence. A live tracker of these scenarios from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) can be found here. Exploration of violence data highlights that presently, electoral violence is highest in competitive areas. This implies that the incumbent and opposition use violence in ‘swing’ areas and areas where they need to poach substantial number of votes from the opponent. Kars de Bruijne & Clionadh Raleigh The presidential and parliamentary elections in violence stemming from the preparations in Cote d’Ivoire are scheduled for October 31, for and the reactions to the elections: since 2020. Public expectations in these weeks August 2020, more than 100 riots and leading up to the elections are that this protests have taken place in Cote d’Ivoire, contest will involve violence, due to the compared to just over 20 in the two months reigniting of political tensions between the before this.2 contenders for the Presidency.1 Indeed, Cote D’Ivoire has already experienced an increase These acts of violence emerged from several contentious issues including an arrest warrant issued in December 2019 against the potential opposition candidate and former 1 Jeune Afrique, ‘Faut-il désespérer de la Côte Prime Minister Guillaume Soro; the sudden d’Ivoire ?’, JeuneAfrique.com, 28 September 2020, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/1049500/ death of the ruling party candidate Amadou politique/edito-faut-il-desesperer-de-la-cote- Gon Coulibally in July 2020; the subsequent divoire/; Deutsche Welle, ‘Crainte d’un cycle third term bid by the sitting President infernal de violence en Côte d’Ivoire’, DW.COM, Ouattarra in August 2020; the invalidation of 24 August 2020, https://www.dw.com/fr/crainte- 40 out of 44 potential presidential candidates dun-cycle-infernal-de-violence-en-c%C3%B4te- – including Soro – in September 2020; and divoire/a-54681751; Amnesty International, the unusual number of defections from ‘Protesters Attacked by Men with Machetes, Knives and Sticks’, 18 August 2020, https://www.amnesty. org/en/latest/news/2020/08/cote-d-ivoire- police-allow-machete-wielding-men-to-attack- protesters/. 2 ACLED, 12-10-2020. Clingendael Policy Brief the ruling coalition.3 All these events have of political violence (from 2002 to 2007) exacerbated the widespread conviction that and had a major post-electoral crisis in a new electoral crisis is looming.4 2010 which led to at least 3,000 deaths, and a decade-long silence by the opposition. In response to the sharp changes in Responses to potential election violence in candidates and particularly the possibility of 2020 include embassy evacuation plans, and a third term for Ouattara, leading opposition the temporary migration of citizens from Cote figures called their supporters out on the d’Ivoire and the capital Abidjan.8 streets in August. These protests were quickly quelled by a heavy display of state As violence is expected, the central question force. Yet from September 14 onwards, new is where and which conditions will encourage protests emerged as the opposition leader or mitigate it. Few observers actually provide and former President, Henri Konan Bedie, predictions as to where to expect violence, called for a campaign of civil disobedience. and those that do often presume that the Days after this call, his ally and former rebel same places where violence occurred in leader Guillaumme Soro had said that “there 2010 – including Goh-Djiboua, Sassandra- will be no election in Cote d’Ivoire”.5 The Marahoue and Abidjan – will continue to be current Prime Minister Hamed Bakoyoko hardest hit in 2020 and for the same ethnic responded that the opposition wants “a Cote reasons.9 d’Ivoire burning and in flames” whereas President Alasane Ouatarra warned Soro that Research into electoral violence suggests, his place was not in the “election campaign, however, that violence is a tool that is used to but in prison”.6 secure specific political outcomes. As today’s political landscape is different from 2010, But more serious acts of violence are so too are the accompanying incentives for expected during the campaign as heated violence. Therefore, this policy brief explores rhetoric and demonstrations give way to the incentives for violence and combines voting and direct competition around the country.7 Cote d’Ivoire has a recent history 15 October 2020, https://www.jeuneafrique. com/1058447/politique/presidentielle-en- 3 E.g. Vice-President Daniel Kablan Duncan; Ministre cote-divoire-bedie-et-affi-nguessan-pas- de l’enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche concernes-par-le-processus-electoral/; France scientifique, Abdallah Albert Toikeusse and 24, ‘Présidentielle en Côte d’Ivoire : le spectre des Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Marcel Amon violences intercommunautaires resurgit’, France Tanoh. 24, 17 October 2020, https://www.france24.com/fr/ 4 International Crisis Group, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: An afrique/20201017-présidentielle-en-côte-d-ivoire- Election Delay for Dialogue’, Crisis Group, 29 le-spectre-des-violences-intercommunautaires- September 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ resurgit. africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/b161-cote- 8 Interview, Diplomatic Source, Abidjan November divoire-reporter-pour-dialoguer. 12 2019; Interview, Diplomatic Source, Abidjan 5 Afrique Sur 7, ‘« Il n’y aura pas d’élection » : Voici November 14 2019. Some expats are known to have la recette de Guillaume Soro’, 28 September 2020, negotiated an escape helicopter in their allowance, https://www.afrique-sur7.fr/443356-pas-election- e.g. Interview with Director in Cacao sector, Abidjan recette-guillaume-soro. October 9, 2019. 6 France 24, ‘Le débat – Côte d’Ivoire : menaces sur 9 Centre for Democracy and Development, ‘Cote la présidentielle ?’, France 24, 21 September 2020, D’Ivoire’s High-Stake Presidential Election’, https://www.france24.com/fr/20200921-debat- 14 October 2020, cote-d-ivoire-menaces-sur-la-presidentielle. https://cddelibrary.org/2020/10/14/cote-divoires- 7 E.g. On October 15, Bedie and another opposition high%e2%80%90stake-presidential-election/; leader, Affi N’Guessan, called for a second phase Jeune Afrique, ‘Côte d’Ivoire : entre Ouattara et of civil disobedience that called supporters Bédié, les fantômes de l’ivoirité – Jeune Afrique’, to disturb “all ongoing electoral processes”, JeuneAfrique.com (blog), 14 October 2020, Jeune Afrique, ‘Présidentielle en Côte d’Ivoire : https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1057913/politique/ Bédié et Affi N’Guessan appellent au « boycott cote-divoire-entre-ouattara-et-bedie-les- actif » – Jeune Afrique’, JeuneAfrique.com (blog), fantomes-de-livoirite/. 2 Clingendael Policy Brief them with the election violence literature venture possible.10 Subsequently, in March to test how likely violence in an ongoing 2020 a third constituent party, the Union election responds to different incentives. pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), left the RHDP as well as Marcel From the literature on election violence, Amon Tanoh, a key figure and one of the four scenarios can be derived that indicate few Southerners in the Northern-dominated which of Cote d’Ivorie’s 31 regions and two RDR. Both left over disagreements as to who autonomous districts are likely to be affected would lead the RHDP, but as both had large by electoral violence. We focus here on pre- constituencies it was a major blow. election and present election contests, and concentrate on how violence may affect All of these breakaway groups joined forces the ability to vote. As pre-election violence and subsequently sought an alliance with has distinct aims compared to post-election the FPI, or rather two different FPI parties violence, we expect that the characteristics (one led by Laurent Gbagbo and one by of areas and voting groups make them more Affi N’Guessan). The golden rule of Ivorian or less susceptible to being involved or politics suggests that a united opposition targeted by this form of violence. is likely to be successful against an RHDP effectively formed around the former RDR. Current political fault lines in However, there are reasons as to why the Cote d’Ivoire golden rule may not apply on this occasion. The RHDP has substantially undercut opposition support to such an extent that Ivorian politics is dominated by three the electoral outcome is uncertain. First, parties: the Rassemblement de Republicans when the PDCI-RDR withdrew, the regime (RDR) led by Alassane Ouattara; the Parti convinced and forced a substantial number démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI-RDA) of the PDCI cadre to remain within the led by Henri Konan Bedie and the Front RHDP; this group is sometimes labelled Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) (still) led by Laurent PDCI-Renaissance. Second, the RHDP Gbagbo. As a rule of thumb, elections in tried to neutralize Guillaume Soro as his Cote d’Ivoire are won when two large parties ascent risked splitting the vote in the unite against a third. In 2010, for example, an RHDP heartland (e.g. Tchologo, Denguela). alliance between the PDCI and the RDR led Therefore, Soro was accused of organizing to the defeat of the FPI and Laurent Gbagbo. a coup and was subsequently convicted The PDCI-RDR alliance transformed into and expelled while many of his cadre were a movement and a new political party, the arrested in December 2019.
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