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Warren Massachusetts Schooner
1 Warren (1) Commander William Coas Schooner 2 August 1776-[] October 1776 Massachusetts Privateer Schooner (2) Commander John Coulston 21 October 1776-[] 26 December 1776 (3) Commander Silas Howell 3 September 1777-9 September 1777 Commissioned/First Date: 2 August 1776 Out of Service/Cause: 9 September 1777/captured by HM Frigate Unicorn Owners: (1) Joseph Foster, Winthrop Sargent and Epes Sargent, all of Gloucester, Massachusetts and John Winthrop, Jr. of Boston, Massachusetts; (2) John Coffin Jones of Newburyport, Massachusetts and Stephen Bruce of Boston, Massachusetts et al Tonnage: 70 Battery: Date Reported: 2 August 1776 Number/Caliber Weight Broadside 4/4-pounder 16 pounds 8 pounds 4/3-pounder 12 pounds 6 pounds Total: 8 cannon/28 pounds Broadside: 4 cannon/14 pounds Swivels: twelve Date Reported: 21 October 1776 Number/Caliber Weight Broadside 8/ Total: 8 cannon/ Broadside: 4 cannon/ Swivels: Date Reported: 1 December 1776 Number/Caliber Weight Broadside 12/6-pounder 72 pounds 36 pounds Total: 12 cannon/72 pounds Broadside: 6 cannon/36 pounds ©awiatsea.com-posted August 2019 --1-- Swivels: twelve Date Reported: 3 September 1777 Number/Caliber Weight Broadside 10/ Total: 10 cannon/ Broadside: 5 cannon/ Swivels: Crew: (1) 2 August 1776: 53 [ total (2) 21 October 1776: 61 []total (3) 1 December 1776: 85 []total (4) 3 September 1777: 53 []total Description: Officers: (1) First Lieutenant Coas Gardner, 2 August 1776-; (2) First Lieutenant Benjamin Tucker, 3 September 1777-9 September 1777; (3) Second Lieutenant Moses Harris, 2 August1776-; -
Volume 5 Fort Mchenry.Pdf
American Battlefield Trust Volume 5 BROADSIDE A Journal of the Wars for Independence for Students Fort McHenry and the Birth of an Anthem Of all the battles in American history none is more With a war being fought on the periphery of the Unit- connected with popular culture than the battle of Fort ed States the British, under the influence of Admiral McHenry fought during the War of 1812. The British George Cockburn, decided to bring the war more di- attack on Fort McHenry and the rectly to America by attacking the large garrison flag that could be Chesapeake Region. The British seen through the early morning Navy, with Marines and elements mist, inspired Washington, DC of their army wreaked havoc along lawyer Francis Scott Key to pen the Chesapeake burning numer- what in 1931 would be adopted ous town and settlements. Howev- by Congress as our National An- er, Cockburn had two prizes in them, the Star-Spangled Ban- mind – Washington, DC and Bal- ner. The anthem is played be- timore, Maryland. Retribution for fore countless sports events the burning of York was never far from high school through the from his mind and what a blow he ranks of professional games. thought, would it be to American The story of the creation of the morale if he could torch the still Star-Spangled Banner is as developing American capital. Af- compelling as the story of the ter pushing aside a motley assort- attack on Baltimore. ment of American defenders of the approach to Washington, DC In 1812, a reluctant President at the battle of Bladensburg, Mar- James Madison asked Congress yland, Cockburn and his forces for a Declaration of War against entered the city and put the torch Great Britain. -
A Timeline of Alexandria's Waterfront
City of Alexandria Office of Historic Alexandria Alexandria Archaeology Studies of the Old Waterfront A Timeline of Alexandria’s Waterfront By Diane Riker July 2008 In the life story of a city, geography is destiny. And so, it is no surprise that Alexandria was destined to become, at least for a time, a major seaport. Here, close to the Potomac’s headwaters, the river’s natural channel touched shore at two points. Between the two lay a crescent of bluffs, backed by abundant woods and fertile fields. Millennia before the town existed, grasslands bordered a much narrower Potomac, providing hunting and fishing grounds for the earliest Americans. Our timeline begins with a remarkable find in the summer of 2007. Prehistoric Alexandria Alexandria Archaeology Museum 11,000 B.C. In 2007 a broken spear point dating back an estimated 13,000 years is uncovered by archaeologists at a Civil War cemetery above Hunting Creek. The Clovis Point is Alexandria’s oldest artifact. Similar tools, also made of quartzite, have been found in Europe and antedate the Paleolithic period. Perhaps the first Europeans here were not who we thought they were. 9,000 B.C. Following the melting of the glaciers, sea levels rise and the Potomac River becomes much wider. Ancient spear points have been found at Jones Point where native Americans probably hunted deer and other mammals. 1,000 B.C. Charred hearthstones and bowl fragments indicate a more settled population. The river runs with shad and sturgeon. The tidelands provide rich soil for cultivation. At Jones Point in 1990 indications of a “village” are found. -
Digital 3D Reconstruction of British 74-Gun Ship-Of-The-Line
DIGITAL 3D RECONSTRUCTION OF BRITISH 74-GUN SHIP-OF-THE-LINE, HMS COLOSSUS, FROM ITS ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION PLANS A Thesis by MICHAEL KENNETH LEWIS Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Chair of Committee, Filipe Castro Committee Members, Chris Dostal Ergun Akleman Head of Department, Darryl De Ruiter May 2021 Major Subject: Anthropology Copyright 2021 Michael Lewis ABSTRACT Virtual reality has created a vast number of solutions for exhibitions and the transfer of knowledge. Space limitations on museum displays and the extensive costs associated with raising and conserving waterlogged archaeological material discourage the development of large projects around the story of a particular shipwreck. There is, however, a way that technology can help overcome the above-mentioned problems and allow museums to provide visitors with information about local, national, and international shipwrecks and their construction. 3D drafting can be used to create 3D models and, in combination with 3D printing, develop exciting learning environments using a shipwreck and its story. This thesis is an attempt at using an 18th century shipwreck and hint at its story and development as a ship type in a particular historical moment, from the conception and construction to its loss, excavation, recording and reconstruction. ii DEDICATION I dedicate my thesis to my family and friends. A special feeling of gratitude to my parents, Ted and Diane Lewis, and to my Aunt, Joan, for all the support that allowed me to follow this childhood dream. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. -
American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2 Alan D
American Calculations of Battleline Strength, 1941-2 Alan D. Zimm Il y a une notion populaire que l'attaque aérienne japonaise sur Pearl Harbor a irrévocablement accompli deux choses, l'une matérielle et l'autre doctrinale: elle a annihilé la ligne de bataille américaine, et elle a résolu le débat porte-avions d'entre-deux guerres contre cuirassés et a donc conduit les dirigeants navals à la conclusion ferme que les cuirassés étaient désuets. Ces points de vue ont été évidemment confirmés par le fait que les cuirassés américains n'ont pas été commis au combat purement maritime dans le Pacifique jusqu'à la fin de 1942. Les deux perceptions sont erronées. La plupart des cuirassés américains ont survécu Pearl Harbor. Elles n'ont pas été immédiatement utilisées pour un certain nombre de raisons. Les calculs basés sur la formation reçue par la plupart des cadres supérieurs des États-Unis prouveraient que la ligne de bataille des États-Unis avait perdu sa marge de puissance assurant la défaite de la ligne de bataille japonaise. La logistique a gardé les cuirassés lents, gourmands de nourriture et de carburant, près de leurs sources d'approvisionnement. There is the popular perception that the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor irrevocably accomplished two things, one material and one doctrinal: it annihilated the American battleline, and it resolved the interwar carriers versus battleships debate driving naval officers to the firm conclusion that battleships were obsolete. These views were evidently confirmed by the fact that American battleships were not committed to surface- to-surface combat in the Pacific until the end of 1942. -
THE MODERNIZATION of the OTTOMAN NAVY DURING the REIGN of SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ (1861-1876) By
THE MODERNIZATION OF THE OTTOMAN NAVY DURING THE REIGN OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ (1861-1876) by DİLARA DAL A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies Department of Classics, Ancient History and Archaeology College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham April, 2015 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT The main focus of this study is to examine the modernization of the Ottoman navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, exploring naval administration, education, and technology. Giving a summary of the transformation of shipbuilding technologies and bureaucratic institutions of the Ottoman naval forces between 1808 and 1861, it analyses the structure of the Ottoman navy, its level of development in comparison to previous periods of time, and the condition of the vessels making up the naval fleet from 1861 to 1876. It also intends to evaluate the character of existing administrative structures at the outset of Abdülaziz’s reign in 1861 and the nature of subsequent changes, including structural reorganization of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the Ministry of Marine, and the Naval Academy, as well as advancements in military training and seafaring; all within the context of the impact of these changes on the military, political, and economic condition of the Empire during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. -
The Professional and Cultural Memory of Horatio Nelson During Britain's
“TRAFALGAR REFOUGHT”: THE PROFESSIONAL AND CULTURAL MEMORY OF HORATIO NELSON DURING BRITAIN’S NAVALIST ERA, 1880-1914 A Thesis by BRADLEY M. CESARIO Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS December 2011 Major Subject: History “TRAFALGAR REFOUGHT”: THE PROFESSIONAL AND CULTURAL MEMORY OF HORATIO NELSON DURING BRITAIN’S NAVALIST ERA, 1880-1914 A Thesis By BRADLEY M. CESARIO Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved by: Chair of Committee, R.J.Q. Adams Committee Members, Adam Seipp James Hannah Head of Department, David Vaught December 2011 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT “Trafalgar Refought”: The Professional and Cultural Memory of Horatio Nelson During Britain’s Navalist Era, 1880-1914. (December 2011) Bradley M. Cesario, B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R.J.Q. Adams Horatio Lord Nelson, Britain’s most famous naval figure, revolutionized what victory meant to the British Royal Navy and the British populace at the turn of the nineteenth century. But his legacy continued after his death in 1805, and a century after his untimely passing Nelson meant as much or more to Britain than he did during his lifetime. This thesis utilizes primary sources from the British Royal Navy and the general British public to explore what the cultural memory of Horatio Nelson’s life and achievements meant to Britain throughout the Edwardian era and to the dawn of the First World War. -
Salvage Diary from 1 March – 1942 Through 15 November, 1943
Salvage Diary from 1 March – 1942 through 15 November, 1943 INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT WAR DIARY COLLECTION It is with deep gratitude to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in San Bruno, California for their kind permission in acquiring and referencing this document. Credit for the reproduction of all or part of its contents should reference NARA and the USS ARIZONA Memorial, National Park Service. Please contact Sharon Woods at the phone # / address below for acknowledgement guidelines. I would like to express my thanks to the Arizona Memorial Museum Association for making this project possible, and to the staff of the USS Arizona Memorial for their assistance and guidance. Invaluable assistance was provided by Stan Melman, who contributed most of the ship classifications, and Zack Anderson, who provided technical guidance and Adobe scans. Most of the Pacific Fleet Salvage that was conducted upon ships impacted by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor occurred within the above dates. The entire document will be soon be available through June, 1945 for viewing. This salvage diary can be searched by any full or partial keyword. The Diaries use an abbreviated series of acronyms, most of which are listed below. Their deciphering is work in progress. If you can provide assistance help “fill in the gaps,” please contact: AMMA Archival specialist Sharon Woods (808) 422-7048, or by mail: USS Arizona Memorial #1 Arizona Memorial Place Honolulu, HI 96818 Missing Dates: 1 Dec, 1941-28 Feb, 1942 (entire 3 months) 11 March, 1942 15 Jun -
Econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Smith, Stefan Halikowski Working Paper International seaborne piracy and the state: Lessons to be learned from history? TranState Working Papers, No. 172 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State Suggested Citation: Smith, Stefan Halikowski (2013) : International seaborne piracy and the state: Lessons to be learned from history?, TranState Working Papers, No. 172, Universität Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597 - Transformations of the State, Bremen This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77943 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE PIRACY AND THE STATE: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM HISTORY? STEFAN HALIKOWSKI SMITH NO. -
Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution Angus K
Naval War College Review Volume 63 Article 12 Number 4 Autumn 2010 Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution Angus K. Ross Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Ross, Angus K. (2010) "Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution," Naval War College Review: Vol. 63 : No. 4 , Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen Ross: Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought R FOUR LESSONS THAT THE U.S. NAVY MUST LEARN FROM THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION Angus K. Ross There is only one thing harder than getting an old idea out of a military mind, and that is to get a new one in. SIR BASIL H. LIDDELL HART our years ago, on 14 June 2006, at a Current Strategy Forum held at the Na- Fval War College, the then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mi- chael Mullen, challenged the audience to think about a new strategy for the U.S. Navy.1 Recalling the enthusiasm and fresh thinking that had surrounded the de- velopment of the World War II ORANGE plans against Japan and a later, Cold War, naval strategy, he urged that the time was ripe to take an equally fundamen- tal look at the needs and constraints of the modern age and to codify a possible maritime contribution to emerging national objectives. -
Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail
Explorations in Economic History 39, 204–231 (2002) doi:10.1006/exeh.2002.0783, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail Douglas W. Allen1 Simon Fraser University The British Navy during the age of sail was systematically successful against its opponents, most notably the French. This paper documents this success, shows that it cannot be explained by superior ships, training, or other naval capital, and puts forth the hypothesis that the British Navy governance structure provided better incentives to fight than those of their opponents. The hypothesis is tested by examining the structure of the rules and then contrasting them with the rules governing privateers, the army, and the navy over time. The paper concludes with a discussion of why the French did not copy the British strategy. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA) He asked who the stout man was who had just been so ceremoniously disposed of. “He was an admiral,” they told him. “But why execute this admiral?” he enquired. “Because he had not enough dead men to his credit,” was the reply; “he joined battle with a French admiral, and it has been established that their ships were not close enough to engage.” “But surely,” exclaimed Candide, “the French admiral must have been just as far from the English as the English admiral was from the French!” “True enough,” was the answer; “but in this country we find it pays to shoot an admiral from time to time to encourage the others.” Voltaire,p. -
April, 1SÍAVAL SONGS and BALLADS in the Library of This
American Antiquarian Society [April, 1SÍAVAL SONGS AND BALLADS BY GAHDNER W. ALLEN N THE library of this Society is a collection of I broadsides marked: "Songs, Ballads, etc. In three Volumes. Purchased from a Ballad Printer and Seller in Boston, 1813. Bound up for Preservation, to show what articles of this kind are in vogue with the Vulgar at this time, 1814. N. B. Songs and common Ballads are not so well printed at this time as 70 years ago, in Boston. Presented to the Society by Isaiah Thomas. August 1814." There are in this set three hundred and two broad- sides containing three hundred and forty-nine distinct poems. Mr. Ford says of them that "no other American library can offer anything like it for the period, and all other libraries combined would still hardly be able to match the contents of these three volumes. "^ In this collection of broadsides are about fifty American naval songs, more than two thirds of them relating to the War of 1812; others to the Revolution and to our hostilities with France and Tripoli. A few are perhaps more political than naval; it is not always easy to draw the line between them. There are a num- ber of other songs, concerning the sea or sailors of a sentimental sort, of less interest to the historian. Several of these latter are British. Fourteen of the naval ballads are listed in "Broadsides, Ballads, etc.. Printed in Massachusetts, 1639-1800. "^ About half »"The Isaiah Thomafl Collection of BaUads," by Worthingtoo C. Ford. Proo. Amer. Antiq.