6

The Political Arena

As I hinted earlier, the Maltese Catholic Church was far from being ecumenical in the 1960s. The , under its dynamic leader Dom Mintoff was only debarred from power by the equally powerful Archbishop Michael Gonzi whose interdicts against voting Socialist ensured the “safe” Dr. to assume the Premiership from 1962 to 1971. On being elected in 1971 Dom Mintoff soon showed that his premiership would be vastly different than that of the happy-go-lucky George Borg Olivier. In the first year of his premiership Mintoff, as he had promised, negotiated the terms of the Defense Agreement with Britain and Nato. His tactics, as Lord Carrington his direct antagonist says, were unorthodox, to say the least.1

Certainly a hostile view; but it would not be the last time that Mintoff’s and Ghadaffi’s name would be paired in the west’s demonology.

Mintoff’s tactics however were successful and he managed to wrest much more money than the docile Borg Olivier ever managed to do out of the British and Nato.2

When, after the Yom Kippur War, the price of oil rose out of all proportion, Mintoff’s newly-found ally proved invaluable:

“A principal reason for ’s coziness today is that Libya helped to insulade the nations from many of the consequences of its new course. Over the past decade, Libya and Malta sealed a bond with that most unbreakable of modern cements - a mix of cash, cheap oil and military advisors.”3

According to the same source there was in 1981 tangible evidence of this friendship. The Maltese “every day... clatter by libraries, schools, training camps, consulates and friendship associations set up for the glory of Allah and the colonel’s Jamahiriya.”4 These same authors, observing the situation through Western eyes, note that “Mintoff saw a chance not only to create jobs with Libyan money but also to evoke a need to keep him placated”.5

This state of affairs had developed because in 1971, the Labour administration, finding itself in dire straits, sought financial help from Libya. Since then, Malta has always maintained intimate relations with Libya and other Arab countries.6 The Arab League started sending aid to Malta7 and a Maltese-Arab

1 Carrington remarks: “Mintoff’s personal style - perhaps his unescapable temperament - was to alternate between periods of civilized charms and spasms of strident and hysterical abuse... At times it even seemed his mental balance was in danger and there were rumours that he was receiving psychiatric treatment from the same specialist as Colonel Ghadaffi of Libya, another unpredictable negotiator.” (LORD CARRINGTON, Reflect on Things Past, Great Britain 1989, 242.) 2 Mintoff’s trump card at the time was “an instant interest-free loan of several million dollars from the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jahamariya... Gaddafi pledged to sustain his brother Third World leader in his nation’s hour of crisis. Mintoff let it be known that London’s intransigence could force him into the arms of the colonel who loathes NATO. At this point, Washington realized that Malta was no longer a dependable ally; U.S. State Department pressure forced the British to give in.” (C. MANN, G. LUDWIG, Malta: A Nation in the Middle, in Geo III [New York, July 1981] 64.) 3 Ibid, 64; as early as 1968, when interviewed by Peter Nichols, Mintoff stated “that Malta would do better to consider the advantages of a common market with Libya instead of seeking association with the European Economic Community.” (P. NICHOLS, Isolation is no Answer, in The London Times [London, 26/10/1968]) n.p.; nevertheless on several occasions and prior to the above mentioned date Mintoff has unambiguously uttered the following “by culture, by race, by creed and by deed we can never uphold the dictatorship of the East” (The Knght [February, 1953]); “European Malta” (in a letter to Nato’s Secretary General, Lord Ismay, 9/3/1953); “Our Europen Civilization” (Priest and Politics in Malta, 1961); Ghal Darb’ohra Kajjin u Abel, in L- Orizzont (Malta, 5/5/1994) 5. 4 C. MANN, G. LUDWIG, ibid, 66. 5 Ibid, 66. 6 “The reasons for such a policy were not only political but also economic. Indeed, it is my opinion that the policy was prompted more by pragmatic economic considerations than any political ideology.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 187.) 7 “In October 1979, during one of Mintoff’s visits to Tripoli, Libya agreed to co-sponsor a proposal made by Malta to the Arab League defining specific assistance fromthe Arab world: US $ 5 million in 1979; US $ 7 million in each of the subsequent four years; a supply of oil of which 340,000 tons would be at prices prevailing on 3.9.79 and 30,000 tons at Opec prices. This proposal was considered by the Arab League in January of 1980 and the League decided to make bilateral contacts with Malta. In a letter dated 27 January 1980, the Secretariat informed the Government of Malta that a ministerial delegation from Libya, Qatar, the PLO and Democratic Yemen would visit Malta in the first half of 1980.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 327.) Chamber of Commerce was set up. Many Maltese sought work in Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. When Air Malta was created in 1975, a number of Pakistani pilots were employed in the new airline and they in turn trained Maltese airline personnel.

Mintoff, himself, spoke out in 1977 on relations between Malta, Europe and the Arab World. In a debate in parliament he stated: “The Arabs agreed with Malta’s policy and that was why they gave Malta aid, and if there was one thing on which all Arabs agreed, it was Malta’s present position.”8

Later commentators saw more clearly Mintoff’s long-term strategy. They realised that the Maltese leader had foreseen the potential of Arab friendship as a lynch-pin for Malta’s economic survival in the near future. As early as 1972, he had forced the British to agree that “their military facilities in Malta would not be used against any Arab country.”9 He saw that the whole of the Middle East was open to whatever Malta could sell there10 and his government stressed “Malta’s position as an ideal base for direct shipping to North Africa and the Middle East.”11 As a result, in 1981, Malta was also importing oil from other countries, besides Libya, which included Kuwait and Iraq.12 Within this context, Mr. Mintoff liked to point out that “his relationships with Arab leaders were good well before their oil gave them universal popularity.”13 Hence “the Arabs are happy to accept Malta as an ‘Arab’ country - it is recognised as such by the Arab league.”14

In fact Malta’s relationship with the Arab world was becoming more enlightened and accepted as early as 1971. Prof. Joseph Aquilina, doyen of Maltese linguists stressed the intimate relationship which the island’s language had with Arabic in The First Congress On Mediterranean Studies of Arabo-Berber Influence:

“The interests of the Department of Maltese and Oriental Languages are certainly not just insular. They are of a Mediterranean nature in a broad sense. As the language is made up of Semitic and Romance elements, so the interests of the Department spread out both towards Europe and the East (the Arab World). They are all centred round Euro-African studies, with their many ramifications.”15

He added that “There is no better place fitted for Arabic studies within the Mediterranean context than Malta where the language spoken is structurally semitic and only superstructurally Romance.”16 He complained that “outside advice (meaning Europhone influence) is not always as expert and well- informed as one might think it is.”17

Aquilina’s views were echoed nearly two decades later by Michael Frendo, an aspiring young Nationalist politician who observed in 1989 that “[Malta is] the best suited, culturally, geographically, historically to

8 Mediterranean News (Malta 3/5/1977) 8; Mintoff continued that if those “who had loaned Malta four million dollars, were not showing gratitude, he did not know who was, Europe certainly did not. It was the Europeans who had been mean and stingy, not the Arabs. If the Arabs did not agree with Malta’s position they would have done as they did with the previous Government and not give Malta anything." (Ibid, 8.) All this was in keeping with Mintoff’s strategy of “devoting [Malta’s] entire strength to build a new economy... to destroy the old image of an island fortress ready to welcome the most powerful foreigner so that from this vantage point he could set out to dominate the rest of the Mediterranean.” (Jamahiriya Mail, Malta 11/10/1978, 11.) He told the Libyan General People’s Congress in Benghazi, that “Malta is looking towards Libya to help her overcome the economic setbacks it will suffer as a result of the closure of the British military base and is confident that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya will not fail to help.” (Jamahiriya Mail, Malta 4/11/1978, 1, 11.) 9 D. BOWDEN, Malta's Trade with the Arab World, in Middle East Review 7 (1981) 95. 10 Ibid, 96. 11 Ibid, 96. 12 Ibid, 96. 13 Ibid, 99. 14 Ibid, 100. 15 J. AQUILINA, The First Congress on Mediterranean Studies of Arabo-Berber Influence, in Journal of Maltese Studies VII (Malta, 1971) i. 16 Ibid, ii. 17 Ibid, ii; He hoped that “with the new concept of Mediterranean association and the forthcoming Congress of Arabo-Berber Studies, the Government and the University Authorities will appreciate the need for a profounder and more intimate knowledge of the civilization and culture of our Mediterrranean friends.” (Ibid, ii.) carry out this task for Europe in Africa through the Mediterranean.”18 He pinpointed the role of several European countries who like Malta, “have historically been intermingled with the Arab and African civilisations”.19 Such countries, while European in character are open to African cultures. The Mediterranean is also a meeting place of two major religions, Christianity and Islam. Frendo opines that “the European Mediterranean and the African Mediterranean [can] be a catalyst for dialogue and tolerance which can radiate to those parts of Africa which even today remain in conflict on religious issues.”20 While Malta belonged to Western European cultures and values which played a significant role in defending such values in the last World War, “Malta now seeks... through its military neutrality, to provide a demilitarised unagressive face of Europe towards the African people.”21

The above are the views of a comparatively moderate conservative politician who seeks to find a modus vivendi with the former Socialist administration’s policies towards the Arab World. No such sentiments are evident in Enzo Rossi’s influential observations on the eve of the 1987 Elections which returned the Nationalists to power after a sixteen-year hiatus. Echoing the views of mainstream Maltese conservative opinion he views things from a NATO perspective and posits a dualism which accurately describes (if with a hint of melodrama) the unfolding of politics in Malta of the Eighties right up to the crucial election of 1987. Rossi states at the outset that “whatever the precise date, the election is likely to be crucial for the future of Maltese democracy and the island’s relations with the West.”22 He sees the Socialist Party policy as being overtly anti-Western and pro-Libyan in its quest for non-alignment. The Mintoff government, moreover, sought controversial new international alliances, such as the 1982 agreement with North Korea and the 1984 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Libya. In contrast Rossi notes the Nationalist Party’s expressed appreciation of NATO’s successful maintenance of peace in Europe contrasting it with the Socialist’s government continuing pursuit of its policies of anti-Western non- alignment and friendship with such non-democratic countries as Libya and North Korea.23

Rossi notes that the Socialist Party pursued a policy of alternating phases of militancy and retrenchment which

“have obscured the fact that each five-year cycle has brought Malta further away from the West and closer to a one-party state. If the cyclical movements are ignored, the distance travelled by the Maltese Socialists over these fifteen years becomes apparent”.24

Rossi observes that each move by the Maltese Socialists towards Libya and the East has been followed by a relatively quiet period “during which the West has been allowed to acclimatise itself to the new situation”.25 The Maltese government over the last fifteen years, had tried to establish economic and commercial ties with Eastern and non-aligned countries but in reality the West still absorbed over 80% of Malta’s exports and accounted for 90% of its tourist trade.26 Rossi notes also that relations with the European Community tend to improve during the election years (1976, 1981, 1986) after periods of acrimonious argument.27

Malta’s relations with Libya, though unpopular at grassroots levels, have passed through varying fortunes. Before the 1981 election, Mintoff defied Qaddafi by drilling for oil in disputed waters.

18 M. FRENDO, ibid, 233. 19 Ibid, 233. 20 Ibid, 233. 21 Ibid, 233. 22 E. ROSSI, Malta on the Brink: From Western Democracy to Libyan Satellite, in European Security Studies (London, 1986) 5. 23 Ibid, 8. 24 Ibid, 9. 25 Ibid, 10. 26 Ibid, 10. 27 Ibid, 10.

“The ensuing clash between the two gave the impression that Libya had been kept at a safe distance during the election, and Western countries were satisfied that Qaddafi’s ambitions towards Malta had been frustrated.”28

Things changed, however, in the ensuing 1982-86 period which saw collaboration on an extensive scale between the two countries. Rossi harps on the theme that “this has been resented by the majority of the Maltese.”29 He alleges that,

“Late in 1986, the Maltese government began to spread the word that relations with Libya had cooled again; but the close personal and institutional relations between the two countries have been preserved intact.”30

Rossi maintained that it is this close relationship of Malta with Libya, reflected by the 1984 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, which, on the eve of the 1987 Elections, posed the greatest threat to Western security. He opined that, “Maltese-Libyan relations like other aspects of Maltese political life, have had to pass through each phase of the island’s election cycle.”31 He again echoes the refrain that “The Catholic Maltese abhor the Muslim Libyans”.32

In 1984, however, Qaddafi sought to unite Libyan interests with those of Malta. On a visit to the island in that year he declared: “those who were against Libya were also against Malta.”33 The two sides also confirmed their full support and absolute assistance to the armed struggle staged by the Palestinian people, “to liberate their soil in its entirety and return to their homeland.”34

Rossi viewed these developments with alarm terming Malta as “Qaddafi’s Trojan horse.”35 He saw that Libya’s territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra affected Malta’s own interests adversely in the division of the continental shelf between the two countries.36 He noted that there were usually about a thousand Libyans on the island at any one time. He even mentioned the fact there was a call for Maltese volunteers to join the Libyan Armed Forces. He commented that “Libyan political influence can be seen and felt in various sections of Maltese society.”37 Noting that though there were no Muslim Maltese, Qaddafi had financed the construction of a mosque in Malta and added that the “Islamic Call Society had an active branch on the island.”38

The different attitude of the Nationalist Party is then commented upon with the remark that while,

“Libya realises that a Nationalist government in Malta would be interested in cultivating economic co-operation and good-neighbourly relations, but would look north when it came to establishing Malta’s political and defence connexions (sic).”39

28 Ibid, 11. 29 Ibid, 11. 30 Ibid, 11. 31 Ibid, 28. 32 Ibid, 28. 33 Ibid, 29. 34 Ibid, 29; “Mintoff’s major thrust, however, was directed at the Arab world. He had already established a close and almost brotherly relationship with Gaddafi’s Libya and made public his support for Arab unity and their struggle to regain the territories lost in the six-day war of 1967.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 189.) 35 Ibid, 30. 36 Ibid, 30. 37 Ibid, 32. 38 Ibid, 32. 39 Ibid, 32. He then argues that Malta does not have any special relationship with the Arab League, having simply normal economic relations with several Arab countries and a special political and military relationship with Libya. However, “the Maltese Socialists have presented the Arab League and Arab countries as a kind of counterweight to the EEC”.40

Rossi states that the Socialist Party’s stand on their relationship with the EU would in their own words “in no way prejudice or impair Malta’s ability to expand the fund of political goodwill which the island has built with a large number of Arab states in recent years” and that “whatever form Malta’s future economic arrangements with the EEC will take, this must not serve as an obstacle to closer commercial relationships with Arab states.”41 These same conditions were reiterated by Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, Mintoff’s chosen successor, to the effect that any improvement in relations with Europe “should be achieved... without detriment to the special friendship which we have established... with Arab peoples, especially the neighbouring Arab states.”42

Rossi concluded that the Malta of 1986, “is much further away from the West and from democratic values than it was in 1971, and much closer to Libya and to a rigidly centralised system of state government.”43 He opined that the Libyan ruler, Colonel Qaddafi considered it to be in his country’s vital security interests that Malta should have at the very least a friendly and broadly sympathetic government.44 He asks “could Qaddafi afford to see Malta ruled by anyone other than the Socialist Party?”45 He ends by stating that “if... the Nationalist Party is returned, the same trends are likely to be reversed .”46

For a totally opposing view, it is necessary to analyse Dennis Sammut’s observations. He declares from the very start that “Malta’s future relations with the Arab nations are essential if this country is to identify its true character and role as a small independent country in the Mediterranean.”47 Looking back at past relations with the Islamic World, he notes that Malta has had various contacts, if not always amicable with these people, observing that “Further human contacts took place at the turn of the century when large Maltese communities were encouraged by the British to settle in North Africa as part of the colonization by European powers of Egypt and Algeria.”48

Passing on to comment on the Nationalist Party’s policies towards Europe and the Arabs, he seems to agree with Rossi, though from a totally polarised angle, that “they [the Nationalists] had therefore to look north [towards Europe] for inspiration.”49 He notices “obvious similarities between the successive positions of the Maltese Nationalist Party and the Maronite Christians in Lebanon.”50 He pokes fun at Dr. Censu Tabone (then Foreign Minister in 1987) who “stated to the amazement and amusement of parliament that the Maltese cannot be classified as Arabs as they were born with blue eyes.”51

Sammut digs back into colonial history to show that Mr. Mintoff paid a number of visits to various Arab states throughout his period as prime minister from 1955-58; visits that were not appreciated by the Colonial Office in London.52 He states that, “It was Nasser who supported the Labour Party’s affiliation

40 Ibid, 33. 41 Ibid, 33. 42 Ibid, 33-34. 43 Ibid, 35. 44 Ibid, 35. 45 Ibid, 35. 46 Ibid, 35. 47 D. SAMMUT, Malta and the Arab World, in Society 3 (July-Sept., 1989) 16. 48 Ibid, 16. 49 Ibid, 16. 50 Ibid, 17. 51 Ibid, 17. 52 Ibid, 17. of AAPSO”.53 Moreover, in 1962 Labour M.P. broadcast in Maltese over Cairo Radio at a time when the Labour Party was denied use of broadcasting facilities in Malta. He declares that “the major breakthrough in relations between Malta and the Arab world came after the revolution in Libya in 1969.”54 Sammut refers then to the 1971 watershed election in which relations with Libya were an issue with the Nationalist Party propaganda machine trying to mock the Labour Party for seeking to establish stronger relations with the Arabs.55 The resulting Labour victory initiated a period of close political, economic and popular relations with Libya which also ensured that Malta had the sympathy of other Arab countries, especially Egypt. Sammut observes at this point that “He [Gaddafi] remains until this very day Malta’s biggest advocate in the Libyan Leadership.”56 Like Rossi but from a radically different viewpoint Sammut discerns that,

“Despite the cooling off in relations throughout 1980, as a result of the dispute between the two countries on the median line, the momentum was on the whole maintained and reached its climax in the 1984 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries.”57

Sammut adds that political co-operation was complemented by economic co-operation,58 although some argued that the level of economic co-operation did not match the former.59 This close neighbourliness helped considerably to break the racist prejudices that many Maltese harboured towards Arabs in general and Libyans in particular. Sammut shrewdly observes that

“The Libyan-Maltese entente created a certain confusion in the mind of the average Maltese as to what constituted an Arab. For many years the words ‘Arab’ and ‘Libyan’ were commonly used in Malta without distinction.”60

On the other hand it was not surprising that many Arab states assumed Malta to be in the Libyan sphere of interest; to this effect Sammut concludes that “the image of Malta in many Arab countries remains blurred, built on impressions rather than realities.”61

Sammut then discusses the question of the compulsory teaching of Arabic in Government schools as the Labour government “identified the language connection as the most important link between the Maltese and the Arabs.”62 He does not doubt that in the long-term the effect of such a policy would have been a dramatic opening towards the Arab world. In this context he castigates the Nationalist government who “reversed this policy in a calculated political move camouflaged as being in the interest of Maltese students.”63 Sammut claims that “This single political act has done more harm to the long-term relations between Malta and the Arab world, than any UN resolution or statement can correct.”64 As many have since seen, Sammut held the idea that strengthening the teaching of Arabic65 and establishing an

53 Ibid, 17. 54 Ibid, 17. 55 Ibid, 17. 56 Ibid, 17. 57 Ibid, 17. 58 Ibid, 17. 59 Ibid, 18. 60 Ibid, 18. 61 Ibid, 18. 62 Ibid, 18. 63 Ibid, 18. 64 Ibid, 18. 65 The teaching of Arabic was introduced by the Labour government and was made compulsory for all secondary school students. The fact that this was so compulsory made it diffucult for many people to accept. Some sections looked at this introduction from a political viewpoint and opposed it because it was introduced by the Labour government. Others accepted it for the same reason. People look at Arabic without any profound knowledge. Many students (and their parents) associated their language with the Libyan. They viewed it as a “poor” language spoken only by Libyan. In my opinion, it was a mistake to introduce it so suddenly without any information about its background. People simply had a poor idea of Arabic. People just had no idea: they just thought it was Libyan. institutionalised relationship with the Arab League should constitute the basis for long term co-operation between Malta and the Arab world.66 The Labour Party realised that good relations with the Arab world must also manifest themselves in Malta’s support for the Palestinian cause,

“After 1971... Malta started taking a leading and vocal role as promoter of the Palestinian cause. This brought it into a head-on collision with the pro-Israeli lobby even in such progressive institutions as the Socialist International.”67

Sammut underlines the difference between the Labour Party attitude and that of the Nationalists: “It was not until 1981 that the Nationalists, under pressure from various Arab diplomatic missions, opened contacts with the PLO Office.”68 He comments further that “The government [Nationalists]... decided to upgrade Malta’s relations with Israel to full ambassadorial level on the same day as the launching of the intifada.”69 The Nationalists “confused” policy regarding the Palestinians, Sammut asserts, shows itself plainly through the fact that, “They then proceeded to congratulate Yasser Arafat for his appointment as head of a state which they did not recognize”70 and concludes that the ambivalence shown by the Nationalist government on this issue has not particularly endeared it to Arab governments “who are also taking note of a number of off-the-record statements being made by Maltese diplomats overseas which are not particularly friendly to the Arab cause.”71 Sammut concludes his contribution by declaring that

“Malta cannot give its back to the Arab world, even if it wants to. The Labour government of 1971-87 laid the foundation for good long-term co-operation, overcoming past prejudices. Despite the present setbacks the next Labour government will make relations with the Arab world one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy.”72

He opines that full EU membership (as the Nationalists desire) would estrange Malta from the Arab world and therefore is not in Malta’s interest.73

The question of “joining Europe” is viewed from a different perspective by Michael L. Nash who states that

“Neutrality is part of Malta’s Constitution, so the same parameters apply as they do in the cases of Austria, Sweden and Finland. But Malta has said it will not make political preconditions for entry.”74 Dominic Fenech also picks up the theme of Malta’s position within Europe and in the Mediterranean. On Malta’s change of government he comments that, “The question... is how will the laissez-faire promised

We know that regional dialect is never taught. We know that Arabic is the official language of all Arab nations: Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Araba, Egypt, Palestine etc. This is the only language which is written: dialect is not written e.g. an illiterate person in Tunis is going to find it difficult to make understood in Lyrie: dialects vary, that's the point. If we had only explained the richness of the language, the richness of its prose etc., that it is a modern language with terms of referring to technology etc., with its wide diffusion in so many countries, students would have realised that Arabic is not a “poor” language. On the contrary it is rich in modern terms with its own vocabulary i.e. for rockets, computer etc. Arabs are proud of their language and they are loath to defile it with foreign terminology. In short, no profound knowledge of the language and culture existed. Then there was the prejudice which hampered the teaching of this language. We live a different culture. Arabic was non-European, non-Christian. Oriental culture repelled the average student. Some are attracted for the same reasons. People look at Arabic without any profound knowledge. Many students (and their parents) associated their langauge with the Libyan. Besides the Libyan teachers who came here had to overcome many difficulties: they knew little about teaching a language to foreign students. The latter made life difficult for them. Still there were students who picked up Arabic swiftly. When government changed, it was made optional and the teaching of Arabic was taken up by less and less students. In Gozo, at one point, there were no students at all. Arabic was a victim of politics: even the Labour opposition was lukewarm in pressing for its maintenance. Arabic is not just another language such as Spanish or Russian: it is very important for Malta because Malta's relations with the Arabs remain strong and in future will remain strong. We are the bridge between Europe and the Arab world. (A. ZERAFA, Intervista, Malta 1995; see also A. ZERAFA, Messagg lill-istudenti li waslu biex jaghzlu s-suggetti fl-iskejjel sekondarji u li jinteressaw ruhhom fl-ilsien Gharbi u fl-ilsien Malti, Malta 1995.) 66 Ibid, 18. 67 Ibid, 18-19. 68 Ibid, 19. 69 Ibid, 19. 70 Ibid, 19. 71 Ibid, 19. 72 Ibid, 19. 73 Ibid, 19. 74 M.L. NASH, The Enlargement of the European Community, in Contemporary Review, 256/1490 (U.K., March 1990) 124. by the Nationalist government affect the economy and who stands to benefit from it?”75 and he continues that “it is in the EEC, which it hopes to join, that the new government has placed its greatest expectations.”76 He is sceptical about the Naltionalists’ policy towards Europe, querying whether the EU “will respond more generously to a government that wants to be a part of Europe at all costs.”77 He contrasts with this, Labour’s policy of seeing Malta as a Mediterranean rather than a European nation and which sought the role of a “bridge” between Europe and North Africa and between East and West.78 Labour’s policy of neutrality and non-alignment was entrenched in the constitution “five months before the election crowned a foreign policy assiduously pursued by the Labour government.”79

With the election of the Nationalist government, it started working on the assumption that neutrality does not hinder economic and even political union with Europe. Fenech quotes Fenech Adami, the new Prime Minister who asserted that “My government strongly believes that Malta should find its rightful place in such a union”.80 Fenech’s view of this policy can be summed up in his statement that “Malta’s and the Community’s interest might be better served by Malta sticking to its Mediterranean vocation.”81 He concludes that “Malta should develop a fuller economic co-operation with the Maghrib Arab countries, with whom Italy and Spain are also interested in strengthening ties.”82

Godfrey A. Pirotta analyses Malta’s foreign policy after Mintoff in a related way. Mintoff had sought to exploit Malta’s strategic position in the Mediterranean, seeking trade and concluding commercial treaties irrespective of political ideology, that Malta’s defence role for Western powers should be dismantled and that Malta should be neutral and non-aligned with major power blocks.83 Mintoff, Pirotta argues, had “forced Britain and Nato ... to refrain until then [1979] from using their military facilities against any of Malta’s Mediterranean neighbours - echoes of Albania, Suez and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.”84 Like Fenech, Pirotta notes that Mintoff “sought to take advantage of Malta’s location between the industrialised nations of Europe and the developing markets of North Africa and the Middle East.”85 Pirotta observes that Malta took upon itself the role of spokesman for the Mediterranean with Malta’s representatives arguing that “it was futile to discuss European security and stability while at the same time ignoring the threat posed to world peace by conflicts which had their origin in the Mediterranean.”86 He further notes that Libya sought to assert itself into this power vacuum by the “closure of the NATO base to replace the West with its own influence.”87 He concludes that Mintoff’s message in his foreign dealings was directed to the Soviet Union as to the West. The latter however “have never been capable to overcome their caricature of him as a Nasser or a Fidel Castro.”88

Malta’s relations with Libya suffered a stunning setback in the early 1980s over the Median line dispute. Both countries had developed intimate relations since 1971 and this was by far the most serious quarrel which they had since then, even involving a quasi-military confrontation.89 Both nations were mindful of

75 D. FENECH, The 1987 Maltese Election: Between Europe and the Mediterranean, in West European Politics 11/1 (U.K., January 1988) 135. 76 Ibid, 136. 77 Ibid, 136. 78 Ibid, 136. 79 Ibid, 137. 80 Ibid, 137. 81 Ibid, 138. 82 Ibid, 138. 83 G.A. PIROTTA, Malta’s Foreign Policy After Mintoff, in Political Quartely 56 (London, April-June, 1985) 183-184. 84 Ibid, 184. 85 Ibid, 184. 86 Ibid, 184; “Although the Russians must have been pleased with Malta’s new position in international affairs and consequently of NATO’s withdrawal from Malta, they were strongly suspicious of China and the new friendship that had suddenly sprung between that country and Malta. Matters did not improve when, at Helsinki, Mintoff took the stand that there could be no security in Europe unless there was also security in the Mediterranean, and insisted on some form of participation by non-European Mediterranean States in the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe - the C.S.C.E. - and later threatened to disrupt the Conference unless the Conference took account also of the situation in the Mediterranean.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 194-195.) 87 Ibid, 184-185. 88 Ibid, 186. 89 “The situation with Libya worsened when, by letter dated 30 June 1980, the Libyan Government was informed that since no overall agreement had been reached, and the Special Agreement signed in May 1976 to refer the continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice was still unratified, the Libyan broadcasting would no longer be allowed after 1 July 1980. Shortly the possibility of striking oil in the disputed area and they sought the arbitration of International Court of Justice at the Hague. Malta’s claims went as far South as 13 50’ and 15 10; to such a claim Libya counteracted with the claim that her long coastline deserved a much larger share of the area. Malta’s objection to this counterclaim was that, if it came to accept Libya’s demands, then the latter’s area of sovereignity would extend to Sicily, thus involving the Italian government. The ICJ judgement in 1985, which was accepted by both sides, was simply a readjustment of Malta’s claim.90

Furthermore, there were other negative repercussions of Malta’s friendship with the Arab world. The most visible was the hijacking of aeroplanes to Malta. One such incident occurred on Sunday 21 February 1983 when a Boeing 727 of the Libyan Arab Airlines was hijacked on an internal flight between Tripoli and Sebha and routed to Malta.

The hijackers were two young Libyans who for personal reasons sought asylum in Malta. After lengthy negotiations in which Prime Minister Mintoff took a leading part the two hijackers surrendered and were taken back to Libya two months later. This hijacking was construed by some sections of the foreign press as another unthought mishap for Mintoff’s Libya policy, but if anything, the Maltese Prime Minister’s prestige rose even higher after this dramatic incident.91

The most celebrated hijacking which involved Malta was that of the Egypt Air jetliner carrying more than 90 people, flying from Greece to Egypt and landing in Malta on 23 November 1985. The plane was stormed at Luqa by Egyptian commandos on Sunday 24 November, and more than 60 people were killed in this assault. Earlier a number of hostages were summarily executed by the hijackers.92 The hijackers, one of whom survived, were reputedly Arab terrorists. The American press tied the hijackers to Libya’s leader Qaddafi93 though this accusation was far from being proven.

after, the dispute over the continental shelf came to a head when an Italian rig, Saipem II, in use by Texaco to drill for the Maltese Government in the region of the Medina Bank, was forced by Libyan warships to stop drilling and withdraw from the area. But this matter will be discussed separately.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 329.) 90 E.D. BROWN, The Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, in The Cambridge Law Journal (Cambridge, 1985) 3 ff; see also: G.P. McGLINLEY, Intervention in the International Court: the Libya/Malta continental shelf case, in International and comparative law quarterly 34 (London, October 1985) 671-694; Z. WLOSOWICZ, The Malta/Libya case: shelf delimitation by the distance principle and how to influence decisions without intervening, in The Cambridge Law Journal 44:3 (Cambridge, Novemeber 1985) 341-345; International Court of Justice: Pleadings, oral arguments, documents, Case concerning the Continental Shelf, I, Netherlands, 568 pp; International Court of Justice: Pleadings, oral arguments, documents, Case concerning the Continental Shelf, II, Netherlands, 662 pp; E. LAUTERPACHT, International Law Reports, 70, Cambridge 1986, 527-689; E. MIZZI, ibid, 359-388. 91 C. FLORES, P. VELLA, Hijack, Malta 1983, 95pp. 92 Egyptian airliner is hijacked: Terrorist on board claims 4 people killed, in The Miami Herald (Miami, 24/11/1985) 1A, 18A; see also: The Miami Herald (Miami, 25/11/1985) 1A, 4A, 12A, 13A; The Miami Herald (Miami, 26/11/1985) 1A, 4A; The Miami Herald (Miami, 27/11/1985) 1A, 6A; The Miami Herald (Miami, 29/11/1985) 2B; The Miami Herald (Miami, 1/12/1985) 1A, 21A, 1E, 5E; The Miami Herald (Miami, 4/12/1985) 23A; The Miami Herald (Miami, 5/12/1985) 20A; Terrorism: Massacre in Malta, in Time (U.S.A. 9/12/1985) 42-44; Egyptian Commandos Storm Hijacked Plane at Luqa: 50 passengers die in explosion, in The Times (Malta, 25/11/1985) 1, 20; Mitmum il-htif ta’ l-ajruplan Egizzjan: Mietu 50 ruh, in Il-Hajja (Malta, 25/11/1985) 1, 3, 5, 12; Il-htif ta’ l-ajruplan intemm tragikament: aktar minn 50 maqtula, in In- Taghna (Malta, 25/11/1985) 1-6, 16; Tmiem Imdemmi, in L-Orizzont (Malta, 24/11/1985) 1-6, 20. 93 The Miami Herald (Miami, 1/12/1985) n.p.