6 The Political Arena As I hinted earlier, the Maltese Catholic Church was far from being ecumenical in the 1960s. The Labour Party, under its dynamic leader Dom Mintoff was only debarred from power by the equally powerful Archbishop Michael Gonzi whose interdicts against voting Socialist ensured the “safe” Dr. George Borg Olivier to assume the Premiership from 1962 to 1971. On being elected in 1971 Dom Mintoff soon showed that his premiership would be vastly different than that of the happy-go-lucky George Borg Olivier. In the first year of his premiership Mintoff, as he had promised, negotiated the terms of the Defense Agreement with Britain and Nato. His tactics, as Lord Carrington his direct antagonist says, were unorthodox, to say the least.1 Certainly a hostile view; but it would not be the last time that Mintoff’s and Ghadaffi’s name would be paired in the west’s demonology. Mintoff’s tactics however were successful and he managed to wrest much more money than the docile Borg Olivier ever managed to do out of the British and Nato.2 When, after the Yom Kippur War, the price of oil rose out of all proportion, Mintoff’s newly-found ally proved invaluable: “A principal reason for Malta’s coziness today is that Libya helped to insulade the nations from many of the consequences of its new course. Over the past decade, Libya and Malta sealed a bond with that most unbreakable of modern cements - a mix of cash, cheap oil and military advisors.”3 According to the same source there was in 1981 tangible evidence of this friendship. The Maltese “every day... clatter by libraries, schools, training camps, consulates and friendship associations set up for the glory of Allah and the colonel’s Jamahiriya.”4 These same authors, observing the situation through Western eyes, note that “Mintoff saw a chance not only to create jobs with Libyan money but also to evoke a need to keep him placated”.5 This state of affairs had developed because in 1971, the Labour administration, finding itself in dire straits, sought financial help from Libya. Since then, Malta has always maintained intimate relations with Libya and other Arab countries.6 The Arab League started sending aid to Malta7 and a Maltese-Arab 1 Carrington remarks: “Mintoff’s personal style - perhaps his unescapable temperament - was to alternate between periods of civilized charms and spasms of strident and hysterical abuse... At times it even seemed his mental balance was in danger and there were rumours that he was receiving psychiatric treatment from the same specialist as Colonel Ghadaffi of Libya, another unpredictable negotiator.” (LORD CARRINGTON, Reflect on Things Past, Great Britain 1989, 242.) 2 Mintoff’s trump card at the time was “an instant interest-free loan of several million dollars from the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jahamariya... Gaddafi pledged to sustain his brother Third World leader in his nation’s hour of crisis. Mintoff let it be known that London’s intransigence could force him into the arms of the colonel who loathes NATO. At this point, Washington realized that Malta was no longer a dependable ally; U.S. State Department pressure forced the British to give in.” (C. MANN, G. LUDWIG, Malta: A Nation in the Middle, in Geo III [New York, July 1981] 64.) 3 Ibid, 64; as early as 1968, when interviewed by Peter Nichols, Mintoff stated “that Malta would do better to consider the advantages of a common market with Libya instead of seeking association with the European Economic Community.” (P. NICHOLS, Isolation is no Answer, in The London Times [London, 26/10/1968]) n.p.; nevertheless on several occasions and prior to the above mentioned date Mintoff has unambiguously uttered the following “by culture, by race, by creed and by deed we can never uphold the dictatorship of the East” (The Knght [February, 1953]); “European Malta” (in a letter to Nato’s Secretary General, Lord Ismay, 9/3/1953); “Our Europen Civilization” (Priest and Politics in Malta, 1961); Ghal Darb’ohra Kajjin u Abel, in L- Orizzont (Malta, 5/5/1994) 5. 4 C. MANN, G. LUDWIG, ibid, 66. 5 Ibid, 66. 6 “The reasons for such a policy were not only political but also economic. Indeed, it is my opinion that the policy was prompted more by pragmatic economic considerations than any political ideology.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 187.) 7 “In October 1979, during one of Mintoff’s visits to Tripoli, Libya agreed to co-sponsor a proposal made by Malta to the Arab League defining specific assistance fromthe Arab world: US $ 5 million in 1979; US $ 7 million in each of the subsequent four years; a supply of oil of which 340,000 tons would be at prices prevailing on 3.9.79 and 30,000 tons at Opec prices. This proposal was considered by the Arab League in January of 1980 and the League decided to make bilateral contacts with Malta. In a letter dated 27 January 1980, the Secretariat informed the Government of Malta that a ministerial delegation from Libya, Qatar, the PLO and Democratic Yemen would visit Malta in the first half of 1980.” (E. MIZZI, ibid, 327.) Chamber of Commerce was set up. Many Maltese sought work in Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. When Air Malta was created in 1975, a number of Pakistani pilots were employed in the new airline and they in turn trained Maltese airline personnel. Mintoff, himself, spoke out in 1977 on relations between Malta, Europe and the Arab World. In a debate in parliament he stated: “The Arabs agreed with Malta’s policy and that was why they gave Malta aid, and if there was one thing on which all Arabs agreed, it was Malta’s present position.”8 Later commentators saw more clearly Mintoff’s long-term strategy. They realised that the Maltese leader had foreseen the potential of Arab friendship as a lynch-pin for Malta’s economic survival in the near future. As early as 1972, he had forced the British to agree that “their military facilities in Malta would not be used against any Arab country.”9 He saw that the whole of the Middle East was open to whatever Malta could sell there10 and his government stressed “Malta’s position as an ideal base for direct shipping to North Africa and the Middle East.”11 As a result, in 1981, Malta was also importing oil from other countries, besides Libya, which included Kuwait and Iraq.12 Within this context, Mr. Mintoff liked to point out that “his relationships with Arab leaders were good well before their oil gave them universal popularity.”13 Hence “the Arabs are happy to accept Malta as an ‘Arab’ country - it is recognised as such by the Arab league.”14 In fact Malta’s relationship with the Arab world was becoming more enlightened and accepted as early as 1971. Prof. Joseph Aquilina, doyen of Maltese linguists stressed the intimate relationship which the island’s language had with Arabic in The First Congress On Mediterranean Studies of Arabo-Berber Influence: “The interests of the Department of Maltese and Oriental Languages are certainly not just insular. They are of a Mediterranean nature in a broad sense. As the language is made up of Semitic and Romance elements, so the interests of the Department spread out both towards Europe and the East (the Arab World). They are all centred round Euro-African studies, with their many ramifications.”15 He added that “There is no better place fitted for Arabic studies within the Mediterranean context than Malta where the language spoken is structurally semitic and only superstructurally Romance.”16 He complained that “outside advice (meaning Europhone influence) is not always as expert and well- informed as one might think it is.”17 Aquilina’s views were echoed nearly two decades later by Michael Frendo, an aspiring young Nationalist politician who observed in 1989 that “[Malta is] the best suited, culturally, geographically, historically to 8 Mediterranean News (Malta 3/5/1977) 8; Mintoff continued that if those “who had loaned Malta four million dollars, were not showing gratitude, he did not know who was, Europe certainly did not. It was the Europeans who had been mean and stingy, not the Arabs. If the Arabs did not agree with Malta’s position they would have done as they did with the previous Government and not give Malta anything." (Ibid, 8.) All this was in keeping with Mintoff’s strategy of “devoting [Malta’s] entire strength to build a new economy... to destroy the old image of an island fortress ready to welcome the most powerful foreigner so that from this vantage point he could set out to dominate the rest of the Mediterranean.” (Jamahiriya Mail, Malta 11/10/1978, 11.) He told the Libyan General People’s Congress in Benghazi, that “Malta is looking towards Libya to help her overcome the economic setbacks it will suffer as a result of the closure of the British military base and is confident that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya will not fail to help.” (Jamahiriya Mail, Malta 4/11/1978, 1, 11.) 9 D. BOWDEN, Malta's Trade with the Arab World, in Middle East Review 7 (1981) 95. 10 Ibid, 96. 11 Ibid, 96. 12 Ibid, 96. 13 Ibid, 99. 14 Ibid, 100. 15 J. AQUILINA, The First Congress on Mediterranean Studies of Arabo-Berber Influence, in Journal of Maltese Studies VII (Malta, 1971) i. 16 Ibid, ii. 17 Ibid, ii; He hoped that “with the new concept of Mediterranean association and the forthcoming Congress of Arabo-Berber Studies, the Government and the University Authorities will appreciate the need for a profounder and more intimate knowledge of the civilization and culture of our Mediterrranean friends.” (Ibid, ii.) carry out this task for Europe in Africa through the Mediterranean.”18 He pinpointed the role of several European countries who like Malta, “have historically been intermingled with the Arab and African civilisations”.19 Such countries, while European in character are open to African cultures.