C. van Dijk The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia

In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 153 (1997), no: 3, Leiden, 397-430

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C. VAN DIJK The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia1

The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), a merger of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), Partai Katolik, Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo), Partai Murba, and the Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), is a party which has been rife with conflicts from its inception in 1973, often with people originating from the PNI being the most strident. In April 1986, for instance, the party's third national congress ended up in the air, as the delegates were unable to reach agreement on who was to lead the party for the next five years. The task of constituting its central board was left to the Indonesian government. The new board, which was announced the following month, was headed by Soerjadi, with Nico Daryanto as general secretary. This did not put an end to the strife within the PDI. In 1988 one of Soerjadi's main rivals for the general chairmanship in 1986, Achmad Subagyo, and a number of others were banned from the party after a failed bid for its leadership, which in the estimation of opponents amounted to a coup d'état. In 1991, when the PDI found itself unable to organize a national congress, Subagyo established a rival central board, with as main argument that Soerjadi's five-year term in office had ended. He formed what came to be known as the DPP Peralihan PDI, or PDI Interim Central Board. It was chaired by Subagyo himself.

The fourth party congress In July 1993, after a delay of two years, the PDI, now sarcastically referred to by some as the Partai Deadlock Indonesia, finally succeeded in holding its fourth national congress. Among the people mentioned as possible candidates for the general chairmanship that time were Soerjadi himself, and Budi Hardjono, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno and Aberson Marie Sihaloho as some of his rivals. Furthermore, the names of Megawati Soekarnoputri and her brother, Guruh Soekarnoputra, came up. Before the congress met in Medan, the armed forces had already indicated that they were against Soerjadi's re-election. Feisal Tanjung, Commander of the Armed Forces, commented after a meeting with President Soeharto that, though the choice was completely up to the delegates, it would be best if they did not elect a person with a 'legal stigma'. This, as he himself admitted, clearly

Unless otherwise stated, this survey is based on Indonesian newspaper reports.

BK1 1553-111 (1997) Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 398 Recent Developments in lndonesian Politics implied Soerjadi. For Soerjadi was implicated in an attempt at kidnapping and beating up two PDI members, Edy Sukirman and Agung Imam Sumanto (two of the leaders of the anti-Soerjadi demonstrators who had occupied the PDI headquarters on Jalan Diponegoro in Jakarta), in July 1991, for which the chairman of the Jakarta branch, Alex Asmasoebrata, was facing charges in a lawsuit in Jakarta at the time.2 Witnesses testified in court that Soerjadi had known of the kidnapping and that he had tried to bribe them not to give evidence, which claims Soerjadi dismissed as slanderous. Admittedly he had given one of the witnesses money, but this had only been for petrol and for repairs on a car owned by the central board.3 Alex Asmasoebrata was acquitted in November 1993, with the judges concluding that the evidence given by the witnesses indicated that Soerjadi was guilty. The congress took place at the Pangkalan Mansyhur Hajj Dormitory in Medan. It was opened on 21 st July at another venue by President Soe- harto, who impressed the importance of strong, properly guided political unity on the PDI and appealed to it to put its house in order by honouring the principle of mutual consultation. This was not to be, however. Soerjadi had made sure that the dissenting members were debarred from the congress. They also had flocked undeterred to Medan, where the interim board had set up its own headquarters in the house of one of its local supporters. Shortly after Soeharto's speech, after the delegates had returned to the Hajj Centre, pandemonium broke out. Only minutes after the conclusion of the speech of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Yogie Suardi Memet, members and supporters of the interim board driving a jeep and a pick-up truck rammed the entrance gate to the complex, shouting anti-Soerjadi slogans like 'Kill Soerjadi' and singing patriotic songs. After the demonstrators gained entry to the congress hall, one of them, Jacob Nuwawea, demanding that the interim board be allowed to participate, grabbed the microphone and announced that his faction had taken over. The next day, July 22nd, protesters trying to enter were refused entry by riot police. On the same day Soerjadi was re-elected. This was an unex- pectedly sudden development, three days ahead of schedule. The chairman of the meeting, Dimmy Haryanto, after listening to speeches by represent- atives of the provincial branches and drawing the conclusion that the great majority of delegates present had shown support for Soerjadi, proposed to the delegates that they agree to his election. When the audience shouted 'We agree', Haryanto considered his proposal accepted. Soerjadi was

2 Immediately after Feisal Tanjung's announcement, Alex Asmasoebrata asked Soerjadi to withdraw his candidature, and the PDI of East Java, where Soerjadi's nomination was not uncontested as it was, withdrew its support of him. 3 In connection with this affair, some PDI members at the end of February 1993 demanded Soerjadi's resignation, accusing him of planning to kill his political enemies, and that of the general secretary, Nico Daryanto, who they alleged had tried to cover up for Soerjadi.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 399 assigned the task of forming a new central board. Some of the delegates sang patriotic songs, and this time cries of 'Long Live Soerjadi' reverberated. Violent protests were voiced against Soerjadi's re-election by the interim board and other dissenting members. On July 23rd demonstrators again forced their way into the Hajj complex. Very shortly after gaining access, five people were hurt in a scuffle with security guards hired by the organ- izing committee. They included Alex Asmasoebrata, who was assaulted and beaten with wooden rods and traffic signs when he tried to phone the Director General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Again Jacob Nuwawea took control. Declaring Soerjadi's election invalid, he appealed to President Soeharto to intervene. Amid the cheers of their supporters, Achmad Subagyo and his close associates entered the conference hall. As his followers continued to occupy the meeting hall for the two remaining days of the congress, a closing address by Vice- President Try Sutrisno had to be cancelled. Nor was a closing meeting held. Instead, a statement was issued pledging continued support for Soerjadi. Soerjadi's opponents showed no sign of flagging in their protests. Achmad Subagyo even announced that he was planning to seize control of the PDI offices in Jakarta. Furthermore, a Group of Five - Alex Asma- soebrata, Latief Pudjosakti (chairman of the East Javanese branch), Slamet Mulyadi (chairman of the West Javanese branch), Zainuddin Ali (chairman of the Aceh branch), and Jacob Nuwawea4 - drew up a statement asserting that the congress had been a failure and that the PDI no longer had a central board. Alex Asmasoebrata, speaking on behalf of the group, announced that they were prepared to organize a 'continuation' of the congress, which he claimed had not finished its business, in Jakarta. The group was asked by the interim board to begin negotiations with the government to ensure that Soerjadi would not take up the function of general chairman of the PDI. The central board was described by some as 'a vacuüm'. Alex Asmasoebrata, on his return to Jakarta, was summoned immediately to the office of the city's military command, where he was asked not to make trouble and to restrain his followers in their quest for revenge. Immediately after the congress, the Co-ordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Soesilo Soedarman, announced that at the request of the various parties concerned the government was prepared to help find a solution. According to him, Soerjadi had failed as leader of the PDI, as he had not eliminated radicalism within the party. A few days later Yogie S. Memet also stated publicly that the government considered the PDI congress a failure, Soerjadi's re-election not having been staged in accordance with approved procedures. He believed that a caretaker board

4 The group was formed on July 23rd, after the forcible occupation of the confer- ence hall. After the congress, however, Slamet Mulyadi became one of the formatur.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 400 Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics was required to préparé an extraordinary congress - an option initially rejected by Soerjadi and his supporters. Soerjadi remained chairman till August, when the government officially refused to recognize his re-election. He had made two major mistakes. One was his advocacy in his election campaign of a restriction on the number of terms the Indonesian President could serve, which had cost him the government support he had enjoyed up till then. The second was his conciliatory gestures afterwards, speaking out in favour of Soeharto's re- election, for instance, which had not gone down well with other PDI leaders, who regarded this as a breach of the promises made by the PDI in its 1992 election campaign. At the instigation of Yogie S. Memet, a caretaker board was formed, headed by Latief Pudjosakti and with Ismunandar as general secretary. It was at about this time that Megawati began to be mentioned increasingly as a figure who could restore unity within the PDI. Feisal Tanjung, acknowledging this at the end of September 1993, pledged that the armed forces would not obstruct her nomination and would adopt a neutral stance. He indicated that she was not identifiable with Soekar- noism. She would not be subjected to any special political investigation, having already been screened as a member of the People's Congress. At around the same time Major-General Arie Sudewo, Deputy Chief of the BAIS (Armed Forces Strategie Intelligence Body), speaking in a similar vein, observed that the claim that her election as general chairperson of the PDI would cause a revival of Soekarnoism had been deliberately exaggerated by the mass media.

The extraordinary congress In an attempt at reconciliation, an extraordinary congress was held in the Sukolilo Hajji Dormitory in Surabaya from 2-6 December 1993. By now there were two main rivals for the general chairmanship: Budi Hardjono and Megawati. The former was rumoured at the time to be the govern- ment's favourite, and had himself stated on a number of occasions that he enjoyed 'support from above and from below'. The latter had reportedly been persuaded by Soerjadi to stand, which led some people to see her as an ally of Soerjadi in his struggle within the PDI. Prior to the congress various senior officials, including Yogie S. Memet and Feisal Tanjung, made statements denying that the administration had its own candidate, reiterating that the government would not interfere in party affairs. Moreover, the then Head of the Armed Forces Information Centre, Syarwan Hamid, commented that the role of the armed forces would be restricted to safeguarding the security at the congress. The extraordinary congress was organized by the caretaker board. It had been decided that each sub-provincial branch could send three delegates, one of whom had to be chosen from among Achmad Subagyo's

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 401 supporters. In spite of this, the latter complained that many branches, at the provincial as well as the lower level, had failed to send representatives to the relevant delegation to the congress. Those who had not been delegated by their branch included Jacob Nuwawea from East Jakarta, for instance. It was pointed out that this sort of practice detracted from the attempts at unity. Megawati supporters equally complained that some of them had been barred from the congress and that in a number of cases local authorities had only allowed local delegates to go to Surabaya after they had made a promise not to vote for Megawati. The extraordinary congress, which was opened by Yogie S. Memet, turned out a fiasco. Outside the dormitory, there were demonstrators showing their support for Megawati, singing revolutionary songs and calling on the delegates to have the courage to elect her and make the PDI independent of the government. Inside, chaos reigned supreme. There were heated discussions, with delegates even coming to blows and chairs being thrown. The main cause of the furore was the circumstance that a large majority of the delegates showed themselves in favour Megawati as new general chairperson, while her opponents tried to make the best of a bad situation by, for instance, pleading against a direct vote and for the formation of a team of j'ormatur, which would put them in a better bargaining position. On the final day of the congress, December 6th, the members of the caretaker board did not even turn up. The delegates waited from 9 a.m. till around midnight to see what would happen. It was later disclosed that the caretaker board had contacted Yogie S. Memet asking for his help at the last moment, one hour before the congress was due to end. It had stated in its letter to him that the extraordinary congress could not be allowed to continue, because it might divide the nation, and that it was inviting him to help break the deadlock that had arisen. Yogie S. Memet later recalled that he had not been able to accomplish anything in just one hour. All the provincial boards represented at the extraordinary congress backed Megawati, while according to a statement issued by the representative of South Kalimantan - which was considered to be an accurate reflection of the true situation - the representatives of 256 of the 303 sub-provincial branches also supported her. This sort of endorsement gave Megawati cause to state, just before midnight on the last day of the congress, that de facto she had been elected general chairperson of the PDI. A few minutes later about five hundred police officers and members of anti-riot squads cleared the venue, as the permit for the meeting had expired. Afterwards the caretakers blamed the failure of the congress on the behaviour of some of the participants. They had acted in a manner that was in contradiction with the Pancasila culture and with adat, Latief Pudjosakti commented. He moreover deplored the psychological pressure brought to bear by people who wanted to impose their own opinions, without a

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 402 Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics thought for unanimity. The overwhelming support shown for Megawati at the congress impressed many. Former Minister of Internal Affairs Rudini commented that this should persuade the government, and in particular his successor, to accept Megawati as the new PDI chairperson. If his plea was disregarded, the Indonesian government would be held in contempt by the international community for its disregard of democratie principles. The former general chairman of Golkar and parliamentary chairman, Wahono, also spoke out in Megawati's favour, urging the government to have the courage to accept the fact that she had grassroots support. Others who showed her their support at that time included PDI leaders such as Soerjadi and Fatimah Achmad. Mien Sugandhi, Minister of Women's Affairs without portfolio, taking a rather different tack, ventured the hypothesis that outside interference had prevented Megawati's election and averred that what was really behind this was a masculine conspiracy.

The national conference What followed was a series of meetings of the various groups and factions in the PDI with Yogie S. Memet, who, as became the custom with high government and military officials dealing with the internal PDI conflict, presented himself as the patron or guardian of domestic political affairs. The ground had to be prepared for a new PDI national meeting. There was a break-through on December 13, in the late afternoon of which Yogie S. Memet, after discussions with the caretaker board and the provincial chairmen, received Megawati. After that he stated that, in view of what had transpired at the extraordinary congress and what had been said by the chairmen of the provincial boards, the government did not preclude the possibility of Megawati becoming general chairperson. Journalists greeted the news with cheers of 'Long Live Mega'. The following day Yogie S. Memet withdrew his support of the caretaker board as organizer of the planned conference. This task now devolved on the provincial boards, which were in favour of Megawati. At that time she seemed to have the blessing of the Co-ordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Soesilo Soedarman, as well, who asserted that people need not be afraid that she might promote 'Soekarnoism'. The military commander of Jakarta, Hendropriyono, now also came out with a statement that Megawati was sure to become the PDI's general chairman on account of the growing support she received 'from below', adding, when asked what would happen, that those responsible for maintaining law and order would be ready to deal with anyone attempting to obstruct the PDI conference. The date set for the national conference (Munas) was, first, 16 December, and when this proved infeasible, 22 December 1993, though it looked virtually up to the very last moment as if it would fall through. The two main camps in the PDI continued to quarrel. They could not agree about

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 403 either the place of the convention or who was to be invited to it. Only after the government declared its support for the options suggested by Megawati and her supporters could the national conference finally take place. It was the PDFs last chance to solve its internal problems, Yogie S. Memet pointed out. One congress had failed, and so had an extraordinary congress, and if this conference now also came to grief, there was no higher forum. The conference was opened in the Hotel Garden in Jakarta on 22 December 1993. It was attended by two representatives from each of the twenty-seven provincial branches and was closely guarded by anti-riot troops. On the evening of that day, Megawati was elected by acclamation for a period of five years. She was to head a team of nine formatur. The delegates shouted their approval and enthusiastically applauded the decision. The formatur needed only one day to finish their work in what was described in the Indonesian newspapers as a round of 'tough negotiations'. The chief bone of contention was the question of whether past 'troublemakers' (that is, representatives of the caretaker board and other dissidents) should be included on the new board. When a deadlock threatened, again military officers became involved, while the formatur also visited the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Because of the demands made by the various groups, there was a delay of twelve hours. A new board, comprising 29 members, was announced in the evening (not, as had been expected, the morning) of 23 December, with Alex Litaay from the Parkindo as the new general secretary. The new board was the best possible result that could have been achieved, Megawati stated. On 5 February 1994 Megawati and a number of other members of the board were received first by President Soeharto and then by Vice-President Try Sutrisno. After the convention, reports began to circulate that the armed forces had had a hand in the composition of the new board. Army officers had been present during the negotiations leading up to its formation, though, as army spokesman Syarwan Hamid afterwards stated, this had been only to ensure the security of the convention, not to influence its decisions. The armed forces had given their representatives explicit instructions not to meddle in PDI party affairs or in the election of its new board, he pointed out. They had been present with a view to preventing undesirable occurrences, such as the convention's ending in deadlock because the differences had become too entrenched. This should not be construed as intervention, however. If the armed forces had intervened, this would have caused uproar, just as at the previous congress, was his considered opinion. Some observers, such as Yahya Muhaimin from Gadjah Mada University and Salim Said, even went so far as to praise the armed forces' 'peace mission'.

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New problems During the closing meeting of the convention a message from Yogie S. Memet had been read out, saying what an extraordinary affair Megawati's election had been: she had very appropriately been elected on Mother's Day, and she was moreover the first woman to head a political party under the New Order. The message expressed the hope that the party would consolidate itself, in particular at the regional level. However, new problems arose the next year, when it was time for various provincial branches to elect a new board. In a number of provinces rival boards emerged, while in others the process of reaching agreement on the composition of a new board was hindered by protests and accusations. The events in East Java, a PDI stronghold, had particularly strong repercussions for later developments. The East Javanese branch failed twice, in July and again in August 1994, to elect a provincial board. In July, Soetjipto, the treasurer and former chairman of that branch, who had supported Megawati at the extraordinary congress of December, won 180 votes for the chairmanship, and Latief Pudjosakti, its then chairman, 154. The latter demanded a new election, but Soetjipto refused the demand. In an attempt to find a way out of the impasse, a team of eight formatur, one from each of the former residencies, was formed, with Megawati as chairperson. Five of them spoke out in favour of Latief Pudjosakti, but Megawati refused to have the matter decided by a vote. The PDI central board thereupon intervened, claiming that it had a legal right to do so, and on 22 August appointed Soetjipto. In the meantime, the five dissenting formatur had formed a board headed by Latief Pudjosakti. His supporters refused Soetjipto entry to the party offices in Surabaya and began demanding Megawati's resignation. The East Javanese dispute in the end turned out to be one of the most sensitive of the disagreements in which the authorities became involved. In September 1994 the Head of the Directorate of Social and Political Affairs of the Province of East Java, Drs Suryadi Setiawan, requested the PDI's central board to revoke its formal decision to appoint Soetjipto. The board, determined to go ahead with the installation of a provincial board headed by Soetjipto, refused his request, which it regarded as an unwarranted form of interference in party affairs. It feit that it was responsible for the solution of the problem. A similar reaction was provoked by the step taken by the Governor of East Java, M. Basofi Soedirman, in convening a meeting of leaders of sub-provincial branches the following month without consulting the central board. Annoyed by his action, this board claimed that he had overstepped the bounds of his authority as a political counsellor and had acted unethically and in violation of legal principles. Jumping to his defence, the Director General for Social and Political Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sutoyo NK, declared that a Governor had the authority to solve any problems that presented itself in his province. Basofi

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Soedirman, at a meeting with the branches, apologized for having hurt the feelings of the members of the central board, explaining that his only aim had been to put an end to the crisis as quickly as possible. Megawati, giving a reaction after a meeting of her board, stated that the matter of the board of East Java had now been decided. The central board thereupon instructed Soetjipto to organize conferences of the sub-branches, and sent a letter to Latief Pudjosakti warning him that he would be expelled from the PDI if he did not cease his opposition. Latief Pudjosakti was not without supporters in the central board, however. One of its members, Gerry Mbatemooy, even went so far as to travel to Surabaya in mid November to install him as chairman of the East Javanese board. At that time no permission had been granted yet by the authorities for the installation of Soetjipto and his board. Moreover, Yogie S. Memet stated on 28 November that he refused to recognize Soetjipto's board, criticizing Megawati for trying to impose her will on the participants of regional conferences in six provinces - a line of action which lay at the root of the PDI conflicts in those regions, he claimed.5 He hastened to point out at the same time that his refusal to recognize Soetjipto's board did not imply that he had given his blessings to Latief Pudjosakti's board. The installation of the latter, as a senior member of staff of his Department had observed earlier, was not legal either. In December, at a meeting of representatives of the provincial boards, including Soetjipto, in Jakarta, the suspension of Gerry Mbatemooy and Latief Pudjosakti was demanded. Mbatemooy retaliated at the end of that month by announcing the creation of a rival board, the so-called 'reshuffled central board', headed by Yusuf Merukh, with FAS Alwi as general secretary. lts members included Latief Pudjosakti, Edwin Hernawan Soekowati (who had stated a few days previously that he would form a National Salvation Team if Megawati did not resign), and Alex Asmasoebrata (who had been succeeded as chairman of the Jakarta branch by Lukman Mokoginta). At least four of these members, including Latief Pudjosakti, denied ever having been contacted in advance. The government refused the new board recognition. Early in January 1995, the central board expelled Gerry Mbatemooy and Latief Pudjosakti. Supporters of the reshuffled board were given ten days to repent. At about this time, the problems for Megawati and her supporters were exacerbated by rumours that the chairman of the West Javanese board, Djadjang Kurniadi, did not have a 'clean background' and that he had been involved in the Gestapu/PKI. At first the Military Commander of West Java commented that no proof had been found for this, but later a spokesman stated that there was indeed cause for doubts about Djadjang

5 The six provinces he was referring to were East Java, West Java, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Aceh. In February, the PDI admitted there were problems in East Java, South Sulawesi, and South Sumatra.

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Kurniadi's past. In early January 1995 the Commander of the Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, further revealed that an investigation would be held into suspicions about the connections of 300 regional PDI leaders with the former PKI. Among the names of those who were not 'clean' even that of Megawati's husband, Taufik Kiemas, a former chairman of the GMNI in Palembang, was mentioned.6 Meanwhile, no solution had been found yet for the conflicts in East Java. One consequence of this was that the PDI was not represented in the provincial institutions responsible for organizing the general election in East Java, which were set up in January 1996. Because there were still two rival boards claiming to represent the PDI in this province, Governor Basofi Soedirman had decided to leave the PDI places open.7 As a result, the PDI's central board declared these institutions invalid, threatening that if no PDI representatives were appointed to them by the time of the general elections, the party would bring the matter up in the discussion by the People's Congress of President Soeharto's review of the government's policy of the past five years. Yogie S. Memet denied that any rules had been violated, but, realizing that this would leave the government open to accusations of holding 'defective' elections, instructed the Governor of East Java to find a solution to the PDI problem troubling his province before May 1996, when the registration of voters should commence. By now the East Javanese case had unmistakably assumed a national dimension. In February 1996 Basofi Soedirman was even summoned to report on the developments to President Soeharto himself. On that occasion Soeharto stressed that the PDI leaders should recognize that their party was plagued by a problem and take steps to eliminate it. They should subordinate their personal interests to those of the party and the nation. Simultaneously the East Javanese police decided for the time being to refuse both rival boards permission to hold public meetings, for fear of unrest and violence involving supporters of the two opposing camps in the East Javanese PDI. This decision came under strong attack from the party's central board, whose members insisted that Soetjipto's board was the only

6 The number 300 had been mentioned by Yusuf Merukh. One PDI board member later asked the security forces to investigate Yusuf Merukh's background, as there were indications that this was not 'clean' either. The affair incidentally cast some doubts on the screening procedure which members of Parliament (like Taufik Kiemas) and the chairpersons of party branches (like Djadjang Kurniadi) had to undergo. 7 Yogie S. Memet had already indicated in November 1995 that this would be the government's policy if the PDI failed to solve its problems in East Java. In December 1995, when election committees had to be formed, Basofi Soedirman invited the two camps to talk matters over. Soetjipto did not attend the talks, afraid, as he was later to state, that the meeting would end in a new discussion about which of the two boards was the rightful one. Some predicted at that juncture, before the setting up of election committees at the end of January, that Basofi Soedirman would come out in favour of Latief Pudjosakti.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 407 legal one. Soetjipto himself rejected the decision as well. In the eyes of all, the latest developments were an additional indication that the Governor of East Java in fact sided with Latief Pudjosakti. Basofi Soedirman defended himself against such accusations by pointing out that he would lay himself open to the same accusations by the other side if he recognized the Soetjipto board. Latief Pudjosakti, for his part, agreed with the measure.

The confrontation From around April 1996 letters were sent by sub-provincial branches to the PDI's central board informing it of pressure exerted by local authorities to support plans to convene an interim national PDI congress. Moreover, the Yusuf Merukh group announced plans to hold an extraordinary congress. The showdown came in early June 1996. On June 3rd, to be precise, dissenting regional leaders, after first visiting the PDI headquarters to put forward their demands for an extraordinary congress, called at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Here the chairman of the Central Javanese provincial board submitted to the Director-General for Political and Social Affairs, Sutoyo NK, twenty-one folders with requests for a congress from 215 leaders of sub-provincial and twenty-one provincial branches. Apart from disappointment about Megawati's leadership, which they alleged had led to conflicts in various regional branches, two other arguments were put forward in support of their plea: that the new PDI party's statutes had not yet been confirmed and that two important institutions, the Central Review Board and the Party Review Council, had still not been formed. Megawati did not consent. Suspecting that the sole intention behind these plans was to oust her, she frustrated the attempts to convene an interim congress by arguing that this was in conflict with the party statutes. Congresses should be held only once every five years, and not in mid-term. Quite apart from this objection, the legality of many of the petitions was questionable. The problem was the familiar one that the documents in question had been signed by individual board members, not all of whom were chairpersons. Party members who did not agree that a congress should be held even maintained that, to make matters worse, some of them contairied false signatures.8 Megawati's supporters continued to stress that the request for a congress had not been made by a majority of

8 According to Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, 16 provincial and 141 sub-provincial branches were involved. Kwik Kian Gie a few days later specified that 141 branches had written to the central board, 103 of them in favour of a congress and 38 against. Of the 103 letters in favour, he went on to explain, some contained forged signatures or the signature of just one person. These claims were contradicted by their op- ponents, however. In mid June the Megawati board announced that it had received statements from 161 branches opposing an interim congress, including 64 branches which had withdrawn their original support for such a congress. Later, after the congress was actually held, Alex Litaay stated that his board had received messages of protest against such a congress from 259 boards.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 408 Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics branches. Later Megawati herself accused the dissidents of obstructing the PDI's preparations for the general elections in 1997. The PDI's 'proclamators', who had been instrumental in founding the party in 1973 - Moh. Isnaeni, Sabam Sirait, Abdul Madjid, and Ben Mangrengsay - also rejected the holding of an interim congress as being unconstitutional, even sending a letter to this effect to President Soeharto. The opposition to Megawati was led by Fatimah Achmad, a known associate of Soerjadi and chairperson of the PDI group in Parliament. As fifteen members of the PDI central board sided with her, her camp soon came to be known as 'the Group of Sixteen'. For the preparations for a congress to be held on 4 June, she set up a committee headed by herself and with Ismunandar as its secretary. At the congress Megawati would be called to account for her leadership, Fatimah Achmad asserted, endorsed a few days later by Soerjadi. She and Soerjadi, who was mentioned at the time as the person most likely to be elected as general chairman, both denied having any ambitions to lead a new board. The idea of a congress met with immediate support from the armed forces and the government, and thus also from the regional authorities and the military. Pleas by Megawati's board against such a congress were ignored. In an initial reaction after receiving the representatives of the Group of Sixteen on June 5th, Sutoyo NK. revealed that the government agreed to their proposal, mainly because a majority of the party's members had asked for this. Similarly, Yogie S. Memet pointed out that sixteen of the twenty-seven members of the central board, the vast majority of the sub-provincial branches, and twenty-two of the twenty-seven provincial branches supported Fatimah Achmad's action, and this, he concluded, unquestionably constituted a quorum. Feisal Tanjung announced on the same day that the armed forces would do all in their power to ensure the security of the planned congress, provided only that it was organized in accordance with party rules. As on similar occasions in the past, Syarwan Hamid, now Chief of Staff in charge of Social and Political Affairs, explained that the armed forces had not engineered the new rift in the PDI and that if the armed forces were present at the coming congress, this would be solely to ensure that the proceedings passed off peacefully. The announcement that dissident leaders of the central board were summoning a PDI congress led to a wave of pro-Megawati demonstrations. In Semarang about a hundred of her supporters camped in front of the local PDI office protesting against the backing given it by its local chairman. They were evicted by the police. More demonstrations by students were to follow in this city. In Medan two hundred Megawati supporters tried in vain to occupy the offices of the PDI's North Sumatran branch. A similar occurrence took place in Bandarlampung, where the offices were temporarily occupied by protesters, and in Ujungpandang. In Riau the chairman and the secretary of the provincial branch were sacked and replaced by two deputy chairmen who were Megawati sympathizers.

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In Java protests were staged in Yogyakarta and Surabaya. In the latter city, organizers afraid of provocations cancelled an initial plan to hold a 'Long March' to Jakarta to show their support for Megawati. In Jakarta, Megawati supporters flocked to the party's headquarters yelling slogans, carrying banners and giving speeches. At a given moment about 2,000 people were estimated to have assembled here. People donated money, as well as rice and other foodstuffs and drinks to supply a public kitchen. Moreover, at the Jakarta PDI headquarters about thirty demonstrators from West Java, singing the song 'Syukur' and shouting 'Allahu Akbar', cut their left thumbs and put a bloody finger-print on a white cloth to testify to their support for Megawati. A similar gesture was made by demonstrators elsewhere. On top of all this, it was announced that PDI members loyal to Megawati would stage a mass demonstration, a 'Long March', in Jakarta before the end of the month, before the dissidents held their congress. It was claimed that between 100,000 and 200,000 PDI members, most of them from Java, would participate. Only if the government withdrew its support from the congress would the event be cancelled. The announced demonstration took place on 19 June. Thousands of PDI members and sympathizers - a procession that was reported to be a kilometre long - marched from Medan Merdeka to Jl. Diponegoro. A deputation first went to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to complain about the discriminatory attitude displayed by the government towards those PDI board members who were against the holding of a congress. Finally, the Group of Sixteen, which had been given an opportunity to repent, was expelled on that date, but, in response to the 'very philosophical appeal by President Soeharto' to engage in mutual consultation, was given till 15th July to return to the fold of the legal PDI. The demonstrators at the PDI office in Jakarta were joined by a number of youths, headed by Budiman Sudjatmiko and Petrus Hariyanto, who styled themselves members of the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratie People's Party).9 They also staged protests in front of the office of the Co- ordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. The many showing their support for Megawati further included representatives of thirty Non- Government Organisations. Led by Muchtar Pakpahan, chairman of the (non-recognized) labour union SBSI (founded in 1992), they demonstrated in front of the Parliament building. Soerjadi, alluding to the display of emotions accompanying the protests - including the use of threatening phone calls and the beating up of one of Fatimah Achmad's associates, Yahya Theo, in front of the PDI office by a

9 The PRD had been founded as the Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik, chaired by Sugeng Bahagijo, in May 1994. After an internal split over its aims and after the leadership was taken over by Budiman Sudjatmiko, the following year the Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik Indonesia (PADI) was founded by Sugeng Bahagijo. The PRD was renamed Partai Rakyat Demokratik in April 1996.

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number of 'security guards' shouting 'traitor' at him - spoke out against the terrorist tactics employed by Megawati's supporters, asking his own supporters not to imitate them. Such behaviour would only end in bloodshed and damage the unity of the party. The growing support for Megawati and the way in which this was manifested led the committee instituted by Fatimah Achmad to préparé the congress to try and keep its meetings secret, choosing different venues each time. The congress eventually took place in the Pangkalan Mansyhur Dormitory in Medan from 20 to 24 June 1996.10 To prevent disorder, the provincial branch of East Java was not invited, while in the case of four provinces - Bali, East Kalimantan, the Western Lesser Sunda Islands, and the Moluccas - only one sub-provincial board participated. The congress was heavily guarded by police officers, soldiers, and the organizers' own security guards. Barbed wire was fitted to the walls of the complex. Meanwhile, on June 15th, Soerjadi had given his promise, at the request accordingly of about a hundred PDI leaders from Central Java and Yogyakarta claiming to represent all the sub-provincial branches in these two provinces, that he would accept nomination as leader of the party. When the formal request was made, Soerjadi's eyes had glistened with tears, as had those of some other persons present. Also on that day, East Javanese PDI leaders pledged the support of twenty-nine sub-provincial branches for Soerjadi. Soetjipto for his part stated that twenty-seven branches would be present at the planned mass demonstration in Jakarta. In keeping with the support given by the government, the congress opened with speeches by Yogie S. Memet and Feisal Tanjung. The former hailed the occasion as the best way to solve the party's problems. Feisal Tanjung, who just prior to the congress had censured Megawati's board for not heeding the government's appeals to end the conflict by mutual consultation, once again explicitly denied that it had been convened as a result of intervention by the armed forces. He seized upon the occasion to appeal for calm, impressing upon his audience that mobilization of the masses represented a form of popular participation dating from the colonial era. In this day and age, it could only give rise to new problems. Soerjadi, in his speech, criticized the government for the measures it had taken, which favoured Golkar, and for the curb it had put on the press. He accused Megawati of plotting to turn the PDI into an opposition party and trying to mobilize mass support, which might well breed radicalism. Unequivocally the main objective of the congress, which proceeded

10 In early June it was still being reported that Fatimah Achmad was having some difficulty finding a place to hold the conference, in view of demonstrations in favour of Megawati in Medan. An alternative venue, Ujungpandang, had to be ruled out because the PDI offices in that city were occupied by supporters of Megawati. One possible solution suggested was to stage the congress in Palangkaraya in Central Kalimantan, or in Manado or Bukittinggi. Batam was also mentioned. The one thing that was sure at that time was that the congress had to take place outside Java.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 411 without incidents and which was by now described in some newspapers as a government-sponsored one, was the formation of a new central board. It was pointed out that the appointment of Megawati's board had merely been the outcome of a national convention at which only the provincial boards had been represented; a congress such as the one staged in Medan had higher authority. As was to be expected, Soerjadi was elected by acclamation as general chairman and formatur of a new board, to replace Megawati Taufik Kiemas, as she was referred to by some newspapers at that time. His board was to be in office for two years, till 1998, when the next PDI ordinary congress was scheduled to take place. Buttu Reinhard Hutapea became general secretary." In his closing speech Yogie S. Memet congratulated Soerjadi on his election. Shortly afterwards he was to underline that the Soerjadi board was the only legal one, as it had been elected by the highest body within the PDI. Officers of the armed forces also made it clear that they recognized the Soerjadi board as the only legal PDI board. One of them, Syarwan Hamid, moreover revealed that the armed forces were ready to ensure the full implementation of the decisions taken by the congress. Soerjadi and Megawati now both regarded themselves as leader of the only lawful PDI, and both took steps accordingly, including preparations for the coming general elections. Megawati and her board continued to insist that they represented the legitimate PDI, and among other things urged regional boards to convene conferences to decide on PDI candidates. Various government officials indicated that such meetings should be prohibited, as only the Soerjadi board was recognized by the authorities. Soerjadi for his part started a campaign for the party's 'internal consolidation'. His plan of action gave a number of provinces, among them West and East Java, special attention. With regard to the problem of East Java it was decided at the Medan congress to freeze the two existing provincial boards and to form a special team, headed by Dimmy Haryanto, to work out a solution. Neither Latief, according to some the favourite of Basofi Soedirman, nor Soetjipto, but a third person would make the best head of this branch, Soerjadi commented. The team had to consult with the sub-provincial branches, but had some diffieulty selecting a safe venue for a meeting with representatives of these because of the opposition shown by Megawati supporters in the cities considered for this - Surabaya, Malang, and Kediri - where they were particularly strong. The meeting finally took place at an officers' mess in

1' The congress further reinstated Latief Pudjosakti as PDI member. Also elected to the rival board were I Gusti Ngurah Sara, as chairman, and Syafei Ali Gumay, as deputy genera] secretary, both of them members of Megawati's board. This was intended as a gesture of conciliation, Soerjadi explained, while Buttu Hutapea added that these two had never publicly opposed the Medan congress. They had not been consulted in advance, and both refused to accept their seat on the board.

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the Navy complex in Surabaya. A similar team was formed for West Java, where Djadjang Kurniadi had been forced to step down because of the charges of Gestapu/PKI involvement against him and the candidate put forward by Megawati had been rejected by the authorities. On the recommendation of this team, the Medan board in mid July appointed H. Idi Siswaya as chairman, who as it happened had been expelled by Megawati's candidate. Bali also posed a particular problem for the Soerjadi board. The chairman of the provincial branch here, Ida Bagus Putu Wesnawa, made no secret of his support for Megawati, and threatened to withdraw the PDI representatives from the local electoral bodies if the decisions of the Medan congress were forced upon them. In their respective campaigns, Soerjadi could clearly count on the government's support. This government recognition of the Soerjadi board had several consequences, one of which was a declaration by the government that the Medan board, and not that headed by Megawati, had the right to submit the PDI lists of candidates for the coming general elections. Even before the end of June the general secretary of the General Elections Foundation acknowledged the right of Soerjadi's board to replace those PDI representatives who still sided with Megawati in this and other electoral institutions. This policy was confirmed early the following month by Yogie S. Memet, who announced that the government would accept the provisional lists of candidates for the general elections submitted by the Soerjadi board. If the Megawati board should submit its own lists, these would be refused. Consequently, on July 9th the registration forms for candidates for the general election were handed out to the Soerjadi board. When questioned about his intentions by journalists, Soerjadi announced that he would invite the Megawati camp's co-operation in the selection of PDI candidates. This was consonant with the remark he had made a number of times previously that his board was the legal board, as was acknowledged by the government, and that he hoped that Megawati and her supporters would accept this and allow him to lead the PDI till 1998. As was to be expected, nothing came of this. The deputy chairman of the Megawati board, Haryanto Taslam, went to the General Election Institute to collect the registration forms. Voicing strong criticism of the fact that the documents had not been given to somebody from the PDI's secretariat at the Jl. Diponegoro, he announced political and legal steps against this. Outside, hundreds of Megawati supporters staged a demonstration against the handing out of the registration forms to the Soerjadi board.12

12 Members of the Megawati board stated in mid July that they had received completed lists of candidates from 100 of the 305 PDI sub-provincial branches.

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Continued demonstrations On 20 June 1996, the day on which the congress in Medan was opened, a demonstration staged in Jakarta by about 8,000 supporters of Megawati, who had marched from Jl. Diponegoro to Merdeka Square, ended in clashes with security forces, which blocked the way to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in front of Gambir Railway Station.13 About seventy demonstrators and fifty-five soldiers and members of the riot police were injured, some seriously. Reports that one PDI supporter had died were denied by the Military Commander of Jakarta, Sutiyoso. The violent turn the protest had taken led the authorities, including Sutiyoso, to comment that the demonstration had been manipulated by a third party. Feisal Tanjung, alluding to this, specifically mentioned 'certain NGOs', whose members, according to him, had incited the protesters and made themselves scarce as soon as emotions had reached a climax, leaving the confrontation with the security forces to the PDI supporters. Early the next month he again made a reference to members of NGOs who had set their face against the established order and tried to manipulate PDI protests in an attempt to overthrow the government.14 Megawati and six other members of her board, in an attempt to prevent new incidents, on June 21st had a meeting with Sutiyoso. On that occasion she vowed that she would try to stop her supporters from demonstrating in the city. Protests should be confined to the PDI head office. Sutiyoso, reciprocating this gesture, promised that demonstrations here would not be obstructed by the security forces - a statement construed by some as an acknowledgment of the legality of the Megawati board.15 By now one of the major issues was who should occupy the PDI offices. Soerjadi had made it clear from the moment he was chosen as general chairman that he was set on taking over the premises. The PDI headquarters belonged to his board, he said in a statement just after his election. Consequently PDI supporters loyal to Megawati in Jakarta braced themselves against an attack on the PDI headquarters by the Soerjadi camp, while the government stationed anti-riot troops near the PDI offices. Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people assembled in Jl Diponegoro to prevent a take-over, singing nationalist songs like 'Halo- halo Bandung' and 'Maju tak gentar', shouting slogans, dancing, and erecting a speakers' platform - a 'democratie stage'.16 Pro-Megawati

13 On the same day demonstrations also took place in Ujungpandang and Surabaya. 14 Syarwan Hamid in February 1996 had stated the New Left movement to pose a greater danger than communism. He claimed that the aim of anti-establishment people like this was to overthrow the government without having a conception of the state of their own. 15 According to one delegation member, Sutiyoso moreover had offered his services as mediator after discussing the matter with his superiors again. lfi The criticism in the speeches was directed not only at the government. On one occasion the PPP, whose office was next door to that of the PDI, was dubbed the Partai

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demonstrations continued in Salatiga, Bandung, Bogor, Semarang (where demonstrators called Soerjadi a political puppet and a clown), Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Medan, Bali, and Ujungpandang. In some of these places, such as Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Ujungpandang, other speakers' platforms were set up. The next few days the pro-Megawati demonstrations intensified. Protesters, many sporting headbands with the words 'Long Live Megawati' or 'I Love Megawati' written on them, on June 28th, for instance, demonstrated in their thousands in front of Parliament House, where they also tried to have a meeting with Soerjadi and Fatimah Achmad to ask them to account for their holding the Medan congress. In view of this, and to end the disruption to the Jakartan traffic as a result of these demonstrations, various military authorities in Jakarta ordered that the rallies and demonstrations should stop, threatening firm action against any criminal acts or violent behaviour that might disturb the public order. So on 28 June Sutiyoso stated that the demonstrations were becoming destructive, dangerous, and brutal, and were disrupting the peace and order and threatening national stability. He appealed to Megawati to put an end to the demonstrations in front of the PDI office. A similar view was expressed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Soeyono, who claimed that the demonstrations were being exploited by a third party. He asserted that the protests had become a threat to national stability and the economy and warned that tough action might be just around the corner. Megawati expressed her regrets about the obstruction the demonstrations were causing to the traffic in Jakarta, but together with her supporters seized the opportunity to point out that the authorities were equally culpable. There would have been no demonstrations if the authorities had not given permission for the Medan congress. With reference to the Gambir railway station incident she pointed out that it had been provoked by the security officers in charge. It was her view that all sides were at fault. Furthermore, one of the members of her board, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, underlined, it was the police and the security forces which were to blame for the traffic jams. Instead of escorting the demonstrators and seeing to it that all passed off in an orderly fashion, they had blocked the protesters' way. In spite of the government's warnings, demonstrations continued on a massive scale, also in other parts of the city. By mid July the collection of signatures on a large piece of white cloth from passers-by had become a popular form of protest. Many signatures were collected this way and the cloths reportedly reached lengths of from one to three kilometres. On other occasions red roses were distributed in

Persatuan Pamongpraja, Partai Persatuan Pemerintah, and Partai Persatuan Perempuan, and referred to as the Satgas (task force) of the government. This drew a protest from the PPP, which requested the government to prohibit the platform. Members of the Megawati board offered an apology.

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The take-over of the PDI headquarters At the end of July 1996 army spokesmen and members of the Soerjadi board were both equally censorious of the democratie platform and what was said there, and urged a speedy take-over of the PDI headquarters. Up to that point senior army officers had been ambivalent in their public statements about what assistance should be given to Soerjadi if he asked for help in his attempt to occupy the PDI offices (which he had actually done at the beginning of July). Careful emphasis was laid on the fact that he had the right to act, so that support from the armed forces might be forthcoming, providing all was done according to the rules. In the course of July rumours that Soerjadi was indeed planning to take action grew increasingly persistent. In the middle of that month general secretary Buttu R. Hutapea admitted that there were plans afoot to take over not only the premises in Jl. Diponegoro but also all regional offices still occupied by Megawati supporters. On top of that, Megawati disclosed on July 22nd that the armed forces had intended to occupy the PDI headquarters the previous day. In reaction to these rumours, Megawati supporters in cities like Surabaya vowed that they would send 'their troops' to Jakarta to defend the PDI office.19 By now the armed forces and the Soerjadi camp had both lost their patience. Buttu R. Hutapea stated on 20th July that, as what he chose to describe as a 'persuasive approach' had failed, less refined methods were in order. He disclosed that on July 16th three thousand Soerjadi followers had been ready to occupy the PDI office and had actually surrounded the building, but that for safety reasons the attack had been called off. Syarwan Hamid on July 24th urged the Soerjadi board to act quickly, and Buttu R. Hutapea reacted by appealing to the authorities to close down the speakers' platform. The latter asserted that the multitude of people who came to listen to the speeches here constituted the main obstacle to a take- over of the premises and pointed out that, since the police had already asked Megawati and her followers to close the platform, a follow-up to this by the authorities was a natural next step. The next day, July 25th, a clear signal was given by President Soeharto, speaking out against groups trying to exploit the internal PDI dispute for their own ends, when receiving Soerjadi's board - a gesture which it had been indicated earlier that month would not be forthcoming until after Soerjadi had succeeded in consolidating the party. Soeharto here referred to setan gundul (bald-headed demons) and warned against 'forces outside the New Order, including NGOs, riding the PDI', which claimed to be

19 At around the same time the general secretary of the PPP, Tosari Widjaja, indicated in an interview with Gatra (27-7-1996), concerning the nuisance caused the PPP by the demonstrations at the PDI office and the things said about it there, that his party could mobilize 2,000 people, only a small fraction of the task force of 15,000 which it had deployed in Jakarta the previous month to ensure a successful election campaign.

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the framework of an action styled 'a thousand flowers'. The speakers' platform, which Megawati insisted was in line with the agreement reached with Sutiyoso on June 21st, came under attack as well. So Feisal Tanjung asserted on June 22nd that some of the statements there and the texts on the banners displayed there tended towards the subversive and were unethical. The unmistakable aim of some of the speakers was the overthrow of the government. These people could no longer be regarded as Indonesian citizens, but were PKI, he stated, claiming that the platform was used by persons who were anti-government, anti- New Order, anti-armed forces and anti-dwifungsi (dual function) of the military, as well as against the law.17 He and Syarwan Hamid both hinted that the authorities would shortly put a stop to it. Sutiyoso as well, speaking of attempts to incite the masses against the government, stated that he could not preclude the possibility of action being taken to prevent a situation in which law and order were threatened in Jakarta, adding that many individuals as well as organizations had urged the authorities to take steps. Such a line of action was indeed supported by the leaders of the Golkar and PPP parliamentary groups, H.A. Moestahid Astari and H. Hamzah Haz respectively. The former, referring to speeches insulting the President, the government, and the armed forces, linked the platform with the activities of the Partai Rakyat Demokratik, the SMID and other NGOs bent on exploiting the rift in the PDI for their own ends.18 The Central Jakarta Chief of Police urged the Megawati board both by phone and by letter to close the platform. His appeals were ignored, among other reasons because Megawati wanted a request of this kind to be directed to her not as a private individual but as chairperson of the PDI. An additional reason was provided by an understanding allegedly reached with Sutiyoso on the same day as Feisal Tanjung's attack on the speeches, according to which the platform would be allowed to continue as long as exclusively only members of the PDI addressed the crowd. Sutiyoso for his part denied the existence of any such agreement and even disclaimed that he had promised toleration of the platform in exchange for an end to the street demonstrations, averring that any agreement to that effect had only been intended to apply for one day.

17 Speakers had asked Feisal Tanjung and President Soeharto among other things to account for some of the actions of the armed forces after September 1965, for instance their reaction to the demonstrations in Tanjung Priok in September 1984 and in Ujungpandang in April 1996, and launched attacks on various well-known corrup- tion cases. 18 Representatives of sixty-one social organizations supporting Golkar, with Chalid Mawardi of the Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI) as their spokesman, also asked for a ban on the platform during a meeting with Syarwan Hamid.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 417 striving for a full implementation of the constitution, the Pancasila, the Proclamation of Independence, human rights, and democratie freedoms. He specifically called for vigilance against those groups which had allied themselves in the MARI and were agitating for a reduction of prices, a campaign against corruption and collusion, and a change in the political system.20 He further drew attention to the similarities between the current situation and the atmosphere prevailing on the eve of PKI risings in the past, which had likewise been preceded by the SOBSI, BTI, and Lekra rallying support among labourers, farmers, and artists. In Soerjadi's eyes this assessment of the anti-government alliance by the President turned the matter of the occupancy of the PDI headquarters into something more than just a party affair. A few hours after Soeharto's message had become public, Megawati requested the people at the PDI office to close the people's platform. The audience was asked to go home, and the majority left, after shouting 'Merdeka' seventeen times, though not for long. The platform was reinstituted the next day. The attack came at 6 a.m. on 27 July, one and a half months after the Medan congress. Those who took part in it were youths wearing red headbands and red shirts with the text 'PDI Supporters of the IVth Congress at Medan' printed on them, who had been trained at Cibubur, in East Jakarta. Soerjadi later denied that non-PDI members had taken part in the assault, as was alleged on 27 July by Muchtar Pakpahan, for instance, in a statement that three hundred gangsters and labourers, who had been promised Rp. 15,000 each, had been especially recruited.21 Another story Soerjadi found himself having to deny was that soldiers dressed as PDI members had been among the assailants. There was fierce fighting. After about three hours, during which the scène of the affray was cordoned off by the police, the building was

20 The MARI had been formed on June 24th. lts members comprised the rep- resentatives of about thirty social organizations and NGOs, including the PRD and the Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI, whose general chairman is Sri Bintang Pamungkas). Pakpahan was one of its founders. Ridwan Saidi, a former Member of Parliament, was chairman of its executive board. At its inception, the MARI had formulated the following 'four demands of the people': (1) the dismissal of all those who sowed discord in the nation; (2) the revocation of the laws regulating the political structure; (3) a wage increase for labourers, civil servants, and soldiers; and (4) a reduction of prices and the eradication of collusion, corruption, and the establishment of monopolies. 21 Almost a year later, in May 1997, fifty-one people, all belonging to a foundation for the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents, filed a suit against Soerjadi, Fatimah Achmad, Buttu Hutapea, Lukman Mokoginta, and Sahala Sinaga (the latter two chair- man and secretary respectively of the PDI Jakarta branch) on the grounds that they had not yet received a sum of two hundred million rupiah in cash promised them for participating in the attack. They claimed in addition that Soerjadi's people had led them to believe when they assembled at the Jakarta police headquarters that they were being hired to reinforce the ranks of the defenders of the PDI headquarters.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 418 Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics taken.22 The occupation had been staged, Buttu R. Hutapea, the organizer of the assault23, explained to the PDI members who had participated in it, to promote the interests and unity of the party. The building (which was the property of the State Secretariat) was seriously damaged and was handed over to the police. A year later it still stood empty. The fighting at the PDI office triggered off serious rioting in Jakarta. For this the Megawati camp laid the blame on Soerjadi, as without his assault on the building in Jl. Diponegoro there would have been no disturbances, they explained in a press statement. Soerjadi defended himself by refuting any connection between the two events. Feisal Tanjung concurred with this view. The only thing the Soerjadi supporters had done, he said at a press conference shortly after the riots, had been to attack their own headquarters, and this was no problem. The event came to be known as Sabtu Kelabu, Grey Saturday. In Salemba an angry crowd set fire to twenty-two buildings, including the Gedung Persit Kartika Chandera Kirana, which was the property of the armed forces, an office of the Ministry of Agriculture, and a number of bank buildings. Subsequently, on July 29th, there were phone calls announcing that bombs had been planted in seven buildings, including that of the BRI bank in Jalan Sudirman and the Ministry of Information in Medan Merdeka Barat. Sutiyoso, condemning the riots, announced that those disturbing the public order would be shot on the spot. Although Sutiyoso furthermore stated in his initial reaction that nobody had died, the official death toll a few days later was established at two. Foreign sources, also quoted in the Indonesian press, were already speaking of 54 dead at that juncture. The number of people missing was reported to be about 150. Sutiyoso stated later, in mid September, that four people had died, refuting rumours that forty-seven people 'had been buried'. Of the sixty-four people who had been seriously injured, only nine were civilians, he claimed, and the remainder were members of the forces sent to restore order. Those arrested included the Megawati supporters who had defended the PDI office, 124 people in all. They were tried in November. The majority of them were sentenced to four months and three days of imprisonment (the sentence demanded by the public prosecutor had been four months and ten days) for disobeying a police order to leave the building while negotiations were going on during the pause in the attack. This meant that they were able to leave prison immediately. The others either received a

22 The fighting was interrupted for about an hour in which the Central Jakarta Chief of Police pleaded in vain with the Megawati supporters to leave and to let the police rather than the Soerjadi group occupy the premises. 23 In February 1997, when testifying as a witness in the case against Muchtar Pak- pahan, Buttu R. Hutapea denied having any detailed knowledge of the assault, the co- ordination of which he had left to Alex Widya Siregar. The participants' training at Cibubur had been intended solely as a means of preventing violence, he stated.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 419 lighter sentence or were acquitted. The action taken by the authorities after the riots was aimed at two principal targets: those who had spoken on the speakers' platform (there had been Soerjadi supporters in the audience) and the members of the PRD. The former included Muchtar Pakpahan, who was arrested on July 3Oth, and Permadi.24 Also questioned was Ridwan Saidi, who had in fact already been summonsed the day before the riots. Leading figures in the Megawati camp who were examined as witnesses included Megawati her- self and her sister Sukmawati Soekarnoputri, and Members of Parliament Aberson Marie Sihaloho, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, Sukowaluyo, Sophan Sophiaan, and Sabam Sirait.25 Soerjadi and Buttu Hutapea were also summonsed, as were prominent dissidents like Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Ali Sadikin, and Goenawan Moehamad (who had all three been presented with the Democratie Award by the PRD). The members of the PRD, many of them students, became the target of an intensive government campaign defaming them as members of a subversive organization. The PRD and its affiliated organizations - the STN or ST Nas (with branches in Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi), the SMID, the JKR, the SRI (aimed at the urban poor, with a branch in Surakarta and one in Jakarta), and the PPBI (with branches in some of the major industrial cities of Java and in Medan) - were equated with the PKI and its mass organizations. The Co-ordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Soesilo Soedarman, asserted that its structure was identical to that of the PKI prior to 1965. He compared the PPBI to the SOBSI, the SMID to the CGMI, the STN to the BTI, and the JKR to the Lekra.26 Their members, according to a statement from the SOKSI, were KGB. The chairman of SOKSI, Suhardiman, claimed the PRD's doctrine to be that of 'diafragma', that is 'dialectics, fragmentation- alism, and materialism'. According to Syarwan Hamid it had invariably been non-PDI groups, manipulated by the PRD, which had participated in the people's platform.

24 Pakpahan's name had already been mentioned together with those of Pramoedya Ananta Toer and George Aditjondro in October 1995 as persons having links with 'formless' organizations (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk, or OTB, which was the form the government believed communist agitation to have taken) bent on toppling the government and dividing the armed forces and alienating them from the people. Later Feisal Tanjung was to describe as naive those people who, rejecting the abbreviation, had asserted that it was in fact the armed forces which were OTB {Omong tanpa bukti, = 'speaking without evidence'). 25 Later Aberson M. Sihaloho's status was changed from that of a witness to that of a person suspected of insulting the President and defaming the armed forces and the People's Congress. Aberson admitted having spoken on the platform but said he had only addressed topics such as the sovereignty of the people and had never mentioned anyone by name. In July 1997 he was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, while the sentence demanded had been eighteen months. 26 Andi Arief, chairman of the SMID, in return pointed out the similarities in structure between the PRD and Golkar, which has its share of affiliated organizations.

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He likened the current atmosphere to that prevailing prior to the coup d'état of 1965. On another occasion he asserted that, with their PRD, the communists in Indonesia were a metamorphosis of the PKI. He pointed out in this connection that, in their attempts at undermining the government, they used propaganda, such as pleas ostensibly on behalf of human rights, labourers, and the ordinary people, which was calculated to arouse the sympathy of the public. A high police officer in Yogyakarta cited as an example the circumstance that their magazine, Gugah, had contained a draft constitution of a Republik Persatuan Indonesia and raised topics like the reduction of prices, the creation of a new party, and the election of a new president in each issue.27 And a colleague of his in Jakarta alleged that PRD members really were communist as the party's statutes did not mention the Pancasila (as all those of all recognized organizations were obliged to do), and that they were intent on transforming the armed forces into a people's army and always appealed to farmers and labourers as their main supporters. Members of the PRD and its organizations not only were accused of mass incitement in Jakarta, but also were held responsible for such disrup- tions to public life as mass strikes and labour demonstrations in Surabaya and other places in early July.28 The fact that, apart from demands like that for a minimum wage being voiced, views about political issues were aired at these demonstrations provided additional cause for the authorities to accuse the PRD and PPBI members of subversive intentions. Members of these organizations were behind labour demonstrations wherever these occurred, President Soeharto asserted to the Minister of Labour, Abdul Latief, on August 8th. In addition, much was made of a political manifesto published by the PRD on July 22nd, which claimed inter alia that the party was based on a people's social democracy, and of its symbol, which in- corporated a star and part of a cog-wheel (resembling that of the SOBSI).29 To explain the wide spectrum of the opposition, both Feisal Tanjung and Suhardiman spoke of a 'post-power syndrome' (as a result of the presence of a large number of frustrated retired officers). The former referred to the new middle class and radical groups, while the latter spoke of, among other things, the litfrus or elite frustrasi.30 Feisal Tanjung stated on another

27 The magazines Buruh Bergerak, Derap Perjuangan, and Workers Banner were published by the PPBI. 2S In April 1997 two PDR members, Dita Indahsari and Coen Husein Pontoh, were sentenced to six and four years' imprisonment respectively for their role in stirring up labour unrest in Surabaya. As their sentences were passed, both were wearing a red headband with the words 'Democracy or Death' printed on it. 29 It was further pointed out a number of times that meetings had taken place between Rewang, a former member of the PKI Central Committee, and members of the PRD and other suspected organizations in Surakarta. 30 In the weeks prior to the riots, various statements that were critical of the current situation had been issued. One of these was a Statement of Concern, issued on lst July, that was signed by such people as (retired) Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 421 occasion that the political atmosphere prior to July 27th had been partly influenced by criticism voiced by former army officers who, according to him, had acted out of keeping with the principles of discipline and loyalty. PRD chairman Budiman Sudjatmiko was arrested on August llth. Frightened by the order to shoot rioters on the spot, he and three others, without disclosing their true names, had turned for help to Ignatius Sandyawan Sumardi SJ, the founder and secretary of the Team Relawan Penolong Korban Insiden Jakarta 27 Juli 1996 (Team of Volunteers to Assist the Victims of the Jakarta Incident of 27 July 1996), which had been formed to cope with the aftermath of the violence and to help the many alleged victims of the assault on the PDI offices and whose members included Abdurrahman Wahid. Sandyawan Sumardi, who was well-known for his work among the street children and poor of Jakarta, had hidden the four in his brother's house, where they were later arrested. He asserted that he had not previously known them and that his decision to help them had been prompted by humanitarian motives. By that time eleven PRD leaders in all were under arrest. They were to be defended by the Tim Pembela Hukum dan Keadilan Indonesia (TPHKI), which had thirty-three members. To deal with the court cases against the PRD members, Attorney General Singgih, representing the government, mobilized about a hundred senior prosecutors and other legal experts. The charge to be brought against the PRD members was that of violation of the Subversion Act, but, as Singgih pointed out, the legal basis of their remand in custody was furnished by the Penal Code, which provided for a maximum period of custody of 120 days, and not a full year, as under the Subversion Act.31 The events furthermore gave rise to a scrutiny of NGOs and other social organizations distrusted by the government in Jakarta and the rest of the country.32 So Yogie S. Memet at the beginning of August announced measures against organizations which were not registered with his ministry,

(former Chief of Staff in charge of Social and Political Affairs of the Armed Forces), Matori Abdul Jalil (former general secretary of the PPP), Jacob Tobing (former chairman of Golkar), (retired) Lieutenant-General M. Kharis Suhud (a former parlia- mentary chairman and former Chief of Staff for Functional Affairs), Frans Seda (former Minister of Finance), and Abdurrahman Wahid. 31 The trials against the PRD leaders and Muchtar Pakpahan started in December. The charges made almost no reference to July 27. Pakpahan was tried for making subversive remarks and inciting hatred against the government, among other things in a book published by him in August 1995, Potret Negara Indonesia, and in a speech made in Lisbon in February 1996, and the PRD members for undermining the Pancasila ideology. In April 1997 Budiman Sudjatmiko was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment. 32 In Ujungpandang, for instance, the Aliansi Mahasiswa Pro Demokrasi was out- lawed. As late as the end of July, its members had demanded the resignation of Soerjadi. The AMPD had also taken part in the April 1996 demonstrations against a rise in mikrolet fares, which had resulted in massive student protests and riots, in which three students - according to some sources six - died when the security forces intervened.

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for instance.33 Military spokesmen on various occasions alleged that such groups, including student organizations, were communist-infiltrated. Syarwan Hamid even went so far as to propose that grants from abroad to what he described as problematic NGOs (Soesilo Soedarman later, in early November, stated that there were thirty-two such NGOs and other social organizations) be more carefully screened. Everything possible should be done to prevent such money being used for purposes inimical to the national interest. In various places offices of such organizations were searched and their members were interrogated and arrested, or went into hiding.34 Because of the rumours about large numbers of people killed in the attack on the PDI office and the subsequent riots, and about many people who were still missing, the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, or Komnas HAM, instituted its own inquiry, setting up a special fact-finding team.35 One of the main tasks of this team was to establish the exact number of people killed: four, as the authorities claimed, or forty-seven, perhaps even ninety, as other sources alleged; and to find out what had been the fate of those of whom nothing had been heard since July 27th. The committee also criticized the Attorney General for using the Subversion Act against the PRD members. This Act, it explained, was an obsolete piece of legislation which was of no relevance to the present circumstances. Moreover, it contained articles of which the wording was too vague or allowed too much room for interpretation, the general secretary of the committee, Baharuddin Lopa, asserted. Singgih disagreed, citing countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, which all had special legislation on subversion. Members of the fact-finding team visited hospitals and the crematorium at Cilincing, and talked to members of both the Soerjadi and the Megawati

33 In August the Ministry of Internal Affairs instructed the Persatuan Nasional Indonesia (founded in October 1995, with Ny Supeni as chairwoman), or PNI (Baru), and the Masyumi Baru (founded in November 1995, and with Ridwan Saidi as general secretary) to disband, as the two organizations had never been recognized by the ministry. Ny Supeni, in her reaction, stressed that after its foundation in October 1995, the PNI had registered and had fulfilled all the conditions for recognition as a social organization. NGOs, which were often foundations, were not required by law to register with the Ministry of Internal Affairs but with that of Justice. 34 Among the organizations in which PRD members had, in fact, been active, at the central as well as the regional level, was the Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (KIPP), or Independent Committee of Election Scrutineers. Founded in March 1996, this Committee's most prominent members included Permadi, Ali Sadikin, H. Princen, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, and Nurcholish Madjid. In August its chairman, Goenawan Moehamad, the former editor-in-chief of Tempo, asserted that the KIPP had no relations at all with the PRD. 35 The Komnas HAM was constituted by Presidential Decree in June 1993; it was funded by the State Secretariat. The Megawati PDI also formed a fact-finding team to find out what had happened to some of the people who had defended the party offices, of whom allegedly 84 were missing.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 423 factions. They further asked the Soerjadi board for the names of those who had participated in the attack on the PDI offices, but this information was refused. The committee's first findings were announced at the end of August. According to the information collected up to that moment, five people had died and 149 had been injured, while 74 persons were still unaccounted for. Syarwan Hamid, referring to the latter figure, observed that there were no special grounds for concern, as it sometimes happened that people failed to return home, perhaps because they had moved somewhere else. Secretary of State Moerdiono on behalf of President Soeharto asked the committee to provide detailed information, as there were fears that the large discrepancy between the number given by the committee and that stated by the authorities might give rise to misunderstandings among the public. He indicated that the government was shocked by the allegedly high number of people whose whereabouts were still unknown. In its reply the committee stressed that further investigation was needed to find out if the information it had been given was correct and, if so, to discover the fate of the persons concerned in an attempt to determine whether they really were 'lost'. There was no need to jump to the conclusion that they were dead. One possibility was that they were still in hiding. The committee made its final report public on October 12th. According to this, 5 people had died (one of whom - and this was a new fact - had been shot); 149 (including army and police personnel) had been injured; and of 23 the whereabouts were still unknown. On July 27th, the committee announced that a number of human rights had been violated by all of the parties involved, namely the rights to freedom of assembly and to freedom from fear and oppression, and the rights to the protection of life and property and to personal and material safety. It pointedly noted that what had happened on 27 July was inseparable from the conflict within the PDI, which had been set off by outside interference. It further alleged that the take-over of the PDI office had been accompanied by violence perpetrated by the Soerjadi board and its supporters, in conjunction with the security personnel. Finally, it concluded that the government had overreacted with respect to the PDI and, in view of its responsibilities as guardian of political stability and public safety, had overstepped the boundaries of its authority.36

The aftermath The riots were followed by what was described by some as a 'season of pledges'. Islamic leaders and Muslim organizations issued statements with particular assiduity and held mass meetings to evince their loyalty to the

36 After publication of the committee's report, it received a number of requests to institute an investigation into the Tanjung Priok affair to find out among other things if the official death figure in that incident (eighteen) was correct.

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government and their abhorrence of communism. One of them, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, on August 21 issued a statement on behalf of the principal Muslim organizations, including the Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, warning those desirous of getting a 'people's power movement' off the ground in Indonesia. It declared that the Islamic community was prepared to act in concert with the government and the armed forces against all radical movements encouraging riots and stirring up social unrest. It urged the Muslim community to be careful not to provide any opportunities for people with PKI leanings or PRD sympathies to manipulate them, and especially Muslim schoolchildren and students to guard against the hidden danger of communism. Earlier, on August 1 lth, a mass meeting of sixty social organizations had been held at the Lapangan Timur Senayan, which was attended by supporters of the PPP, PDI, and Golkar, among others. Similar events took place elsewhere. On September lst, for instance, a mass meeting attended by tens of thousands of people - according to some reports as many as 70,000 - was staged in Surabaya by the Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah of East Java, an organization that had been dormant since the aftermath of September 1965. Here a statement was read stressing that co-operation and mutual understanding between the armed forces and the Islamic community were a conditio sine qua non for the maintenance of national stability. The opportunity was seized also to draw attention to such problems as chronic corruption and collusion, and the gap between rich and poor. The pro-government demonstrations culminated in a mass prayer meeting, reportedly attended by 100,000 Muslims, in the Istiqlal mosque on 1 October, on the occasion of the commemoration of the September 1965 coup d'état. Megawati, as she had announced before the start of the Medan congress, started litigation against the people she held responsible for this congress. She and her supporters emphasized that, until such time as the court reached a decision, the Megawati board remained the only legal board. Six different writs issued by her and Alexander Litaay were served on: (1) Fatimah Achmad and the other members of the Group of Sixteen; (2) the organizers of the Medan Congress (Fatimah Achmad and Panangian Siregar); (3) Soerjadi and Buttu Hutapea, as general chairman and general secretary of the board formed at this congress; (4) the Minister of Internal Affairs; (5) the Commander of the Armed Forces; and (6) the Chief of Police. The latter three - Yogie S. Memet, Feisal Tanjung, and Dibyo Widodo - were subpoenaed for giving permission to hold the controversial congress and for afterwards giving their support to the Soerjadi board. A team of lawyers, the Tim Pembela Demokrasi Indonesia (TPDI), was formed under the leadership of R.O. Tambunan to préparé the charges, labelled 'lndonesian Democracy Accuses'. This team also had provincial branches to deal with the charges to be brought against those who had attended the Medan congress in the name of their party branch

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 425 but, it was claimed, without a mandate from it. Tambunan announced that this would affect all of the 306 sub-provincial branches as well.37 Soerjadi could count on the help of a 'Team of Defenders of the Upholders of the Constitution of the PDI Congress, the Soerjadi Group'. The court hearings began on lst August. They were immediately deferred for three weeks, however, because the president of the court was suffering from toothache. They were resumed on 22nd August. Then there was a new respite when all parties accepted the judge's proposal to try and reach a settlement out of court. This attempt failed. In October the judge ruled against the plaintiffs, but Megawati did not give up. Appeals were filed first with the appellate court and after that with the Supreme Court. On a more personal level, Megawati and her sister Sukmawati on 2lst August filed a libel suit against Syarwan Hamid. The point at issue here was a report in the riewspaper Surya of 13 August of a speech given by Syarwan Hamid at a meeting with the Majelis Ulama Indonesia in Jakarta the previous day. According to this he had stated that Megawati was planning to build up a following with a view to changing the Indonesian government, intimating that a certain group wanted Megawati to play a similar role to that fulfilled by Cory Aquino in the downfall of Marcos.38 The movement was to be spearheaded by the Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen (Movement of Marhaen People), led by Sukmawati.39 According to the same report Syarwan Hamid had also stated that there was a wish to assign the role played by Cardinal Sin in the Philippines to K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid. At the same time he had emphasized that any such scheme was bound to fail, as those who wanted to topple the government lacked a Fidel Ramos, and the Indonesian armed forces would never go over to the enemy. The sisters demanded Rp. 50 billion compensation, as well as a public apology in a number of national and regional newspapers. Syarwan Hamid defended himself by pointing out that what he had said at the meeting concerned had not been for public consumption and that in fact he had done no more than pass on what certain other people were saying. A settlement was reached at the end of September, with Syarwan Hamid admitting that the disputed statement was unfounded, while in return the demand for a public apology from him in the media was dropped. Megawati and Sukmawati Soekarnoputri afterwards issued a statement saying among other things that, now that Syarwan Hamid had admitted

37 Such cases against local PDI leaders who had attended the Medan congress - of which there were eventually about 120 in all - were initiated against members of the boards of South Sulawesi, East Jakarta, Palembang, Bali, and Semarang, for instance. 3X Surya stated in its edition of 16 August that the report had been withdrawn and should be considered as having never been written. 39 The Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen was one of the few organizations to be mentioned by name in revelations in early November that the government was contemplating action against problematic NGOs.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 426 Recent Developments in lndonesian Politics that he was in the wrong, there was no longer any need for the govern- ment or the armed forces to restrict their political rights or the political rights of the members of the PDI board headed by Megawati. While all this was going on, in August and September, Soerjadi took several steps to consolidate the position of his board and to diminish the political influence of his opponents. There was no deadline set for the implementation of the relevant measures, but Yogie S. Memet had indicated as early as the beginning of July that September 16th would be the most appropriate date on which to complete the consolidation of the PDI. This was the date on which the parties had to submit their lists of candidates for the forthcoming general election. In August Soerjadi replaced Royani Aminullah, Sukowaluyo Mintorahardjo, and Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno as deputy chairpersons of the group of PDI Members of Parliament with others. Aberson Marie Sihaloho, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Budget Committee, who was well known for his critical views, was transferred to another parliamentary committee, and the committee of advisors to the Members of Parliament, which included Megawati and Sabam Sirait (as well as Soerjadi himself) among its members, was dissolved.40 On top of all this Soerjadi asked for the suspension of three PDI members of the central general election boards - Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, Adipranoto, and Suparlan - who were indeed replaced by his supporters, among them Dimmy Haryanto, at the end of September.41 No Members of Parliament were recalled. Soerjadi, who gave the local leaders till 31 July to declare their support for him, also appointed new provincial and sub-provincial boards.42 The first was that of West Java, with H. Idi Siswaya as its chairman. The ceremony of installation in the Savoy Homan Hotel in Bandung, being held only a few days after the riots, was not well attended. A bomb warning had been received over the telephone, and the participants only put on their red PDI jackets after reaching the safety of the hotel. Pro-Soerjadi boards also took over in the Western Lesser Sunda Islands and Bali. The provincial board of East Java was placed in the charge of Dimmy Haryanto. At its inauguration on 5th September Soerjadi, who had had a hand in its formation, declared that this signalled the end of the problems of the composition of the provincial boards, as that of East Java was the last one needing to be put to rights. The ceremony was attended by Basofi Sudirman.

40 In reaction, the Megawati board sent a letter of protest to parliamentary chairman Wahono, objecting to this move and pointing out that the PDI's legal board had decided not to introducé any changes in the composition and structure of the group of MPs. 41 Similar measures were taken with respect to the election boards at the provincial and regency/city levels. 42 In August, Syafei Ali Gumay also stated himself to be prepared to take a seat on the Soerjadi board.

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Trouble reared its head again at the end of the year, however, when a number of sub-provincial branch leaders called for Dimmy Haryanto's replacement, as he spent more time in Jakarta than Surabaya and his absenteeism hampered the board's functioning. The dissidents spoke out at a regional PDI conference at the party's provincial office in Surabaya. This provoked such fierce protests from Megawati supporters that Soerjadi had to be conveyed in an anti-riot vehicle on his departure from the meeting. Then, in January, the Soerjadi board found itself obliged to appoint a special fact-finding team after strong opposition had begun to be shown to the new chairman of the West Javanese board, H. Idi Siswaya, and demands were made that he be forced to stand down. On September 16th the political parties presented their lists of candidates to the Indonesian Election Foundation. Both PDI camps submitted their own list, the Soerjadi board in the morning, along with those of the PPP and Golkar, the Megawati board in the afternoon. As Soerjadi had announced earlier, the list of his board comprised the names of people who had supported the Medan congress.43 The East Javanese list was headed by Dimmy Haryanto, followed by Latief Pudjosakti. That the latter would be put in a prominent place, reportedly to compensate him for agreeing to the proposed composition of the new East Javanese provincial board, had already been widely rumoured at the time of the constitution of that board.44 Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno and Alexander Litaay had chosen the afternoon for calling at the Foundation on behalf of the Megawati board in order to avoid a confrontation, they explained. Their list was rejected. Early the next month a suit, labelled 'The People's Sovereignty Accuses', was duly filed against the Election Foundation and Yogie S. Memet.45 On publication of the provisional lists of candidates in January 1997, after scrutiny of the candidates put forward by the parties and Golkar, another complaint was lodged and demonstrations were staged in Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Dilli. While the publication of these lists had been intended to give the public an opportunity to protest against the inclusion of any persons who it feit failed to meet the criteria for

43 Soerjadi stated the next month that the list did not include the names of any flamboyant personalities or public figures, as such persons were often only concerned about themselves and not about the people. 44 It had also been agreed in advance that people who had supported the Medan congress from the start would be given prominent places on the lists for the central and regional parliaments. Latief Pudjosakti died in Mecca in April 1997. 45 Yet another legal action was announced around the same time, when the authorities sealed off the temporary office the Megawati board had occupied in early September. Megawati's lawyers, challenging the formal reason given for this, namely that the office had been closed because it was located in a residential area, urged the government to take the same action with respect to the office of the Soerjadi board, which was accommodated in the house allocated to Soerjadi in virtue of his function as deputy parliamentary chairman. About three hundred demonstrators in December blockaded Soerjadi's house in protest.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access 428 Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics nomination for ideological or other reasons, Megawati's complaint was rejected because, it was stated, it involved an objection not to any individuals on the list but to the list itself. Soerjadi's manoeuvring for the consolidation of his board and appointment of new boards provoked some violent demonstrations. In the months following 27 July he was often confronted by pro-Megawati demonstrators on his trips throughout the country to meet local PDI leaders and install new branch boards. Yogie S. Memet, referring to this in November 1996, even feit impelled to say that he feit sorry for Soerjadi. At around the same time rumours were circulating that the police were preparing a court case against Soerjadi. This and the many protests against him personally suggested for a brief while that some PDI members wanted a new extraordinary party congress to be held for the purpose of electing a new general chairperson. Interest in the matter ebbed again after a few days, when the Jakarta Chief of Police announced that the police's questioning of Soerjadi had yielded no evidence on which to prosecute him for involvement in the disturbances of 27 July. In January 1997 the authorities once again made it plain that they supported the Soerjadi board and that Megawati and her supporters needed to put an official stop to the resistance they were putting up. The occasion was the PDI's twenty-fourth anniversary, celebrated on 10 January. Megawati had planned a celebration in Bali, but the request for permission for this was refused by the police. Meanwhile Soerjadi, unfettered by any such problems, was granted permission to hold a festive gathering. He did so at Tentena, in Poso, Central Sulawesi - hardly a PDI stronghold. It was attended by both Yogie S. Memet and Feisal Tanjung, uhderlining their support for him. Megawati commemorated the occasion with a festive dinner to break the fast at her home in Jakarta. Feisal Tanjung had announced beforehand that the authorities were prepared to take action against any such gathering. They did not actually do so, however. Instead, legal action was prepared against Megawati and her husband for holding a political meeting without informing the authorities of their intention - a charge one of her lawyers denied. They were summonsed by the police to appear as witnesses in early February. As the summons did not state the name of any accused, both refused to obey it. In retaliation, the police made the chairman of the committee which had organized the meeting, Haryanto Taslam, a 'provisional accused'. Consequently Megawati and her husband complied with the new summons. When it was Megawati's turn to appear, she was accompanied by sixty lawyers. She was cheered by a large crowd. As her summons had not been signed by the President, as was essential in the case of a Member of Parliament, but by State Secretary Moerdiono, her lawyers filed a suit against Soeharto, Moerdiono, Singgih, and the Chief of Police of South Jakarta. In early February 1997, just one day before the deadline for challenging

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:53:18PM via free access Recent Developments in Indonesian Politics 429 nominees on the provisional lists of candidates closed, members of the Central Advisory Council of Soerjadi's PDI lodged formal objections to eleven persons on the PDI list. These were people - with Soerjadi, Fatimah Achmad, and Dimmy Haryanto among them - who had already occupied seats in Parliament, or chaired a branch, for two consecutive terms and thus, according to the party rules that were passed in 1986, should not be nominated for a third time. Soerjadi, drawing a distinction between the right to be nominated and the right to occupy a seat, reacted by stating that he had already indicated before the Medan congress that his current term in Parliament would be his last and that he did not aspire to an extension. With reference to the other candidates in the same position he drew attention to the fact that the PDI members had urged that the relevant rules not be applied too strictly, but only on a selective basis. The many cases brought to court by Megawati and her board initially were unsuccessful. The first victory scored by her supporters came almost a year after Grey Saturday, in July 1997, after the so-called Group of 124 - the defenders of the PDI office who had been convicted for their refusal to evacuate the building - had initiated legal proceedings against Soerjadi and the Chief of Police of Central Jakarta. To the surprise of many, the Jakarta Central Court decided that this case came within its competence, as it regarded the incidents on 27 July 1996 as constituting a case for criminal justice. Then a few days later it became known that the High Court of Jakarta on 10 July had ruled that the Jakarta Central Court had been wrong in deciding in October 1996 that Megawati's case against Soerjadi and Fatimah Achmad was beyond its competence because it feit that the legality of the leadership of the PDI was an internal affair of that party, to be se.ttled at the party's congress of 1998. The High Court did agree, however, with the Jakarta Central Court's finding that it had no authority to deal with the case brought by Megawati against Yogie S. Memet, Feisal Tanjung, and Dibyo Widodo, as their actions were a matter of national security. Meanwhile it had also become clear that Soerjadi's PDI could count on little sympathy from the Indonesian voters. lts results in the elections of May 1997 were poor, with the PDI retaining only 11 of the 56 seats it had occupied in Parliament. Soerjadi, who had been nominated in Jakarta, had failed to win a seat at all. In early September 1997, agreement was finally reached between the Indonesian government and the National Basic Human Rights Committee about the toll of 27 July 1996. It was: 5 killed, 149 sixteen wounded, and 16 still missing. At the end of that month the PRD and affiliated organizations were formally banned.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED AMPD Aliansi Mahasiswa Pro Demokrasi = Pro-Democracy Student Alliance BTI Barisan Tani Indonesia = Indonesian Farmers' Front CGMI Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia = Concentration of the Indonesian Student Movement DPP Dewan Pimpinan Pusat = Central Board Gestapu/PKI Gerakan September Tigapuluh / Partai Komunis Indonesia = Thirtieth September Movement / Indonesian Communist Party GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia = Indonesian National Student Movement IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia = League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence JKR Jaringan Kesenian Rakyat = People's Art Network KGB Komunis Gaya Baru = New-Style Communists KIPP Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu = Independent Committee of Election Scrutineers Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia = National Basic Human Rights Committee Lekra Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakjat = People's Culture League MARI Majelis Rakyat Indonesia = Indonesian People's Council PADI Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik Indonesia = Indonesian Democratie People's Union Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia = Indonesian Protestant Party PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia = Indonesian Democratie Party Pemilu Pemilihan Umum = general election PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia = Indonesian Communist Party PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia = Indonesian National Party Persatuan Nasional Indonesia = Indonesian National Union PPBI Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia = Centre for the Struggle of Indonesian Workers PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan = Unity and Development Party PRD Partai Rakyat Demokratik = Democratie People's Party PUDI Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia = Indonesian Democracy ^Union Party SBSI Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia = Indonesian Prosperous Workers' Union SMID Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi = Indonesian Student Solidarity with Democracy SOBSI Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia = All-Indonesia Federation of Labour Organizations SOKSI Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia = All-Indonesia Federation of Workers' Organizations SRI Serikat Rakyat Indonesia = Indonesian People's Union STN (ST Nas) Serikat Tani Nasional = National Farmers' Union TPDI Tim Pembela Demokrasi Indonesia = Team of Defenders of Indonesian Democracy TPHKI Tim Pembela Hukum dan Keadilan Indonesia = Team of Defenders of Law and Justice in Indonesia.

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