316 BOOK REVIEWS percent annual interest to private shareholders of joint state-private enterprises that were taken from them during the Socialist Transformation of 1955-1956)" (pp. 325-6, # 1925). Without the little background provided in the parentheses, the user might not understand what exactly is a "buying-out policy". In addition to this, the dictionary also provides dates of when certain terms are popularly used (as in the above example) and, if an entry has more than one meaning, depending especially on what time period it is found and used, the dictionary will also indicate this. Granted that some basic and elementary knowledge of the Chinese language might be necessary, The Chinese-English Dictionary of Contemporary Usage can be easily used by any beginner in the language. Because of the richness and variety of entries, some might find it more than just a "supplement". Furthermore, although the dic- tionary focuses mainly on terms and phrases used in Chinese Communist documents and other non-fiction writings, the fiction reader might still find it of some assistance at time because quite a few Chinese colloquial and idiomatic expressions can be found in the book. The only one possible disadvantage to this work is that the entries are mostly contemporary, so naturally any newly-coined phrase or terminology that may occur after its compilation will not be included. Hence, it might not be as up-to-date in another five years or even earlier. However, this minor point does not detract from its excellence as an invaluable source of reference for the time serious present period. Any ' student or scholar of contemporary Chinese should have it in his library. University of Washington LORRAINEDONG Seattle, U.S.A.

Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, Diplomats in Crisis: United States- Chinese-Japanese Relations 1919-1941. Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-Clio, 1974. xxi( 346 pp. Maps, appendixes, notes and index. Cloth, $15; paper $4.95.

The focus of this excellent volume of thirteen essays centers on the diplomats of China, Japan and the United States who handles Asian relations in the interwar period. In the American section, the weakest area of the book, the studies range from Edward Bennett's well-written defense of Joseph C. Grew (as a man who advised all courses of action and was therefore always "right") to Gary Ross' convincing argu- ment that Ambassador W. Cameron Forbes had no effect on policy formation and is, essentially, not worthy of study. In between are Richard Burn's standard defense of Stanley K. Hornbeck as a vaccilator between pragmatism in the Far Eastern crisis and idealism in international law. Herbert Wood demonstrates how Nelson T. Johnson moved from isolationism to interventionism against Japan in the 1930's to protect American rights in Asia, not Chinese independence. Wood argues, just as Nelson Buhite as earlier, that Johnson was ready to scrap the co-operative stance of the Washington Conference Treaties in 1927 and replace them with an independent American stand on the unequeal treaties. And finally, there is Thomas Buckley's disappointing essay on John V. A. MacMurray which simplistically portrays Mac- Murray as some sort of throwback to the interventionist days of the Boxer Rebellion. Be concentrating mostly on MacMurray's career as Minister to China after 1925, Buckley misses the important developmental years of MacMurray's thought on Asia from 1913 onward. Buckley portrays the diplomat as simply wanting to use force against the Chinese to maintain American treaty rights when, in fact, throughout 317

MacMurray's career he never felt it in America's interests to respond in a military manner in the Far East. While it is obvious that MacMurray was no supporter of early Chinese nationalism (which he viewed as destructive to the whole co-operative Washington Conference Treaty system he had helped create) he realized America's non-interventionist tradition would never permit implementation of large scale military operations in China. In this reviewer's opinion, one of the best essays in this volume is by Han-shen Lin concerning Chou Fo-hai, a "diplomat without portfolio" in the "puppet" government of Wang Ching-wei. Lin begins his essay with some very penetrating questions and concludes with enlightening answers on this often ignored government. In less than one page Lin skillfully outlines Chou's early career from a Casanovian student, to CCP founder, to execution cell, to high level KMT office-outdoing an Andr6 Malraux novel. In an admirable defense of Chou's peace efforts towards the Japanese, Lin demonstrates through multi-lingual research the need for a closer look at the history of the "other" KMT. Lin's ultimate argument comes down to the point that Chou's cunning techniques did the best job possible under an occupation situation to ameliorate the difficult conditions of the majority of the Chinese people. Paul Heyer's thesis is rather simple-Hu Shih was most noted as an intellectual and spokesman for American liberalism in the mold of his mentor John Dewey. Hu Shih was therefore able to use this identification with the West as Ambassador to the United States from 1938-1942 to great advantage. Heyer's argument, however, that Hu Shih was personally responsible for convincing F.D.R. to take a hard line against the Japanese flys in the face of a great deal of contrary evidence and Heyer's own argu- ment earlier in the essay that Hu Shih had little effect on policy. The most disappointing essay in the China section in Pao-chin Chu's on V. K. Wellington Koo. While Dr. Koo's long diplomatic career should yield a wealth of information on the inner workings of Republican China, Professor Chu has vastly overstated Koo's influence on every event from the Versailles settlement to the Man- churian Incident. By far the best section in this study is the one on Japan. Two essays stand out especially-Sidney Brown's on Shidehara Kijuro and Hillary Conroy's on Nomura Kichissburo. In an amazingly short essay for such a complex figure, Brown has drawn a realistic portrait of one of Japan's most influential diplomats. Brown notes that Japan's most famous "liberal" Foreign Minister was just as interested as the military in Japanese markets, resources and security but preferred to replace the older "force" diplomacy with one based on friendship towards China and structural around free trade im- perialism. With due appreciation for the work of Akira Iriye, Brown concludes that ' Shidehara's policy failed largely because not even the Foreign Minister was willing to relinquish Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria. Brown then notes that due to a number of factors Shidehara's policy in handling the Manchurian Incident was doomed to failure. One of the most provocative essays in this book is Hillary Conroy's study of Nomura. He notes that while all evidence indicated that Admiral Nomura's eleventh hour negotiations with the Americans failed because the Ambassador was a "bad com- municator" of diplomatic positions-Nomura may, in fact, have purposely been doing this in an attempt to avert war. If any villain emerges from the Japanese section of this book, it is Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke who, Conroy claims, was dumped from the Konoye cabinet as a result of Nomura's strategy.