Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique French Journal of British Studies

XX-3 | 2015 The 2015 General Election in the Les élections législatives de 2015 au Royaume-Uni

David Fée et Romain Garbaye (dir.)

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/474 DOI : 10.4000/rfcb.474 ISSN : 2429-4373

Éditeur CRECIB - Centre de recherche et d'études en civilisation britannique

Référence électronique David Fée et Romain Garbaye (dir.), Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-3 | 2015, « The 2015 General Election in the United Kingdom » [En ligne], mis en ligne le 16 octobre 2015, consulté le 05 mars 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/474 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.474

Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 5 mars 2020.

Revue française de civilisation britannique est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modifcation 4.0 International. 1

SOMMAIRE

Avant-Propos David Fée et Romain Garbaye

New Context, Old Campaign

The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory? Tim Bale et Paul Webb

“The Wall was Too High”: the Four Predicaments of Mr Miliband Eric Shaw

La fabrique des députés ou l'art de sélectionner les candidats travaillistes et conservateurs aux élections législatives de 2015 Agnès Alexandre-Collier et Emmanuelle Avril

Trying to Turn up the Turnout: Youth Wings and the Youth Vote in the 2015 General Election Sarah Pickard

The Stage-Management of the leaders’ personal lives in the 2015 General Election Sabine Michelon

Key debates in the 2015 campaign

Fiscal Policy, Public Spending and the 2015 General Election Nicholas Sowels

Monetary Policy in the Conservatives’ 2015 General Election Campaign Nathalie Champroux

The Cost of Broken Promises or How Policy Failure Can Help Win Elections - Immigration and the 2015 UK General Election James

The House is on Fire: Housing and the 2015 General Election David Fée

The NHS at the Heart of the Election Campaign. Louise Dalingwater

Little Britain? The Debate on Britain’s Foreign and Defence Policy Thibaud Harrois

Challenges and Challengers: Is the Mould Breaking?

The Elephant in the Room: Europe in the 2015 British General Election Pauline Schnapper

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Les élections législatives de 2015 en Écosse : résurgence et reconfiguration des enjeux constitutionnels Edwige Camp-Pietrain

The 2015 British General Election: a Convergence in Scottish Voting Behaviour? Nathalie Duclos

Northern Ireland: as an Electoral Issue in the 2015 UK General Election Valérie Peyronel

The : ‘Green Surge’ or Work in ? Brendan Prendiville

UKIP's Performance in the 2015 General Election: A Series of Unfulfilled Expectations Karine Tournier-Sol

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Avant-Propos Foreword

David Fée et Romain Garbaye

1 Les élections législatives de 2015 ont produit des résultats remarquables. Contre toute attente, les conservateurs ont remporté une nette victoire et les travaillistes ont enregistré une perte notable de sièges et, dans une moindre mesure, de voix. Ces résultats s’expliquent numériquement par la victoire écrasante du SNP en Ecosse qui, en remportant la quasi-totalité des sièges, a privé le parti travailliste des sièges cruciaux qui lui échoyaient traditionnellement depuis des décennies; en Angleterre, le parti conservateur est parvenu à infliger une défaite sévère aux travaillistes et à gagner une majorité absolue de sièges, se dispensant ainsi de former une coalition avec les libéraux-démocrates comme en 2010. Ce triomphe pourrait augurer d’une nouvelle ère, marquée par la domination durable par les conservateurs de la scène politique britannique, et par les divisions internes d’un parti travailliste absorbé par son entreprise de redéfinition.

2 Tout autant que les résultats, ce qui rend cette élection remarquable est son caractère inattendu, non seulement pour les candidats eux-mêmes mais aussi pour les médias et spécialistes des élections. Ces résultats ont en effet pris tous les observateurs de court, tel le Guardian qui la veille du scrutin titrait encore ‘It couldn’t be closer’ 1. L’issue la plus fréquemment envisagée consistait en un Parlement sans majorité () et une nouvelle coalition entre un premier parti en termes de sièges et un allié de circonstance. Bien sûr, le caractère surprenant des résultats peut s’expliquer par une erreur de la part des sondeurs, comme en 1992, et la difficulté inhérente à la prévision des résultats dans un pays possédant un système électoral comme le First Past the Post. Ces résultats ont d’ailleurs conduit à une enquête par le British Polling Council à la suite du scrutin. 3 Néanmoins, faire l’impasse sur la campagne électorale elle-même serait une erreur, car celle-ci est susceptible d’expliquer une partie de ces résultats et plus encore l’écart entre prévisions et issue du scrutin. C’est l’objet de ce numéro de la Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique.

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4 L’une des questions que soulève cette élection est celle du caractère novateur (ou non) de la campagne orchestrée par les deux grands partis politiques. Rétrospectivement, il apparaît que les conservateurs l’ont emporté grâce à une campagne soigneusement pensée et organisée qui leur a assuré la maîtrise de la communication électorale. 5 L’article de Tim Bale revient ainsi sur l’ampleur de la victoire électorale et en analyse les causes. Il avance qu’elle est due à une combinaison de facteurs à court et à long termes, en particulier les efforts couronnés de succès de pour transformer l’image du parti et rendre à celui-ci sa réputation de compétence économique. Cependant, les conservateurs ont su aussi monter une campagne qui, bien que terne, s’est révélée très efficace, renforçant les stéréotypes attachés aux travaillistes (largesse en matière d’aides sociales) et convainquant les électeurs de la responsabilité de ceux-ci dans la crise bancaire de 2008. Ils ont également su jouer avec les peurs des électeurs vis-à-vis d’une possible coalition de circonstance entre Labour et le SNP, et cibler leurs efforts sur les sièges où ils étaient au coude à coude avec les travaillistes. 6 Eric Shaw dans son analyse de la défaite des travaillistes avance pour sa part l’idée selon laquelle les partis politiques sont capables de façonner la compréhension par les électeurs des changements sociétaux uniquement s’ils parviennent à imposer un « récit » plausible de ces changements. Il affirme que d’emblée, le parti travailliste n’a jamais été capable de projeter une image convaincante et de contrer la campagne négative des conservateurs sur quatre points. Premièrement, n’est jamais parvenu à s’afficher comme un leader rassurant et convaincant, qualités essentielles dans une élection moderne, à la différence de David Cameron qui a su projeter une image de fermeté. Deuxièmement, ils sont demeurés prisonniers du discours des conservateurs qui leur attribuait la responsabilité de la crise économique ; troisièmement, ils n’ont pas su se montrer crédibles sur le sujet de l’immigration et ont ainsi perdu des voix au profit de UKIP ; enfin, ils ont toujours semblé irrésolus en matière de lutte contre la fraude aux allocations. 7 Agnès Alexandre-Collier et Emmanuelle Avril se concentrent sur la procédure de sélection des candidats parlementaires, procédure cruciale dans un pays où le Parlement concentre davantage de pouvoir qu’ailleurs. Les enjeux expliquent les tensions entre la base et la direction dans les deux partis. Les coulisses de la procédure sont analysées pour tenter d’évaluer si celle-ci a évolué et si en conséquence les deux partis sont plus représentatifs de la société britannique dans son ensemble. L’analyse met en lumière des tendances sous-jacentes communes, les deux grands-partis s’efforçant de combiner meilleure représentativité et contrôle par le centre de la procédure et de son issue. Le risque, montrent-elles, est que les nouveaux parlementaires soient plus malléables et perdent leur indépendance. 8 Sarah Pickard met quant à elle l’accent sur un aspect trop souvent négligé des élections et des campagnes, malgré son importance pour l’évolution de la démocratie dans la société britannique : la question de la participation des jeunes. L’étude du vote de la jeunesse en 2015 montre que cette fois encore, le taux de participation des 18-24 ans a été inférieur à celui des autres tranches d’âge, et que, de surcroît, les jeunes ont tendance à être considérés par les grands médias comme une population peu intéressée par la politique. Pourtant, Sarah Pickard montre que la participation des jeunes était en hausse, et que leur adhésion aux organisations de jeunesse des partis politiques a aussi progressé. Malgré tout, l’intérêt que leur portent les institutions politiques reste limité.

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Sur la base de son analyse Sarah Pickard conclut en proposant une série de réformes visant à mieux inclure les jeunes dans le jeu politique « traditionnel » (c’est-à-dire la participation électorale et le militantisme au sein des partis), autour d’idées telle que l’abaissement de l’âge du droit de vote à 16 ans, la possibilité de voter en ligne, une meilleure utilisation des réseaux sociaux et une plus grande sensibilité des décideurs politiques aux enjeux de politique publique qui touchent particulièrement la jeunesse. 9 Sabine Michelon analyse la construction de l’image personnelle des leaders des partis politiques dans la campagne, en se penchant essentiellement leur image télévisuelle. S’agissant des « Premier-Ministrables », David Cameron et Ed Miliband, le rôle de père de famille est devenu un argument de communication politique, à tel point que l’on peut parler d’instrumentalisation de leur vie personnelle, ce qui comprend aussi l’intérêt des médias pour leurs épouses. Ces questions prennent un relief particulièrement net dans le contexte d’un système politique particulièrement marqué par la personnalisation de la compétition électorale. Celle-ci a encore été renforcée depuis la campagne législative précédente en 2010, qui avait vu l’introduction des débats télévisuels entre les leaders des grands partis. Cependant, une campagne électorale ne saurait se concevoir sans enjeux et débats électoraux. Ceux-ci peuvent se diviser en deux domaines, économique d’un côté, social de l’autre. 10 S’agissant du premier, Nicholas Sowels examine le bilan de la Coalition en matière de politique fiscal et de dépenses publiques. Il souligne le hiatus entre le discours de la Coalition et son pragmatisme face à une situation économique difficile, ainsi que le rôle joué dans la campagne par l’héritage économique légué par le parti travailliste et l’incapacité de celui-ci à contrer la campagne négative des conservateurs. Il poursuit par une analyse contrastée des propositions économiques des divers partis en 2015, et en particulier des positions des partis vis-à-vis des mesures d’austérité. La dernière partie de l’article est consacrée à un paradoxe : bien que désormais libres de mettre en œuvre pleinement leurs engagements économiques, conçus à l’origine comme un simple préambule à de futures négociations avec de possibles partenaires de coalition, les conservateurs n’ont peut-être pas élaboré les mesures susceptibles de résoudre les problèmes sous-jacents à l’économie britannique. 11 Toujours dans le domaine de l’économie, Nathalie Champroux explique que les conservateurs ont su exploiter leurs atouts et détourner l’attention du public de certains aspects les moins positifs de leurs politiques. Alors qu’ils ont mis en avant dans leur stratégie électorale leurs succès économiques durant les cinq ans de gouvernement de coalition en matière de croissance, emploi et déficit budgétaire, ils ont pris soin de ne pas mentionner la question de la politique monétaire alors qu’elle avait été au centre de leur programme de 2010. 12 Se concentrant sur le thème de l’immigration, deuxième question la plus importante durant la campagne, James Hampshire montre comment les conservateurs ont transformé un handicap en atout. Alors que l’immigration aurait dû leur coûter des sièges en raison de leur mauvais bilan car s'étant montrés incapables de réduire le solde migratoire comme ils s’y étaient engagés en 2010, il n’en a rien été. Loin de tenter de cacher cet échec, les conservateurs se sont en réalité contentés de fixer le même objectif en 2015. Selon la thèse audacieuse de l’auteur, leurs difficultés à maîtriser les flux migratoires leur auraient été en réalité bénéfiques : elles auraient contribué à rendre le discours travailliste sur l’immigration encore moins convaincant, auraient

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maintenu les électeurs conservateurs dans le giron de leur parti mais en revanche auraient encouragé un certain nombre d’électeurs travaillistes à se tourner vers UKIP. 13 Dans le domaine social, David Fée s’intéresse à la question du logement qui, à la différence des élections précédentes et pour la première fois depuis les années 1980, s’est imposée parmi les questions incontournables de ces élections. Associant une analyse des cinq années de gouvernement de coalition et de la campagne, il distingue au premier rang des causes de ce retournement l’aggravation de la situation immobilière et la difficulté pour un pourcentage croissant de la population de se loger. A ceci sont venu s’ajouter des choix politiques perçus comme injustes et susceptibles de renforcer les inégalités qui ont eux-mêmes alimenté l’essor d’un mouvement militant dénonçant les politiques du gouvernement de coalition. Enfin, les engagements pris durant la campagne par les deux grands partis ont été perçus comme plus clivants et ont attiré davantage l’attention des médias. L’article se conclut sur la question de la traduction (ou non) de cet intérêt pour la question du logement en voix. 14 Comme à chaque élection, le NHS est demeuré un thème électoral incontournable. C’est pourquoi Louise Dalingwater se penche sur la place dévolue au système de santé dans la campagne. Institution de premier plan en Grande-Bretagne, le National Health Service (NHS) a été l’une des priorités des partis politiques. Face à un constat unanime de crise budgétaire, tous les partis se sont accordés sur le besoin de « sauver » le NHS, et sur la plupart des solutions envisagées, comme une augmentation des ressources financières ou la réduction des listes d’attentes. Cependant, des divergences très significatives sont apparues sur l’ampleur exacte des financements nécessaires pour « sauver » le NHS ou sur le nombre de recrutements nécessaires. Surtout, les positions des principaux partis sont apparues très contrastées sur la question clé du rôle croissant du secteur privé dans le système de santé, les conservateurs y étant favorables, contrairement aux travaillistes et aux libéraux-démocrates. 15 Thibaud Harrois s’intéresse à la place occupée par la politique étrangère dans les débats, place plus importante en 2015 en raison de la conjonction de plusieurs facteurs, dont la nouvelle convention qui veut que le Parlement soit consulté avant toute intervention des forces armées à l’étranger. Par ailleurs, le chef de l’opposition, Ed Miliband, ne s’est pas privé de souligner l’écart entre les ambitions affichées des conservateurs et les moyens financiers octroyés à l’armée ainsi que l’isolationnisme croissant des conservateurs vis-à-vis de l’Europe. Quant à ceux-ci, ils n’ont pas manqué de souligner le risque que la possibilité d’une coalition SNP-labour faisait peser sur la force de dissuasion nucléaire (Trident). L’article souligne combien les contraintes budgétaires annoncées par les conservateurs rendent la politique étrangère peu lisible en dépit des engagements pris par ces derniers vis-à-vis de leurs alliés. 16 Si les questions sociales et économiques et de politique étrangère ont dominé la campagne, les questions constitutionnelles n’en ont pas été absentes pour autant. 17 Comme l’article de Pauline Schnapper consacré à l’Europe le révèle, les conservateurs ont choisi leurs batailles avec soin. Bien que le thème de l’Europe n’ait jamais été très présent dans les élections législatives précédentes, 2015 augurait d’un changement. En effet, l’engagement de David Cameron, seul parmi tous les leaders, d’organiser un référendum avant 2017 sur la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans l’Europe aurait dû contribuer à accroître l’importance de la question. Mais il n’en fut rien. Ni les conservateurs ni leurs opposants n’ont en effet choisi de mettre en avant cette question

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durant la campagne, à l’exception notable de UKIP et du SNP, chacun pour des motifs très différents. 18 La victoire écrasante du SNP en Ecosse, moins d’un an après le référendum écossais, justifiait amplement deux articles. 19 Edwige Camp revient sur la dimension écossaise de l’élection. Elle nous rappelle que bien avant les élections, et à la suite du référendum, tous les principaux partis s’étaient entendus sur un transfert de pouvoir vers Holyrood, mais que ce consensus s’était effondré peu à peu en raison de la question du vote des députés anglais (EVEL). En dépit du succès du non au référendum, le paradoxe, explique Edwige Camp, est que les questions constitutionnelles ont dominé la campagne en raison de la possibilité d’une coalition Labour-SNP ainsi que du refus de N. Sturgeon d’exclure un autre référendum sur l’indépendance. L’auteure se penche sur les causes de la victoire éclatante du SNP ainsi que sur les futurs sujets de discorde entre les conservateurs et le SNP (l’Europe, la commission Smith…) 20 Nathalie Duclos prolonge cette analyse de l’Ecosse sous l’angle du comportement électoral des Ecossais. Elle démontre que les élections ont été exceptionnelles en Ecosse non pas tant en raison des résultats du SNP mais surtout par la convergence en matière de vote au Parlement de Westminster et au parlement écossais et ce pour la première fois. L’article met en regard le système de parti dominant caractérisant l’Ecosse avant 2015 pour les élections nationales avec le système pluraliste né de la dévolution. S’appuyant sur une analyse de certains sièges qui illustrent le profond changement apparu en 2015, elle formule des hypothèses pour expliquer cette évolution (référendum, faible autonomie des travaillistes écossais), et s’interroge sur l’évolution de l’Ecosse vers un système à parti unique. 21 La question de la dévolution constitue également le sujet de l’article de Valérie Peyronel mais appliqué cette fois à l’Irlande du Nord. La victoire des Unionistes aux élections est venue rappeler les profondes divergences qui demeurent entre les partis irlandais quant au fonctionnement des institutions dévolues. Néanmoins, l’article montre que le principe même de gouvernement de dévolution fait désormais l’objet d’un consensus et que ce sont des questions de politiques publiques plus traditionnelles telles que la protection sociale qui sont devenues sources de désaccords et de clivages politiques, contribuant ainsi à brouiller les lignes entre Unionistes et Nationalistes. 22 Enfin ce numéro revient sur les nouveaux opposants aux partis traditionnels dans un système politique qui n’est plus désormais un système de bi-partisme. 23 Les élections ont en effet été marquées par un regain de popularité pour les Verts. Brendan Prendiville revient sur la couverture médiatique accordée aux Verts en 2015, se demandant si elle augure d’une nouvelle ère pour eux et sur les raisons de cette nouvelle popularité. L’article dessine les formes qu’ont prises cette popularité et cette visibilité nouvelles, tout en s’intéressant aux réactions qu’elles ont suscitées dans les autres partis, en particulier les tentatives des travaillistes pour dissuader les électeurs de voter pour les Verts. Enfin, B. Prendiville évalue si cet essor s’est traduit en voix et pointe les raisons qui permettent aux Verts de se montrer optimistes. 24 Le dernier article est consacré au grand défi posé aux partis traditionnels par UKIP. Karine Tournier-Sol retrace la campagne et les résultats. 2014 avait été en effet une excellente année pour UKIP et le parti fondait tous ses espoirs dans un parlement sans majorité. Souvent décrit comme le futur « faiseur de roi », UKIP pouvait s’attendre à

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tirer profit de sa stratégie de professionnalisation. Contre toute attente, les résultats des élections furent décevants pour UKIP et l’article avance des raisons pouvant expliquer ce paradoxe. Au nombre de celles-ci figurent une campagne terne émaillée de scandales ainsi qu’un message confus sur l’immigration qui contribua à son déclin dans les intentions de vote. Bien que décevantes, comme l’explique Karine Tournier-Sol, les élections de 2015 n’en constituent pas moins un tournant pour UKIP, désormais perçu comme l’alternative aux deux grands partis en Angleterre en lieu et place des libéraux- démocrates.

NOTES

1. Tom CLARKE & Patrick WINTOUR, « It couldn’t be closer », , 7 May 2015.

RÉSUMÉS

The 2005 general election produced remarkable results that surprised many, and in more ways than one it seems to have ushered in a new era in British politics. Against all odds, the Conservatives scored an unexpectedly clear-cut victory which was matched by the scale of Labour’s defeat. What makes the election even more remarkable is the extent to which these results came as a surprise to most of those involved. Indeed, the most commonly expected outcome during the campaign had been a narrow victory for one of the two big parties or a hung parliament. Of course, this can be put down to the inability of pollsters to come close to an accurate prediction of the results. But it would be a particularly serious omission in the case of this particular election to overlook an obvious factor: the electoral campaign. This is the object of this special issue.

AUTEURS

DAVID FÉE

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3

ROMAIN GARBAYE

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3

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New Context, Old Campaign Les élections de 2015: nouveau contexte, même campagne?

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The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory? Les Conservateurs : la plus douce des victoires ?

Tim Bale and Paul Webb

1 Virtually nobody standing for, or working for, the Conservative Party at the general election of 2015 expected it to win an overall majority. True, there were those who were more bullish about the party’s prospects than many of the pundits and pollsters who published their predictions in the week running up to the poll – but in most cases only to the extent that they believed that the Tories would emerge not just as the largest party (the consensus view of the forecasters) but with enough seats to make it likely that they could put together a minority government or else renew the coalition with the Liberal Democrats that had governed the country since May 2010.

2 Both Jim Messina, the veteran of the Obama campaign who David Cameron had brought in to advise the Tories on voter identification and mobilisation, and Lynton Crosby, the Australian consultant who was in overall charge of the Conservative campaign, were quietly confident by polling day itself that the party would win around 300 seats. But even they were pleasantly surprised at the exit poll. Even then, they didn’t breathe easy until the result from marginal constituency of Nuneaton came in at 1.50am, showing that the Conservatives had increased their share of the vote by four percentage points, while Labour’s had actually dropped. As more and more results came in, it became clear that the exit poll’s projection had actually understated the Conservatives’ margin of victory: Mr Cameron would be back as Prime Minister, but more than that – he would be heading a Tory government which, with 12 seats more than all the other parties in Parliament put together, would not need to rely on anyone else’s help to run the country. 3 This, then, was a historic victory, achieved against expectations and in some ways in defiance of what are sometimes presented as the laws of political gravity. David Cameron is the first Prime Minister since in 1983 to increase the number of Tory MPs in Parliament from one election to the next and the first Tory Prime Minister since in 1955 to increase the party’s share of the vote.

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The Tories won 330 seats (51% of the total) on a vote-share of 37% (just under one percentage point up from 2010). Just as encouragingly, albeit under the radar, they picked up around 500 additional seats in local government and assumed control of thirty more councils, which, given how often party activists these days are either elected representatives or their friends and relations, may help them at the next general election, currently scheduled for 2020. They will also be advantaged at that election by boundary reforms which, according to some projections, could effectively give the Conservatives an extra twenty seats or so and mean Labour will need a swing as big as those achieved by Herbert Asquith in 1906 and by in 1945 to win an overall majority next time around. 4 The Conservatives’ improved performance was down in no small measure to what we might call «the black widow effect’: after mating with their Liberal Democrat coalition partners, they gobbled them up, taking 27 of their seats. The Tories lost only 2 seats, net, to Labour, helped by an incumbency effect favouring Conservative MPs who won their seats in 2010, and, as we shall go on to suggest below, by being well ahead of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition when it came to voters’ views on which party would best manage the economy and which had the best leader. In this, they were almost certainly helped by their campaign, which much like the work done by Better Together before the referendum, could hardly be called pretty but turned out to be highly effective. Not only did it manage to focus relentlessly on Labour’s negatives and neutralise any of its positives, it may also, via its emphasis on the ‘chaos’ inherent in some sort of Labour-SNP ‘deal’, have persuaded some who might otherwise have wavered ultimately to vote Tory. Possibly (although only partially) as a result, UKIP, contrary to much, but not all, conventional wisdom before the election, may well have done much, if not more, damage to Labour than to the Conservatives in some crucial English marginals.

The long-term context: Conservative development, 1992-2010

5 David Cameron, along with , has taken the Tories a long way in the ten years since he became leader towards restoring their reputation as Britain’s (or at least ’s) “natural party of government”. Indeed, it is easy to forget just how bad things had become back then. After presiding over the country’s embarrassing and expensive exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, thereby forfeiting public trust in its ability to run the economy, the Conservative Party turned in on itself over Europe and was subsequently swept away in the 1997 Labour landslide. Rather than coming to their senses, however, the Tories headed for the ideological hills, selecting a series of frankly unelectable leaders and pursuing policies (or at least, adopting a rhetoric and tone) that looked a long way out of step with where most of the electorate located themselves.1 By their third defeat in a row in 2005, it had become obvious, even to many die-hard right-wingers, that things would have to change – or at least be made to look as if they had changed.

6 Cameron, who offered himself as the proverbial “change candidate” appeared to many (even to some of those who couldn’t bear his incipient sense of entitlement and his claim to stand on the pragmatic centre-ground) to be the answer to the party’s prayers: Eurosceptic without being obsessive, Thatcherite without being a zealot, and a gifted

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communicator – a politician not only able to convey genuine enthusiasm for national treasures like the NHS but to look like he was at home in the more socially liberal, ethnically-diverse country that twenty-first century Britain had become. His game plan, however, was rather more complex than some of his right-wing detractors and some of his left-wing and socially liberal admirers gave him credit for. He and other “ modernisers” clearly believed that the Conservatives must do all those things that Conservative oppositions (including the one led by Margaret Thatcher between 1975 and 1979) had done to put the party back in contention. Rather than obsessing over issues which fired up the party faithful but put off large numbers of voters – especially many liberal middle-class voters who ought otherwise to be Tory supporters – the party should focus counter-intuitively on topics, such as the environment, that would symbolise a shift away from its past. And it should insist that those parts of the which (like it or not) enjoyed overwhelming public backing, such as the NHS, education and pensions, were completely safe in the new leadership’s hands. 7 “Team Cameron”, however, did believe in a smaller role for the state and that the public could be convinced, pace , that tax cuts and spending reductions wouldn’t automatically lead to reductions in public services. They just believed that the place to persuade people was in government rather than out of it. Unfortunately for them, however, things did not go entirely according to plan. ’s decision not to call a in the summer of 2007 was followed by a chapter of accidents and then the global financial crisis. All of this boosted Tory fortunes but effectively put the brand decontamination operation on ice, meaning that the lead which the Conservatives had built up over the next year or two was more fragile than it looked. By May 2010, as the economy began to recover and doubts about the Conservatives’ good intentions began to resurface now that Cameron and Osborne were talking about “an age of austerity”, a double digit Tory lead at the end of 2009 had dropped into single figures – so narrow that even a brilliant short campaign would have had trouble getting Cameron over the line – at around 323 seats – for an overall majority. And sadly for him, the Tory campaign, although incredibly well financed and equipped (at level at least) with what was then state-of-the-art technology, turned out to be anything but brilliant. Little wonder perhaps that the British Election Study’s panel study found that the Tories ended up with less support at the end of the short campaign than they had at the beginning.2 8 As a result, the Tories had fallen short – their lead on “instrumental” evaluations associated with “valence politics”, namely relative judgements about leadership, credibility and competence, was enough to make them the largest party in a hung parliament but was insufficient, given lingering concerns about their real intentions towards public services and how much they had really changed, to afford the party the overall majority that some Conservative MPs had assumed would be theirs.3 Some of those MPs were even more alarmed at what happened next. Faced with a Liberal Democrat leadership which was some way to the right of the majority of their party, but who clearly were not going to be content with simply supporting a Conservative minority government, Cameron offered Clegg a full-blown majority coalition. Given that Labour could not match that offer, it is understandable that it was accepted. But what defies understanding is the Liberal Democrats’ failure to negotiate an agreement, be it on policy or on portfolios, which might have given them a sporting chance of claiming credit for what the government they had joined would go on to do. Little

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wonder that , former Tory leader and future Foreign Secretary returned from the negotiations and declared “I think I’ve killed the Liberal Democrats”.4

The Permanent Campaign: 2010-2015

9 Having effectively captured and neutered their coalition partners, the Conservative leadership immediately co-opted them into what was a ruthless and highly effective campaign to re-write history and, in so doing, destroy Labour’s reputation for economic competence. Years of uninterrupted growth after 1997 had allowed Labour to build up a big lead on the issue and, while that lead had been lost during the banking crisis, the party had been closing on the Conservatives again as the economy began to recover in the months leading up to the election. Now, however, it was involved in a leadership contest in which even the most Blairite of the candidates spent most of their time insisting on the need to move beyond New Labour rather than the importance of defending its record and its achievements. Seizing the opportunity provided by this hiatus – and by an emergency budget supposedly designed to ensure that Britain did not go the way of Greece – Osborne and Cameron (assisted by Liberal Democrat politicians desperate to persuade their erstwhile supporters that they had gone into coalition to protect what they insisted was “the national interest”), rammed home the message that Labour had, in their words, “maxed out the nation’s credit card” and “failed to fix the roof while the sun was shining”, thereby giving the impression that “the mess” they were having to clear up was due not so much to a global crash as to Blair and Brown’s supposed profligacy and mismanagement. This was enough to ensure that even when, as Shadow Chancellor predicted, the Coalition’s austerity programme damaged (or at least delayed) the recovery, Labour was unable to capitalise on its temporary distress. Labour’s difficulties in turn meant that when the economy at last began to grow again, after Osborne quietly took his foot off the brake, the Conservatives were able to contrast the Coalition’s performance with a caricature of what had happened between 1997 and 2010 that was by then deeply embedded, namely the idea – hotly disputed by many economists, who point out that the sums involved were inconsequential, both in relative and absolute terms – that Labour had “overspent” and run a deficit even when the economy was doing well. That narrative, and of course the recovery itself – even though it was not accompanied by the kind of sustained rise in real wages needed to generate a “feel-good factor” – ensured that, by the time the 2015 election came round, the Tories led Labour as the best party to handle the economy by some twenty percentage points.

10 Cameron and Osborne were also ruthless, perhaps even more so, in exploiting Labour’s other big weakness – the widespread perception that it was a soft touch on welfare. Given the hyperbole that characterised tabloid newspapers’ coverage of the issue, their readers could be forgiven for thinking that almost everybody claiming benefits was either doing so fraudulently or as a foreigner, or both – when, that was, in the very worst tabloid case, they weren’t busy breeding and then killing their own children.5 Naturally, official statements or ghosted columns put out in the name of government ministers, were generally more careful and coded, with Osborne’s headline-grabbing response to the Mick Philpott case perhaps the paradigmatic example.6 They nonetheless constituted a concerted and effective effort, exploiting long-established and popularly-held distinctions between the “undeserving” and the “deserving” poor, to

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justify money-saving policy changes by giving the impression that the only losers would be people currently getting “something for nothing” – the shirkers and skivers rather than the workers and the strivers. Because it was almost bound to stick up for those who stood to lose out, Labour could then be portrayed as a budget-busting friend of the feckless, with any outrage expressed on its part at the shocking unfairness of the stereotypes involved simply playing into Osborne’s hands by giving legs to all the stories that helped reinforce those stereotypes in the first place. And when Labour belatedly tried to go the other way and attempted to “out-Osborne Osborne” by making some supposedly “tough choices” of its own on welfare, it was too late to convince voters it was sincere and probably did no more than legitimize and perpetuate the myths that played so well for the Conservatives in the first place. 11 Of course, the Conservatives didn’t have everything their own way. They failed, because of a bust-up with the Liberal Democrats over Lords reform, to achieve a reduction in the size of the Commons that would have prompted a boundary review estimated to be worth around twenty additional Tory seats. And on one issue, immigration, which, since the mid-1960s, has been one of their most reliable weapons in their electoral battles with Labour, they struggled to maintain credibility. A rash pledge in the run up to the 2010 election that a Tory government would reduce net immigration from the EU from hundreds to tens of thousands backfired when, despite legislation and rule changes designed to “crack down”, the figure actually rose markedly over the course of the Parliament. True, it was UKIP rather than Labour which benefited most from this all-too-obvious failure, despite Miliband shifting his party’s stance on the issue to a more restrictive one from 2011 onwards.7 Nevertheless, the Tories’ lead over their main opponent shrank, according to YouGov’s tracker on best party to handle immigration and asylum, from 28 points (45 vs 17) in May 2010 to just six points (22 vs 16) on the eve of the general election in May 2015. Meanwhile, on Europe - where Conservatives have also come to assume that they enjoy an advantage over Labour in these increasingly Eurosceptic times - their position was far from strong: certainly any hope that Miliband’s decision not to match Cameron’s offer to hold an in-out referendum would damage him proved forlorn – possibly because it was obvious to the electorate that the offer was only made in order to appease Eurosceptic backbenchers worried about UKIP. The story on health (traditionally Labour’s strong suit) was not quite as bad, but the issue nonetheless remained a problem – and was made worse when the government went ahead with legislation in 2011-12 that totally contradicted their pre-election promise to avoid a “top-down reorganisation” of the NHS. Prior to the legislation being announced, the Tories had actually reduced Labour’s lead on the issue to one or two percentage points. After the announcement, Labour’s lead went back into double figures and, prompted, too, by rising waiting times, hospital deficits, and local closures, pretty well stayed there until polling day in 2015.

The Short Campaign: March-May 2015

12 To understand why the Conservatives fought the campaign of 2015 the way they did, one has to go back to the Conservative campaigns of 2005 and 2010. The latter was widely perceived, not least by those working at Conservative Campaign Headquarters (CCHQ), as a bit of a mess. Its untested main theme – the – not only failed to impress, but was a distraction. Meanwhile nobody was ever quite sure exactly to whom

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they were reporting and who had the final word. What a contrast with 2005, when at least everyone knew who was running the show – the so-called Wizard of Oz, Lynton Crosby – and the result, while dire, was a marked improvement in terms of seats, on the two previous contests.

13 Campaign 2015, then, would be the safe if dull one in which Cameron looked and sounded like a Prime Minister sticking to the game-plan devised by the fabled Australian who was supposed to know what he was doing. Cameron, having decided, along with George Osborne, on the basic strategy – banging on about fears on the part of “business” about a Labour government; donning hi-viz jackets and hard-hats to emphasise their “long term economic plan” for “hard-working families”; counter-posing Conservative “competence” with Labour “chaos”; talking up the SNP “threat” while simultaneously portraying them as bullies and blackmailers; and badmouthing Miliband as a weak and weird individual whose only decisive act had been to shaft his own brother – left the tactics to the hired help. This, along with the fact that Cameron refused to risk a one-on-one television debate with Labour’s leader and confined his public appearances to carefully-crafted pseudo-events, attracted more brickbats than plaudits – and some concerns even within the Prime Minister’s own camp. The Tory leader’s response to such criticisms, however, was essentially limited to rolling up his sleeves at his photo-ops to show how “pumped” he was and how hard he was working. Other than that, he simply stuck with the programme, reminding journalists that this was “the most organised, disciplined, clear campaign I have ever been involved in”.8 14 There were few surprises, then, but there were some raised eyebrows. In particular, the decision to announce, at the same time as continuing to pound away at Labour’s purported profligacy, that a Conservative government would guarantee billions of additional spending on the NHS, without actually identifying where the money would come from, was seen as a rather desperate move to prevent Labour from getting as much traction on health as it hoped. Desperate or not, it may well have done the trick. And the fact that it could be defended on the grounds that the Tories were good for the money because, unlike Labour, they could be trusted to grow the economy, was testimony to the unassailable lead they had built up on the latter – one that meant they felt able to ignore suggestions that they should somehow match Labour’s promise to tax “non-doms” and raise the top rate of income tax to 50p, both policies being intended to tap into the widespread feeling (reinforced by the so-called omnishambles budget of 2012) that the Conservatives were “out of touch” and “the party of the rich”. 15 Clearly, the leadership decided there was little point in wasting time trying directly to counter such deeply-held prejudices. Instead, they countered with some prejudices of their own, using highly supportive newspapers – especially the Sun (“This is the pig's ear Ed made of a helpless sarnie. In 48 hours, he could be doing the same to Britain”), the Mail (“For sanity's sake don't let a class-war zealot and the SNP destroy our economy – and our very nation ”), and (to the embarrassment of some of their staff) the Telegraph (“Nightmare on Downing Street”) and – to ramp up fears of a Miliband-Sturgeon deal and to remind the public (if they needed reminding) of Ed Miliband’s shortcomings as a leader. 9 The party also used the press, especially in the last week of a campaign when it, like everyone else, firmly believed that the country was heading for another hung parliament, to question the legitimacy of any possible attempt by Labour, if it finished behind the Conservatives in terms of seats, to form a government.

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16 Perhaps the least-noticed aspect of the Conservative campaign, however, was the decision, taken late in 2014, that, rather than focusing solely on the constituencies they needed either to defend or snatch from Labour while going easy on their coalition partners, the Conservatives would throw a significant proportion of their considerable financial resources at trying to unseat Liberal Democrats – an effort that gathered pace during the campaign when frontbenchers were dispatched to seats few had imagined were in play. Even then, the Tories’ target seats coordinator, Stephen Gilbert, forecast that the Liberal Democrats would win around 15 seats – which was way below most pundits’ guesses but, as it turned out, was almost twice as many as the eight that ’s party finally ended up with. Clearly, the fact that the Conservatives took 27 seats from their erstwhile partners was due mostly to the Liberal Democrats losing an average 21 percentage points in seats they held by less than ten points from the Tories in 2010. But it also had something to do with the fact that Tory candidates in those seats managed to add an average of nearly 4 percentage points to the vote the party received at the previous election. 17 This points to the main reason (apart of course from winning all those Liberal Democrat seats) why the Conservatives were able to win an overall majority in spite of the fact that Labour actually managed to improve its share of the vote marginally more than they did. For the first time in a long time, the Tories managed to concentrate their vote in exactly the right places better than Labour did. In both safe Conservative and safe Labour seats, the Tories actually slipped by an average of two percentage points compared to 2010. In those marginal seats they were defending against Labour, however, they increased their average share by two points, while Labour managed to increase its share by, on average, less than two points. That said, given that Conservative candidates in Labour-held marginals did not in the main significantly increase their share of the vote, the main reason they were able to make eight gains from Labour (to offset their ten losses) may well have been down to some of the Labour vote going to UKIP. The fact that the nearly fourfold increase in the share of the vote won by ’s party did not damage the Conservatives as much as expected, especially given that far more of its voters had previously supported the Tories than Labour, was remarkable. It is perhaps a testament to the effectiveness of the “coalition of chaos” strategy that many of them seem to have ended up sticking with the Conservatives for fear of letting in Miliband and/or the SNP. In any case, the SNP surge played an obviously important role in decimating Labour representation north of the border, while inflicting no damage on the Tories there – a major advantage for the Tories, although in the event they would have won an overall majority even if Labour had maintained its habitual dominance over the Scottish seats.

Why the Conservatives won: post-election polling evidence

18 Although the Conservatives enjoyed a remarkable victory, one thing seems fairly clear: it was not because of any great love on the part of the British electorate for the party or an affinity to its perceived values or ideology. According to British Election Study data gathered shortly before the campaign started,10 Labour just about retained its place as the most popular party in terms of partisan identification, with 27.8% of respondents claiming to identify with it (down from 31% in 2010), compared to 26.1% for the

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Conservatives (down from 27.1%), and 6.2% for the Liberal Democrats (15.9% in 2010). Neither was the Conservative Party especially well liked, with an average score of just 3.77 on a scale running from 0 (“dislike”) to 10 (“like”), compared to 4.12 for Labour and 3.02 for the Liberal Democrats; UKIP (5.10), SNP (3.94) and the Greens (3.98) all scored more highly than the Tories on this scale. Moreover, the BES data shows that the Conservatives were regarded as being more ideologically remote from the average voter than most other parties: the mean position of voters on a scale running from 0 (“ very left-wing”) to 10 (“very right-wing”) was almost exactly in the centre, at 4.99, while the Tories and UKIP were both perceived as being well to the right of this position (at +2.93 and + 2.94 respectively), whereas the other main parties were all regarded as being to the left of the average voter – and all were seen as closer than the two right- wing parties; the Liberal Democrats were closest (at -0.21), followed by SNP (-1.42), (-1.69), Labour (-1.87) and the Greens (-2.06).

19 The limited post-election polling evidence that is available at the time of writing suggests that the same factors that ushered the Conservatives into government in 2010 counted in their favour once again in 2015: perceived economic and leadership competence.11 Interestingly, post-election data published by Lord Ashcroft shows that the modal response to the question of which was the most important issue in 2015 was the NHS rather than the economy – and this held regardless of whether or not respondents were asked to consider their own family’s position (58%) or the country’s position as a whole (55%). 12 One would normally expect it to favour Labour when the NHS is so salient – and indeed, there was some mileage in this issue for Labour; 76% of those voting Labour cited health as the most important issue for the UK, whereas only 39% of those voting Conservative did. Even so, close behind the NHS in terms of salience was the need to “get the economy growing and creating jobs” (51%), and 61% of those citing this as one of the three most important issues voted Conservative, while only 50% voted Labour. More directly telling, perhaps, is the fact that 46% of respondents (a plurality) agreed with the statement that “the national economy is not yet fully fixed, so we will need to continue with austerity and cuts in government spending over the next five years”, including 84% of those who voted Conservative; by contrast, only 17% of Labour supporters saw things this way, as did 45% of Liberal Democrat supporters. 20 Further support for the argument that valence considerations weighed decisively in the balance is provided by a Greenberg Quinlan Rosler post-election poll that was commissioned by the TUC.13 This shows that the top three reasons for supporting the Conservatives were the feeling that the economy was recovering (39%), that progress that had been made with deficit-reduction (29%), and the belief that David Cameron would make a better Prime Minister than Ed Miliband (18%). It is not necessarily that voters were entirely sold on the detail of economic policy: The GQR poll showed that fewer people agreed with the Conservative position that the best way to get the economy growing would be to get the deficit under control and cut taxes and red tape (43%) than with the Labour emphasis on ensuring that “working people feel better off and more comfortable spending” (48%). Nevertheless, 40% felt that Labour would “spend too much and can’t be trusted with the economy”, and 25% felt they would make it “too easy for people to live off benefits”. A quarter also felt that Labour in government would be “bossed around by and the Scottish Nationalists”, which suggests that the Tories’ negative campaigning on the theme of a Labour-SNP “threat” may have resonated with a significant number of voters. More generally, far more respondents saw the Tories as

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competent (53%) and having a good track record in government (50%) than Labour, for whom the respective figures were only 29% and 25%. 21 For the second election running David Cameron proved a huge asset to his party’s electoral prospects. The Ashcroft poll showed that some 71% of Tory voters cited the leader as one of the three most important reasons for voting for the party, compared to just 39% of Labour voters. This is a very striking difference, which is consistent with the possibility that more and more voters are coming to rely on leadership evaluations as a heuristic simplification to guide their decision at a time when policy debates are becoming increasingly complex and almost impossible for non-experts to adjudicate on.14 22 While these valence considerations certainly mattered at the level of the individual voter, one other thing should not be overlooked in seeking to understand the unexpected Tory majority in 2015: the paradoxical impact of Liberal Democrat losses to Labour, of which the Tories were a serendipitous beneficiary. While disgruntled Liberal Democrat voters from 2010 probably shifted predominantly to Labour, this almost certainly ended up helping the Conservatives in terms of overall seat gains. The last BES pre-election panel showed 27% of the 2010 Liberal Democrats saying that they were intending to shift to Labour at the general election, while only 11.2% were planning to vote Conservative. Moreover, in the seats that the Liberal Democrats were defending in 2015, the Conservatives lost 0.5% of their vote on average, while Labour increased by 2.7%. However, this profited Labour relatively little, given that in 33 of the 57 seats that the Liberal Democrats were defending, their nearest challengers were the Tories, compared to only 17 in which Labour were the main opponents. Thus, by taking Liberal Democrat votes, Labour’s electoral progress in such seats more often than not only served to let the Conservatives win. 23 One final observation about the electoral standing of the Tories should be made, which takes us back to the point about the party not being especially loved by voters, notwithstanding the majority it secured in the Commons. It is clear that the Conservatives continue to have some significant image problems, which may hinder them in the next parliament. The GQR poll shows that the number one doubt voters have about the Tories is that “they are for the rich and powerful, not ordinary people” (36% expressing this view). Not far behind (32%) is the feeling that “they can’t be trusted with the NHS” (the most salient issue at the election, remember), while a mere 29% of voters regarded them as “honest”. This suggests a picture in which the nation has entrusted the government of the country to the Conservatives while having their eyes wide open as to the deficiencies of the party. To put it differently, the Tories may not have a strong bank of political capital on which to draw when the going gets tough in the years leading up to 2020 – as it almost certainly will, given the challenges to be faced over continuing economic recovery, and the UK’s political relationships both internally and with the EU.

Conclusion

24 Speaking just after he realised he had won, David Cameron called 2015 his “sweetest victory”. But, as many commentators rushed to remind him, it has the potential to turn very sour very quickly. His narrow, 12-seat majority is smaller, it is worth recalling, than the 21-seat majority won by (on 42% of the vote) back in 1992.

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Moreover, anyone old enough to remember that time will recall how that victory soon turned to ashes as Britain’s “Black Wednesday” exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the announcement of massive job losses in the coal industry and parliamentary rebellions over the , turned him from hero to zero. It is difficult at present to foresee anything on the immediate economic horizon that could do such dramatic damage to the Tories’ valuable reputation for competence in that sphere, although the severity of the expenditure cuts promised by George Osborne certainly has the potential to tip the economy into recession yet again. However, an arguably chronic tendency toward ideological overreach and internal strife over Europe means that Mr Cameron’s successor, presuming he makes good on his promise not to seek another term, needs to be careful not to assume that he or she has the next general election in the bag. He has laid the foundations, but they need to be built on – and, given the cagey and contingent nature of the support given to the Conservatives by many of those who voted for them in May 2015, that building will have to be erected on the centre-ground of British politics rather than the cloud-cuckoo land inhabited by some of David Cameron’s less pragmatic colleagues. Still, for all the dangers coming down the line, we should acknowledge Cameron’s achievement. As the respected political commentator, John Rentoul, put it a few days after the election, “Overnight, he has transformed from the one-term mechanic called round to fix the deficit, who couldn’t even do that, into a 10-year prime minister who can stamp his personality on the nation”.15

25 Cameron may be helped to do that by a Conservative Party that is at last beginning to look a little bit more like the country it governs. The willingness of at least some constituency associations to pick (without being pressured to do so) less conventional Conservative candidates in safe or at least winnable seats means that the Tory benches in the Commons now contain the party’s highest ever proportion of women, the 68 female MPs who sit there making up 21% of the party’s contingent in the lower house. The Tories also have the largest number of non-white MPs they have ever had: a total of 17, seven of whom are new entrants to the Commons. In addition, «only’ 48% of Tory MPs went to independent schools (with 34% having been to comprehensives and 18% to grammars), although this hardly constitutes proportional representation, given that only seven per cent of pupils currently go to schools outside the maintained sector; it is a drop from the 54% who had been privately educated in 2010 and continues a long- term trend toward more state-educated Tory MPs. That said, a disproportionate share of the majority of Tory MPs who are graduates attended elite universities: some 34% of Conservatives in the Commons were educated at Oxford or Cambridge. If David Cameron was serious when he talked in the wake of his victory about the Tories becoming “the party of working people”, then, in this respect at least, he still has a long way to go.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BALE, Tim. The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: Polity, 3rd edition, forthcoming.

D’ANCONA, Mathew. In it Together. : Penguin, 2014.

GEDDES, Andrew & TONGE, Jonathan. Britain Votes 2015. Oxford: OUP, 2015.

KAVANAGH, Dennis & COWLEY, Philip. The British General Election of 2015. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

SELDON, Anthony & SNOWDON, Peter. Cameron at Ten: the Inside Story. London: William Collins, 2015.

NOTES

1. T. QUINN, 'The Conservative Party and the centre ground of British Politics', Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 18, no 2, 2008, pp. 179-199. 2. For a detailed look at 2010 based in part on BES findings, see J. GREEN «Strategic Recovery? The Conservatives under David Cameron’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 63, no 4, 2010, pp. 667–688. 3. See T. BALE & P. WEBB, «The Conservative Party’ in N. ALLEN & J. BARTLE (eds.), Britain at the Polls 2010, London: Sage, 2010, pp. 37-62. 4. Quoted in G. PARKER, «Highs and lows of the UK’s coalition government’, , 26 March 2015. The most comprehensive sources on the Coalition include M. D’ANCONA, In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition government, London: Penguin, 2014; A. SELDON & M. FINN (eds.), The Coalition Effect, 2010-2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015; and M. BEECH & S. LEE, The Conservative-Liberal Coalition: Examining the Cameron-Clegg government, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015. 5. This was essentially the implication of the coverage of the genuinely shocking trial of one benefit claimant who, with two accomplices, was found to have burned down his house with some of his children still inside. See «Vile product of welfare UK’, , 3 April 2013 (http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2303120/Mick-Philpott-vile-product-Welfare-UK-Derby-man- bred-17-babies-milk-benefits-GUILTY-killing-six.html), accessed 11 September 2015. 6. For Osborne’s reaction when quizzed by a reporter about Philpott, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/uk-22024061, accessed 11 September 2015. 7. T. BALE, «Putting it right? The Labour party's big shift on immigration since 2010’, Political Quarterly, vol. 85, no 3, 2014, pp. 296-303. 8. J. FORSYTH and F. NELSON, “David Cameron: 'I always manage to portray a calm smoothness or something'”, , 25 April 2015 http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9507922/why- dont-people-think-you-want-to-win-prime-minister-i-dont-know-there-is-something-about-me/ 9. See J. JEWELL, «Election coverage: sweet victory or a new low for UK press?’, 9 May 2015 https://theconversation.com/election-coverage-sweet-victory-or-a-new-low-for-uk-press-41569 10. We are grateful to the directors of the BES for making Wave Four of their panel data available for this analysis. 11. See T. BALE & P. WEBB, «The Conservative Party’ in N. ALLEN & J. BARTLE (eds.), Britain at the Polls 2010, London: Sage, 2010, pp. 37-62. 12. See http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/LORD-ASHCROFT-POLLS- Post-vote-poll-summary1.pdf

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13. See http://www.gqrr.com/uk-post-election-3. 14. See A. BITTNER, Platform or Personality? The Role of Party Leaders in Elections, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; G. EVANS & R. ANDERSEN, «The impact of party leaders: How Blair lost Labour votes’ in P. NORRIS & C. WLEZIEN (eds.), Britain Votes 2005, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; M. COSTA LOBO & J. CURTICE (eds.) Personality Politics? The Role of Leader Evaluations in Democratic Elections, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 15. J. RENTOUL, «Is no one going to give Cameron any credit?’ Independent on Sunday, 10 May 2015.

ABSTRACTS

In the 2015 general election, the Conservative party did not just win an overall parliamentary majority against expectations, but they also increased their national share of the vote and secured additional seats in local government. The article examines the long and short term campaigns and contrasts the 2010 campaign with the one in 2015 to explain their success. It highlights how the Conservatives were able to spin a convincing narrative of Labour economic incompetence and welfare profligacy and capitalise on their opponents’ inner conflicts and voters’ fears of a Labour-SNP coalition. The article argues that their victory is also due to their command of valence issues and their effective targeting of marginal seats.

Lors des élections parlementaires de 2015, le parti conservateur n’a pas seulement remporté une majorité absolue de sièges au Parlement contre toute attente mais a également accru sa part nationale des voix et gagné de nouveaux sièges au niveau local. Cet article revient sur la campagne courte et la campagne longue des Conservateurs et oppose la campagne de 2010 à celle de 2015. Il souligne combien le parti est parvenu à tisser un récit convaincant des années Labour, arguant de l’incompétence économique de ses opposantes et de leur prodigalité excessive en matière de dépenses sociales, tout en exploitant leurs conflits internes et la crainte des électeurs d’une alliance SNP-Labour. L’article revient sur leur domination de certains sujets électoraux et leur stratégie pour cibler certains sièges.

INDEX

Keywords: Conservatives, Cameron, elections, Tory, United Kingdom Mots-clés: conservateurs, Cameron, élections, Tory, Royaume-Uni

AUTHORS

TIM BALE

Queen Mary University

PAUL WEBB

University of Sussex

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“The Wall was Too High”: the Four Predicaments of Mr Miliband L’obstacle était trop grand : les 4 difficultés de Monsieur Miliband

Eric Shaw

“Hey you, don’t help them to bury the light Don’t give in without a fight…… But it was only fantasy. The wall was too high, As you can see. No matter how he tried, He could not break free…… Pink Floyd “Hey You” in The Wall 1 The 2015 elections inflicted a devastating defeat on the Labour party. Until the last moment polls indicated that a minority Labour government backed by the SNP would scrape though. In the event, the Tories gained an absolute majority, the first time since 1992 in a result no one had anticipated. Ed Miliband immediately resigned and the search for a successor has begun.

Party Percentage Gain/loss Seats

Conservative 36.9 +0.8 331

Labour 30.4 +1.5 232

UKIP 12.6 +9.5 1

Liberal Democrat 7.9 -15.2 8

Scottish National Party 4.7 +3.1 56

Green 3.8 +2.8 1

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Others (Mainly in Northern Ireland) 23

2 Source BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results

3 Let me begin by explaining what this paper is not about: it is not an analysis of why Labour suffered such a devastating election defeat, nor does it seek to explore its election campaign strategy in any detail. It also ignores the crucial aspect of , where, crushed by the SNP, Labour lost all but one of its 41 seats: in effect this was a separate election.1 4 The issue the paper explores is why Labour was never likely to succeed. 2 And it does so by probing four major predicaments: lack of confidence in Ed Miliband as a potential Prime Minister, in Labour’s ability to run the economy, in its capacity to manage the explosive issue of immigration and in its will to tackle (alleged) pervasive welfare abuse. 5 The first section of the paper consists of a detailed examination of these predicaments and evaluates Labour’s efforts to resolve or mitigate them. The second section consider whether, as many commentators alleged, that Labour lost because it failed to come to terms with “reality”, that is was out of tune with public opinion on the issues of the economy, immigration and welfare (see, e.g., Philpott, 2015). This article paper argues that “reality” is a rather more ambiguous concept than this argument allows, and that the “reality” which Labour failed to recognise was a constructed reality. The paper uses the metaphor of the dwellers in Plato’s Cave to illustrate the fact that the subjective mental universe of many voters was at variance with empirically verifiable facts. The paper then uses concepts from social psychology to scrutinise the rather different ways people apprehend social realties. 6 If many (though not all) voters inhabited Plato’s Cave should it follow that, as senior Labour frontbenchers, , maintained, Labour “must start by meeting the voters where they are, not where we would like them to be”? (Guardian 29 June 2015). Or would this failure by the party to affirm its own values simply, as former prominent Labour MP Bryan Gould riposted, lead voters to conclude that Labour was “fatally short of both courage and convictions”? (Guardian 21 July 2015). The third section of this article contends that political parties do have the capacity to modify mass perceptions but only be devising a plausible narrative, that alter the way people construe key salient societal issues. This the party failed to do, disabling its capacity to tackle any of its four predicaments. The paper concludes with some brief reflections on the party past and present.

Labour’s four predicaments (1) The problem of leadership

7 We now live in an age when fixed party loyalties and class allegiances have faded and where voting is no longer an expressive act but a conscious decision. But how is that decision made? Rational choice theory, deriving from the work of Anthony Downs, sees voters as rational calculators or “utility maximizers” driven by self-interest. Scrutinising party programmes and ideology, they decide which party is closest to them in the

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political spectrum and which policies coincide most closely to their own preferences and will therefore maximize their “utility”.3

8 This approach makes quite implausible assumptions about voter willingness to seek information and undertake sustained cognitive activity. Valence theory takes a more realistic approach. It argues that, rather than engaging in a time-consuming and demanding process of learning about party policies voters rely on simplifying “heuristic devices” or shortcuts. Research in the UK has shown the two principal such devices are evaluations of party leadership and economic competence.4 The section will focus on the first of these, the next section on the second. 9 Why is leadership so important? Unlike issues and policies, which are complex and often abstract, party leaders are highly visible embodiments of their parties.5 The greater the confidence voters repose in a leader, then the more trust they will place in the capacity of the leader’s party to “deliver the goods”. Conversely, lack of faith in a leader undermines faith in the party. Three attributes of leadership are of particular relevance here: 10 The possession of the qualities seen as required to be an effective Prime Minister; communicative ability, that is the ability to persuade people of the validity of their message; Affinity, or the possession of a personality which people find attractive and appealing. 11 Miliband’s predicament was that he, very consistently, scored poorly on all three counts. Whilst Cameron conveyed a sense of being competent, decisive, self-assured and willing to take tough decisions (all major prime ministerial qualities) Miliband was seen as weak, irresolute and ineffectual.6 12 A party’s capacity to communicate its message effectively relies heavily on the performance skills of its leader, especially on television. Unlike , Miliband was neither a polished televisual performer, with his delivery too often stilted and wooden, nor a telegenic personality.7 According to John McTernan, formerly a senior aide to Tony Blair, “the Labour leader is compelling in private; empathetic, intelligent and charming. Yet this does not come across in all his public performances – in particular, it does not survive the journey through the camera lens and into the living room” (John McTernan, Financial Times 24 September 2014). 13 But it was on people’s judgment of his personality that Miliband trailed most heavily behind David Cameron. This judgment is more affective than reasoned; a matter of how people feel about leaders, whether they like or dislike them, whether or not they find them congenial and attractive. Miliband’s public image was an extraordinarily negative one. He was widely seen as odd, pathetic, “geeky”, and “uncharismatic”, a man who had “ stabbed his brother in the back”. The character trait most often used to describe him was “ weird.” The sheer intensity of this hostility, sometimes verging on loathing, is striking and, doubtless influenced by the unremittingly scathing coverage meted out to him by the right-wing tabloids. The virulence of the Murdoch press indeed intensified after Miliband’s decision (bravely and against the advice of a number of senior frontbenchers8) to challenge News International over the phone hacking-scandal. An avalanche of vitriolic personal denunciation was the inevitable result.9 14 Miliband’s capacity to place a firmer stamp of authority was sapped by the narrowness of his majority over his brother, by his poor personal ratings and by relentlessly unflattering, but off-the record, briefings by many of his colleagues who portrayed him

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as arrogant, aloof and indecisive.10 All this was demoralising and, not surprisingly, Steve Richards of reported “a mood of paranoia and suspicion” around him.11 15 When the campaign commenced, perceptions became less negative as Miliband was exposed to more voters and performed better than anticipated on TV interviews. But it was too little, too late.12 Well before the election campaign, Miliband’s media-propelled caricatured image had congealed in the public eye to form a gestalt through which all information was filtered and this proved impossible to dislodge. A party’s leader should operate as its most effective exponent: for Labour, Miliband was a hindrance and this first predicament was never overcome.

Labour’s four predicaments (2) the problem of economic credibility

16 If leadership quality, according to valence theory, is the first heuristic to simplify voting choice, the second is evaluation of economic competence. Which of the two major contenders for government office is most capable of managing the economy and hence delivering improved living standards, jobs and stable prices? 13 Labour’s second predicament was that voters consistently preferred the Conservatives and by a wide margin with, for example, with much greater confidence in George Osborne than in Ed Balls as a Chancellor of the Exchequer.14

17 It rapidly became evident that poor economic ratings was a major problem for Labour: the question was how to address it. Here there were differences over two main issues, broad economic strategy and fiscal policy, between three strands of opinion : (1) Ed Miliband and his closest advisers, (2) the Blairite/right-wing of the party, including the senior frontbencher and elections co-ordinator, and (3) the Shadow Chancellor, Ed Balls. 18 Miliband’s analysis, in brief, was as follows: Labour had forfeited the voters” confidence because it was associated with a flawed economic model inherited from and in its essentials preserved by the Blair/Brown Governments. Under this model economic activity was skewed by an inflated and inadequately regulated financial sector prone to speculative activity – which was why the UK had suffered so severely from the financial crash. This was coupled with a low-skill, low-wage growth model characterised by insecure and precarious work that stifled productivity and growth, and exacerbated labour exploitation. Whilst growth did revive in 2013 it was unstable because wage stagnation depressed demand causing heavy reliance on high private debt and a re-ignited housing bubble. The outcome was, in an oft-repeated sound-bite, a “cost of living crisis in which rewards from higher growth accrued primarily to a privileged few whilst living standards for most others, the ‘squeezed middle’ as well as the poor, languished.” 15 This was the system of “predatory ”. 19 Miliband’s initial prescription for restoring Labour’s standing on the economy, unveiled in his 2011 Conference speech, was to call for a radical reform of the British economic model by replacing “predatory capitalism”, with its “cosy cartels” and “vested interests” with “responsible capitalism”. “Responsible capitalism”, based on the German model of “concerted capitalism”, would be characterised by more sustained investment, a more highly-skilled workforce, firmer regulation and a more equitable pattern of

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distribution.16 The transition to “responsible capitalism” would be effected through the reconfiguring of the institutional interface between finance, industry and labour including such institutions as a state investment bank to foster long-term lending, enhanced vocational training and major infrastructure investment. 20 How realistic this move to a more socially-regulated form of concerted capitalism was is a moot point since theorists of “varieties of capitalism” argue that problems of “path dependency” greatly complicate the task of shifting from one “variety” to another. But, for Miliband, an additional problem was that many influential voices in the party did not even believe the effort was worthwhile. Shortly after his conference address assailing “predatory capitalism” Lib Dem Business Secretary texted Labour’s leader to commend him for “the most important social democratic speech for forty years”. 17 Many of Miliband’s senior colleagues, including Ed Balls, Douglas Alexander, (then Shadow Defence Secretary) and Shadow Business Secretary Chukka Umunna sharply disagreed. For such politicians securing the support of big business was a key to the success of New Labour and the language of “corporate greed and ‘predatory capitalism’” - as well as the call for a new 50% income tax band for the very wealthy - heedlessly put this at risk.18 They rapidly communicated their reservations to Miliband. 21 Miliband, it seems, had not anticipated so negative a response and the concept of “ predatory capitalism” was soon abandoned. Instead, he shifted towards a more cautious strategy, one designed to rebuild Labour’s economic credibility by formulating and highlighting a series of tangible policies that focus groups indicated would galvanise public opinion. These included a freeze on energy prices, the reintroduction of the 50% tax rate (for those earning over £150,000), an increase in the minimum wage, a restored 10% tax band on low income-earners, the so-called “Mansion Tax” on houses worth more than £2m and a one-off tax on bankers” bonuses. Whilst some of these policies overlapped with those contained in the “responsible capitalism” approach they took the form of discrete pledges rather than integrated elements of an alternative, overarching programme. 22 In fact, such broader economic matters were increasingly overshadowed by more immediately contentious issues of fiscal policy. From the inception of his leadership Miliband was faced with the allegation that Labour’s reckless over-spending had caused the financial crash. For many on the party’s right (though not for Miliband and Balls) there was some validity in these charges. Impatient with Miliband and Balls” refusal to accept this they wanted a much tighter fiscal stance. A willingness to take a tough line on spending was, they asserted, “fundamental to being regarded as a credible alternative government”.19 23 Under pressure, Miliband and Balls eventually agreed to shift towards a more astringent fiscal stance. Thus a future Labour government would acquiesce in many of the Coalition’s cuts, adhere to its spending plans for the first year in office, impose a cap on most welfare spending and agree to more means-testing of benefits. 20 But the two men were equally keen to retain room for manoeuver. Thus whilst they pledged to eliminate the current budget deficit – the gap between tax revenues and day-to-day spending – within the next parliamentary term, they rejected the much tighter Tory goal of an overall budgetary surplus, promising to proceed more slowly on deficit reduction and to rely more on higher taxes. 21 Disputing claims (from the left) that the two main parties had converged, the Institute of Fiscal Studies reported that Tory

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policies required a “colossal” reduction in public spending whilst Labour’s did not. As a result, the IFS”s deputy director Carl Emmerson concluded that the choice over tax and spending was starker than at any general election since 1992.22 24 As the party moved into the election campaign, it struck was a balance between left- leaning populism and fiscal caution. The former was epitomised by Miliband’s call for the “irresponsible rich” to bear a larger share of the burden of compressing the deficit through higher taxes 23 and tough measures to curb “industrial scale tax avoidance.” 24 But equal attention was given to asserting Labour’s “fiscal responsibility.” Thus the manifesto promised that no additional spending would be financed by borrowing (although Labour would borrow to fund infrastructure projects, a major difference from the Tory plans); cuts would continue until the deficit was eliminated; borrowing and the national debt would be progressively reduced and a surplus delivered on the current budget “as soon as possible in the next parliament”.25 25 Neither arm of the strategy had much effect as Labour continued to lag well behind on economic competence. Polls regularly found that the majority of voters accepted the Coalition’s story that Labour had caused the financial crisis, that tough austerity measures were a vital for the economy and that a government led by Miliband and Balls would ruin the nation’s finances. 26 This second predicament, like the first, was never resolved.

Labour’s four predicaments (3) the problem of immigration

26 Voters have always preferred the Conservatives over Labour as being “tougher” on the issue of immigration. Labour’s vulnerability on the issue intensified as the salience of the issue mounted with a rapid expansion in immigration accompanied by hardening attitudes towards immigrants.27 In one extensive survey, Lord Ashcroft found that 60% thought immigration had a negative impact on the country with many believing that immigrants took jobs away from British workers, were claiming too many benefits, were lowering wages and were putting an unfair burden on hospitals and schools. 28 Amongst voters who backed Labour in 2005, those who were most worried about immigration were most likely to desert the party in 2010. 29 After 2010, immigration was perceived as one of the three key problems (along with the economy and the NHS) confronting the country. Labour’s problem was that many believed that the interests of immigrants and the native population were in conflict with each other, it that it placed the interests of the former first.30 The more heated the public debate over immigration, the more opinion (especially working class opinion) was alienated from Labour. This was Miliband’s third predicament.

27 The remarkable rise of UKIP – which triumphed as the largest party in the 2014 European elections – was the principal expression of the upsurge in the political prominence of immigration. Initially, there were hopes amongst Labour strategists that this would benefit the party by splitting the right-wing vote, but it soon became evident that UKIP was making deep inroads into Labour’s own working class base. For example, between 2005 and 2013, Labour’s support among white working-class pensioners collapsed from 45% to 26% whilst UKIP support leapt from 3% to 28%. 31

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28 The party was uncertain how to respond to which was, in truth, an intractable predicament, oscillating from one approach to another. Thus, in his 2010 acceptance speech Miliband conceded the previous government had ignored rising anxieties about immigration and reassured voters that he understood their “frustration […] that we didn’t seem to be on your side.”32 Initially, he construed the problem of immigration as primarily one of a defective, malfunctioning labour market. Cheap labour was being sucked in because employers were competing on price rather than quality, and rather than investing were expanding low-paid jobs at pay rates many were reluctant to accept. His remedy was to strengthen labour protection, tighten regulations governing working conditions and inhibit employers from undercutting wages through imported labour. 33 The cultural sources of anti-immigrant feeling, especially significant in areas of high Muslim population, were more or less ignored. It soon became apparent that, whatever its merits, this initial approach was not assuaging voter insecurities and not arresting defections from Labour. 29 With anxiety mounting over its vulnerability on the issue, the party switched tack pledging to be “tough” on immigration. The manifesto combined elements of the two approaches coupling labour market reforms with promises to reduce low-skilled immigration from outside the EU, prevent EU migrants from claiming benefits for at least two years (and from claiming child benefit for children living outside the UK) and stronger action to stop illegal immigration.34 However, this new approach appeared to be no more effective. According to the polling agency Survation, immigration was responsible for the loss of many votes to UKIP and this contributed directly to Labour’s failure to win marginal seats in the North and the Midlands. 35 30 In truth there was no easy solution to Labour’s predicament on immigration since the party’s liberal values were so incongruent with popular sentiment. Miliband acknowledged that the previous government had tended to ignore the impact of migrant labour on wage levels, especially amongst the low paid, though he tended to skirt the impact on social cohesion as the native population struggled to adapt to the heavy influx of immigrants, many with different cultures, customs, languages and values. But however much the party hardened its stance it could never outbid UKIP and the Tories. The plain fact was, as an influential Labour blogger commented, that “ immigration is one of those issues on which it’s hard-wired into the public imagination that we are ‘soft’. And no amount of tough-talking rhetoric […] has helped our case a jot.” 36 Miliband had anticipated that having an informed and candid debate on immigration would be an “incredibly hard thing to achieve”. 37 In practice, impossible – rendering the third predicament impossible to resolve.

Labour’s four predicaments (4) the problem of “welfare cheats”

31 The brunt of the Coalition’s spending axe fell on those reliant on welfare benefit, the unemployed, the sick, the disabled and the low-waged. But this did not alienate popular support. To the contrary: the cuts have been popular, with YouGov polling finding that about 60%-65% believed government welfare reductions were about right or were not deep enough. 38 A British Social Attitudes Survey in 2014 revealed that less than a third of the population felt that the government should spend more on welfare, a sharp reduction from previous years. 39 It was Labour’s natural instinct to defend the most

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vulnerable members of society from severe benefit reductions, but this merely fed the popular perception that it was “soft on welfare spongers”. This was Miliband’s fourth predicament.

32 Research has shown that whether or not people approve of benefits is contingent upon whether the groups that receive them are seen to be “deserving.” Notions of desert are, in turn, heavily influenced by how the problem which social benefits are meant to tackle is framed. Framing involves selecting, highlighting and presenting aspects of perceived reality in a way that privileges a particular diagnosis of the problem, invokes a moral evaluation, and prescribes a remedy. 40 The key distinction here is between individualistic and societal frames: whether problems such as poverty and unemployment are construed as the responsibility of the poor and unemployment themselves (the individualistic frame) are as the result of social factors (the societal frame). Survey evidence has chronicled the growing popularity of the former at the expense of the latter. For example, a majority of voters evidently believe that poverty is a lifestyle choice rather than the result of social and economic conditions 41 and 59% feel that “most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one” (the figure for 1993 was 27%). 42 Research has found that a very large proportion of people are convinced that social security “sponging” and welfare fraud are ubiquitous and that the excessive generosity of benefits causes “dependency” and discourages the search for work. 43 This obsession with “welfare scrounging” - that is the receipt of benefits by those who do not deserve them – has been fuelled by media (especially tabloid) reporting which imputes the plight of the poor to their own fecklessness, irresponsibility and anti-social behaviour. 44 Not surprisingly the Tory rhetoric of “strivers versus skivers” caught the mood of the nation with Labour depicted as a “soft touch” for “welfare cheats” and the pampered “workshy”. 45 When focus groups were asked who they thought Labour represented, one of the stock images was of “a slob lounging at home on his sofa.” 46 As a result very large numbers of voters identified Labour as the party not of “ ordinary, hard-working” families but of benefit claimants. 47 Ever since the Thatcher years Tory strategy had been to drive a wedge through Labour’s social base by exploiting, sharpening and amplifying existing divisions between those in work and the poor, welfare recipients and immigrants. As long ago as 1989 one commentator had noted how adept was at negative stereotyping. It was “superb at parcelling people up as outsiders, malcontents or morally undeserving ‘scroungers’”. 48 Endlessly reinforced and magnified by the Conservatives and the right-wing press (and increasingly, by television) 49 such ideas had entrenched themselves in the public psyche, and the “hard-working families” vs. the undeserving poor cleavage has increasingly displaced traditional notions of class identity. 33 How was the party to respond? Again, there was uncertainty and equivocation in Labour’s upper echelons. The right of the party was clearer in its strategy. “Transfixed by dire polls showing voters see them as soft on welfare” 50 they pressed for a more robust line on welfare: in the words of frontbencher Liam Byrne to “get tough on those who are consistently shown to be shirking their responsibilities”;51 or, as his successor as Work and Pensions Shadow, , declared to show that “we are not the party for people on benefits” and would be “tougher than the Tories”.52 However Miliband knew that matching the Tories” rhetoric would be impossible, would inflame opinion in the party and would simply give grater coherence to the myth of mass welfare fraud. But he was caught in a dilemma, as the Tories well knew. By criticising the Tories” “cruel and

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unfeeling” cuts, Labour rendered itself “vulnerable to being portrayed as defending the interests of a dodgy, workshy minority against the decent, hardworking majority”.53 On the other hand, if it backed Tory measures it would anger its own members, subvert its core values and probably have little to show for it. The point about predicaments is they cannot easily be escaped and on this, the fourth predicament, Labour did not.

In Plato’s Cave

Imagine human beings living in an underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from childhood [….] and can only see into the den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which marionette players show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are talking and others silent. … They are ourselves and they see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give names. (Plato, The Republic). 34 So far, we have charted public attitudes on a range of issues – on Miliband’s leadership, on the economy, immigration and welfare benefits. For most politicians and many commentators the extent to which these attitudes corresponded to a verifiable reality is not an issue of any real importance. Rational choice theory takes it as axiomatic that voters act as informed rational decision-makers whilst valence theorists seem uninterested in how voters use heuristics to make evaluations. Equally, it was not a matter that interested the bulk of Labour politicians.

35 The point of departure in this paper is rather different. Its hypothesis is that the gap between perception and reality is, for many, wide with the majority of voters having at best a desultory interest in politics, a meagre awareness of the issues and little appetite to find out more. These voters – this paper suggests – are the dwellers in Plato’s cave who see reality not as it might present itself to the informed observer but through “the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den”. 36 This may seem a sweeping statement so let us inspect some of the research evidence. Take, for example, the issue of immigration. An Ipsos MORI poll reported that the public’s average estimate of the proportion of the UK population that is foreign-born was 31 per cent: the official estimate is of around 13 per cent. 54 Similarly YouGov research reported that respondents exaggerated the proportion of immigrants on any sort of benefit by a factor of over 7. 55 Most people believe that immigrants are a huge burden on the state. In fact between 2001 and 2011 overall immigration to the UK made a positive net contribution of about £25billion. “Rather than being a drain on the UK’s fiscal system” Dustmann and Frattini, two leading experts on migration economics concluded, “immigrants arriving since the early have made substantial net contributions to its public finances, a reality that contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate.” 56 Other research has found that the widespread belief that immigrants have “taken our jobs” and seriously depressed wage levels is incorrect. 57 In summary, perceptions of the impact of immigration bear “little relationship to objective assessments” with people in general having “a very poor understanding of the scale and nature of immigration”.58 37 The same pattern unfolds on the question of welfare benefits. A survey found that on average people believed that the percentage of the welfare budget spent on the unemployed people was 41%. The actual figure was 3%. They believed that 27% of the

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welfare budget was claimed fraudulently: the real figure (according to Government statistics) was 0.7%. 59 A report commissioned by an alliance of British churches found that the perception of the majority of the population that poverty was largely due to sloth, irresponsibility and addiction to drink and drugs, had no basis at all in empirical evidence. The ease with which social benefits could be accessed and their generosity were both grossly exaggerated (See table below). 60

Source: Independent 4 January 2013.

38 It does not follow from this that all public opinion is equally poorly-informed: in fact research consistently shows that minorities of voters are well-informed. To explain and conceptualise the difference between the two, we need to understand the psychological mechanisms through which people process political information. Social psychological research has found that faced by a mass of data people act as “cognitive misers” who economise “as much as they can on the effort they need to expend when processing information.”61 They do so by relying on “cognitive shortcuts”, or “schemas”. Schemas are sets of pre-existing beliefs, preconceptions and expectations about a particular issue, group or event which help “guide what we attend to, what we perceive and what we infer...a kind of mental short-hand.” 62

39 However, schemas can vary widely in nature, quality and intellectual rigour. Though it is commonly assumed that people absorb messages and formulate opinions in more or less the same way, research has consistently shown that this is not the case. People differ considerably in their reasoning capacity, their use and application of concepts and in the contextual knowledge they have at their disposal.63 For example, research into how people consume the news uncovered “pronounced differences in the extent to which news is remembered and understood by difference sections of .” 64 The key variable here is education. Higher levels of education, as one would expect, provide people with greater ability to process and more motivation to search out information as well as more skill in assessing it by manipulating concepts. 65 40 Petty and Cacioppo have sought to conceptualise the operations of differing schemas through their Elaboration Likelihood model. Elaboration refers to the extent to which a

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person “scrutinises the issue-relevant arguments contained in the persuasive communication” with the propensity to do so a function of “a person’s motivation and ability to evaluate the communication presented.” 66 They distinguish here between two distinct modes of response to communications, the “central” and “peripheral.” The “central” mode takes the form of a considered and thoughtful examination of the arguments and evidence. Those who follow the “peripheral route”, in contrast, respond less to the substance of the message than to “some simple cue in the persuasion context”, e.g., an attractive or appealing source. 67 41 The assumption made by most analysts, journalists and pollsters is that the bulk of voters process political messages through the central (or rational) mode. In fact, as indicated above, the majority of people consume political messages and information with a very modest degree of rational engagement. They tend to be “unfamiliar with ideological constructs; often unable to define or explain them; and anyway not much interested to make use of them.” 68 Politics is at most a side-show in the drama of their lives, a poor competitor with more pressing and rewarding pursuits. They do not attend closely to what is happening, do not utilise reliable sources of information, do not engage in prolonged cognitive activity, find handling abstract concepts time-consuming and often rely on affect-driven heuristics in making judgments. In their survey of focus group findings, Mattinson and Tyndall concluded that “many voters do not understand how politics works. Some find the constant change, impenetrable language and many layers of political structures complicated and confusing. …. voters find it hard to understand the issues, hard to relate to the politicians, and hard to trust the process.” 69 42 In short, the larger portion of the electorate relies heavily on the “peripheral route” to ingesting political information. In this process negative or positive cues – e.g. politicians’ appearance, facial expressions, general demeanour and likeability – are of crucial importance. For these dwellers in Plato’s cave it is “the shadows of the images” than matter most. All this is neatly illustrated by the much publicised incident of what the Sun called Miliband’s “bacon sandwich disaster photo.” 70 In May 2014 Miliband was photographed munching a bacon sandwich. This rapidly evolved into a major news item (with hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube). For the Mail, the “pictures of him clumsily scoffing a bacon-and-ketchup sandwich” was “a desperate attempt to [make him] look like a man of the people” – but instead demonstrated that he was an unelectable “Mr Weirdo.” 71 Such a man was plainly utterly unsuited for the premiership. Other newspapers, the broadcasters and the social media, followed suit to such a degree that Miliband’s and the bacon sandwich entered into popular folklore. It appeared to operate as an effective persuasion cue consolidating a highly negative image of Miliband

Labour’s narrative failure

43 If the way in which people absorb information is a function of their schemas or cognitive maps what role, then, can a party’s communications strategy have? The first point to stress is that is that whilst opinion-formation is an individual act it takes place in a collective process and in a social context. People, in responding to events and making judgments draw heavily upon the wider world of debate, argument and political advocacy.72 In other words, “how we think and what we think is rooted in the

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particular set of meaning-saturated signs and symbols we inherit in a given political setting.” 73

44 This leads to a second point. Public opinion is not fixed and immutable. Rather “people are active, thinking and feeling agents whose perceptions and understandings of the world...are always subject to change as a consequence of how they experience a world that is itself subject to change.” 74 Opinions are often in a process of flux as people’s schemas interact with their experiences and observations of the social world which are, in turn, filtered through the mass media. This brings us to the third, fundamental, point. Reality is not simply a given set of facts containing their own, intrinsic meaning: it is the outcome of a process of construction. 75 Because the meanings of issues, problems and events are not self- evident, how make sense of them is primarily a function of the interpretive framework people use. These frameworks have been labelled “narratives”. 76 45 A narrative has been defined as “a fundamental way in which we grasp the meaning and the ordering of the events we experience and in particular of how we understand human actions and their effects.” 77 Narratives supply the mental maps which confer some sort of intelligibility on the raw data of events and experiences.78 Since the process of narration is an inherently social one 79 political parties can make strategic interventions: by highlighting issues for debate, delineating problems, invoking values and proposing policy solutions they contribute to the gradual unfolding of the public conversation. 80 Crucial to the success of a party’s persuasive strategy is its ability to mobilise mass content for its favoured narrative. 81 This involves framing. 46 As noted above, framing occurs where particular aspects of reality are chosen and magnified with the intention of eliciting support for a preferred understanding of societal ills and a preferred set of recipes.82 It entails distilling from an otherwise “ overwhelmingly complex reality” a particular narrative or story-line to enable the essential features of a problem to be readily grasped.83 “Research suggests” an influential psychologist commented, “that our minds naturally seek out stories with a particular kind of structure, something that is coherent, has an initial setting, protagonists, a problem that constitutes the central story line, obstacles that stand in the way, a sense of who the main protagonists are, and some form of resolution.”84 47 The Conservatives, as we show, understood the importance of narratives but Labour, crucially, failed to do so. The central hypothesis of this rest of this article is that this failure had a fatally disabling impact of the party’s strategy gravely impairing its capacity to intervene effectively in the national debate. The point is illustrated by a case study of Labour’s feeble, listless and ineffective economic campaign. 48 As we have seen, valence theory stipulates economic credibility as one of the key heuristics determining partisan choice, and on this criterion the Conservatives outshone Labour by a handsome margin. Some might argue that this simply reflected objective circumstances from 2013 onwards, with rapidly falling unemployment, revived growth and price stability. This certainly gave some credence to Tory claims. On the other hand, the period 2010-2015 was one of stagnant and for many falling living standards and growing economic insecurity. The post-recession recovery has been the most sluggish on record, productivity had hardly risen and was lagging well behind comparable countries and the UK was running a very high balance of payments deficit. 85 One survey of prominent macroeconomists found that two thirds of respondents disagreed with the proposition that Coalition policies had had a positive effect, whilst only 15% agreed.86 Oxford University economics Professor Simon Wren-

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Lewis concluded, the Conservatives had “presided over the worst recovery from a recession for hundreds of years, and an unprecedented fall in real wages.”87 49 If Tory economic success was not self-evident why then did people judge it favourably? Economic issues are incredibly complex and research has found that most voters are unfamiliar with economic concepts and experience difficulty in making sense of economic data.88 Why then did voters consistently rate Labour as much less capable of running the economy than the Conservatives? Two considerations seem to have been particularly influential:

Attributions of responsibility for the financial crisis

50 A crucial aspect of a frame is the cognitive mechanism of “responsibility attribution”. The process of stipulating who is responsible for a particular problem “reduces information and decision costs and provides a ready basis for political judgment.”89 The Conservatives (and LibDems) were quick to recognise this. The economic narrative propounded by the Coalition to depict the economic crisis was simple, cogent and straightforward with the adept use of easily-digested and vivid images and pithy, punchy soundbites all of which were endlessly repeated. It was “all Labour’s mess”. The financial crash occurred had occurred on its watch. Labour had brought the economy to the edge of bankruptcy through extravagant over-spending and piling-up debt. It had “maxed out on Britain’s credit card” and failed to “mend the roof when the sun was shining.” It had squandered money on the lazy and the pampered at the expense of “hard-working families”, splashing out great sums on a sprawling and swollen welfare system. It had disregarded the obvious fact that you had to balance the books and “you can’t spend what you don’t have”. These linguistic formulations resonated in part because they were reiterated and reinforced by most of the organs of mass opinion, in part because they gelled with “ common sense.” “Common sense”, Hall and O’Shea argued, “is a compendium of well-tried knowledge, customary beliefs, wise sayings, popular nostrums and prejudices”, rather like sedimented deposits which have been layered over the years and thereby gained a solid grasp on the public mind, acquiring the status of “the plainly obvious”.90 Anything that lies outside the preferred range of meanings was plainly wrong, even outlandish.

51 This was dramatically demonstrated when Miliband appeared before an audience of the popular news-programme, Question Time to field questions from the audience. He faced a series of angry questioners interrogating him over his party’s responsibility for the recession. When he bluntly denied that “Labour had caused the crisis” much of the Question Time audience exploded in a paroxysm of disbelieving rage. How could you have trust in someone who denied irrefutable fact? As a senior Labour MP, Alan Johnson, put it, “when that Question Time audience turned on Ed Miliband, the die was cast. The public became convinced that Labour had indeed driven the car into the ditch and declined to return the keys.”91 52 As Johnson added, “We seemed to have no effective riposte to Cameron’s successful distortion of our economic record in government.”92 Labour’s efforts to develop a rival economic narrative were halting, hesitant and half-hearted. Vital to effective framing is the ability to forge connections and weave together ideas in such a way as create “a coherent interpretation on the whirls of events and actions around us.” 93 But such framing was almost totally neglected by Labour. Instead it preferred bland, dull and banal soundbites and catchphrases like the “the cost-of-living crisis”, “the squeezed middle” and “

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a recovery made by the many and built to last.” Given the party’s heavy reliance on the broadcasting media to disseminate its message, it was especially damaging that, time and again, it used its access to scarce broadcasting time for point-scoring, denunciations of ministerial incompetence and cavils over policy details – the whole paraphernalia of knockabout politics which so bored and alienated voters. The opportunity for narrative-building went by default. 53 For the party’s right after the election, Miliband and Balls’ failure was not their inability to formulate a rival economic narrative but their reluctance to acknowledge the established one. By stubbornly refusing to apologise for Labour’s past fiscal improvidence they forfeited the voters’ trust.94 The problem with this analysis was that, quite simply, it involved giving credence to a myth. Whilst the UK’s public finances “ were not particularly strong compared with those of other advanced economies”, the prestigious Institute for Fiscal Studies maintained, equally they “were not in a bad state on the eve of the crisis”.95 The cause of the crash was, the Treasury’s top official, Sir Nicholas Macpherson declared, “a banking crisis pure and simple”, a view echoed by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England at the time.96 “The last government”, Wren-Lewis averred, “did not borrow excessively…The recession was a consequence of overleveraged banks and the collapse of the US housing markets.”97 The proposition that Labour’s fiscal stance caused the crisis of 2008-2009 was, Nobel Laureate economist Paul Krugman tartly put it, “nonsensical.”98 54 Labour’s huge mistake was not its unwillingness to “own-up” but its failure to contest the Tory narrative. As Lord Skidelsky (Keynes’ biographer) observed, it left “the telling of Labour’s story to the Conservatives.” As a result “the Conservatives have been able to take the narrative of the crisis away from Labour and turn their disastrous economic stewardship to political advantage.”99 Krugman was “astonished” by the limpness of Labour’s response to “the austerity push” and by its willingness “to accept claims that budget deficits are the biggest economic issue facing the nation.”100 The leading economic journalist, William Keegan, put the matter pithily: “Labour was ineffective in countering the Big Lie ….that Gordon brown was responsible for the recession.”101 It was, Krugman concluded, guilty of “an absolutely terrible job of making its case.”102 55 The contest for narrative ascendance is of crucial importance since most politically inattentive voters – the dwellers in Plato’s Cave – are, social psychological theory holds, “cognitive misers” who in making judgments will rely heavily on what ideas are most easily accessible. If only one interpretation of a problem is readily available then it is highly likely to be the only one noticed, understood and accepted.103 The Tories offered a well-crafted narrative which was relentlessly hammered home. Labour responded with, in the words of Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, “a minimalist agenda that was out of sync with the magnitude of the problems.”104 The Tory narrative monopolised the field and set the terms through which all subsequent debate was conducted.105 “The initial view of a social crisis caused by out-of-control capitalism”, Andrew Marr wrote, was replaced by the belief that it was a bloated, out-of-control state that was largely to blame. That has probably been the single most important political fact of the past five years.”106

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Judging economic competence

56 For a narrative to gain ascendancy, it has to “win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken- for-grantedness for itself”, which in turn involves “marginalizing, down-grading or de- legitimating alternative constructions.”107 Here the media play an essential role since voters are reliant on them for relaying and distilling complex information about the economy. They operate as communication gatekeepers “controlling what messages reach the public...through their control over the organisational channels of communication.”108

57 Labour’s problem here was that it inhabited a media environment in which most news organisations (including the broadcasters) were largely content to recycle received economic orthodoxy about the debt, the deficit, welfare spending and the purgative powers of austerity. The antipathy of most of the newspapers was predictable, given that right-wing newspapers commanded not far short of 90% of total readership. But Labour’s difficulty was compounded by the fact that most TV journalists and producers bought into the ruling austerity narrative. In broadcast interview after broadcast interview during the election campaign, Labour spokespeople were relentlessly interrogated about how precisely they could eliminate the deficit as if this was self- evidently the test of economic probity and good-sense. Krugman noted the striking contrast in the UK between “the consensus of professional economists” and “what passes for economic analysis in the news media — even in high-end newspapers and on elite-oriented TV shows.” At a time when the austerity paradigm had been discredited amongst most macroeconomics “to the point where hardly anyone still believes it” it was still uncritically accepted and regurgitated by the bulk of the UK media.109 58 A key role in shaping economic debate is also played by those who acquire the status as disinterested experts.110 In analysing those who appear on the media, Deacon and Golding distinguish between advocates, who are “associated with a particular position” and arbiters, who are “regarded as non-aligned providers of information.” The views of the latter “are treated with much greater deference.”111 The media (especially the broadcasters) regularly employ business representatives, especially from the City, as authoritative economic arbiters, seen as uniquely suited by virtue of their occupational location and specialist knowledge to pronounce on the health of the economy and on the feasibility of party policies.112 One study of the interpretations of the financial crisis found that City voices figured disproportionately in BBC programmes and they were treated “as impartial experts rather than as representatives of a sectional interest.”113 This follows a common and recurring pattern. In ’s terminology, these voices were “the accredited witnesses [….] who had a privileged access, as of right, to the world of public discourse and whose statements carried the representativeness and authority which permitted them to establish the primary framework or terms of an argument.”114 59 This posed a major problem for Labour. In angering business the party was incurring the enmity not only of a powerful bloc which wielded very considerable structural power but also of one which acted as an agent of legitimation, whose representatives – as “accredited witnesses” – were able to set the terms of the economic debate. The business community was particularly aggravated by the prospect of having to pay a higher rate (50%) of income tax115 which former Labour City minister, the financier Lord Myners, dubbed “predatory taxation” and “the politics of envy.”116 During the election campaign, a letter signed by 103 senior business leaders (including a number who had backed New Labour) warned that a “change in course” would “put the recovery at risk” and

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would “threaten jobs and deter investment.”117 This received very extensive and mainly uncritical extensive media coverage – far fuller than the survey of macroeconomists mentioned above that appeared on the same day118 – and was treated as informed and impartial commentary. The perception that Labour would be “bad for business” and, therefore, “bad for the British economy”, framed much of the debate on economic issues in broadcasting as well as most of the press. 60 To Blairite critics after the election, Miliband had “allowed the impression to arise that we were not on the side of those who are doing well” and “creating wealth”119 and, except for Jeremy Corby, the contenders to replace him as leader all admonished him for heedlessly offending business.120 (ostensibly a non-Blairite) called for an admission that Labour “got it wrong on business” and promised that under his leadership Labour would “celebrate the spirit of enterprise”, praise “the everyday [business] heroes of our society” and “champion wealth creation.”121 Former shadow chancellor Ed Balls after the election criticised what he dubbed as Miliband’s “anti-business” stance adding that it “was no secret that I thought from the very beginning that Ed needed to position himself better with business.”122 61 In fact it can be argued that “anti-business” Labour had exhibited a circumspection verging on timidity towards business.123 Over the years business organisations, especially in the financial sector, had been found to be responsible for endemic malpractices including a long series of mis-selling scandals, over mortgage endowments, personal pensions, Personal Protection Insurance (PPI), card protection insurance and interest-rate swaps; and major cases of rigging of interest rate (Libor) and exchange rate (Forex) markets, both of which had cost the banks and insurance companies billions of pounds in compensation and fines. To this can be added the countless billions lost to government revenues through rampant and massive tax evasion and avoidance, hugely dwarfing much-publicised welfare fraud.124 62 Most damaging of all was the deep involvement of British banks and other financial institutions in the speculation-driven financial crash. None of the above issues (with the partial exception of tax avoidance) figured prominently in Labour’s campaigning and the occasional criticism of business tended to be tentative, hesitant and very carefully modulated. For example, there was no systematic analysis of industry’s poor record in productivity, investment and employee training largely responsible for the weak performance of UK manufacturing. 63 But in the eyes the right of the party it appeared the behaviour of the financial and corporate sector should be more or less exempt from critical invigilation, certainly on any sustained and rigorous manner. Lord Mandelson, a senior minister in the Brown government, averred that Labour would never be seen to be economically credible without demonstrating that it “understood business.” 125 In effect, what was good for British business was good for the nation as a whole. Some time ago, Crouch pointed out that New Labour was “moving beyond the rapprochement and co-operation with business interests which is essential to all social democratic parties to becoming simply a business party.” 126 That movement stalled under Miliband: whether it should resume, as the party’s right urged, became a matter of some contention in the leadership race, and the outlook remains unclear.

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Conclusion

64 None of Labour’s four predicaments was resolved and any prospect of victory slid away. Crucial to effective campaigning is the capacity “to define the party and its principles in a way that is emotionally compelling and tells a coherent story of what its members believe in.”127 Far from narrating such a story, the party was obsessed with short-term presentation, with grabbing favourable headlines through often disconnected policy initiatives and with wrong-footing the government in tactical manoeuvres that often left voters bored, exasperated and baffled. Initially some tentative efforts were made to play with larger themes, such as the flirtation with “” and “predatory versus responsible capitalism” but these soon vanished from Labour’s lexicon. The party then played with the idea of “”, drawing upon some Blue Labour ideas and formulating an approach that could appeal to both the poor and the “squeezed middle.” But the concept lacked clarity, precision and resonance, and the leadership was never fully committed. In 2013 the “omnishambles” budget which witnessed a slump in the Coalition’s popularity opened a gap between the two main parties, convincing the inner leadership that in could dispense with broader themes and rely instead on what Cruddas called a “minimalist, safety-first offer.”128 The “offer” consisted of a list of focus-group tested policy - but essentially un-coordinated - “winners” such as an energy price freeze, a 10% income tax band, a higher minimum wage and above all pledges for more nurses and doctors for the NHS. For the last two years of the 2010 Parliament Labour’s strategy was essentially two-pronged: a combination of advocacy of these policy “winners” and effort to undermine and discredit the Coalition’s record.

65 But even here Labour’s message too often was communicated in a hesitant and ambivalent manner, lacking confidence, clarity and consistency. The party denounced the heartlessness of coalition cuts, whilst conceding it would be unable to reverse them. It accepted some measures (caps on benefits) whilst rejecting others (the bedroom tax). It gravitated towards more stringent fiscal targets but appeared chary about specifying how they would be met. Above all, it was reluctant, to contest the right’s terms of engagement, “hiding its own good actions behind tough talk”, its “foggy messages hiding agonised ambivalence.”129 66 The most effective way in which politicians “ can manipulate the issue positions of voters [is] by manipulating the interpretations to which voters are exposed.”130 Labour’s faltering efforts here meant that too often voters were only exposed to one interpretation, that of the right. It had no rejoinder to the proponents of austerity and its response to the anti-welfare assault was often almost contrite and apologetic. As Stuart Hall and his colleagues presciently observed in 2013, “Labour is not yet winning hearts and minds. It shuttles between conflicting ways forward. ….. [and] appears tongue-tied when invited to enunciate an alternative set of principles, to outline a strategic political approach or to sketch out a compelling alternative vision.”131 67 For many within the party Labour was crushed because it had lost touch with reality. “ Not since 1983” frontbencher Tristram Hunt announced, “have we been so out of step with the prevailing mood of the nation.”132 As we have seen, on the crucial issues of the economy, immigration and welfare benefits, there was much truth in this claim. But here lay Labour’s ultimate predicament. Any party to gain office must take account of public opinion – but to what extent? What if that opinion sat uneasily not only with the party’s own values, ethos and tradition but with empirically verifiable reality? As the

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above account has shown, mass attitudes on contentious issues were often permeated by misconceptions, misinformation - or even plain prejudice. Such attitudes often formed the stuff of the “reality”, which, as Hunt and others contended, Labour had ignored. All “realities”, it could be admitted, are to some degree contrived but some more so than others. Labour’s final, perhaps debilitating, weakness was the inability or unwillingness of most of its leading figures to even confront this problem: to what extent should the party adjust its policies to reflect or seek to reshape popular opinion where that opinion does not form the basis for rational, effective and progressive policies?

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NOTES

1. With one major exception. The Tories’ late campaign claim that a minority Labour government propped up by the SNP would seriously destabilise the UK seemed to have persuaded many swing voters to rally behind them. 2. By “succeed” I mean gain more than 34% to 35% of the vote. 3. D. SANDERS et al., “Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 2, 2011, p 288. 4. See, e.g., P WHITELEY et al., “The Issue Agenda and Voting in 2005”, Parliamentary Affairs vol. 58, n° 4, 2005. 5. H. CLARKE et al. Political Choice in Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 28. 6. YouGov poll, Sunday Times 16 November 2014. 7. It is worth noting here that Osborne recruited an ex BBC producer to address his own lack of personal appeal – in his case with a considerable degree of success. 8. M. HASAN AND J. MACINTRYRE, Ed: The Milibands, London: Biteback Publishing, 2012, p.305.

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9. In January 2015 one political editor congratulated Miliband after an effectively-delivered speech but then added “I’m sorry about all the terrible things we are now going to write about you.” R. BEHR, “The Making of Ed Miliband”, Guardian April 15 2015. 10. M. HASAN AND J. MACINTRYRE, op. cit. pp. 240-1,326; T. BALE, Five Year Mission: The Labour party under Ed Miliband, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 86; Guardian 10 November 2014; conversation with senior political journalist. 11. S. RICHARDS, “The mood around Ed Miliband is one of paranoia and suspicion”, New Statesman, 3 April 2014. 12. P. KELLNER, “Round One to Miliband”, 29 March 2015. https://yougov.co.uk/news/ 2015/03/30/round-one-miliband/YouGov. Accessed 7 April 2015. 13. WHITELEY et al., 2005, op. cit. pp. 803-4. 14. P. KELLNER, “Osborne’s two-stage Budget gamble”, YouGov. 23 March 2015. https:// yougov.co.uk/news/2015/03/23/osbornes-two-stage-budget-gamble/. Accessed 25 March 2015 15. See e.g. Stewart (Lord) WOOD, “We need to talk about the “Middle””, Open Democracy, 15 February 2013). https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/stewart-wood/we-need-to-talk- about-middle. Accessed 16 March 2015. Wood was Miliband’s senior economic advisor. 16. THE GUARDIAN, 17 November 2011. 17. HASAN AND MACINTRYRE op. cit. p. 322. 18. BALE op. cit. pp 76-7; Independent 6 Feb. 2015; Independent on Sunday 8 February 2015. 19. G. COOKE et al, In the Black Labour: Why fiscal conservatism and social justice go hand-in-hand, London: Policy Network, 2011, p3. See also P. DIAMOND AND G. RADICE, Southern Discomfort One Year On, London: Policy Network, 2011; BALE op. cit. p. 73; Martin KETTLE Guardian 11 December 2014. 20. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 22 September 2014; MP, Shadow Treasury Minister, Guardian 30 May 2014. 21. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 March 2014; Guardian 22 September 2014. 22. Cited in 1 February 2015. 23. These included the 50% additional rate of income tax, cuts to pension tax credit for higher earners, higher taxes on tobacco companies and hedge funds and a windfall levy on bankers’ bonuses. 24. Ed MILIBAND, speech to the Welsh Labour Annual Conference, 14 February 2015; Guardian 8 April 2015. 25. THE GUARDIAN, 13 April 2013; Labour Party Manifesto, Britain Can Be Better, London: Labour party. 26. YouGov. “Government Spending Cuts”, 20 February 2015 https:// d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/2r9kn9ifym/YG-Archive-Pol-Sun- results-190215.pdf; Accessed 27 February 2015. YouGov. “Daily Briefing”, 15 April 2015. https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/ cumulus_uploads/document/4eu9xrll80/ TimesRedBoxResults_150414_Labour_borrowing_Website.pdf Accessed 17 April 2015. 27. R. FORD, R. MORRELL AND A. HEATH, ““Fewer but better”? Public views about immigration” in A. PARK et al. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 29th Report London: NatCen Social Research, 2012. “Immigrants” is a term loosely used in popular parlance to include asylum-seekers, EU migrants and indeed members of ethnic minorities born in the UK. 28. Lord ASHCOFT, Small Island: Public Opinion and the Politics of Immigration, 2011. http:// lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/LORD-ASHCROFT-Public-opinion-and-the- politics-of-immigration2.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2015. 29. FORD et al., op. cit. p33; G. EVANS AND K. CHZHEN, “Explaining Voters’ Defection from Labour over the period 2005–10” Political Studies, vol. 61, n° S1, 2113, p150; S. CAREY and A. GEDDES, “Less

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Is More: Immigration and European Integration at the 2010 General Election” Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 63, n° 4, 2010, p. 853. 30. DIAMOND AND RADICE op. cit. p. 19. 31. Matthew GOODWIN and Caitlin MILAZZO, Guardian 24 June 2014. 32. Ed MILIBAND, Acceptance speech to Labour party conference, Sept. 2010 http:// www2.labour.org.uk/ed-miliband---a-new-generation. Accessed 12 March 2015. 33. Ed MILIBAND, Speech on immigration to Institute of Public Policy Research, June 2012. http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2012/06/22/ed-miliband-s-immigration-speech- in-full. Accessed 9 April 2015. 34. LABOUR PARTY, 2015, op. cit. pp. 49-50. 35. Cited in R PHILPOTT, “The politics of delusion” Progress, 15 May, 2015. http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2015/05/15/the-politics-of-delusion/. Accessed 27 May 2015. 36. Mark FERGUSON, Labour List, November 13, 2013 37. MILIBAND, 2012, op. cit. 38. YouGov. 26 June 2013 https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/ az5cybaaw2/YouGov-IPPR-results-130606-Welfare.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2015. 39. J CURTICE and R ORMSTON, (eds.) (2015) British Social Attitudes: The 32nd Report, London: NatCen Research, pp. 78-9. 40. R. M. ENTMAN, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, Journal of Communication, vol. 43, n° 4, 1993, p. 52. 41. PARK et al., op. cit.; P. TAYLOR-GOOBY, “Why Do People Stigmatise the Poor at a Time of Rapidly Increasing Inequality, and What Can Be Done About It?”, Political Quarterly vol. 84, n° 1, 2013; J. H. McKENDRICK et al., The media, poverty and public opinion in the UK, London: Rowntree Foundation, 2008 http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/2224-poverty-media-opinion.pdf p. 50. Accessed 17 March 2015. 42. CURTICE and ORMSTON, op. cit. p. 82. 43. E. CLERY, L. LEE and S. KUNZ, Tough on People in Poverty, London: Rowntree Foundation, 2013, http://www.jrf.org.uk/media-centre/tough-attitudes-poverty. Accessed 18 March 2015; TAYLOR- GOOBY op. cit. ; CURTICE and ORMSTON, op. cit. p. 82. 44. McKENDRICK et al., op. cit. 45. L. BYRNE, “Why did Labour Lose? and How Do We Win Again?” 2010. http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2010/05/20/why-did-labour-lose-and-how-do-we-win- again/. Accessed 6 January 2015. 46. T. BALE, 2015, op. cit. , p. 150. 47. P. DIAMOND AND G. RADICE, Southern Discomfort Again, London: Policy Network, 2010 pp. 26, 9. 48. C. LEADBETTER, “Back to the Future”, Marxism Today, May 1989 p15. 49. H BEIDER, “Whiteness, Class and Grassroots Perspectives on Social Change and Difference”, Political Quarterly, vol. 85, n° 3, 2014. 50. P. TOYNBEE, Guardian 6 January 2012. 51. , 26 Sep 2011; see also BALE, 2015, op. cit., p. 83. 52. THE GUARDIAN, 25 March 2015. 53. T BALE, “Concede and Move On? One Nation Labour and the Welfare State”, Political Quarterly, vol. 84 n° 3, 2013, p. 344. 54. B. DUFFY, “Perceptions and Reality: Ten Things We Should Know about Attitudes to Immigration in the UK”, Political Quarterly, vol. 85, n° 3, 2014, p. 260. 55. P.KELLNER, YouGov. 13 Jan. 2014, “Welfare tourism: crisis, what crisis?” https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/01/13/welfare-tourism-crisis-what-crisis/. Accessed 19 March 2015.

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56. C. DUSTMANN and T. FRATTINI, “The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK”, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Discussion Paper Series CDP No 22/13, 2013, p. 27. 57. M MANACORDA, A MANNING and J WADSWORTH, “The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 10, n° 1, 2012 p. 27. 58. DUFFY, op. cit., pp. 261, 260. 59. THE INDEPENDENT, 4 January 3013. 60. BAPTIST UNION of Great Britain, METHODIST CHURCH, CHURCH OF SCOTLAND and the UNITED REFORM CHURCH, The lies we tell ourselves: ending comfortable myths about poverty, 2013, pp20, 26. http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/files/truth_and_lies_report_final.pdf Accessed 20 February 2015. 61. M. AUGUSTINOS and I. WALKER, Social Cognition: An integrated introduction, London: Sage, 1995, p. 42. See also P. CONOVER and S. FELDMAN, “How People Organise the Political World: A Schematic Model”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, n° 1, 1984. 62. AUGUSTINOS and I WALKER, op. cit. p. 68. 63. I. CRESPI, The Public Opinion Process, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 36; D. SWANSON, “A Constructivist Approach” in D. NIMMO and K. SANDERS (eds.), Handbook of Political Communication, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981, p. 177; D. BROUGHTON, Public Opinion Polling and Politics in Britain, London: Prentice-Hall, 1995, p. 187. 64. B. GUNTER, Poor Reception, London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1987, p. 108. See also J. P. ROBINSON and M. R. LEVY, The Main Source: Learning from Television News, London: Sage, 1986. 65. P. M. SNIDERMAN, R. A. BRODY and P. E. TETLOCK, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 9, 22; J. R. ZALLER, The Nature and Origins of Public Opinion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 18. 66. R. E. PETTY and J. T. CACIOPPO, Communication and Persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change, Springer Science & Business Media, 2012, p7 R. E. PETTY and J. T. CACIOPPO, “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion”, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 19, Academic Press, 1986 p. 129. 67. PETTY and CACIOPPO, 2012, op. cit. p. 13, 158; PETTY and CACIOPPO, 1986, op. cit. p. 125. 68. SNIDERMAN et al., op. cit. p. 87. 69. D MATTINSON and Z TYNDALL “Meet the Swing Voters”, Progress, December, 2013. http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2013/12/01/meet-the-swing-voters/. Accessed 20 January 2015. 70. Sun 24 May 2014. 71. THE DAILY MAIL, 24 May 214. 72. V. PRICE and D. F. ROBERTS “Public Opinion Processes” in R. BERGER and S. CHAFFEE (eds.), Handbook of Communication Science, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1987, pp. 783-4. 73. P. L. HAMMACK and A. PILECKI “Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Political Psychology”, Political Psychology, vol. 33, n° 1 2012, p. 82. 74. CRESPI, op. cit. p11. 75. STUART HALL, “The rediscovery of ideology”, in M. GUREVITCH et al. (eds.), Culture, Society and the Media, London, Methuen, 1982, pp. 64, 67. 76. HAMMACK and PILECKI, op. cit. 77. A. FINLAYSON, “From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 9, n° 4, 2007, p. 557. 78. F. FISCHER, Reframing Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 144. 79. HAMMACK and PILECKI, op. cit., p87. 80. T. LEEPER and R. SLOTHUUS, “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation”, Advances in Political Psychology, vol. 35, Suppl. 1, 2014, p. 132.

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81. D. A. STONE, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 104, n° 2, 1989, pp. 282-3. 82. ENTMAN, op. cit. p. 52. 83. D. SCHON and M. REIN, Frame Reflection, New York: Basic Books, 1994, p. 26. 84. D. WESTERN, The Political Brain, New York: Public Affairs, 2007, p. 146. 85. W. KEEGAN, Mr Osborne’s Economic Experiment , London: Searching Finance Ltd, 2014; D. SPENCER, State of the Nation: a dismal record for the UK economy, 2015. https:// theconversation.com/state-of-the-nation-a-dismal-record-for-the-uk-economy-39675. Accessed 20 May 2015. 86. Centre for Macroeconomics Survey, The Importance of Elections for UK Economic Activity March, 2015. http://cfmsurvey.org/surveys/importance-elections-uk-economic-activity. Accessed 8 April 2015. 87. S. WREN-LEWIS, Recognising the success of macroeconomic myths , 29 May 2015 http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/recognising-success-of-macroeconomic.html. Accessed 29 May 2015. See also S. WREN-LEWIS, “The Austerity Con.”, London Review of Books, vol. 37 n° 4, February 2015. 88. S. IYENGAR and V. OTTATI, “Cognitive Perspective in Political Psychology”, R. S. WYER and T. K. SRULL, Handbook of Social Cognition Vol 11 Applications, 2nd ed. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum 1994 p151; M. PEFFLEY, S. FELDMAN and L. SIGELMAN, “Economic Conditions and Party Competence: Processes of Belief Revision”, Journal of Politics, vol. 49, n° 1, 1987, p. 103. Whilst these studies refer to voters in the USA it highly likely to be equally applicable to their British counterparts. 89. PEFFLEY et al., op. cit. p. 104. 90. STUART HALL and A. O’SHEA, “Common-sense neoliberalism,” Soundings 2014 http:// www.lwbooks.co.uk/journals/soundings/pdfs/s55_hall_oshea.pdf. Accessed 21 April 2015. 91. THE GUARDIAN, 8 May 2015. 92. Ibid. 93. FISCHER, op. cit. p. 162. 94. See, e.g. , Independent 11 May 2015. 95. C. EMMERSON, P. JOHNSON and R. JOYCE, The Green Budget, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015, p. 16. 96. THE GUARDIAN, 3 May 2015; Guardian 29 December 2014. 97. THE INDEPENDENT, 3 May 2013. 98. P. KRUGMAN “The Austerity Delusion”, Guardian 29th April 2015. 99. R. SKIDELSKY “George Osborne’s cunning plan”, New Statesman 19 April 2015. 100. KRUGMAN op. Cit. 101. THE OBSERVER 17 May 2015. 102. P. KRUGMAN “Economics and Elections”, New York Times, 6 April 2015. 103. R. R. LAU, R. A. SMITH and S. T. FISKE, “Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and Political Persuasion”, Journal of Politics vol. 53, n° 1, 1991. 104. THE OBSERVER, 24 May 2015. 105. NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION, 2013: 2. 106. A MARR, “British politics is broken – the centre cannot hold,” New Statesman, 20 March 2015. 107. HALL, op. cit. p. 67. 108. CRESPI, op. cit. p. 69. 109. KRUGMAN, 6 April 2015, op. cit.; KRUGMAN, 29 April 2015, op. cit. 110. CRESPI, op. cit. p69. 111. D. DEACON and P. GOLDING, Taxation and representation: The media, political communication and the poll tax, Luton: University of Luton Press, 1994, p. 202. 112. S ALLAN, News Culture, Maidenhead: Open University Press, 1999, p. 68.

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113. M BERRY, “The Today programme and the banking crisis”, Journalism, vol. 14, n° 2, 2012 p. 267. 114. HALL op. cit. p. 67. 115. Surveys shared that this proposal was backed by 60% of voters, Observer 26 January 2014. Other policies disliked by business included the mansion tax, the additional levy on banks and restrictions on tax relief on pensions for the very wealthy. 116. THE OBSERVER 26 January 2014. 117. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 1 April 2015. 118. WREN-LEWIS, May 2015, op. cit. 119. Chuka UMUNNA, Guardian 9 May 2015. 120. THE OBSERVER, 17 May 2015, The Financial Times 18 May 2015, The Guardian 15 May 2015. See similar comments by Chris Leslie, the new Shadow Chancellor, The Observer 31 May 2015. 121. http://labourlist.org/2015/05/to-regain-trust-labour-must-admit-we-spent-too-much-says- burnham/. Accessed 25 August 2015. 122. THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 31 July 2015. 123. Indeed both Ed Balls and Chuka Umunna devoted considerable efforts to courting business. 124. See, e.g. N. SHAXTON, Treasure Islands, London: Vintage Books, 2012. 125. Lord Mandelson, Observer 10 May 2015. 126. , “The Parabola of Working-Class Politics”, Political Quarterly, vol. 70 n° 1, 1999. 127. WESTEN, op. cit. , p183. 128. Guardian 17 May 2015. 129. Polly TOYNBEE, Guardian 25 March 2015. 130. LAU et al., p. 670. 131. STUART HALL, D. MASSEY and M. RUSTIN, “After neoliberalism: analysing the present”, Soundings, vol. 53, Spring, 2013. MP articulated this alternative approach shortly after the election: “Labour only wins when it has a unifying, compelling, national popular story to tell… when it speaks in deeper, animated language about national prosperity and collective endeavour” Observer 17 May 2015. 132. Tristram Hunt, “The Forward March of Labour,” Speech to Demos 20 May 2015. http:// www.demos.co.uk/press_releases/the-forward-march-of-labour.

ABSTRACTS

This article discusses why the Labour party was highly unlikely to win the British general election of 2015. It does so by probing four major predicaments: lack of confidence in Ed Miliband as a potential Prime Minister, in Labour’s ability to run the economy, in its capacity to manage the explosive issue of immigration and in its will to tackle (alleged) pervasive welfare abuse. The article agrees that, in the key issues of the economy, immigration and social welfare Labour was quite out of tune with public perceptions and attitudes but then suggests these many of these were, in turn, at variance with empirically verifiable facts. The article then contends that political parties do have the capacity to modify public perceptions and attitudes but only be devising plausible alternative narratives. This the Labour party signally failed to do, disabling its capacity to resolve any of its four predicaments.

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Cet article montre pourquoi une victoire travailliste aux élections législatives de 2015 était peu probable, en analysant quatre obstacles principaux : le manque de confiance en Ed Miliband comme premier ministre potentiel, en la capacité des travaillistes à gérer l’économie, en leur capacité à se saisir de l’enjeux potentiel explosif de l’immigration, et en sa détermination à s’attaquer à la fraude aux allocations sociales, supposément très répandue. Cet article accepte l’idée selon laquelle, sur l’économie, l’immigration et l’Etat-providence, le parti travailliste était en décalage avec les perceptions et les attitudes dominantes dans l’opinion publique, mais il suggère aussi que ces perceptions et attitudes étaient elles-mêmes en décalage avec les faits vérifiables empiriquement. L’article avance ensuite que les partis politiques ont la capacité d’influer sur les perceptions et les attitudes, mais seulement en construisant des discours alternatifs plausibles. C’est ce en quoi le parti travailliste a échoué de manière spectaculaire, se privant ainsi des moyens de surmonter ses quatre obstacles.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Parti travailliste, opinion publique, discours politiques, communication politique, Ed Miliband Keywords: Labour party, public opinion, political narratives, persuasive communication, Ed Miliband

AUTHOR

ERIC SHAW

University of Stirling

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La fabrique des députés ou l'art de sélectionner les candidats travaillistes et conservateurs aux élections législatives de 2015 Crafting the Commons: The Art of Selecting Conservative and Labour Parliamentary Candidates for the 2015 General Election

Agnès Alexandre-Collier et Emmanuelle Avril

Introduction

1 La sélection des candidats est l’une des premières actions à accomplir en vue d’élections : c’est le premier maillon de la chaîne de la délégation, colonne vertébrale du système de démocratie représentative. La sélection des candidats est donc aussi l’une des actions les plus importantes, mobilisant des acteurs ayant des objectifs divers et parfois contradictoires, ce qui nécessite de trouver un compromis entre, d’une part, le contrôle exercé par le centre, et, d’autre part, l’autonomie associée à la démocratie locale1. En Grande-Bretagne, cette tension entre le fonctionnement oligarchique des grands partis britanniques et le désir accru de démocratie locale au niveau des sections locales est aussi l’un des principaux problèmes que pose la sélection des candidats.

2 Cette sélection est l’une (voire la) fonction fondamentale des partis politiques dans les démocraties représentatives2 et ce d’autant plus dans un système parlementaire comme la Grande-Bretagne où l’exécutif émane du Parlement. De plus, le mode de scrutin et le fait que près des deux tiers des sièges sont considérés comme « sûrs » (safe) c'est-à-dire acquis à l’un des partis en compétition, expliquent l’équation selon laquelle sélectionner un candidat équivaut à choisir un député. La sélection des candidats détermine non seulement le choix proposé aux électeurs mais aussi la composition de la Chambre des Communes et donc du Gouvernement. Du point de vue des adhérents, l’influence exercée sur ce processus de sélection est souvent considérée comme une

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justification majeure de l’adhésion. Ce processus est donc à la fois une arène permettant l’expression de conflits de pouvoir internes et le moyen par lequel les partis contrôlent le recrutement et le comportement des élus3. C’est aussi l’une des procédures les moins visibles et à bien des égards très mystérieuse, rarement étudiée en dehors des États-Unis, et à propos de laquelle on trouve encore peu d’études empiriques car l’accès aux données reste très difficile. Malgré une volonté récente de transparence, il s’agit d’un processus qui reste en effet marqué par le sceau du secret. L’objet de cet article sera précisément de faire la lumière sur les mécanismes qui, au sein des partis conservateur et travailliste, président à la fabrication d’une élite parlementaire, laquelle, dans ce pays plus qu’ailleurs, concentre l’essentiel du pouvoir. 3 Il s’agit de replacer les décisions stratégiques qui ont présidé à la sélection des candidats pour les élections législatives de 2015 dans une perspective plus générale afin de voir si l’on assiste à une simple consolidation, à des réorientations, voire à des renversements de tendances. Le point commun entre les deux partis réside dans l’origine des réformes entreprises, qui peuvent être qualifiées de top-down en ce sens qu’elles ne proviennent pas de la base, généralement satisfaite de ses prérogatives et de la part d’autonomie qui lui est laissée pour la sélection du candidat local, mais sont à l’instigation exclusive de la hiérarchie du parti. Les réformes sont pour l’essentiel motivées par la nécessité de pallier le déclin inéluctable de l’identification partisane - ou désaffiliation (party dealignement)4 - qui s’illustre par une baisse du nombre d’adhérents5 et une augmentation critique du taux d’abstention aux élections, conjuguée à une volonté croissante de démocratisation interne, dans le cadre de ce que l’on peut qualifier d’ « injonction délibérative »6 et qui pèse de plus en plus sur les organisations politiques au sens large. De fait, comme Hazan et Rahat le montrent, la réforme de la sélection des candidats vise à servir simultanément plusieurs objectifs7, qui vont de l’accroissement de la diversité des candidats, à l’encouragement de la participation citoyenne, en passant par la sélection de candidats dotés des compétences requises et la limitation des conflits entre la base et le leadership. 4 En Grande-Bretagne, comme dans la plupart des pays européens, la sélection des candidats est considérée comme la prérogative des sections locales mais cette prérogative reste étroitement contrôlée par le centre, les militants étant régulièrement accusés de sélectionner des candidats peu représentatifs de l’électorat. C’est donc pour répondre à la critique d’une élite parlementaire principalement blanche et masculine, et souvent issue de catégories sociales plus aisées, que les leaders des deux principaux partis (auxquels on pourrait ajouter celui du parti libéral-démocrate même si ce n’est pas l’objet de cet article) ont pris des mesures encourageant une meilleure représentativité en termes de sexe et d’ethnicité. L’introduction des All-Women Shortlists (AWS) chez les travaillistes au début des années 1990 et d’une liste prioritaire - la A-List - chez les conservateurs dès 2006, en est l’exemple le plus probant. Conduites au nom de la « démocratisation », ces réformes, généralement entreprises dans le cadre d’une profonde refonte organisationnelle du parti, ont introduit des procédures délibératives visant à mieux associer les militants, voire l’électorat, aux processus internes de décision. Ce faisant, elles impliquent une remise en cause du principe de l’autonomie des sections locales chez les conservateurs et de celui de la centralité du militant chez les travaillistes. C’est ce qui explique que, dans ces deux partis, ce processus soit devenu l’une des principales sources de tension entre la direction nationale et les adhérents, comme les deux sections de cet article s’efforceront de le montrer. La comparaison de ces deux partis de statut comparable au sein d’un même système, tout

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en faisant ressortir certaines tendances lourdes qui seront soulignées en conclusion, permet d’analyser plus finement la nature de chaque parti et la spécificité de ses luttes internes (en particulier la relation entre leadership et base) ainsi que la manière dont chacun gère ses relations avec les électeurs, ce que les études comparatives plus vastes, dominantes à l’heure actuelle sur ce sujet, ne permettent pas d’envisager.

La sélection des candidats conservateurs

5 La nature même du parti conservateur explique en grande partie les modes de sélection des candidats parlementaires, leurs failles et les réformes introduites en 19988 pour améliorer le dispositif. Le parti a longtemps été présenté comme l’idéal type du modèle oligarchique centré autour du leader et d’une poignée de dirigeants concentrant l’essentiel du pouvoir. L’image du « cercle magique » appliquée à l’équipe dirigeante a, jusqu’en 1965, illustré une structure peu démocratique, entièrement tendue vers l’émergence d’une équipe pressentie comme capable de prendre les rênes du pouvoir. D’une certaine manière, la sélection des candidats parlementaires reproduisait, au niveau local, cette oligarchie, en fabriquant une élite parlementaire démographiquement et socialement semblable à l’équipe dirigeante mais peu représentative de sa base électorale et militante. Malgré ce mimétisme, la structure même du parti permettait aux sections locales de jouir d’une certaine autonomie et, jusqu’en 1998, on peut dire que les sections locales et le siège entretenaient une relation assez distendue, chaque composante conservant sa propre sphère d’influence. Cette relation a fait l’objet d’une abondante littérature, Peter Mair9 évoquant par exemple, en 1994, un fonctionnement qu’il appelle « stratarchique » du parti conservateur, c’est-à-dire permettant aux différentes composantes de fonctionner comme des strates disposant, chacune, de compétences et de prérogatives propres. Plus explicitement, Kenneth Carty10 évoque le modèle du « parti-franchise » permettant de clarifier la relation entre le siège et les sections locales en comparant ces dernières à des franchises du parti, dont le rôle est bien de diffuser et vendre la « marque » conservatrice mais qui disposent d’une grande autonomie, voire fonctionneraient de manière semi-autarcique comme en témoignent notamment leurs modes de sélection des candidats.

6 Jusqu’en 1998, la sélection des candidats est un processus relativement uniforme dans lequel le siège et les sections locales interviennent de manière alternée et équivalente, à toutes les étapes du processus. Pour pouvoir participer au processus, les postulants doivent préalablement figurer sur une « liste approuvée » par la direction nationale, après avoir subi une série de tests. Cette étape essentielle est celle du « Parliamentary Selection Board » (PSB) qui s’inspire de la procédure d’entraînement des officiers de l’armée telle qu’elle se pratique dans l’école militaire de Sandhurst. La liste élaborée à la suite du PSB est ainsi décrite comme « un menu fixe »11 dans lequel les sections locales sont invitées à piocher. Chaque section locale peut alors recevoir une trentaine de postulants approuvés, à partir de laquelle sera établie une liste courte de trois ou quatre postulants présélectionnés à l’issue d’un jeu d’interviews conduits en alternance par le siège et la section locale. La dernière étape (« general meeting ») rassemble ensuite tous les membres actifs de la section locale et les adhérents de la circonscription, présents lors de l’assemblée, pour élire celui qui deviendra leur candidat.

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7 Ce dispositif, qui permet aux circonscriptions de jouir d’une autonomie relative par rapport au siège, a néanmoins produit ses propres effets pervers, à savoir une sélection nettement biaisée en faveur d’un même type de candidat blanc, masculin et issu d’un système éducatif sélectif et privé. Autrement dit, jusqu’en 1998, le manque de représentativité des candidats conservateurs et de diversité au sein du groupe parlementaire est perçu comme le résultat d’une sélection trop ancrée dans les sections locales et presque entièrement laissées aux mains des militants sans contrôle véritable par le siège. 8 C’est dans cet esprit que vont être conduites les réformes organisationnelles introduites par le leader de l’époque William Hague à la suite de l’humiliant revers électoral de 1997. L’objectif de ces réformes était double : officiellement, il s’agissait de démocratiser l’organisation partisane en introduisant des dispositifs plus délibératifs entre les dirigeants et la base. Ainsi les adhérents furent-ils invités à participer à l’élection du leader et à prendre part plus activement au processus de décision par des consultations plus régulière sous forme de « focus groups » et de référendums internes. Officieusement, il s’agissait pour le siège de mieux centraliser les décisions. Cette centralisation fut rendue possible par l’introduction de nouveaux statuts permettant d’unifier l’organisation désormais chapeautée par un bureau politique (« Party Board ») ayant un droit de regard sur toutes les composantes du parti, en particulier les sections locales. En matière de sélection des candidats, les réformes de 1998 n’envisageaient cependant que des ajustements à la marge, comme le remplacement du « Parliamentary Selection Board » par un « Parliamentary Assessment Board » prévoyant un mode de recrutement fondé sur des compétences de communication, de gouvernance et de motivation, et calquée non plus sur le modèle de l’armée mais sur celui de l’entreprise. Néanmoins l’un des effets indirects des réformes de 1998 a été d’accroître la centralisation et le contrôle sur la sélection des candidats puisque le siège est désormais présent, de manière presque systématique, à chaque étape de la procédure.

Les mécanismes de sélection

9 Ainsi, depuis 1998, la procédure de sélection des candidats, justifiée par une volonté d’améliorer la représentativité, révèle une centralisation accrue de la structure organisationnelle.

10 Tableau 1

11 Standard Conservative Candidate Selection Process (2010)

12 a) Nominated by local associations Apply via CV

13 CCHQ sift

14 b) Parliamentary Assessment Board (PAB)

15 c) Acceptance onto Approved List / A-List

16 d) Constituency CV Sift

17 e) Long List

18 f) Selection Committee Interviews

19 g) Shortlisting by Selection Committees

20 h) General Meeting to select committee

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21 Source : Williams et Paun (2011), p. 1

22 Le processus est agencé autour de plusieurs étapes qui, jusqu’en 2003, sont les mêmes pour toutes les sections locales. Il reste très semblable à ce qu'il était avant 1998. Pour pouvoir se présenter dans la circonscription de leur choix, les postulants doivent, au préalable, être approuvés par le siège. Pour figurer sur la liste approuvée par le siège (« approved list »), ils doivent d'abord envoyer leur CV au siège puis subir une journée de tests lors du Parliamentary Assessment Board. A l’issue de cette étape, il reste une trentaine de candidats « approuvés » qui sont ensuite interviewés alternativement par la section locale et le siège à partir de la liste préalable qui passe ainsi d’une trentaine de personnes à trois ou quatre postulants. Ce sont sur ces postulants que vont se prononcer les adhérents de la section réunis lors d’une assemblée (« general meeting ») organisée dans la section locale. 23 Les réformes de 1998 ont toutefois fait apparaître un rôle accru du siège (CCHQ) par rapport à la procédure antérieure. Le siège intervient désormais à chaque étape de la procédure, y compris dans celles qui étaient jusqu'à présent réservées aux sections locales, qu’il s’agisse du tri des CV opéré par le Candidates’ Team au CCHQ, du Parliamentary Assessment Board qu’il organise, des entretiens qu’il mène en parallèle avec les sections locales, de l’approbation des trois ou quatre candidats choisis par la circonscription, voire dans l’ultime étape où un représentant du siège est désormais présent pour scruter, arbitrer et contrôler le déroulement de cette réunion finale. Non seulement la sélection des candidats s’avère-t-elle encore plus centralisée, mais le problème de la sous-représentation des femmes et des minorités ethniques n’est pas réglé pour autant. Les réformes de 1998 sont vite accusées de révéler la véritable nature - oligarchique - de l’organisation sous couvert de démocratisation, en propulsant le leader à la tête d’une immense structure désormais unifiée et en lui permettant de garder la mainmise sur la moindre composante, y compris les sections locales jadis très autonomes. 24 Dès 2005, deux dispositifs vont donc être introduits pour corriger les failles des réformes de 1998, visant à améliorer la représentativité du groupe parlementaire et compenser, cinq ans après la publication de A Fresh Future for the Conservative Party, la centralisation accrue de l’organisation partisane. Une liste parallèle – ou A-list - est proposée aux sections locales qui ont désormais le choix entre les postulants de la liste approuvée et ceux de la A-list. Cette liste prioritaire comprend une centaine de candidats dont 50% doivent être des femmes et une proportion significative de minorités ethniques. Or les critères permettant aux postulants de figurer sur cette liste sont très opaques et les postulantes – essentiellement des femmes -, dont les compétences sont alors remises en cause, sont rapidement accusées d’avoir été parachutées par le siège sans avoir à subir de tests de sélection. La même année sont introduites dans les sections locales qui en font la demande les premières primaires ouvertes permettant aux électeurs qui s’inscrivent de participer au vote final pour sélectionner le candidat. Ainsi la procédure reste la même à l’exception de la dernière réunion jadis réservée aux adhérents et désormais ouverte aux électeurs. Dès l’élection de David Cameron à la tête du parti, ces dispositifs innovants vont être rapidement étendus et vendus par le dirigeant comme un instrument de la modernisation qu’il compte opérer au sein du parti. De 2006 à 2009, ce sont ainsi 116 primaires qui sont organisées dans les sections locales. Il s’agit uniquement d’assemblée primaires (« primary meetings ») réunissant adhérents et électeurs inscrits. En mai 2009, deux

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primaires postales sont organisées à Totnes et à la suite du scandales des notes de frais et destinées à sélectionner le candidat conservateur avant les élections partielles. Avant les élections de mai 2015, seules 26 primaires ont été organisées et le processus, encensé par David Cameron en 2010, s’est considérablement essoufflé, n’ayant pas permis au parti d’être plus représentatif ni de fonctionner plus démocratiquement. Le dispositif a été en effet, une fois de plus, rigoureusement contrôlé par le centre, comme si les mesures de démocratisation - qui évoquent l’idée d'une ouverture horizontale vers la société civile - devaient nécessairement s’accompagner d'un mouvement vertical de centralisation qui chercherait à en limiter les effets pervers. Ainsi les primaires sont-elles restées un dispositif expérimental et voué à l’échec en raison d’un taux de participation toujours très faible12, d’un résultat équivalent à celui de la sélection traditionnelle en termes de représentativité et de ses effets présumés sur le comportement parlementaire du député issu d’une primaire13. Symboliquement, les primaires ont toutefois abouti à des résultats intéressants dans certaines circonscriptions, comme les élections de 2015 ont pu le laisser entrevoir. Ainsi, selon nos estimations, sur les 26 primaires organisées avant 2015, 19 ont abouti à l’élection d’un candidat conservateur. Si 12 de ces circonscriptions étaient traditionnellement acquises au parti conservateur (safe seats), la quasi-totalité des primaires organisées dans des circonscriptions marginales (4) ou acquises aux Libéraux-Démocrates (2) ont permis de faire basculer la circonscription dans le camp conservateur bien qu’il soit difficile de savoir si ce résultat est un effet de la primaire ou le produit d’autres facteurs. Quoi qu’il en soit, trois de ces circonscriptions, qui ont été très médiatisées, méritent d’être signalées : à Twickenham où le ténor du parti libéral- démocrate, Vince Cable, a perdu son siège (très sûr) au profit de la candidate conservatrice Tania Mathias et à Morley and Outwood où Ed Balls, le challenger présumé de Ed Miliband à la tête du parti, a perdu son poste au profit d’Andrea Jenkyns, les deux candidates conservatrices avaient été sélectionnées par une primaire ouverte. A Rochester and Strood, la candidate conservatrice, , qui a évincé l’un des deux députés UKIP, , qui avait quitté le parti conservateur en 2014 pour rejoindre le parti de Nigel Farage, venait d’être sélectionnée par une vaste primaire postale organisée par le parti à la suite de la défection de Reckless. Même si l’échantillon de 26 primaires ouvertes ne permet pas d’en tirer des conséquences significatives, il n’en reste pas moins que ces quelques expériences locales révèlent l’importance symbolique de la primaire sur trois plans : premièrement par la façon dont elle a permis de porter sur le devant de la scène certains candidats (comme Andrea Jenkyns, précédemment citée, très présente sur les réseaux sociaux) avant même les élections de 2015, deuxièmement en court-circuitant en quelque sorte la progression de partis comme le UKIP par l’introduction d’un dispositif qui à bien des égards peut être considéré comme l’un des instruments du populisme qu’ils affichent, troisièmement en contournant les adhérents pour permettre aux députés d’établir une connexion directe avec les électeurs, renforçant par la même la centralisation autour du leader.

Les effets : profil des candidats et des élus conservateurs14

25 S’il est difficile de mesurer l’effet de la A-list et des primaires ouvertes sur la représentativité du groupe parlementaire élu en mai 2015, il n’en reste pas moins que ces élections ont été saluées comme des élections historiques en matière de diversité

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sexuelle et ethnique. L'évolution est particulièrement frappante chez les conservateurs dont les députés comptent traditionnellement moins de femmes et de minorités ethniques. Il a pu être également étonnant de trouver, parmi les candidats conservateurs issus de l’immigration, des profils atypiques, à l’image de Amandeep Singh Boghal, candidat sikh portant turban et longue barbe et se présentant dans une circonscription d'Irlande du Nord ou des profils nouveaux, comme , premier candidat conservateur d’origine chinoise et sélectionné à l’issue d'une vaste primaire ouverte – « à l’américaine » précise le site de la section - dans la circonscription de Havant. On dénombre ainsi 67 femmes élues, soit 20% du groupe parlementaire (contre 16% en 2010) sur 164 candidates sélectionnées par le parti, soit 25% du total. Par ailleurs, 17 députés issus de minorités ethniques ont été élus soit 5% du groupe (comparé à 3,5% en 2010), sur un total de 62 minorités (BAME ou « Black and Asian Minority Ethnic »people) qui avaient été sélectionnées, soit 9,5% de l’ensemble des candidats conservateurs. Malgré ce renouvellement, on dénombre peu de nouveaux députés élus pour la première fois (19%) contre 81% de réélus, à la différence des travaillistes. Si les nouveaux députés conservateurs sont aussi sensiblement plus âgés (50,2 ans en moyenne contre 47,8 en 2010), leur profil social est cependant remarquablement constant puisque 71% des députés conservateurs sont issus du milieu des affaires, de la finance et du droit, lesquels représentent respectivement 29%, 25% et 17% des députés du parti. On trouve toujours une prédominance de chefs d’entreprise mais aussi une diminution nette d’universitaires (2% contre 8% en 2010). On note aussi une proportion légèrement en baisse de députés issus des relations publiques, à l’image de leur dirigeant David Cameron (12% en 2015 contre 15% en 2010). Le changement le plus significatif provient de leur formation : on trouve en effet plus de députés issus du système des universités les plus prestigieuses comme Oxford ou Cambridge que lors des élections de 2010 (soit 45% contre 32%) mais un peu moins d’entre eux proviennent des écoles privées (52% contre 54% en 2010). Autrement dit, si le visage du nouveau groupe parlementaire est aujourd’hui plus féminin et coloré que le précédent, il reste remarquablement constant en termes d’origines sociales et de catégories socioprofessionnelles.

26 La sélection des candidats conservateurs révèle un effort constant d'ouverture vers la société civile. Le parti conservateur fait ainsi figure de pionnier dans l’utilisation de primaires ouvertes qui s’appuient sur des électeurs dont on peut supposer qu’ils manifestent un intérêt pour le parti ou au moins pour le candidat si celui-ci est déjà connu dans la circonscription ou dispose d’un fort ancrage local. Mais derrière ce dispositif transparaît une stratégie de la part du parti pour rehausser son image de marque. Au-delà de la sélection des candidats, on pourrait même y voir l’un des instruments de communication de David Cameron prêt à toutes les innovations pour diffuser sa vision d'une « ère post-bureaucratique »15 selon laquelle le pouvoir doit être distribué au peuple. Dans une certaine mesure, ce dispositif incarne aussi l’inauguration d’une nouvelle pratique démocratique plus délibérative à l’échelle du parti et du pays tout entier, qu’illustre aussi l’extension de la pratique référendaire comme nouveau mode de décision gouvernementale, à l’instar du référendum sur l’indépendance écossaise de septembre 2014 ou de celui annoncé sur le maintien du pays dans l'Union européenne. Derrière ce nouveau mode de sélection des candidats se cache aussi une volonté paradoxale de mieux contrôler le type de candidat traditionnellement choisi, l’arrivée massive des femmes et des minorités ethniques ne correspondant en réalité pas au choix des militants de base. Derrière ce dispositif se

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cache enfin une volonté nette du parti d’étendre sa base de soutiens. La mise en place d’un réseau de « registered supporters » - Team 2015 - par le président du parti , va de pair avec l’ouverture du processus de sélection à des électeurs dont on peut supposer qu’une fois inscrits dans les registres de la section locale, ils feront partie de ce vaste réseau sur lequel le parti envisage de compter désormais, pour pallier la baisse radicale du nombre d’adhérents. Moyennant une participation de 1£, ces supporters16 ont eu la possibilité d'apporter leur aide sur le terrain, à la campagne électorale, suppléant ainsi les militants dans un domaine qui leur était réservé. Mais en dépossédant aussi les adhérents du parti de leur principale prérogative - le monopole de la sélection du candidat local - le parti risque également de perdre, à terme, sa principale source de financement.

La sélection des candidats travaillistes

27 Au parti travailliste comme au parti conservateur, la sélection des candidats a longtemps été la prérogative des sections locales. Le contrôle du processus par les sections locales avait même été renforcé en 1981 avec l’adoption de la « re-sélection obligatoire » (« mandatory reselection ») des députés sortants17, qui avait constitué une victoire de l’aile gauche du parti, alors en pleine ascension. Depuis le début des années 1990, cependant, les réformes introduites visant à la fois à « démocratiser » le processus (c’est-à-dire à reconnecter le parti avec son électorat dans une quête de légitimité) et à encourager la diversité (afin d’obtenir une meilleure représentation de l’électorat) ont été impulsées de haut en bas et se sont accompagnées d’un contrôle accru de la direction nationale sur le processus. En 1993, l’adoption du vote par tête (OMOV – « one member one vote ») pour la sélection des candidats, qui mettait un terme à un vote bloqué syndical pesant pour 40% des voix au sein des collèges électoraux locaux18, reflétait un effort plus général pour réduire le poids des syndicats dans les processus décisionnels du parti et réduire l’influence des militants (considérés comme trop radicaux) sur le processus. A partir de 1995, après l’élection de Blair à la tête du parti et dans la perspective des élections législatives à venir, on observe un changement d’approche plus marqué. Avec le New Labour, la priorité est désormais donnée à la sélection de candidats compétents et capables de projeter une image centriste et moderne et qui, une fois élus, soutiendraient Blair. L’objectif des réformes était donc de rééquilibrer un groupe parlementaire dont le centre de gravité était, aux yeux du leadership, situé trop loin sur la gauche19. Tout est alors mis en œuvre pour faire émerger les « bons » candidats, c’est-à-dire ceux dont le profil est conforme aux objectifs stratégiques de la direction nationale, dans les sièges gagnables, ce qui passe par une mainmise du centre sur le processus de sélection, par le biais de réformes destinées à accroître l’ouverture et la diversité, dont la plus marquante a été l’introduction des « All Women Shortlists » (AWS)20.

Les mécanismes de sélection

28 Contrairement à ce qu’on trouve chez les conservateurs, la procédure de sélection est très strictement encadrée, codifiée et unifiée. Les documents internes tels que le NEC Procedural Guidance2013 et, sous une forme plus condensée, le Rule Book 2014, stipulent dans le menu détail les principes et objectifs, les rôles respectifs du Comité exécutif

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national (« National Executive Committee » - NEC) et de la section locale, la composition du comité de sélection, les critères d’éligibilité des candidats, le sélectorat et les critères d’éligibilité des adhérents. A noter qu’il est cependant possible de se dispenser de la procédure en cas d’urgence, lorsque le calendrier l’impose, comme c’est le cas lorsqu’un député sortant se retire à une date tardive ou bien simplement lorsque que le NEC considère qu’il est dans l’intérêt du parti de le faire21. Cette procédure abrégée ouvre grand la porte aux tentatives de parachutages.

29 Une caractéristique majeure du processus est d’être contrôlé plus ou moins directement de bout en bout par le Comité exécutif national, par le biais notamment du comité de sélection piloté par un représentant du NEC22. La composition de ce comité est soumise à des règles strictes en vue de refléter l’équilibre des forces au sein de la section locale et de répondre à des critères de représentativité23.

Source: The Labour Party, NEC Procedural Guidance, 2013, p. 13.

30 Bien que, chez les travaillistes, le principe d’une liste nationale de candidats établie par le NEC au sein de laquelle les sections locales peuvent choisir leur candidat ait une longue histoire24, la stratégie déployée au plan national au milieu des années 1990, en vue d’accroître la représentativité du groupe parlementaire, a impliqué un rôle plus actif du NEC. Même si la mainmise de la direction nationale semble, depuis 2010, un peu moins directe, le rôle du NEC se définit en termes d’une « supervision » de l’ensemble du processus de sélection afin d’atteindre les objectifs stratégiques de la direction nationale25. Les principes régissant la constitution de la « short-list »26, étape cruciale du processus, visent à réconcilier des objectifs parfois contradictoires : d’une part la promotion de la diversité et d’autre part la nécessité de faire émerger des candidats « compétents »27. En outre, le NEC se réserve un droit de veto (exercé à plusieurs reprises)28 et a le dernier mot en cas de conflit29.

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31 En outre, alors que jusque-là l’accent avait été principalement mis sur des caractéristiques telles que le sexe et l’origine ethnique, lors du congrès annuel de 2012, les règles de diversité ont été élargies en vue d’encourager également la sélection de candidats handicapés ou issus de la communauté gay et lesbienne, et, dans le même temps, d’obtenir une meilleure représentation de la classe ouvrière30. L’action du NEC vise essentiellement à agir au niveau de l’offre31, en encourageant et soutenant les candidats potentiels ayant ce type de profil, notamment par le biais du programme de formation intitulé « Future Candidates » qui a permis l’élection, le 7 mai 2015, de 53 députés travaillistes sans expérience (soit 21% du parti parlementaire). Cela permet de faire émerger un nouveau type de candidats ayant moins d’ancienneté dans le parti, dotés de ressources personnelles plus limitées (une candidature réclame un investissement financier personnel non négligeable) et ne bénéficiant pas du soutien d’un syndicat. Du point de vue de la direction nationale, ces candidats moins expérimentés sont aussi plus dociles et susceptibles de constituer un groupe parlementaire plus homogène et légitimiste32. On voit ainsi l’effet paradoxal de mesures destinées à encourager la diversité, qui relèvent donc d’une démocratisation au sens d’une meilleure représentativité des candidats et du groupe parlementaire, mais qui réduisent encore un peu la marge de manœuvre des sections locales, contribuant donc à éroder le degré de démocratie interne. 32 Une autre dimension cruciale est la composition du « sélectorat »33. Le passage au vote par tête a mis un terme au vote bloqué syndical, mais n’empêche pas les syndicats d’avoir une influence sur le processus, ce qui est parfois source de conflit avec la direction nationale34. Il s’agit d’une modification majeure qui affecte la nature même de l’organisation, ce qu’elle représente et la façon dont elle fonctionne35. Des règles strictes d’éligibilité fixent les conditions à remplir pour prendre part au scrutin : d’une part le droit de vote est réservé aux seuls adhérents36, d’autre part une condition d’ancienneté est imposée37, ce afin de réduire les distorsions résultants d’éventuelles vagues d’adhésions massives juste avant le scrutin. Ces conditions peuvent sembler anodines, mais, comme pour toute procédure, le « diable est dans les détails ». C’est pourquoi les désaccords ne sont pas seulement anecdotiques, mais au contraire le révélateur de tensions intra-organisationnelles fondamentales38. C’est ce qu’illustre le cas des sections locales de Falkirk et de Halifax, qui ont eu le plus de visibilité dans les médias, où les conflits ont justement porté sur l’éligibilité des votants. Dans le cas du « scandale » de Falkirk, en 2013, le syndicat UNITE avait été accusé d’avoir payé les cotisations d’une partie de ses membres afin de peser davantage sur le résultat final. Même si l’enquête policière a finalement statué que la pratique n’avait rien d’illégal, le retentissement médiatique a été tel qu’il a précipité l’adoption, en mars 2014, des réformes du mode d’affiliation des membres des syndicats dans le parti ainsi que le mode d’élection du leader travailliste. Halifax a été, au printemps 2015, le théâtre d’un autre bras de fer entre ce même syndicat - dont la candidate était celle-là même qui avait été suspendue à Falkirk, puis réintégrée – et le NEC, accusé de vouloir lui faire barrage à tout prix. Suite à une plainte de la députée sortante auprès du NEC, un comité de sélection spécial a été constitué sous la houlette de . Après la suspension de 134 membres ayant récemment adhéré, en vertu d’une nouvelle règle imposant une ancienneté d’au moins un an au lieu de six mois, c’est la candidate légitimiste qui a été élue à une courte majorité. L’aile gauche du parti dénonce le manque de transparence concernant les raisons véritables de la « dé-sélection » de candidats par le NEC au motif d’ « irrégularités ». La sélection des candidats cristallise

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ainsi les tensions entre leadership et syndicats, et fait l’objet de fréquentes accusations croisées de parachutages et de manipulation39. 33 Il faut donc souligner le fossé entre les règles formelles et leur mise en pratique. L’introduction d’OMOV, qui visait essentiellement à accroître l’autonomie stratégique de la direction nationale40, rend en réalité la manipulation du processus dans son ensemble plus difficile41 (les tentatives échouent parfois de manière spectaculaire, comme on l’a vu pour les élections à la Mairie de Londres), tout en ouvrant la porte à des ajustements « discrets » de certains aspects du mécanisme, comme celles portant sur les règles d’éligibilité des votants42. Il faut en outre souligner le rôle majeur des permanents du parti au niveau régional (« regional organisers »), courroies de transmission des décisions stratégiques de la direction nationale, qui œuvrent en sous- main à orienter les choix des sections locales, par le biais de pressions informelles - mais néanmoins très pressantes - sur des membres clés de ces dernières. Il est impossible de mesurer avec précision l’étendue, la fréquence ou l’effet de ces pressions, mais elles existent indéniablement43. Les plaintes adressées au NEC ont d’ailleurs souvent trait aux techniques employées par les dirigeants (liste d’adhérents fournies à l’avance à certains candidats, irrégularités concernant les votes postaux etc.). Cet aspect requiert des recherches empiriques plus poussées car les cas rendus publics sont rares.

Les effets : profil des candidats et des élus travaillistes44

34 Sur les 631 candidats travaillistes sélectionnés en vue des élections du 7 mai 201545, 34% étaient des femmes. Le fait que 53% de ces candidates aient été sélectionnées dans des sièges gagnables explique un très bon taux de conversion entre le pourcentage de candidates et le pourcentage d’élues, en dépit des pertes sèches46: avec 99 femmes élues aux Communes (soit 41% du groupe parlementaire contre 31% en 2010), le parti travailliste continue de se distinguer. On voit comment les AWS, au demeurant toujours controversées47, ont institué une égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes dans les sièges gagnables et ainsi permis de constituer une réserve de députées solidement implantées à Westminster, ce que les quotas en place depuis les années 80 n’avaient pas permis de faire. En l’absence de loi sur la parité, la discrimination positive pratiquée par le parti le distingue clairement de ses rivaux. En comparaison, la promotion des candidats issus des minorités ethniques (on pense par exemple au programme « Operation Black Vote »), pour lesquels c’est l’encouragement plutôt que la discrimination positive qui prévaut, est restée plus limitée. Toutefois on observe en 2015, grâce à la sélection de candidats dits « BAME » dans des sièges gagnables (9% des candidats, et 13% dans des sièges gagnables) un bon taux de conversion avec l’élection de 23 députés avec ce profil, soit 10% du groupe parlementaire travailliste (contre 5,8% en 2010), proche du profil de la population (12,1% de BAME selon les chiffres du recensement de 2011). La section locale d’Edmonton a même établi une « short-list » entièrement composée de femmes « BAME ». La progression est donc très nette.

35 Concernant l’origine sociale, les disparités perdurent en dépit des déclarations d’intention, puisque la proportion de députés travaillistes issus des écoles privées sélectives est stable, à 12%, de même que ceux ayant suivi des études dans les universités prestigieuses d’Oxford et Cambridge (17%). En termes de profession, le groupe parlementaire travailliste se distingue par une proportion plus élevée de

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députés issus du mouvement syndical (15%, chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2010 où l’on en comptait 18%) et du secteur associatif (15% également). Cependant il faut souligner que la proportion de députés travaillistes issus du milieu des affaires a doublé (14%, contre 7% en 2010) alors que la sous-représentation de la classe ouvrière s’accentue, avec seulement 7% de travailleurs manuels (9% en 2010) contre 12% issus des professions juridiques (un point de plus qu’en 2010) et 10% du secteur des médias. Pour être vraiment représentatif, le PLP devrait compter plus de 50 % de députés issus de la classe ouvrière (un sondage réalisé par le British Election Survey en 2013 indiquait que 61% de la population se considère comme « working class »)48. Un autre trait particulièrement marquant est la proportion croissante de « professionnels » de la politique (29%), de même que la proportion de députés élus pour la première fois (21%) et la surreprésentation au sein de cette dernière catégorie de femmes (65%) et de minorités ethniques (15%). Ces éléments confirment les tendances identifiées en 2010 et l’idée d’une convergence entre les principaux groupes parlementaires. 36 L’évolution des méthodes de sélection des candidats parlementaires travaillistes doit se concevoir dans le cadre plus large des réformes organisationnelles impulsées à partir du début des années 1990, car elle fait écho à d’autres changements tels que la réforme de l’élection du leader, la réduction progressive du poids des syndicats dans les différentes instances du parti, et la mise en place de réseaux de supporters. Toutes ces réformes vont dans le sens d’une individualisation du vote, accompagnée d’une centralisation croissante49. Comme chez les conservateurs, la tendance lourde depuis le début des années 90 a donc été celle d’un contrôle accru de la direction nationale sur le processus de sélection. L’adoption du vote par tête (OMOV) permet en effet au NEC d’intervenir à toutes les étapes du processus, ce qui génère des tensions préoccupantes entre la base et le leadership, mais permet dans le même temps de préserver la cohésion au niveau du groupe parlementaire dont la composition est stratégiquement orientée de façon à ce que les députés puissent jouer un rôle de soutien au leadership. Au plan local, la sélection des candidats parlementaires travaillistes obéit aujourd’hui à des logiques contradictoires, puisqu’on observe une tension entre les objectifs des syndicats soucieux de favoriser une meilleure représentation de la classe ouvrière, et ceux d’un leadership dont la priorité a surtout été d’encourager la représentation des minorités, pour la plupart issus des classes moyennes. Les perspectives d’évolution concernent le sélectorat, probablement voué à s’élargir dans une quête de représentativité, ce qui pose la question du rôle et des droits devant être octroyés aux « registered supporters », déjà invités à participer à l’élection du prochain leader, par rapport aux adhérents s’acquittant d’une cotisation et – pour certains - participant activement à la vie de la section locale. Pour l’heure, la démocratisation du processus de sélection reste très relative puisque le choix proposé aux membres des sections locales travaillistes est à la fois filtré et fermement encadré par les instances nationales.

Conclusion

37 La sélection des candidats aux élections de mai 2015 a modifié le visage de la Chambre de la Communes qui s’avère aujourd’hui plus féminin, plus coloré et sans doute plus moderne qu’il ne l’a jamais été, ou, comme on dit en anglais, « less stale, pale and male ». Ce résultat, est, comme nous l’avons vu, le fruit d’un processus complexe qui a subi d'importantes modifications dans le cadre de réformes organisationnelles plus larges.

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Parmi les changements les plus notables, on note une ouverture plus nette vers la société civile qui va de pair avec ce que Katz et Mair50 ont appelé la cartellisation des partis, ou la transformation de l’objet partisan en une entité qui aspire à se confondre avec la société et dont les frontières, notamment entre les adhérents et les non- adhérents, deviennent de plus en plus poreuses. L’indice le plus net de cette transformation est l’introduction de primaires pour la sélection des candidats. Qu’elles soient fermées, dans le cas des travaillistes (c’est-à-dire limitées aux seuls adhérents), ou ouvertes (aux électeurs) chez les conservateurs, l’idée commune est de multiplier les procédures délibératives et d’associer le plus possible la base (militante ou électorale) aux processus de décision. Au chapitre des convergences entre les deux partis, on note aussi une utilisation de catégories nouvelles d’individus qui ne sont pas financièrement affiliés au parti : les supporters. Ces points communs signalent également un effet de mimétisme entre les deux grands partis majoritaires et un mouvement de convergence vers le modèle de parti-cartel annoncé par Katz et Mair. Ainsi est-il permis de penser que ces « registered supporters », qui peuvent déjà participer à la sélection du candidat conservateur dans certaines circonscriptions et peuvent désormais participer à l’élection du leader travailliste, pourraient, à terme, dans ce parti, se voir également dotés du droit de participer à la sélection des candidats.

38 Pour autant, le fait que le processus de sélection soit désormais plus ouvert à la société civile ne signifie pas qu’il soit devenu plus transparent. Il subsiste en effet un profond hiatus entre les motivations officielles et l’agenda secret des partis. Derrière l’apparente démocratisation, le processus reste en effet étroitement contrôlé et surveillé par la direction nationale. Tout semble indiquer que l’intention est de garder la mainmise sur les sections locales en contournant les militants sous le prétexte qu’ils ont tendance à sélectionner des candidats peu représentatifs de la société. Par le bais des primaires ouvertes, le parti conservateur en vient même à priver les adhérents de leur principale prérogative tout en continuant à s’appuyer sur eux pour la campagne de terrain et le financement du parti. Le parti travailliste, on le voit, évolue dans la même direction. Ainsi, sous couvert de diversité, l’objectif implicite dans les deux partis serait de produire un type de député plus malléable. La diversité et la recherche d’un profil différent du type de député traditionnellement majoritaire dans ces partis pourrait en réalité aboutir à un formatage d’un type nouveau. Ainsi, les députés sélectionnés pour leur capacité à refléter la société civile et leur indépendance des contraintes partisanes seraient en contrepartie moins expérimentés et moins familiarisés avec les pratiques de la profession parlementaire, par conséquent plus dociles et plus exposés aux consignes d’un leadership dont le pouvoir a lui-même été renforcé. Le cas de la sélection des candidats parlementaires illustre bien la tension, précédemment évoquée, entre objectifs explicites et objectifs cachés : les réformes conduites au nom d’une « démocratisation » relèvent plutôt d’un travail de « rebranding », où la décentralisation s’accompagne d’un contrôle accru. Les modifications des règles de sélection des candidats induisent donc des changements organisationnels profonds. 39 Cependant ces changements de règles du jeu comportent des risques et peuvent produire des effets pervers. Les nouveaux processus (OMOV, primaires ouvertes) échappent parfois au contrôle de la direction nationale et peuvent donner des résultats inattendus, comme l’élection de députés rebelles. L’individualisation du vote et l’adoption du vote postal accentuent en outre l’effet d’atomisation, rendant plus difficile toute coordination d’une action collective, tant par les militants que par le

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leadership. De plus, il subsiste des risques liés au retrait du « différentiel d’influence » des militants51 alors que les partis se reposent largement sur eux pour la conduite de la campagne de terrain, dont l’importance est désormais pleinement reconnue, et en tant que source de revenus. 40 La comparaison entre les deux principaux partis britanniques permet donc, tout en révélant des cultures organisationnelles très différentes, de mettre en lumière les tendances lourdes et les effets de mimétisme. En effet, bien que les mêmes problèmes ne se posent pas dans les mêmes termes et les changements ne se produisent pas au même rythme, l’analyse de la sélection des candidats et, plus largement, des réformes organisationnelles à l’œuvre au sein des principaux partis britanniques permet de dessiner une trajectoire commune et de futures pistes de recherche sur la vie politique britannique en particulier et les partis politiques en général.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

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GALLAGHER, M. & MARSH M. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics. Londres: SAGE, 1988.

GAUJA, A. “The Individualisation of Party Politics: The Impact of Changing Internal Decision- Making Processes on Policy Development and Citizen Engagement”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol.17, n° 1, 2015, pp. 89-105.

HAZAN, R. Y. & RAHAT, G. within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

HOPKIN, J. “Bring the Members Back in? Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain”, Party Politics, vol. 7, n° 3, 2001, pp. 343-361.

LOW, M. “Parliamentary Candidate Selection in The Conservative Party: The Meaning of Reform For Party Members and Membership Parties”, British Politics, vol. 9, n° 4, 2014, pp. 401-429.

MINKIN, L. The Blair Supremacy. A Study in the Politics of Labour’s Party Management, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014.

PENNINGS, P. & HAZAN, R. Y. “Democratizing candidate selection. Causes and Consequences”, Party Politics, vol. 7, n° 3, 2001, pp. 267-275.

SCARROW, S. E. Beyond Party Members. Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

WILLIAMS, R. & PAUN, A. Party People. How do - and how should – British political parties select their parliamentary candidates. London: Institute for Government,2011 [consulté le 18 juin 2015].

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NOTES

1. Pour une évaluation de l’impact des réformes récentes adoptées par les trois partis majoritaires en matière de sélection des candidats, voir par exemple Rhys WILLIAMS & Akash PAUN, Party People: How do – and how should – British political parties select their parliamentary candidates?, Londres: Institute for Government, 2011 et Peter RIDDELL, Candidate Selection. The Report of the Commission on Candidate Selection, Londres: Electoral Reform Society, 2003. 2. Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems, New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 3. Reuven Y. HAZAN & Gideon RAHAT, Democracies within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and their Political Consequences, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 6-12. 4. Russell J. DALTON & Martin P. WATTENBERG, Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 5. Pour une analyse précise des fluctuations de l’adhésion voir Susan E. SCARROW, Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 69-97. 6. Voir par exemple Rémi LEFEBVRE & Antoine ROGER (dir.), Les partis politiques à l'épreuve des procédures délibératives, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009 et James JOHNSON, « Political Parties and Deliberative Democracy? », in Richard S. KATZ & William CROTTY (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, Londres: Sage, 2006, pp. 47-51. 7. Reuven Y. HAZAN & Gideon RAHAT, op. cit. 8. William HAGUE, A Fresh Future for the Conservative Party, Londres: Conservative Central Office, 1997. 9. Peter MAIR, “Party Organisations: from to the state”, in Richard S. KATZ & Peter MAIR (eds.) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, Londres: Sage, 1994, pp. 1-22 10. Kenneth CARTY, “Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical organisational Imperative”, Party Politics, vol. 10, n° 1, 2004, pp. 5-24. 11. Mark LOW, “Parliamentary candidate selection in the Conservative Party: the meaning of reform for party members and membership parties”, British Politics, vol. 9, n° 4, 2014, pp. 401-429. 12. Les assemblées primaires, qui représentent la très grande majorité des primaires ouvertes organisées par le parti conservateur, affichent en moyenne un taux dérisoire de 0,4% des électeurs inscrits dans la circonscription (entre 100 et 600 participants). Seules les trois primaires postales organisées en 2009 et 2014 à Totnes, Gosport et Rochester and Strood peuvent afficher, notamment pour les deux premières organisées en 2009, un taux de participation significatif de respectivement 24,5%, 17,8% et 7,6%. Mais le coût d’une primaire postale évalué à 40 000 £ n'a pas permis au parti de poursuivre cette initiative pourtant présentée dans l’accord de coalition de 2010 comme une innovation que le Gouvernement de coalition envisageait d’étendre massivement. 13. L’hypothèse selon Pennings et Hazan est celle d’une plus grande indépendance du député sélectionné par primaire ouverte car il doit sa sélection à l’électorat et non au parti. Or Sarah Wollaston et , les deux députées élues en 2010 après avoir été sélectionnées par primaire postale en 2009, affichaient, dans la précédente législature, un taux de rébellion extrêmement faible par rapport à la moyenne des députés conservateurs (cf. www.publicwhip.org), autrement dit comptaient parmi ceux qui suivaient le plus souvent les consignes de vote du parti. 14. Sources : Paul HUNTER & Dan HOLDEN, Who Governs Britain ? A Profile of MPs in the 2015 Parliament, The Smith Institute, 2015. Voir également les nombreux articles mis en ligne sur le site du projet UK Parliamentary Candidates UK. URL : http://parliamentarycandidates.org 15. David CAMERON, “MPs’ expenses: Why I want to open up Tory candidate selection”. The Telegraph, 25 May 2009. 16. https://www.conservatives.com/volunteer

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17. “If the sitting MP wishes to stand for re-election a trigger ballot will be carried out […]. If the MP wins the trigger ballot he/she will, subject to NEC endorsement, be selected as the CLP’s prospective parliamentary candidate”, 2014, p. 22. 18. Le système de collège électoral, adopté en 1987 sous l’impulsion de , avait constitué une première étape dans cette « démocratisation » progressive. 19. Ce point est développé dans Lewis MINKIN, The Blair Supremacy. A Study in the Politics of Labour’s Party Management, Manchester University Press, 2014, p. 369. 20. La « long-list » comprend l’ensemble des candidats éligibles ; la « short-list » comprend les finalistes, le plus souvent entre trois et six personnes. 21. “The normal procedure may be dispensed with by the NEC where no valid nominations are received, or when an emergency arises, or when the NEC are of the opinion that the interests of the party would be best served by the suspension of the procedures issued by the NEC”. LABOUR PARTY, Labour Party Rule Book2014, p. 23. 22. “A Selection Committee (SC) shall be appointed by the Executive Committee of the CLP in consultation with the NEC Representative”. LABOUR PARTY, NEC Procedural Guidance2013, p. 11. 23. “The Selection Committee shall be gender balanced and comprised of not less than six and not more than 10 members. As far as possible it should reflect the demography of the constituency and in particular at least two members representing affiliated organisations”. Ibid. 24. Avant 1960, il existait deux listes distinctes, une « A List » (candidats bénéficiant du soutien d’un syndicat) et une « B List » (autres). En 1960, ces deux listes ont été fondues en une liste nationale unique (voir Eric SHAW, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party, 1987). A l’heure actuelle, le NEC compile une liste appelée « National Parliamentary Panel » qui inclut des candidats approuvés par les organisations affiliées. Les candidats sélectionnés en dehors de cette liste doivent se soumettre à un entretien avant de recevoir l’approbation du NEC. 25. “The NEC shall have a supervisory role”. op. cit., p. 4. 26. Dans les sièges ordinaires, un minimum de quatre candidats dont au moins deux femmes ; dans les sièges appliquant les « AWS », un minimum de trois candidats. 27. “[…] to ensure that objectives in relation to quality and diversity are met. This procedure is designed to ensure the process is open and accessible to candidates from all backgrounds including individuals from under-represented groups”. op. cit., p. 4. 28. “The selection of a parliamentary candidate is subject to the endorsement by the NEC”. Ibid., p. 4. 29. “Disputes arising out of the selection procedure shall be considered by an officer appointed by the NEC who shall report to them. The NEC’s decision on that report shall be final and binding on all parties for all purposes”. Labour Party Rule Book 2014, p. 25. 30. “[...] to select more candidates who reflect the full diversity of our society in terms of gender, race, sexual orientation and disability, and to increase working class representation”. NEC Procedural Guidance 2013, p. 4. 31. Sur cette dimension voir par exemple Pippa NORRIS & Jon LOVENDUSKI, Political Recruitment. Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 32. Sur la « docilité » des députées travaillistes, voir Philip COWLEY & Sarah CHILDS, « Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour’s Women MPs”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, n° 3,pp. 345-365. 33. Sur l’évolution du sélectorat, voir par exemple Paul WEBB, The Modern Party System, Londres : Sage, 2000, pp. 207-208. 34. “All members participate in the final selection of the candidate in an OMOV ballot, either at hustings meetings or by post must be eligible members of the Labour Party”, LABOUR PARTY, NEC Procedural Guidance2013, p. 11. 35. Michael GALLAGHER & Michael MARSH, Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective, Londres: Sage, 1988, p. 3.

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36. “[...] be a current member of the constituency in question at the freeze date and at each stage of the procedure”, Procedural Guidance 2013, p. 12. 37. “Have at least six months continuous membership of the Labour Party (any constituency) at the freeze date”, Ibid. 38. Anna B. MIKULSKA et Susan E. SCARROW soulignent très justement l’importance à accorder aux détails des procédures qui se cachent derrière les discours officiels de « démocratisation », dans “Assessing the Political Impact of Candidate SelectionRules: Britain in the 1990s”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 20, n° 3, pp. 311-333, août 2010. 39. Voir par exemple Patrick WINTOUR, “MP condemns Labour decision to increase influence over selection of parliamentary candidates”, The Guardian, 20 novembre 2014. URL: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/20/tom-watson-condemns- labour-leader-influence-parliamentary-candidate-selection[consulté le 15/05/15]. 40. Peter MAIR, dans un article de 1994 abondamment cité depuis (cf. supra), avait souligné que l’extension de droits électifs à l’ensemble des membres visait à marginaliser les militants, moins dociles. 41. Voir Patrick SEYD & Paul WHITELEY, High-intensity Participation: The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain, Ann Arbor :The University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 23. 42. Lewis MINKIN, op. cit., p. 370. 43. Ibid. et Eric SHAW, op. cit. Ces formes de pression, qui ne peuvent être relevées que par le biais d’une observation directe, ont été développées dans Emmanuelle AVRIL, Du Labour au New Labour. Le changement vue de l’intérieur, Villeneuve d’Ascq :Presses du Septentrion, 2007. 44. Sources : Paul HUNTER & Dan HOLDEN, Who Governs Britain ? A Profile of MPs in the 2015 Parliament, The Smith Institute, 2015.Voir également les nombreux articles mis en ligne sur le site du projet UK Parliamentary Candidates UK. URL : http://parliamentarycandidates.org 45. Il n’y a pas d’élection dans la circonscription représentée par le président de séance de la Chambre des Communes (« Speaker »), qui est travailliste. 46. Le parti travailliste a remporté un total de 232 sièges, contre 258 en 2010. 47. Sur les “AWS” voir Rosie CAMPBELL, “All women shortlists remain a controversial but effective way to improve women’s representation in politics”, The Constitution Unit, 5 février 2015. URL: http:// parliamentarycandidates.org/news/all-women-shortlists-remain-a-controversial-but-effective- way-to-improve-womens-representation-in-politics/ 48. Sur ce point, voir la critique de , ancient secrétaire général du parti travailliste (2006-2007), dans « Labour’s new way of selecting parliamentary candidates makes a mockery of calls for more working class MPs”, Labour Uncut, 8 février 2013. URL: http://labour-uncut.co.uk/ 2013/02/08/labours-new-way-of-selecting-parliamentary-candidates-makes-a-mockery-of-calls- for-more-working-class-mps/ et celle publiée par le député Michael MEACHER sur son blog : « The alienateduntouchables », 19 avril 2015. URL : http://www.michaelmeacher.info/weblog/ 2015/04/the-alienated-untouchables/ 49. Voir Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER & Emmanuelle AVRIL, Les partis politiques en Grande-Bretagne, Paris: Armand Colin, 2013. 50. Richard KATZ & Peter MAIR, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n° 1, 1995, pp. 5-28; Richard KATZ & Peter MAIR, “Party Organisation, Party Democracy and the Emergence of the Cartel Party”, in Peter MAIR (ed.),Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 93-119. 51. Jonathan HOPKIN, “Bringing the Members Back In?: Democratizing Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain”, Party Politics, vol. 7, n° 3, mai 2001, pp. 343-361.

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RÉSUMÉS

La sélection des candidats parlementaires aux élections législatives est l’une des fonctions les plus cruciales qui incombent aux sections locales, lesquelles ont longtemps joui, dans ce domaine, d’une relative autonomie par rapport au siège des partis. Mais partant du principe que l’agrégation des choix individuels des sections locales détermine la composition du groupe parlementaire, la direction nationale de chacun des partis a conçu de nouvelles stratégies et règles leur permettant d’influencer ces choix, l’objectif étant de s'assurer que les futurs députés seront plus conformes à la ligne définie par la direction du parti et la composition socio- démographique du groupe parlementaire plus représentative de l’électorat. Cet article étudie donc l’impact de ces procédures de sélection à la fois sur l’organisation partisane et la représentativité des groupes parlementaires travaillistes et conservateurs issus des élections.

The selection of parliamentary candidates for the general election is one of the most crucial tasks carried out by local parties who have long enjoyed relative autonomy from party headquarters in this respect. But because the aggregate choices of individual local parties determine the composition of the parliamentary parties, the party leaderships in both parties have devised new strategies and rules allowing them to influence that choice. This is in order both to ensure both that future MPs are more in tune with the leadership line and that the socio-demographic composition of the parliamentary parties is more representative of the electorate. This article therefore looks at the impact of the methods of candidate selection both on party organization and on the representativeness of the Conservative and Labour parliamentary parties which has emerged out of the election.

INDEX

Keywords : Conservative party, Labour party, candidate selection, local parties, primaries Mots-clés : parti conservateur, parti travailliste, sélection des candidats, section locales, primaires

AUTEURS

AGNÈS ALEXANDRE-COLLIER

Université de Bourgogne

EMMANUELLE AVRIL

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3

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Trying to Turn up the Turnout: Youth Wings and the Youth Vote in the 2015 General Election La Participation des jeunes lors des élections législatives de 2015 au Royaume- Uni

Sarah Pickard

An estimated 7.5 million 18 to 24-year-olds were eligible to vote in the 2015 general election.1 Most had been affected by neoliberal policies and austerity measures enacted during the five years of the Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition government. In particular, many young people suffered due to the growth of youth unemployment, the lack of affordable accommodation, the closure of youth services, the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA), the cuts to the higher education budget and the increase in university tuition fees.2 Conversely, opposition parties made concerted efforts to appeal to young people by proposing specific “youth-friendly” policies. For example, the Labour Party pledged to reduce university tuition fees to £6,000 per annum, whereas the Green Party promised to scrap them completely. Both parties claimed they would enfranchise 16 and 17-year-olds in future elections. At the same time, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats made manifesto pledges that were favourable to the “grey vote,” for example, they all promised to maintain the triple lock on the State pension. David Cameron also vowed to protect universal pensioner benefits, such as the Winter Fuel Payments, free bus passes and free television licences. The relationship between young people and traditional politics featured prominently throughout the 2015 election campaign. The predominant mass media narrative was that British youth is uninterested in politics and politicians.3 Indeed, there is a “widely- held view that today’s generation of youth is increasingly reluctant to play a role in political life, and is dismissive of the formal political process and democratic institutions”.4 Such pessimistic and normative labelling corresponds to an overwhelmingly negative portrayal of young people in the media in general.5 Evidence of the apparent political disaffection resides

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in the general election turnout rates of 18 to 24-year-olds, which are considerably lower than those of other age groups. During the election campaign, barely any mention was made of political party youth wings and their membership. In this article, I draw together these different strands, in order to answer the following question: What was the relationship between young people and traditional electoral politics during the 2015 general election?6 Thus, the article first discusses voter registration and voter turnout of 18 to 24-year-olds. It goes on to explore the role played by the youth wings of traditional political parties in encouraging political participation among young people. The article ends with an analysis of the outcome of the 2015 general election in terms of the youth vote.

Participating in traditional politics

Political participation tended to be divided into two main forms in the past. First, traditional (also called conventional or institutional participation), which includes registering on the electoral roll, voting in elections and being a member of a political party. Second, non-traditional (also called unconventional or non-institutional participation), which encompasses protesting, dissenting and being involved in civil disobedience.7 Increasingly, a third kind of identity politics or issue-based political participation is being acknowledged, which covers deliberate acts, such as product boycotts and lifestyle choices, such as veganism. Thus, the repertoire of political participation has become more diverse8 and the meaning of politics, political acts and political participation, i.e. ways of doing politics has been widened.9 Young people are especially associated with newer forms of political participation, probably to the detriment of traditional politics, such as registering and voting in general elections, on which this article focuses.10

Registering to vote

In order to vote in an election in Britain, it is necessary to be on the electoral roll (also called electoral register). British citizens become entitled to vote at the age of 18, although the electoral register also includes records of “attainers”: 16 and 17-year-olds who will turn 18 during the period in which the register is in force. Young people tend to have lower registration rates than other age groups. At the end of 2010, 56% of 18 to 24-year-olds were on the electoral register, compared with more than 94% of those aged over 65, according to the Electoral Commission;11 the Society provided similar statistics in 2014: The youngest age groups, particularly 18-24s, are those most likely to say they are not registered or to claim not to know. Only 69% of respondents in this age group say they are registered compared to a national average of 90%. In contrast, respondents aged 45+ all reported registration levels of 96% or above.12 This phenomenon exists for a variety of reasons, including pragmatic and logistic ones. Young people are more likely to be mobile, change addresses and live in temporary accommodation, which makes it harder for local authorities to register them. According to the Hansard Society, “given that young people (18-34) are those most likely to be in rented accommodation there is a clear association between age, housing tenure and electoral registration levels.”13 This is all the more relevant as a greater proportion of

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young people is going into higher education than in the past. Potential first time voters are also more likely to lack knowledge about how to register, or find it difficult because they do not have the experience of older age groups. Various institutional efforts have been made in recent years to make inclusion on the electoral roll easier, in order to boost registration rates, especially among young people and stem the perceived crisis of democracy.14 First, rolling registration, also called continuous registration, was introduced by the Labour Government in February 2001,15 so that it is now possible to be added to the electoral roll with a local authority throughout the year. Second, registration has been mandatory since 2001, when it became obligatory for the head of a household to list all the eligible voters living at that address.16 Third, online registration is now possible. Fourth, the gap between when registration closes and voting takes place has been narrowed. In 2015, the deadline to register was Monday 20 April, 17 days before polling day.17 However, in a bid to reduce electoral fraud, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition introduced individual electoral registration (IER) during 2014. University halls of residence and parents can no longer register a young person on his/her behalf. For Georgia Gould, the change was likely to exacerbate the decrease in voter registration among younger people18 and it was predicted that thousands of young people would fall off the electoral register thus not be able to vote.19 In March 2015, it was estimated that 70% of 18 to 24-year-olds were registered to vote (representing eleven per cent of the total registered electorate), which led to speculation that the youth turnout in the 2015 general election could be the largest since 1964 and have “a significant impact on the result”.20 This optimism was partially due to the exceptionally high turnout rate among young people in the Scottish Independence referendum on 18 September 2014. Crucially, 16 and 17-year-olds were enfranchised and about 80% of those eligible to register to vote did so (109,533), whereas the turnout for these first time voters was 75%, compared to a national average of 84.59%.21

Turning out to vote

There is a clear link between registration rates and turnout rates; according to the Electoral Commission, this correlation is especially manifest among young people: One of the most important reasons for declining levels of registration is increasing disengagement with politics and decreasing turnout at elections as the desire to participate in elections remains a key driver for registering. Findings presented in this report show that people who say they are less likely to vote are less likely to be registered. Disengagement with traditional party politics is even more marked among young people (only 24% said they were certain to vote in a general election compared to 60% or above for those aged 55 or over) and, with mobility, is likely to be the main reason behind the low level of completeness among this group.22 Turnout rates at elections are calculated according to the proportion of the population who vote that are actually registered to vote. Turnout rates exclude people who are not on the electoral roll.23 Therefore, if someone is not registered, he or she will not be included in the electoral turnout rate. Older and more educated individuals tend to have high participation rates in elections. However, young people in Britain have had consistently lower turnout rates than other age groups for general elections since the 1960s. This is despite a much bigger proportion of young people today having a high

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level of educational attainment – usually a factor linked to greater turnout rates – compared to older generations. Moreover, the gap between age groups has been widening since the mid-1960s and especially since 1997. The different rates between age groups now is therefore greater in Britain than in other advanced democracies, to the extent that for Richard Berry and Anthony McDonnell, in Britain “highly educated young people are less likely to vote than older people with much lower levels of attainment”.24 David Denver argues that four interconnected social factors are associated with low turnout: being young (the most important one), being unmarried, living in privately rented accommodation, and being residentially mobile.25 Higher levels of non-voting by these groups can be explained in terms of isolation from personal and community networks, which are characteristic of stable communities that encourage conformity or the norm of voting.26 Varying political participation rates can be understood in terms of cost and benefit,27 hence some young people might not see the point (or the value) of making the effort to vote.28 The way the first-past-the-post electoral system works in general elections favours larger established parties and leads to the under-representation of certain smaller political parties, which tend to gain a greater proportion of their votes from young people, such as the Green Party.29 This under-representation contributes to the feeling among British youth that voting is not worth it. Not going to the polls can be explained by other logistical factors: young people might have other things to do on the polling day that seem more important, they might be too busy,30 or the polling station might not be accessible enough for them. Significantly, in the May 2015 general election, it was not possible to vote online or via a Smartphone. The Electoral Commission and the Electoral Reform Society have both acknowledged that e-voting (electronic voting) would increase turnout especially among first time voters. The Digital Democracy Commission was set up and is chaired by , the Conservative Speaker of the House of Commons who was once leader of the Young Socialists. It recommended in a report published early 2015 that “By 2020, secure online voting should be an option for all voters”.31 Yet e-voting already exists in other countries, such as Estonia, which introduced it in 2007 for parliamentary elections. The lack of opportunity to vote via new technologies is a non-negligible drawback for young people of whom almost two thirds wanted to be able to vote online in the general election, while a similar amount felt the voting system was failing.32 Voting online would be a way to reach young people who often change addresses and whose lives are led online. Other reasons why young people abstain are ‘a feeling that their views are not represented by any particularly party (38 per cent),’ ‘an inability to distinguish between political parties (23 per cent)’ and ‘a lack of diversity amongst candidates (22 per cent)’.33 Another cause of not going to the polls is that some young people feel disaffected34 with politics or alienated35 from MPs, for example, due to their behaviour in the House of Commons and during the expenses scandal.36 But young people were especially affected by the broken 2010 electoral promise of the Liberal Democrats with Nick Clegg’s U-Turn on university tuition fees, which increased distrust of politics in general: ‘Voter cynicism is most prevalent among young people’.37 Such disillusionment and distrust in traditional politics can lead to an active and deliberate decision not to participate, which Nicole Gallant calls ‘avoidance’.38 It can be a way of refusing the normative political status quo. Russell Brand initially advocated

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abstention in the 2015 general election, in order not to endorse what he considered a deeply unsatisfactory political system in need of a ‘revolution’.39 He outlined his stance on (he has a vast Twitter following), in a guest editorship of the New Statesman, a subsequent interview with Jeremy Paxman (23 October 2013) and in his book: I don’t feel inclined to rally youth to put an x in a box on a little ballot ticket but on the doors of those who will be spared when the plague descends. For we are at a turning point: the exploitation has now reached a pitch where the disenfranchised and exploited can look to a culpable minority with vengeful eyes. […] There are some ideas worth voting for, no party in any civilised nation will propose them, because they are not there to represent us and to ensure that the necessary change to protect us and our planet but to simply maintain the current system.40 Russell Brand went on to endorse of the Green Party and then the Labour Party leader Ed Miliband.

Supporting a political party

Political party affiliation acts as a motivator and encourages people to turn out to vote. However, young people in Britain today are less likely to identify with or support a political party than older age groups. According to the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey, 19% of 16 to 24-year-olds supported a political party compared with 56% of people over 75-years-old.41 The Hansard Society has similar statistics: Younger respondents are much less likely to claim support for a party than older age groups: just 23% of 18-24s claim to be at least a ‘fairly strong’ supporter of a party compared to 44% of those aged 75+ who say the same. Conversely, just over half of 18-24 year olds (53%) declare themselves not to be a supporter of any political party but this is a view shared by only 24% of those aged 75+.42 Membership of political parties has decreased considerably in Britain over the past two generations.43 In 2015, a tiny proportion of the population is a member of a political party: Membership of the three main political parties is at a historic low: less than 1% of the UK electorate is now a member of the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat Party, compared to 3.8% in 1983. Latest membership estimates from the parties suggest that the Conservative Party has 149,800 members, the Labour Party 190,000 and the Liberal Democrat Party 44,000.44 The percentage of British youth who are members of a political party is even smaller.45 For Richard Keen, “Young people seem to have become particularly disassociated from political parties, although all age ranges surveyed demonstrate a loss of allegiance”.46 This drop can partially be explained by the lifecycle effect, i.e. the older you become the more civic-minded and more responsible you become and the more interested in politics you become. However, the current rates of party affiliation and party membership are much lower than in previous decades. Fewer young people today support political parties than previous cohorts of young people.47 There is a “generational” change, as all groups are less likely to be members of a political party than in the past. Over the previous thirty years, each successive cohort of young voters has been less likely to identify with a political party than its previous cohort. When the lifecycle effect is combined with the generational effect, the forecast for traditional political participation among young people is bleak.

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Campaigning among youth wings

All the mainstream English political parties have youth wings (also called youth sections, youth factions, youth branches, or youth organisations), which are aimed mainly at 16 to 30-year-olds, especially further and higher education students. They have all undergone name changes over the years, often to distance themselves from unfavourable and/or extreme reputations. The Labour Party first had Leagues of Youth, followed by the Young Socialists, and now it has two youth wings, Young Labour (for 14 to 26-year-olds) and .48 The Conservative Party started with Young Britons and then Young Conservatives, before adopting the name Conservative Future, in 1998.49 The Liberal Democrats once had the National League of Young Liberals, then the Liberal Democrat Youth and Students (LDYS); the current entity has been Liberal Youth (for students and young people under-26) since 2008. The Green Party of England and has had Young Greens (for 18 to 30-year-olds and students) since 2002.50 Lastly, UKIP’s youth wing (for under-thirties) called Young Independence has existed since 2007; it also has the smaller UKIP Students Association.51 Youth wings have an ambivalent relation with parent parties.52 They fulfil various roles, such as supplying “foot soldiers” and activists for the parent party during election campaigns, providing young candidates and to a lesser degree financial funds through membership fees. Most have played a very limited role in policy formulation and decision making within the parent party from whom they receive some degree of funding. Very little has been written about British youth wings, except for works by Zig Layton-Henry on Labour and Conservative youth wings in the 1970s and a PhD thesis on the same subject by Matthew Lamb in 2002. There is little doubt that the dearth of research on youth wings is linked to the opaque relations between youth wings with main parties, the lack of real power invested in youth wings, their poor communication and the high turnover of membership. It is also linked to the lack of reliable information regarding membership data and the relatively small number of young people seemingly involved. Indeed, it is impossible to obtain reliable and precise statistics on membership of youth wings.53 In the past, the recording of membership tended to be more informal; demographic data such as age were not noted and parties were prone to exaggeration.54 Today, political parties are still not obliged to publish membership statistics and youth wings have been reluctant to reveal their figures. The situation is further complicated by the regular turnover of members as they reach the upper age limit and differing age brackets for each youth wing. Nonetheless, there exists a great deal of competition among youth wings regarding membership numbers. Conservative Future (CF) claimed on its website at the time of the general election to be the “largest youth political organisation in the UK with 15,000 members under 30” (a figure it had been using since 2007).55 However, the Young Greens, declared on its blog mid-April that “the #GreenSurge has been incredible, with the Young Greens growing from about 1,300 at the end of 2013, to more than 17,700 now – more than Conservative Future”’.56 Young Greens also boasted via Twitter that was the biggest youth wing, which led to scathing tweets from Young Labour, the only youth wing to criticize another youth wing on Twitter during the election campaign: @YoungGreenParty, 13 April 2015, “We are now the largest youth party in the whole of the UK with over 17,700 members!”

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@YoungLabourUK, 20 April 2015, “Hey @YoungGreenParty just FYI you are not the biggest youth party. We understand stats aren't your strong point but over 22,000 > 17,700” also all our members are under 27 rather than up to 30. Plus we have Labour Students on top of those numbers. #justsaying However, Young Labour and Labour Students do not reveal membership statistics and they did not appear of their website. Liberal Youth does not give out its figures either. Lastly, Young Independence “UKIP’s Youth Wing for the under thirties” stated that it had “over 3,000 members”,57 although elsewhere on the site it says 3,500 and it tweeted statistics that did not add up: @Yiofficial, 30 March 2015, Today YI membership passes 3,500 alongside UKIP's 44,000. Be part of our movement, join us: @Yiofficial, 16 April 2015, YI Membership DOUBLES in year! @Yiofficial, 25 April 2015, YI membership this morning jumped to 3,600, up by 100 in just one week! Therefore, youth wings insisted on their membership statistics and vied to be the biggest youth wing, although, altogether, these six youth wings accounted for fewer than 50,000 members. During the 2015 general election campaign, youth wings used social media to varying degrees in order to encourage voter registration and voter turnout among first time voters. Official youth wing websites were employed in a very limited way as they were rarely changed or updated. Official Facebook pages were revised more frequently and posts were made, in particular by Liberal Youth and Young Greens. Similarly, these two youth wings were the most active on Twitter, the preferred form of social media among most youth wings. The exception was Conservative Future that neither posted any messages on its official Facebook page nor tweeted from its Twitter account. The main themes in the Facebook posts and tweets were campaigning for a specific policy, the parent party, or a particular candidate and to a lesser degree encouraging young people to come and join them on the campaign. Hardly any mention was made of registering to vote except by Young Labour and Young Greens.

Evaluating the outcomes

Prior to the 2015 general election, there were various measures and drives to encourage young people to be active citizens engaged with traditional politics and thus to register on the electoral roll and to vote.58 In particular, not-for-profit organisations campaigned vigorously to incite young people to engage in politics by registering and voting, so that politicians listen to and act on the specific interests of British youth. New technologies were at the heart of efforts. For example, the youth volunteering charity vInspired led a “#Swing the Vote” campaign, the not-for-profit organisation Bite the Ballot modelled a campaign on the American “Rock the Vote”,59 whilst the National Union of Students (NUS) organized “#GenerationVote.” Initiatives encouraging young people to become engaged in politics included Smartphone apps, vlogging (video blogging) and social media campaigns aiming to transform how young people think about politics. Youth wings of political parties also promoted registering to vote and turning out to vote. No precise data is available on how many young people actually voted on 7 May 2015 because general elections are secret ballots and exit polls do not collect demographic

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information. Statistics have been obtained for recent general elections through aggregated opinion polls (Ipsos MORI), exit polls and specific academic studies, such as the British Election Study (BES). After an unprecedented low in 2001, general election participation rates among 18 to 24-year-olds increased in 2005 and 2010, but remained far lower than other age groups (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The national average turnout for all age groups in the 2015 general election was 66 per cent. According to the British Election Study 2015, 58 per cent of young people, aged 18 to 24, turned out to vote, 60 whereas the Ipsos MORI statistics, obtained by aggregating the data from election polls and other surveys, were considerably lower with 43 per cent turnout among 18 to 24-year-olds.61 Whilst there is a sizeable difference between the British Election Study and the Ipsos MORI figures, it remains that both reveal substantially lower turnout among young people than other age groups and the drop in turnout among 18 to 24-year-olds has been stemmed. Regarding the preferences of young people who did vote in the 2015 general election, statistics reveal salient differences in their voting patterns compared to other age groups (see Table 2 and Figure 2). The Conservative Party obtained 27% of votes among 18 to 24-year-olds, but 47% of votes among 65+ year-olds. Similarly, UKIP obtained 8% of votes among 18 to 24-year-olds, but 17% of votes among 65+ year-olds. Conversely, the Labour Party was the most popular political party among the 18 to 24 age group (43%), whereas its popularity decreased as the age of voters increased, reaching 23% among the 65+ age group. Likewise, the Green Party was also more popular among the youngest voters (8%) than the oldest voters (2%). In other words, the younger the voter, the more likely he/she was to vote for the Labour Party or the Green Party and less likely he/she was to vote for the Conservative Party or UKIP. The statistics also show that in the 2015 general election there was a steep fall in votes for the Liberal Democrats from 30% in 2010 to 5% in 2015, suggesting among other things, an ongoing discontent with Nick Clegg’s U-turn on university tuition fees in 2010. Therefore, whilst Liberal Youth were the most active on social media during the election campaign, this did not translate into votes for the Liberal Democrats. Obviously, many other factors were involved and we cannot know the proportion of votes that would have been cast for the Liberal Democrats if Liberal Youth had not led a dynamic online campaign. One striking phenomenon in relation to young people and politics regarding the 2015 general election, is the increased membership of youth wings before and after the poll. Liberal Youth does not give out its figures, but on 19 May 2015, it claimed that its membership increased dramatically immediately after the 2015 general election to 7,300.62 Similarly, Labour Students bragged on 10 June 2015: “Want to get involved in the largest student wing of any political party in the U.K?[…] Our membership has gone up by a massive 40% since the general election, thousands of you have put your disappointment to one side and decided to get organised to make a difference”.63 Table 1: Voter turnout (of registered voters), %, general elections 1964-2015, UK

18-24 year-olds (%) 18-24 year-olds (%) year all age groups (%) BES* Ipsos MORI**

1964*** 77.1 76.4 N/A

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1966*** 75.8 60.5 N/A

1970 72.0 64.9 N/A

1974F 78.8 70.2 N/A

1974O 72.8 62.5 N/A

1979 76.0 62.5 N/A

1983 72.7 63.9 N/A

1987 75.3 66.6 N/A

1992 77.7 67.3 68

1997 71.4 54.1 60

2001 59.4 40.4 39

2005 61.3 38.2 37

2010 65.0 51.8 44

2015 66.1 58.0 43

Sources: *Aliyah DAR, Elections Turnout. Standard Note SN/SG/1467. House of Commons Library, 2013, p. 4, based on re-analysis of datasets British Election Study (BES), HC Library Research Paper 03/59. **Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted since October 1974, 2010. Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted in 2015, 2015. ***The voting age was decreased from 21 to 18 in 1969.

Sources: Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted since October 1974, 2010. Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted in 2015, 2015.

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Table 2: Voting for each political party, %, according to age group, general election, 2015 (2010), UK

Labour Conservative Green age group Liberal Democrats Ukip Others Party Party Party

18-24 43 (+12) 27 (-3) 5 (-25) 8 8 9

25-34 36 (+6) 33 (-2) 7 (-22) 7 10 7

35-44 35 (+4) 35 (+1) 10 (-16) 4 10 6

45-54 33 (+5) 36 (+2) 8 (-18) 4 14 5

55-64 31 (+3) 37 (-1) 9 (-4) 2 14 7

65 + 23 (-8) 47 (+3) 8 (-14) 2 17 3

All 31 (+1) 38 (+1) 8 (-16) 4 13 6

Figure 2: Voting for each political party, %, according to age group, general election 2015 (2010), UK

Source: Adapted by the author from: Ipsos MORI, Final Aggregate Analysis, How Britain Voted, (General Election), 2015.

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Conclusion

The turnout rate of 18 to 24-year-olds was slightly higher in the 2015 general election than in the 2010, but it remained considerably lower than the national average. Left- wing political parties gained a greater proportion of their votes from younger people who turned against the Liberal Democrats compared to the previous general election. Membership of all youth wings increased before and after the 7 May 2015 polling day. These facts reveal a growing interest among young people in traditional politics and the scope for harnessing the youth vote in the future. For this to be achieved, politicians need to address the fundamental issue that the way traditional politics is carried out in Britain is unattractive to many young people. This situation probably suits many politicians, as illustrated by their lack of financial and political investment in youth policy, youth wings and the youth vote in general. This reinforces the impression that young people are not taken seriously by politicians, contrary to the older members of the electorate who have a higher turnout rate. Institutional politics needs to change in order to be more attractive and relevant to first time voters. First, the voting age should be reduced to 16 in order to get young people involved in politics whilst they are still within the framework of secondary education. Second, voter registration among young people should be encouraged more and registration should be possible on polling day. Third, e-voting should be launched to make voting up to date and relevant to young people who live their lives online – no party has committed to initiating online voting.64 Still not being able to vote online in 2015 might be explained by politicians lacking interest in the section of the population most likely to be interested in this type of voting: young people. Fourth, social media campaigns aimed at youth should be improved via the injection of skills and funds by parent parties. Fifth, parent parties should take their youth wings seriously, as they can be valuable allies in the traditional politicization of young people. The autonomy of youth wings can be a good when it confers respect and trust from the parent party. However, the freedom with which youth wings are imbued can also reflect a lack of interest from parent parties. Sixth, politicians should take an interest in young people’s views and lives. Lastly, youth policy and policy in general should take more into account the specific situation of young people. However, George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in his 8 July 2015 budget statement that the cap on university tuition fees will be increased, higher education maintenance grants will be replaced by loans and housing benefit will be scrapped for 18 to 21-year-olds. It is therefore possible that during the Conservative Party’s 2015-2020 term of office the relationship between young people and politics will shift away from the ballot box and towards political protest.

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NOTES

1. According to official statistics, there were nearly six million 18 to 24-year-olds in the United Kingdom mid-2014, which represented about 11% of the total United Kingdom population of 64.6 million. There were approximately 1.53 million 16 and 17-year-olds (ONS, 2015). 2. Sarah PICKARD, “Productive Protest? The Contested Higher Education Reforms in England under the Coalition Government,” pp. 93-106 in Emmanuelle AVRIL & Johann NEEM (eds.), Democracy, Participation and Contestation: Civil Society, Governance and the Future of Liberal Democracy, London & New York: Routledge, 2014. 3. For example, Matt CHORLEY, “Two Million Young People Will Not Vote”, Daily Mail, 6 May 2014; Helen LEWIS, “Apathy or Antipathy? Why So Few Young People Vote”, The Guardian, 19 April 2015. 4. M. HENN and N. FOARD, Young People and Politics in Britain. How do Young People Participate in Politics and What can be Done to Strengthen their Political Connection? (Briefing Paper), Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University, 2012, p. 3. 5. Sarah PICKARD, “The Trouble with Young People These Days: ‘Deviant’ Youth, the Popular Press and Politics in Contemporary Britain.” ‘Labelling the Deviant. Othering and Exclusion in Britain from Past to Present,’ Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 19 (1), 2014, pp. 91-122. See also: Clare HACKETT, “Young People and Political Participation,” pp. 74-80 in J. ROCHE & S. TUCKER (eds.). Youth in Society, Second edition. London: Sage, 2004, p. 74. 6. This article only deals with England rather than the whole of the United Kingdom due to differing policies because of devolution of power. 7. Pippa NORRIS, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 222. 8. James SLOAM, “The Outraged Young,” pp. 161-179 in B. LOADER, A. VROMEN and M. XENOS (eds.). The Networked Young Citizen. Social Media, Political Participation and Civic Engagement, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 163. 9. Judith BESSANT, Democracy Bytes: New Media and New Politics and Generational Change, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 10. See Sarah PICKARD, Politics, Protest and Young People: Political Participation and Dissent in 21 st Century Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan [forthcoming 2017]. 11. Electoral Commission, Great Britain’s Electoral Registers 2011, London: Electoral Commission, 2011, p. 31. 12. Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 11. The 2014 Report, with a Focus on the Accountability and Conduct of MPs, London: Hansard Society, 2014, p. 41. 13. Op. cit.

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14. Philippa COLLIN. Young Citizens and Political Participation in a Digital Society: Addressing the Democratic Disconnect. Studies in Childhood and Youth, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 2. 15. David DENVER, et al, Elections and Voters in Britain, Third edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 30; Sarah PICKARD, “What’s the Point? The Youth Vote in the 2005 General Election” ‘Les Elections législatives de 2005 au Royaume-Uni.’ Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 13(3), 2005, p. 22. 16. In Britain, registration is obligatory according to Section 23 of the Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001, and those who do not are liable to a fine. 17. HM Government. The Electoral Register and the Open Register. Overview, 2015. 18. Georgia GOULD, Wasted. How Misunderstanding Young Britain Threatens Our Future. London: Little, Brown, 2015, p. 49 19. The Electoral Reform Society suggested 800,000 people aged 18 to 21 would not be able to vote because they were not on the electoral roll, whereas Labour MP predicted the number would be even greater: Liz KENDALL, “Over 200,000 Young People have Fallen off the Electoral Register: Time to Get Them Back.” New Statesman, 5 February 2015. 20. Rebecca MORTON, “TV Debates and the General Election: The Largest Youth Turnout Since 1964?” Shout Out UK, 7 May 2015. 21. Electoral Commission, Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the Referendum held on 18 September 2014. London: The Electoral Commission, 2014, p. 67. 22. Electoral Commission, The Quality of the 2014 Electoral Registers in Great Britain. Research into the last registers produced under the household registration system, 2014, p. 5. 23. David DENVER et al, 2012, op. cit., p. 31. The voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1970, which ‘added some 3 million young people to the register.’ 24. R. BERRY and A. McDONNELL, Highly Educated Young People are Less Likely to Vote than Older People with much Lower Levels of Attainment. Democratic Audit and London School of Economics, 13 March 2014 (http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=2752) 25. David DENVER et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 41. 26. I. CREWE, T. FOX and J. ALT, “Non-voting in British General Elections 1966-October 1974,” pp. 38-109 in Colin CROUCH (ed.), British Political Sociology Yearbook, 3. London: Croom Helm, 1977. 27. K. SWADDLE and A. HEATH, “Official and Reported Turnout in the British General Election of 1987” British Journal of Political Science, 19 (4), 1989, pp. 537-551. 28. Sarah PICKARD, “What’s the Point? The Youth Vote in the 2005 General Election.” ‘Les Elections législatives de 2005 au Royaume-Uni’, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 13(3), 2005, pp. 21-32. 29. YOUGOV, Green Party Membership is Booming – But it May Count for Little on Polling Day, February 2015. Sarah PICKARD, “The Nature of Environmental Activism among Young People in Britain” in D. H AIGRON and B. PRENDIVILLE (eds.), Political Ecology and Environmentalism in Britain [forthcoming 2016]. 30. M. PIRIE and R. WORCESTER, The Big Turn-Off, London: Adam Smith Institute, 2000, pp. 11-12. 31. Digital Democracy Commission, Open Up, London: 20 January 2015. 32. Ibid. 33. Rebecca MORTON, 2015, op. cit.. 34. For an overview of young people and political disaffection, see M. HENN and M. WEINSTEIN, “Young People and Political (in)Activism: Why Don‘t Young People Vote?”, Policy and Politics, 34(3), 2006, pp. 517-534. 35. David MARSH et al., Young People and Politics in the UK: Apathy or Alienation?, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

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36. Sarah P ICKARD, “Sleaze, Freebies and MPs: The British Parliamentary Expenses and Allowances Scandal,” pp. 117-141 in D. FÉE and J-C SERGEANT (eds.). Éthique, Politique et Corruption au Royaume-Uni, Aix-en-Provence: PUP, 2013. 37. Colin HAY, Why We Hate Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p. 42 38. Nicole GALLANT, “Young People and Politics in Quebec: Participation, Protest, Avoidance”, Copenhagen, Denmark: Journal of Youth Studies Conference, March 2015. 39. Russell BRAND, 23 October 2013 in interview with Jeremy PAXMAN, BBC 2, : ‘It is not that I am not voting out of apathy. I am not voting out of absolute indifference and weariness and exhaustion from the lies, treachery and deceit of the political class that has been going on for generations [...]. Stop voting, stop pretending, wake up, be in reality now. Time to be in reality now. Why vote? We know it's not going to make any difference already.’ 40. Russell BRAND, Revolution, London: Century, 2014, pp. 79-80. 41. Ben PAGE, “The Shock of the New? The Menace of 2015.” British Social Attitudes Survey, July 2014, p. 48. Question: ‘Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party? Pre-war (born before 1945) = 56%; Baby boomers (born 1945-1965) = 40%; Generation X (born 1966-1979) = 30%; Generation Y (born 1980-1999) = 19%; Generation Z (born after 2000).’ 42. Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 11. The 2014 Report, with a focus on the accountability and conduct of MPs. London: Hansard Society, 2014, p. 45. 43. David DENVER, et al., 2012, op. cit.. 44. Richard KEEN, Membership of UK Political Parties, SN/SG/5125. London: House of Commons Library, 30 January 2015, p. 1 (www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05125.pdf) 45. Ingrid V AN BIEZEN, “Going, Going … Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary Europe.” European Journal of Political Research, 51(1), 2012, pp. 24-56. Knut, HEIDAR, Party Membership and Participation. Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage, 2006, pp. 301-315. 46. Richard KEEN, 2015, op. cit., p. 11 47. Georgia GOULD, 2015, op. cit., p. 49. ‘The decline in party affiliation is most stark for the young. In 1991, 29 per cent of fifteen-to twenty-four-year-olds supported a political party; in 2011 it was 15.8 per cent compared with 57.8 per cent of over-seventy-fives.’ 48. For a comprehensive summary of the history of the Labour Party’s youth wings, see Jeremy TRANMER, “From Young Socialists to Young Labour: The Changing Face of Left-wing Youth Politics in Britain,” pp. 45-58 in Sarah PICKARD, et al.. Les Politiques de Jeunesse au Royaume-Uni et en France: Désaffection, Répression et Accompagnement à la Citoyenneté. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle , 2012. 49. For a comprehensive summary of the history of the Conservative Party’s youth wings, see Sarah PICKARD, “A Conservative Future? Youth and the Conservative Party.” ‘Le Parti Conservateur Britannique.’ Observatoire de la Société Britannique, 4, 2007, pp. 75-93. 50. Sarah PICKARD, 2016, op. cit. 51. Other political parties in Britain have youth wings, which have undergone name changes. The BNP (the British Nationalist Youth Movement, Young BNP, Student BNP and BNP Crusaders). The SNP (Young Scots for Independence, Federation of Student Nationalists, SNP Students) and Plaid Cymru (CymruX and Plaid Cymru Youth). 52. Mathew L AMB, Young Conservatives, Young Socialists and the Great Youth Abstention: Youth Participation and Non-Participation in Political Parties. PhD thesis. University of Birmingham, 2002. 53. No political party youth wing responded to my requests for official membership figures. 54. Sarah PICKARD, 2007, op. cit. 55. Conservative Future, 7 May 2015, (http://www.conservativefuture.com) 56. Young Greens, 16 April 2015, ( http://younggreens.org.uk/ygblog/2015/04/16/our-future- election-2015/#comments).

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57. Young Independence, 16 April 2015 , ‘membership of UKIP’s youth wing has surpassed 3,500 members, head and shoulders above Liberal Youth’s membership numbers. This is an enormous increase of 104%, or 1,800 members, since March 2014’, (http://www.youngindependence.org.uk/about) 58. A. MYCOCK and J. TONGE, “The Party Politics of Youth Citizenship and Democratic Engagement.” Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1), 2012, pp. 138-161. 59. Sarah PICKARD, “The Youth Vote and Electoral Communication in the UK and the USA, 2005-2008,” pp. 107-127 in R. DICKASON, D. HAIGRON and K. RIVIÈRE DE FRANCO (eds.). Stratégies et Campagnes Électorales en Grande-Bretagne et aux États-Unis. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009. 60. British Election Study (BES), ( http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/news-category/2015- general-election/2015). 61. Ipsos MORI, How Britain Voted 2015, 2015. 62. Liberal Youth, 19 May 2015, ‘Since polling day something awesome has been happening, people are joining the Liberal Democrats in their thousands. Why? Because the British people want to stand up for liberty, equality and freedom. Because we want a society that is united, tolerant and fair. Liberal Youth's membership has gone up by 160% - and we now have over 7,300 members are growing more and more everyday.’, (http://www.liberalyouth.org/news) 63. Labour Students, 10 June 2015, ‘ We were all disappointed with the result on May 8th. A Toryovernment means harsh cuts for the very poorest in our communities. This disappointment however, has led to thousands of you joining us to fight back against the Tories, fight against inequality in our society, and fight for a better future for our generation.’, (http://www.labourstudents.org.uk/ a_fresh_start_for_labour_students) 64. Rick EDWARDS. None of the Above. Your Vote is Your Voice. Don’t Stay Silent. London: Simon & Schuster, 2015, p. 7.

ABSTRACTS

The political participation of 18 to 24-year-olds in British general elections is substantially lower than for other age groups. As a result, young people are frequently labelled in the media as being disaffected with traditional politics. This article explores the relationship between young people and traditional politics within the context of the 2015 general election in the United Kingdom. It addresses voter registration, electoral turnout, party preferences and youth wings of mainstream political parties in England: Conservative Future, Labour Students, Young Labour, Liberal Youth, Young Greens and Young Independence. The article reveals that whilst voter turnout among young people increased in 2015 and membership of youth wings grew, political institutions clearly did not invest time and money in the youth vote.

La participation politique des jeunes aux élections législatives au Royaume-Uni est inférieure à celle des autres tranches d’âge depuis longtemps. De ce fait, les 18 à 24 ans sont souvent étiquetés dans les médias comme une population qui rejette la politique traditionnelle. Cet article explore les relations entre les jeunes et la politique traditionnelle dans le contexte des élections législatives au Royaume-Uni du 7 mai 2015. Nous analysons l’enregistrement des jeunes sur les listes électorales, la participation électorale des jeunes, les préférences politiques des jeunes et les sections jeunes des partis politiques traditionnels. Si la participation politique des jeunes et l’adhésion aux sections jeunes ont augmenté, ce n’est pas le cas de l’intérêt qui leur est porté par les instituions politiques.

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INDEX

Mots-clés: vote des jeunes, sections jeunes des partis politiques, jeunesse, participation électorale, taux de participation Keywords: youth vote, youth wings, young people, political participation, voter turnout

AUTHOR

SARAH PICKARD

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle

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The Stage-Management of the leaders’ personal lives in the 2015 General Election La mise en scène de la vie privée des leaders durant la campagne législative de 2015

Sabine Michelon

Introduction: the publicization of the private persona

1 Although the extent of their influence on actual electoral results remains debated, the promotion of the leaders’ personalities is a prominent feature of electoral campaigning in Western democracies, in particular in the UK. It has been argued that the introduction of the leaders’ debates in 2010 even reinforced the trend.1 As a matter of fact, Jeremy Paxman opened the debate section of The Battle for by saying: “ tonight we’ll see what they are made of.” It was an invitation for the public to make up their minds between “the only two who actually [stood] a chance of forming the next government”2 based on an assessment of their mediated personalities. This is in exact keeping with what Ana Inés Langer, upon whose seminal research this paper draws, wrote in the introduction of her book on the personalisation of politics: “issues and policies are identified with leaders, political successes and failure attributed to them and their political and personal qualities discussed, often in detail.”3 Indeed, “leaders are increasingly expected to embody the party brand, personify the party’s values and policies, (…) and function as the unifying narrative that links what often seems like a set of ideologically disjointed policy proposals.”4

2 The issue of distinguishing between the personal and the political is an age-old feature of politics (the Romans called it the art of Janus, the two-faced god). However, the boundaries between the two seem to have become increasingly blurred, to the extent that David Cameron famously declared in the 2010 campaign that “the personal is political.”5 This can be perceived as the culminating point of a move over the past two

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decades in the UK towards emphasising the personal lives and qualities of the leaders, their private spheres and inner selves. Langer argues that Blair’s era modified expectations about both the actual and expected roles of the personal in public discourse, of which it has now become “a common and accepted feature.”6 She further explains that both the media and the politicians coproduce the phenomenon, as both sides readily reveal all kinds of private details to the public. More importantly, there has been, as a result, a “broadening of what are considered leadership qualities”,7 that is to say, there have also been changes as to how relevant the personal is now deemed to be as far as evaluating leadership is concerned. The most striking element in this phenomenon is that the ability to present a “human” persona is now a “prerequisite of political and electoral success and a key marker of contemporary leadership potential”.8 It has not led the “human being” to replace the leader, but has made the line between the two harder to draw than ever before. This shift is what Ana Inés Langer theorises in her work as the “politicization of the private persona.”9 3 This paper will focus on one specific aspect of personal image-building in the 2015 electoral campaign, which is the stage-management of the four national “major party” 10 leaders’ personal and family lives, based primarily on a corpus of televised portrait interviews: and Julie Etchingham’s ITV Tonight: Spotlight and James Landale’s BBC Leader profiles.11 Even if they were conducted by senior political journalists in most cases,12 they can be described as “soft-focused” 13 because of the central role devoted to the personal. The main corpus was essentially completed with relevant press articles commenting upon the programmes. Two main questions will therefore be addressed in this article: how were the leaders’ personal spheres used for strategic publicity in the campaign? It will try and assess, as well as compare, and when necessary, contrast, the leaders’ strategies in this respect. Secondly, to what extent did the media play a complicit or antagonistic role in the use of the personal to construct and/or consolidate the leaders’ personae?

Managing the leaders’ personae

4 The title of the BBC series of political portraits, “Leader profile”, suggested that viewers/voters would get to form an opinion of the politician under focus’s ability to run the country through the depiction of his14 character. From this viewpoint, “leader profile” could be seen as synonymous with “political persona” (or simply “persona”), which can in turn be equated with a politician’s public image or personality, which indeed includes his or her leadership qualities. The fact that the pieces all provided glimpses of the depicted leaders’ personal lives is representative of Langer’s key idea that the distinction between “leadership/political (or hard, performance-related)” and “ personal/private (or soft) qualities” is “not straightforward” because these categories are “ continuous rather than dichotomous.”15 It is relatively simple to identify which are situated at the opposite ends of the spectrum: “’pure’ leadership qualities” (defined as “ personality traits that have a direct link to the leader’s fitness and capability to govern”16) include for instance experience, competence, intelligence, strength, reliability, and honesty; on the other hand, being nice, interesting, cool, fun/good humoured, loving and family-oriented are clear personal qualities. Even so, presenting themselves as loving and family-oriented can influence the perception that a leader is reliable, and why not, honest, since they appear to be showing their inner or “true” self. The

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qualities that are of a “mixed personal/political nature”17 situated in the middle part of the continuum, such as social skills, are all the more complicated to qualify that they have been shifting along the spectrum as a result of the politicization of the private persona. Thus, and, to sum up, political and personal qualities are not, and cannot, be clearly separated in the media’s or public’s appraisal of politicians. In addition, the necessity to appear “human”, that is to say “in touch” at least emotionally, operates within a broader technological, socio-economic and cultural context in which the concept of charisma in politics has been undergoing partial redefinition. Indeed, it no longer uniquely corresponds to some sort of “greatness”, to “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities” as defined by Weber in 1968.18 It has now come to also entail the ability to generate a degree of identification. This is not to say that traditional leadership qualities are no longer deemed important, or more important, than softer qualities. However, they no longer suffice.

5 The original Latin meaning of the word persona is remarkably enlightening, since it referred to the theatrical masks worn by actors on stage. Thus, when applying the term to political leaders, the similarities between the professions cannot be ignored.19 In fact, James Landale, who conducted the BBC interviews, indicated in his comments about Nigel Farage’s episode20 that filming took place under the chaperonage of the UKIP leader’s media advisors.21 Two remarks must therefore be made: first, this is concrete proof that his appearance on the programme was a choreographed performance; secondly, it may reasonably be assumed that it was also the case on his Tonight Special episode, and crucially, that it was also true of all the other leaders’ pieces under study in this article. 6 Although their individual circumstances vary, the four leaders have in common a rather, if not very, privileged background, which means that none of them could dispense with attempting to present themselves as convincingly “normal” so as to evidence their ability to relate to voters’ daily lives and problems. Opening up about their daily family lives played an important role for the leaders of the three main parties, as shall be seen in the next part of this article, but another key element was to showcase how their experiences of personal hardship, which generally drew from their political lives and/or their family histories, accounted for their political commitment. 7 David Cameron’s strategic uses of the personal in the construction of his public persona have been well documented throughout his political life in general22 and was even further analysed during the 2010 campaign.23 There is overall consensus that he had rather successfully “detoxified” the Tory brand through effective marketing of himself as “Chillax Dave”, a family-oriented and environmentally conscious man full of youthful vitality, achieved by means of remarkable ease in the confessional mode, combined with clever use of photo-opportunities. The other side of the coin was that he was criticised for being too “packaged” and glossy. In fact, as far as the construction of his persona is concerned, Langer explains that he has been more than the “Heir to Blair”, setting new milestones and asserting that the public is entitled to know about a leader’s personal life.24 More importantly, because he was the incumbent Prime Minister, albeit in a Coalition government, his relative past success and continued media presence over the past five years had made him the yardstick against which others were measured in the political landscape of the 2015 election. Thus, given the “

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highly reactive” nature of leadership dynamics in the UK, his strategies could either be viewed as the ones to emulate, or to provide an “antidote”25 to. Cameron’s personal circumstances may well explain why it was so essential for him to develop ways of appearing “human” through unprecedented politicization of his family life.26 Indeed, it cannot be denied that the Prime Minister is archetypically posh: educated at Eton and Oxford—where he joined in the Bullingdon Club—, he rose to political prominence as part of the “Tory Notting Ill set”. Such an extremely privileged background has always been used against him to suggest that he was out of touch with ordinary people, and that he was living proof that the Conservative party was the party of the rich. The 2015 campaign was no exception, and he was indeed on several occasions reminded of his origins, a situation he himself dubbed, heaving a sigh, “the old posh question” in response to James Landale’s rather benign: “Has being posh held you back?” on his BBC Leader profile interview.27 Jeremy Paxman asked him bluntly and rhetorically: “This is one of the things that people really find problematic about you, I’m going to be personal if I may for a second, (…) what do you have in common with these very rich people?”28 Yet David Cameron’s life has not been devoid of hardship on a personal level. He grew up with a handicapped father, and more tragically, he and his wife lost their severely disabled son Ivan in 2008, a topic he has been open about in a truthful and dignified way. 8 Ed Miliband, although from a middle-class background, went to Oxford like Cameron, and was even a visiting scholar at Harvard for a year. His insistence on the crucial role played by the local comprehensive school he and his brother attended29 in his life can be interpreted as a way of contrasting his more modest upbringing with Cameron’s. Nevertheless, one of the many indictments against him has been his perceived aloofness. Paxman perfectly summarized the ins and outs of his image problem when he pointed out that people “see [him] as a North London geek.”30 The word “geek” is defined in the Merriam-Webster as “a person who is socially awkward and unpopular: a usually intelligent person who does not fit in with other people.” First, it is a fact that he is commonly perceived as a “lofty intellectual” whose social awkwardness was infamously epitomised in the much-discussed disastrous bacon sandwich photo-op,31 ironically “ intended to show what a normal guy he was.”32 Secondly, not only did a disgruntled electrician decry him for sounding “like a public schoolboy,”33 but he was also reviled within his own ranks by Labour backbencher Simon Danczuk, who declared: “he has an image of being more of a toff than David Cameron. That’s how the public see it. And what they mean by that is that he’s seen as more aloof. They’d prefer to go for a pint with David Cameron than they would with Ed Miliband.”34 One instance in which the political was truly personal in his case was the Labour leadership contest against his brother David in 2010. The topic was repeatedly brought about on his television appearances.35 Each time, he addressed it in a similar wording to that of his official biography on the Labour Website: “It was a tough time for my family, but I thought Labour had to make some changes and that I was the best person to bring them about.”36 He also systematically added that it was “healing.”37 In addition, Miliband was prompted by his advisors to introduce elements of his private life in his discourse, in particular the narrative of the influence of his Jewish refugee parents on his political views:38 “If we win the election, I think millions of people will lead better lives, and that’s what politics is all about, that’s what my parents taught me.”39 9 Even if he shares Miliband’s middle-class origins and was educated at Cambridge, Nick Clegg’s elitist credentials are usually presented as having to do with his cosmopolitan background and multicultural nuclear family (his mother is Dutch, his father Anglo-

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Russian, and his wife, Miriam González Durántez, is Spanish) which partly resulted in his ability to speak five languages. Albeit of a relatively different nature, they were still used against him by Evan Davis to argue that Europhilia had come to him so naturally that he could only find it difficult to relate to common people’s reservations about the EU.40 The remark on the number of languages he can speak also smacked of the same anti-intellectualism levelled against the Labour Party leader. The focus on Nick Clegg as a person in the campaign was otherwise essentially about how he had been dealing with the extremely cruel personal attacks lashed out at him in the wake of the Liberal Democrats’ broken promise concerning university tuition fees.41 His personal experience of hardship seems to have come with his political work. However, like Ed Miliband, he shared the story of how his mother was imprisoned for three years in a Japanese camp in Indonesia on his BBC interview, to show that he too knew of true hardship, even if, like Miliband, he had not experienced it first-hand either. 10 As to Nigel Farage, Evan Davis attempted to expose him as a hypocrite for claiming as a staple feature of his political rhetoric that he is nothing like “the liberal metropolitan elite” of the other parties by pointing out that he was in fact public school educated himself. The UKIP leader replied rather feebly that half of the boys in his school came from working class background (although he was not one of them).42 To quote Julie Etchingham, Nigel Farage’s is a “one-pint-in-one-hand-one-cigarette-in-the-other-persona”43 (echoing his introduction on Loose Women a few days earlier as the “down-to-earth bloke who likes a pint and a fag”).44 It was designed, however much he may claim it to be otherwise (“that’s what I do”),45 to be an “authentic” antidote to the “boredom” embodied by all the others leaders.46 Interestingly, if he was indeed interviewed by Etchingham in a pub (which was where she raised the topic of his persona with him), the BBC piece included no such setting; instead, he appeared aboard a ferry on his way to the , in the Parliament itself, and in some Great War battlefields. Landale mused on the BBC website that “his [Farage’s] media team are much much more reluctant to let him be filmed in pubs, pint and fag in hand”, and offered the following analysis: “It is almost as if they want to present a more professional, less jokey narrative.”47 The UKIP party leader is not, however, entirely out of tune with his competitors concerning the incorporation of the experience of personal hardship in his political narrative, although he was reticent to talk about the difficulties in his childhood.48 However, his rather extraordinary personal history may well give him the upper hand in this area, given that he can truly label himself as a “survivor”, having beaten cancer and come out alive of both a plane and a car accident. He builds on this image to project himself as an unstoppable force for change.

The stage-management of family life—public fatherhood

11 Ana Inés Langer points out that crucial though the narrative of the personal journey may be in the construction of a leader’s persona, it cannot be substituted for the role played by family life. In particular, public fatherhood is a remarkably useful strategic instrument in terms of image-building since it “can help infuse a leader’s persona with key leadership attributes such as kindness and reliability while at the same time reinforcing authoritativeness.”49 It can also be argued that in the context of Cameron’s continuation and expansion of Blair’s practices in this respect, expectations have changed further,

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and that it may no longer be dispensed with as a tool for both the media’s and the public’s assessment of these qualities. In fact, although strategies varied among them, the leaders of the three main parties were committed to presenting themselves as good, ordinary fathers in spite of their extraordinary political circumstances.50 Indeed, Ed Miliband’s: “my most important job is being a dad”51 was echoed by Nick Clegg’s: “I am a dad,52 and a husband before I am a politician, and I will be a dad and a husband long, long after I’ve left politics.”53 As to the Prime Minister, Tom Bradby commented on the topic of his family life: “this is the first clue to David Cameron, no one who knows him can doubt that this is where his heart lies.”54 Nevertheless, Nigel Farage clearly and voluntarily stood out by confessing on Loose Women that he is on the whole a poor family man, even if he acknowledged that becoming a father was the “most phenomenal experiences in [his] life,” 55 and gave other hints as to his love for his children.

12 The key strategic question that arises for political leaders when it comes to opening up about their lives as parents is the extent to which they are willing to expose their children. Both David Cameron and Ed Miliband had theirs feature prominently (the same was true of their wives) in their BBC and ITV portraits. There was however one fundamental difference in the way the Prime Minister’s and the Labour Leader’s children appeared on TV: the two little Milibands (Daniel, 5 and Samuel, 4) were fully shot, whereas the faces of the three young Camerons (Elwen, 9 Nancy, 11, and Florence, 4) were never shown. Thus, a hasty conclusion might have been that the Milibands were rather reckless in prioritising alleged political gain over their offspring’s right to privacy, while the Camerons had found the more responsible way of playing the family life disclosure game by still providing their children with protection from the public eye. However ITV’s Tom Bradby revealed the truth of the matter: “for security reasons we have agreed not to identify the children here.”56 By contrast, both Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage have always refused to throw their children in the limelight. The UKIP leader, who is a father of four, was content with telling ITV’s Julie Etchingham that “they’re all doing very well in life, and I’m pleased about that” after saying, with no further comment: “ you’re not going to see their pictures, cause I’m keeping them out of the public view,”57 implying that he viewed the statement as self-explanatory. Nick Clegg made a similar statement on his LBC phone-in show: “You might catch glimpses of my kitchen,58 you certainly – I hope – will catch sight of Miriam. You will never catch sight of my children.”59 His tone was even firmer than Farage’s (“you will never”), and the line was all the better drawn that he proved perfectly aware of contemporary expectations in terms of publicization of the private persona as he conceded that he might yield to the media pressure to show his kitchen and reminded the public that his wife’s was not to be used as a prop, and that any appearance she would make would be very much her own decision. As a matter of fact, he said absolutely nothing himself about his children on either of his portraits: on the BBC, it was his mother who rapidly mentioned them while really describing her son and daughter-in-law as parents (“he and Miriam have a lovely relationship with their children, they are very dedicated parents”),60 and on his Tonight Special episode, they were very subtly hinted at through quick shots on handcrafted gifts from them that he keeps in his Downing Street office like any other parent, and were mentioned once and then alluded to by his wife. Both Clegg and Farage were critical of the Conservative and Labour leaders’ choices: commenting on the Battle for Number Ten, Farage turned on David Cameron for “bringing in his children every time he could.”61 But it was Nick Clegg who carried out the harshest attack, through perfect antiphrasis, when he quipped on the above-mentioned LBC show: “I am not making oblique criticism of David

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Cameron or Ed Miliband. I have always felt very, very strongly that my children are entitled to an innocent childhood just as much as any other kids.”62 He further highlighted his determination by explaining: “I don’t want them when they go to school to suddenly have someone sitting next to them saying ‘I saw you on telly’. It makes them feel different.”63 13 Concern about ensuring their children had a “normal” life in spite of the demanding circumstances of their lives as politicians was actually shared by almost all leaders beyond the issue of protecting them from public scrutiny, but “normalcy” covered different meanings. For instance, the notion of “home” as a safe haven played an important role for both the Cameron and Clegg families, but was not mentioned by the Milibands. David Cameron summed up the matter when he told Susanna Reid: “You can’t insulate your children from what you do, you just try to create, you know, a warm home”64 and explained later on to James Landale that the weekends in their Oxfordshire constituency home were essential to enable his children to keep their bearings: “you know London was their home and they are at school in London, but because we live in number 10, which one of my children calls ‘the pretend home’, (…) it’s very important that they feel rooted and grounded here.”65 His wife Samantha even confided on ITV that she initially felt extremely anxious about the potential impact of life at Number Ten, but that they had found ways of preventing a complete overhaul: “It's been much easier than I expected it to be, I go to the same office, the children go to the same school. There's a lot of our life that hasn't changed.”66 The Cleggs’67 choice not too uproot their children when he joined in the Coalition government was first brought about on the above-mentioned LBC show, when he explained that he and his wife had declined “to move into a great fancy flat behind the battlements of Downing Street or Whitehall”68 and that his family “still [lived] live in the home that [they] did before [he] became deputy prime minister.” The topic was raised again in the couple’s joint interview for ITV, and it was revealed that they had been quite under a lot of pressure to move, but had decided against in order to protect their children. 14 Yet the main challenge political leaders appeared to be faced with was to be able to provide their children with a “normal” life in the sense that they would not be deprived of their love, care and attention because of their extremely busy schedule. Thus, the leaders appeared juggling work and family life, or, in the case of Nigel Farage, failing to do so. Indeed, when asked whether he found time to spend with his wife and children by one of the Loose Women, the UKIP leader gave the following answer: At the moment I don’t and I was very clear about that (…), I said you know, you cannot conduct any sense of family life and do politics. Now I notice how the three big party leaders are very good at coming on programmes like this and say what wonderful family men they are and how they do the school run and when the babies were little they changed the nappies and did the night feeds. Maybe that’s true but all I can say is that my life in politics… it is pretty much impossible to do that.69 15 Farage succeeded in counterpoising his potentially damaging confession70 that his wife was more than bearing the brunt of childcare by casting doubt on his competitors’ presentation of themselves as hands-on fathers. He was also slightly dishonest in putting Nick Clegg on a par with David Cameron and Ed Miliband, given that the Lib- Dem leader is almost as spare about details of his family life as he himself is.71 However, Farage qualified his discourse later on by declaring that he was “not particularly proud of how he [had] been running his family”, and by provocatively saying that he would consider quitting politics to become a househusband if he lost the election in order to make up

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for his mistakes.72 The one serious concern he expressed as to the toll taken by his political career on the normalcy of his children’s lives was of a different order compared with the other leaders: indeed, he explained on both the BBC and ITV that they sometimes went through hard times because they were easily identified with him on account of their “unusual surname”.

16 Ed Miliband first expressed his frustration at not getting enough time with his children on the BBC piece (as a matter of fact, his wife Justine also mentioned it), and even made the touching confession that it was one of the things he worried about when he thought about his future life if he won the election: “obviously I think about what would happen if was Prime Minister, and making sure there’s enough time.” He was nevertheless shown spending quality time with them and his wife Justine in the park on both his BBC and ITV portraits. Asked what type of father he was on Good Morning Britain, Miliband answered: “I’m the kind who likes to tell stories,”73 as had been exemplified at the beginning, pursuing the family tradition invented by his late father. The Miliband boys were shown as normal happy little boys enjoying a ride on their scooters in the park. On the BBC piece, they commented on how “daddy” was always on the phone, or at work. 17 The Prime Minister, however, was presented as moving seamlessly from one role to the other, notably in the ITV piece, in which the marble table of the Downing Street flat was offered as the symbol of his effortless ease in “[switching] from the matters of state to the business of the school run” as he simply explained: “you can see this is my work table but in a minute it’s gonna be a breakfast table.” In his case, even the personal table is political. Time did not seem to be an issue: “I like living above the job because I get to see my children. ”74 The Prime Minister’s children’s coverage consisted in mundane scenes of domestic happiness: they were shown discussing things with their parents over breakfast on ITV (which had already been done in the 2010 campaign) and over lunch on the BBC, as well as in a PEB75 using footage obviously shot on the same day. On the ITV piece, the conversation was about school dinners and costumed book day at school. The latter topic provided Cameron with the occasion to mention Elsa, thereby proving that, he was perfectly in touch with the overwhelming success and ubiquitous merchandising of Disney’s Frozen. The BBC portrait only featured snippets of talk with the children at the end of the piece, but these included the happy ending of the Camerons’ eldest daughter Nancy’s “hunger strike”, which the Prime Minister had previously explained had led to an important conversation between them. He thus further evidenced his parenting skills by showing that discussion is the way problems are solved in his home. He had already shown himself as a good father like any other by going to support his son at his football game in the opening of the piece. In addition, he was seen doing his share of the school run on ITV, tying his daughter’s hair with a band before giving her a kiss. The close-up on his hands showed that he was handling it rather well, in an attempt to prove that it was not a mere stunt, but something he was comfortable with out of practice. It is worth noting that throughout the campaign, he constructed a consistent persona of his eldest daughter Nancy as an independent (she was apparently sewing her book day costume herself on the ITV piece) smart young girl with a sense of humour (it was revealed in that she compares him to Phil Dunphy from the American sitcom Modern Family, and that she found the “kitchengate” hilarious),76 but also aware of radical means of political action (when she allegedly went on a hunger strike for the reinstatement of Jeremy Clarkson on the motoring

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programme Top Gear). The latter element says something about how he and his wife Samantha are raising her in a spirit of gender equality, which was also alluded to by the Prime Minister’s agreement to be seen doing her hair on ITV, showing that the distribution of tasks in the Cameron household is not defined by traditional gender roles.77

The “secret weapon” is the new “ordinary political spouse”

18 The unprecedented intensity and nature of the media coverage given to the three main party leaders’ wives was pointed out by Higgins and Smith as one of the most notable of the many innovations in the 2010 campaign. They found that it resulted from a combination of three factors: “party communication strategy, established media discourses, and the agency and visibility of the wives themselves.”78 Indeed, although in different ways, neither of the women involved in 2010 fit in the mould of the “ordinary political spouse”, who provides silent yet smiling support to their powerful other half through strategic appearances by their side at political events, and possibly act as signposts for their moral worth as husbands. Since both and Miriam González Durántez were involved again, it could reasonably be assumed that the trend would be continued in the 2015 election, not to mention that their status as wives to the two most important figures in the British government over the past five years meant that they had both had continued media presence and had developed a rather high media profile in their own right. Justine Miliband had also received some media attention over the same time period as the spouse of the leader of the opposition, it was by no means comparable to the other two, even if she had taken her real first steps into the limelight a few months ahead of the campaign at the Labour Party conference.

19 Although Higgins and Smith79 explained that wives such as or Mary Wilson had previously contributed to the political realm in their own terms, once again the most tremendous changes were introduced in the Blair era, when his wife Cherie became a public figure in her own right, who “flitted across a range of press identities, from the domestic role of ‘wife’ to the professional position of ‘’, bridged by the combined role of ‘working mother.’”80 The multiplicity of roles attributed to still holds true as far as the coverage of the three wives under focus in this part is concerned: indeed, Samantha Cameron, Miriam González Durántez and Justine Miliband are all cast (or cast themselves) in turn as instruments offering a way into the domestic realm, adding elements of ordinariness to their husbands’ personae in their role as their “wives” and as the mothers of their children, quite in the same manner as the children themselves do, while conducting high-flying careers; as a matter of fact, both Miriam González Durántez and Justine Thornton81 work full-time as like Blair’s wife, while Samantha Cameron is a creative consultant for the leather company Smythson, though she has reduced her working hours to two days a week since her husband was elected. Cherie Blair found herself the object of media backlash because she often expressed her independence, thereby refusing to “occupy a silent position of commitment to her (...) husband,”82 and was often vilified in the right-wing press which enjoyed portraying her as scheming “Lady MacBeth Character”. However this was not the case of three leaders’ wives under focus in this article. Their coverage was seldom aggressive, although Nick

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Clegg’s wife has occasionally been portrayed as a feminist bully, in the same right-wing press83. 20 One of the essential roles of a political leaders’ wife is to provide them with support, both in the public and in the private realm. Naturally, it consists first and foremost in backing them politically. Indeed, all voiced their support for their spouses’ political ambitions. While Samantha Cameron simply declared about her husband David that “ he’s the best man for the job,”84 Miriam González Durántez chose to argue for the Liberal- Democrat Party as a whole rather than to lay the focus on the sole figure of Nick Clegg, moving away from personalisation: “I have seen Nick and these guys for five years putting country above party consistently, every single day - very often at a great personal cost. They deserve to be back.”85 Justine Miliband was even more elaborate as she—now famously— said on the BBC early in March that she expected the personal attacks on her husband to get worse, “vicious”, and that she was “totally up” for the “fight”: "because I think this goes way beyond Ed as an individual, I think it's about whether decencies and principle count for something in political life, wherever you are on the political spectrum” and added that she had decided to give a speech in the last Labour Party Conference because she wanted to “ reassure people that [she] was in fact more than a dress.”86 21 Samantha Cameron was the wife who received the widest media coverage.87 She has always been willingly in the public eye in the role of the spouse, both by her husband’s side and through regular charity work. Consistently, during the campaign, she joined in on the campaign trail both with the Prime Minister and on her own within the framework of charity events. On both the BBC and the ITV pieces she spoke almost exclusively of family life and how she and “the kids” keep the Prime Minister “grounded ”.88 In addition, she gave a Sunday Times interview in which she opened up about the loss of her son Ivan.89 22 Miriam González Durántez has often been said to be reluctant to be cast in a politician’s wife role. Indeed, during the campaign, she only appeared very briefly in a joint interview at the end of the ITV piece, and was physically, albeit not entirely (she was mentioned and a photograph of her was shown), absent from the BBC Leader profile. Her stand-alone interviews during the general election campaign were always given primarily within the framework of her “Inspiring Women” campaign, which is about providing girls age 13-15 with real-life role models by having professional women coming to talk to them. She did join in on the campaign trail late in April, to support women Liberal-Democrat candidates, in keeping with her feminist work. Like Samantha Cameron, she appeared to play a key role in making sure her husband did not lose touch with reality. Commenting on the decision not to move to Whitehall when her husband became Deputy Prime Minister, she said: If you look at it with perspective it has been the best decision for all of us and if I may, also for Nick as well because you can see how politicians sometimes can get in a bubble and be completely distant from normal society and I think if you’re in your house in your neighbourhood, it’s much easier really.90 23 Her husband’s BBC piece was Justine Miliband’s first major interview, although she had started getting more involved since she gave a speech at the previous Labour Party conference. In James Lansdale’s opinion, the Labour Party intended to spark a debate about character, and portray Ed Miliband as a decent man trying to bring change to Britain. He purports that within this framework, they must have hoped Justine Miliband would prove an asset, like Sarah Brown seemed to have been for her husband Gordon, “possibly knocking the edges of her husband’s image, and perhaps helping him connect

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with voters.” 91 Her role in helping him keep his feet on the ground was not mentioned in the portraits, however Miliband did mention his official Labour autobiography that: “My wife Justine (…) has done more than anyone to keep me rooted in real life over the last few years.”92

The “kitchen election”

24 However important the exchange of words in televised interviews, visual elements play, by essence, a key role: they are an integral part of the performance. As a matter of fact, what can be seen may even become more important than what is being said when viewers’ focus on the latter falters, whether by choice of out of loss of attention. Thus, all elements of visual presentation matter in the ultimate reception of the message conveyed: the speakers’ body language and physical appearance (clothes, haircut) on the one hand, but also the visual background provided by the setting. It has already been noted that the chosen locations of the filmed interviews of all four leaders were more or less instrumental in bestowing consistency to their intended messages, whether explicit or implicit (Cameron’s breakfast table, Miliband’s comprehensive school, Clegg’s office, Farage’s BBC settings). Given the highly confidential tone of the main televised corpus of this article, it is hardly surprising that the TV crews were let into their private homes.93 However, the cameras were let further in than the expected reception spaces that are the living or dining rooms; indeed, David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg were all seen in their kitchens, and what was truly remarkable about the 2015 election was the media frenzy generated by these specific rooms, in particular in the wake of the revelation that the kitchen the Milibands were filmed in by the BBC was one of the two they have in their house. It was treated much like a sleaze scandal, and led to media talk about a “kitchengate” and to the leader of the Labour party being dubbed “Ed ‘Two Kitchens’”, in reference to the former Labour “John ‘Two Jags’” Prescott. Only Nigel Farage kept the cameras away from his home in general and from the room in particular, in usual keeping with his private persona strategy.

25 Though the UKIP leader did not show his kitchen, he did however mention his cooking credentials in a Mirror interview, but presented them in a “manly” way: “I’m not a new man, but I can cook, I particularly like cooking things I’ve caught.”94 Both Ed Miliband and David Cameron were filmed cooking simple meals, probably to show off their man-of- the-people credentials. When present, their wives stood by their side watching, in a modern redistribution of traditional gender roles. The Labour Party leader sought to evidence that his first-floor kitchen was indeed “for tea and snacks”95 as he prepared eggs-on-toast for his children and his interviewer Tom Bradby, while the Prime Minister was shown putting together a sardine-and-mayonnaise sandwich for himself and the filming crew behind the cameras of his #SunNation video. The inclusion of some of the media professionals involved at their tables was useful in alleviating the pure pseudo-event dimension of the act. Cameron repeated the performance on his BBC Leader profile, this time chopping tomatoes for a salad for his Sunday family lunch. As far as the Cleggs were concerned, unusually, the talk about cooking was exclusive to the Lib-Dem Leader’s wife Miriam. Even more surprisingly, she mentioned on at least two occasions96 her passion and talent for spending time in the kitchen, and even revealed that she had been a secret food blogger for the past couple of years.97 For all

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that, such revelations strengthened her image of epitome of the over-accomplished 21st century woman who could not be more successful at combining an outstanding career, charity work, motherhood and a perfectly egalitarian and blissful marriage. 26 The Milibands were the first to be filmed in their kitchen, on the Labour Party Leader’s BBC profile. Scrutiny of the room immediately gave rise to mixed media coverage, depending on the political side of the newspapers involved. The harshest piece, penned by Sarah Vine, was published in the Daily Mail. Its title was eloquent enough: “Why their kitchen tells you all you need to know about the mirthless Milibands... and why there's nothing to suggest that Ed and Justine are not, in fact, aliens.”98 The Milibands decided to laugh it off, not quite unlike the bacon sandwich incident, and even invited the cameras in a second time for the ITV Tonight Special episode. The “Kitchengate” was interpreted in the right-wing press as “a brilliant metaphor for Ed Miliband's failure to connect with Middle England's aspirational voters.”99 The Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition even clashed over the issue in PMQs. There came to be so much talk of kitchens that it became expected that the Cleggs would in turn show theirs,100 which they did on ITV, not after displaying humorous awareness concerning the matter: Miriam González Durántez quipped on LBC: “I have only one kitchen,”101 while Nick Clegg had declared: “ you may catch glimpses of my kitchen.” According to a Times article, they passed the test with flying colours.102 27 Two press articles went so far as to provide forensic analysis of the Camerons’ two kitchens, the one in their Cotswolds family home shown on the BBC and the one in their Downing Street flat103. The angle was typical of the Daily Mail’s celebrity-based approach to politics, indeed, the layout was similar to their detailed dissections of celebrity outfits; however the publication of an even more elaborate piece in the quality paper the Daily Telegraph, complete with an interactive interface (while the Daily Mail simply included paragraph-long captions) was more intriguing, not to mention that it predated it. Not only was every single visible piece of produce in the pantry tagged, but it was also accompanied with comments on the choices in oil and vinegar. There appeared to be oblique criticism of the Cameron’s failure at concealing their poshness. The comparison with “most families” was in fact limited to the “staples” “milk”, “ketchup” and “Marmite”, the latter being an indispensable feature of Britishness. In truth, it was almost immediately debunked with the mention of the “strangely neat pantry”, which could either hint at their having professional help to keep their home immaculate, and/or to the presentational efforts made for the sake of stage- management. Similarly, the “American-style fridge freezer”, unambiguously alluded to their financial means. The rather gentle exposure culminated with the remark that there are in fact “some clear markers as to [the Cameron’s] roots in the Notting Hill quinoarati set”, with the mention of the South-American cereal which has been all the rage in the plates of the trendy health and environment conscious upper-middle classes over the past couple of years. 28 In the Daily Telegraph, Tim Stanley 104 both argued and lamented that Ed Miliband’s kitchens only mattered because of lesser differences between the parties. To him, the Labour Leader’s kitchen problem did not lie in the fact that it revealed that he had money, since Labour leaders had already had to make up for being rich and well- educated through public display of connection with the middle classes in the past.105 To Stanley, “the difference between Wilson and Miliband is partly that the modern voter is trained to recognise political choreography and spot the strings – hence a photo-op in a kitchen that

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clearly isn’t an everyday kitchen won’t work.”106 His ultimate conclusion was that “Miliband fails to convince as a socialist not simply because he’s personally rich but because Labour won't and can't offer a serious alternative to Tory policy.” Thus, though Stanley provocatively went as far as to say in the opening of his article that in the 2015 election kitchens came first and ideas second, echoing the common contemporary concern that “style” has won over “substance”, his core argument is that it is in fact not the case. More importantly, he acknowledges the public’s awareness of the marketing techniques at work in any politician’s attempt to present themselves under a specific light, and himself contributes to pointing them out, revealing the vulnerability of the parties’ intended propaganda machines. Kitchen articles in particular showed that the media were not simply passive, but could play an antagonistic role (while the main corpus interviews had been little confrontational).

Conclusion

29 Langer points out that one major concern is that the politicization of the private persona has diminished political debate, and that “style” may have won over “substance”, that is to say, over ideas and policies. By providing pseudo-insights into the personal lives of politicians, the phenomenon is blamed for trivializing and depoliticising the public sphere, diminishing the quality of political information and distracting from the substance of politics. It is a fact that human stories and personal narratives do make coverage more appealing in what has been described as a context of “tabloidization of the media”, which is itself the product of intense commercial pressure.107 However, such softer coverage can also be a strategy to divert attention from more pressing issues, as was analysed by a number of journalists in the context of the “kitchengate.”108

30 This study gave further evidence that the stage-management of the private and family lives of the leaders was a highly choreographed matter. Indeed, if the same arguments on topics of policy were made almost verbatim from one media outlet to another, the same was true of the presentation of the leaders’ personal lives and selves: words and stunts were often repeated. Yet even the Prime Minister’s highly controlled media operation was not immune to glitches: at some point in April, he made an embarrassing gaffe that exposed his love of football as fake, when he mistakenly wished West Ham good luck, instead of his “official” favourite Aston Villa. Personal experiences and examples were systematically politicized, used for political means, “woven into ideological commitments, used to infer and underwrite political values as well as used to try and legitimize political positions.”109 In addition, a most prominent feature of the use of the personal was how it was used to make adjustments to the leaders’ perceived personality in order to meet voters’ alleged expectations. 31 On the topic of comparing strategies, what was most striking was that there were clearly converging trends for the two main party leaders on the one hand, and for the two secondary party leaders on the other hand, which was simply consistent with the general marketing of their parties as offering an alternative. The reason why Ed Miliband’s strategies were so similar to Cameron’s is however less straightforward. It could be argued that the Labour Party leader’s readiness to expose his family life stemmed from a perceived need to play by the rules of the winners of the previous elections, Blair and Cameron, and from the fear that if he failed to do so, he might be

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further compared with his predecessor Gordon Brown in terms of lack of communication skills. Indeed, Brown’s reluctance to talk about his private life was interpreted as a sign of aloofness and invited suspicions of concealment. In this context, Farage’s success at keeping his family life private and avoiding such criticism is all the more astonishing. The truth of the matter is that he could afford being reserved on the topics of his childhood and private life because the means of asserting the authenticity of his persona lie elsewhere. Given the increased awareness of the public as to the routine of political communication, his claims of authenticity seemed all the more self-fulfilling that he did not indulge in the same sort of photo-ops as the candidates who actually stood a chance of becoming Prime Minister.

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Ofcom, List of major parties, 16 March 2015, , accessed 17 March 2015.

OWEN, Pamela. “Nigel Farage: 'If I Lose I May Quit Politics to Become a House Husband’”, Daily Mirror, 11 April 2015.

RAINEY, Sarah. “Inside the Camerons' OTHER Kitchen - with its £22 Ikea ceiling lights, £239 John Lewis Food Processor, a £87 Panasonic Bread Maker - and a Calm Down Dear Chopping Board”, Daily Mail, 24 March 2015.

RILEY-SMITH, Ben. “Ed 'Two Kitchens' Miliband under Fire in Bizarre Row”, Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2015.

ROSE, Hillary. “Never Mind the Cabinet: this Election is Being Fought in the Kitchen”, Times, 19 March 2015.

SEAWRIGHT, David. “‘Cameron 2010’: An Exemplification of Personality-Based Campaigning”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 12, n° 2-3, 2013, pp.166-181.

SHIPMAN, Tim. “Cameron’s Just a ‘Sad Dad’ to his Daughter”, Sunday Times, 12 April 2015.

SMITH, Gareth. “Conceptualizing and Testing Brand Personality in British Politics”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 8, n°3, 2009, PP. 209-232.

STANLEY, Tim. “British politics has a surfeit of kitchens and a deficit of ideas”, Daily Telegraph, 16 March 2015.

SWINFORD, Stephen. “Video: Ed Miliband Sounds like a Public Schoolboy”, Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2015.

VINE, Sarah. “Why their Kitchen Tells you All you Need to Know about the Mirthless Milibands... and Why there's Nothing to Suggest that Ed and Justine are not, in Fact, Aliens”, Daily Mail, 12 March 2015.

WALLIS SIMONS, Jake. “Why are so Many Men Attracted to Ukip?”, Daily Telegraph, 26 February 2015.

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H. WALLOP & M. OLIVER. “The 45 Secrets of David Cameron’s Middle Class Kitchen” Daily Telegraph, 20 March 2015.

WATT, Nicholas. “Kitchen Sink Drama for Miliband as Homely Photo Backfires”, Guardian, 12 March 2015.

WOLLATSON, Sam. “Spotlight – Ed Miliband: Tonight review: ‘Personality’n’politics, Easy Over’”, Guardian, 17 April 2015.

NOTES

1. See Ivor GABER, “The ‘Hollowed-Out Election,’ or Where did All the Policy Go?”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 12, n° 2-3, 2013, p.212. 2. David CAMERON & Ed MILIBAND, Interview with Jeremy PAXMAN, Cameron & Miliband Live: The Battle for Number 10, Channel 4/Sky News, 26 March 2015. 3. Ana Inés LANGER, The Personalisation of Politics in the UK: Mediated Leadership from Attlee to Cameron, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011, p.1. 4. Ana Inés LANGER, “The Politicization of Private Persona: Exceptional Leaders or the New Rule? The Case of the UK and the Blair Effect”, International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 15, n°1, January 2010, pp.61-62. 5. David CAMERON, “My credo for my country”, Daily Telegraph, 2 April 2010. 6. Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, p.61. 7. Ana Inés LANGER, 2011, pp.2-3. 8. Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, p.61. 9. Which she defines as “ the emphasis in public discourse not just on leaders, on their overall personalities, or on their leadership traits, but on their personal lives and qualities. In other words, this concept encompasses the emphasis on politicians not just as representatives of an ideology or a party, or as statesmen, but also as persons, as human beings.” (Ana Inés LANGER 2011, p. 44). 10. The decision was made to include UKIP as the fourth “major party” (in addition to the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal-Democrats) in Great Britain even if it is only acknowledged as such in England and Wales in the latest Ofcom List of Major Parties. See Ofcom, Ofcom List of major parties, 16 March 2015, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/ broadcast/guidance/major-parties.pdf, accessed 31 May 2015. 11. David CAMERON, Interview with Tom BRADBY, Tonight: Special, Series 22, Episode 1, ITV, 7 April 2015; Nick CLEGG, Interview with Tom BRADBY, Tonight: Special, Series 22, Episode 2, ITV, 9 April 2015; Ed MILIBAND, Interview with Tom BRADBY, Tonight: Special, Series 22, Episode 3, ITV, 16 April 2015; Nigel FARAGE, Interview with Julie ETCHINGHAM, Tonight: Special, Series 22, Episode 4, ITV, 23 April 2015; Nigel FARAGE, Interview with James LANDALE, Leader profile, BBC, 6 March 2015; Ed MILIBAND, Interview with James LANDALE, Leader profile, BBC, 10 March 2015; Nick CLEGG, Interview with James LANDALE, Leader profile, BBC, 20 March 2015; David CAMERON, Interview with James LANDALE, Leader profile, BBC, 23 March 2015. 12. Both James Landale and Tom Bradby are political editors, Julie Etchingham’s career only took a truly political turn in the election. 13. The Guardian’s view was that “these [ITV] Tonight shows are more magaziney profiles— personality’n’politics, easy over.” This also applies to the BBC Leader Profiles (Sam WOLLATSON, “Spotlight – Ed Miliband: Tonight review: ‘Personality’n’Politics, Easy Over’”, Guardian, 17 April 2015). 14. All the leaders under study were male. 15. Ana Inés LANGER, 2011 pp.79-81. 16. Ana Inés LANGER, 2011, p.80.

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17. Ibid. 18. Max WEBER, Economy and Society, and Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, p.241, quoted by Ana Inés LANGER, 2011, p.49. 19. Not to mention that it has been argued that “politics is increasingly about symbolism as opposed to policy implementation, image rather than content. As such, politicians can be viewed as ‘actors’ performing in a purposive way to achieve predetermined party political objectives.” See Gareth SMITH, “Conceptualizing and Testing Brand Personality in British Politics”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 8, n°3, 2009, p.214. 20. James LANDALE, “Leader Profile: 24 hours with Nigel Farage”, bbc.co.uk, 6 March 2015, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-31771963, accessed 29 April 2015. 21. See note 46. 22. Ana Inés LANGER 2010, pp. 64-67 and 2011, chapter 6, pp. 139-159. 23. David SEAWRIGHT, “‘Cameron 2010’: An Exemplification of Personality-Based Campaigning”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 12, n° 2-3, 2013, pp.166-181. 24. Ana Inés LANGER 2010, pp. 146-147. 25. Michael FOLEY, John Major, Tony Blair and a Conflict of Leadership: Collision Course, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 194, p.8. 26. Although he made the case that: “I think people have a right to know a bit more about you, your life and your family, what makes you tick, and what informs your thinking. And to me, nothing informs my thinking more than family because I think it's the most important thing there is in our society.” (“Cameron defends filming of family”, BBC News, bbc.co.uk, 14 March 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7295735.stm, accessed 31 May 2015). 27. David CAMERON, 23 March 2015. 28. David CAMERON & Ed MILIBAND, 26 March 2015. 29. It is mentioned in his official biography on the Labour Party website, and it was used as a setting on both his BBC (“where he said he learnt to stand up for himself”) and ITV (“That’s where it all started”) portraits. ( accessed 31 May 2015; Ed MILIBAND, 10 March 2015; Ed MILIBAND, 16 April 2015). 30. D. CAMERON & E. MILIBAND, Interview with Jeremy PAXMAN, op. cit. 31. The terms “bacon sandwich” are now the most googled alongside his name. (Jane MERRICK, “Ed Miliband's Trial by Media: Damned if he Does and Damned if he Doesn't”, Independent, 15 March 2015). 32. Tim BALE, Five Year Mission—The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 220. 33. Stephen SWINFORD, “Video: Ed Miliband Sounds like a Public Schoolboy”, Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2015. 34. Ashley COWBURN, “Exclusive: Labour MP says the Public Thinks Ed Miliband is Aloof and more of a Toff than Cameron”, New Statesman, 23 March 2015. 35. In the panel part of The Battle for Number Ten (D. CAMERON & E. MILIBAND, 26 March 2015) and on his ITV piece (Ed MILIBAND, 16 April 2015). 36. , accessed 29 April 2015. 37. D. CAMERON & E. MILIBAND, 26 March 2015; Ed MILIBAND, 16 April 2015). 38. Raphael BERH, “The Making of Ed Miliband”, Guardian, 15 April 2015. 39. “Ed Miliband—a Portrait”, Labour Party PEB, 28 April 2015, accessed 29 April 2015. 40. Nick CLEGG, Interview with Evan DAVIS, BBC Leader Interviews, BBC, 13 April 2015. 41. Ibid; Nick CLEGG, 9 April 2015; Nick CLEGG, 20 March 2015. 42. Nigel FARAGE, Interview with Evan DAVIS, BBC Leader Interviews, BBC, 22 April 2015. 43. Nigel FARAGE, Interview with Julie ETCHINGHAM, 23 April 2015. 44. Nigel FARAGE, Interview on Loose Women, ITV, 5 March 2015.

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45. Ibid. 46. Two thirds of UKIP voters are male, making it “by far the most male-dominated party in Britain”. (Jake WALLIS SIMONS, “Why are so Many Men Attracted to Ukip?”, Daily Telegraph, 26 February 2015). 47. James LANDALE, 6 March 2015. If staying away from the pub may result in a more “ professional, less jokey” persona for Farage, it is worth noting that both Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband called upon the softening powers of the most traditionally British of décors in their BBC and ITV pieces respectively (Nick CLEGG, 20 March 2015; Ed MILIBAND, 16 April 2015). 48. Farage’s father had a drinking problem and left when he was still a child. 49. Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, p. 66. 50. For analytical purposes, the focus in this part will be on the stage-management of the leaders as fathers, though their role as parents is obviously encompassed in their broader role as family men, which also includes their role as husbands and can hardly be separated from it since their wives are their children’s mothers. Indeed, it is worth noting that all the leaders’ families who received media coverage are “traditional” in the sense that all children were born of their marriage. The Milibands stand out slightly because their sons were born out of wedlock, but they did “regularize” their situation by getting married eventually. Nigel Farage, always the outsider, is the only one in his second marriage after a divorce, and whose children have different mothers. 51. Ed MILIBAND, 10 March 2015. 52. The use of the word “dad” by the three main party leaders, and even “daddy”, in the case of Cameron and Miliband, that is to say of the name they are called by their children, to refer to themselves as fathers, is a simple, touching way of projecting themselves in that role by showing emotional connection. 53. Nick CLEGG, 20 March 2015. 54. David CAMERON, 7 April 2015. 55. He was quoted by Julie Etchingham as she interviewed him for ITV (Nigel FARAGE, 23 April 2015). 56. Yet pictures of the Prime Minister’s children can easily be found on the Internet, and Samantha Cameron’s Mail on Sunday interview included photographs of all of them (Geordie GRIEG, “Samantha Cameron: 'Dave runs the country; I do the school run'”, Mail on Sunday, 4 April 2015). 57. Nigel FARAGE, 23 April 2015. 58. See “the kitchen election”. 59. Nick CLEGG, Call Clegg: Nick's Weekly LBC Phone-In, LBC, 12 March 2015. 60. Nick CLEGG, 6 March 2015. 61. David CAMERON & Ed. MILIBAND, 26 March 2015. 62. Nick CLEGG, Call Clegg: Nick's Weekly LBC Phone-In, LBC, 12 March 2015. 63. Ibid. 64. David CAMERON, Interview with Susanna REID, Good Morning Britain, ITV, 17 March 2015. 65. David CAMERON, 23 March 2015. 66. David CAMERON, 7 April 2015. 67. Nick Clegg and his wife are here referred to as “the Cleggs” for the sake of convenience, and by no means in accordance with the rightwing press’s pratice to call Miriam Gonzáles Durántez “Miriam Clegg” in jingoistic ignorance of the Spanish tradition concerning married women’s surnames. 68. Nick CLEGG, 12 March 2015. 69. Nigel FARAGE, 5 March 2015.

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70. However, the extent of the damage remains to be seen: though he did take the risk of alienating the women presenters of the show and their primarily female audience, he also comforted his electorate in their traditional approach to gender roles. 71. The only hint given as to their childcare arrangements during the campaign was when his wife Miriam said that he took his children to school in her talk at the Grazia Feminism: Then, Now and Tomorrow conference in February. (“Londoner's Diary: Miriam González Durántez: MPs can learn it all at the school gates”, Evening Standard, 27 February 2015). 72. Pamela OWEN, “Nigel Farage: 'If I lose I may quit politics to become a house husband’”, Daily Mirror, 11 April 2015. 73. Ed MILIBAND, Interview with Ben SHEPARD, Good Morning Britain, ITV, 25 March 2015. 74. David CAMERON, 7 April 2015. 75. Which was reminiscent of Tony Blair’s much commented upon 1997 kitchen PEB. See Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, p. 63. 76. Tim SHIPMAN, “Cameron’s Just a ‘Sad Dad’ to his Daughter”, Sunday Times, 12 April 2015. 77. The Milibands gave a very simple visual hint in that area: indeed, their boys could be seen riding pink scooters on the BBC piece. 78. Michael HIGGINS & Angela SMITH, “‘My Husband, My Hero’: Selling the Political Spouses in the 2010 Election”, Journal of Political Marketing, vol. 12, n° 2-3, 2013, p. 197. 79. Michael HIGGINS & Angela SMITH, art. cit., p.199. 80. Ruth E. PAGE, “Cherie: Lawyer, wife, mum: Contradictory patterns of representation of media reports of Cherie Booth/Blair”, Discourse & Society, vol. 14, n°5, pp.559-579, quoted in Michael HIGGINS & Angela SMITH, ibid. 81. Ed Miliband’s wife practices law under her maiden name. Her first major interview on the BBC with James Landale was the first time she used her husband’s surname in public. 82. Natasha WALTERS, Living Dolls: The return of sexism, London: Virago, 2010, p.224, quoted in Michael HIGGINS & Angela SMITH, ibid. 83. She pointed the fact out herself, in her above-mentioned Grazia talk (see note 71), with a degree of humour and irony: “Apparently I was a terrible person because I was depriving my husband, who has a ‘really, really important job’, from being in yet another meeting because, poor thing, I was forcing him to take his children to school. Have you actually thought about how stupid it is to think we are ‘forcing’ men — men want to be with their children.” (“Londoner's Diary: Miriam González Durántez: MPs can learn it all at the school gates”, Evening Standard, 27 February 2015). 84. David CAMERON, 23 March 2015. 85. Ben GLAZE, “Nick Clegg's wife delivers slap down to David Cameron for living in a 'bubble'”, Daily Mirror, 9 April 2015. 86. Ed MILIBAND, Interview with James LANDALE, op. cit. 87. As a matter of fact, she ranked 15th most prominent individual in terms of press and television news coverage in the formal campaign, as monitored by the Loughborough University, three places behind Green Party leader , and two places ahead of , leader of Plaid Cymru. This pointed out to the fact that the women party leaders failed to have much of an impact on the coverage. See Emily HARMER, “Men Writing About Men: Media And The UK General Election 2015”, Loughborough University blog, 22 May 2015, http:// blog.lboro.ac.uk/general-election/men-writing-about-men-media-and-the-uk-general- election-2015/, accessed 31 May 2015. 88. David CAMERON, 23 March 2015; David CAMERON, 7 April 2015. 89. Geordie GRIEG, “Samantha Cameron: 'Dave Runs the Country; I Do the School Run'“, Mail on Sunday, 4 April 2015. 90. Nick CLEGG, 9 April 2015. This was interpreted as an attack on David Cameron. See GLAZE, Ben, art. cit.

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91. James LANDALE, “A chat with Justine Miliband”, bbc.co.uk, 10 March 2015, , accessed 29 April 2015. 92. , accessed 31 May 2015. 93. Surprisingly enough, Nick Clegg even exceeded expectations to a certain extent, by letting the BBC in his parents’ home, although this may have been simply been in compensation for, or even to create a diversion from, not having them in his own. 94. Pamela OWEN, art. cit. 95. Ben RILEY-SMITH, “Ed 'Two Kitchens' Miliband under Fire in Bizarre Row”, Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2015. 96. Both on her LBC interview (Miriam GONZÁLES DURÁNTEZ, Interview with Shelagh Fogarty, Live on LBC, LBC, 25 March 2015) and in her Musmnet Q&A (Miriam GONZÁLES DURÁNTEZ, Webchat, Mumsnet.com, , accessed 31 May 2015). 97. The name of the blog, mumandsons, speaks for itself as to how the Clegg boys are raised in a spirit of gender equality (see note 77). 98. Sarah VINE, “Why their Kitchen tells you All you Need to Know about the Mirthless Milibands... and why there's Nothing to Suggest that Ed and Justine are not, in Fact, Aliens”, Daily Mail, 12 March 2015. 99. Eleanor MILLS, “Why Voters don't Feel at Home with Ed”, Sunday Times, 15 March 2015. 100. See for instance Rachel HALLIWELL, “Politicians: Get out of the Kitchen (but not before Showing us your Smeg)”, Daily Telegraph, 25 March 2015. 101. Miriam GONZÁLES DURÁNTEZ, 25 March 2015. 102. Tom KNOWLES, “No Kitchen Sink Dramas as Cleggs Let TV Crew into Home”, Times, 9 April 2015. 103. H. WALLOP & M. OLIVER. “The 45 Secrets of David Cameron’s Middle Class Kitchen” Daily Telegraph, 20 March 2015, and Sarah RAINEY, “Inside the Camerons' OTHER Kitchen - with its £22 Ikea Ceiling Lights, £239 John Lewis Food Processor, a £87 Panasonic Bread Maker - and a Calm Down Dear Chopping Board”, Daily Mail, 24 March 2015. 104. Tim STANLEY, “British politics has a surfeit of kitchens and a deficit of ideas”, Daily Telegraph, 16 March 2015. 105. As famously did by smoking a pipe in public instead of the cigars he enjoyed in private. Tim STANLEY, ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, pp.71-72. 108. See Tim STANLEY, art. cit., but also for example Hillary ROSE, “Never Mind the Cabinet: this Election is Being Fought in the Kitchen”, Times, 19 March 2015, or Dan HODGES, “I couldn't Care less about Ed Miliband's Kitchen”, Daily Telegraph, 13 March 2015. 109. Ana Inés LANGER, 2010, p.61.

ABSTRACTS

This article focuses on a specific aspect of the leaders of the four main British parties’ image- building strategies in the 2015 campaign—the stage-management of their private lives. Indeed,

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family life is used as a key instrument in the construction of a particular dimension of the leaders’ public personality theorised by Ana Inés Langer as the “private persona.” Based primarily on a televised corpus, it seeks to analyse the political messages that were conveyed through public fatherhood. In addition, attention is devoted to the involvement of the leaders’ wives.

Cette étude propose d'examiner un aspect particulier de la construction de l'image des leaders des quatre principaux partis politiques britanniques dans le cadre de la campagne électorale de 2015: les mises en scènes de leur vie privée. L'instrumentalisation de la vie familiale joue en effet un rôle clé dans l'élaboration de la dimension de la personnalité des leaders théorisée par Ana Inés Langer sous le nom de « persona privée ». Il s'agira notamment d'étudier, à partir d’un corpus essentiellement télévisuel, les messages politiques qui peuvent être projetés à partir de leurs rôles en tant que pères de famille. L'implication de leurs épouses sera également l'objet d'une attention particulière.

INDEX

Mots-clés: persona privée, communication, David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Nigel Farage, Ed Miliband Keywords: public relations, private persona, David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Nigel Farage, Ed Miliband

AUTHOR

SABINE MICHELON

Université Paris 3 Sorbonne-Nouvelle

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Key debates in the 2015 campaign Les principaux débats des élections de 2015

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Fiscal Policy, Public Spending and the 2015 General Election Politique budgétaire, dépenses publiques et les élections de 2015

Nicholas Sowels

The general election in May 2015 took place against a fair, but mixed economic background. On the one hand, the UK economy was experiencing quite strong GDP growth, running at a bit more than 2.5 percent on an annualised basis at the time of the vote. This growth rate was similar to pre-crisis levels, and amongst the highest of the industrialised nations. It certainly contrasted with the difficult performance of many Eurozone countries. It also compared favourably with the years of “flat-lining” which the British economy had experienced between 2010 as the Coalition government came to office, through to about the middle of 2013, when growth finally began to pick up. Moreover, the growth performance was accompanied by falling unemployment and very low inflation. Not for nothing did Chancellor George Osborne purr with pride and a bit of French-bashing in his March 2015 Budget Speech, noting that he was not planning to adopt “the French approach” advised by some.1 On the other hand, the UK economy was once again manifesting signs of its habitual imbalances. These were most obviously linked to the fact that growth was associated with house price rises, especially in the London area. Indeed, George Osborne had apparently even congratulated himself in Cabinet on this in 2013, noting how he was engineering a good old-fashioned house price boom in the run-up to the election.2 Significantly too, household indebtedness continues to be relatively high. In the first quarter of 2015 it stood at 145 percent of disposable household income.3 This was considerably lower than the peak of 169 percent in the first quarter of 2008, but was still high by historical standards. Such borrowing, along with continued high public sector borrowing in turn have had their counterpart in a yawning current account deficit, running at 5.5 percent in 2014. Linked to these demand and supply imbalances, which are not particularly new to the UK or even the English-speaking countries as a group, Britain has been suffering from chronic productivity stagnation since the outset of the financial crisis and Great Recession: labour output per hour has been flat for nearly a decade. Lastly, while the government deficit was indeed halved during the

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Parliament, dropping from 10% of GDP in 2010 to around 5% at the time of the election, the budget squeeze was far from over (see the table in the Annex for key economic indicators and government finance figures). The Coalition’s economic record going into the general election was therefore mixed, and its track record on bringing down public deficits ambivalent, given its original commitment to more-or-less balancing the budget during the Parliament. As a result, during the 2015 election campaign, the Conservatives pledged to press on with spending cuts and to continuing implementing their plan. Their strong manifesto position may have been an opening bid in possible renewed negotiations with the Liberal Democrats. In the event, they obtained a small parliamentary majority, and immediately began applying quite a strident policy of deficit reduction through spending cuts. This article starts by examining the Coalition’s record on fiscal policy and public spending. It is a controversial record, as we shall see in the first section, but it shaped the background to the election and to the policy of the new Conservative government. Section 2 will then outline the fiscal policy proposals of the main parties during the campaign, and examine in particular how the Conservatives’ negative and critical electoral strategy vis-à-vis Labour seems to have been successful. The following section will examine the pursuit of the Conservatives’ austerity agenda, notably as put forward in the “emergency budget” of July 2015.4 The article concludes by putting forward some considerations about how this policy is likely to evolve and what its results could be.

The Coalition government’s record on fiscal policy and public spending

The Coalition government was formed after the election in May 2010 and immediately announced that it would launch a programme of fiscal consolidation. This turned out to be increasingly controversial as time went on. Yet as growth picked up in the second half of 2013, it became the basis for the Conservative party’s electoral platform in 2015. The background to this overall strategy of fiscal consolidation was the massive development of fiscal deficits in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and Great Recession. Globally, it is estimated that the financial crisis had led governments to commit $14 trillion into national banking systems and the international financial system, equivalent to about a quarter of world GDP.5 Most of this money was not actually spent, and came in the form of guarantees of bank liabilities which often went unused. Nevertheless substantial sums of public finance were also mobilised and directly injected into banks’ capital. In the UK, the government committed £1.2 trillion to prevent the banking system from collapsing. This sum involved £1,029 billion in guarantees (not ultimately used) and £133 billion in direct outlays. Intervention was especially significant in the UK as it was linked to the nationalisation of four major banking groups. As a result of such increased spending (and the contraction of the economy at the end of 2008 and into 2009), total government spending rose to nearly 50 percent of GDP, while tax earnings fell. The overall impact was to push the annual public deficit into double figures. When the Coalition came into office, the public sector deficit was therefore still running at just over 10 percent of GDP. Such was the background to the Coalition’s announcement that it would close the budget gap by the end of the Parliament (in 2015). This policy of consolidation in the

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UK came at a time when European governments were on the whole shifting towards a policy of fiscal austerity, and the economic policy debate was being influenced by warnings concerning the growth consequences of high deficits. In particular, very influential empirical work by two renowned US economists – Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff – suggested that once the government debt to GDP ratio rises above 90 percent it has the effect of depressing median growth by 1 percentage point. Their study was based on examining a large number of countries (44) and their debt and growth trajectories over a long period of time (200 years). Its findings were thus based on statistical averages for many different countries, political regimes and economic circumstances.6 Therefore, their observation is far from being hard rule or law, universally applicable. Nevertheless, it was a simple finding which could be relatively easily understood and converted into public policy, especially as many industrialised countries were experiencing debt levels at around 90 percent of GDP or more. Britain and other European countries in particular started to cut spending, with an insistence that has undoubtedly played a part in slowing Europe’s recovery from the Great Recession, and so arguably compounding the European debt crisis itself. In this context, the Coalition announced in its “emergency” Budget in June 2010 its intention of bringing the budget deficit down from 10.1 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 1.1 percent by 2015/16. In its Spending Review presented to Parliament in October 2010, detailed plans were set out to achieve this objective. These plans included an overall reduction in forecast spending of £81 billion, amounting to a 19 percent cut in spending across all departments, except health and overseas aid. In the event, the change in policy from supporting growth to squeezing public deficits arguably played an important role in holding down growth in Europe. The situation in Greece has of course been the most acute and socially destructive example in which the pursuit of fiscal austerity has weakened growth, making fiscal consolidation even more difficult. To a far lesser extent, Britain too paid a price for the switch in policy, notably as growth “flat-lined” for more than three years. This even led to a public clash between the government and the IMF in April 2013, when the IMF’s Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard warned the British government that it was “playing with fire”.7 Based on its own research, the IMF and notably Mr Blanchard argued that the world economy following the Great Recession was experiencing an exceptional situation. More specifically, he argued that under the prevailing conditions of low or non-existent growth and very low interest rates, the multiplier of public spending could be significantly greater than 1: in other words, a $1 cut in public spending leads to a fall in GDP that is greater than $1, and vice versa for increases in spending.8 On the basis of this research, the Fund publicly warned the UK government that its pursuit of spending cuts was endangering recovery. In the face of slow growth, the Coalition government in fact showed itself to be a bit more pragmatic in reality than its rhetoric suggested. Significantly, while repeatedly stating the importance of austerity, it accepted slower deficit reduction than originally planned. But its public presentation of policy remained tough. Part of its approach was based on political calculation, and notably the idea that the deepest retrenchment should be carried out as early as possible, so that a more lenient policy could be adopted in the run up to the 2015 election. Part of the approach was also based on the collective memory of the Conservatives concerning Mrs Thatcher’s defiance in the face of the economic slump in the early 1980s – “the Lady is not for turning” – and the

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insistence with which Mrs Thatcher and Sir (Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time), pushed through an austerity budget in the trough of the economic downturn in 1981. In his speech to the Conservative party conference in October 2012, George Osborne very specifically referred to the resolve of this first Thatcher government, whose actions appear subsequently to have been justified. Similarly, with the upturn in growth during the second half of 2013, the Coalition government and George Osborne in particular have felt vindicated in their overall economic plan. In his Budget speech in March 2015, the Chancellor clearly opened by saying, “We took difficult decisions in the teeth of opposition and it worked – Britain is walking tall again”. He has also repeatedly noted that the UK has grown “faster than any other major advanced economy in the world”.9 Yet the recent record in growth and employment has surely also been underpinned to quite some extent by unprecedentedly loose monetary policy. The Bank of England’s “ Bank rate” has been at 0.5 percent since March 2009. This is an exceptionally low rate which the Bank has maintained for an exceptionally long period of time. In fact, it is completely unprecedented in the Bank’s entire history stretching back to 1694! Until the end of 2013, the low interest rate was furthermore accompanied by the unconventional policy of “quantitative easing” (QE). This involved the Bank buying financial instruments (largely government bonds) from banks and the markets, in an attempt to push down long term interest rates and so stimulate economic activity. Generally speaking, the impact of these policies is still hard to assess. Both low interest rates and QE are on the whole believed to have helped in preventing the Great Recession from turning out much worse, but they have not necessarily had quite the impact hoped for, and have likely contributed to new areas of asset-price speculation, while also aggravating income and wealth inequalities. However, for the Conservatives any doubts about macroeconomic policy were not reflected in their election commitments in 2015 and in their subsequent pursuit of strong public spending cuts after the election.

Fiscal policy and public spending in the 2015 general election

The election results in 2015 came as a surprise. For months, the opinion polls had been putting the Conservatives and Labour neck-and-neck. It was widely expected and commented that there would be a hung parliament and some form of new coalition. Various combinations of ruling parties were talked about, most notably some new form of coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats on the one hand, and some form of coalition or agreement between Labour and the on the other hand. Other possibilities included a coalition between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and so on. It is possible that the election manifestos were drafted in view of possible negotiations with potential coalition partners. This was said to be especially so concerning the Conservative manifesto, which was perhaps more extreme than it might have been otherwise, in order to provide room for manoeuvre for the Conservative leadership in bargaining with potential coalition partners.10 Whatever the exact calculations may have been, it is sure that the manifesto firmly favoured the continuation of the policy of austerity. Indeed, the Conservative manifesto very clearly stated the aim of reducing public deficits and then running

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surpluses as of 2018/19, in order to reduce public indebtedness. This turnaround in public finances was to be achieved by departmental savings of £13 billion, together with further cuts in welfare benefits totalling £12 billion. According to the manifesto, an additional £5 billion was to be saved by tackling tax evasion, bringing the total spending consolidation to £30 billion. Also, the manifesto set out the Conservatives’ objective of reducing administrative expenditure by £1 for every £100 spent, during the first two years of office. Tellingly, it notes that “[w]e don’t think there is a business that couldn’t do that”.11 The Conservatives pledged to achieve these fiscal adjustments – and the return to public sector surpluses towards the end of the Parliament – through spending cuts, while ruling our tax increases. The manifesto made a specific commitment not to raise VAT, National Insurance Contributions or income tax. In fact, at the end of April 2015, David Cameron even went so far as to commit a future Conservative government to pass a law prohibiting tax increases in these areas. This was an unusual proposition in as much as it seeks to bind future government policy discretion by formal legislation. As even (Lord) Nigel Lawson has noted, the pledge would limit George Osborne’s capacity of raising government revenue in a way that no “previous Chancellor” would have done.12 Fiscal responsibility also featured in the Labour party’s manifesto, entitled Britain can be better. It is notable that in the preamble to the document itself, Labour committed itself to establishing a “Budget Responsibility Lock”, based on reducing the public sector deficit every year, and achieving a budget surplus by the end of the Parliament. More specifically, the manifesto stated that the Labour party had no new spending or borrowing plans: “[a]ll of our commitments will be paid for by reducing spending elsewhere or by raising extra revenue. For example, we will introduce a tax on properties worth over £2 million to help raise the £2.5 billion a year for an NHS Time to Care Fund – part of our plan to save and improve the health service”.13 The Labour party manifesto also proposed making richer households pay more in taxation, while reducing their welfare benefits. Thus, it included a commitment to restore the top income tax rate to 50 percent, for the top 1 percent of earners, with incomes of more than £150,000. At the same time, the manifesto pledged to stop paying Winter Fuel Payments to the top 5 percent of households, while capping child benefits. In fact, the manifesto went so far as to commit the party to cap structural social security expenditure in each spending review. The document also committed the party to using proceeds from the privatisation of Lloyds bank and the RBS to pay back national debt. The Labour party’s election pledges appear generally to have been quite detailed and cautious. This reflects the legacy of New Labour’s and Gordon Brown’s previous commitments to “prudence”, and the generally mainstream approach to economics of Ed Balls. Mr Balls was the principle economic policy advisor to Gordon Brown during the opposition years in the 1990s and then during most of New Labour’s first two periods in government (1997-2001 and 2001-2005). Subsequently, Ed Balls was shadow Chancellor throughout Ed Miliband’s time as leader of the Opposition. Labour’s broadly cautious approach to fiscal policy was also a way of trying to present itself as economically responsible, especially given the poor support the party was getting from business.14

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However, Labour failed to be as convincing as the Conservatives on the economy. Two factors stand out in particular: first the hostility between Labour and business and second Labour’s inability to be persuasive enough concerning government spending. The former is not really within the scope of this article, but it should be noted that during its years in opposition, Labour and Ed Miliband had made a number of pronouncements and policy proposals that were interpreted as anti-business and regulatory. For example, at the 2011 party conference Mr Miliband had criticised “ predators” who were “interested in the fast buck”, etc. Similarly, proposals for “fixing broken markets”, freezing energy prices and so on appear to have been clearly interpreted by business as being interventionist.15 Offsetting this was, however, Labour’s far more pragmatic position on membership. Prior to the election, the party had ruled out holding a referendum, and during the campaign made a point of stressing that the Conservative commitment to a referendum would plunge businesses into a long period of uncertainty before the vote, and even afterwards in case of a vote to leave the EU. Turning to public spending, the Labour Party and Ed Miliband personally failed to counter Conservative criticisms of the previous Labour government and in particular the policies of Gordon Brown in controlling public spending. Indeed, during the Coalition and then the election campaign, the Conservatives managed to portray their successors as having been reckless with public finances. Although government spending as a share of GDP was not particularly high at the start of the financial crisis in (42.6 percent of GDP in 2006, see the Annex), the Conservatives skilfully obfuscated the fact that the explosion of deficits and public sector debt in the closing years of the Labour government were largely due to the financial crisis and hardly a direct result of old-Labour tax and spend policies. A particularly damaging moment came in the closing days of the election campaign in the live Question Time debate on the BBC, on Thursday the 30 April, a week before the poll. During the programme, David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg were each questioned by an audience on all areas of policy. In the words of Guardian columnist Jonathan Freedland: ...the most lethal missile of the night came from the man who asked whether Miliband would admit that the last Labour government had overspent. When the Labour leader said no, a lowing sound could be heard, the noise of an audience uniting in sceptical rejection of the man before them.16 For Labour grandee, Alan Johnson, writing the day after the 7 May election, this was a turning point in the campaign when, “[t]he public became convinced that Labour had indeed driven the car into the ditch and declined to return the keys”.17 The Liberal-Democrats’ manifesto – running to nearly 160 pages! – also put fiscal responsibility right at the top of its agenda. The manifesto started by running on the Party’s record as a coalition partner, and noting how the annual deficit had been halved between 2010 and 2015. In contrast to the Conservatives, the Liberal-Democrats stressed the importance of (some) tax rises to balance the books by 2017/18. They very clearly positioned themselves as standing between the Conservative policy of relying only on public spending cuts to bring down deficits, and Labour’s greater recourse to taxation to close the budget gap. Notably, however, the manifesto did not indicate which taxes would be raised (or created), and stated that “headline taxes” like income tax, VAT, National Insurance and Corporation Tax should not be increased. The manifesto also pledged the Lib-Dems to cut taxes for poorer households by raising the

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tax-free Personal Allowance (i.e. the threshold below which individuals or households do not pay tax).18 Alongside their general commitment to balance the books, the Liberal Democrats proposed two new rules by which fiscal policy and public finances were to be guided. Their first rule was that once the budget deficit was closed in 2017/18, public sector debt as a share of GDP should fall each year, except during recessions. The aim was for debt to reach “sustainable levels around the middle of the next decade”. The second rule was to balance public spending over the “economic cycle”, apart from finance for investment, provided the debt rule is met: “the government will be able to borrow for capital spending that enhances economic growth or financial stability, enabling us to increase this productive investment”. This latter rule was very similar to New Labour’s Golden Rule for fiscal policy, put forward in its 1997 manifesto, and then adopted when in government. This is not the place to discuss the usefulness and feasibility of fiscal rules. Suffice it to say, however, that the New Labour governments had already broken the Golden Rule to finance public services in the mid-2000s, prior to the haemorrhaging of public finances during the financial crisis. Similarly, governments of the Eurozone, though they too have repeatedly committed themselves to rules-based fiscal policy, have also repeatedly broken their own rules. In short, announcing fiscal rules sounds fine in principle, but frequently turns out to be more difficult to apply in practice over time, especially when circumstances change. The case of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) manifesto is somewhat different. Unlike the other manifestos, it specifically argued for supporting public services but in Scotland. As the manifesto’s title – Stronger for Scotland – and the party’s exclusive representation in Scotland both suggest, the SNP’s approach to the election was based overwhelmingly on getting the best funding deal for Scotland. The manifesto said little about the whole of the UK, although its preamble did argue that the Scottish Nationalists want “to help deliver positive change for the benefit of ordinary people, not just in Scotland, but across the UK”. Accordingly, the manifesto preamble went on to declare that: We propose a real alternative to the pain of austerity, an end to unfair policies like the Bedroom Tax, a higher minimum wage and protection for our NHS and vital public services. Instead of even deeper Westminster spending cuts, we want to see more investment in our economy, to create more and better paid jobs.19 The SNP manifesto did therefore contrast quite strongly with the manifestos of the three main national parties presented above. It very clearly opposed “austerity”, and proposed tackling deficit reduction not through spending cuts, but by raising taxes, including: “the reintroduction of the 50 pence top tax rate, a tax on bankers' bonuses, a bank levy, a mansion tax, a crackdown on tax avoidance, the abolition of 'non-dom' status and reversal of the married couple’s tax allowance”. While supporting the policy of debt reduction, the SNP manifesto nevertheless argued that such tax increases would provide “£140 billion across the UK to invest in skills and infrastructure, in our NHS and other public services, and in measures to protect the vulnerable and lift people out of poverty”. In contrast to the other manifestos, the SNP therefore argued far more forcefully for expanding welfare and public services, financed through higher taxation. Lastly, the UKIP manifesto was broadly based on a tax cutting and spending reduction agenda, in that order. Accordingly, its key proposals included: raising the personal allowance to at least £13,000 during the forthcoming parliament; abolishing inheritance tax – a “death tax” which “hits the middle classes hardest”; raising the 40

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percent income tax threshold, and introducing an intermediate 30 percent rate for “ middle-income earners such as school teachers and senior nurses” who should not be paying the top rate. The overall aim of tax policies was to bring down income taxes as a whole, while making the tax structure flatter. On the spending side, the UKIP manifesto begins by stressing that leaving the EU would cut public spending by £9 billion (the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget). It also proposed a significant cut in overseas aid, down from the international target of 0.7 percent of gross national income, to 0.2 percent (“ matching the contribution made by the USA”). The manifesto went on to put forward an end to the Barnett Formula for calculating Scotland’s block grant from the UK’s national budget. According to UKIP, this would lead to “substantial reductions in funding for Scotland”, though the would be able to make its own decisions on taxation in Scotland. Finally, the UKIP manifesto set out a number of areas for cutting direct government spending, such as reducing the size of the House of Commons, abolishing certain government departments, abolishing unnecessary quangos, “ceasing all subsidies for bars and dining rooms in the ”, etc.20 In short, the tax and spending agenda of UKIP stood out as right-wing, nationalist and quirky, in the image of Nigel Farage himself.

Fiscal policy and government spending following the Conservative election victory

To widespread surprise, the Conservatives won the election, with a small outright majority. With 36.9 percent of the vote (on a turnout of 66.1 percent), the Conservatives took a total of 330 seats, giving them a working majority of 12 seats. 11.3 million electors voted for the party. This contrasts with the last Conservative government to be re-elected, by a small margin of seats: in 1992, John Major led the Tories to victory, winning a 21-seat majority, on the basis of 41.9 percent of votes cast, and an absolute historic record number of votes totalling 14.1 million. The unexpected success by the Conservatives in 2015 has been much attributed to campaign strategy of Lynton Crosby, their Australian electoral consultant. This is not the place to examine the strategy in detail, but it is worth looking at a couple of related issues. One has already been mentioned above, namely the success the Conservatives had in labelling Labour as having been reckless with public spending when last in power. The second involves the so-called technique of “wedge-politics” whereby one camp (in this case the Conservatives) seeks to split its opponent’s traditional supporters. Thus, Mr Crosby apparently – correctly – identified the rise of Scottish nationalism as a wedge to be used against Labour, both in Scotland and England.21 By repeatedly stressing the economic consequences and above all the impact on the Union of some form of alliance between Labour and the SNP, the Conservatives skilfully divided and conquered their enemies. During the closing days of the campaign, Ed Miliband was boxed into ruling out emphatically any possible governing agreement with the SNP. Along with his poor performance concerning the New Labour record (see above), this made it hard for the Labour party to appear credible in terms of forming a new (coalition) government. Putting it in more conventional terms, and reiterating his view that the Conservative party dominates British electoral politics because of “fear”, Vernon Bogdanor commented that “[f]ear of Labour’s economic policies and of an SNP stranglehold at Westminster were sufficient to see David Cameron comfortably home”.22

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The unexpected nature of the Conservative victory in 2015 seems to have given David Cameron’s new government the impression of having received a strong and clear mandate, to push through quite radical and often controversial measures. Most notably, the Conservatives will honour their electoral pledge to hold a referendum on EU membership by the end of 2017. This is a radical policy commitment that has been much in the news since the election, and the Labour party has subsequently agreed to support the organisation of a referendum. More contested, however, has been the new government’s decision to press ahead with the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1988, a kind of sop to the Eurosceptics in the party. The Act incorporates the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into British law, and even though the Convention is not an emanation of the EU it seems to suffer from guilt by association. At the time of writing (July 2015), the nature of reform in this area remains open, partly due to the fact that senior Conservative politicians have openly defended the link to the ECHR, noting amongst other things that former Tory grandee and Lord Chancellor David Maxwell Fyfe had played a key role in drafting the Convention in 1950. The same cannot be said about public spending. If the Conservative manifesto was indeed written as a kind of opening bid in view of possible negotiations with the Lib- Dems as a renewed coalition partner, George Osborne has been quick to implement its promises of spending cuts, including £12 billion in cuts to welfare. Indeed, a week after the election, he announced in The Sun that he would put a second emergency budget to Parliament in early July (2015), in order not to wait to tackle the problem of Britain’s budget deficits.23 Accordingly, on 8 July the Chancellor presented his second budget for the year to the House of Commons. Ostensibly trailed as a budget for “working people”, George Osborne set out the government’s vision of creating a “new settlement” based on “a plan for Britain for the next 5 years to keep moving us from a low wage, high tax, high welfare economy; to the higher wage, lower tax, lower welfare country we intend to create”. To this end, George Osborne announced the introduction of a National Living Wage – drawing on the idea promoted by the campaign of the Living Wage Foundation and the Labour party for a more decent minimum wage – and he stated that it would rise to £9 an hour by 2020. This was accompanied by an announced rise of personal allowances to £11,000 by 2016/7, and an increase in the threshold for entering the 40 percent top income tax bracket to £43,000. In contrast and revealingly, Mr Osborne also pushed back the schedule for reaching a budget surplus by one year, to 2019/20. This can be viewed as another manifestation of his somewhat more pragmatic practice compared to his tougher policy statements. At the same time, however, the Chancellor announced a series of measures to squeeze welfare spending by £12 billion. Most notably, these include: a reduced cap on welfare payments that any one household can obtain (down to £23,000 per year in London and £20,000 in the rest of the country); and a significant change in the operation of tax credits and other support for people in work. In particular, the income levels at which such credits are paid will be lowered, and the increase in credits is frozen. According to an early estimate given by the Director of the Institute of Fiscal Studies, the freezing of credits will affect 13 million families, costing them an average of £260 per year; while the drawing down of the allowance will lead to an average £1,000 fall in the incomes of 3 million families.24

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Apart from the specific measures put forward to cut welfare spending, George Osborne’s presentation of welfare as such is very revealing. Paraphrasing an expression often used by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Mr Osborne noted in his budget speech that “Britain is home to 1% of the world’s population; generates 4% of the world’s income; and yet pays out 7% of the world’s welfare spending”.25 Very significantly he went on to say that “It is not fair to the taxpayers paying for it”. In making such a strong assertion, he has very clearly reflected the success which neoliberals have had in arguing that “ welfare” is a burden on employed taxpayers. Initially in the first phases of neoliberalism in the 1980s, this strategy was based on the alleged inefficiencies of providing welfare benefits and services to the middle class, rather than letting them take out various forms of private insurance.26 Subsequently, once welfare is pared back to support a (poor) minority, it can then be recast not as universal social insurance for all – Beveridge’s original vision – but as a burden on the self-reliant who are in gainful employment. The emergency budget makes this point unequivocally. To be sure, the July Budget also announced some measures to end so-called “non-dom” status (i.e. the ability to claim non-residence status and hence tax exemption) for people living permanently in the United Kingdom. Similarly, new measures and enhanced resources to collect taxes are forecast to generate £5 billion in revenue through reductions in tax avoidance. Yet the ideological orientation of the budget is not to be mistaken. This is especially so given that Mr Osborne also announced that corporation tax will be reduced to 18 percent by 2020, following the substantial reduction from 28 percent to 20 percent which occurred in the last Parliament (2010-2015)! In short, the Budget and the new government’s overall policy approach is strongly neoliberal and indeed neo-Thatcherite. It fits in with the government’s other policies, for example the revival of tenants’ Right to buy their homes from housing associations as well as from local councils, and the further tightening of legislation regulating strike action. At the time of writing (July 2015), Mr Osborne and the government feel largely vindicated in their overall economic strategy. Britain’s headline growth figures are good (second quarter growth was 0.7 in 2015, up to the pre-crisis growth rate, with unemployment still falling and inflation flat). Whether the government’s economic policies are enough to tackle the on-going structural problems of the UK economy, however, is another question.

Conclusion

The election campaign was led by the Conservatives and the other major parties in the expectation that the electorate would once more return a hung parliament to Westminster. It is therefore possible that the manifestos of the leading parties, whose public spending commitments have been presented here, were to some extent drafted in view of holding negotiations to form a new coalition government. They may be seen, to some extent at least, as constituting opening positions prior to coalition discussions. Policies could then have been watered down during negotiations. It is important to note from this point of view, that the three major parties (the Conservatives, Labour, and the Lib-Dems) all placed a high priority on bringing down public deficits, though for the Conservatives this is to be done through spending cuts.

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In the event, the Conservatives obtained a small outright majority in the House of Commons, based on a relatively low share of the total electorate, and a relatively low absolute popular vote. They nevertheless immediately set out to implement their agenda in full, which in the case of public spending includes planned cuts in welfare spending running to £12 billion. The stated aim is to close the existing deficit gap, which was still over 5 percent of GDP in 2014, and generate a budget surplus by 2019/20. The recovery in the British economy since the second half of 2013 is seen and presented by the Conservatives as a clear indication that their strategy – their “plan” – is working. While “austerity” may have contributed to the flat-lining between 2010 and early 2013, the more recent pick-up in growth has confirmed the Conservatives’ view that the contractionary consequences of squeezing public spending are not to be worried about, as was already shown dramatically in the past by the 1981 budget squeeze which in fact took place at a time when Britain was beginning to come out of its early-1980s slump. The bet today is that Britain is in a broadly similar position. In fact, both the new government’s fiscal policy (the squeeze on spending) and other policies like the revival of Right-to-Buy, the further curtailment of striking rights, the Eurosceptic stance of the government and especially the upcoming referendum on EU membership are all markedly neo-Thatcherite. But 2015 is not 1979, and neither Britain nor the rest of the industrialised world is embarking on creating the neoliberal paradigm. Quite the contrary, more than three decades of neoliberal policies have left the UK economy with a number of structural imbalances, including most notably the domination of international finance, repeated house-price booms and busts, deepening inequality (especially wealth inequality), ever- retrenching manufacturing and low labour productivity. Both the Conservative election manifesto and the policies implemented in the July 2015 Budget, as well as those likely to follow in the autumn spending review are unlikely to tackle these structural weaknesses. Thus while the UK economy is indeed benefitting from relatively strong growth at the time of writing (July 2015), it may well be asked whether such growth is not in fact much linked to the historically-unparalleled monetary boost it has received for more than five years: interest rates have been much lower and for longer than at any previous time of the Bank of England’s 320-year history. If the 1970s are often portrayed as the decade when Keynesianism spun wholly out of control, it may today be asked whether the same cannot be said for how cheap money is being used to stimulate growth. Also, unlike the mid-1980s (or indeed the mid-1990s and mid-2000s) when the US economy was roaring out of recession and other parts of the world economy were booming, today’s external environment is considerably more fragile. Moreover, many of the underlying weaknesses of the international financial system have not really been dealt with. This raises the question of whether the rather simplistic and repeated policy mix being applied by the new Conservative government is really sufficient to ensure a return to more balanced growth, let alone to help generate a more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALESSANDRIE, Piergiorgio & HALDANE, Andrew. “Banking on the State”, Paper, Bank of England, 6 November 2009, , retrieved 18 August 2015.

BECKETT, Andy. “Lynton Crosby: the man who really won the election for the Tories”, The Guardian, 8 May 2015.

BLANCHARD, Olivier & LEIGH, Daniel. “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers”, IMF Working Paper, 13/1, at , retrieved 30 July 2015.

BURKE, Michael. “If the IMF is criticising UK austerity, things must be bad”, The Guardian, 17 April 2013.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, April 2015.

ELLIOT, . “George Osborne calls emergency July budget to reveal next wave of austerity”, The Guardian, 16 May 2015.

FREEDLAND, Jonathan. “Question Time crowd emerge as stars on a night of vicious attacks on leaders, The Guardian, 30 April 2015.

GAPPER, John. “UK election 2015: Labour strains”, The Big Read, The Financial Times, 30 March 2015.

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. Household Debt: Key Economic Indicators, Research Briefings, 29 July 2015, at: , retrieved 30 July 2015.

JOHNSON, Alan, “When that Question Time audience turned on Ed Miliband, the die was cast”, The Guardian (online), 8 May 2015.

JOHNSON, Paul. Opening remarks, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Summer post-Budget briefing 2015, 9 July, available at: , retrieved 29 July 2015.

KEEGAN, William. Mr Osborne’s Economic Experiment, Searching Finance, 2014.

LABOUR PARTY. Britain can better: Labour Party Manifesto 2015, 2015.

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. Manifesto 2015 Stronger Economy, Fairer Society, Opportunity for Everyone., 2015.

MORRIS, Nigel and WRIGHT, Oliver. “General Election 2015: The masterminds behind the scenes”, The Independent, 31 March 2015.

NARDELLI, Alberto. “Does the UK really have 7% of the global welfare spend?”, The Guardian, 17 June 2015.

OSBORNE, George. Budget Speech, 18 March 2015.

OSBORNE, George. Budget Speech, 8 July 2015.

RAWNSLEY, Andrew. “Party manifestos: furtive silences that speak more eloquently than flowery words”, The Observer (Guardian website), Sunday 12 April 2015.

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REINHART, Carmen & ROGOFF, Kenneth. “Debt and growth revisited”, 11 August 2010, VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal, at: < http://www.voxeu.org/article/debt-and-growth-revisited>, retrieved 30 July 2015.

SCOTTISH NATIONALIST PARTY. Stronger for Scotland, Manifesto, 2015

SNOWER, Dennis. “The Future of the Welfare State”, Economic Journal, no 101, May 1993, pp 700-717.

UKIP. Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, 2015.

WHALE, Sebastian. “Lord Lawson criticizes Tory tax freeze pledge”, Politics Home, 27 May 2015, , retrieved 18 August 2015.

NOTES

1. George OSBORNE, Budget Speech, 18 March 2015. Although he was not very specific about this, Mr Osborne was presumably referring to suggestions by the IMF that the government should do more to support demand through higher spending: see Section 1 of the article. 2. William KEEGAN, Mr Osborne’s Economic Experiment, Searching Finance, 2014, p. 97. 3. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, Household Debt: Key Economic Indicators, Research Briefings, 29 July 2015, at: , retrieved 30 July 2015. 4. An “emergency budget” refers to a budget implemented by an incoming government so that it can immediately apply its policies. 5. Piergiorgio ALESSANDRIE, and Andrew HALDANE, Banking on the State, Paper, Bank of England, 6 November 2009, , retrieved 18 August 2015. 6. For a summary presentation of their findings see: Carmen REINHART and Kenneth ROGOFF, “Debt and growth revisited”, 11 August 2010, VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal, at: < http:// www.voxeu.org/article/debt-and-growth-revisited>, retrieved 30 July 2015. 7. The expression was widely reported, including by Michael BURKE, “If the IMF is criticising UK austerity, things must be bad”, The Guardian, 17 April 2013. 8. Olivier BLANCHARD and Daniel LEIGH, “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers”, IMF Working Paper, 13/1, at , retrieved 30 July 2015. 9. This point was made by George Osborne in his Budget Speech on 18 March 2015, and more or less repeated in his emergency Budget Speech on 8 July 2015. 10. Andrew RAWNSLEY, “Party manifestos: furtive silences that speak more eloquently than flowery words”, The Observer (Guardian website), Sunday 12 April 2015. 11. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, April 2015. 12. As reported by Sebastian WHALE, “Lord Lawson criticizes Tory tax freeze pledge”, Politics Home, 27 May 2015: , retrieved 18 August 2015. 13. LABOUR PARTY, Britain can better: Labour Party Manifesto 2015, 2015. 14. Nigel MORRIS and Oliver WRIGHT, “General Election 2015: The masterminds behind the scenes”, The Independent, 31 March 2015. 15. John GAPPER, “UK election 2015: Labour strains”, The Big Read, The Financial Times, 30 March 2015.

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16. Jonathan FREEDLAND, “Question Time crowd emerge as stars on a night of vicious attacks on leaders, The Guardian, 30 April 2015. 17. Alan JOHNSON, “When that Question Time audience turned on Ed Miliband, the die was cast”, The Guardian (online), 8 May 2015. The debate can be viewed online at: , retrieved 27 July 2015. The exchanges between Ed Miliband and members of the audience asking him questions about Labour’s previous spending record occur between minutes 38 and 42. 18. LIBERAL DEMOCRATS, Manifesto 2015 Stronger Economy, Fairer Society, Opportunity for Everyone, 2015. 19. SCOTTISH NATIONALIST PARTY, Stronger for Scotland, Manifesto, 2015. 20. UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, 2015. 21. Andy BECKETT, “Lynton Crosby: the man who really won the election for the Tories”, The Guardian, 8 May 2015. 22. Vernon BOGDANOR, “Fear of Labour’s policies and SNP trump hope in UK election”, The Financial Times, May 10, 2015. 23. Reported by Larry ELLIOT, “George Osborne calls emergency July budget to reveal next wave of austerity”, The Guardian, 16 May 2015. 24. Paul JOHNSON, Opening remarks, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Summer post-Budget briefing 2015, 9 July, available at: , retrieved 29 July 2015. 25. Angela Merkel has frequently been reported noting that “Europe has 7% of the world’s population, 25% of its wealth, 50% of its welfare spending” (quoted here by Alberto NARDELLI, “Does the UK really have 7% of the global welfare spend?”, The Guardian, 17 June 2015. 26. One very clear presentation of this argument, which broadly fits into the public choice criticism of public policy and public services, was given by the American academic Dennis SNOWER in “The Future of the Welfare State”, Economic Journal, 1993, no 101, May, pp. 700-717.

ABSTRACTS

The general elections in May 2015 took place against a fair, but mixed economic background. After three years in the previous parliament when the UK economy had been flat-lining (mid-2010 to mid-2013), partly as a result of the Coalition’s policy of fiscal consolidation, the pick-up in activity during the second half of 2013 provided the outgoing government with a reasonable economic record to present to the electorate. The three main parties – the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and Labour – all ran manifestos based on fiscal responsibility, as in some ways did UKIP. Only the SNP proposed a clearer leftwing agenda based on stronger public services and higher taxation. Given the outcome of the elections, the Conservatives appear to have had a more successful electoral strategy, in which they succeeded in portraying themselves as economically competent while characterising Labour as having wrecked the economy during the Blair-Brown years. Yet the economy was not the only major issue to have shaped the electoral results. Since resuming office unexpectedly, the Conservatives have pursued the policy of deficit and debt reduction begun under the Coalition, as part of a tougher neo-Thatcherite approach.

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Les élections ont eu lieu en mai 2015 dans un contexte économique relativement favorable, quoique mitigé. Pendant les trois premières années de la législature précédente (de mi-2010 à mi-2013), l’économie britannique marquait le pas, partiellement en raison de la politique d’austérité budgétaire du gouvernement de Coalition. Puis, à partir du second semestre de 2013, l’économie entre dans une nouvelle phase de croissance. Ainsi le gouvernement sortant pouvait présenter un bilan économique raisonnable à l’électorat. Les trois principaux partis – les conservateurs, les libéraux-démocrates et les travaillistes – ont tous élaboré des manifestes électoraux fondés sur la responsabilité budgétaire. Il en va de même pour UKIP. Seulement le SNP a proposé une plateforme qui était clairement à gauche, comportant le renforcement des services publics et une imposition plus élevée. Compte tenu des résultats des élections, la stratégie électorale des conservateurs semble avoir réussi, notamment en soutenant que les travaillistes avaient ruiné l’économie britannique pendant les années Blair-Brown. Pourtant, l'économie était loin d'être la seule question qui a déterminé les résultats électoraux. Depuis leur réélection et grâce à une majorité parlementaire inattendue, les conservateurs ont poursuivi la politique de réduction des déficits et des dettes publiques commencée sous la coalition, mais d’une manière bien plus dure et néo-thatchérienne.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Royaume-Uni, élections générales, gouvernement de coalition, Parti conservateur, politique budgétaire, dépenses publiques Keywords: United Kingdom, general elections, coalition government, Conservative party, fiscal policy, public spending

AUTHOR

NICHOLAS SOWELS

Université Paris 1

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Monetary Policy in the Conservatives’ 2015 General Election Campaign La politique monétaire dans la campagne législative des Conservateurs en 2015

Nathalie Champroux

1 For the outgoing Coalition government and Conservative leader and Prime Minister David Cameron, the 2015 general election date could hardly have come at a better time from the point of view of the economy. At first glance, the statistics tended to show the government had effectively presided over a firm and balanced recovery, leading the country to enviable steady growth, zero inflation, falling unemployment and a lower budget deficit. There was therefore hardly any doubt that the Conservatives’ campaign would focus on this great asset. Indeed, even before the dissolution of Parliament, David Cameron started communicating a positive message about his government’s proven economic competence,1 while Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne contrasted this competence to the economic “chaos” 2 a Labour team would bring.

2 This article examines how the Conservatives exploited the United Kingdom’s good economic performance in their 2015 general election campaign and, in particular, seeks to identify the role attributed to the last five years’ monetary policy. Of course, monetary policy on its own cannot exclusively account for Britain’s relative prosperity. Nevertheless, if Osborne’s 2013 Budget speech to the House of Commons3 is to be believed, monetary policy should be given some credit. This article is therefore interested in how the Conservatives treated this particular issue: whether they acknowledged the effectiveness of the independent Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England or whether they claimed full merit for all the factors supporting Britain’s economic success, thus adding to the monetary policy re-politicization process observed in 2013. It will focus on the Conservatives’ public electoral campaign, as relayed by the media to ordinary citizens, and not on the specially tailored messages delivered to specific economic or political assemblies.

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3 The article starts with the contextualisation of the analysis. Section 1 explains how the introduction of forward guidance in Britain in 2013 entailed a process of monetary policy re-politicization. Section 2 presents an overview of the United Kingdom’s economic conditions at the time of the 2015 general election, which will help readers to understand the various arguments the Conservatives put forward in their campaign. The article then analyses the campaign itself. Section 3 explains the process which underpinned the Conservatives’ decision to focus their campaign on economic aspects. Section 4 describes the economic message that was conveyed and Section 5 seeks to identify more particularly how the Conservatives dealt with monetary policy. The article finishes with an attempt at explaining why the Conservatives chose to deal with their own monetary policy actions in the way they did during the campaign.

The 2013 Process of Monetary Policy Re-Politicization

4 Most elements of Britain’s current monetary policy were introduced by previous Conservative and New Labour governments. Conservative Chancellors of the Exchequer Norman Lamont and Kenneth Clarke set up the bases of direct inflation targeting,4 just after sterling left the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System in September 1992. New Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown then reinforced the policy with the Bank of England Act voted in Parliament in 1998. A more formal framework was established, with the Treasury being henceforth only responsible for defining price stability, while operational independence was granted to the Bank of England. More explicitly, the Treasury fixed the inflation target5 and the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decided on the proper use of monetary policy instruments to achieve the target in the medium term. Then, with the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007, Brown’s successor, , agreed to gradual reductions of the Bank of England’s base rate to close to zero percent, from December 2007 to March 2009. Finally, Darling authorized the first waves of quantitative easing, with asset purchases totalling £200 billion from March 2009 to January 2010.

5 Cameron’s team subsequently made their own particular contributions to Britain’s monetary policy framework. Osborne allowed for further quantitative easing in October 2011, and February and July 2012, which increased the amount of government debt purchases from £200 billion to £375 billion. In July 2012, the Treasury and the Bank of England introduced the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), which permitted commercial banks and building societies to borrow more cheaply from the central bank. In turn, households (until January 2014 only) and, especially, companies, had easier access to loans. In addition to these measures, the Conservative Chancellor was at the origin of the inclusion of forward guidance in the Bank of England’s monetary strategy.6 Osborne appointed Mark Carney as the Governor of the Bank of England. He had headhunted Carney from the Bank of Canada, where Carney had famously pioneered the use of the unconventional instrument. Osborne also officially assumed the responsibility of opening the door to the adoption of forward guidance, in the remit7 he sent to the Governor of the Bank of England at the time of the 2013 Budget. In his Budget speech, he even presented this adoption as the “monetary reform”8 which constituted one of the three pillars of the reinforcement of the government’s economic plan. In reality, the adoption of forward guidance fell short of the commentators’ expectations of a complete change in the British monetary policy framework. Yet

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Osborne’s move and speech should be remembered as they re-politicized monetary policy in the United Kingdom. 6 To understand the re-politicization of monetary policy, it is necessary to go back to the opposite concept of de-politicization. According to political scientist Matthew Flinders, de-politicization happens when “politicians [...] attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific decision.”9 As far as British monetary policy is concerned, this phenomenon occurred with the introduction of the minimum lending rate in 197210 and the participation of sterling in the ERM at the beginning of the 1990s. Then, since 1998, when Gordon Brown entrusted the MPC with formulating monetary policy, British governments have relinquished their power over the manipulation of monetary policy instruments – the main instrument being the Bank base rate, until the zero lower bound was reached in 2009. 7 But Osborne’s 2013 Budget measure and speech reversed the trend. First, the Chancellor encompassed the government in the “we” he used to refer to the actors responsible for “[keeping] interest rates at record lows”,11 whereas only the Bank of England could take credit for the interest rate stability. Second, his so-called “reform” was more a slight interference with the Bank of England’s operational independence. Indeed, Osborne did not act on the government’s prerogatives: he neither gave a new definition of price stability nor changed the target, which he could have replaced by a new target altogether (like nominal output) or by a new inflation target rate at 3% or 4% of CPI, for example. Instead, the Chancellor incited the MPC to adopt a new instrument. He made “clear that the Committee may wish to issue explicit forward guidance, including using intermediate thresholds”12 and presented the United States Federal Reserve’s experiment with the unemployment threshold as an example to follow. Even if he cautiously declared that “whether intermediate thresholds [were] used [would] be an operational matter for the independent MPC”,13 it was absolutely clear that he advocated – and expected – such a use. The chicken-and-egg question will remain unanswered here. Was Osborne the initial instigator of the adoption of forward guidance or, to mix metaphors, was he simply holding the magician’s hat for Carney’s rabbit? Whatever the causal direction, the essential point is the impression conveyed: that of the Treasury getting its hands back on monetary policy.

The Economic Context of the 2015 General Election

8 In 2013, the Chancellor’s directions were understood as a clear recourse to monetary policy to rescue the economy in the context of asphyxiating fiscal austerity. To be fair, Osborne did not convey this precise message. Rather he presented “credible” fiscal policy as a help which “creat[ed] the space for”, or “securely anchored”,14 active monetary policy. But he gave monetary policy “a full role in supporting the economy”,15 while this role was not linked in any way to efforts to reduce budget deficits, even in the long term. There was an echo of the Medium Term Financial Strategy of the early 1980s, so much so that the supply side reforms of the government’s plan were not much remarked upon by commentators.

9 As it turned out, by 2015, the statistics tended to confirm the effectiveness of the government’s plan and its reinforcement performed in 2013, as regards both budget deficit reduction and economic growth. Questions of fiscal policy are dealt with in

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another article of this special issue,16 and so are left aside here. Let it simply be noted that, according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the deficit, as measured by the public sector net borrowing, excluding public sector banks, was cut from £153.5 billion in 2009-2010 to £87.3 billion in 2014-2015. In terms of a percentage of GDP, the deficit was reduced, from 10.2% in 2009-2010 to 4.8% in 2014-2015. The latter figure, released on 23 April 2015,17 helped the outgoing government claim that their tough fiscal discipline had halved the deficit. Their message, however, ignored the role of the low interest rates paid on government debt, the slow rise in tax receipts recorded since the end of 2012, and the fact that GDP itself had grown. 10 On a quarter-to-quarter basis, after four quarters of encouraging recovery, GDP growth remained stuck in stagnation, or even in decline, from the election of 2010 until the first quarter of 2013. It indeed showed a steady rate after Osborne’s announcement of monetary activism intensification. In the end, after five years of Coalition government, GDP growth had fallen, from an annual rate of 1.3% in 2010 down to 0.7% in 2011 and 0.2% in 2012, before recovering to 1.7% in 2013 and 2.8% in 2014. The latter GDP growth figure, happily revised up by 0.2 percentage point from previous estimates, was revealed towards the end of the general election campaign, on 31 March 2015. Unsurprisingly, Osborne rejoiced and boasted about the effectiveness of his economic plan, posting the following Tweet straight away: “Hat trick of good news just out from ONS: GDP revised up, consumer confidence up, living standards up. #LongTermEconomicPlan working.”18 Indeed, that same day, the media relayed the ONS figures that GDP per head and household consumption had increased by 4.8% and 3% respectively since 2010. Moreover, household consumption did not seem fuelled by credit, as the ratio of household debt to GDP fell by one percentage point, to 93 per cent, in the last quarter of 2014. Yet, critics argued that GDP growth was depending too much on consumer spending, while the latter was depending too much on exceptionally low inflation which needed to rise back to the official 2% target. 11 As it was, inflation had dramatically decreased. After a peak at 4.48% in 2011, up from 3.29% in 2010, inflation had gradually diminished to 2.83% in 2012, 2.56% in 2013 and 1.46% in 2014. Monthly inflation on a yearly basis in fact had slumped below 1% in November 2014, to reach 0% in February 2015, before becoming negative in March 2015, at -0.08%. Even though inflation thus strongly departed from the Treasury’s 2% target, the news of zero inflation was not unwelcome for the government. This was because the decline was accounted for by temporary decreasing oil prices, while the probability of damaging structural deflation was rejected. For example, when the ONS published an inflation figure at 0.5% for December 2014, Cameron declared it was “fundamentally good news”19 and Osborne proposed to “celebrate [the] effects of low inflation, not fear them”. 20 Indeed, low inflation meant real family incomes increased. It was all the more true since, as long as inflation predictions were not alarming, the Bank of England’s base rate would be kept at its 0.5% low. And this low had eventually influenced the average interest rates that households were offered by commercial banks, which decreased from 2.98% to 2.51% between September 2012 and September 2014.21 12 Unemployment had decreased too, following the same general trend as that of inflation: a peak at 8.1% of the active population in 2011, up from 7.8% in 2010, then gradual reductions to 7.9% in 2012, 7.6% in 2013 and 6.1% in 2014.22 On a quarterly basis, the unemployment rate had fallen below 7% in February 2014, and below 6% in November 2014. It actually went down further to 5.5% in March and April 2015,23 but

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these figures were not officially known at the time of the campaign as they were released on 13 May 2015. 13 There were still dark areas in all the fields described above, though. In money terms, the deficit had only been reduced by 1.75%. Moreover, since the 2010 general election, public borrowing had amounted to more than £550 billion, that is to say £100 billion more than the amount New Labour had borrowed in 13 years. There was also the issue of the current account (the difference between the income paid to, and received from, the rest of the world), which showed a £97.9 billion deficit in 2014. At 5.5% of national income, this deficit was the highest recorded in history. Further historical comparisons show that GDP per head was 1.2% below its 2008 peak. Moreover, its average growth failed to reach all social classes throughout the country. Among employed people, five million workers were in low-paid jobs and 700,000 had accepted zero-hour contracts that did not provide them with sufficient income. Wages had been slow to increase too, until March 2014. All employee weekly earning growth had remained below 2.25% annually since 2009, reaching striking lows of 0.4% in 2011 and 0.1% in 2014, even if persons in continuous employment had pay rises of 3.5-4%.24 Until inflation disappeared altogether, real wage growth was negative, around -2.5%, from the first quarter of 2010.25 Only since March 2014 could the British rejoice about a timid real pay rise.26 Furthermore, zero inflation, when experienced, did not mean all prices remained stable. The annual inflation rate for house prices increased from 7.3% in 2010 to 10% in 2014.27 Even food prices increased: the 20 most popular branded grocery prices apparently rising by 12% between 2010 and 2015.28 As proof of spreading poverty under the Coalition government, the number of food banks had soared by 537%, to 421 outlets, while the number of people using them increased by 163%, to 900,000. 14 There could of course be a lot more to say about the details of the United Kingdom’s 2015 economic situation. But what must be remembered is that, on the whole and despite resilient inequality and poverty, the country appeared to be in a far better economic situation in the spring of 2015 than it had been at the election of 2010. Unsurprisingly, the Conservatives made the most of this in their general election campaign.

The Choice of the Economy as the Main Theme for the Conservatives’ Campaign

15 The broad topic of “the economy” dominated the national 2015 general election campaign. A study made by Loughborough University reveals the economy remained the second of all issues, and the first substantive matter covered by the press and television in the run up to the elections, as shown in Table 1 below.

16 Table 1 – Top 10 TV and press election news coverage issues(1)

30 March– 7 30 March– 8 9 April– 15 16 April– 22 23 April– 29 Issues May April April April April

Election process 1 1 1 1 1

Economy 2 2 2 2 2

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Taxation 3 3 3 8 4

Constitutional issues 4 9 12 3 3

Employment 5 4 11 9 9

NHS 6 7 6 5 13

Immigration/ 7 8 9 4 7 Migrants/ Race

Europe 8 5 15 7 10

Business 9 6 13 14 8

Social security 10 10 17 11 10

17 (1) Main issues in election news coverage in TV and press coverage produced on weekdays (i.e. Monday to Friday inclusive). TV = Channel 4 News (7pm), Channel 5 News (6.30pm), BBC1 News at 10, ITV1 News at 10, BBC2 Newsnight, Sky News 8-8.30pm; Press = The Guardian, Independent, Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Mirror, Sun, Star and Metro.

18 Sources: Loughborough University Communication Research Centre, Media Coverage of the 2015 General Election Campaign, Reports, n°1-5, 13 April 2015, 18 April 2015, 24 April 2015, 1 May 2015, 11 May 2015. 19 In fact, the political commentators faithfully followed the Conservatives’ lead on the subject. In 2010, the Conservatives’ general election campaign had failed to fully exploit the idea of New Labour’s economic incompetence in both preventing and eliminating the financial and economic crises. As a result, the Conservatives had fallen 20 seats short of an overall majority at the House of Commons and had had to form a coalition with the Liberal-Democrats. In 2015, the mistake of a disappointing campaign was not to be repeated. As of 2012, the Conservatives therefore renewed their contract with one of the best election strategists of the time: Australian Lynton Crosby. Crosby had not managed to lead the Conservatives to power at the 2005 general election. Yet, he remained famous for his past success in Australia, since he had actively contributed to the election of Liberal Prime Minister John Howard four times in a row, from 1996 to 2004. In Britain, he had recently regained his reputation, when helping to be repeatedly elected as Mayor of London, in 2008 and 2012. 20 Crosby is known for getting straight to the point. When called for the 2015 campaign preparation, he was reported to have told David Cameron to “scrape the barnacles off the boat”29 and rather focus on the issues that mattered to the real citizens. Before and during the campaign, the top three concerns of the British were the NHS, immigration, and the economy, as shown in the various Economist/Ipsos MORI polls conducted at the time and summed up in Table 2 below. The macroeconomic state of the United Kingdom was not at the top of the population’s concerns, a fact that clearly transpired during the televised debates, when the audience was offered the chance to put questions to the political leaders.30 The British ordinary citizen was much more keen to

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know about every-day-life issues like help to the elderly, the disabled, the sick and children. 21 Table 2 – Top 10 most important issues facing Britain today

Ranks 2014 January 2015 February 2015 March 2015 April 2015

Immigration NHS NHS Immigration NHS 1 (38%) (45%) (41%) (45%) (47%)

Economy Immigration Immigration NHS Immigration 2 (34%) (34%) (34%) (38%) (36%)

NHS Economy Economy Economy Economy 3 (27%) (33%) (30%) (28%) (36%)

22 Sources: Economist/Ipsos-MORI, Issues Index 2014 aggregate data, 14 January 2015; Issues Facing Britain (Issues Index), January 2015, February 2015, March 2015, April 2015.

23 As a matter of fact, Healthcare/NHS/Hospitals remained the first issue the public quoted, in January and March 2015, when asked about what would help them decide which party to vote for.31 But the NHS, like immigration, was a field in which the Conservatives’ records and proposals were very likely to be criticized.32 With the prospect of being attacked by the Labour Party on the NHS, as was indeed the case in the very first campaign poster of the opposition party,33 and by UKIP over immigration, it was a better strategy for the Conservatives to shift the attention towards their economic strengths.

The Details of the Conservatives’ Economic Litany

24 Consequently, in January 2015, the first Conservative campaign poster paved the way for a battle focused on the economy. The poster, which showed an upward road slicing through two flourishing crop fields and leading to a clearing in green forest in the background, proposed to “[...] stay on the road to a stronger economy”. Under the inviting positive slogan, the Conservatives listed the following economic achievements: “1.75 million more people in work. 760,000 more businesses. The deficit halved.”34 These were three of the four recurring achievements put forward throughout the Conservatives’ campaign. Cameron added that of “the fastest growing economy of any major Western economy”35 during the televised interview led by Jeremy Paxman on 26 March 2015. The message was positive, concise but accurate, easy to remember and to quickly drop during any televised interview, and easily understandable by the public. As it turned out, zero inflation also happened to be mentioned, but was not part of the Conservatives’ preferred litany.

25 After Parliament was dissolved, on 30 March 2015, Cameron went on directing the national debate towards the economy, as he dedicated more than 60% of his statement to economic issues. His statement laid the four pillars of the Conservative Party’s campaign: the desperate situation inherited five years before, the government’s achievements (with references to the four achievements mentioned

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above), the Conservatives’ programme for the next five years, and the Labour Party’s economically destructive plan. The speech enclosed the two main phrases to be attached to the Labour Party. The past record of New Labour was summed up in the expression “Britain [...] on the brink”, to qualify the 2010 economic situation; the possible future performance of Ed Miliband was anticipated as “economic chaos”.36 It is worth noticing that in this speech, the NHS was hardly mentioned, with just a reference stating its financing and improvement depended on a growing economy that only the Conservatives could secure. Immigration was ignored altogether. 26 From then on, the Conservatives’ campaign sounded like a variation on the same theme. We will only take two more striking examples, to be compared to the excerpts quoted above. At the live televised debate gathering the seven main party leaders on 2 April 2015, Cameron started his opening statement saying: Five years ago, this country was on the brink. [...] we’ve been working with the British people through a long-term economic plan. And that plan is working. There’re almost two million more people in work. It’s a balanced plan so we’ve invested in our NHS as well as reducing the deficit [...]. And the plan’s working because last year, we had the fastest growing economy of any of the major Western countries [...].37 27 And he closed his statement in this way: [...] I’ve tried to have one task in mind above all others and that has been turning our economy around, putting the country back to work [...]. We’ve created two million jobs. Let’s create a job for everyone who wants and needs one. We’ve cut the deficit in half. Let’s clear it altogether [...].38 28 Thirteen days later on BBC One, when asked about what grade he would give his government’s records, Cameron answered: What I’ve tried to do [...] is [...] to turn the economy around, and two million more people in work, 750 000 more businesses operating in Britain, growing faster than the other major Western countries, I think that’s a strong record [...]. We got two million more people in work, now let’s get full employment. We cut the deficit in half as a share of GDP, let’s now get rid of it altogether. [...] stick to the plan and build on it.39 29 As can be seen, Cameron’s economic message that was delivered to the general public via popular media was very repetitive. Some political commentators went so far as to remark that its litany nature even led to a loss of effectiveness.40 To be fair, the out- going Prime Minister sometimes complemented the campaign’s simplified message with some details about his government’s economic achievements. For example, when questioned about the job creation benefiting foreign nationals, Cameron argued that the proportion had slumped from 90% in 2010 to two-thirds in 2015. He even added that 80% of the jobs created were full-time jobs.41 But on the whole, Cameron stuck to the slogans. Details and explanations were left to Conservative junior political figures, who had more time to express themselves during debates about specific questions. For example, when Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury was invited to debate against , the shadow Exchequer Secretary, about employment, she specified that three-fifths of the jobs that had been created over the last five years were highly skilled jobs and only 2% were zero-hour contracts.42 Yet, it is not unreasonable to believe that Priti Patel, like any other Conservative junior political figure, had probably less chance to reach the general public than Cameron or Osborne expressing themselves on the main television channels.

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30 Moreover, if the recurring simple economic message was sometimes complemented with details about the nature of the government’s economic achievements, it was seldom accompanied by explanations about the methods and means that had been implemented. When explanations were given, they concerned only the achievements of deficit reduction and job creation. First, about the deficit reduction, Cameron repeatedly referred to the “difficult decisions” his government had taken. Yet, he cautiously avoided going into any detail. For example, he proudly declared that the government had “saved 20 billion in welfare over the last Parliament”,43 but did not take the risk of marking out some unpopular saving measures. Second, to explain job creation, Cameron enumerated the improvements made to the education system, the training of apprentices, and the reform of the welfare system.44 He was also heard saying: “It is only with a strong economy that we can achieve the things that we dream of: jobs, and homes, and livelihoods for more people.”45 This meant that good macroeconomic conditions were indeed the key to success. Yet Cameron did not elaborate on these conditions. Moreover, he never precisely explained how his government had realized the two achievements of economic growth and low inflation. His only hint of an explanation was the recurring reference to the “long-term economic plan”. But the details of this three-part plan were not explicitly recalled. When some were alluded to, they did not concern the monetary activism part of the plan. Rather, they were related to the credible fiscal policy part, as seen above, and also to the supply side reform part with, for example, the mention of the Help-to-Buy scheme that had made house purchase more affordable.46

Monetary Policy Issues in George Osborne’s Messages

31 The fact that the Prime Minister never made any reference to the monetary activism implemented by his outgoing government might lead to the hypothesis that the subject of monetary policy was the prerogative of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But Osborne was not the Conservatives’ leading campaign figure. As the designer and presenter of fiscal austerity measures, he was not very popular. In March 2015, only 43% of poll respondents said they were satisfied with the way Osborne had done his job. 47 In light of this lack of popularity, it was better for the Conservatives to let Cameron occupy centre stage.

32 Table 3 – Ranking of the main political figures’ media appearances(1)

30 March– 7 30 March– 8 9 April– 15 16 April– 22 23 April– 29

May April April April April

David 1 1 1 2 1 Cameron

Ed Miliband 2 2 2 1 2

Nick Clegg 3 3 3 5 5

Nicola 4 6 7 3 3 Sturgeon

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Nigel Farage 5 4 5 4 4

George 6 5 4 15 6(2) Osborne

Natalie 12 20 9 10 11 Bennett

Leanne Wood 17 10 -(3) 10 -

33 (1) Ranks according to the percentage of appearances of a political figure as a proportion of the total number of media coverage items analysed. Items produced in TV and press coverage on weekdays (see note (1), Table 1, supra).

34 (2) Position shared with Boris Johnson.

35 (3) Dropped out of the top 20.

36 Sources: Loughborough University Communication Research Centre, Media Coverage of the 2015 General Election Campaign, op. cit. 37 As can be seen in Table 3 above, Osborne was indeed not in the top five of the main political figures appearing in the media, even if he did far better than the leaders of two of the main political parties in the United Kingdom, Natalie Bennett (the Green Party), and Leanne Wood (Welsh Plaid Cymru). When he physically appeared in the media while campaigning, he was usually staged so as to look like the “nice guy” close to British industry and workers. This is what could be seen, for example, in the BBC electronic site daily section called “Election 2015 In Pictures”, which exhibited 242 pictures of the campaign taken from 30 March to 6 May 2015. Of the nine pictures in which Osborne was present, three showed him paying an interested visit to a British company and two even participating in the activity, making pizzas at Pizza Express and changing oil on a car at Hawkins Motor Group garage. In the other four pictures, he just stood with another public figure.48 The Conservatives’ staging of Osborne as “working Britain’s friend” appears even more obvious in The Telegraph’s electronic 64 picture book of the Conservatives’ campaign. In the selection of 13 pictures representing Osborne, 11 were snapshots of the Chancellor actively visiting a company or a working site.49 38 This article is not the place to review all the pictures taken of the Chancellor campaigning for the 2015 general election. There were many others. Yet, it is worth noting that no picture could be found that purposefully evoked the outgoing government’s success in monetary activism. The author’s search for pictures of Osborne in front of the Bank of England or with Mark Carney, for example, remained fruitless. As a matter of fact, pictures of the pair are not numerous on the Internet. Google displays only fewer than a dozen of different ones, some of them taken at the same event, either from May 2013 to August 2014, or from May 2015. 39 A Search for reported statements did not bring better findings. Nowhere was Osborne reported to have acknowledged publicly the positive role of monetary policy in achieving the economic growth that the Conservatives were promoting during the general election campaign. Yet, two annual events could have given Osborne this opportunity during the campaign: the Budget and the remit to the Governor of the

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Bank of England, which were presented and sent on 18 March 2015. It was, in fact, hardly the case, as we will see now. 40 The Chancellor opened his Budget speech with the idea that Britain was growing and, faithful to the campaign strategy, recounted the government’s various economic achievements seen above, just adding that of the replacement of bank bail-outs and by the profitable sale of bank shares back to the private sector. He then linked the achievements to the British long-term economic plan, but did not go back to the three components of the plan. When speaking about employment, he actually said the plan was “based on the premise that if you provide[d] economic stability [...] then you w[ould] create jobs too”. He thus reckoned economic stability was the main root of the government’s economic success, but he did not mention how this stability was achieved. And when he more specifically covered monetary policy, Osborne just factually explained the inflation level and announced the future policy as regards gilts and long-term interest rates.50 The part of the speech dedicated to monetary policy therefore remained very neutral. 41 The letter to the Governor of the Bank of England, that Osborne wrote to introduce the remit, was not more promotional, as it remained focused on regulatory aspects. Indeed, the objective of the letter and the remit is to establish technically the monetary framework. The documents do not contain any evaluation of the economic situation of the country or of the results of monetary policy. In March 2015, they therefore consisted in reaffirming the framework, assessing the progress of the reform and announcing the next steps of the latter.51 If, in the rosy circumstances of good GDP growth for 2014, Osborne took the opportunity to acknowledge the effectiveness of the monetary policy and pay tribute to Carney and the Bank of England’s work, it remained off the media record. 42 Last, the author found no evidence in media reporting of the campaign of Osborne explaining economic growth by the effectiveness of his government’s 2013 monetary policy reform. Similarly, no evidence was found of Osborne explaining economic growth by anything more than the “long-term economic plan” litany. Nevertheless, the Chancellor was heard to say that the years of economic growth should be used by the government to reduce its deficit so as to create the economic stability necessary for business investment and job creation.52 That was similar to Cameron’s reference to a strong economy being the necessary condition to any broader political achievement. But how this strong economy had indeed materialised was never precisely recalled.

The Conservatives’ Reasons for De-Politicizing the Monetary Policy

43 The fact that the Conservatives did not allude to their monetary policy reform, while hammering home their economic achievements tirelessly, in their popular campaign that targeted ordinary citizens, contrasts quite clearly with the stance of re-politicizing the monetary policy which surrounded the reforms implemented in 2013. In fact, the Conservatives’ attitude amounted to de-politicizing monetary policy to its extreme limits. Indeed, not only did the outgoing government relinquish any link to, and thus any accountability for, monetary policy and its possible results, but they removed the issue from the political debate. There might be several reasons for this strategy.

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44 The first reason is purely economic and stems from the fact that the actual influence of the outgoing government’s monetary policy actions on the United Kingdom’s growth is difficult to measure. There is an economists’ consensus about the fact that the 2010 recession, as measured by GDP negative growth, would have been even worse without the first wave of quantitative easing (QE1), implemented by New Labour.53 But the impact on growth of the Conservatives’ further QE2 and QE3 has remained uncertain. The same is true for the effects that the FLS and Help-to-Buy scheme may have had on the level of lending while, at the same time, the schemes have been suspected of contributing to demand-led housing price inflation.54 The only actual economic success seems to have come from forward guidance. In November 2014, Carney remarked that the markets’ expectations that the Bank of England’s interest rate would rise “to a more limited extent and at a more gradual pace” 55 had led to a decrease in the rates offered to households and businesses. This could only have had positive effects on growth. But if forward guidance had met with economic success, it was not well understood by the general public. 45 Forward guidance really started on 7 August 2013 when the MPC announced that interest rates would not be raised as long as the unemployment rate did not fall to 7%. This policy was meaningful as it rested on data everyone understood. But then, in February 2014, as the unemployment rate approached the threshold, the MPC changed its message. It established Forward Guidance II, which linked the base rate future rises to the level of absorption of the economy’s spare capacity. The absence of immediate interest rate rises was rather good news. But the side effect was that monetary policy lost credibility in the eyes of the ordinary citizen because first, the MPC seemed to have suddenly changed its mind and, second, it had replaced its message by something far more obscure. It meant that, even if in purely economic terms, Osborne’s 2013 monetary reform seemed to have delivered, this achievement was inoperable as a campaign argument, because of people’s misunderstanding of the ways forward guidance had been rolled out by the MPC. 46 By contrast, low inflation and low interest rates were two economic facts, related to monetary policy, that were grasped by all. But inflation was far too low as regards the target of 2% confirmed year after year in the Treasury’s remit to the Bank of England. Since the Bank of England Act of 1998 requires the Governor to write to the Chancellor when the actual inflation rate departs from the target by more than one percentage point, Carney had written an open letter to Osborne on 12 February 2015. He had placed most of the responsibility for undershooting the target on oil and energy price decreases, and put much emphasis on the temporary aspect of this deviation from the target.56 Osborne had accepted the explanations straight away. Yet, there was a risk that not only the MPC’s operational effectiveness, but also the Treasury’s designing competence, might be called into question. Indeed, the government had paradoxically welcomed the transgression of their own directives in December 2014, as we have seen, 57 and this had encouraged unsettling speculations about whether it was not time to change the nature of the target altogether.58 It was therefore preferable for the outgoing Treasury team not to insist too much on the subject of low inflation, that they were not fully responsible for, anyway. 47 As for low interest rates, they were the results of the MPC’s autonomous operations. The outgoing government could not claim credit for them. More than that they should not do so, because it would compromise the central bank’s independence. In the

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summer of 2014, Conservative Member of Parliament Mark Field had already accused Carney of having a “clear bargain” with Osborne not to raise interest rates before the election. Labour Treasury Committee member John Mann had followed suit, declaring that it was “abundantly clear that Mark Carney [was] attempting to delay interest rate increases until after the election when they [would] rise immediately”59 which, in the end, has not proved true. Another Labour member of the Treasury Committee, Teresa Pearce, had also suggested that the Bank of England was not “free of political interference”.60 Not only were such accusations likely to undermine the whole British monetary policy framework, but in election times, they might also question the outgoing government’s integrity. Carney had quickly managed to silence gossip, but during the general election campaign, the Conservatives could not take the risk of soliciting criticism by showing any complicity with the Governor. As regards interest rates, the best stance to adopt would have been to congratulate the MPC for its effectiveness. But that would have implied blurring the message that the government’s long-term economic plan was working, since the credit of economic growth would thus have been shared with a third party. The Conservatives already had to make the electorate forget that, over the last five years, they had led a Coalition government. Indeed, while the Conservatives claimed they had not been able to achieve all that they wanted to because of the Coalition,61 the Liberal Democrats were more than ready to try to step into the limelight. For example, as regards economic growth, Liberal Democrat Treasury Minister Danny Alexander was reported as saying that his party had been the “rock of stability on which [the] recovery had taken root.”62

Conclusion

48 The contrast between the United Kingdom’s economic turmoil, in which the Conservative-Lib-Dem government was formed in 2010, and the comparative prosperity recorded in 2015 represented the main general election asset of the Conservatives. It was therefore chosen as the primary issue of the party’s campaign – even though the public was more concerned with the themes of the NHS and immigration. The strategy seems to have worked since, against all predictions and polls, the Conservatives won a majority of seats in the House of Commons and formed the first Conservative government since 1997.

49 Regarding the economy, the strategy that the Conservatives deployed to defend their economic competence was the litany-like use of a limited number of repetitive short soundbites, which symbolised the principal economic achievements of the government. With the predominance of this litany, there was hardly any room for explanations about the ways and means used to reach these achievements, and absolutely no mention of the government’s monetary policy actions. 50 The truth is that the exact impact of this policy is not easily measurable, except for the reform consisting in the introduction of forward guidance. Yet while forward guidance appears to have been effective economically, its dynamic implementation, evolving with conditions, undermined its credibility in the eyes of the public, and so prevented its use as a campaign argument. What was clear to the public was historically low inflation and interest rates, which were both the results of the independent operations of the Bank of England. It seemed more dangerous than anything else to try and claim credit for the former, as zero inflation was too much of a deviation from the symmetric

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inflation target. As for the latter, it had already been exploited by MPs to accuse Mark Carney of electoral collusion with George Osborne. 51 Eventually, the way the Conservatives dealt – or did not deal – with monetary policy during the general election campaign corresponds to a move to renewed de- politicization, which contrasted with that of re-politicization observed in 2013. In the end, the Conservatives denying themselves the use of monetary policy for electoral purposes tends to prove the robustness of the monetary policy framework, based on the operational independence of the Bank of England. The shift in focus from monetary policy to fiscal and supply side measures also suggests the latter might have regained potency in the generation of growth.

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NOTES

1. See David CAMERON in Jeremy PAXMAN (interviewer), “Cameron & Miliband – the battle for number 10”, Sky News 4, 26 March 2015,˂https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAoMFz7qaR0˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 2. See George OSBORNE in Cathy NEWMAN (interviewer), “Osborne: ‘Competence versus chaos’ – video”, Channel 4, 02 January 2015, ˂http://www.channel4.com/news/osborne-chancellor- george-conservative-poster-taxation˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 3. George OSBORNE, “Budget 2013: Chancellor’s statement”, Oral statement to Parliament, HM Treasury, 20 March 2013. 4. In a letter addressed to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee Chairman at the beginning of October 1992, Norman Lamont set “for the remainder of this Parliament [...] the objective of keeping underlying inflation within a range of 1-4 per cent”. Letter available at ˂http:// webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ foi_dis_7_john_watts_081092.pdf˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 5. The Treasury has kept targeting inflation directly since 1992. Instead of a target range, a symmetric inflation target has been adopted since 1998, from which the actual rate might depart in exceptional circumstances. The first target, fixed in 1998, was for inflation, as measured by growth in the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX), to be stabilized at around 2.5% in the medium term. Since December 2003, inflation has been measured in terms of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth and should be kept close to 2%. 6. Forward guidance is a form of communication dedicated to the management of expectations of future monetary policy. It consists in clarifying the authorities’ reaction function so that market participants may know more acutely what to expect. 7. George OSBORNE, “Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee”, HM Treasury, 20 March 2013. 8. George OSBORNE, “Budget 2013: Chancellor’s statement”, op. cit.

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9. Matthew FLINDERS, “Memorandum”, Written Evidence, Select Committee on Public Administration, November 2005, ˂http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/ cmselect/cmpubadm/122/122we12.htm˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 10. See Peter BURNHAM, “Depoliticising Monetary Policy: The Minimum Lending Rate Experiment in Britain in the 1970s”, New Political Economy, London: Routledge, vol. 16, Issue 4, September 2011, pp. 463-480. 11. George OSBORNE, “Budget 2013: Chancellor’s statement”, op. cit. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. See Nicholas SOWELS, “Fiscal Policy and Public spending Under the Coalition Government, 2010-2015” in this issue. 17. See OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, “Public Sector Finances, March 2015”, Statistical Bulletin, 23 April 2015, p. 13. 18. Tweet reproduced on the site of ITV, in “Osborne buoyed by stronger economic figures”, 31 March 2015, 9:36 am, ˂http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-03-31/uk-economy-grew-by-0-6- in-the-fourth-quarter/˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 19. Quoted on ITV, “Cameron: We don't face European countries' deflation problem”, 13 Jan 2015, 5:24 pm, ˂http://www.itv.com/news/story/2015-01-14/osborne-lets-celebrate-effects-of-low- inflation-not-fear-them/˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 20. Quoted on ITV, “Osborne: Celebrate effects of low inflation not fear them”, 13 Jan 2015, 11:33 pm, ˂http://www.itv.com/news/story/2015-01-14/osborne-lets-celebrate-effects-of-low- inflation-not-fear-them/˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 21. This slight decrease has been the second one since the crisis. The commercial banks’ average interest rate had dramatically slumped from 5% in the winter of 2008 to 3% in the spring of 2009. It had then stabilized slightly below 3% until September 2012. See Peter SPENCE, “Don't be fooled: interest rates have been changing since the crisis”, The Telegraph, 1 March 2015, ˂http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-england/11443530/Dont-be-fooled-interest-rates-have- been-changing-since-the-crisis.html˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 22. EUROSTAT, ˂http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 23. Unemployment rates measured over the three preceding months until the end of the month that is quoted. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, “A01: Summary of labour market statistics”, 15 July 2015, ˂http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html? nscl=Unemployment+Rates#tab-data-tables˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 24. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, “Understanding Average earnings for the Continuously Employed - Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2014”, 18 May 2015. 25. Ciaren TAYLOR et al., “An Examination of Falling Real Wages”, Office for National Statistics, 31 January 2014. 26. Katie ALLEN, “UK workers set for first real pay rise for four years”, The Guardian, 14 April 2014. 27. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, House Price Index, March 2015, Table 22 Housing market, ˂http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html? edition=tcm%3A77-364254˃, accessed 25 July 2015 28. See THE SCOTSMAN, “UK food prices rising at slowest rate in decade”, Monday 29 June 2015. 29. Reported by BBC, “Lynton Crosby goes full time for Tories in £0.5m deal”, 3 November 2013. 30. See Kay BURLEY (moderator), “Cameron & Miliband – the battle for number 10”, Sky News 4, 26 March 2015; and David DIMBLEBY (moderator), “Question Time: Election Leaders Special | UK Election 2015”, BBC One, 30 April 2015.

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31. See IPSOS MORI, “The Budget and the Economy Infographic”, Pre-Budget 2015 poll, 18 March 2015. 32. See James HAMPSHIRE, “The Cost of Broken Promises: Immigration in the General Election, Immigration and the 2015 UK General Election”, and Louise DALINGWATER, “The NHS at the heart of the election campaign”, both in this issue. 33. The Labour Party’s first campaign poster showed a picture of Cameron and said: “The Tories want to cut spending on public services back to the levels of the 1930s, when there was no NHS / The NHS as you know it cannot survive five more years of David Cameron”. 34. The poster was criticized for its false claims, the deficit being halved only in GDP proportion, and the German origin of the picture. 35. David CAMERON in Jeremy PAXMAN (interviewer), op. cit. 36. David CAMERON, “David Cameron calls 2015 General Election (30Mar15)”, Speech announcing the dissolution of Parliament, BBC Two, Daily Politics, 30 March 2015, ˂https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvxS0ygbghs˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 37. David CAMERON in Julie ETCHINGHAM (moderator), “The ITV Leaders Debate”, ITV, 2 April 2015. 38. Ibid. 39. David CAMERON in Evan DAVIS (interviewer), “The Leader interviews: David Cameron (Conservatives)”, BBC One, 15 April 2015. 40. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, “The Conservative Party is losing the election campaign”, 20 April 2015, ˂http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx? articleid=1753090359&Country=United%20Kingdom&topic=Politics˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 41. David CAMERON in Andrew MARR (interviewer), “The Andrew Marr Show”, BBC One, 20 April 2015. 42. See Priti PATEL in “Debate – Employment: are people better off in 2015?”, ITN – Channel 4, 1 April 2015. 43. David CAMERON in Jeremy PAXMAN (interviewer), op. cit. 44. David CAMERON in Andrew MARR (interviewer), “The Andrew Marr Show”, op. cit. 45. David CAMERON in Evan DAVIS (interviewer), op. cit. 46. David CAMERON in Julie ETCHINGHAM (moderator), op. cit. 47. See IPSOS MORI, “The Budget and the Economy Infographic”, op. cit. 48. The companies were Lewes Brewery, WWDistribution, and George Bence & Sons. The public figures were Cameron, Cameron’s wife when she and Osborne were listening to Cameron’s speech, a candidate, and the education secretary. See BBC, “Election 2015 In Pictures”, ˂http://www.bbc.co.uk/search?q=election+2015+in+pictures&sa_f=search- product#page=3˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 49. The companies were Hawkins Motor, Numatic, Britvic Soft Drinks, Marston Brewery, Pizza Express, and Hecks Cider Farm. The working sites were those of London Victoria subway station, and the interior of a building in construction. Osborne also appeared assisting Cameron in test- driving London’s new tube train. Note that out of the 13 pictures, four showed him with Cameron, and two with Boris Johnson. See THE TELEGRAPH, “General Election 2015: David Cameron and Conservatives on the campaign trail”, ˂http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general- election-2015/11494250/General-Election-2015-David-Cameron-and-Conservatives-on-the- campaign-trail.html?frame=endScreen˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 50. George OSBORNE, “Chancellor George Osborne's Budget 2015 speech”, HM Treasury, 18 March 2015. 51. George OSBORNE, “The Chancellor’s letter to the Governor of the Bank of England setting the remit for the Monetary Policy Committee”, HM Treasury, 18 March 2015. 52. See George OSBORNE in Cathy NEWMAN (interviewer), op. cit.

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53. See David COBHAM, “Monetary policy under the Coalition”, posted on 16 April 2015, ˂http:// www.coalitioneconomics.org/uncategorized/monetary-policy-under-the-coalition/˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 54. Ibid. 55. See Mark CARNEY, “Opening remarks”, at the Inflation Report Press Conference, 12 November 2014, ˂http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/ 2014/irspnote141112.pdf˃, accessed 25 July 2015. 56. See Mark CARNEY, “Letter from the Governor to the Chancellor”, Bank of England, 12 February 2015. 57. See the paragraph about “The Economic Context of the 2015 General Election”, supra. 58. See THE ECONOMIST, “Wrong target?”, 12 February 2015. 59. See THE INDEPENDENT, “Bank of England's Mark Carney accused of delaying rate hike ahead of General Election”, 18 August 2014. 60. See Asa BENNETT, “Bank Of England ‘Blind’ To Political Pressure Not To Raise Interest Rates, Says Mark Carney”, The Huffington Post, 12 November 2014. 61. See David CAMERON in Evan DAVIS (interviewer), op. cit. 62. See Danny ALEXANDER in “Labour scornful of Osborne’s good news ‘topping’”, Channel 4, 31 March 2015, ˂http://www.channel4.com/news/george-osborne-uk-growth-economy- election-2015˃, accessed 25 July 2015.

ABSTRACTS

The relative prosperity of Britain in 2015 represented the main asset around which the Conservatives built their general election campaign. The strategy that they deployed was the repetition of a litany of their principal economic achievements, in which no mention was made to the government’s monetary policy actions. The fact that the outgoing government did not use the possible success of the last five years’ monetary policy as a campaign argument contrasted with the re-politicization of monetary policy that had accompanied the introduction of forward guidance in Britain in 2013. It can be explained by the difficulty of assessing the exact effect of monetary policy on the recovery, the loss of credibility encountered by forward guidance as it was modified according to economic conditions, and the robustness of the framework itself, which is based on the Bank of England’s independence.

La prospérité relative de la Grande-Bretagne en 2015 a représenté l’atout majeur autour duquel les Conservateurs ont bâti leur campagne électorale. La stratégie qu’ils ont déployée a consisté à répéter une litanie de leurs principales réussites économiques, dans laquelle ils ont passé leur politique monétaire sous silence. Le fait que le gouvernement sortant n’a pas utilisé les succès probables de la politique monétaire de ces cinq dernières années comme argument de campagne contraste avec la re-politisation de la politique monétaire qui a accompagné l’introduction d’indications sur la trajectoire future des taux d'intérêt directeurs (forward guidance) au Royaume-Uni en 2013. Il peut être expliquée par la difficulté à évaluer l’effet exact de la politique monétaire sur la reprise économique, la perte de crédibilité encourue par la stratégie de communication de la Banque d’Angleterre et la robustesse du cadre de politique monétaire lui- même.

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INDEX

Keywords: Conservatives, economy, monetary policy, Bank of England Mots-clés: Conservateurs, économie, politique monétaire, Banque d’Angleterre

AUTHOR

NATHALIE CHAMPROUX

Université Paris Est Créteil

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The Cost of Broken Promises or How Policy Failure Can Help Win Elections - Immigration and the 2015 UK General Election Le coût des promesses non tenues ou comment des objectifs manqués peuvent permettre de remporter des élections - L’immigration et les élections législatives de 2015

James Hampshire

Introduction

1 One function of elections is to enable voters to provide their collective judgement of the incumbent government. In making this judgement, it seems reasonable to assume that the government’s policy record – its successes and moreover its failures – will play a role. However, whether or not voters reward or penalise parties for delivering or failing to deliver on their policy promises is likely to depend on at least two factors. Firstly, all things being equal, a policy success or failure is more likely to matter when the policy in question is publicly visible and widely known. If a party is able to obscure its poor record on a particular issue – for example by highlighting other issues – or if its record has not been widely debated and scrutinised through the mass media, then it is more likely to escape electoral punishment. Secondly, and related to the previous point, policy success or failure is more likely to matter if it relates to an issue that voters care about. In other words, a government’s record will matter more on issues that are highly salient and about which voters express clear and strong preferences.

2 These conditions were all met regarding the Coalition government’s immigration policy record in the run-up to the 2015 UK general election. In 2010, the Conservatives had committed to reduce net migration from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands – “no ifs, no buts” as David Cameron put it. Over the five years of the Con-Dem Coalition,

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they failed, and failed spectacularly, to do so. Not only did they not meet their own target, they actually presided over an increase in net migration, to a figure significantly higher than Labour’s final years in office. In the latter years of the Coalition this failure was widely observed in the media and, as we will see, at least one political party made it central to its attack on the Conservatives. Yet rather than hide the issue, the Conservatives recommitted themselves to the net migration target in their 2015 manifesto. This was all the more surprising because by 2015 voters considered immigration to be the second most important issue facing the country (after the economy) and the majority of them thought that immigration was too high. Given all of this, it might have been expected that voters would punish the Conservatives at the ballot box. 3 In the event, the Conservatives’ record on immigration did not appear to harm their election result. In one of the biggest upsets in British electoral history, the Conservatives outperformed every pollster’s predictions – for reasons that are still unclear – and win an outright majority. Pollsters were so confounded that the British Polling Council launched an inquiry (on-going at the time of writing) into how they got it so wrong. A complete explanation of why the Conservatives did so well and Labour so badly is, of course, complex and multi-faceted and would require attention to a number of factors: the SNP’s surge leading to Labour’s collapse in Scotland; the Conservatives benefiting disproportionately from the Lib Dems’ collapse throughout the UK; Ed Miliband’s poor approval ratings; and the Conservative’s effective (though false) economic narrative that blamed the deficit on Labour’s supposed profligacy before the 2008 financial crisis (see for example Bale and Shaw’s contributions to this volume). So it could be that immigration was simply outweighed by these other factors. In other words, the Conservatives did well despite failing to meet their own migration target, the counterfactual being that they would have done even better had they met the target. 4 While intuitively plausible, I think this is incorrect. In this paper I want to argue that in fact the Conservatives won a majority not despite their immigration policy failure, but in large part because of it. In other words, their failure to reduce immigration and address public anxiety about this issue should be added to the list of reasons why they won, rather than considered as a factor that they overcame to win. How so?

Promises, promises

5 We have to go back to the previous election in 2010 to understand how the Conservatives set themselves up to fail, yet succeed. Then as now, the Conservatives enjoyed a lead over Labour on immigration. Voters had lost trust in Labour’s ability to manage migration and since the 2004 EU enlargement resulted in large increases in immigration to the UK attitudes had hardened. As the 2010 election drew near, the Conservatives were keen to exploit their advantage on this issue. At the same time, they faced a threat from the right, in the form of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which since 2005 had increasingly campaigned on an anti-immigration message. Thus both in its competition with Labour over the centre ground, and in its efforts to prevent defectors to UKIP on the right, a robust policy on immigration seemed essential to any Conservative victory.

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6 The challenge was to articulate such a policy without falling into the trap of appearing as the “nasty party”, as arguably the Conservatives had done in the 2005 election, when the party used none too subtle dog-whistle posters on immigration asking “are you thinking what we’re thinking?” and moreover promised in their manifesto to withdraw Britain from the United Nations Refugee Convention. In the party’s 2005 election post- mortem, this draconian approach immigration was identified as having discouraged some swing voters from voting Tory and thus contributing to defeat. The new Conservative leader, David Cameron, had committed to modernise the party, precisely aiming to shed the “nasty” image and make it more appealing to centrists. So Cameron needed an immigration policy that was tough enough to exploit the party’s advantage over Labour and prevent defections to UKIP, yet not so tough as to jeopardise his modernisation strategy. 7 The solution was the net migration target. Cameron first announced in a television interview that if elected his party would reduce net migration “from hundreds to tens of thousands” in the course of the next Parliament, a promise that was then included in the Conservative Party manifesto. At the time, net migration was 255,000 per year, so Cameron had effectively committed to more than halving it in the space of just five years. The target sounded robust – it after all committed the party to very substantially reducing migration to Britain – yet it did not demonise immigrants and had a pleasing technocratic ring to it (even if in reality it was endorsed by hardly any experts). Of course, in the 2010 election the Conservatives did not win a majority, but they were the largest party and entered into negotiations with the Liberal Democrats over the formation of a coalition government. In the Coalition Agreement, the net migration target was not included as the Lib Dems would not endorse it, but it nevertheless became de facto government policy, clearly driving a restrictive policy agenda on students and family migration, and to a lesser extent work migration. 8 Although it made sense politically, the migration target was at best a hostage to fortune. Net migration is simply immigration minus emigration. Democratic states cannot effectively control emigration: neither by forcing people to leave nor preventing them from doing so. Short of becoming an authoritarian state the emigration half of the net migration equation is thus outside government’s control. The immigration side of the equation is in principle more controllable, but there are important limitations here too, not least since a significant proportion of immigration to the UK comes from other EU countries. So long as it remains part of the EU, the government has no effective control over this inflow which is guaranteed by European free movement rights. Immigration from outside the EU is more controllable, but (as discussed below) there are real constraints on government even here. 9 For these reasons, many commentators and academics (including this author) said at the time that the target was effectively impossible to achieve. It was certainly difficult to see how the Coalition could both secure an economic recovery (where relative economic strength would attract immigrants, especially EU free movers) and reduce net migration to under 100,000. Thus two of the Conservatives’ central commitments seemed incompatible, if not flatly contradictory. The same commentators who pointed this out also typically argued that the target would come to haunt the Conservatives. While it might have paid electoral dividends in 2010, they claimed, the target would soon become an electoral albatross, costing votes at the next election. In hindsight,

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while critics were right to observe that the target would not be achieved, they were wrong to think that this would be politically costly (as we shall see below). 10 Initially, it looked as though the government might get close to the target. Net migration fell during the first two years of the Coalition, reaching a low of 153,000 in the year to October 2012. From late 2012 onwards, however, net migration started to increase again. By the end of 2014, the last figures released before the election in May 2015, net migration was 318,000.1 This was not only three times the target and 63,000 higher than when the Coalition was formed, but higher than at any time since 2005. 11 The failure to reduce migration below the level when they entered office, let alone achieve their self-imposed target, was certainly not for want of trying. The Coalition government introduced a slew of restrictive policies across the spectrum of routes.2 Work entry routes were closed or tightened, and an annual cap was put on the number of skilled workers that employers could recruit. Businesses, and even some foreign governments, complained loudly about these changes, and indeed managed to extract some significant concessions, but there is little doubt that policy on non-EU labour migrants tightened under the coalition. And this was notwithstanding a Liberal Democrat Business Secretary, Vince Cable, who fought a running, and often public, battle over immigration policy with Teresa May at the . The changes were more dramatic in the areas of international students and family migration. The financial requirements for sponsors of family migrants were increased, as were English language requirements for foreign spouses. Financial and language requirements were also raised for overseas students, and new restrictions were put on students’ rights to work or bring dependent relatives. 12 These policies failed to reduce net migration for three main reasons. First, and most important, was the substantial increase in the number of EU citizens migrating to Britain. While free movement to the UK had dropped off in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, it picked up again as the UK labour market, while hardly booming, was in better shape than many other EU countries. In particular, the crippling effects of the Eurozone crisis on southern European countries – where youth unemployment reaching staggering levels of up to 50 per cent – created a new flow of young Europeans in search of work. Cafes and restaurants in London were inundated with university-educated Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians fleeing their ravaged economies. Second, even non-EU immigration, which was affected by all the policies above also increased. The reasons for this are complicated but again reflect the relative (if not absolute) strength of the British economy, especially after the Chancellor eased back on austerity in 2012, as well as the path dependent nature of non-work migration routes. Third, the effect of increased immigration flows was compounded by the decrease in the number of people emigrating from Britain, as fewer people went to work or retire abroad. 13 These developments meant that the Conservatives approached the 2015 election campaign having singularly failed to deliver on one of their headline promises.

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Getting away with it? Migration in the 2015 election campaign

14 Given all of this it was perhaps surprising that the Conservatives chose to reaffirm their commitment to the net migration target in the 2015 campaign. The 2015 manifesto promised that they party would “keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands”, and blamed the failure to do so – not entirely inaccurately – on the economic recovery.3 Presumably, the Conservatives took the decision that reneging on the commitment would do more damage than reasserting it as an ambition. As the campaign got under way it was unclear how this would play for the Conservatives, but it was certainly plausible to think that it could damage them, especially with UKIP in the ascendant.

15 Furthermore, immigration was by now a highly salient issue and something about which the electorate had strongly negative attitudes. IPSOS-Mori polls – if such things can be believed anymore – showed that immigration was considered by voters to be the second most important issue facing the country (See Fig 1).

Figure 1: IPSOS-MORI Index on most important issues facing the country 1993-2015

16 And the public had strong preferences for more restrictions on immigration. The 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey suggested that three-quarters of the British population wanted to see immigration reduced, and over half wanted it to be ‘reduced a lot’ (See Fig 2).

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Figure 2: Preferences for level of immigration to Britain, 2013

17 Despite this, immigration did not figure in the campaign as much as might have been expected. The Conservatives did not want to draw attention to the high level of net migration while Labour had little to gain from politicising the issue. For both of the main parties immigration was, as it had been for some time, electorally risky and internally divisive. Immigration is generally an issue that splits both centre-left and centre-right parties, with the former divided between cultural conservatives and free market, pro-business interests, while the latter finds itself caught between left cosmopolitans and internationalists on the one hand, versus labour market and welfare protectionists on the other.4 In the specific context of the 2015 British election, these divisions had a particular resonance because were immigration to become a central aspect of the campaign, both Conservatives and Labour would find themselves having to defend an unpopular record – the Conservatives’ missed target and Labour’s record of policy liberalisation when it was in government. 18 Thus while the Conservatives still enjoyed a lead over Labour on immigration they did not seek to make the issue a major part of their campaign. The Party’s two chief strategists – the Australian electoral strategist, Lynton Crosby, and the Chancellor, George Osborne – focused instead on the economic recovery (weak though it was) and how Labour’s alleged fiscal profligacy meant they could not be trusted with the reins of government. 19 For its part, Labour did not seek to go on the offensive on the missed target because it was itself increasingly split on immigration and acutely aware of how many of its core voters thought the party had been too liberal when in office. Instead it staked out a largely defensive position to present itself as tough on immigration without really attacking the Coalition’s record. While parts of the party – including both some Blairites and left-wingers – thought Labour’s record in office should be defended, figures such as John Cruddas, who Ed Miliband had appointed as Policy Coordinator to write the party’s manifesto, successfully argued that Labour needed to adopt a robust

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line on immigration. Thus Miliband apologised for his party’s supposed mistakes in 2004-2010, admitting that the previous Labour government had been too sanguine about the effects of immigration, and he made tighter controls on immigration one of the party’s five election pledges. The pledge for “controls on immigration” adorned a much-derided campaign mug, as well as the even more derided “Ed Stone” – the surreal stone slab carved with Labour’s election pledges, which Miliband promised to put in the Downing Street garden if he was elected Prime Minister. 20 There was an interesting parallel in all of this with the debate on the economy. On both issues, the Conservatives arguably had a poor record (most economists arguing that austerity was unnecessary and had in fact harmed the recovery) yet managed to present themselves as competent while depicting Labour as unreliable. And on both issues, Labour failed effectively to challenge this narrative – allowing the idea that they were to blame for the deficit and uncontrolled immigration to take hold.

A fox in the henhouse – the rise of UKIP

21 If Labour’s defensiveness on immigration is perhaps a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition, to explain how the Conservative’s immigration policy failure contributed to their electoral success. The missing piece of the puzzle is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which unlike the major parties did campaign, and campaign vociferously, on immigration.

22 As its name implies, UKIP began life as a party with the principal aim of withdrawing the UK from the European Union. Founded in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League by , a Professor of History at the LSE, it was renamed UKIP in 1993. For many years UKIP was effectively a single-issue party, which drew its limited support from Eurosceptic Tories. It achieved some modest successes, but never looked likely to trouble the main parties. After a particularly poor performance in the 2005 general election, UKIP elected Nigel Farage, a sitting MEP, as its new leader. Farage set about trying to widen the party’s appeal with a broader right-wing agenda in an effort to pick up support from Tories alienated by (what they saw as) David Cameron’s socially liberal modernisation of the Conservative Party. 23 From August 2010, when he was re-elected as leader following a brief hiatus, Farage developed a two-pronged strategy for UKIP: first, a focus on developing the party’s representation in selected local councils to create bridgeheads for national election campaigns; and second, adaptation of the party’s core message to target disenfranchised working-class voters. Election results revealed that UKIP was gaining support in areas with a large proportion of blue-collar voters. Conversely, it was doing badly in metropolitan areas with higher levels of education and significant ethnic minority populations. In other words, UKIP’s support was evolving from a reliance on dyed-in-the-wool Europhobes and the “disgruntled of Tunbridge Wells” to a more economically marginalised base. Under Farage, UKIP increasingly became a party of these “left behind” voters: working class, mostly white, and with few educational qualifications. 24 The central issue chosen to develop this strategy to target the “left behind” was immigration. UKIP had been long arguing that European integration threatened British national sovereignty, but this was a relatively esoteric pitch, unable to galvanise voters whose concerns were more immediate and visceral than monetary union or Brussels “

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red tape”. Fortunately for UKIP, the EU and immigration had already begun to fuse as issues in the public mind following the 2004 enlargement round, when thousands of central and eastern Europeans exercised their new rights as EU citizens to move to the UK. As immigration from Poland and other A8 countries soared, significant parts of the public, especially those competing for jobs with the newcomers, began to express growing concern about immigration. This created an opportunity for UKIP to fuse its longstanding opposition towards the EU with an altogether more electorally potent issue. It was an opportunity Farage did not pass up. He set about refocusing UKIP’s core message on immigration, and on European immigration in particular. The only way the UK can effectively control immigration, he argued, is to withdraw from the EU. 25 Thus UKIP morphed from being a fringe Eurosceptic party into a populist far right party, with immigration – especially though not exclusively from the EU – at the forefront of its campaigns. Its focus on EU free movement – rather than Muslim or other non-EU immigrants – distinguishes UKIP from some other populist far right parties in Europe, but in many ways it increasingly resembles them. As with other members of this party family it is nationalist, economically conservative (though it has shifted from a libertarian to more protectionist stance in recent years) and populist. In Farage it has a charismatic leader who, literally as well as metaphorically, likes to present himself as a “bloke down the pub”, in contrast to the cosmopolitan elite of the mainstream parties. 26 This change has certainly widened the electoral appeal of UKIP, in terms of both the socio-demography and geography of its voters. Without losing its earlier support from Europhobic ex-Tories in southern England, UKIP has attracted growing support from white working-class voters across the country, including the Midlands and the North (their support remains more limited in Wales and especially in Scotland). Indeed, the stereotypical UKIP voter of the 1990s – a Blimpish ex-Tory living in southern England – is less and less important as an altogether different group has turned to the party. As Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin pointed out in 2014, UKIP’s support has an increasingly clear social profile: “old, male, working class, white and less educated”.5 These are “disadvantaged and economically insecure Britons, who are profoundly uncomfortable in the ‘new’ society, which they regard as alien and threatening.”6 As with many other far right parties in Western Europe, UKIP’s support is nowadays founded on what Hans-Peter Kriesi calls the “losers of ”,7 the growing number of people for whom the economic, social and cultural changes of globalization are associated with insecurity and disadvantage, rather than growth and prosperity, and who feel alienated by mainstream parties who, they believe, represent the interests of cosmopolitan elites. 27 An important implication of this, as Ford and Goodwin have been arguing for some time, is that UKIP now pose as much a threat to Labour as to the Conservatives. Where UKIP had once simply hived off voters from the right of the Conservative Party, it now stood to harm the Labour party by eating into its traditional working-class heartlands. While there was some limited evidence of this occurring already in the 2010 election it remained a matter of debate which party stood to lose more as a result of a UKIP surge in the run-up to the 2015 election. 28 UKIP did well in the 2013 local elections, winning 22 per cent of the popular vote and 147 seats, and especially in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, where it emerged as the largest single party with 26.6 per cent of the popular vote and 24 out of the UK’s 73 Parliamentary seats. In both of these polls, especially the European

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elections, UKIP’s campaign concentrated on immigration. Most of its election posters were about the supposed harm that free movement caused British workers, and in his media appearances Farage focused relentlessly on immigration. In one of his more controversial interventions he claimed that “any normal and fair-minded person would have a perfect right to be concerned if a group of Romanian people suddenly moved in next door ”.8 29 It remained to be seen whether the successes in the local and European elections could be repeated in the general election, and what effect this would have on the overall outcome. Could UKIP retain the support it had acquired in these second-order elections, where turn-out is lower and voters often protest against the main parties, and which moreover are governed by more proportional electoral systems, unlike the Fast Past the Post system of single member constituencies, which is notoriously difficult for smaller parties? 30 UKIP’s core message in the general election campaign was essentially the same as in the EP elections. Although Farage himself fought what many thought a lacklustre campaign, he still managed to generate media controversy by using the televised leaders debate to attack migrants for health tourism, and on another occasion blaming his late arrival at a meeting on traffic congestion caused by “open door immigration.” Unlike Labour, UKIP did make the Conservative’s failure to meet its net migration target an issue. Indeed, one of its general election campaign posters was a (quite clever) variation on a theme of a one of its 2014 European election posters. While the 2014 version depicted an escalator running up the white cliffs of Dover with the caption “No border. No control”, the 2015 poster used the same imagery but with three escalators to represent the idea that “Immigration is three times higher than the Tories promised” (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3a: Spot the difference: UKIP 2014 European Election Posters

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Figure 3b UKIP 2015 General Election Posters

31 In the event, UKIP did both spectacularly well and spectacularly badly. The bad news was that UKIP returned just one MP: , a former Conservative who had defected to UKIP in 2014. This was in stark contrast to some predictions that they could win in several tight contests. Perhaps most disappointing was the result for Farage himself. Despite concentrating his efforts on the constituency of South Thanet, he failed to win, prompting his immediate (albeit short-lived) resignation. 32 But in terms of its popular support the UKIP surge held up pretty well. Across the UK the party received 12.6 per cent of the vote, and in England, 14 per cent. Their total vote share – nearly four million votes – was as large as the SNP and the Lib Dems combined (who between them managed to win 64 seats). Moreover, UKIP came second in more than 120 seats. In terms of the influence of UKIP’s rise on the outcome of the election, it was here that the effect was felt.

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Explaining successful failure

33 Indeed, in 2015 the chief significance of UKIP’s large popular vote spread across many constituencies lies in the effect that it had on the two main parties’ performance. In short, while both the Conservatives and Labour lost votes to UKIP, the electoral damage was greater for Labour. In numerous key marginals, especially in the Midlands and the North of England, UKIP prevented Labour from taking seats they simply had to win from the Tories.

34 Before demonstrating this, it is worth pausing to observe how counter-intuitive it is, at least if one assumes (not unreasonably) that an incumbent party’s policy record on high salience issues might be expected to affect its electoral fortunes. Given that UKIP campaigned on immigration and indeed sought to make the Conservative’s migration policy failure an electoral issue, it might have been expected that the Tories, as the governing party (strictly speaking, the main party in a coalition) that had presided over an increase in immigration, would be damaged most. However, while there were voters who abandoned the Tories for UKIP over immigration, the more significant effect appears to have been Labour voters shifting to UKIP for the same reason. In other words, while it was the Conservative-led coalition that presided over increasing net migration, it was Labour that bore the brunt of public frustration on the issue. Thus Conservative policy failure contributed towards political success. 35 Of course immigration was not the only factor that caused voters to defect to UKIP: a general disaffection with the mainstream parties and opposition towards the European Union – to the extent that they can be separated from immigration – were also important. But immigration was undoubtedly a major factor, especially among former Labour voters. 36 To see how UKIP’s rise contributed towards Conservative victory by harming Labour we can compare the results of the Conservatives and Labour in constituencies where UKIP performed very well versus constituencies where UKIP performed relatively badly. As Steve Fisher has pointed out, where the UKIP vote was up over 14 per cent on their 2010 result, the Conservatives were down 0.9 per cent and Labour up 1.6 per cent (see Table 1).9 At first glance, then, it appears that UKIP harmed the Tories. However, to gauge the UKIP effect on each party’s relative performance what really matters is the difference in each party’s vote in these seats compared to those where UKIP was not doing so well. In those constituencies where the UKIP vote was up by less than 7 per cent, the Conservative vote was up by 1.5 per cent while the Labour vote was up by 6.9 per cent. Therefore, Labour (which remember increased its total UK vote share by 1.5 per cent compared to 2010) was up 5.3 per cent less where UKIP did well, whereas the corresponding difference for the Conservatives was 2.4 per cent. Thus in terms of the popular vote, UKIP hurt Labour more than they hurt the Conservatives.

Table 1: Change in the popular vote of the main parties where UKIP did well versus less well, 2015

Constituencies where UKIP up <7% Constituencies where UKIP up >14% Difference UKIP doing less well minus doing very well

Conservatives +1.5% -0.9% 2.4%

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Labour +6.9% +1.6% 5.3%

Source: Author’s recalculations based on Fisher 2015.

37 This effect is even clearer at the level of constituency results, where UKIP stopped Labour taking seats from the Tories. In constituencies where UKIP did less well (up <7%), Labour managed to take 6 seats from the Tories. In contrast, where UKIP was polling strongly (up >14%) Labour did not take a single seat from the Tories. Especially given the collapse of the Labour Party in Scotland (where of course it faced the even more dramatic SNP surge), it was these Tory-held English marginals that Labour had to win to have any chance of forming a government; and it was here that Labour defectors to UKIP helped the Conservatives.

38 There was a strong regional aspect to this effect. One post-election study by the polling firm Survation found that while UKIP took more votes from the Conservatives than from Labour in some parts of the country, in the North of England and possibly also in the Midlands UKIP took 10-15 per cent more of its vote from Labour than from the Conservatives.10 According to their poll of people who voted Labour in 2010, in the North of England, where Labour lost 16 per cent of its 2010 voters, and in the Midlands, where it lost 11 per cent, the largest share of lost votes went to UKIP. In the South of England, Labour lost an even higher proportion of its 2010 vote, but here voters broke roughly equally to the Conservatives (38 per cent) and UKIP (36 per cent). Only in London and Scotland did UKIP not take votes from Labour. 39 In the North and the Midlands, the defection of Labour voters to UKIP stopped Labour from taking key marginal seats that it needed to win from the Tories, and also resulted in them losing supposedly safe seats to the Tories. In Conservative-held constituencies such as Bury North and Weaver Vale (both Conservative-Labour marginals), the Tories held with majorities significantly smaller than the number of Labour votes lost to UKIP. And in places such as Bolton West and Morley and Outwood, seats that Labour expected to hold (the latter being the constituency of Ed Balls, the Shadow Chancellor), Labour votes lost to UKIP were instrumental to the Conservatives’ gains. Academics are not generally given to citing UKIP politicians approvingly, but on this occasion the UKIP candidate for Warwickshire North, William Cash, the son of Tory Eurosceptic Bill Cash MP, was quite right when he argued that “the reason the Tories have won the key battleground of the Midlands is that UKIP came to their rescue. We rode into the flanks of the white working class and captured them [from Labour]. I had Tory workers coming up and hugging me”.11

Conclusion

40 It is widely known among political scientists who study migration that immigration policy is replete with unintended consequences. Yet rarely can the political consequences of a migration policy have been quite so perverse as the case discussed here. Over the course of five years, the Conservatives’ failure to achieve a high profile commitment, one that was intended to help them win the 2010 election by capitalising on their lead over Labour and stemming defections to UKIP, became an electoral benefit by prompting defections of former Labour voters to UKIP. Counterfactually, had the Tories achieved their net migration target, which would have meant very

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substantial reductions in immigration, it seems likely that public opposition towards immigration and thus UKIP’s appeal would have been diminished, and fewer Labour voters would have responded to Farage’s populist anti-immigration message.

41 It is tempting to think that George Osborne and Lynton Crosby, the two chief architects of the Conservatives’ victory, may have sensed this and were happy to let public anxiety about immigration run high assuming that defections to UKIP were likely to harm Labour more than their own party. If that was their political calculus then it was a canny one, and it helps to explain why the net migration target was reiterated in the 2015 manifesto. Whether or not this is true – and it is only speculation – it is clear is that far from harming the Conservatives, failure to reduce net migration, let alone meet the target, helped them to victory. A promise made in 2010 had become a promise broken in 2015; but the latter was even more politically advantageous. 42 The wider lesson here is that there is such thing as a politically successful policy failure. Contrary to the logic outlined at the start of the paper, this case shows that under certain circumstances an incumbent’s failure to achieve its policy goals, even on a highly salient issue, can not only not matter, but may even contribute towards electoral success. It may sometimes be to the advantage of an incumbent party to set themselves up to fail, or at least be at ease with their apparent failure, if they can see a positive political externality. Of course, all of this depends on the caveat ‘under certain conditions’, which in this case involved an insurgent party increasingly campaigning on the issue where the incumbent party had “failed”, but where voter concern was concentrated among core supporters of the opposition party. This is, of course, a rather specific set of circumstances. And while it is possible to be wise after the fact, the implications were far from certain in real-time, as they depended on how unpredictable party political dynamics and issue salience would influence voter behaviour. 43 Whether the trick will work twice remains to be seen. Unless they renounce or quietly resign the target mid-Parliament, neither of which seems likely, the Conservatives will go into the 2020 election once again defending their record on net migration. Given that there is no more reason to believe that the target will be achieved this time, the theory of successful failure may well be put to the test once again. Some of the key variables shaping how this unfolds will be whether immigration remains as salient an issue for voters in 2020 as it is today, whether UKIP continues to build upon its populist anti-immigration, anti-EU message, which in turn will depend on whether the UK is still in the EU following Cameron’s in/out referendum, and whether Labour is able to wrest back some of the votes it lost to UKIP. Given this, it would be unwise to assume that migration policy failure will be so advantageous to the Conservatives again.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANTHONY, A. “How UKIP Helped David Cameron Win in the Midlands”, The Guardian, 9 May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/09/ukip- tory-tories-election

BALE, T. “Turning Round the Telescope: Centre-right Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no 3, 2008, pp. 315-330.

BBC. “Nigel Farage Attacked Over Romanians “Slur””, 18 May 2014, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27459923

CONSERVATIVE PARTY. The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015. London: Conservative Party, 2015, p. 82.

FISHER, S. “How Did the Tories Win a Majority?” Elections etc. blogpost, 8 May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://electionsetc.com/

FORD, R., & GOODWIN, M. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. London: Routledge, 2014, p. 336.

HAMPSHIRE, J. The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal State. Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 224.

HAMPSHIRE, J., & BALE, T. “New Administration, New Immigration Regime: Do Parties Matter After All? A UK Case Study”, West European Politics, vol. 38, no 1, 2015, pp. 145-166.

KRIESI, H., GRAND, E., DOLEZAL, M., HELBLING, M., HÖGLINGER, D., HUTTER, S., & WÜEST, B. Political Conflict in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 368.

MAKINSON, L. & BRIONE, P. “How Did UKIP’s Rise Affect the Lab/Con/Lib Dem Seat Position?”, Survation, 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://survation.com/how-did-ukips-rise-affect- the-labconlib-dem-seats-position/

OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS. Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly- report/may-2015/sty-net-migration.html

NOTES

1. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly- report/may-2015/sty-net-migration.html. 2. See J. HAMPSHIRE & T. BALE, “New Administration, New Immigration Regime: Do Parties Matter After All? A UK Case Study”, West European Politics, vol. 38, no 1, 2015, pp. 145-166. 3. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, London: Conservative Party, 2015, p. 82. 4. See James HAMPSHIRE, The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal State; Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 224; Tim BALE, “Turning Round the Telescope: Centre-right Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no 3, 2008, pp. 315-330.

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5. R. FORD & M. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 159. 6. Ibid, p. 11. 7. H. KRIESI, E. GRAND, M. DOLEZAL, M. HELBLING, D. HÖGLINGER, S. HUTTER, & B. WÜEST, Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 368. 8. See BBC, “Nigel Farage Attacked Over Romanians “Slur””, 18 May 2014, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27459923 9. Stephen FISHER, “How Did the Tories Win a Majority?”, Elections etc. blogpost, 8 May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://electionsetc.com/. 10. L. MAKINSON & P. BRIONE, “How Did UKIP’s Rise Affect the Lab/Con/Lib Dem Seat Position?”, Survation, 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://survation.com/how-did-ukips-rise-affect- the-labconlib-dem-seats-position/ 11. Quoted in Andrew ANTHONY, “How UKIP Helped David Cameron Win in the Midlands”, The Guardian, 9 May 2015, consulted on 3 August 2015 at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2015/may/09/ukip-tory-tories-election

ABSTRACTS

Do policy failures inevitably lead to electoral punishment? This paper examines the role of immigration in the 2015 UK general election to argue that policy failure can be electorally successful. In the 2010 election, the Conservatives had committed to reduce net migration to under one hundred thousand. As majority partners in the 2010-15 Coalition government, they failed spectacularly to achieve this, overseeing a substantial increase in net migration. By 2015 immigration was highly salient and the electorate wanted it reduced. The paper argues that the Conservatives won a majority not despite their migration policy failure, but in large part because of it. Their failure to reduce immigration and address public anxiety contributed to the emergence of UKIP as an anti-immigration party, a development which disproportionately harmed Labour in the 2015 election. UKIP’s anti-immigration message helped the Conservative win victories in a number of key marginal constituencies, thus contributing to their unexpected majority.

Les politiques publiques qui manquent leurs objectifs mènent-elles inévitablement aux échecs électoraux ? Cet article analyse le rôle de l’immigration dans les élections législatives de 2015 pour montrer que les objectifs manqués peuvent contribuer à un succès électoral. Lors des législatives de 2010, les conservateurs s’étaient engagés à réduire les chiffres nets de l’immigration à moins de 100 000. En tant que partenaires majoritaires dans le gouvernement de coalition de 2010-2015, ils ont échoué de manière spectaculaire à atteindre cet objectif, et ont vu au contraire une augmentation substantielle de l’immigration nette. Cet article montre que les Conservateurs ont gagné la majorité en 2015 non pas malgré cet échec en matière migratoire, mais en bonne partie à cause de lui. Leur incapacité à réduire l’immigration et de répondre aux anxiétés de l’opinion sur le sujet a contribué à l’émergence de UKIP comme parti anti- immigration, ce qui a nui de manière disproportionnée aux travaillistes. Le message anti- immigration de UKIP a facilité la victoire des conservateurs dans un ensemble de circonscriptions marginales cruciales, contribuant ainsi à leur majorité inattendue.

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INDEX

Keywords: immigration, elections, policy failure, Conservatives, UKIP Mots-clés: immigration, élections, échec de politique publique, Conservateurs, UKIP

AUTHOR

JAMES HAMPSHIRE

University of Sussex

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The House is on Fire: Housing and the 2015 General Election Un sujet brûlant ? Le logement et les élections de 2015

David Fée

1 Housing was a key electoral issue during the post-war years because of an enduring shortage. It remained so throughout the Thatcher years because of the Conservative governments’ emphasis on home-ownership as well as the proven connection between home-ownership and voting behaviour.1 It then experienced a decline in visibility in the 1990s and 2000s due to politicians’ conviction that the housing shortage was over and the emergence of a housing consensus2 between the two main parties that deprived home-ownership of its electoral importance.

2 However, the 2015 general election saw housing move up the political agenda and burst onto the political stage. Hardly a week went by without press articles, TV programmes or public opinion polls highlighting the housing situation in the UK. This rise culminated in a TV debate between party leaders in April 2015 when all contestants were asked about their housing policies. It appeared then that the housing crisis that had been building up since the early 1980s had finally been given official recognition and housing had regained its former salience. 3 But housing issues are not restricted to supply or home-ownership; they also encompass welfare policies. The 2015 general election brought to an end five years of coalition government that were marked by the introduction of major reforms to welfare and as a result to housing. These reforms contributed to pushing the British housing system further away from the classic social democratic welfare state model, as defined by G. Esping Andersen,3 towards greater commodification and financialisation. As a result, they led to renewed militancy in UK society in the months leading up to the general election in order to denounce the housing choices made between 2010 and 2015 and their consequences. 4 This article will review the reasons why housing became a more salient electoral issue during the run-up to the 2015 general election and examine whether voters’ greater

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awareness of the housing crisis and readiness to mobilize translated into votes, in a country where a large majority of the population own their homes. 5 In order to throw light on these questions, in the first section I shall look at the growing activism that has characterized UK society since 2010 in the field of housing. In the second section, I shall examine the causes of the militancy and the reasons why a growing number of citizens are turning to direct action. I shall then move on to the main parties’ reaction and finally explore the electoral dimension of housing.

The electoral campaign and the rise of a housing movement

6 The five years that followed the formation of the coalition government in May 2010 were marked by the rise of a housing movement that sought to bypass traditional in order to bring housing issues in the UK to politicians’ and the public’s attention. As the day of the general election drew nearer, it gathered . Although protest flared up occasionally in the 1990s and 2000s,4 the last five years were unusual in the growing number of protests, occupations and debates as well as the nature of the movements and organisations joining forces prior to the general election.5

7 The rise of the housing movement cannot be dissociated from the formation of a coalition government and the policy choices made as early as 2010. The call to arms came from the Chancellor’s emergency budget, announced six weeks after the election, in June 2010. On the basis of what was said to be a rise in welfare spending under Labour from £132 billion to £192 billion between 2000 and 2010 (including an increase from £14 billion to £21 billion in housing benefit) George Osborne announced his decision to cut the welfare budget by £11 billion by 2015. These figures were compounded by further cuts that were made public in October of that year in the Comprehensive Spending Review. Beside a reduction of social housing funding from £8.4 billion in 2008-2011 to £4.4 billion in 2011-2015,6 G. Osborne also revealed government plans to reform the social housing sector: housing associations were to be given the right to charge new tenants up to 80% of the market rents so as to build 150,000 new affordable homes over the next four years, housing benefit (HB) for a flat would no longer be paid to young people below the age of 35 (but only the Shared Accommodation Rate), and the housing allowance paid to private sector tenants would be capped at £417 a week for a four-bedroom house. It was no longer to be calculated on the basis of the median rent by a housing officer but on the bottom 30th percentile of local market rents.7 These measures as well as more controversial ones (see next section) were included in the Welfare Reform Act that received royal assent on 8 March 2012. 8 The first sign of things to come was the decision by the Occupy London movement that started in October 2011 to set up a housing think tank in order to make proposals to the government on housing supply, house prices and homelessness.8 A year later, in October 2012, the first protest against the demolition of a council estate in London took place at the Carpenters Estate in Newham. The coming into effect of the Welfare Reform Act in April 2013 led to the first demonstrations in March 2013 against some of the provisions made in the Act regarding the calculation of the Housing Benefit (Bedroom Tax, see next section) and to the setting up of the Radical Housing Network

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to bring together various housing campaign groups. The salience of housing was increased in the run-up to the general election by the decision of some British celebrities to wade into the debate. In October 2014, Comedian Russell Brand came out in favour of a group of mothers threatened with repossession and rehousing outside of London (Focus E15 mums) by Newham council, thus highlighting the extent of homelessness in London. One month later, Russell Brand went on to give his support to another cause that publicized the issue of uncontrolled rents in the capital. The high profile protest staged outside Downing Street to denounce the sale of a 1930 charitable trust estate (New Era in Hackney) to an American investment company attracted so much media attention that it forced the Mayor of London to step in and the Greater London Authority to broker an alternative solution in order to protect the tenants from uncontrolled rent increases.9 9 The final five months to polling day saw increasing mobilization in order to put the housing issue centre stage in the election campaign and to step up pressure on politicians. Tactics ranging from direct action through celebrity personalised campaigns to the use of social media were employed. On 31st January 2015, the March for Homes gathered some 6,000 housing activists, union representatives and campaigners who marched on City Hall to denounce the housing situation in London and demand rent controls, as well as an end to the demolition of council homes and the bedroom tax. The march was followed by the occupation of the boarded up Aylesbury Estate and the decision by another famous comedian, Eddie Izzard, in February to add his voice to those of the Sutton estate tenants threatened with eviction because of the imminent redevelopment. In the following months, similar protests and occupations took place in Brixton (Loughborough Estate), in Barnett (Sweets Way) and other parts of London. The extent of the civil mobilization led to the organization of the ‘Homes for Britain Rally’ in Westminster on 17 March. The event gathered 2,500 housing professionals and members of the public calling “for an end to the housing crisis within a generation”. It saw politicians of all hues (Nigel Farage, Caroline Lucas, Grant Shapps, , etc.) address the assembly and promise to build more homes, less than two months before polling day.10 10 The unprecedented growth of a housing campaign movement since the 1960s leaves us with several questions: first, why did housing feature so much in the run-up to the 2015 general election? Indeed, the previous poll had only seen a timid attempt by the Chartered Institute for Housing (backed by the House Proud campaign) to raise - unsuccessfully - the profile of housing. Second, how did politicians react to the changing context? Third, did the movement have an impact on the outcome of the election and the public?

A worsening housing crisis

11 One first element of answer lies in the low housebuilding level that characterised the years between the two general elections and its consequences on the lives of many Britons. In 2010, the Conservative Party had gone into battle promising to abolish the delivery targets imposed by the Labour government on councils through new regional planning structures after 1997. Quite logically, its 2010 manifesto did not contain any11 and nor did the Coalition’s government document.12 However, on the basis of the target raised by Gordon Brown in 2007 to 240,000 new homes a year13 and the conclusions of

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the 2003 Barker report into housing supply14, most specialists regard the Coalition’s achievements as wholly inadequate. The banking crisis and its spin-off effects caused housebuilding to fall from a peak of 219,000 new homes in 2006-2007 in the UK to an all-time low of 135,000 in 2012-2013. Since then, housebuilding has slightly recovered but remained far too low, at 141,000 in 2013-201415. The causes of this debacle are controversial and numerous: the planning system is said to be too slow by the Conservative party as well as by the House Builders Federation despite numerous reforms under the previous Labour government. The HBF argue that 150,000 plots are waiting for planning permission and that there is an overall lack of available land.16 Conversely, countryside protection organisations contend that developers indulge in land banking in order to maximize their profits and do not respond to market signals. The construction industry is often blamed for its poor efficiency, too, and its high degree of concentration.17 Finally, the decline of social house building cannot be stressed enough, down from close to 200,000 units in 1969-70 to some 30,000 in 2013-14. This is clearly due to a drastic reduction in public spending since the late 1980s, although local authority housebuilding has been growing since 200818. This needs to be contrasted with the 78,000 social homes thought to be needed in England alone every year.19 Out of the £19.5 billion spent on building 217,000 affordable homes between 2011 and 2015, only £1.8 billion came from the coalition government, the rest from housing associations and the previous Labour government (£15 billion and £ 2.3 billion respectively).20 Funding social housing was certainly not a priority of the coalition government.

12 The consequences of a very dysfunctional UK housing system were plain to see by May 2015. Since 2010, house prices have risen so fast that the percentage of home owners in England has carried on declining from 71 % in 2003 to 63 % in 2013. Young people aged 25-34 are particularly affected, with a decline in owner occupation from 59 % in 2003 to 36 % in 2013. As a result of this rise in house prices, the percentage of English households renting in the private sector increased from 11 % in 2003 to 19 % in 2013-14. 21 Rents have been rising steadily (by 32 % between 2008 and 2014 in the social sector and 15 % in the private rented sector) and this has led to a growing proportion of tenants being unable to meet the cost of renting without receiving housing benefit (hence the ballooning Housing Benefit total). The percentage of working households in receipt of HB has indeed increased from 19 % in 2003 to 2008 to 32% in 2013 in the social sector and from 7 % to 14 % in the private sector.22 Other signs of the worsening situation can be seen in the growing proportion of households classified as overcrowded in the private rented sector23 as well as households found to be homeless since 2008 (81,000 in 2013-14)24 or the 1.4 million people on council waiting lists in England alone.25

Controversial Policy Choices

13 As seen in the first section, the Coalition’s early policy and financial choices triggered the rise of the housing movement. Indeed, these choices were said to be unfair and leading to social polarisation. Their consequences were denounced not just by housing activists but by housing professionals too. They were relayed and given extensive coverage by the media and as such helped to give housing greater electoral visibility26.

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14 The attempts by London councils at finding cheaper solutions to house priority homeless households were indeed widely publicised. Their task has been made all the more difficult in a national context of acute social housing shortage as the welfare reforms that came into effect as of April 2013 (see first section) drastically reduced their scope for action. As a result of the decision by the coalition government to cap overall entitlement to welfare to £500 a week for a couple or single-parent households and £350 for single person households, councils have been forced to cut the housing benefit of those households who received welfare payment in excess of the cap. The consequences were said to be the eviction of private rented sector tenants unable to pay their rents, growing homelessness as well as tensions in the government’s housing policy.27 This has made it almost impossible for councils to house priority households in the private sector in expensive areas - for lack of social homes - at rents below the overall cap or below the rent cap set in 2012 by the Welfare Reform Act (see previous section). As a result, some councils in the South East (Westminster, Oxford, Newham etc.) have been striking deals with local housing associations as far as Birmingham or Stoke on Trent to relocate their homeless households at a cheaper rent. Some are even offering to pay those housing associations more than the local housing allowance if they agree to take their tenants on.28 Since 2011, it is estimated that 50,000 families have been moved out of London29 and private landlords have been shown to be increasingly reluctant to rent to Housing Benefit claimants.30 15 However, although benefit capping fundamentally alters welfare in England, it was not the object of media attention and did not draw the ire of housing activists and professionals as much as another cause that emerged at some point in 2014, namely the bedroom tax. 16 The spare room subsidy removal (its proper denomination in official documents) is a provision of the 2012 Welfare Reform Act. The Act introduced a major change to Housing Benefit in as much as the (capped) benefit is henceforth calculated on the basis of the size of the accommodation occupied by a household in the social housing sector: one room is allowed for a couple or each person of a household with the exception of children under 16 of the same gender or children under 10 of the opposite gender (expected to share a room) and disabled tenants or their partner who needs an over- night resident carer. Those working age tenants whose accommodation is thought to be too large will lose a part of their benefit, the total of which will be reduced by 14% for one spare bedroom and 25% for two or more spare bedrooms.31 The official explanation was that the change would bring the rules in line with those in the private rented sector, and more generally improve incentive to work.32 But the unofficial one was that it would help free social homes for families and match needs and supply without building more. Even before the reform came into effect on 1st April 2013, protests were organised across the country by political organisations such as Labour Left or civil ones like Defend Council Housing or the Anti-bedroom Tax and Benefit Justice Federation. The movement culminated in a National Meeting on 7th June 2014 in Manchester and the drafting of a Charter for Benefit Justice. 17 Housing institutions like Shelter estimated that a third of all working age benefit claimants living in the social sector would be affected and would have to move or lose money. Shelter therefore came out against the bedroom tax. It opposed the change on a number of grounds including the increased risk of falling into arears and eviction for low-income households, the need for households to cut down on essential spending to

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compensate for lost money or the impossibility to downsize due to a shortage of homes. Shelter waded into the debate, especially criticising the government for not taking into account the needs of disabled households and leaving to local authority discretion the possibility to allocate an extra room to disabled households in very limited circumstances. The straightjacket of the law, they said, also failed to take into account the specific needs of divorced households while creating a bureaucratic nightmare, a system far more intrusive than in the private rented sector.33 A Court of Appeal Case in 2012 on behalf of disabled children and the extent of the mobilisation before 1st April 2013 led to a few government concessions for foster parents and parents with children in the armed forces.

More Radical Proposals

18 A final reason why housing was given wider media coverage and moved centre stage has to do with some of the proposals included by the two main political parties in their manifestos in the run-up to the election. Two proposals in particular attracted much attention and caused a media storm as they were seen as an expression of the radicalisation of Labour and the Conservatives as well as a return to the days when housing was a fighting ground for the two parties.

19 Closer to the date of the general election, the Labour Party September 2014 conference triggered a new controversy. On that occasion, Ed Miliband got the principle of a new housing tax adopted by Conference and made it an election pledge. Originally a Lib- Dem idea, the Mansion Tax (as it was immediately dubbed) was to have been a new tax on the owners of the 108,000 homes valued at more than £2 million in the UK (88% of them in London and 35% of the total tax in Kensington and Chelsea).34 Although Labour did not specify the precise rate of taxation and simply referred to four bands, it argued that it would raise £1.2 billion that could be used to fund the NHS. The announcement immediately came under fire from the Conservative party and created dissensions in Labour itself and criticisms from Labour donors. The right-wing press, rarely a friend of Labour, came out fighting with headlines like “Middle Class Families hit by Labour’s Mansion Tax”35 and articles arguing that millions of ordinary home owners would suffer because of the increased volatility in the housing market it would create.36 Minor celebrities like Myleene Klass stepped in and grilled Ed Miliband on ITV in January 2014, arguing that the tax would hit cash poor but property rich Britons, giving the polemic a higher profile. Ed Balls, as a result, was forced to appear on further TV programmes (such as Sky News on 23 April 2015) to explain the tax to viewers and try to counter criticisms. The polemic was amplified and given a more respectable and serious dimension when Kate Barker, the economist commissioned by the previous government to advise on housing supply (see section 2), criticised the plan saying it would be “very disruptive for the market”.37 20 The announcement by the Tories on 14 April (less than a month before polling day) that they intended to give housing associations tenants the right to buy their home in their manifesto opened a last front between the two main political parties and brought housing into the spotlight of the campaign again. The Tory manifesto indeed pledged to extend the Right to Buy introduced by Margaret Thatcher in 1980 to housing association tenants (some 1.3 million tenants) on the basis that the RTB was unfairly restricted to local authority tenants and the Conservatives wanted to help “working

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people” and give them “the security to build a brighter future”.38 In order to pre-empt any criticism about the reduction of social stock the sales would cause, it added that local authorities would be required to sell off their most expensive properties on the market when they became vacant in order to pay for the building of replacement properties.39 This announcement came three years after the decision by the Coalition to revive the Right to Buy (RTB) by removing the restrictions imposed by the previous Labour government. Between 1997 and 2010, the discounts available to buyers in areas under housing stress were indeed lowered and the qualifications altered. Instead, the Coalition chose to raise discounts in London to £75,000 in April 1012, leading to a growing number of council homes being sold (from 3,800 units in 2008-09 to 15,600 in 2013-14), although this remained far below the 2003-04 Labour peak of 84,000, not to mention the 1982 Conservative peak of 167,000.40 In 2015, the Conservative pledge to offer discounts close to £78,000 in England and £104,000 in London to housing association tenants smacked of a desire to undercut its opponents and was revealed to be a U-turn on the subject in the run-up to the election.41 21 Although not entirely novel and limited in practice, contrary to Tory rhetoric,42 the extension of the Right to Buy to housing associations in England,43 at a time of acute social housing shortage and growing waiting lists, did not fail to spark off a public debate and brought the risk of a legal challenge against the government one step closer.44 The National Housing Federation (the umbrella organisation for housing associations) immediately came out against the proposals and unveiled a YouGov poll that appeared to support its position.45 It argued that housing associations would be forced to concentrate on replacing homes and not building additional ones, that it set a dangerous precedent of the government interfering in the independent sector, the total discounts (some £12 billion) could fund one million shared ownership homes and that it would not improve the housing situation of private sector tenants.46 Financial experts, for their part, warned about the risks of the policy to the credit worthiness and balance sheets of housing associations and ultimately risks of insolvency for some of them due to the reduced value of their assets and consequently borrowing problems.47 Even the Institute of Fiscal Studies, not exactly a left-wing body, waded in and pointed to the many questions raised by the Tory plan: uncertainties surrounding the revenues that housing associations could generate by selling their most expensive homes or the cost of RTB discounts for housing associations and that of having to replace sold properties. It pointed out that the £4.5 billion in earnings from the sales expected by the government were at odds with its own calculation48 and added that the policy was likely to lead to further housing segregation by concentrating new homes in low cost areas and selling the most valuable ones in expensive areas.

Addressing the crisis? The party manifestos

22 In the face of such media coverage and activism, how did political parties react? Despite the crisis, it appears that the manifestos of the main political parties mostly reflect the consensus that has prevailed in housing over the last 40 years49, with some variations. In many ways, they failed to address the affordability and supply crisis properly, hence the criticisms they drew from housing organisations.50 Indeed, in a country where home owners remain a majority of the population, where most tenants aspire to becoming home owners51 and home-ownership meshes so closely with the rest of the

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economy (through mortgaging, remortgaging, equity withdrawal), it is tempting for parties to focus on the issue at the expense of equally important other housing matters. This accounts for the fairly traditional pledges included in the main political parties’ manifestos.

23 Like all their main opponents, the Conservatives pledged to build more homes and promised to extend home-ownership (to another 1 million people in 5 years). Being in power, they celebrated what they described as “housebuilding at its highest”52, failing however to explain that housebuilding was simply recovering from its post-2008 collapse. In a context of spiralling house prices that makes it very difficult for young people to become owners, the Conservatives focused on first-time buyers. The housing crisis, if there is such a thing to the Tories, was clearly construed as a problem of access to the housing ladder. Describing themselves as “the party of home-ownership” (an echo of Anthony Eden’s slogan of “property-owning democracy”), they reminded voters of the introduction of the Help to Buy scheme, promised to extend it to 2020 and provide new government help (IPSA). Furthermore, the manifesto also marked a return to Thatcherite tenets in the shape of a revived and polemical Right to Buy (see previous section). Apart from a brief reference to “homes to rent”, affordable housing itself (a term decried by housing specialists for being too vague and often close to market levels) was only defined in connection with home-ownership: 200,000 affordable homes were to be sold to the under-40s, at 20% below the market price (as revealed in a speech by D. Cameron in Colchester on 2 March). As part of their efforts to cut public spending and prevent voters from drifting to UKIP, the manifesto pledged to withdraw Housing Benefit from certain categories of the population (18-21 year-olds on job seekers allowance, EU workers) or ban them from accessing social housing (EU workers). Finally, in keeping with their 2010 promise to create a ‘Big Society’ and the 2011 Act, it also expressed support for locally-led Garden Cities. 24 Although explicitly referring to a “housing crisis”, the Labour manifesto’s housing section remained strikingly short and vague. In it, the party pledged to help (young) people into home-ownership and to build Garden cities, too. However, unlike its opponents, it also looked beyond home owners,53 promising to get 200,000 homes built a year (to buy and rent) and took into account various aspects of the crisis: the private rented sector (infamous for its excesses) was to be controlled by introducing three-year secure tenancies, a register of private landlords and a limit to excessive rent rises. A more traditional, social agenda was also visible in the denunciation of the increase in homelessness and rough sleeping, a pledge to abolish the Bedroom Tax (see previous sections) and an indication that it would allow public housebuilding again. 25 There were echoes of Labour’s manifesto in the Liberal Democrats’ in so far as it also committed the party to a higher housebuilding target (300,000), ten Garden Cities, helping local authorities build again and protecting private renters.54 However, the manifesto was far more detailed and clearly distanced itself from the policies introduced during their years in the Coalition, policies that had fuelled housing activism as seen before: the shared accommodation rate was to be reviewed and the spare room subsidy reformed. It was also more interventionist, vowing to tackle ‘buy to leave empty’ investment, tax second homes and restore local authority control of RTB. Oddly enough, many proposals designed to boost supply were redolent of the New Labour years (reforming the planning system, assessing better local housing needs through price signals, prioritising brown field development and planning housing

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needs over 15 years) when these were not found in Labour’s manifesto. In a word, the Liberal Democrats put more onus on housing than the other two main parties although, paradoxically, their manifesto stated that the housing crisis was only in the making. 26 As for UKIP, it adopted an ambivalent attitude, positioning itself both against the Coalition’s welfare measures (promising to scrap the bedroom tax and continue to pay Housing Benefit to young people) but also against a Mansion Tax.55 Its manifesto was not remarkable for its proposals to address the shortage (more brown field sites and fewer empty homes), as they had been mooted by other parties before or its stress on localism but for its clear link between migration and housing problems. Indeed, it committed itself to restricting access to social housing and RTB to British citizens. 27 In 2015, it fell to the Green Party to take up the radical and politically controversial proposals put forward by housing specialists to address the housing crisis. In its manifesto, the party denounced the current situation - without using the term ‘crisis’ though - and put it down to three reasons: the financialisation of housing, the end of investment in public building and uncontrolled private rented sector.56 In keeping with the proactive stance of its one and only MP regarding housing57, the party listed in three policy-packed pages a number of far more interventionist measures (giving power to the Bank of England to limit the size of mortgages, making developments more evenly distributed across the country, taking action on empty homes, ending the RTB, providing 500,000 socially rented homes etc.) Tellingly, these also encompassed the demand side of the problem (making buy-to-let less attractive, scrapping Help to Buy schemes) and the structural one (diversifying the construction industry), hence showing the influence of academic work on the party’s proposals.58

The electoral dimension of housing

28 Having charted the rise of housing activism, its causes and the place occupied by housing in the campaign, we need to turn to the reaction of British voters. How did the electors react to the growing salience of housing in the debate prior to polling day? If statistics on voting behaviour on the basis of tenure are not available at the time of writing (September 2015), we can at least resort to pre-election polls to fathom the views of the British electorate on the housing crisis.

29 Housing offers an electoral paradox, if we are to go by Ipsos Mori polls: on the one hand, the salience of housing grew between 2013 and 2014, with 13% of interviewees thinking housing was the most important issue facing Britain in the summer of 2014 (up 3% over a year and two positions).59 Those interviewees were young (25-34), Labour voters, C2 workers, belonged to BME groups and lived in the South East. This was corroborated by another poll in January 2015, conducted on behalf of the Chartered Institute of Housing, that showed that housing was more salient in 2015 than in the two previous general elections and a very high proportion of British people considered there was housing crisis (75%, with 44% strongly agreeing) and that parties should talk more about housing (82%).60 In a country where Nimbyism runs deep, the proportion of people (including in small villages) in favour of more housebuilding had gone up surprisingly, as a much trumpeted government press release showed: the British Social Attitude Survey revealed that the proportion of those in favour of more housebuilding had gone from 28 % to 47 % between 2010 and 2013 while that of those opposed declined from 46 % to 31 %.61

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30 On the other hand, housing remained low in voters' priorities with only 5 % saying it would determine their vote.62 Nationally, the issue was further down the list of concerns than the NHS, immigration, the economy and unemployment. Only in London was it among the three most salient issues and 28% of the residents thought it was the top issue. Furthermore, although a majority of British people were prepared to agree that there was a national housing crisis, only 37% thought the crisis was local. One explanation could be that in a society dominated by owner occupiers, the housing crisis remains above all a private and social renters' issue and one's tenure makes a fundamental difference to one's perception of the situation as well as one’s home satisfaction.63 Most voters know about the crisis, fewer (fortunately) experience it first- hand. 31 However, the voices of private (and social) renters are not completely drowned out by those of owner-occupiers. Prior to the election, housing was expected to bear on electoral results in at least 16 of the most marginal constituencies where private or social renters represent 40 % of the population as well as the four seats where they outnumber home owners. Mobilising this category was thought by some to have the potential to swing the electoral result of marginal seats.64 Furthermore, the changing British party system, combined with tenure, appeared to have the potential to hurt the two main parties. Support for UKIP was indeed up among home owners (+11%), who traditionally are more likely to vote Conservative - except during the Blair years - as well as among social renters (+12%) who are more likely to vote Labour. In January 2015, on the basis of tenure, the outlook for the Conservatives was not good: their support among home owners (the section of the electorate most likely to turn out) was down 8 %, while support for Labour was up 5 %. Their respective standing was mirrored among mortgage holders (-2 % and +4%) and voting intentions for Labour were up among all tenured voters especially among private renters, a fast expanding category of the population. But unfortunately for Labour, they are less likely to turn out to vote. 65 Finally, most voters in the capital were opposed to Conservative housing policy: polls found that 51 % of London voters considered the Conservatives ' manifesto pledge to extent the right to buy to housing association tenants to be the wrong priority (30 % a good idea) while 60 % thought that Labour's proposed Mansion Tax on properties was a good thing (28 % didn't).66 With many polls predicting another hung parliament and placing Labour and the Conservatives neck and neck, housing, in the weeks leading to the election, appeared to be well placed to make a difference to the final result. We shall have to wait for the detailed analysis of the vote to see how it played out at the local level, now that the result of the general election is known.

Conclusion

32 That the Conservatives managed to win the general election with a small majority is not just an indication of the success and effectiveness of negative campaigning on their part, but also of the limited impact housing has on general election results these days. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s or even the 1980s (with the Right to Buy), housing issues are no longer able to sway voters’ choices and bear on the final result. Political parties are aware of the decline of its electoral strength and, apart from the Greens, have tailored their manifesto to its waning influence.

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33 However, the run-up to the 2015 general election held out the promise of a change as it was marked by renewed activism and the positioning of housing organisations against government policies. The debate and the mobilisation around housing policies - past and future - was given a wider echo in the press, and this echo, combined with the higher visibility of the housing movement, helped make the issue more salient than at any other general election since the 1980s. The higher salience, in turn, prompted political parties - with the exception of the Conservatives - to include more detailed and ambitious proposals - although they fall short of what is needed - in their manifesto to tackle the housing crisis. The media coverage and the activists’ tactics had convinced them of the need to broaden their housing pledges beyond home- ownership and think more radically. 34 Nevertheless, the 2015 election demonstrated once again that housing’s appeal as an electoral issue remains limited to a (growing) minority of the British population, those mostly housed in the private and rented sectors as well as homeless households: i.e. the persons least likely to turn out to vote. It has also become a local issue, with Londoners and people living in the South-East most likely to feel the pinch and be affected by the housing shortage and its consequences. In a country where home-ownership and private consumption are dominant, voting behaviour is strongly influenced by the state of the economy and the perceived economic competence attached to political parties. 35 The election of the Conservative party in May 2015 was soon followed by the announcement of further cuts to housing finance in the July Budget as well as other financial measures.67 These demonstrate the priority given by the Conservatives to reducing public spending on housing and confirm their determination to place the social housing sector on a self-financing and commercial basis. These measures will further reduce state intervention in the housing sector and move housing further away from the welfare state. They may bring down the cost of housing to the tax payer but whether they, along with the much criticised government’s flagship Starter Home programme,68 will help to solve the housing crisis by 2020 is another matter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPS, P. ‘Right to Buy Extension would hit borrowing and could push landlords into insolvency”, Inside Housing, 14 April 2015.

BARKER, K. Review of Housing Supply: Securing our Future Housing Needs. London, HM Treasury, 2003.

BBC News, “Social Cleansing housing benefit cap row: Duncan Smith hits back”, 24 April 2012.

BOOTH, R. “Homes for Britain rally puts housing firmly on housing radar”, The Guardian, 17 March, 2015.

CHANDLER, D. & DISNEY, R. Extending RTB: Risks and Uncertainties, IFS Briefing Note, BN171. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015.

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COLLINSON, P. “What is the mansion tax and can the rich wriggle out of it?”, The Guardian, 26 September 2014.

DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Homes for the Future, more Affordable, more Sustainable, Cm 7191. London: DCLG, 2007.

DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Spending Review, Housing Settlement, Letter by Grant Shapps. 20/10/2010.

DE CASTELLA, T. “Why can't the UK build 240,000 houses a year”, BBC News, 13 January 2015.

DOUGLAS, D. “Over 50,000 families shipped out of London Boroughs”, The Independent, 29 April 2015

DOUGLAS, D. “Government considered Right to Buy as unreasonable”, Inside Housing, 20 April 2015.

DOUGLAS, D. ’Landlords threaten Legal Action over Right to Buy extension’, Inside Housing, 25 March 2015.

DUXBURY, N. & McCABE, J. “The Rise of the Housing Activist”, Inside Housing, 1 May 2015.

ESPING-ANDERSEN, G. Three Worlds of . Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.

FEE, D. La crise du logement en Angleterre, quatre décennies de politiques de logement de la ville, 1977-2013. Paris: Michel Houdiard, 2013.

FORREST, R. & MURIE, A. Selling the Welfare State: the Privatization of Public Housing. London: Routledge, 1988.

HARINGEY COUNCIL & CIH. Experiences and Effects of the Benefit Cap in Haringey. CIH, London, 2013.

KLIER, S. “Housing Policies in the General Election: what do Experts think?”, The Guardian, 23/04/2015.

LUSHER, A. « New Era Estate Victory », The Independent, 19 December /2014.

MALPASS, P. More Coherent than Sustainable :A Critique of Contemporary British Housing Policy. Unpublished, 2007.

MARSHALL, B. « The Home Front : why Housing will be a key general battleground », New Statesman, 10 February 2015.

MEMOM, A. “Red Ed’s Mansion Tax Meltdown”, The Mail, 18 April 2015.

NATIONAL HOUSING FEDERATION, Response to the announcement of an extension to the RTB to housing associations, 26 May 2015, see www.housing.org.uk/media/press-releases/response-to- the-announcement-of-an-extension-to-the-RTB-to-housing-ass, accessed 25 July 2015.

SALVIRK, B. & CREWE, I. A Decade of Dealignment. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983.

SHELTER, What’s wrong with the Bedroom Tax, Shelter Briefing, 2013, http:// england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/650630/Bedroom_tax_- _Shelter_briefing_March_2013.pdf

THE COALITION. Our Programme for Government. London: HM Government, 2010.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY. Invitation to Join the Government of Britain. London: The Conservative Party, 2010.

The CONSERVATIVE PARTY. The Conservative Party Manifesto, Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter more Secure Future. London: The Conservative Party, 2015

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THE LABOUR PARTY. Britain can get Better, The Labour party Manifesto. London: The Labour Party, 2015.

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. The 2015 Manifesto: Stronger Economy, Fairer Society and Opportunity for All. London: The Liberal Democrats, 2015.

THE GREEN PARTY. For the Common Good, The Green Manifesto. London: The Green Party, 2015, p. 41.

WELLMAN, A. “Occupy Protestors in bid to shape housing policy”, Inside Housing, 26 January 2012.

WINTOUR, P. “Mansion Tax could be very disruptive for housing market”, The Guardian, 25 September 2014.

NOTES

1. B. SALVIRK & I. CREWE, A Decade of Dealignment, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983. See also R. FORREST & A. MURIE, Selling the Welfare State: the Privatization of Public Housing, London: Routledge, 1988. 2. P. MALPASS, More Coherent than Sustainable: a Critique of Contemporary British Housing Policy, unpublished, 2007. 3. G. ESPING-ANDERSEN, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. 4. The decision to speed up the transfer of council housing under Tony Blair to the voluntary sector led to the foundation of the Defend Council Housing organisation in 2004 for instance. 5. For this first section, I shall draw on the timeline and information published in Inside Housing on 1May 2015, see Nick DUXBURY & Jess McCABE, “The Rise of the Housing Activist”, Inside Housing, 1 May 2015. 6. DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Spending Review, Housing Settlement, Letter by Grant Shapps, 20/10/2010. 7. DCLG, The Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit) Regulations, 2012, www.legislation.uk/uksi/2012/2994/ introduction/made, accessed 24 July 2015. 8. Alex WELLMAN, “Occupy Protestors in bid to shape housing policy”, Inside Housing, 26 January 2012. 9. A. LUSHER, « New Era Estate Victory », The Independent, 19 December 2014. 10. See Grant Shapps’ statement: “We must end the housing crisis in the next generation but our plan is working when you look at the facts. We are going to build a new generation of garden cities”, in Robert BOOTH, “Homes for Britain rally puts housing firmly on housing radar”, The Guardian, 17 March, 2015. 11. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, London: The Conservative Party, 2010, p. 76. 12. The COALITION, Our Programme for Government, London: HM Government, 2010. 13. DCLG, Homes for the Future, more Affordable, more Sustainable, Cm 7191, London: DCLG, 2007. 14. Kate BARKER, Review of Housing Supply: Securing our Future Housing Needs, London, HM Treasury, 2003. 15. DCLG, Table 209, Permanent dwellings completed by tenure and country, hhtps:///www.gov.uk/ government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-house-building, accessed 13 July 2015. 16. Tom DE CASTELLA, “Why can't the UK build 240,000 houses a year”, BBC News, 13 January 2015. 17. For an overview of these problems, see David FEE, La crise du logement en Angleterre, quatre décennies de politiques de logement de la ville, 1977-2013, Paris: Michel Houdiard, 2013. 18. DCLG, Table 2009, op.cit.

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19. Alan HOLMANS, New Estimates of Housing Demand and Need in England, 2011 to 2031, Tomorrow Paper Series no 16, Town and Country Planning Association, 2013 p. 5. 20. Nick DUXBURY and Jesse McCABE, op.cit. 21. DCLG, English Housing Survey, Headline Report, 2013-2014, London: DCLG, 2015, pp. 8-12. 22. Ibid., pp. 19-24. 23. Ibid., p. 32. 24. SHELTER, http://england.shelter.org.uk/campaigns/why_we_campaign/ housing_facts_and_figures, accessed 21 July 2015. 25. DCLG, Table 600, Rents, lettings and Tenancies, number of households on local authorities’ housing waiting lists, http://data.gov.uk/dataset/ households_on_local_authorities_housing_waiting_lists_excluding-households-waiting-for- transfers, accessed 21 July 2015. 26. Housing was the 11th most often quoted topic on TV and the 12th in newspapers from March to May, see blog.lboro.ac.uk/general-election/media-coverage-of-the-2015-campaign-report-5/ 27. Haringey Council and CIH, Experiences and Effects of the Benefit Cap in Haringey, CIH, London, 2013, p. 6. 28. BBC News, “Social Cleansing housing benefit cap row: Duncan Smith hits back”, 24 April 2012. 29. Daniel DOUGLAS, “Over 50,000 families shipped out of London Boroughs”, The Independent, 29 April 2015. 30. , Housing Committee, op. cit., p. 19. 31. DCLG, Housing Benefit Amendment Regulations, 2012, London: DCLG, www.legilsation.gov.uk/ uksi2012/3040/contents/made accessed 24 July 2015. 32. Ibid. 33. SHELTER, What’s wrong with the Bedroom Tax, Shelter Briefing, 2013, http:// england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/650630/Bedroom_tax_- _Shelter_briefing_March_2013.pdf, accessed 24 July 2015. 34. Patrick COLLINSON, “What is the mansion tax and can the rich wriggle out of it?”, The Guardian, 26 September 2014. 35. See this article by Steve SWINFORD, The Telegraph, 20 October 2014. 36. Adam MEMOM, “Red Ed’s Mansion Tax Meltdown”, The Mail, 18 April 2015. 37. Patrick WINTOUR, “Mansion Tax could be very disruptive for housing market”, The Guardian, 25 September 2014. 38. See ’s, the Communities Secretary, statement on https://www.go.uk/government/ news/over-a-million-more-people-given-the-chance-to-own-their-own-home, accessed 25 July 2015. 39. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, The Conservative Party Manifesto, Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter more Secure Future, London: The Conservative Party, 2015 40. DCLG, Table 678, Social Housing Sales, Annual Sales by Scheme, 1980-81 to 2013-14, https// www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-social-housing-sales, accessed 13 July 2015. 41. Daniel DOUGLAS, “Government considered Right to Buy as unreasonable”, Inside Housing, 20 April 2015. 42. 800,000 housing associations tenants already enjoyed the Right to Acquire, namely those living in homes built or bought by a non- association with the help of a social housing grant after 1997, and with a tenancy going back between 2 to 5 years depending on the start of it see England.shelter.org.uk/get_advice/social_housing/ buying_your_home/right_to_acquire, accessed 25 July 2015. Besides, only 221,000 tenants are thought to be eligible and able to afford it. 43. The decided to end the RTB in Scotland on 1st August 2016 and the has decided to halve discounts as a first step towards full abolition.

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44. Daniel DOUGLAS, ’Landlords threaten Legal Action over Right to Buy extension’, Inside Housing, 25 March 2015. 45. 60% of the 8,000 people questioned said the policy was unfair, see Pete APPS, ‘Tories Pledge to extend the Right to Buy to Housing Associations’, Inside Housing, 14 April 2015. 16% only said it was the best way of tackling the housing crisis and 27% only said it was a good use of tax payers money. 46. NATIONAL HOUSING FEDERATION, Response to the announcement of an extension to the RTB to housing associations, 26 May 2015, see www.housing.org.uk/media/press-releases/response- to-the-announcement-of-an-extension-to-the-RTB-to-housing-ass, accessed 25 July 2015. 47. Pete APPS, ‘Right to Buy Extension would hit borrowing and could push landlords into insolvency”, Inside Housing, 14 April 2015. 48. Daniel CHANDLER, Richard DISNEY, Extending RTB: Risks and Uncertainties, IFS Briefing Note, BN171, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015. 49. P. MALPASS, op. cit. 50. S. KLIER, “Housing Policies in the General Election: what do Experts think?”, The Guardian, 23/04/2015. 51. D. FEE, op. cit. 52. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, op. cit. 53. THE LABOUR PARTY, Britain can get Better, The Labour party Manifesto, London: The Labour Party, 2015. 54. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS, The 2015 Manifesto: Stronger Economy, Fairer Society and Opportunity for All, London: The Liberal Democrats, 2015. 55. UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto 2015, London: UKIP. 56. THE GREEN PARTY, For the Common Good, The Green Manifesto, London: The Green Party, 2015, p. 41. 57. In July 2014, Caroline Lucas introduced a Private Member’s Housing Bill to address problems in the private rented sector. She also published a housing charter for Brighton. 58. See Pre-election statement by the Highbury Group on Housing Delivery, Policies on housing supply for the next Government, www.westminster.ac.uk. The author wishes to thank Duncan Bowie here for his help. 59. See 2014 Economist/Ipsos MORI Issues Index 2014 aggregate data, www.ipsos-mori.com/ researchpublications/researcharchive/3507, accessed 6 August 2015. 60. See article by Ben MARSHALL, www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchives/ 3519/Mps-and-public-sense-housing-crisis-but-less-so-locally.aspx, accessed 7 July 2015. 61. DCLG, Public Attitudes to New Housebuilding, see https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/british-social-attitudes-survey-2013-attitudes-to-new-house-building 62. Ben MARSHALL, “The Home Front : why Housing will be a key general battleground” , New Statesman, 10 February 2015. 63. See for clues, IPSOS MORI, www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3402, accessed 6 August 2015. 64. Ben MARSHALL, op. cit. 65. Ibid. 66. Dave HILL, “Most Londoners oppose RTB and back Mansion Tax-new poll”, The Guardian, 16 April 2015. 67. Among these are 1% cuts to social housing rents, a lower benefit cap, abolition of Housing Benefit for the under 21s, higher rents for high-earning social tenants. 68. Shelter demonstrated that average earning families will be priced out of these homes in 58% of local authorities by 2020, see http://blog.shelter.org.uk/2015/08/non-starter-homes/, accessed 9 September 2015.

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ABSTRACTS

Unlike previous elections, the 2015 general election saw housing move to the foreground of political debate. The visibility of the issue was increased by the rise of a housing activist movement that was given extensive coverage in the media but also by the worsening housing crisis which in turn made some of the policy decisions and manifesto announcements more controversial. The article examines these issues and tries to assess whether the higher visibility of housing influenced voting intentions and the election results.

Contrairement aux élections précédentes, les élections parlementaires britanniques de 2015 ont été marquées par le retour sur le devant de la scène de la question du logement. L'essor d'un mouvement militant, relayé par une large couverture médiatique, a en effet contribué à faire du sujet un thème électoral. Son importance a été renforcée par l'aggravation de la crise du logement qui elle-même a donné aux choix politiques opérés entre 2010 et 2015 et aux engagements électoraux un caractère éminemment polémique. L'article revient donc sur ces causes et tente d'évaluer si la visibilité accrue du thème du logement a influencé les intentions de vote et les résultats électoraux.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Logement, militants, construction, statuts d'occupation, propriété. Keywords: housing, activists, housebuilding, tenures, Right to Buy.

AUTHOR

DAVID FÉE

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3

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The NHS at the Heart of the Election Campaign. Le système de santé britannique au coeur de la campagne

Louise Dalingwater

Introduction

1 One of the key subjects of debate in the run up to the 2015 general election in the UK was public services. Labour’s election poster claimed “The Tories want to cut spending on public services back to the level of the 1930s, when there was no NHS.” The National Health Service (NHS) is a huge organisation, with over one million staff. The configuration for current health services was set forth in 1948 under the National Health Service Act which ensured a comprehensive system of health for all citizens, entirely free at the point of use. This Act allowed for local authorities to provide welfare and health services. However, since this legislation was implemented, the social, demographic and technological framework of Britain has changed. In particular, life expectancy has increased dramatically. Increased longevity, the retirement of the baby generations of the 1940s and the expected weight of the retirement of the 1960s baby boomers has meant that more people are living longer, which in turn means greater health demands. In addition, there has been significant medical and technological progress, which has resulted in rising drug and medical device costs.

2 The NHS has been described as a monster too big to reform. This has not prevented successive governments from attempting a vast number of reforms: devolution, centralisation, purchaser-provider split, commissioners, and GP fund holders, all of which have had their downsides and received extensive criticism. The essential problem is that the organisation is very costly to deliver, but public opinion is strongly against the privatisation of health services. 3 Despite pledging not to make any top-down reorganisation of the NHS during the 2010 election campaign, the Lib-Con coalition has brought about sweeping changes to the National Health Service since then. Much focus has been on making the NHS function

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more efficiently. This paper will thus examine the issues that were debated during the 2015 election campaign relating to the NHS. It will also consider how the results of the elections might influence the future running of health services in the UK. The main focus will be on NHS England because health has been devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland separately since the late 1990s and each of these countries takes a different approach to health services.

The crisis of the NHS: key points of analysis

4 The 2015 election saw the emergence of the health service and its future as one of the key points on the election battleground. The NHS hardly featured in the manifestos of the 2010 general election. Indeed, Labour, which usually promotes its good record on prioritising the NHS, failed to take any particular standpoint in 2010. The Conservatives had made this more difficult by stating it would outspend Labour and that this was one of the areas that would be excluded from cuts. However, this time the NHS did indeed take centre stage in a number of the debates. This is because the NHS was flagged as one of the key issues of public concern. Ipsos MORI’s political monitor of March 2015 found that “health care and the NHS” was the most important issue for voters in the run up to the election. Indeed, 38% stated it was a very important issue, up from 26% before the last general election.1 This is not just because of a commitment to the NHS but also because of the recognition of the pressures and strains on the public health service, which have been widely publicised in both the popular and the quality press. The main issues of debate in the run up to the election were funding, stealth privatisation of health services, quality of health services and governance issues.

The NHS Funding Crisis

5 According to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, the NHS is facing its worst financial crisis in 50 years. The crisis of funding started to become an issue in the 1990s. Between 1948 and 1999, NHS expenditure in England increased by 3% on average in real terms. However, it was clear by the end of the 1990s that the NHS was facing a financial and organisational crisis. Many people were reported to be dying on waiting lists. The Wanless reports of 2001 and 20022 showed that successive governments had underinvested in the NHS by between £220 billion and £267 billion in the quarter century up to 1998, which had led to lower achievements compared to continental Europe in terms of health performance. The reports called for an increase in spending to meet the needs of the population in terms of health. Thus, New Labour increased real spending between 6 and 7 per cent a year during much of the 2000s. From 2001-2002 to 2004-2005, spending on the NHS reached its highest level, increasing by 8.7% in real terms. The coalition government also increased spending during their time in government. However, in real terms this was in fact the lowest rate of growth in health spending recorded since 1955, that is 0.6%.3

6 The Health Foundation reported that NHS spending per person was calculated as virtually flat, only increasing by 0.13% a year on average for the period 2009-2010 to 2015-2016.4 A number of recent reports have underlined the urgency to act to stop the NHS sinking. The interim and main report of the Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care5 concluded that a new settlement was necessary to face the huge

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pressures on the NHS and social care because of growing demands and constrained resources. It builds on the changes recommended in the Dilnot report,6 written by the Commission on Funding of Care and headed by Andrew Dilnot. This independent body was tasked by the government to review the funding system for care and support in England. This commission underlined the need for an additional £3 billion, rising to £5 billion by 2025, to ensure that social care is provided free of cost. In the same vein as the Dilnot report, the interim report argued that England needs a single, ring-fenced budget for health and social care. The King’s Trust also stated that additional funding of around £2 billion more than the current settlement is needed for next year. If this money is not found then staff cuts will have to be made and the level of care will most certainly decline. To fund the new NHS, the report suggests that charges should be applied to health care, cuts to other areas of public spending should be implemented and levels of taxation need to rise. These are reiterated in the final report. It points to the defects of the current fragmented system of funding and entitlement. Without any action taken, the burden will fall on the individual to provide his or her own care. They deem the current projections from the Office for Budget Responsibility to be too low. In addition to the Dilnot and the King’s Fund reports, a survey carried out by the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS), interviewing councils on NHS funding needs, concluded that the present system of social care is becoming “ unsustainable”’.7 The Local Government Association (LGA) also estimated that councils would already be faced with a £5.8 billion shortfall by the end of the next financial year, including a £1.9 billion gap for adult social care8. Provider trusts have a deficit estimated at £630 million and many hospitals have reported deficits, showing a financial crisis across the system. However, perhaps one of the most influential reports in terms of funding needs in the run up to the 2015 elections was the NHS Five Year Forward View.9 In a follow up to the recommendations of this report, the NHS Chief Executive, called for at least £8 billion in additional funds by 2020 and a further £30 billion in efficiency gains. The National Audit Office also recognized that current financial trends were unsustainable.10 Comparative studies of major economies of the EU show that there is a problem of underinvestment in the UK. In 2010, the UK spent 9.6% of its national income on public and private health compared to 11.6% in France, 11.9% in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands and 11.2% in Austria and Canada.11 7 The future funding of the NHS therefore seems to be the main concern, which is essential to maintaining a high level of care and meet the demands of an ageing population. The British people seem to be on the whole against privatisation. Even proposals to charge for GP visits, as in other European countries, do not seem to be popular. Indeed, in England, there are only charges on prescriptions and dentistry, which raise about £1.1 billion. This is quite surprising because even Scandinavian countries, which are typically seen as highly collectivist, charge for GP visits. However, charges would also have to be applied to Accident and Emergency (A&E) services to avoid diversion problems and this could cause a lot of administrative pressure and cost. The King’s Fund concluded that it was not feasible to make changes to current NHS charges except for the treatment of accommodation or hotel costs outside hospital, and that new recipients of NHS healthcare could meet accommodation costs on a means- tested basis. Other solutions proposed are hypothecation, but earmarking taxes means that tax income can rise and fall and is therefore dependent on the economic cycle. Both Conservative and Labour chancellors have used tobacco tax to pay for NHS

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spending in the past. In 2002, Gordon Brown decided to add an additional 1 percentage point on National Insurance to pay for a large increase in NHS funding. However, there was no subsequent information on how it contributed to NHS funding. The King’s Fund recommends the creation of a single, ring-fenced budget for health and social care and a unique commissioner. They also argue that pensioners should pay a greater share of the burden. More affluent pensioners should not benefit from the winter fuel payments and free TV licenses. It also suggests revisions to wealth taxation and reforms to inheritance tax. 8 Many of the manifestos drew on such publicised reports to put forward proposals on how they would make up for the shortfall in funds, it being impossible to deny the need for this. Indeed, all parties agreed to the fact that the NHS should remain a tax-payer funded system, which is free at the point of use, based on a number of polls (such as the one shown in the figure below of March 2015) which showed that the British public was clearly in favour of keeping the NHS public.

9 The Liberal Democrats were one of the first parties to pledge the extra £8 billion a year in NHS funding that was called for by Simon Stevens. However, they also claimed that this extra funding would not be made available until 2017-2018 when the deficit had been reduced and “the books balanced”. While offering £3 billion a year more on the NHS, much of the focus of the UKIP party was on restricting NHS for migrants and visitors to the UK by requiring that they have medical insurance in order to access NHS services. Access to NHS services would only be made available if the “health visitor” had paid tax for 5 years in the UK. The Green Party pledged the highest amount in its manifesto: £20 billion a year in extra funding by 2020. The Conservative party finally pledged to provide at least £8 billion by 2020 to support the NHS action plan over the next 5 years. Labour said it was committed to setting up a £2.5 billion-a-year “time to care” fund to pay for 20,000 more nurses, 8,000 more GPs and 3,000 more midwives. The Labour party tried to imply that services were under threat if the Conservatives were elected into office: Our NHS, care services, schools, colleges and other public services make up the essential fabric of our society. People need them to be able to live secure and

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fulfilling lives. Britain needs them if we are to succeed as a country. But under the Conservatives they are under threat. The next Labour government will protect, improve and invest in our public services.12 10 Labour accused the Conservatives of having cut billions of pounds from adult social care budgets since 2010 which means that older people are not receiving vital care services.

11 Although all parties pledged to provide the extra funds needed to enable the NHS to run as a service free at the point of use, by claiming that the money would not be made available until the books had been balanced, the NHS remains dependent on other economic variables, and immediate pressures facing the NHS will not be resolved. Moreover, in the run up to the election, Labour accused the Conservatives of not being honest about the NHS. They claim that if they implement £30 billion worth of cuts in the first three years of the next Parliament, this would mean cuts to social care and other services which the NHS relies on. 12 Efficiency gains in order to fund the extra NHS needs were also a key point of debate. The Conservatives claimed to have cut administrative costs. Cameron announced that there are now 20,500 fewer managers, senior managers and administrative staff, and nearly 14,500 more professionally qualified clinicians than there were in 2010. But, Dr. Tomlinson13 pointed out that cutting down on administrative staff does not necessarily result in a reduction in costs because medical professionals are doing a lot of the work such as choose and book14 coding, and so on, that could be classed as market costs. In April 2015, Andy Burnham, the Labour shadow health secretary, accused the Conservatives of allowing huge pay increases of £35m for NHS managers. He claimed that, if Labour was elected, it would make sure executive pay was not excessive: “It cannot be right at a time when NHS staff have been asked to accept years of freezes to see this level of excess at the top.”15 According to the Department of Health, the average NHS trust chief executive in England earned £163,679 (average chief executive pay for all trusts) in 2014, which is higher than that of the British Prime Minister.16

Providing Quality Health Services

13 Another issue related to the lack of funding is the standard of health services. The performance of the NHS has been criticised because A&E waiting times are the highest they have been for a decade and target waits for hospital treatment, diagnostic tests and cancer treatment are breached on a regular basis. Sir Merrick Cockell, former chairman of the LGA, criticised the fact that many old people were left in hospital beds because no residential care was available.17 However, it is difficult to measure whether overall quality of care in the NHS improved or not during the last Parliament. It is also too soon to assess the effects of reforms introduced in April 2013. However, most people are waiting longer to receive treatment than they were in 2010. Indeed, under the Coalition, hospitals have breached the waiting time target of under 4 hours in A&E on a number of occasions. Nevertheless, 92% of patients were seen within this limit. Moreover, an international survey, carried out by the Commonwealth Fund, rated the UK first out of eleven countries in 2014. However, in some key areas the UK tends to fare less well than other countries. For example, infant mortality and deaths that could be prevented by effective health care are not highly ranked in the UK compared to other countries. It was estimated in 2010 that nearly a quarter of deaths under the age of 75 could have been prevented if appropriate health care had been provided,

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compared to 18% in France (which has the lowest amenable mortality rates in 19 key countries analysed).18

14 Focus has been on improving person-centred care since 2000 without consistent and effective indicators to measure whether this has been achieved. It has also been difficult to ensure appropriate funding has been directed for quality care. For example, mental illness accounts for 23% of total illnesses in the UK, but receives only 13% of NHS funding. 15 All parties seemed to take into account the need to bridge the gap between physical and mental care. The Liberal Democrats pledged to put an eighth of the extra £8 billion into providing care in people’s homes and in communities to relieve pressure on hospital services. They maintained that they would guarantee equal care for mental health. Their manifesto also stated that the party would ensure improvements to waiting times for crisis care in A&E, diagnostic tests and treatments. The Conservatives pledged to continue to ensure a high quality of health and social care. They promised same day GP appointments for the over 75s and greater investment to fight against cancer and dementia. They accused Labour of covering up standards of care giving the example of Stafford and Morecambe Bay and poor cancer survival rates. They blamed the Labour government for nursing staff shortages that led to the Mid Staffordshire crisis. The Conservatives stated that they had increased access to drugs for cancer, increased dementia research and halved hospital infections. They drew on the Commonwealth Fund report to claim that, under the Conservatives, the NHS has become the best healthcare system of any major country. In the televised debate, Cameron claimed that waiting times had been reduced: “fewer patients waiting longer than the 18, 26 and 52 week targets than in May 2010”. “We have slashed the number of people who wait over a year for the treatment they need, from over 18,000 to under 500”.19 He claimed that the Conservatives would provide a truly 7 day NHS and that they were committed to implementing the NHS’s Five Year Forward plan. The same commitment to mental health was also underlined. They promised to provide better health and social care for the terminally ill. 16 Labour accused the Conservatives of underinvesting and thus compromising the quality of care. It claimed that people have been waiting longer for tests and treatment. A 27- page document, published by Douglas Alexander, Labour’s election chief, reported that seven out of fifteen patients’ rights set forth under the NHS constitution, had been breached under the coalition government.20 Labour pledged to invest in more staff which would be paid for out of a mansion tax on properties worth over £2 million, through a levy on tobacco firms and by cracking down on tax avoidance. It also stated its commitment to guaranteeing a GP appointment within 48 hours and an improvement in waiting times for cancer tests. Labour’s manifesto promoted “joining- up” services around patients’ needs. 17 All parties pledged to integrate care. However, they did not offer any solution to resolve the immediate pressures facing social care services. As the King’s Trust Fund underlines: “Social care funding has become at the feast of this election campaign.”21

Governing the new NHS

18 The way the NHS is governed is also central to the debate on improving health services. Here we are referring to the shift from a central state to devolving accountability to

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governing agencies. Markets and other hierarchies can also be ways of governing. Governance in health is said to be “about the oversight and balancing of financial, clinical and patient satisfaction objectives.”22

19 Under the coalition government, a major shift has taken place under the Health and Social Care Act which came into force in 2013. Henceforth, GP practices must join Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). These groups are responsible for commissioning services on behalf of patients in their practices. Previous to this Act, local health budgets were controlled by Primary Care Trusts where GPs could assess a patient’s primary needs and refer him or her to a secondary service, for example a physiotherapist or a cardiologist, if necessary. The implications of replacing Primary Care Trusts with CCGs means that the GPs on CCGs are now responsible for commissioning budgets and have much more freedom to contract out services to the private sector. Previous governments, including New Labour, actually created and reinforced the internal market by introducing the purchaser/provider split.23 However, the significant change of replacing the Secretary of State’s duty to make way for the GP commissioning process has entirely changed the notion of the NHS as a nationalised service and the essential governance of health services. GPs are now responsible for commissioning patient care but they may not be qualified for the job or there may be a conflict of interest because healthcare companies may encourage doctors to commission private treatment by offering them shares. CCGs function more like health insurance companies on the principle of membership and not automatic membership on an area basis. Homeless or new migrants may therefore not have equal access to health services. 20 It has also been pointed out that the Health and Social Care Act has made NHS governance more complex. There’s a sense in which nobody is in charge at a county level or a city-wide level when it comes to getting different organisations to work together both to implement the Five Year Forward View and to deal with the growing financial and service pressures within the NHS.24 21 In addition, there has been a move towards more localised decision-making under the coalition, which is welcomed by healthcare providers. For example Greater Manchester council’s control will soon have a greater say over health spending. These changes will need to go hand-in-hand with improved methods of measuring outcomes. NHS Chief Historian, Professor Charles Webster25 argues that long A&E waiting times, for example, should be the responsibility of all primary and community care providers, not just hospitals. He argues: “What we need is a simplified outcomes framework that aligns across healthcare, public health and social care.”26 Governance therefore needs to bridge the gap between health and social care.

22 The Conservatives criticised Labour for its governance record and claimed to have improved the situation by cutting middle-management and PR. However, 3,400 press officers (PR or spin doctors) are still employed by local councils across the UK! The Conservatives also claimed that they had cleared out bureaucracy and made savings. Rather than setting managerial targets they have focused on outcomes and performance. They accused Labour of micro-managing from Whitehall and clogging up the system. However, the Conservatives have also been highly criticised for governing the NHS as a private entity.

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Towards the stealth privatisation of health services?

23 The “privatisation” of the NHS, or more accurately the marketization of the NHS is a key point of dispute between political parties. Beyond the debate about the public good aspect of public services, is the question of quality. The criticism is that market forces drive down quality because private companies aim to win tenders and contracts by spending as little as possible on services and wish to maximise profits above all. Tendering out to the private sector has also resulted in increased pressure on hospital staff to meet targets.

24 One of the main providers of health services is Virgin Care, which has contracts worth hundreds of millions of pounds, running more than 230 NHS and social care services. Other private companies that have shown an active interest to take on NHS services are:– Bio Product Laboratories (BPL), Care UK, Circle, General Healthcare Group (GHG), HCA International (Hospital Corporation of America), Ramsay, Spire Healthcare, The Practice PLC and UnitedHealth (Optum). The concern is that seven of the firms, including Virgin and GHS, have US subsidiaries which would enable them to use the EU- US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) to prevent the government blocking future bids or terminating existing contracts. The fear is that because many of these companies have strong US investment links, it would prevent the government from taking NHS contracts back into the public sector, unless it is clearly indicated in the T-TIP that the NHS is excluded. 25 Moreover, the expense of creating an artificial marketplace has also been underlined. Successive governments since the late 1980s (both left and right) have gradually put in place a system which allows private providers to compete with each other to offer services to the NHS. Dr Jacky Davis and other doctors and campaigners, including the National Health Action Party, estimated the cost at £10 billion per year. In 2010 the Health Select Committee reported that the cost of running the NHS as a market took up 14% of the NHS budget each year. The same committee pointed out that in the period before the market was introduced in the NHS, in the late 1980s, administration only accounted for 5% of the NHS budget. Even though the administration costs might have risen anyway as a proportion of the budget, it would seem that the market does tend to have more transaction costs – advertising, negotiating contracting, invoicing, billing, auditing, monitoring contracts, collecting information, resolving disputes both in court and out… For example, the legal fees that local Clinical Commissioning Groups had to pay to comply with one of the clauses of the Health and Social Care Act cost £77 million a year. NHS providers have also been criticised for the pay of their Chief Executives and hiring expensive management consultants. The Clinical Commissioning Groups are advised by costly commissioning support units, which were created under the coalition government and NHS England. Regulation to ensure the fair play of the market sector also costs money: NHS Trust Development Authority Monitor, the Care Quality Commission… Some of these bodies will be privatised soon. Removing these costs could free up funds to make up for the NHS shortfall and provide critical social care if market activities were reduced. A comparison with Scotland’s hospital administration costs shows that in a less marketized system, there are fewer transaction costs. In the US, a country where the health sector is one of the most marketed in the world, much more money is spent on administering the system for poorer outcomes than the UK. Since the 1960s, there has been plenty of evidence to suggest that markets in health care just

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do not work. As Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow stated in 1963,27 patients are not customers in a supermarket. It takes expertise that the common patient simply does not have and therefore choice should not be an issue. A marketed system also tends to provide incentives to over-treat, over-investigate and stimulate patient demand through advertising. 26 There is also evidence that marketization in the NHS has compromised care. In the Francis report that examined the failures of care at Mid Staffordshire, it was found that too much emphasis had been put on the market in running the hospital in order to get Foundation Trust status, which ended up compromising co-operation between medical professionals. Hinchinbrooke hospital, which is more or less run through the private sector, has been criticised by the Royal College of Nursing and the Care Quality Commission for poor standards of care and demoralised staff. 27 The Health and Social Care Act which came into force on 1 April 2013 has been accused of speeding up privatisation. The conditions of this act allows trusts to earn up to 49 per cent of their total income from private services. In addition, it gives groups of GP practices and professionals – Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) – “real” budgets to buy care on behalf of their local communities; it transferred many of the responsibilities of the Department of Health to a new politically independent NHS Commissioning Board (this has now been renamed NHS England); it created a health specific economic regulator (Monitor) with a mandate to guard against “anti-competitive ” practices; and moved all NHS trusts to foundation trust status. This has encouraged more tendering to the private sector because Clinical Commissioning Groups – also known as GP consortia –control about £60 billion of the NHS budget and are responsible for commissioning local services. Therefore, extra focus is actually put on commissioning. Commissioning takes place through competitive tendering and NHS contracts are therefore open for tender to the voluntary and private sectors. This has led to £250 million worth of NHS services being put out to tender, with 105 private firms granted contracts. This year, a further £750 million of services will be tendered. The conservatives claim that privatisation has not increased. However, according to the NHS trusts and financial regulator Monitor, average income from private patients per NHS foundation trust increased from £1.7 million (2009/10) to £2.7 million (2013/14), which represents an increase of 58%.28 Department for Health figures show that there has indeed been an increase in services commissioned from private providers since the Health and Social Care Act was implemented.

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28 The extension of the Private Finance Initiative in the health sector has also been heavily criticised by both the popular and the quality press. Services outsourced to private companies through the PFI led to the compulsory redundancies of 4,620 frontline NHS staff between 2010/11 and 2012/13, and 2,430 voluntary redundancies. Since 2010, more than 30 NHS maternity and 42 A&E units have either been closed down or downgraded.29 Until 1990, hospitals did not have to pay a charge for their land, building and assets, but PFI hospitals must pay more than 15% of annual operating costs. Since the launching of the PFI in 1992, there has been an association with trust mergers which has led to a 30% reduction of hospital beds, staff lay-offs and closures of hospitals and community services.30 The hospitals are closed down because the government does not allow PFI hospitals to default on debt to avoid threatening other PFI schemes. 29 Finally, marketization has also led to a target-driven approach. This tends to put extra pressure on staff and hospitals. For example, fines are imposed on A&E departments that miss waiting time targets or receive too many patients. However, imposing fines is counterproductive and unfair since A&Es are dealing with backlogs in care elsewhere. 30 The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto claimed that it would moderate the marketization of the health system by securing local agreements on fully-pooled health and social care budgets and transfer responsibility for social care to the Department of Health, removing NHS mergers from the hands of the Competition and Markets Authority. Their manifesto said the party was committed to repealing any parts of the Health and Social Care Act which had made NHS services vulnerable to forced privatisation and affecting international agreements on free markets in goods and services. It stated that it would protect the NHS from being open to tender under the T-TIP. Nick Clegg claimed that he had had a guarantee from the EU that member states’ rights to provide public services directly and not open to competition have been enshrined in the T-TIP.

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31 In the televised debates, the Green Party heavily criticised the current government for the “creeping privatisation” of the NHS and called for the suppression of competition and the commissioner-provider split. In addition, the National Health Party (a party which was launched in 2012 by doctors, nurses, paramedics, NHS staff and ordinary members of the public to protest again the coalition’s health reforms) said it would repeal the Health and Social Care Act to end competition in the NHS! It would introduce an NHS Bill to repeal the Health and Social Care Act and to end privatisation. “We will put an end to the billions of pounds of money wasted paying high interest rates on PFI debts originally brought in by the Tories and accelerated under New Labour.”31 Although this party did not gain a seat, they got over 20,000 votes (more than the BNP and Monster Raving Loony Party) and will most likely put increasing pressure on the government to moderate tendering out to the private sector. 32 The Labour party stated that it would repeal the Health and Social Care Act of 2012. They claimed that they would scrap the competition regime and restore democratic accountability in the NHS and stop the drive towards privatisation. It also promised to make sure that services are not destabilised by competition and fragmentation. Labour does not actually intend to scrap commissioning to private companies but it said it would impose a cap on any profits made from the NHS to ensure that the needs of patients are always put first. It claimed that private health companies made a record £18 million each day from the NHS budget because more and more health contracts have gone to the private sector. Figures from the Department of Health underlined that last year £6.6bn was taken from the NHS coffers to pay private health providers – a 50% rise from before the coalition took power. “The money we pay for healthcare must go on healthcare and not for excess profit for private firms,” Ed Miliband said, and “Privatisation cannot meet the needs of a 21st Century health service.”32 The Labour manifesto stated that all outsourced NHS contracts valued at more than £500,000 would have to include a profit cap, with the default level set at 5%. During the campaign trail in Stevenage, Miliband was also reported to have threatened: “A Tory second term means stealth privatisation of the National Health Service”. Labour also promised that it would hold the European Commission to account on issues relating to public services and the Investor to State Dispute Settlement Mechanism33 regarding the T-TIP. Labour proposed to put a two per cent cap on work for private patients as a proportion of total income. Yet, they also stated that if the trust were to meet strict safeguards to ensure NHS patients are unaffected, then hospitals could exceed the two per cent limit. This led a Conservative spokesperson to dispute Labour’s claim of scaling back privatisation and also added that, under the Conservatives, official figures show that outsourcing accounts for only 6% of NHS spending and that private patient income has actually fallen as a share of hospital budgets. However, as the King’s Fund underlined,34 Labour’s manifesto marked a break with the past by rejecting markets and competition. The only concern was how Labour might dismantle the Health and Social Care Act without causing disruptive structural changes to the NHS. The manifesto was also criticised for proposing another top-down reorganisation. Labour thus pledged that local areas would be free to find their own routes to integration. 33 The Conservative manifesto is the only one that showed its intention to continue with the relentless move towards privatisation to encourage “the entrepreneurial spirit of public servants” and give all public sector organisations the right to mutualise. This could increase the trend introduced by the Health and Social Care Act of contracting

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out to Community Interest Companies (that is private firms that have a declared community benefit). Indeed, whereas in May 2010 fewer than 300 NHS staff worked for Community Interest Companies, 14,000 NHS staff now work for 17 Community Interest Companies.

Conclusion

34 The provision of health services and the future of the NHS were clearly priorities for most parties during the 2015 election. Key reports by the NHS, health organisations and the national press have brought to light the funding crisis that the National Health Service is currently facing in England. What is quite surprising about the 2015 election is that all parties seemed to agree on what is needed to sustain and improve health services in the UK: greater funding, greater support for mental health and dementia, reduced waiting lists and more integration of health and social care. Differences emerged in the figures, that is the additional money needed to “save” the NHS and the number of health professionals. There was also discord on the question of tendering out health services to the private sector. Whereas the Conservative party is quite happy to tender NHS services out to private companies, the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats want to cut back on this practice. The Green party called for an end to tendering out altogether.

35 The victory of the Conservative Party in the 2015 election means that it is unlikely that there will be yet more structural reforms to the NHS. The Conservatives have pledged to increase funding to meet the shortfall. However, most health organisations have pointed out that this is a bare minimum and unlikely to meet the needs of the NHS. Moreover, as the King’s Fund evaluation of the manifesto pointed out35, the Conservatives do not say how they will fund the £8 billion a year. The fear is that because they have announced cuts, this may mean cutting social care budgets to be able to increase spending on the NHS. In an interview with Andrew Marr, David Cameron did not answer the question about where the extra money was coming from and whether this would involve further cuts (to the police force, social benefits…) The Conservative manifesto failed to address the challenges of increasing social care needs. Although the arguments for seven day services have already been supported by health service leaders and politicians, there are a number of challenges that will need to be overcome to ensure that the staff can be made available. Moreover, the Conservative Party promise to provide seven days a week services would require additional resources over and above the proposed £8 billion. The next 5 years will thus be crucial for the future of the National Health Service in Britain, especially faced with protest from sectoral interest groups and parties which offer an alternative to the marketed form of health service provision.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADASS., “Social care services 'unsustainable'”, 2 July 2014, .

ALEXANDER, DOUGLAS. “NHS can’t survive 5 more years of DC”, Working Document, 5 January 2015, , (accessed on 25 May 2015).

BBC., “Miliband warns of stealth privatization of NHS”, 25 April 2015, .

COMMISSION ON FUNDING OF CARE AND SUPPORT FAIRER CARE FUNDING., “The Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support”, 2011, http:// .

COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE., “A New Settlement for Health and Social Care”, London: The King’s Fund, 2014.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH., “The Senior Salaries Review Body”,. Department of Health, 2014.

DOUGLAS, Alexander, “NHS can’t survive 5 more years of DC”, 5 January 2015, Working Document, 5 January 2015.

RIBGY, Elizabeth. “Labour focuses election campaign on NHS”, Financial Times, 4 January 2015.

HEALTH ORGANISATION., “NHS Finances – The challenge all political parties need to face”, .

JOUMARD I, ANDRE C and NIC C. , “Health care systems: efficiency and institutions”, OECD Economics Department, Working Papers No. 769 OECD Publishing,: Paris, 20130, p.133.

LABOUR PRESS., “Ed Miliband’s speech launching Labour’s election campaign”, .

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION., “Councils face £5.8 billion funding 'Black hole'”, .

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION., “Adult social care funding: state of the nation report”, Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 2014.

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE., The financial sustainability of NHS bodies. HC 722 (2014-15),. Available at: .

NHS ENGLAND., “Five year forward view”, 2014, .

STOREY, John et al., Governing the New NHS: Issues and Tensions in Health Service Management, New York: Routledge, 2010, p.2081.

THE HEALTH FOUNDATION., “Swimming against the tide? The quality of NHS services during the current Parliament”, March 2015 .

THE KING’s FUND., “General Election 2015: Analysis” .

THOMAS, Kim., “What the healthcare sector wants from the next government”, 10 March 2015, ,.

WANLESS, Derek., Securing Our Future Health : Taking a Long-Term View, London: HMSO, 2002, p.164.

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WANLESS, Derek., Securing Good Health for the Whole Population, London: HMSO, 2001, p. 51.

WINTOUR, P., “Ed Balls renews Labour’s commitment to NHS by promising extra £2.5bn”, 20 April 2015, .

NOTES

1. Reported in THE HEALTH FOUNDATION, “NHS finances – The challenges all parties need to face”, Briefing, January 2015, (accessed 25 April 2015). 2. Derek WANLESS, Securing Our Future Health : Taking a Long-Term View, London: HMSO, 2002; Derek WANLESS, Securing Good Health for the Whole Population, London: HMSO, 2001. 3. THE HEALTH FOUNDATION, “NHS finances – The challenges all parties need to face”, Briefing, op.cit. 4. THE HEALTH FOUNDATION, “Swimming against the tide? The quality of NHS services during the current Parliament”, Briefing, March 2015, (accessed 3 May 2015). 5. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE, A New Settlement for Health and Social Care, London: The King’s Fund, 2014. 6. COMMISSION ON FUNDING OF CARE AND SUPPORT FAIRER CARE FUNDING, The Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support, , 2011 (accessed 26 May 2015). 7. ADASS, “Social care services 'unsustainable'”, 2 July 2014, (accessed on 3 May 2015). 8. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, “Councils face £5.8 billion funding 'Black hole'”, , (accessed on 6 May 2015). 9. NHS ENGLAND, Five Year Forward View, 2014 , (Accessed on 7 March 2015). 10. NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE. The financial sustainability of NHS bodies. HC 722 (2014-15). Available at: (accessed on 7 May 2015). 11. I. JOUMARD I, C. ANDRE and C. NIC, “Health care systems: efficiency and institutions”, Economics Department Working Papers, No. 769, OECD: Paris, 2013. 12. The Labour Manifesto 2015, , (accessed on 12 May 2015). 13. Reported in Kim THOMAS, “What the Healthcare sector wants from the next government”, 10 March 2015, , (accessed on 25 April 2015). 14. Choose and Book is a service that lets you choose your hospital or clinic and book your first appointment. 15. Patrick WINTOUR, “Ed Balls renews Labour’s commitment to NHS by promising extra £2.5bn”, 20 April 2015, , (accessed on 25 April 2015). 16. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, The Senior Salaries Review Body, Department of Health, 2014. 17. LGA “Adult social care funding: state of the nation report”, Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, 2014. 18. THE HEALTH FOUNDATION, “Swimming against the tide? The quality of NHS services during the current Parliament”, op. cit.. 19. ITV, First Televised Election Debate. 20. DOUGLAS ALEXANDER, “NHS can’t survive 5 more years of DC”, Working Document, 5 January 2015, (accessed on 25 May 2015).

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21. THE KING’S FUND, “General Election 2015: Analysis” (accessed on 7 May 2015) 30. Ibid. 31. National Health Action Party, “NHA’s key pillars for a healthy NHS and a healthy population” (accessed on 7 May 2015). 32. LABOUR PRESS, “Ed Miliband’s speech launching Labour’s election campaign”, (accessed on 6 May 2015). 33. The Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is an instrument of public which grants an investor the right to use dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign government. 34. THE KING’S FUND, “General Election 2015: Analysis”, op. cit. 35. THE KING’s FUND, “General Election 2015: Analysis” op.cit.

ABSTRACTS

The 2015 general election in the UK saw the emergence of the health service and its future as one of the key points on the election battleground. This is because the NHS was flagged as one of the key issues of public concern. This is not just because of a commitment to the NHS but also the recognition of the pressures and strains on the public health service, widely publicised in both the popular and the quality press. The main issues of debate in the run up to the election were funding, stealth privatisation of health services, quality of health services and governance issues.

Les élections législatives de 2015 au Royaume-Uni ont vu l'émergence des services de santé et l’avenir du système de soins (National Health Service ou NHS) comme l'un des points clés d’affrontement de la campagne électorale. En effet, le NHS est l'un des principaux sujets de préoccupation publique, non seulement en raison de la popularité du système de santé publique, mais aussi en raison des menaces et incertitudes qui pèsent sur le système et qui ont été amplement médiatisées. Les principaux enjeux dans la course à l'élection furent le financement, la privatisation furtive des services de santé, la qualité des services de soins et les questions de gouvernance.

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INDEX

Mots-clés: Elections législatives 2015, système national de santé, financement, privatisation, gouvernance Keywords: UK General Election 2015, NHS, funding, privatisation, governance

AUTHOR

LOUISE DALINGWATER

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3

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Little Britain? The Debate on Britain’s Foreign and Defence Policy Une Grande-Bretagne isolationniste? Le débat sur les politiques étrangère et de défense

Thibaud Harrois

Introduction

Foreign and defence policy is not a central issue in British general elections and the 2015 general election campaign was no exception, with the issue being mentioned only at the end of party manifestos and with few debates on the subject. Yet, whereas there usually is much common ground between the policies of government and the Opposition, the 2015 debate was of a different kind. On the one hand, the Conservatives argued that David Cameron’s government had pursued the same “grand strategy” as the one the UK had pursued since the end of the Cold War, that Britain is still “punching above her weight” on the world stage and one of the most powerful countries in Europe as well as the USA’s strongest ally. On the other hand, the Opposition agreed with many experts, military officials or foreign politicians who voiced their concerns in the media, to say that Britain had seen a decline in its international role and influence during Cameron’s premiership. The debate on Britain’s waning influence in the world is not a new one, but while it had been somewhat settled at the beginning of Blair’s premiership, it has come back with a vengeance when the UK failed to win the peace after its long interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2011 military intervention in Libya, which was overwhelmingly supported by Parliament and the public, was not sufficient to erase doubts about the role of the Armed Forces after they left Afghanistan and they underwent deep budgetary cuts. Besides, the Opposition embraced the public’s growing war-weary caution on the use of force in an ever more complex international environment, especially when these actions were not undertaken under a clear UNSC mandate.

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Thus this paper aims to examine the gap between David Cameron’s – and Ed Miliband’s – speeches in which they stated their wish to see Britain continuing to play the role of a great power, and the failing support for involvement in foreign operations. The debate on whether to intervene, either in Libya or in Syria (against the Assad regime or against ISIL), revolved around the questions of legality and legitimacy of such military interventions. The arguments put forward by the government and those who have supported intervention from August 2013 will be contrasted with the arguments used by Ed Miliband and MPs who have been more cautious about the use of force in order to show their respective understanding of the role of the UK in the world and the limits of British interventionism. The gap between the image political leaders have of the country’s role in the world and Britain’s actual commitments can also be explained by the cuts in the defence budget made by the Coalition government. The debate on the need for further cuts and their consequences on Britain’s military ambition will thus be explored. Lastly, the consequences of the Conservatives’ victory on 7 May will open a new debate on the need for an overarching national strategy that includes a clear definition of British interests and takes into account the country’s capacity to deal with new threats, especially from the Middle East. The kinds of domestic and international pressures that are exercised on Britain will be analysed to offer some insight on the challenges the new government will have to face.

The coalition government, Parliament, and the debate on British military interventions

Britain’s role in the world has rarely been as debated inside the walls of Parliament as during Cameron’s first term in office. The “royal prerogative” gives the Prime Minister vast powers and the Westminster model has long been used in foreign policy analyses to explain why the issue is so rarely debated in the House of Commons and in the . However, building on James Strong’s article,1 I argue that Parliament has been given more power on foreign and defence policy in the last decade and that, under the last government, it has become the place for an actual debate on the UK’s foreign interventions. The Conservatives’ justification for the war in Libya and the proposed interventions in Syria and against ISIL as well as the Opposition’s stance on each of these issues are part of a pre-electoral debate in which the two main parties stated their vision of Britain’s role in the world.

Parliamentary debates on Britain’s foreign and defence policy

Traditionally, the British Parliament has not had any role in decisions to use military force as the Westminster model vests the responsibility to deploy armed forces in the Prime Minister, who possesses the “royal prerogative”. Most of the foreign and defence policy debates organised in the House of Commons are adjournment debates2, that allow MPs to discuss policies but without voting on them, and Parliament spends but a very limited amount of time discussing the issue, both because it is an issue that requires few laws and because there is often a consensus between party leaders. Studies on foreign and defence policy generally emphasise the bipartisan approach to the issue, 3 although this apparent cross-bench consensus sometimes diverts attention from

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deeper tensions between leaders and their own back-benchers. However, party discipline is such that MPs most often remain loyal to the choices made by the government and authors dismiss parliamentary discussions, be they intra- or inter- party, as irrelevant in the policy-making process. However, since the March 2003 vote over the , Parliament has played a greater role, which gave rise to a renewed analysis of the policy-making process that underlines the fact that a government necessarily has to negotiate in order to gather support for its action, including in the field of foreign and defence policy. The “ differentiated policy model”4 thus challenges the traditional Westminster model and offers useful tools to explain the changes made to the royal prerogative. This also led some authors to talk about a new parliamentary prerogative, especially when analysing the power to take Britain to war.5 In March 2011, in the context of the war in Libya, William Hague, then Foreign Secretary, committed to “enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action”.6 Such a law failed to be adopted, but the new Cabinet Manual mentioned the rise of a convention giving the House of Commons an opportunity to organise a debate before troops are sent abroad. 7 The growing role of Parliament in the last decade has had a direct impact on the policy of the Conservative-led coalition, and on the attitude of the Labour opposition between 2010 and 2015 as well as during the 2015 campaign. The arguments used during the debate on the war in Libya and those that led Parliament to deny the Prime Minister authorisation to send British armed forces to Syria can be contrasted to understand in what conditions and for what reasons each party is ready to commit British troops to war.

Meeting the conditions for intervention: the 2011 war in Libya

The decision to go to war in Libya was justified by the need to save the lives of civil protesters threatened by the violent repression of demonstrations by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Following the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, France and Britain played a frontline role in the process that led to the adoption on 17 March 2011 of UNSC Resolution 1973 that allowed the use of “all necessary means” in order to protect civilians from Gaddafi’s forces.8 The threat of a massacre in Benghazi, the international support for military action – both through adoption of Resolution 1973 and the call for the implementation of a no-fly zone from the Arab League – helped David Cameron and William Hague make the case for intervention in Westminster. In order to get parliamentary support, they argued that Britain would not take any unilateral action and was working with partners in order to obtain a clear mandate, which would remove any doubt on the legality of the intervention. Ministers also guaranteed that the government would not launch a military intervention without seeking parliamentary approval.9 After resolution 1973 was adopted, Britain launched “Operation Ellamy” on 19 March 2011. Two days later in Parliament, Cameron made the case for war, insisting on the moral need to protect innocent civilians and on the fact that no ground troops would be sent to Libya,10 making it clear that “this [was] not another Iraq.”11 MPs approved the motion by 557 votes to 13. However, the process that led to the intervention in Libya being overwhelmingly approved by Parliament was soon to become synonymous with a loss of power on the part of the Prime Minister, and as another humanitarian crisis

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unfolded in the Middle East, the government was unable to make the case for another war in the region.

The debate on interventions in Syria and against ISIL: the end of the age of British interventionism?

A few months after Gaddafi was ousted from power and killed by rebels in Sirte, attention focused on the ongoing civil war in Syria. But as the need for intervention was being debated in the media, William Hague made clear in June 2013 that neither arms nor British forces would be sent to Syria without previous parliamentary approval.12 On 21 August, a chemical weapons attack on the suburbs of Damascus allowed Cameron to build a clearer case against the Assad regime13 and the Prime Minister recalled Parliament before the end of the summer recess in order to organise a vote on military action. However, Ed Miliband insisted on the fact that UN inspectors had not yet established Assad’s responsibility for the attack, and that he therefore could not support the government’s motion. Even after the PM said he would wait for the full report by UN weapons inspectors before seeking approval for a British intervention,14 the Labour leader chose to withdraw his support for the government’s motion, which was subsequently defeated by 285 votes to 272 on 29 August 2013. Contrary to what had happened during the run-up to the war in Libya, MPs began to question the legality and the legitimacy of an intervention that was not backed by the UN Security Council. Besides, Cameron failed to convince his own MPs, thirty of whom voted with Labour (together with nine Liberal Democrats), and lost control of his foreign policy to Parliament. The British decision not to commit troops led the USA to suspend its move towards intervention and allowed Russia to make a deal with Assad requiring him to destroy Syrian chemical weapons. At a national level, Cameron’s statement confirmed the birth of a new constitutional convention that required Parliament to approve military action. 15 It also considerably shook the Conservatives’ confidence in their leader, even though the party rebels confirmed they supported the PM on other social policies.16 Ed Miliband, whose leadership had been heavily criticised during the summer, was praised by Labour MPs and the media for his commitment to international law and diplomacy against Cameron’s more hawkish behaviour.17. However, the Labour leader was also blamed for the international consequences of the vote, with Britain losing its forefront role on the international stage, especially after Cameron ruled out the possibility of another vote on Syria.18 In the end, the aftermath of the vote seemed more negative than positive for Ed Miliband’s leadership as concerns were voiced as to the kind of foreign policy a Labour government would implement.19 One year later, on 26 September 2014, the House of Commons voted in favour of air strikes against ISIL in Iraq by a vote of 524 to 43, thus launching the third operation in Iraq in 25 years. There being no UN mandate authorising intervention against ISIL, Cameron managed to convince Miliband and the vast majority of MPs to support military action by insisting on the fact that no ground troops would be sent to Iraq and that British forces’ mission was to support the Iraqi government in its effort to free itself from ISIL.20 However, in spite of ISIL being present both in Iraq and Syria, Cameron chose to limit the scope of the motion to Iraq in order not to trigger

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opposition from Miliband and Labour MPs.21 Further military engagement would need a new vote in Parliament should the government wish to intervene in Syria. Thus, even though the new convention has not been enshrined in law, no government will be able to launch a military intervention without prior parliamentary approval. This might make intervention more difficult as the public – and the Commons – have become more sceptical about the reasons for intervention. Ed Miliband has made it clear his party would support no intervention that would not have been previously authorised and legitimised by a UNSC resolution. Therefore the arguments used during the parliamentary debates on whether to intervene in Libya, Syria or against ISIL give a pre-election campaign insight on the way the main parties and their leaders think about British interventionism and the UK’s role in the world.

Britain in the world: what means for what ambitions?

By refusing to organise a second vote on a possible intervention in Syria after the Labour party voted the first motion down, the Prime Minister hoped to put the responsibility for non-intervention on the shoulders of those who had opposed him. However, Ed Miliband insisted Labour would have supported intervention if it had been legitimised by a UNSC resolution and accused the government of being responsible for Britain’s isolationism. But in his attempt to re-establish the Conservative Party’s reputation as the “party of defence”, Cameron argued that only the Conservatives had a clear plan to maintain Britain’s international rank. The prospect of a Labour-SNP pact of government provided the Conservatives with an opportunity to effectively use defence and more particularly Trident renewal to open a debate on Labour’s ability to make reasonable choices for the future of the country, an argument they also used when Cameron moved the debate back on the economy.

Labour’s opposition to “small-minded isolationism”

Ed Miliband’s major speech on foreign policy was given on 24 April 2015. In that speech, the Labour leader accused David Cameron of having led a policy of “small-minded isolationism”: David Cameron has presided over the biggest loss of influence for our country in a generation. And that has happened because the government he leads has stepped away from the world, rather than confidently towards it. It is an approach that has shrunk our influence and weakened Britain.22 Miliband pointed out several occasions when Britain’s “isolation and waning influence” in the world was made obvious. First, a few weeks before the speech was made, on 11 February 2015, Britain had been absent from the Minsk II summit that had gathered the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in order to agree on new measures to solve the crisis in the Donbass region of Ukraine. The second example of Britain’s failure under the Conservative-led government was Libya. Miliband accused the government of misreading the situation on the ground before the intervention, and leaving Libya to its own devices instead of helping the Libyans build a stable government after October 2011. The third and “most important cause of [Britain’s] loss of influence” is the ambivalent discourse of the Conservatives on Britain’s future in the European Union. Without a clear commitment to staying in the EU, Britain’s influence

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would necessarily be diminished “and our loss of influence in Europe leads to a further loss of influence in the world.”23 Ed Miliband’s foreign policy experience as Leader of the Opposition before the 2015 elections had been limited and his positions unclear. Whereas his brother David had been Foreign Secretary in Gordon Brown’s government, Ed had been in charge of Energy and Climate Change which gave him far less international experience and even after he became party leader, his flight record was far from outstanding24 and there were lasting concerns about his vision for Britain in the world after his opposition to intervention in Syria. However, his speech allowed him to state that he would support “ genuine and hard-headed multilateralism” and “international law” in case Britain should intervene. He also insisted on the importance of working with EU and NATO partners to restore British influence in international organisations and in the world. The Labour Manifesto insisted in the same fashion on Britain’s “unique influence in the world” and Labour’s pledge to “take a multilateral approach to global challenges.”25 Besides, Miliband linked defence policy with the rest of his economic pledges: I want to be absolutely clear that amongst the reasons we reject the extreme spending cuts that the Conservative Party propose is that they would be truly catastrophic for the future of our armed forces […] I am not going to sacrifice the defence of our country on an ideological commitment to a significantly smaller state. The Labour manifesto made the same commitment to: ensuring the UK has responsive, high-tech Armed Forces, with the capability to respond to emerging, interconnected threats, in an unpredictable landscape. We will conduct a Strategic Defence and Security Review in the first year of government, with an inclusive national debate on the security and defence challenges facing the country.26 The coalition government had proposed to hold a new SDSR every five years27 (a period that was judged far more appropriate than the twelve years between the previous review and the 2010 SDSR.28 The Labour Party agreed with the proposed timetable and was ready to conduct the process immediately after the election. However, the manifesto insisted that the review be both “fiscally responsible and strategically driven”, and not “Treasury-driven” as the 2010 Review had been. However, Ed Miliband’s effort to convince voters that Cameron’s government was to blame for the UK’s loss of influence in the world did not really trigger the expected debate on defence. The issue became more central in the campaign when Labour’s expected alliance with the SNP raised doubts about the future of Trident.

Trident renewal and the campaign: party commitments and the ambiguity of a Labour-SNP alliance

At the beginning of his time as Labour leader, Ed Miliband adopted a cautious approach to Trident, saying that the UK needed “to look very carefully at whether renewing Trident is the necessary or the right thing to do.”29 However, after the government published the Trident Alternatives Review30 and confirmed the country’s commitment to Trident renewal, the Labour Party reaffirmed its commitment to Britain’s nuclear capability and the last pledge in the defence section of the Labour manifesto stated that the party “[remained] committed to a minimum, credible, independent nuclear capability, delivered through a Continuous At-Sea Deterrent.”31

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It is surprising that an issue on which the two main parties agree should become the focus of public attention during the campaign, and the only defence-related issue to be discussed at length in the media. Yet, as polls suggested Labour would be able to form a government only if they agreed on some sort of coalition pact with the Scottish National Party, Conservative senior figures suggested this would inevitably lead to Trident being abandoned. Indeed, the SNP manifesto stated: The SDSR must […] consider the advantages of a defence policy without weapons of mass destruction and wasting £100bn renewing Trident. We will continue in our principled opposition to nuclear weapons and believe that the UK should abandon plans to renew the Trident nuclear missile system.32 Nicola Sturgeon made this measure a red line in any negotiation to form a coalition government, thus confirming the SNP’s traditional opposition to what is often perceived not only as a waste of money but also a typical example of the kind of policies London imposes on the Scottish territory and people. The SNP’s fierce opposition to Trident led many to wonder what the Labour Party would do in case it had to form a coalition government that included or partnered with Scottish nationalist MPs. The debate was used by the SNP and the Labour Party to show their difference and convince voters that if the SNP supported a minority Labour government, this did not mean that one party was adopting all of the other party’s policies or that the two parties’ stances would be mixed in order to reach a vague, middle of the road compromise. Yet however much Miliband insisted that if he formed a government with the support of the SNP he would nonetheless maintain Britain’s deterrent, he failed to explain how a Labour-SNP deal could lead to a stable and disciplined government. Douglas Alexander’s reaffirmed that “Labour’s commitment to continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent was not up for negotiation.” 33 However, on the same day, Defence Minister Michael Fallon wrote that Ed Miliband was “willing to stab the United Kingdom in the back to become Prime Minister” in the same way he did his brother to gain the Labour leadership.34 The personal nature of the attack caused some stir, including among Conservatives, but David Cameron supported Fallon and repeated that the Labour party was “playing fast and loose with our security”. 35 Even when Vernon Coaker, the Labour defence spokesman, argued that the Labour party was indeed committed to Trident renewal and asked whether the Conservatives would support Labour in a vote on the issue, Fallon replied that “the way to be absolutely sure about our nuclear defence is to vote Conservative.”36 Thus the Conservatives’ response to Miliband mixed personal attacks on the Labour leader with worries about the party’s ability to effectively undertake the necessary measures to secure the future of the UK’s nuclear capability. Whereas there have been very few – if any – past examples of a general election debate when defence became a decisive issue, the 2015 campaign showed that a change in the parliamentary majority could now have consequences on an issue that used to be characterised by continuity. The Conservatives therefore insisted on the difficulties that the country could expect if a Labour-SNP coalition were brought to power. They further insisted on Labour’s inconsistent defence policy plans as part of a wider attack on the economic unsoundness and strategic ambiguity in Labour’s manifesto.

The Conservative Party: putting the economy first

Just as Lynton Crosby, the Conservative campaign director, kept repeating that the Conservatives were the only party to have a “long-term economic plan”, the party’s line of

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attack on defence was also the economy. The coalition government had prepared the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and SDSR, which were published at the same time as the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), and there were clear indications in the SDSR that the government’s main concern had been to balance the book and that the defence budget was no exception.37 Former Defence Secretary adds that the coalition government was often accused of having produced a “Treasury-driven” review but that it was the only solution to tackle the deficit in public expenditure inherited from the previous Labour government. The over-commitment was estimated at £38 billion but it was even bigger than that according to Fox, who adds that many problems were made worse by the bad governance of the MoD with no mechanism to say whether the targets were right and whether they were achievable.38 The 2015 Conservative Manifesto insisted once more on the situation the government inherited when they came to power in 2010: Labour’s Great Recession weakened Britain on the world stage. They left a £38 billion black hole in the defence budget, went 12 years without conducting a Strategic Defence Review, and, at time, failed to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment they needed in Afghanistan. They shut down over 30 British diplomatic missions, failed to plan properly for Iraq’s reconstruction, ignored trade and investment opportunities overseas, and neglected vital relationships.39 Labour’s bad management had made cuts in the defence budget necessary and had threatened Britain’s national security as a whole. On the contrary, the Conservatives pledged to “maintain a balanced defence budget” and provide the “equipment they need” to the Armed Forces: We can only have strong, well-funded Armed Forces by continuing to build a stronger economy. We have the second largest defence budget in NATO and the largest in the EU. We are meeting NATO’s two targets: that each country should spend two per cent of its gross national income on defence, and of that spending 20 per cent should go on major equipment.40 Thus the Conservatives insisted they had made and would continue to make well- planned investments in defence capabilities. However, since the end of the Cold War, British military interventions have all taken place within a coalition (NATO or US-led) and the November 2010 Lancaster House Treaties are a sign of Britain’s (and France’s) ever-growing difficulty maintaining and modernising their armed forces on their own. Cooperation with other nations, France in particular, seems a necessary move if Britain is to maintain her international rank, especially at a time when the “special relationship” does not bring as much as it used to for Britain. Indeed, voters expect their country to continue to exercise influence in the world and play the role of a bridge between the USA and Europe.

The voters’ paradox: expecting Britain to do more with less

The 2015 party manifestos provide yet another proof that issues such as the economy, taxes, health, crime and justice or education are more crucial to the electoral debate than foreign and defence policy, which is relegated at the end of the documents. Yet, even if foreign and defence policy was unlikely to become a decisive issue, polls suggest that there is no consensus among Britons on the country’s role in the world. A major survey was conducted by Chatham House and YouGov in July and August 2014 and published in January 2015.41 It reveals that a majority of Britons support an ambitious foreign policy, with more than 60% of Britons saying that the country should aspire to

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be a “great power” and a majority saying that Britain should participate in peacekeeping missions and should help maintain international security. However, Britons generally identify border protection and counterterrorism as the most important international issues, and only 17% of the public say that it is a moral responsibility to support revolutions and uprisings against dictators. Besides, while two-thirds of Liberal Democrats and half of Labour voters say they support an ethical foreign policy, only one-third of Conservatives do. Thus, even though Britons still have “great power expectations” for the UK in the world, they have become more supportive of a defensive policy that aims to protect the nation’s borders and homeland security. Furthermore, in spite of the support for the UK’s leadership role and responsibilities in the world, 60% of the public agree that “The UK is expected to do too much internationally [and that it] should do less and others should do more”. Britons are divided on questions of defence spending: 33% of the public would like defence spending to increase, 31% want to keep spending at current levels and 22% would favour cuts. While Trident was not part of the 2014-2015 survey, a 2013 survey shows that 32% of the electorate wanted to maintain the Trident nuclear weapons system, 34% wanted to find a cheaper system and 20% favoured scrapping Trident altogether.42 Surveys thus reveal that Britons are not becoming isolationists, but they favour foreign interventions that are meant to improve national security and which are in Britain’s interest rather than humanitarian interventions that are part of an “ethical” foreign policy. Besides, more Britons would rather have the government spending the same amount or less on defence, thus putting politicians in a paradoxical situation where they are expected to satisfy voters’ ambitious vision for the UK while continuing to cut spending. The 2010 SDSR and NSS focused on the latter expectation and the election of a Conservative government on 7 May 2015 is likely to lead the country towards another “Treasury-led” strategy.

Britain’s foreign and defence policy after 7 May 2015

The newly-elected Conservative government pledged to put the economy first while maintaining a certain level of defence spending in order to continue to be able to face international threats on Britain’s security. Thus the government faces several challenges at the same time. At the domestic level, the government will have to deal with the need to fulfil its pledge to continue to curb the deficit, while responding to voters’ “great power expectations” for Britain. But the government is also under international pressure as the USA and other European allies want the UK to continue to take its share of the burden by spending a minimum of 2% of its GDP on defence. How the government plans to meet these challenges will be detailed in the new NSS and SDSR to be published in the second half of 2015, together with a new spending review.

The “triple lock” pledge on defence: NATO allies and the 2015 election

At the NATO Summit that took place in Wales on 4-5 September 2014, the UK government encouraged all member states to meet the Organisation’s 2% target of GDP spending on defence. However, even if, as Michael Fallon underlined in a campaign speech,43 Britain “ [has] met and will this year again meet the 2 per cent target”, the

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chancellor, George Osborne, announced as early as November 2014 that deeper cuts were to affect the army as he needed to make more savings in order to meet his austerity targets.44 Spending plans and growth projections put defence spending at an estimated 1.88% of GDP in 2015-16, thus falling below the NATO 2% target for the first time. The chief of the defence staff, General Sir Nick Houghton, expressed his worries and declared that further cuts in funding and in the number of troops could threaten the national security and would jeopardise the armed forces.45 Twenty-seven Conservative MPs, including former defence secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Rory Stewart, the chairman of the Commons Defence Select Committee, also called on the government to meet the NATO target, forcing a Commons vote on the issue a few weeks before the election.46 But David Cameron is not being put under pressure to meet the 2% target at home only. Indeed, during Cameron’s trip to the USA in January 2015, President Obama insisted that the military alliance between the two countries would be undermined if Britain did not take its share of the burden, and US defence officials have intensely lobbied the British ambassador with the same message.47 Michael Fallon tried to reassure both voters and Britain’s allies with the promise of a “ triple lock” on defence: First, we commit to increasing the defence equipment budget by at least 1 per cent more than inflation, throughout the Parliament […]. Second, we commit to making no further reductions in the size of our regular armed forces. Third, we commit to modernising our independent nuclear deterrent […].48 However, neither Fallon nor Cameron made any formal commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence, whereas the government enshrined their commitment to spending 0.7% of GDP on international aid in law, something Liam Fox found “hard to swallow”. How the government will fulfil the “triple lock” pledge without spending 2% of GDP on defence is unclear and given the Conservatives’ promise to continue fighting the deficit, the next SDSR will prove a difficult process.

The 2015 NSS, SDSR and CSR: a missed opportunity to debate the government’s choices

The end of operations in Afghanistan and the new challenges to Britain’s security, from terrorism to Russia, require Britain to redefine its world vision and the role of its armed forces. The 2010 SDSR and NSS had been conducted over a few months, which had given rise to concerns about the speed of the process and the poor quality of the strategic thinking that had guided those who were in charge of conducting it.49 Furthermore, in order to build a clearer strategy for Britain and a coherent DSR, the Commons Defence Committee recommended that the NSS process start earlier and be published ahead of the CSR and SDSR.50 However, a few months before the general election and six months before the publication of the next NSS, no formal talks had been held and there were concerns that if anything were done it would again be far too rushed to be out before the next CSR.51 Besides, a rushed NSS and SDSR process will restrain the number of people – academics, civil servants, politicians or members of the Armed Forces – consulted when preparing the strategy, which might damage the quality of the process.52 In 2010, the newly created National Security Council had been in charge of the process and there had been limited consultation, something which the Defence Committee had found “regrettable.”53 The Committee was particularly concerned that, because of the lack of consultation, the public would fail to understand

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the decisions made by the government, which would create a “sense of disconnection between the decisions of government and the understanding of the people at large on defence issues.”54 By conducting another speedy process, the newly re-elected Conservative government is likely to reinforce this sense of disconnection, and deprive the country of a rare opportunity to debate Britain’s foreign and defence policy. One conclusion that can be drawn from this is that in spite of all the talks and pledges about maintaining Britain’s role in the world, the Conservatives Party under Cameron did not see foreign and defence policy as a critical electoral issue or a priority for the nation. This also reveals the deep consequences of the financial crisis and ensuing austerity measures on Conservative politics. The Conservative Party had long prided itself on being the “party of defence” that held an interventionist and militaristic policy under Margaret Thatcher and criticised Labour’s inadequate funding of the armed forces, but this tradition has given way to a more isolationist view that focuses on the defence of the UK’s borders and territory, more in tune with voters’ war-weary attitude after decades of foreign interventions.

Conclusion

The debate on Britain’s role in the world and the end of interventionism started before the 2015 general election. Indeed, while Parliament used to play but a very limited role in the policymaking process, the last decade has seen the evolution of the royal prerogative and the emergence of a new parliamentary prerogative, which gave MPs the power to approve the Prime Minister’s decision to intervene in Libya and deny him the right to send planes to Syria. The Opposition focused on the legality and legitimacy of the proposed intervention in Syria, thus announcing the arguments that Ed Miliband later used during the campaign to present his version of interventionism. However, the focus of the campaign was on the country’s economic difficulties and their link with the United Kingdom’s military and diplomatic decline. Both parties tried to woo voters by promising to maintain Britain’s “world power” ambition while continuing to cut the budget deficit, which would require efforts from all departments, including the MoD. The way the new Conservative government fulfils its election pledges will depend on the new Strategy it is expected to formulate at the end 2015.

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NOTES

1. James STRONG, ‘Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, n/a n/a, ISSN 1269-1481, 2014. 2. Adjournment debates are held at the end of each day’s sitting. The government proposes to adjourn the House, the opposition objects, and MPs then discuss an issue proposed by an MP in advance. As they do not lead to a vote on the policy under scrutiny, governments need not fear being defeated. However, it also means that governments are free to ignore the content of debates and dismiss any opposition. 3. See for instance Rosara JOSEPH, The War Prerogative: History, Reform and Constitutional Design, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 78. 4. See for instance Mark BEVIR & R. A. W. RHODES, ‘Les récits du régime politique britannique’, Revue française de science politique, vol. 49, n°3, juin 1999, pp. 355-377. 5. James STRONG, op. cit., pp. 2-4. 6. HC Deb 21 Mar 2011, vol. 525, col. 799. 7. CABINET OFFICE, The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government, 1st ed., London: Cabinet Office, 2011, para. 5.38. 8. UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION, Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973 (2011), New York: Security Council, 17 Mar 2011, para. 4. 9. HC Deb 10 Mar 2011, vol. 524, col. 1066. 10. HC Deb 21 Mar 2011, vol. 525, col. 700-806. 11. Ibid., col. 709. 12. William HAGUE, interview, The Andrew Marr Show, BBC, 9 June 2013. 13. JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION (CABINET OFFICE), ‘Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use’, Letter to the Prime Minister, 29 Aug 2013. 14. Peter DOMINICZAK, Tim ROSS & Robert WINNETT, ‘Cameron backs down on urgent Syria strikes’, The Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug 2013. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 15. HC Deb 29 Aug 2013, vol. 566 col. 1555-1556. 16. Nicholas WATT, ‘Cabinet frustration over Syria vote as Cameron misreads Tory party’s mood’, The Guardian, 30 Aug 2013. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 17. Rowena MASON, ‘Ed Miliband restores party confidence in his leadership on Syria motion’, The Guardian, 30 Aug 2013. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 18. Ben BRADSHAW, ‘On Syria, we have allowed Labour policy to be dictated by the government’, The Guardian, 5 Sep 2013. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 19. Tim BALE, Five Year Mission: The Labour Party under Ed Miliband, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 189-191. 20. HC Deb 26 Sep 2014, vol. 585, col. 1255. 21. Tim ROSS, ‘Ed Miliband under pressure to back air strikes in Syria’, The Daily Telegraph, 5 Oct 2014. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 22. Ed MILIBAND, ‘Britain’s Place in the World: A Labour Perspective’, speech, London, Chatham House, 24 April 2015. 23. Ibid.

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24. Patrick WINTOUR, ‘Ed Miliband: small-minded isolationism has damaged British influence’, The Guardian, 23 April 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 25. LABOUR PARTY, Britain can be better: The Labour Party Manifesto 2015, London: Labour Party, 2015, pp.74-75. 26. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 27. HM GOVERNMENT, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, London: The Stationery Office, 2010, para. 1.3. 28. HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, vol.1, HC 761, London: The Stationery Office, 2011, para. 85. 29. Andrew GRICE, ‘Lib Dems push for “stand-by” Trident replacement deal’, The Independent, 19 Jul 2012. Available on line: , accessed 25 May 2015. 30. HM GOVERNMENT, Trident Alternatives Review, London: Cabinet Office, 2013. 31. LABOUR PARTY, Britain can be better, op. cit., p. 78. 32. SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY, Stronger for Scotland: SNP Manifesto 2015, Edinburgh: Scottish National Party, 2015, p. 20. 33. Patrick WINTOUR, ‘Trident row: Cameron defends Fallon’s attack on Miliband’, The Guardian, 9 Apr 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 34. Michael FALLON, ‘This unholy alliance would put Britain’s security in jeopardy’, The Times, 9 Apr 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 35. David CAMERON, speech, Cameron Direct event, Sherwood, 9 Apr 2015, quoted in Patrick Wintour, ‘Trident row…’, op. cit. 36. Defence and Security Election Debate, BBC Two, 28 Apr 2015. 37. HM GOVERNMENT, Securing Britain in an Age…, op. cit., paras. 2.D.3-2.D.5. 38. Liam FOX, interview with the author, 14 Jan 2015. 39. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure Future: The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, London: The Conservative Party, 2015, p. 75. 40. Ibid., p. 77. 41. Chatham House – YouGov Survey – General Public Results, Fieldwork dates 6-12 Aug 2014. The total sample size was 2,059 adults and was carried out online. Another survey focused on opinion-formers and was published under the title: Chatham House – YouGov Survey – Opinion- Former Results, Fieldwork Dates: 31 July – 16 Aug 2014. The total sample size was 704 adults. See also: Thomas RAINES, Internationalism or Isolationism? The Chatham House-YouGov Survey: British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2015. 42. YouGov Survey Results, Fieldwork: 23-24 April 2013. Similar results in YouGov/Sunday Times Survey Results, Fieldwork: 7-8 Mar 2013. 43. Michael FALLON, ‘A Conservative Party View of UK Defence Policy’, speech, Royal United Service Institute, London, 10 Apr 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 44. Chris GILES, ‘Britain and the cuts: Blow for Cameron as UK faces deeper cuts’, Financial Times, 10 Nov 2014. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 45. General Sir Nicholas HOUGHTON, interview, Andrew Marr Show, BBC, 9 Nov 2014. 46. ‘Nato 2% defence spending target should be met, MPs say’, BBC News, 12 Mar 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015.

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47. Ben FARMER, ‘Obama to Cameron: maintain UK defence spending or weaken Nato’, The Daily Telegraph, 10 Feb 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. See also US chief of staff General Raymond ODIERNO’s concerns in Con COUGHLIN and Steven SWINFORD, ‘US military chief: Britain cannot cut more troops’, The Daily Telegraph, 1 March 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 48. Michael FALLON, ‘A Conservative Party View…’, op. cit. 49. HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, Who does UK National Strategy?, HC 435, London: The Stationery Office, 2010, para. 39. 50. HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One, vol. 1, HC 197, London: The Stationery Office, 2014, paras 66-67. 51. Senior civil servants, interview with the author, Jan 2015. 52. ‘National security strategy “will be rushed”’, BBC News, 3 Mar 2015. Available on line: , accessed 13 May 2015. 53. HOUSE OF COMMONS DEFENCE COMMITTEE, The Strategic Defence and Security Review, HC 345, London: The Stationery Office, 2010, para. 30. 54. Ibid., para. 31.

ABSTRACTS

This article aims to show that foreign and defence policy has played an unusual role in the debate between the main parties in the 2015 general election. Whereas, in the “Westminster model” tradition, there are few parliamentary debates on the issue, the consensus on foreign and defence policy has gradually disappeared, and the royal prerogative has been replaced by a parliamentary prerogative, with Parliament deciding on the use of armed forces abroad. This paper examines the arguments used by the Conservative-led coalition government and the Opposition about the conditions for interventions. The parliamentary debate is thus analysed as a prelude to the electoral debate. The latter focused on the consequences of a possible change of government, especially in case Labour had been led to form a government with the support of the SNP. But even if the Conservatives traditionally define themselves as the “party of defence”, it is argued that domestic constraints, especially budgetary constraints, instead of a clear national strategy, now underpin Britain’s foreign and defence policy.

Cet article cherche à montrer que la politique étrangère et de défense a joué un rôle inhabituel dans le débat entre les principaux partis lors des élections législatives britanniques de 2015. Alors qu’elle était traditionnellement l’objet de peu de débats au sein du Parlement, la politique étrangère et de défense est de moins en moins consensuelle, et la prérogative royale a cédé la place à une nouvelle prérogative parlementaire sur la question du déploiement des forces armées. Cet article examine les arguments du gouvernement de coalition et ceux de l’opposition concernant les conditions de tels déploiements, prélude au débat qui précéda l’élection du 7 mai 2015. Celui-ci s’est concentré sur les conséquences d’un potentiel changement de gouvernement, notamment si les Travaillistes étaient amenés à faire alliance avec le Scottish National Party. Mais si les Conservateurs se définissent traditionnellement comme le « parti de la défense », les

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contraintes, notamment budgétaires, qui pèsent sur le gouvernement, semblent guider une politique dont la direction stratégique est désormais peu claire.

INDEX

Mots-clés: politique étrangère, politique de défense, Trident, Strategic Defence and Security Review, National Security Strategy, David Cameron Keywords: foreign policy, defence policy, Trident, Strategic Defence and Security Review, National Security Strategy, David Cameron

AUTHOR

THIBAUD HARROIS

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3

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Challenges and Challengers: Is the Mould Breaking? Nouveaux défs et nouvelles menaces: la fn d'une ère?

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The Elephant in the Room: Europe in the 2015 British General Election La grande absente: l’Europe dans les élections législatives de 2015

Pauline Schnapper

Europe has been a divisive issue in British politics for at least three decades, when the ratification of the Maastricht treaty opened divisions in the Conservative party after decades during which Labour had been split on the question. Yet it has usually played a very limited, if not insignificant, role in British general elections. When asked about their main concerns, voters hardly ever mention Europe, but rather domestic issues such as the economy, the NHS and immigration. 2015 was no exception to this rule, with only 6% of voters mentioning the European Union (EU) as the most important issue for them, in spite of the apparent rise of in the country.1 Politicians know that they have little to gain therefore from tackling the issue, as William Hague learnt the hard way when he tried to campaign to “Keep the Pound” against New Labour in 2001, and made no electoral gain out of it. Yet the 2015 general election could have been different because this time, the outcome of the election was going to have dramatic consequences on the future of Britain in the EU. In a speech on 23 January 2013, David Cameron had promised to organise an in/out referendum by the end of 2017 should the Conservatives win a majority in the House of Commons in 2015. This was the result of on-going pressure both from some of his own backbenchers and from UKIP, which made spectacular gains in second-order elections between 2010 and 2015. Neither Labour nor the Liberal Democrats had matched this pledge, so the outcome of the general election could potentially change the course of the history of Britain in Europe. A debate on the EU could have been organized during the campaign, but this did not happen. Beyond voter lack of interest, none of the three mainstream national parties wished to say much about the EU for a number of reasons that will be explored in this article. Europe was therefore very much the elephant in the room, looming large over the campaign but hardly mentioned until the day after the election.

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In order to explore both the importance of the issue and its low salience, I will first briefly recall the process by which, in the course of the five years of coalition government, Europe became again a divisive issue in the Conservative party, leading the government to gradually become marginalised in the EU in ways which were not very different from what happened under the last Conservative government, under John Major (1990-97). The second section will look at the campaign itself and the way parties used or avoided the issue. Finally, I will try to assess the consequences of the Conservative victory over the prospect of “”, or British exit from the European Union.

Party Pressure and the Road to Isolation

David Cameron had tried to please the growing number of eurosceptics in his party in opposition as early as his election as leader in 2005. He had pledged that Conservative members of the European Parliament would leave the centre-right European People’s Party, deemed too federalist, to establish a new eurosceptic but not extreme-right grouping. When the Lisbon treaty was signed by the Brown government in 2007, he had demanded a referendum and when this proposal was turned down, William Hague, the shadow Foreign Secretary, promised “not to let matters rest there”, although what he meant by this exactly was never clarified. Indeed Cameron abandoned the pledge when the Lisbon treaty was ratified by all other member states, much to the dismay of his radical eurosceptic backbenchers. He was therefore already on the defensive when he pledged in the 2010 manifesto to introduce a bill in Parliament which would require any new transfer of power to Brussels to be subject to a referendum (Conservative Party 2010: 113). The party would also campaign for a repatriation of powers to the national level in three areas: the Charter of Fundamental Rights, criminal justice and social legislation (p. 114). There was no mention of an in/out referendum at that stage or of other policies which should be repatriated. The Liberal Democrats agreed to the “referendum lock” clause in the coalition document signed in May 2010 (HM Government 2010). In this case as on other European issues, their attitude was low-key and their influence limited during the five-year coalition: when it came to Europe, the difficult ‘coalition’ seemed to be between hard and soft Conservative eurosceptics rather than between the two parties in power. The “lock” was duly introduced in Parliament in the European Union Bill, which became an Act in 2011. But it was not enough to satisfy the hardline eurosceptics, in particular the veteran MP Bill Cash, who headed the EU Scrutiny Committee, and pressure grew within the party in favour of an in/out referendum.2 In October 2011, a motion was introduced by David Nuttall, a hard eurosceptic who was part of the new intake of Conservative MPs, following an e-petition asking for a referendum which had gathered more than 100,000 signatures. At that time the government was adamantly against the idea and imposed a three-line whip on the vote. This did not prevent the first major rebellion on Europe since Maastricht, with 81 Conservative MPs voting in favour of the motion (D’Ancona 2014, p. 243-244). This domestic context explains to a large extent the first crisis between the Cameron government and its European partners at the December 2011 European Council. The Prime Minister had already refused to take part in the bail-out packages for countries such as Portugal and Spain which were affected by the sovereign-debt crisis. This time,

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he opposed - without discussing it with Nick Clegg, his pro-European coalition partner – the fiscal compact proposed by the other member-states in order to strengthen the coordination of budgetary policies within the eurozone. Although not a member of the eurozone and therefore not directly affected, he argued that it would be detrimental to the interests of the . This was hardly the ‘veto’ that he claimed, since the other EU states went ahead with the plan outside the EU institutions, but it was a clear signal that the British approach to EU affairs would be much more negative than under the previous New Labour governments. In July 2012, Cameron took a further step to attempt to placate the Conservative eurosceptics, some of whom were tempted to defect to UKIP. The government announced that a “review of the balance of competences” between the national government and the EU would be conducted across the different ministerial departments. This would examine for each area whether the balance was right or whether the government should attempt to repatriate powers to the national level. It would inform future decisions taken by the government. The irony of this exercise, completed in summer 2014, was that its conclusions were broadly positive about the European Union and the balance between Brussels and London, leading it to be quietly shelved and hardly commented on in the (mostly eurosceptic) press.3 Cameron’s failure to please the hard eurosceptics became even more visible when on 31 October 2012 the government suffered its first parliamentary defeat on the EU budget. Conservative hard eurosceptics joined Labour MPs in voting for a sharp reduction in the EU budget, ringing enough bells in 10 Downing Street to prompt David Cameron to give in on the prospect of a referendum. On 23 January 2013, Cameron delivered a speech in the London Bloomberg headquarters where he promised a renegotiation of the terms of British membership of the EU if he won the 2015 general election, followed by an in/out referendum in the UK by the end of 2017 (Cameron 2013). He mentioned the need for more flexibility in Europe, less regulation and more power for national parliaments. The parallel with Harold Wilson’s tactics to keep the Labour Party united behind him in 1974-75 was obvious and, indeed, his U-turn was very well received by Tory backbenchers, who had attempted to introduce a number of Private Members’ bills with similar aims.4 In the run up to the lifting of restrictions on the free circulation of Romanians and Bulgarians in the EU on 1 January 2014, the issue of EU migrants came to the fore of the British debate, leading Cameron to contemplate imposing controls on EU migration, which is unlawful under the Single European Act.5 As German Chancellor Angela Merkel reacted angrily that this could not happen, he backtracked and suggested first imposing restrictions on so-called ‘benefit tourism’, then in late 2014 restricting migrants’ access to welfare for several years (Cameron 2014). By then, he was under growing pressure from UKIP, which in May 2014 had won the European elections and in the autumn secured the defection of two Conservative MPs, thereby gaining its first two parliamentary seats. Cameron’s second and equally unsuccessful battle with his European partners came after the May 2014 European elections. New rules to make EU institutions more accountable had been adopted in the Lisbon treaty, by which the main parties in the European Parliament would choose a ‘leader’ who would then be appointed as the new President of the European Commission if his/her party won a majority of seats in the European Parliament elections. The leader of the EPP, which won the highest number

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of seats in May 2014 was Jean-Claude Juncker, the former Prime Minister of Luxemburg. David Cameron decided to oppose his appointment, arguing that it ‘shouldn’t be the Parliament’s role, but the heads of state and governments’, to appoint the President of the Commission and that Juncker, as a federalist and representative of unpopular old- style Brussels politics, was not a suitable candidate.6 But he failed to find allies in the EU, in spite of early signals from Merkel as well as the Swedish and Dutch Prime Ministers that they might not support Juncker. In the end, he called for a formal vote in the June European Council in which he was outnumbered by 26 to 2, with only Hungary supporting him.7 By the time of the 2015 general election, David Cameron had therefore given in to his eurosceptic backbenchers by committing his party to a referendum on “Brexit”, although he made clear he expected to win enough concessions from his partners to call for a yes vote to stay in the EU. At the same time and in apparent contradiction, he had antagonised many of his European neighbours with a negative attitude to EU attempts to strengthen integration in the midst of a deep economic crisis. He made few friends in the EU in the process and lost those he had had in the past, Northern and Eastern Europeans who would normally share his Atlanticist and economically liberal views but rejected his anti-immigration rhetoric. He faced an uphill struggle to reverse the marginalisation of his country in the EU and extract concessions from them.

The Campaign

On the day after the 7 May general election, the political debate returned immediately to Europe and Cameron’s promise to organise a referendum, which was announced in the Queen’s speech on 27 May, illustrating how crucial the issue was. Yet this stood in stark contrast to the campaign itself, where Europe was hardly present, at least in the mainstream parties’ campaign. As we have seen, David Cameron had agreed to a referendum in part to avoid eurosceptic pressure during the campaign and limit the damage UKIP could do to his electoral chances. The Conservative manifesto therefore insisted that the party would “ give you a say over whether we should stay in or leave the EU”, but it was short on substantive issues, except to pledge to “reform the workings of the EU, which is too big, too bossy and too bureaucratic; reclaim power from Brussels on your behalf and safeguard British interests in the Single Market” (Conservative Party 2015). There was no need to be more explicit at that stage, and the less the EU was talked about during the campaign, with Conservative divisions papered over in the short term, the less UKIP could pressurize and divide the Tories. There was no discussion of the reforms which would need to be agreed in order to support staying in the EU and Cameron was not really pushed on the issue by other parties or journalists. Their coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, declined to promise an in/out referendum, although in 2007 they were in favour of a referendum on the Lisbon treaty, which they supported, but were not keen to raise the issue. Traditionally more pro-European than the two other main parties, and indeed than the British public at large, they had also had a bruising experience when Nick Clegg confronted Nigel Farage, the UKIP leader, in two televised debates in April 2014, which Clegg was widely seen as having lost.8 Europe was not a vote-winner for the Lib Dems and their manifesto

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mainly repeated a very general pro-EU stance, qualified by equally vague criticism of the way the EU worked, a view supposedly in tune with the mood of the country: Liberal Democrats want Britain to remain a member of the EU because we are fighting for a stronger economy and British jobs… But that doesn’t mean the European Union is perfect: far from it. Liberal Democrats want to reform the EU so that it concentrates on doing the things it’s good at such as creating jobs, fighting climate change and combating cross-border criminal gangs, but stays out of decisions better decided at national, devolved or local levels.(Liberal Democrats 2015) During the campaign, Clegg softened his opposition to the idea of a referendum, saying he might accept it provided a number of conditions were met.9 He was by then hoping to be in a position to negotiate another coalition with the Conservatives after the election, and therefore wanted to keep all options open, knowing that this would be a red line for the Tories. The Lib Dem manifesto was not very different from Labour’s, which stated that “because Britain will be better off remaining at the heart of a reformed EU, Labour will make the hard- headed, patriotic case both for reform in Europe, not exit from Europe” (Labour Party 2015). Ed Miliband, its leader since 2010, insisted, like the Liberal Democrats, on the folly of “ Brexit”. But he was more on the defensive on this issue than Clegg because he had resisted the pressure from inside and outside his own party to match Cameron’s promise to organise a referendum.10 He had therefore no reason to make too much of the European issue, on which he risked being accused of refusing a democratic vote. Indeed he appeared awkward and uncomfortable when confronted on why he refused a referendum on EU membership by a factory worker on the campaign trail in .11 The two Labour voices that were heard about Europe during the campaign were those of Gordon Brown and Tony Blair, the ex-Prime Ministers, neither of whom stood anymore for election. Brown published a pro-EU article in the Guardian and Tony Blair delivered a speech criticising the Conservatives over Europe in his former Sedgefield constituency.12 As a result of the mainstream parties’ reluctance to mention the EU in the campaign, this was left to what we call the successful insurgent parties in this journal issue, i.e. UKIP and the Scottish National Party (SNP), although for different reasons. A British withdrawal from the EU has been UKIP’s raison d’être since it was created in 1993. Its whole 2015 manifesto was based on the idea that this would solve all of Britain’s problems, in particular immigration, the economy and the NHS, as the first line of its introduction clearly showed: “This manifesto is our blueprint for a Britain released from the shackles of the interfering EU” (UKIP 2015). In the general election, Farage was hoping to gain at least a handful more MPs on top of the two he had gained in 2014. In case of a hung Parliament, he might be able to bargain his support for a minority Conservative government in exchange for an immediate referendum on ‘Brexit’. Mentioning Europe was also a way to increase pressure on the Conservatives, who feared losing voters to UKIP in the south of England. In the case of the SNP, Europe was one area where the party could distance itself from all unionist parties by making an unambiguously pro-European case. The manifesto opposed withdrawal from the EU without the qualifications of Labour or the Lib Dems’ document: At least 330,000 Scottish jobs – around one in seven of all jobs – are dependent on our membership of the single market. That is why we will oppose a referendum on

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membership of the EU. Being part of Europe is good for business and it supports jobs in Scotland and across the UK. (SNP 2015) Europe was also a useful tool to strengthen the nationalists’ case for independence. They were able to turn the relatively more pro-European views of many Scots, confirmed in a number of polls, to their advantage.13 The simple argument was that if there was to be a referendum in the UK about leaving the EU, the only certain way for Scots to remain in the EU was to vote SNP and to support Scottish independence. Nicola Sturgeon repeated several times that in case of Brexit, all parts of the UK should vote for it, asking effectively for a Scottish veto in the referendum – which she knew the British government would never accept.14 In the Scottish leaders’ debate on 9 April, she explicitly threatened to demand a second referendum on Scottish independence if the UK voted to leave the EU.15 Europe was therefore once again a tool in the SNP’s overall strategy to distance itself from Westminster politics and policies.16

Is Brexit more likely ?

The immediate effect of the general election results was that, with the new Conservative overall majority in the House of Commons, a referendum on the future of Britain in the EU is no longer just possible but now certain. David Cameron confirmed that it will take place by the end of 2017 and possibly earlier, depending on the negotiations he is going to start with his European partners. After Ed Miliband’s resignation from the Labour leadership, the party opted to support the referendum. The Queen’s speech announced that: My government will renegotiate the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union and pursue reform of the European Union for the benefit of all member states. Alongside this, early legislation will be introduced to provide for an in-out referendum on membership of the European Union before the end of 2017.17 The Prime Minister started a tour of European capitals to lay out a general list of UK demands, without being too specific. Issues often mentioned involved a possible opt out from the aim of ‘ever closer union’ which is in the European treaties; completing the single market and protecting the interests of the City; curbing welfare access for immigrants. This was meant to keep him some room for manoeuvre both for the negotiations and domestically. It was also a far cry from the ideas about fundamental change in the relationship with the EU or the repatriation of substantial powers from Brussels which had often been aired in the past, and this made success in the negotiations more likely or less unlikely in the future. Similarly, it became clear as early as the 26 June European Council, that there would be no treaty change in the EU before the referendum took place. Cameron’s main difficulty is going to be to find a compromise between what the radical eurosceptics demand and what the European Union member states are able and willing to grant him. At the moment the gap between the two looks difficult to bridge, so he will aim to obtain enough substantial and symbolic concessions in Brussels to convince, not so much the anti-Europeans, as enough British voters to win the referendum. Indeed, like Wilson in the 1970s, resorting to a referendum is not just a way to please opponents to membership of the EU but also the means to bypass their opposition, going directly to ‘the people’. But another possible comparison is with the Major years. Like Major after the 1992 general election, Cameron’s majority is already very small. This could give extra leverage to the eurosceptic backbenchers, like Major’s ‘bastards’

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then, to harass the government. Furthermore, some radical eurosceptics, like or Boris Johnson (who has sent ambiguous signals on the topic of Brexit) sit in the Cabinet, which was not the case in the 1990s. Cameron will have to walk a fine line to maintain at least some of them on board in the run up to the referendum. The outcome of the ballot is of course impossible to forecast in 2015. Opinion polls in 2014 and 2015 showed a slight majority of voters in favour of staying in the EU, especially if the government achieved a successful negotiation. 18 But the general election showed that polls were not always reliable. Furthermore, much will depend on Cameron’s results in the negotiations, the popularity of his government when the vote takes place, the Greek crisis and the state of the eurozone economies, the strengths and weaknesses of the future ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns, that is a mixture of domestic and European factors. A period of political uncertainty for Britain and for the EU has started.

Conclusion

Europe is going to dominate British political debate until the referendum on membership of the EU takes place sometime in 2016 or 2017. Yet the merits or otherwise of membership were never discussed during the campaign, except by Nigel Farage, the UKIP leader, and Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP leader, two parties which were unlikely to become part of the UK government but exercised strong pressure on the traditional political system. None of the main three party leaders saw any compelling reason to mention it on the doorsteps or in the national medias, both because voters did not seem interested and because, for different reasons, they were all on the defensive and preferred to avoid talking about Europe altogether, thereby postponing the discussion to a future referendum campaign. Europe remains more than ever a difficult question in British politics, bringing trouble to all mainstream parties. They therefore choose the conservative attitude of not mentioning it when they can rather than engaging the public.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CONSERVATIVE PARTY (2015), Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure Future, Conservative Party Manifesto, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf, accessed 30 June 2015.

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SCHNAPPER, Pauline. “The Labour Party and Europe from Brown to Miliband: Back to the Future”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, n°1, 2015, pp. 157-173.

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UKIP (2015), Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, http://ukip-serv.org/theukipmanifesto2015.pdf, accessed 30 June 2015.

NOTES

1. The Guardian, 20 January 2015. 2. Julie SMITH, “Europe: The coalition’s poisened chalice” in Anthony SELDON and Mike FINN (eds.), The Coalition Effect, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 383; Philip LYNCH, “The Con-Lib Agenda for Europe” pp. 218-236 in Simon LEE & Matt BEECH (eds.), The Cameron-Clegg Government, Palgrave, 2011. 3. The reports can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/final-reports-in-review- of-eu-balance-of-competences-published, accessed 1 July 2015. See also Simon USHERWOOD, ‘Hand-waving as renegociation : the UK’s (and EU’s) limited options’, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ europpblog/2013/09/26/hand-waving-as-renegotiation-the-uks-and-eus-limited-options/, 26 September 2013, accessed 23 June 2015. 4. See http://www.conservativehome.com/the-jury/2013/01/what-did-you-think-of-david- camerons-europe-speech.html, accessed 29 June 2015.

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5. David CAMERON, “Free movement within Europe needs to be less free”, Financial Times, 26 November 2013. 6. “Juncker is wrong person for European Commission job, says David Cameron”, The Guardian, 27 June 2014. 7. “David Cameron loses Jean-Claude Juncker vote”, The Guardian, 27 June 2014. 8. “Farage vs Clegg: UKIP leader triumphs in second televised debate”, The Guardian, 3 April 2014. The second debate can be watched on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fd9rsmD4HiM. 9. “Nick Clegg set to exact steep price for backing EU referendum”, Financial Times, 31 March 2015. 10. “Ed Miliband set for decision on Europe referendum”, The Guardian, 19 May 2012. 11. “Ed Miliband confronted by working class voter over Europe”, Daily Telegraph, 19 February 2015. 12. Gordon BROWN, “The truly patriotic British view on Europe ? We must lead from within”, The Guardian, 9 March 2015; “Tony Blair backs Ed Miliband and warns of EU chaos if Tories win election”, The Guardian, 7 April 2015. 13. See for instance the British Future poll showing that over 50% of Scots would vote in favour of staying in the EU against 33%, quoted in The Scotsman, 6 June 2015. 14. “Scotland should have veto on UK exit from EU, says Sturgeon”, Financial Times, 29 octobre 2014. 15. http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05tv6dm/the-leaders-debate. 16. Gilles LEYDIER, « L’Europe, une ressource politique pour le SNP » pp. 47-62 in Agnès ALEXANDRE-COLLIER, Bernard D’HELLENCOURT and Pauline SCHNAPPER (eds.), Le Royaume-Uni et l’Union européenne depuis 1997, Dijon, Editions Universitaires, 2007 ; Pauline SCHNAPPER, “New Labour, Devolution and British Identity : the Foreign Policy Consequences” pp. 48-62 in Oliver DADDOW and Jamie GASKARTH (eds.), British Foreign Policy : The New Labour Years, Palgrave, 2011. 17. Queen’s speech 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015, accessed 1 July 2015. 18. At the time of writing, the latest poll available gave 45% of respondents in favour of staying and 35% for leaving. See https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/04/22/eu-referendum-lead-10/, accessed 1 July 2015.

ABSTRACTS

Europe was hardly mentioned by the mainstream parties in the 2015 general election campaign in spite of the fact that its outcome was going to have a dramatic impact on whether an in/out referendum was going to be organised in the UK or not. For different reasons, it was not in the interest of either the Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Democrats to make much use of the issue, leaving it to UKIP and, to a certain extent the SNP. In contrast to the election campaign, Europe is now going to dominate the political debate until the referendum takes place in 2016 or 2017.

La question européenne a été peu abordée par les principaux partis politiques britanniques pendant la campagne législative de 2015 malgré les conséquences importantes du résultat sur l’organisation ou non d’un référendum sur le maintien dans l’UE. Pour des raisons différentes, ni les Conservateurs, ni les Travaillistes ni les Libéraux-démocrates n’avaient intérêt à en parler,ce

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qui a laissé le champ libre à UKIP et dans une moindre mesure le SNP. Contrairement à ce qui s’est passé pendant la campagne, l’Europe va dominer le débat politique outre-Manche jusqu’au référendum, en 2016 ou 2017.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Union européenne, référendum, parti conservateur, Brexit, UKIP Keywords: European Union, referendum, Conservatives, Brexit, UKIP

AUTHOR

PAULINE SCHNAPPER

Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3

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Les élections législatives de 2015 en Écosse : résurgence et reconfiguration des enjeux constitutionnels The 2015 General Election in Scotland: the Re-Emergence of Constitutional Issues in a New Shape

Edwige Camp-Pietrain

Introduction

1 Les questions constitutionnelles ne devaient pas constituer des enjeux lors des élections du 7 mai 2015 en Écosse. Les Travaillistes écossais, du côté des vainqueurs à l'issue du référendum d'autodétermination, pouvaient même espérer conserver leur domination. Pourtant, ils ont rapidement déchanté, dès l'automne 2014, au vu de sondages d'opinion laissant présager une déroute totale en Écosse, laquelle empêcherait leur parti de former un gouvernement disposant d'une majorité à la Chambre des Communes. Dès lors, les questions constitutionnelles se sont multipliées : à celles agitant traditionnellement la classe politique écossaise (compétences du Parlement écossais, modalités d'accession à l'indépendance) s'est ajoutée celle d'une alliance entre SNP et Travaillistes. Le SNP s'est donc trouvé au centre de la campagne, en Écosse, mais aussi dans l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni, en tête dans les sondages tandis que ses thèmes de prédilection devenaient dominants. Son résultat, exceptionnel, est loin de mettre un terme à toutes les interrogations, reposant même la question centrale de l'avenir du Royaume-Uni.

2 Les enjeux institutionnels, toujours prééminents, ont connu une évolution depuis le référendum. À la fin de l'année 2014, il s'agissait d'améliorer la dévolution du pouvoir. Le débat s'est ensuite déplacé vers les possibilités d'influence du SNP, sur le plan

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constitutionnel, auprès d'un éventuel gouvernement travailliste pendant la campagne, puis sur le gouvernement formé par David Cameron à l'issue du scrutin1.

Des enjeux constitutionnels officiellement réglés après le référendum

3 Les dirigeants politiques écossais s'accordaient pour souligner que les élections à la Chambre des Communes de 2015 n'étaient pas axées sur les enjeux constitutionnels. En ce qui concerne l'accession à l'indépendance, celle-ci avait fait l'objet de deux ans de campagne électorale intense, au cours de laquelle tous les arguments avaient été échangés, pesés, critiqués. Or le 18 septembre 2014, près de 55 % des Écossais avaient voté contre la création d'un État. Ce résultat avait été reconnu par les deux camps, unionistes (Conservateurs, Travaillistes, Libéraux-démocrates) et nationalistes, conformément à l'article 30 de l'accord d'Édimbourg du 15 octobre 2012 qui avait conféré un cadre légal au référendum.

La perspective de transferts de compétences à Holyrood

4 S'agissant de la dévolution, les responsables des partis écossais avaient compris qu'ils devaient proposer de nouveaux transferts de compétences au Parlement écossais, afin que le rejet de l'indépendance ne puisse être assimilé à la volonté de maintenir le statu quo. Ils avaient donc désigné des commissions chargées d'élaborer des projets. Si la réflexion des Libéraux-démocrates avait abouti dès l'automne 2012, les Travaillistes et les Conservateurs avaient dû surmonter des réticences internes avant de publier leurs projets au printemps 20142. Les dirigeants écossais, puis britanniques, de ces partis, se sont engagés à les mettre en application. Cet engagement a pris la forme solennelle d'un serment commun aux trois leaders à l'approche du référendum, lorsque la courbe d'intentions de vote en faveur de l'indépendance était en nette progression. À l'issue du référendum, les partis unionistes ont tenu leurs promesses. Dès le lendemain du référendum, David Cameron a désigné Lord Smith à la tête d'une commission de réflexion, lui assignant le calendrier serré qui avait été fixé par Gordon Brown. La commission a respecté ce cadre, en publiant son rapport le 27 novembre (avant la Saint-André), tandis que le gouvernement a rédigé un avant-projet de loi le 22 janvier (avant la fête de Robert Burns)3.

5 Les compétences à transférer étaient substantielles puisqu'elles devaient permettre aux dirigeants politiques écossais de traiter des questions ayant émergé pendant la campagne référendaire. De plus, nombre de domaines étant partagés entre gouvernements britannique et écossais, le projet impliquait une coopération étroite entre ces derniers. Sur le plan symbolique, et en l'absence de constitution écrite, la loi devait garantir la pérennité des institutions écossaises ainsi que leur protection contre toute immixtion du Parlement britannique4. Grâce à ses nouveaux pouvoirs fiscaux (en particulier la gestion des taux et des tranches de l'impôt sur le revenu et des taxes aéroportuaires) et à ses recettes supplémentaires (la moitié du produit de la TVA), le Parlement écossais serait en mesure de collecter des sommes correspondant à plus de 50 % de ses dépenses. Les députés à Holyrood seraient donc davantage responsables de leurs décisions. De plus, ces derniers se verraient confier certaines allocations (adulte handicapé), tout en ayant la possibilité d'abonder les allocations britanniques ; ils

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pourraient même instaurer des prestations. Ainsi, alors que le Gouvernement britannique conserverait la gestion de l'État-Providence, et, partant, de l' « » (soumis à un plafonnement), les élus écossais pourraient faire entendre leur différence quant au mode de versement de ce dernier, mais aussi au sujet de l'une de ses composantes, la « bedroom tax » (réduction de l'allocation-logement en cas de chambre inoccupée). De même, si le droit du travail continuait à relever du domaine réservé, le Parlement écossais pourrait gérer les indemnités dues en cas d'accidents de travail, les dispositifs de retour à l'emploi, ainsi que les tribunaux des prud'hommes, afin de renforcer les droits des salariés. En matière d'énergie, autre domaine réservé, le Parlement de Holyrood pourrait traiter l'épineuse question des hydrocarbures « non conventionnels », mais aussi s'attacher à la précarité énergétique en imposant des conditions aux sociétés de distribution. Il pourrait aussi contrôler les propriétés de la Couronne (Crown estates), notamment sur le littoral. 6 Le rapport Smith semblait faire l'unanimité puisqu'il avait été cosigné par des membres des cinq partis représentés au Parlement écossais, les trois unionistes, mais aussi les deux partis indépendantistes (SNP et Verts). L'avant-projet de loi du Gouvernement Cameron était jugé fidèle au rapport Smith par la commission des Affaires écossaises de la Chambre des Communes, dominée par les Travaillistes5. Le projet de loi devait être élaboré par le gouvernement formé à l'issue des élections législatives. Mais le gouvernement britannique avait accepté de transférer immédiatement, par voie réglementaire, les modalités d'élection du Parlement écossais, afin de laisser à ce dernier le temps nécessaire pour abaisser la majorité électorale pour les élections à Holyrood de 2016 et pour les élections locales6.

La rupture du consensus

7 Cependant, le consensus s'est quelque peu fissuré pour deux raisons principales. D'une part, en période pré-électorale, l'avant-projet de loi a fait l'objet de critiques partisanes. Les dirigeants du SNP ont martelé que les élus écossais seraient soumis à une tutelle pesante de « Londres » (nécessité d'accords préalables, définitions restrictives des termes), qualifiée de veto7. Ils se sont inquiétés de la méthode de calcul des compensations financières dues par chaque partie pour pallier toute incidence de ses choix sur l'autre partie. Les Nationalistes ont également remis en cause le mode juridique retenu pour protéger l'existence et les décisions du Parlement écossais. Quant aux Travaillistes écossais, ils ont tenté de se démarquer des deux autres partis unionistes avec lesquels ils avaient été associés pendant la campagne référendaire, tout en mettant l'accent sur leurs priorités. Jim Murphy, leur nouveau leader, et Gordon Brown, ont formulé un autre serment, s'engageant à publier un projet de loi de « home rule » au cours de leur premier trimestre au pouvoir. Cela permettrait de renforcer les pouvoirs du Parlement écossais en matière d'allocations (en l'autorisant à compléter toutes les allocations britanniques et à gérer intégralement l'allocation-logement) et d'emplois (en lui confiant toute la politique de retour à l'emploi, rapidement, par voie réglementaire).

8 D'autre part, le premier ministre a déclenché la polémique dès la nomination de la commission Smith en ouvrant un autre chantier, celui de la place des députés écossais à la Chambre des Communes8. Au lendemain du référendum, il a désigné une commission, sous la tutelle de William Hague. Mais seuls les Libéraux-démocrates y ont

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pris part, tandis que les Travaillistes appelaient à une réflexion plus approfondie dans le cadre d'une convention constitutionnelle. Pis, Alistair Darling, qui avait dirigé la campagne unioniste, a accusé David Cameron de vouloir paralyser les travaux de la commission Smith avec cette concomitance. Si le premier ministre a prouvé que l'avancement des deux réflexions n'était pas lié, il a persisté dans sa volonté d'accorder un droit de veto aux députés anglais sur les projets de loi « anglais ». En février 2015, William Hague a indiqué qu'il privilégiait l'instauration d'une étape supplémentaire dans la procédure législative, permettant aux députés anglais de voter une « LCM », après l'examen détaillé en commission, et avant la troisième lecture auprès de l'ensemble des députés britanniques9. Cependant, cela n'a pas apaisé les Travaillistes, Gordon Brown fustigeant l'émergence de deux catégories de députés10. Les Nationalistes ont mis en avant l'impossibilité de qualifier certains textes d' « anglais », en raison de leurs incidences, notamment financières, en Écosse. Même la commission parlementaire de la Réforme politique et constitutionnelle n'a pas caché son scepticisme11. 9 Ces questions ont pris de l'ampleur tout au long de la campagne électorale, en se focalisant sur la légitimité du SNP.

La mise en cause de la légitimité du SNP sur la scène politique britannique pendant la campagne électorale

10 Pendant la campagne électorale, alors que les acteurs politiques écossais ont continué à souligner que les questions constitutionnelles ne constituaient pas des enjeux électoraux, elles ont été omniprésentes. Le SNP était crédité d'intentions de vote constamment supérieures à 40 % par tous les instituts de sondage, tandis que les deux grands partis restaient au coude à coude sur le plan britannique. Les controverses ont donc porté sur la formation d'un gouvernement de coalition et sur les perspectives d'accession de l'Écosse à l'indépendance.

Le SNP et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni

11 D'une part, en ce qui concerne l'éventualité d'une alliance électorale, Nicola Sturgeon, nouveau leader du SNP et du Gouvernement écossais, a affiché une préférence claire et constante pour les Travaillistes, écartant les Conservateurs. Elle a posé des exigences minimales : la dévolution de compétences supplémentaires à Holyrood, la hausse (« modérée ») des dépenses publiques et le non-renouvellement des sous-marins nucléaires stationnés en Écosse. De plus, elle a habilement repositionné son parti au centre- gauche, alors que pendant la campagne référendaire, son prédécesseur avait été accusé d'incohérence entre son programme de dépenses (social-démocrate) et de recettes (d'inspiration néo-libérale). Sous l'impulsion de Sturgeon, le Gouvernement écossais a abandonné, dans son programme économique, la promesse d'abaisser l'impôt sur les sociétés12. De plus, le manifeste électoral du SNP a endossé des promesses « progressistes » du Parti travailliste : hausse du taux marginal de l'impôt sur le revenu et de la surtaxe sur les banques, taxation des bonus des banquiers et des propriétés immobilières luxueuses, abolition du statut fiscal privilégié des étrangers fortunés13. Les Nationalistes ont balayé avec succès toutes les objections des Travaillistes écossais quant à leur bilan : or, s'ils présentaient comme un emblème la suppression des droits

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universitaires, les bourses accordées aux étudiants étaient plus faibles en Écosse qu'en Angleterre.

12 David Cameron a axé une partie de sa campagne sur les pressions que Nicola Sturgeon ne manquerait pas d'exercer sur un gouvernement minoritaire dirigé par Ed Miliband, afin d'obtenir des concessions. Son objectif était double. D'une part, il cherchait à accentuer, auprès des Anglais, les craintes à l'égard d'un gouvernement britannique sous le joug d'un parti indépendantiste et dispendieux, ce qui devait les inciter à opter pour les Conservateurs. D'autre part, il voulait renforcer, auprès des Écossais, l'idée que les Travaillistes ne pouvaient l'emporter, ce qui leur laissait toute latitude pour voter SNP, en pouvant malgré tout espérer un gouvernement travailliste. 13 Dans ce contexte, sous la pression de ses députés écossais qui craignaient de perdre leurs sièges, Ed Miliband a publiquement rejeté toute alliance, formelle ou informelle, avec le SNP. Pour se maintenir au pouvoir, un gouvernement travailliste aurait besoin du soutien du SNP lors des votes de confiance et au moment de la discussion du budget annuel. Or les Travaillistes estimaient que les députés SNP ne chercheraient pas à s'y opposer, gardant en mémoire le souvenir cuisant de 197914. La configuration la plus probable serait celle de négociations au cas par cas, sur chaque texte, tout au long de la législature puisque la Chambre des Communes a désormais un terme fixe15. 14 Selon les Conservateurs, ceci aurait créé une instabilité permanente, tout en suscitant des interrogations quant à la légitimité de requêtes provenant d'un parti régionaliste, ne présentant des candidats que dans une partie du Royaume-Uni, et dirigé par un leader ne siégeant pas à la Chambre des Communes. Ces questions agitaient également les Travaillistes. Les figures de Charles Parnell et de William Gladstone ont été mentionnées à plusieurs reprises16. En réaction, Nicola Sturgeon a cherché à rassurer les Anglais, notamment au cours des débats télévisés, en soulignant qu'elle se contentait de prôner la fin des politiques d'austérité, conçues par les Conservateurs avec l'approbation tacite des Travaillistes17, sans renoncer à l'objectif d'équilibre des comptes ; le retour à ce dernier serait seulement plus progressif. De plus, à destination de leur électorat, les Nationalistes ont fait valoir que le Gouvernement britannique ne pourrait ignorer les suffrages émis par une partie de la population, notamment si ces suffrages favorisaient nettement un parti.

Le SNP et le statut de l'Écosse

15 D'autre part, l'accession à l'indépendance n'était plus à l'ordre du jour selon Nicola Sturgeon. Pourtant, le vote de septembre 2014, qualifié d'occasion unique pour la génération actuelle pendant toute la campagne référendaire, ne paraissait plus aussi définitif. Sturgeon n'a pas écarté la tenue d'une nouvelle consultation, en l'assortissant de trois « verrous », censés refléter la volonté du peuple. En effet, la consultation devrait faire l'objet d'un engagement dans le manifeste électoral du SNP pour les élections à Holyrood de 2016, avant d'être approuvée par les Écossais lors de ce scrutin, mais sa mise en œuvre nécessiterait un changement matériel substantiel. Si Sturgeon s'est gardée de fournir une liste exhaustive, elle a évoqué, à titre d'exemple, la convocation d'un référendum sur l'appartenance à l'UE par le Gouvernement Cameron. En effet, les sondages d'opinion laissant penser que les Écossais sont moins eurosceptiques que les Anglais, ils ne pourraient tolérer une sortie de l'UE sous l'effet d'une majorité de voix anglaises.

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16 Toutefois, la First minister préférait esquiver tout engagement ferme à organiser un second référendum d'autodétermination, souhaitant être certaine de l'emporter. Or au début de 2015, les Écossais ne semblaient pas désireux de revenir sur leur vote de l'année précédente. Mais Sturgeon avait l'intention de poursuivre son travail de persuasion, en saisissant toutes les occasions. Elle a ainsi martelé que les institutions britanniques ne servaient pas les intérêts écossais, citant à l'envi les propos tenus en janvier 2015 par Nicholas MacPherson, secrétaire du Trésor britannique18. Celui-ci a reconnu le caractère unioniste de son administration, en faisant notamment référence à la publication d'un avis, en février 2014, rejetant toute union monétaire avec une Écosse indépendante. 17 Les unionistes n'ont cessé d'affirmer que le SNP, obnubilé par la question institutionnelle, était prêt à plonger à nouveau l'Écosse dans un débat la divisant. David Cameron a voulu s'aventurer sur la question de la légalité de ce second référendum, en la récusant par avance. Mais il n'a pas été suivi par , leader des Conservateurs écossais, laquelle a précisé que sa formation ne s'opposerait pas à l'expression démocratique du peuple, rappelant à quel point la campagne de 2014 avait passionné ce dernier. Jim Murphy souhaitait à l'origine éluder cette question afin de séduire les électeurs travaillistes qui avaient voté pour l'indépendance. Mais en fin de campagne, constatant l'échec de cette stratégie qui tendait même à accroître les intentions de vote en faveur du SNP, il s'est mis à dénoncer avec force la perspective d'un second référendum. 18 Par contre, les unionistes s'accordaient pour stigmatiser le danger d'une indépendance progressive, acquise indirectement. En effet, Nicola Sturgeon et , demeuré ministre des Finances et devenu numéro deux du Gouvernement écossais, ont défendu le projet qu'ils avaient remis à la commission Smith, en faveur d'une dévolution « maximale » (devo-max), ne laissant au gouvernement britannique que la défense, la politique étrangère, la monnaie19. Sur le plan fiscal, le Parlement écossais serait donc entièrement autonome, même si le SNP préférait désormais employer le terme « responsable » afin d'asseoir sa crédibilité. Certes, le SNP pouvait faire valoir sa constance car non seulement il prônait cette réforme depuis 2001, mais, qui plus est, le Gouvernement d'Alex Salmond avait envisagé de la soumettre aux électeurs, aux côtés de l'indépendance, lors du référendum d'autodétermination20. Néanmoins, ses adversaires doutaient de la compatibilité de ce type de projet avec un État unitaire. Ils remettaient également en cause sa viabilité en raison de l'effondrement des cours du pétrole, le baril ayant perdu la moitié de sa valeur entre août 2014 et janvier 2015. Les unionistes n'ont cessé de rappeler que l'autonomie fiscale impliquait la suppression de la dotation annuelle provenant du budget britannique, présentée comme un filet de sécurité. Le déficit budgétaire de l'Écosse, rapporté à son PIB, estimé à 6,4 % en 2013-201421, passerait à 8,4 % en 2015-2016 et 4,6 % à l'horizon 2020. Or dans le reste du Royaume-Uni, le déficit, de 4,1 % en 2013-2014, aurait disparu en 2020. L'écart, déjà perceptible avant la baisse des cours, ne ferait que s'accentuer, pour atteindre 7,6 milliards de livres en 2015-2016 selon l'Institute for fiscal studies, organisme indépendant22. Ce dernier chiffre a été martelé par les unionistes pendant la campagne, afin de souligner la perspective de fortes hausses d'impôts et/ou de baisses des dépenses23. Cela n'a pas entamé la confiance des Nationalistes, tant à l'égard de la fluctuation des cours que de la possibilité de recueillir d'autres recettes. Nicola Sturgeon a même ajouté qu'elle réclamerait l'adoption de l'autonomie fiscale dès la

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première année de la législature, tout en affirmant pouvoir compter sur la dotation britannique, et sur la formule Barnett, dans la phase de transition24. 19 En outre, les Travaillistes écossais, toujours soucieux de se démarquer des Conservateurs, se sont élevés contre deux dispositions du manifeste de ces derniers (reprises dans le manifeste écossais25), pouvant elles aussi conduire à un démantèlement du Royaume-Uni. Le parti conservateur proposait le vote d'un impôt anglais sur le revenu, par les députés anglais à la Chambre des Communes, parce que le barème écossais serait désormais fixé par le Parlement d'Édimbourg. Or le principal impôt en Grande-Bretagne constituant un socle commun, la définition d'impôts nationaux ouvrirait une brèche dans l'Union. De plus, cet impôt ne serait pas entièrement dévolu à Holyrood, Westminster gérant les exonérations et les dégrèvements. Il y aurait donc, selon les adversaires des Conservateurs, une incohérence à empêcher les députés écossais à la Chambre des Communes de prendre part aux votes. Qui plus est, le manifeste conservateur prévoyait d'obliger le Parlement écossais à rendre des comptes, chaque année, au Parlement britannique sur l'utilisation des fonds publics, ce qui paraissait contrevenir à l'esprit de la dévolution. Or le SNP pourrait mettre en évidence cette tutelle. Gordon Brown (qui ne se représentait pas) est sorti de son silence pour fustiger une stratégie visant à stimuler, pour mieux les opposer, un nationalisme anglais et un nationalisme écossais26. 20 Les questions constitutionnelles ont pris une autre dimension à l'issue du scrutin, même si, sur le fond, ce sont les enjeux considérés comme réglés avant le scrutin qui continuaient à se trouver au cœur des débats.

Une victoire du SNP reposant la question centrale de l'Union

21 Le 7 mai 2015, le SNP a rassemblé une majorité absolue de suffrages (50 %) et emporté la quasi-totalité des sièges écossais (56 sur 59). Jamais les Travaillistes, majoritaires depuis une cinquantaine d'années, n'étaient parvenus à une telle hégémonie, obtenant au maximum 70 % des sièges. De même, en 1955, lorsque les Conservateurs ont atteint la majorité absolue des voix, ils n'ont recueilli qu'un peu plus de la moitié des sièges. Qui plus est, cette hégémonie est relativement homogène sur le territoire car 60 % des circonscriptions ont accordé au SNP une majorité absolue, et ce, au terme d'une progression généralisée. Par contraste, en 2010, les Travaillistes avaient recueilli 50 % des voix dans un tiers des sièges.

Un résultat lié au référendum

22 Ce résultat peut être analysé comme la conséquence du référendum. À l'issue de celui- ci, le SNP a enregistré un quadruplement des adhésions (dépassant 100 000), ainsi qu'une inflexion des courbes d'intentions de vote en sa faveur alors que jusque-là, il était devancé par les Travaillistes à ce type d'élections. Ce regain de popularité s'expliquait par la normalisation du parti et de son objectif indépendantiste dans le jeu politique, mais aussi par la prise en compte des enjeux à travers le prisme des seuls intérêts écossais, désormais associés au SNP. Ce regain, antérieur à l'accession de Nicola Sturgeon à la tête du parti, a été décuplé par celle-ci. Cela se mesurait autant aux réactions suscitées par ses déplacements (et par sa proximité avec la population,

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symbolisée par les « selfies » qu'elle avait la réputation de ne jamais refuser) qu'à l'appréciation de ses prestations lors des débats télévisés qui lui ont d'ailleurs permis d'acquérir une stature comparable à celle de Cameron et Miliband. Plus consensuelle qu'Alex Salmond, notamment auprès des femmes, elle ne faisait pas mystère de ses origines sociales modestes, ce qui la rendait plus crédible pour porter un message d'espoir. Sturgeon, entrée en politique à l'âge de 16 ans, avant de gravir rapidement les échelons internes du parti, a ainsi réussi le tour de force de se présenter comme une femme politique différente de l'establishment traditionnel avec lequel les indépendantistes voulaient rompre lors du référendum27.

23 À leur grande stupéfaction, les Travaillistes ont constaté que leur message n'était plus audible. Certes, ils avaient perçu le danger à l'examen des résultats du référendum, près d'un tiers de leurs électeurs de 2010 ayant opté pour l'indépendance. De plus, les quatre collectivités locales ayant accordé une majorité absolue au « oui » étaient des territoires qu'ils considéraient comme leurs bastions (, , North Lanarkshire et West Dunbartonshire). Jim Murphy avait affiché sa détermination à les récupérer, avec l'aide de Blair McDougall, qui avait dirigé la campagne Better Together. Il a révisé en hâte le programme de son parti sur quelques points-clés (tel le financement du recrutement d'infirmières par le produit de la taxe anglaise sur les propriétés luxueuses). Mais il n'a pu surmonter les accusations quotidiennes de collusion entre Travaillistes et Conservateurs, membres d'un même establishment britannique qui avait déjà démontré sa proximité lors de la campagne référendaire. Il n'a pas été en mesure de donner de la cohérence à son programme, avec une vision claire. Or Ian Murray, seul député travailliste réélu, avait pris des positions fermes, proches de celles du SNP, contre Trident et l'austérité. Plus que jamais, le SNP est apparu comme le défenseur des intérêts écossais, à tel point qu'il n'a pas été desservi par les incohérences économiques de son programme, d'autant que les critiques des Travaillistes paraissaient trop complexes face à la simplicité de ses slogans. Ainsi, est apparue une corrélation forte entre le vote SNP et le taux de chômage dans les circonscriptions, mais aussi avec le vote Travailliste aux élections de 2010 (coefficients de corrélation de 0,6)28. Le SNP a gagné les élections en occupant le terrain des Travaillistes et en fédérant les suffrages des personnes ayant voté « oui » le 18 septembre 2014. 24 Les trois partis unionistes se sont partagés les voix des personnes ayant rejeté l'indépendance, ce qui est préjudiciable dans un scrutin majoritaire. Le vote tactique, soutenu par des groupes de pression comme Forward together, ou Scotland in Union, n'a eu aucun effet notable. Les Conservateurs ont conservé leur seul député, mais ils ont perdu des parts de voix alors que pour la première fois, ils proposaient des réformes constitutionnelles. Les Libéraux-démocrates, qui avaient piloté ces dernières au sein du Gouvernement Cameron, ont été sanctionnés en raison de cette coalition : sur 11 députés, seul , dernier Secrétaire d'État à l'Écosse, a été reconduit. Côté indépendantiste, les Verts et le SSP ont souhaité maintenir leur identité distincte, déclinant l'offre du SNP qui consistait à présenter des candidatures issues du mouvement Yes Scotland, mais sous l'étiquette du parti nationaliste. De ce fait, ils ont souffert de l'engouement pour le SNP. Ces petits partis, qui avaient eux aussi enregistré une forte hausse des adhésions à l'issue du référendum, ont plutôt pris date pour les élections à Holyrood de 2016.

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Une voix forte pour l'Écosse à Westminster ?

25 La représentation du SNP aura un impact sur le fonctionnement de la Chambre des Communes. Elle contribue à féminiser celle-ci (29 %) car 20 députés SNP sont des femmes. La sur-représentation du SNP en sièges (95 %) au regard des suffrages obtenus (50 %) soulève à nouveau la question de la réforme du mode de scrutin. Le SNP a affiché son soutien à la représentation proportionnelle intégrale (STV). Qui plus est, la taille du groupe SNP pose la question de la place accordée aux tiers partis. En tant que troisième formation en nombre, les députés SNP vont pour la première fois avoir accès à tous les rouages de la chambre basse : participation à toutes les commissions parlementaires (et présidences de deux d'entre elles, Affaires écossaises et Énergie, par deux députés expérimentés), temps de parole substantiel lors des questions au premier ministre et dans les débats, fonds destinés à l'opposition (estimés à 1,2 million de livres par an). Le SNP, jusque-là axé sur les questions écossaises, veut s'intéresser à tous les sujets anglais en raison de leur incidence financière pour l'Écosse (grâce à la formule Barnett). De ce fait, il se déclare préoccupé par la limitation du droit de vote des députés écossais, préconisant un véritable débat sur une loi, alors que David Cameron veut procéder rapidement, en modifiant le règlement intérieur de la Chambre des Communes.

26 Les 56 députés écossais s'estiment plus représentatifs de la voix du peuple écossais que David Mundell, seul député conservateur, devenu Secrétaire d'État à l'Écosse (fonction occupée par un Libéral-démocrate lors de la précédente législature), et, plus encore le sous-secrétaire d'État, Andrew Dunlop, ancien conseiller du gouvernement Thatcher lors de l'entrée en vigueur de la poll tax, élevé en hâte au rang de pair pour pouvoir entrer au Gouvernement. Les Nationalistes ont saisi l'occasion pour dénoncer l’archaïsme de cette chambre haute, ainsi que le décalage entre le Gouvernement britannique et la population écossaise29. 27 L'harmonie de cette voix écossaise est source d'interrogations. En effet, le groupe SNP aura de facto trois leaders : , directeur de campagne du parti depuis 2007, qui continuera à le diriger, , numéro deux du parti et du groupe, ainsi qu'Alex Salmond qui a retrouvé une enceinte dont il est familier. Il a signalé son retour en décrivant les résultats comme le rugissement du lion écossais. Une autre inconnue concerne le comportement des 56 députés SNP à la Chambre des Communes. S'agissant de la cohésion interne, entre 1974 et 1979, les 11 députés du SNP étaient souvent en désaccord avec leur direction et avec leur leader William Wolfe30. Cependant, Nicola Sturgeon a acquis une légitimité incontestable car elle a conduit son parti jusqu'au référendum d'autodétermination dans un cadre légal, aux côtés d'Alex Salmond, avant de le mener à la victoire du 7 mai. De plus, le parti s'est professionnalisé depuis les années soixante-dix, notamment sous l'impulsion d'Alex Salmond et de John Swinney. Mais les nouveaux députés viennent d'horizons variés : certains étaient élus dans les conseils locaux, alors que d'autres, qui ont rejoint l'action politique lors de la campagne référendaire (par l'intermédiaire de Women for Independence ou Business for Scotland), n'ont pas d'expérience de la discipline partisane. La direction du SNP avait pris soin de prévenir les divergences de vues en faisant adopter, lors de son congrès de printemps, une motion interdisant aux élus à la Chambre des Communes d'exprimer une position distincte de celle de leur parti. Le directeur général de celui-ci, Peter Murrell, n'étant autre que l'époux de Sturgeon, la question de la démocratie interne au parti pourrait finir par se poser31.

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De nouvelles opportunités pour exiger des réformes constitutionnelles

28 Peu après l'annonce des résultats, Nicola Sturgeon a rencontré David Cameron pour lui expliquer qu'il ne pourrait ignorer le vote des Écossais. Ce dernier a retrouvé les accents de la campagne référendaire pour évoquer la nécessité de gouverner l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni. Or leurs deux partis, que tout semble opposer, avaient trouvé un terrain d'entente à Holyrood entre 2007 et 2010. En effet, le gouvernement SNP, alors minoritaire, avait négocié le soutien des Conservateurs lors du vote annuel du budget. Mais à Westminster, les concessions envisageables seront sans doute plus modestes que celles d'un gouvernement travailliste, ce qui pourrait soulever la question de l'impact de cette « voix » écossaise, rappelant l'incapacité d'action des 50 députés travaillistes (sur 72 députés écossais) entre 1987 et 1992, notamment lors de l'introduction de la poll tax. Le SNP les avait d'ailleurs surnommés « feeble fifty ».

29 Nicola Sturgeon a mis en avant les questions constitutionnelles. Certes, celles-ci ne sont pas prioritaires pour les Écossais, mais ils plébiscitent le SNP pour les régler32. Le débat s'est focalisé sur le Scotland Bill, publié dès le 28 mai, projet que le SNP souhaitait faire évoluer par voie d'amendements tout au long de la procédure parlementaire (séance plénière et commission de la chambre entière). Tout d'abord, Sturgeon exige le respect du rapport Smith dans sa lettre et dans son esprit, notamment une clarification au sujet des allocations, de la politique de retour à l'emploi et du Crown Estates, points sur lesquels le Scotland Bill n'a pas apporté d'améliorations substantielles par rapport à l'avant-projet de loi33. Pour étayer ses revendications, la First Minister s'est habilement appuyée sur le rapport qui venait d'être publié par la commission spéciale chargée d'examiner ces questions à Holyrood, en soulignant son caractère multipartite (même si elle est dominée par le SNP)34. Ensuite, Sturgeon réclame, au nom du « mandat » conféré par le peuple écossais le 7 mai, et avec le soutien de la confédération syndicale STUC, de véritables leviers d'action économique, en matière de droit du travail (salaire minimum, hygiène et sécurité, syndicats), de prélèvements pesant sur les entreprises (impôt sur les sociétés, taxe sur les plus-values, mais aussi cotisations sociales) ou s'agissant de l'État-Providence (maîtrise des règles d'attribution de l'universal credit)35. Les amendements déposés par le SNP mettront ainsi à l'épreuve les Travaillistes qui s'en tiennent aux revendications formulées avant les élections, en ajoutant cependant la nécessité de pratiquer une décentralisation en Écosse, au profit des collectivités territoriales, à l'encontre de la politique menée par le Gouvernement SNP (malgré ses affirmations). Enfin, l'autonomie fiscale complète ne semble pas à l'ordre du jour dans l’immédiat, son entrée en vigueur devant dépendre de la volonté des autorités écossaises selon les amendements du SNP. Mais les Travaillistes invitent leurs adversaires à tenir leur engagement de campagne et, surtout, à diffuser une analyse des conséquences économiques de ce projet, alors que les prévisions de recettes pétrolières sont de plus en plus pessimistes, sous le double effet de l'effondrement des cours et de la production. De plus, certains députés conservateurs ont rédigé un amendement prévoyant une application rapide de cette « devo-max », afin de placer les Nationalistes devant leurs contradictions36. 30 Quant à l'indépendance, Sturgeon a répété qu'elle ne s'estimait pas pourvue d'un mandat. Mais si le SNP a mis en évidence, tout au long de la campagne électorale, sa

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proximité idéologique avec le Parti travailliste, c'est la victoire des Conservateurs qui sert ses intérêts, c'est-à-dire l'accession à l'indépendance37. Ces derniers vont en effet poursuivre les politiques d'austérité contre lesquelles les indépendantistes avaient axé leur campagne référendaire, le SNP paraissant même modéré au regard de ses alliés, les Verts, le SSP et la radical independence campaign. Dès le mois de juin, Swinney a fustigé les coupes l'obligeant à revoir un budget déjà adopté à Holyrood. 31 Qui plus est, le Scotland Bill devant institutionnaliser la consultation préalable du Parlement écossais sur tout sujet le concernant, Sturgeon n'hésite pas à revendiquer un droit de veto sur certaines questions réservées. Si la First minister a évoqué le secteur de l'énergie, c'est surtout l'Europe qui devrait engendrer des dissensions entre les deux gouvernements. Or à la Chambre des Communes, c'est Salmond qui s'exprimera au nom du parti. En ce qui concerne l'UE, Nicola Sturgeon s'élève contre certains thèmes que Cameron souhaite renégocier avec ses partenaires européens, notamment les restrictions à l'immigration et à l'accès aux allocations. Les députés nationalistes critiquent les modalités du référendum prévu à l'issue de ces discussions, opposant la définition du corps électoral, qui exclut la plupart des ressortissants de l'UE et les jeunes, au référendum écossais de 2014. De plus, ils maintiennent leurs pressions en faveur d'un comptage des voix par nations, afin de protéger les Écossais38. S'agissant du Conseil de l'Europe, le SNP est contre l'abrogation de la loi de 1998 (Human Rights Act) qui incorpore la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (CEDH) dans l'ordre juridique interne et pourrait entraîner une sortie de celle-ci. Or la dévolution écossaise est étroitement imbriquée à ce texte à travers la loi de 1998 portant création des institutions écossaises (Scotland Act). Toute norme juridique, y compris une loi, peut se voir invalidée si elle contrevient à la CEDH. Si le gouvernement britannique devait persister dans son intention, le gouvernement SNP exigerait un traitement distinct pour l'Écosse. 32 Cette attitude ferme permet au SNP de se positionner en tant que défenseur de l'intégration européenne, mais aussi des droits de l'homme, positions qui, parce qu'elles sont largement majoritaires à Holyrood (seuls les Conservateurs émettent des réserves39) peuvent être considérées comme représentant l'Écosse et manifestant une certaine supériorité morale. Cependant, Cameron affirme sa propre légitimité, issue de son manifeste électoral, endossé sur le plan britannique. Qui plus est, les sondages d'opinion montrent que la population écossaise est moins enthousiaste que ses dirigeants à l'égard de l'Europe ou de l'immigration. Seule la comparaison avec l'Angleterre la fait apparaître comme plus ouverte. Le Gouvernement SNP lui-même en a tenu compte dans ses décisions, par exemple en privant les détenus du droit de vote lors du référendum d'autodétermination, à l'encontre des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. En matière d'immigration, il se contente de réclamer l'attribution de visas aux jeunes ressortissants de pays tiers à l'issue de leurs études en Écosse. 33 Ces conflits pourraient constituer le changement matériel légitimant un autre référendum d'autodétermination. Sturgeon n'est pas pressée, au vu de la conjoncture économique et des sondages d'opinion qui continuent d'indiquer que l'indépendance n'est pas majoritaire40. Or comme l'a rappelé Gordon Wilson, ancien leader du SNP, un second référendum devra impérativement être gagné, en s'appuyant sur une avance réelle et durable des indépendantistes dans les sondages41. Mais Sturgeon va devoir

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contenir l'impatience de ses députés et des nouveaux adhérents, dont l'engagement a été motivé par la campagne référendaire. 34 Afin de prévenir ces velléités de rupture, dès l'annonce des résultats des élections, d'anciens responsables politiques travailliste (Jack McConnell) et conservateur (Malcolm Rifkind) ont estimé qu'il fallait abandonner le rapport Smith, et constituer une convention constitutionnelle destinée à repenser l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni. Jeremy Purvis et George Foulkes, anciens députés, désormais membres de la Chambre des Lords, ont repris leur projet fédéral, déjà formulé pendant la campagne référendaire. Mais ils souhaitent désormais associer des représentants des deux principaux protagonistes, les Conservateurs (Boris Johnston) et le SNP (). La Chambre des Lords, qui rassemble de nombreux juristes, semble désireuse de se préoccuper de l'imbrication des questions constitutionnelles, dès l'examen du Scotland Bill42. Mais elle est handicapée par ses faibles pouvoirs (elle ne dispose plus d'un droit de veto) et par son manque de représentativité (les anciens dirigeants et élus du SNP ayant toujours refusé d'y siéger).

Conclusion

35 Le SNP a mené une campagne exceptionnelle, sans précédent au cours de son histoire. Nicola Sturgeon a su, comme son prédécesseur et mentor, Alex Salmond, s'emparer de toutes les opportunités afin d'en tirer profit pour son parti. La dynamique électorale en faveur du SNP était telle que les électeurs n'ont prêté aucune attention aux contradictions de son programme, ni même aux improvisations de ses dirigeants. Il n'en serait pas de même lors d'un nouveau référendum d'autodétermination. C'est la raison pour laquelle Nicola Sturgeon continue à se montrer prudente sur cette question, en dépit des pressions internes qui souhaiteraient capitaliser sur la coïncidence troublante entre le nombre de personnes ayant voté SNP (1,4 million) et en faveur de l'indépendance (1,6 million). Si les thèmes abordés étaient semblables à ceux de la campagne référendaire, les Écossais ne sont pas majoritairement partisans de la création d'un État.

36 La voix de l'Écosse à la Chambre des Communes, unitaire et forte, comme le désirait Nicola Sturgeon, semble en tout cas conforter le caractère distinct de la partie septentrionale du Royaume-Uni. Si depuis 50 ans, les Écossais votaient majoritairement en faveur d'un seul des deux grands partis britanniques, ils accordent désormais leur confiance à un parti écossais, ce qui confère une autre dimension à la théorie du « mandat » popularisée dans les années quatre-vingt en réaction aux politiques néo- libérales de Margaret Thatcher. Mais celle-ci pouvant précipiter l'Écosse vers l'indépendance, elle était peu prisée par le juriste , alors leader des Travaillistes écossais. David Cameron, qui a sans nul doute contribué au résultat du 7 mai 2015 en stigmatisant le SNP et les possibilités d'alliance avec les Travaillistes, et en stimulant un nationalisme anglais, va devoir trouver une voie lui évitant de rester dans l'histoire comme le premier ministre responsable du démembrement du Royaume- Uni43. 37 La prochaine échéance électorale en Écosse sera marquée par les élections à Holyrood. Les enjeux constitutionnels (pouvoirs du Parlement écossais, raisons pouvant légitimer un autre référendum d'autodétermination) seront encore à l'ordre du jour, notamment parce qu'ils passionnent les élites politiques, dans les partis et dans les médias. Reste à

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savoir si le Gouvernement SNP sera en mesure d'échapper, comme au printemps 2015, aux questions de l'opinion publique portant sur l’usage de ses compétences, qu'il s'agisse de sa politique de centralisation du pouvoir en Écosse ou de son bilan socio- économique au regard de ses ambitions sociales-démocrates. Il va devoir s'engager quant à l'utilisation des nouveaux pouvoirs, notamment fiscaux. Or Swinney semble toujours attaché à la progressivité, mais aussi à la baisse de la pression fiscale, à en juger par la taxe sur les mutations foncières à titre onéreux, qu'il a mise en œuvre au 1er avril 2015, ou par ses projets relatifs aux compétences qu'il réclame (en vue de réductions ciblées des prélèvements sur les entreprises), alors qu'il envisage de revaloriser les allocations.

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SCOTTISH LABOUR PARTY. Powers for a Purpose. Strengthening Accountability and Empowering People. Glasgow, mars 2014, 297 p.

SCOTTISH LABOUR PARTY. Scottish Labour Manifesto. Glasgow, mars 2015, 92 p.

SCOTTISH LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. Federalism : the Best Future for Scotland. Édimbourg, octobre 2012, 64 p.

SCOTTISH LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. Stronger Economy. Fairer Society. Opportunities for Everyone. Édimbourg, mars 2015, 117 p.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 9 octobre 2014, col. 23-37.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 28 octobre 2014, col. 23-81.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 11 novembre 2014, col. 22-67.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 2 décembre 2014, col. 3-20.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 10 décembre 2014, col. 18-73.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 27 janvier 2015, col. 10-22.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 22 avril 2015, col. 19-45.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 13 mai 2015, col. 17-30.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 21 mai 2015, col. 37-90.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 28 mai 2015, col. 86-105.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 9 juin 2015, col. 12-57.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT. Official Report. 18 juin 2015, col. 58-89.

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, DEVOLUTION (FURTHER POWERS) COMMITTEE. New Powers for Scotland: An Interim Report on the Smith Commission and the UK Government's Proposals. Édimbourg : SP paper 720, 14 mai 2015, 172 p.

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SCOTTISH SOCIALIST PARTY. For an Independent Socialist Scotland. Standing up for Scotland's Working Class Majority. Glasgow, 2015, 23 p.

SCOTTISH TRADES UNION CONGRESS. Submission to the Smith Commission. Glasgow, octobre 2014, 7 p.

SMITH COMMISSION. Report of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament. Édimbourg, 27 novembre 2014, 28 p.

SNP. Stronger for Scotland. Édimbourg, mars 2015, 38 p.

TORRANCE, David. 100 Days of Hope and Fear. How Scotland's Independence Referendum was Lost and Won. Édimbourg : Luath press, 2014, 188 p.

TORRANCE, David. Britain Rebooted. Édimbourg : Luath Press, 2015, 106 p.

TORRANCE, David. Nicola Sturgeon. A Political Life. Édimbourg : Birlinn, 2015, 256 p.

UKIP. Believe in Britain. Londres, mars 2015, 76 p.

WILSON, Gordon. Strategic Review: the Referendum Six Months On. 2015. www optionsforscotland.com.

NOTES

1. Notre étude s'achève au 15 juin 2015, au début de l'examen en commission du Scotland Bill. 2. SCOTTISH LIBERAL DEMOCRATS, Federalism: the Best Future for Scotland, Édimbourg, octobre 2012 ; SCOTTISH LABOUR, Powers for a Purpose. Strenghtening Accountability and Enpowering People, Glasgow, mars 2014 ; SCOTTISH CONSERVATIVES, Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland Report, mai 2014. 3. SMITH COMMISSION, Report of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament, 2014. Source: www.smith-commission.scot, consultée le 27 novembre 2014. HM GOVERNMENT, Scotland in the United Kingdom: an Enduring Settlement, Londres : Stationery Office, Cm 8990, janvier 2015. 4. Les « legislative consent motions » (LCM), par lesquelles le Parlement écossais autorise le Parlement britannique à légiférer ponctuellement dans un domaine dévolu, auraient un fondement législatif alors qu'elles résultaient jusque-là d'une pratique coutumière initiée par Lord Sewel. 5. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SCOTTISH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, The Implementation of the Smith Agreement, Londres : Stationery Office, mars 2015, paragraphe 18. 6. Le gouvernement britannique s'est exécuté, en dépit des réticences quant à l'impact sur les autres élections, formulées moins à la Chambre des Communes (HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 2 février 2015, col. 82-98) qu'à la Chambre des Lords (HOUSE OF LORDS, Hansard, 26 février 2015, col. 1790). 7. SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, Official Report, 27 janvier 2015, col. 10. 8. Cette question était jusque-là qualifiée de « West Lothian », du nom de la circonscription du député travailliste écossais (Tam Dalyell) qui l'avait posée lors des débats précédant le vote du Scotland Act de 1978. Cameron lui a assigné une finalité explicite en la désignant sous l'expression « English Votes for English Laws ». 9. Il s'agissait d'une position médiane, entre l'exclusion des députés non-anglais du vote final des textes anglais, prônée par certains Conservateurs, et leur simple examen par une commission exclusivement composée de députés anglais, préconisé par les Libéraux-démocrates, HM

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GOVERNMENT, The Implications of Devolution for England, Londres : Stationery Office, Cm 8969, décembre 2014, pp. 25-26. 10. HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 4 février 2015, col. 392. 11. HOUSE OF COMMONS, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COMMITTEE, The Future of Devolution after the Scottish Referendum, Londres : Stationery Office, 2015, paragraphes 99-104. 12. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Scotland's Economic Strategy, Édimbourg, mars 2015, p. 80. 13. SNP, Stronger for Scotland, Édimbourg, mars 2015, p. 8. 14. À la suite du référendum sur le Scotland Act de 1978, les députés SNP, réalisant que la dévolution n'entrerait pas en vigueur, s'étaient associés aux Conservateurs pour voter une motion qui, en poussant le Gouvernement Callaghan à la démission, avait entraîné l'arrivée au pouvoir de Margaret Thatcher. 15. Le SNP estimait que le Fixed-term Parliament Act de 2011 devrait faciliter le maintien au pouvoir d'un gouvernement minoritaire. 16. Parnell avait également mené une action directe tant à l'intérieur du Parlement (obstruction parlementaire) qu'à l'extérieur (appel au boycottage des fermages). Or Salmond s'était lui aussi livré à des coups d'éclat à la Chambre des Communes entre 1987 et 2010. 17. En janvier 2015, ces derniers avaient voté, avec les premiers, une Charte de responsabilité budgétaire, charte dont le SNP a chiffré les conséquences en termes de coupes budgétaires. 18. HM TREASURY, The Treasury and the Union, Londres, janvier 2015. 19. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, More Powers for the Scottish Parliament, Édimbourg, octobre 2014, p. 31. 20. Salmond avait dû y renoncer, tant pour des raisons internes (Sturgeon n'y étant pas favorable) qu'en raison du refus catégorique du gouvernement britannique. 21. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland 2013-2014, Édimbourg, mars 2015, p. 7. 22. David PHILIPS, FFA Delayed ? The SNP's Plans for Further Devolution to Scotland, Londres : Institute for Fiscal Studies, avril 2015. 23. Cette perspective n'était cautionnée ni par la confédération syndicale STUC (STUC, Submission to the Smith Commission, Glasgow, octobre 2014, p.1), ni par le collectif composé de syndicalistes, d'universitaires et de militants se réclamant du mouvement travailliste (Dave WATSON, « From Devo-Max to Devo-Austerity », pp. 6-10 in Pauline BRYAN (ed.). Myths, Realities, Radical Future, Édimbourg : red paper collective, avril 2015). 24. Aucun parti unioniste ne remettait en cause cette formule, qui avantage l'Écosse, à l'exception de UKIP, peu prisé dans cette partie du Royaume-Uni. 25. SCOTTISH CONSERVATIVES, Strong Leadership. A Brighter, More Secure Future, Édimbourg, mars 2015, p. 62. 26. Magnus GARDHAM & Michael SETTLE, « Brown Hits out over “anti-Scots” Tory Tactics », The Herald, 30 avril 2015, p. 1. 27. La dynamique en faveur du SNP a été appuyée par un nouveau quotidien, The National, créé peu après le référendum, mais aussi par l'édition écossaise du Sun, plus gros tirage de la presse écossaise, alors que le quotidien de Murdoch, après avoir tergiversé, n'avait pas appelé à voter en faveur de l'indépendance en 2014. 28. Calculs de l'auteur d'après les résultats des élections (Herald, « Scotland Decides », 9 mai 2015) et les taux de chômage en mars 2015 (Aliyah DAR, James Mirza DAVIES, Fergal McGUINESS & Chris WATSON, Unemployment by Constituency, Londres, House of Commons Library : Stationery Office, mars 2015). Les corrélations entre ces données n'étaient pas significatives en 2010. 29. La nomination de Richard Keen, juriste et président des Conservateurs écossais, au poste d'advocate general (en charge des questions juridiques écossaises à la Chambre des Lords), a été critiquée en raison de son refus de transferts complémentaires de compétences. Quant au juriste Adam Tomkins, qui avait représenté les Conservateurs au sein de la commission Smith, sa

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désignation comme conseiller de Mundell a elle aussi été dénigrée car il avait remis en cause les politiques socio-économiques du SNP. 30. Dix d'entre eux avaient été élus dans des circonscriptions rurales alors que les leaders du parti avaient échoué dans des sièges travaillistes. Ainsi, de 1974 à 1977, les députés SNP ont voté avec les Conservateurs, contre le gouvernement travailliste, dans 60 % des votes à la Chambre des Communes, faisant fi des consignes de leur direction. 31. Sturgeon souligne que ces questions ne relèvent pas de son époux mais de Bruce Crawford, chargé des affaires internes du parti. Cependant, c'est elle qui désigne ce dernier. 32. Selon TNS, en février 2015, seul un quart des personnes interrogées évoquaient la dévolution ou l'indépendance parmi les enjeux prioritaires. Mais d'après plusieurs sondages de YouGov, entre février et avril 2015, deux-tiers des Écossais faisaient confiance au SNP pour obtenir davantage de pouvoirs pour le Parlement écossais. Source : whatscotlandthinks.org, consultée le 6 mai 2015. 33. Néanmoins, selon David Mundell, le projet précisait la possibilité de prélever un taux d'impôt sur le revenu égal à 0 pour une tranche, la protection de certains domaines nécessitant des majorités qualifiées, ou encore le partage d'informations entre les gouvernements au sujet des allocations. HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 8 juin 2015, col. 926. 34. SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, DEVOLUTION (FURTHER POWERS) COMMITTEE. New Powers for Scotland: an Interim Report on the Smith Commission and the UK Government's Proposals, Édimbourg, mai 2015. 35. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, Further Devolution Beyond the Smith Commission, juin 2015, p. 2. 36. Cet amendement, faisant l’objet d’une approbation de principe par le SNP, n'avait pas le soutien du Gouvernement Cameron. HOUSE OF COMMONS, Hansard, 15 juin 2015, col. 38-39. 37. Cette convergence d'intérêts a brièvement émergé au cours de la campagne électorale, pendant le week-end de Pâques, lors de la publication de propos confidentiels présentés comme la transcription d'une conversation entre Sturgeon et l'ambassadrice de France au Royaume-Uni, tenue en février, rapportée par le consul général d'Écosse au Scotland Office où elle avait fait l'objet d'une fuite. Mais la polémique a été étouffée par le démenti cinglant opposé par toutes les personnes en cause. La question a refait surface à l'issue du scrutin : une enquête officielle ayant fait apparaître qu'Alistair Carmichael était au courant, des citoyens ont lancé une campagne pour le contraindre à remettre en jeu son mandat. 38. SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, Official Report, 17 mars 2015, col. 14. Si , First Minister gallois (travailliste) refuse également toute sortie imposée par l'Angleterre, il ne cautionne pas un décompte des voix par nation. 39. SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, Official Report, 11 novembre 2014, col. 24. 40. Sur 16 sondages organisés par divers instituts entre octobre 2014 et avril 2015, la proportion de personnes favorables à l'indépendance, supérieure à 41 %, excédait rarement la proportion de personnes contre ce projet (www.whatscotlandthinks.org, consulté le 6 mai 2015). 41. Gordon WILSON, Strategic Review: The Referendum Six Months On, 2015, p. 4. Source: www.optionsforscotland.com, consultée le 6 mai 2015. 42. HOUSE OF LORDS, Hansard, 1er juin 2015, col. 233. 43. Ce face-à-face n'est pas sans rappeler celui imaginé dès la percée du SNP par Douglas HURD & Andrew OSMOND, Scotch on the Rocks, Londres : Warner Books, 2001 (1968). Mais le futur ministre des gouvernements Thatcher évoquait des groupes ayant recours à la violence.

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RÉSUMÉS

Les enjeux constitutionnels écossais étaient supposés réglés depuis le référendum d'autodétermination de 2014. Mais ils ont resurgi à l'approche des élections législatives, sous leur forme traditionnelle (pouvoirs du Parlement écossais, accession à l'indépendance) mais aussi au travers de la question de la légitimité du SNP dans la vie politique britannique. La victoire massive du SNP garantit leur maintien sur le devant de la scène.

Constitutional matters were supposed to have been settled in Scotland with the 2014 independence referendum. Yet they re-emerged in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, through traditional issues (the powers of the Scottish Parliament, the prospect of independence) as well as the question of the legitimacy of the SNP in British politics. They will remain high on the political agenda thanks to the SNP's landslide.

INDEX

Keywords : Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland, independence, devolution, constitution Mots-clés : Nicola Sturgeon, Ecosse, indépendance, dévolution, constitution

AUTEUR

EDWIGE CAMP-PIETRAIN

Université de Valenciennes

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The 2015 British General Election: a Convergence in Scottish Voting Behaviour? Les élections législatives britanniques de 2015, signe d’une convergence des comportements électoraux des Écossais?

Nathalie Duclos

Introduction

Since the 2015 British General Election, the SNP has repeatedly underlined how exceptional and historic the result was in Scotland. In the Guardian on 9 May, just after the election, SNP leader and Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon noted that: The word historic is overused when it comes to elections and political events – but what we have witnessed in the past few days is properly deserving of that description. Whatever the future of Scottish and UK politics, the events of the early hours of Friday are a moment in time that will be studied and debated for decades to come.1 To her party, the exceptional outcome of the election in Scotland now gives the British Government and Parliament a moral obligation to agree to the SNP’s demands, especially, for the time being, its demands on further powers for Scotland. That is what several SNP MPs argued in the House of Commons during the Second Reading of the Scotland Bill on further devolution of powers, one month after the election. , for instance, declared: “The SNP won the election in Scotland conclusively. We stood on a mandate of powers for a purpose. Why does the Secretary of State [for Scotland, David Mundell] not deliver what the people of Scotland voted for: a powerhouse Parliament with full economic powers?”2 Similarly, SNP group leader Angus Robertson stated: “The Bill is a response to the referendum, but we now need an adequate response to the general election and the clear mandate for more powers that was delivered.”3 In summary, the SNP is arguing that the General Election result was so conclusive in Scotland that the

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British Parliament should take it into account when voting on the Scotland Bill, considering that there are only 59 Scottish seats in the House of Commons, which makes it structurally impossible for Scottish MPs to force a majority vote, despite their near unanimity. As Angus Robertson put it during the same debate, “[t]he people have spoken, and the UK Government should respect their choice.”4 One might disagree with the SNP’s assessment of what the mandate which it was given implies, but it is undeniable that the General Election result was historic, in at least two respects. First of all, beyond the fact that the SNP won a majority of Scottish seats in a General Election for the first time in its history, what is truly exceptional is that the Labour Party did not win a majority for the first time in more than half a century. Labour had won every single General Election in Scotland since 1959 in terms of seats, or since 1964 in terms of both seats and votes. Secondly, the 2015 outcome was historic because of the margin of the SNP’s victory: the SNP won all seats in Scotland bar three, one for each of the big Unionist parties (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats).5 In other words, Labour didn’t just lose in Scotland in 2015: it lost all of its seats except one, and a rather unlikely one at that (Edinburgh South). Moreover, the SNP won exactly half of the popular vote (50.0%), which no party had managed to do in more than half a century. The Liberals had regularly won more than 50% of the vote in Scotland before 1918, and the Conservatives had won 50.1% in 1955, but Labour, despite its near-hegemony in Scotland since the 1960s in terms of seats won, never managed to reach 50% of the popular vote, although it did come close with 49.9% in 1966. This paper will not argue that the 2015 election outcome in Scotland was not historic: it undeniably was. Rather, the aim of this paper is to put this outcome into context and into perspective, through an analysis of General Election results in Scotland over the years, and then through a comparison between those results and Scottish Parliament election results. It will be argued that the 2015 election outcome was exceptional for another, less obvious reason, namely that it was the result of a convergence in voting behaviour in Scotland for General Elections and for Holyrood elections (though not – or not yet – for other types of elections), something which had not happened since the early days of devolution in Scotland. General Election results in Scotland since 1997

Table 1- General Election results in Scotland since 1997, in terms of seats

1997 2001 2005 2010 2015

(72 seats) (72 seats) (59 seats) (59 seats) (59 seats)

56 seats/ 56 seats/ 41 seats/ 69% 41 seats/ 69% 1 seat/ Labour 78% seats 78% seats seats seats 2% seats

10 seats/ 14% 10 seats/ 14% 11 seats/ 11 seats/ 1 seat/ Lib Dem seats seats 19% seats 19% seats 2% seats

6 seats/ 5 seats/ 6 seats/ 6 seats/ 56 seats/ 95% SNP 8% seats 7% seats 10% seats 10% seats seats

0 seat/ 1 seat/ 1 seat/ 1 seat/ 1 seat/ Conservative 0% seats 1% seats 2% seats 2% seats 2% seats

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Table 1 presents General Election results in Scotland since 1997. It starts in 1997 because those results will then be compared to Scottish Parliament election results, of which there were none before 1999. It displays the number of seats won by each party, as well as the share of seats which this represents, as there was a substantial reduction in the number of Scottish seats in the House of Commons (from 72 to 59) on the occasion of the 2005 General Election. Over the 1997-2015 period, General Election results in Scotland were extremely stable until the historic 2015 result, if only because Scots systematically gave seats to the same parties in the same order every time. From 1997 to 2010, Labour always came first, the Liberal Democrats second, the SNP third and the Conservatives fourth. In summary, what is noteworthy is not just that Labour always came first, but also that the SNP never managed to come better than third. Looking at the table more closely, one sees that the results were almost identical in 1997 and 2001 (there was one seat change in the whole of Scotland) and that they were completely identical in 2005 and 2010 (there were no seat changes at all). In other words, between 1997 and 2010, the only significant change happened on the occasion of the 2005 election, not so much because Scots modified their voting behaviour, but for a structural reason, namely the reduction in the overall number of Scottish seats in the Commons, the main consequence of which was a reduction in the number of Labour seats (from 56 to 41). The overall impression of stability from 1997 to 2010 diminishes a little if one considers General Election results not in terms of seats, but in terms of votes, as table 2 makes clear.

Table 2- General Election results in Scotland since 1997, in terms of votes (%)

1997 2001 2005 2010 2015

(72 seats) (72 seats) (59 seats) (59 seats) (59 seats)

Labour 45.6 43.3 39.5 42.0 24.3

Lib Dem 13.0 16.3 22.6 18.9 7.5

SNP 22.1 20.1 17.7 19.9 50.0

Conservative 17.5 15.6 15.8 16.7 14.9

Contrary to what was the case in terms of seats, Scottish voters’ party rankings were not always the same depending on the years. Labour still always came first, but the SNP did not always come third (as it did in terms of seats): it managed to come second in three out of the four elections concerned (in 1997, 2001 and 2010). Moreover, whereas there were almost no seat changes except when the electoral boundaries were redrawn in 2005, the share of the vote won by each party did evolve over the years. However, it did not evolve in the way that might be expected considering the 2015 election result. Where one might expect a steady decline in Labour votes and a steady rise in SNP votes over the years (which is what has characterised Scottish Parliament elections, as will be seen later), what one gets instead is two parallel curves for Labour and the SNP until 2010. From 1997 to 2005, there was a slight but steady decline in the percentage of votes won by both parties, followed by a rise in both parties’ share of the vote in 2010. In other words, only between 2010 and 2015 did the share of the votes won by the two parties follow a completely different curve.

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In summary, General Election results in Scotland were very stable between 1997 and 2010. Labour always came first, in terms of both seats and votes, and by far (winning between 69% and 78% of all seats, and between 39.5% and 45.6% of the vote). As for the SNP, it always came third in terms of seats, and came either third or second in terms of votes (winning either 5 or 6 seats, and between 17.7% and 21.1% of the vote). Until 2015, the SNP had never in its existence managed to win more than 11 seats in a General Election, as table 3 shows.

Table 3- SNP results in General Elections

Seats Votes (%)

1970 1 11.4

1974 (Feb) 7 21.9

1974 (Oct) 11 30.4

1979 2 17.3

1983 2 11.8

1987 3 14.0

1992 3 21.5

1997 6 22.1

2001 5 20.1

2005 6 17.7

2010 6 19.9

2015 56 50.0

The SNP won its first seat in a General Election (as opposed to a by-election) in 1970, and it has consistently won seats at every General Election since. Yet, until 2015, its only real breakthrough had been in October 1974, when it had managed to win 11 seats and 30% of the vote. Though impressive, those results are a far cry from the 56 seats and 50% of the vote that the SNP won in 2015. By contrast, the 2015 election was undoubtedly exceptional. The SNP came first at a General Election in Scotland for the first time in its history, and it reached the symbolic barrier of 50% of the popular vote. Also exceptional about the 2015 election were the big Labour scalps that the SNP took and, in many cases, the size of the swings which the SNP achieved, as the following examples demonstrate. In Paisley & South, a traditionally safe Labour seat (under the name Paisley South until 2005) which the SNP took over with 50.94% of the vote (against Labour’s 38.64%), twenty -year-old famously beat senior Labour candidate Douglas Alexander. In the 2010 election, Alexander had won by far with 59.6% of the vote and the SNP had come

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second with only 18.1% of the vote. In 2015, the SNP also won the seat of East Renfrewshire (with 40.57% of the vote against Labour’s 34.01%), a seat which Scottish Labour leader Jim Murphy had held since 1997 (before which it had been a safe Conservative seat). Murphy had won 50.8% of the vote in 2010 and the SNP had only come fourth with 8.9% of the vote. In addition to those widely-reported cases (due to the high profile of the losing MPs), some constituencies saw even more impressive swings from Labour to the SNP. Glasgow North East, a normally safe Labour seat (and one of the most deprived constituencies in the UK), saw the largest swing in Scotland (a swing of 39.3%). The SNP won 58.05% of the vote (against Labour’s 33.69%), when it had only come a distant second in the previous General Election with 14.1% of the vote (against Labour’s 68%, which had given it a comfortable victory). Also notable were the swings of 36.2% in Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill; 35.2% in Glasgow South West; 34.9% in Glenrothes; and 34.6% in Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath (the former seat of Gordon Brown), to name but a few. The 2015 Scottish results were clearly singular in the sense that they were different from all previous General Election results in Scotland. However, it remains to be seen whether they were completely unprecedented in the wider sense that they can be compared to no other election results in Scotland.

Comparing General Election and Scottish Parliament election results in Scotland

A comparison between General Elections in Scotland and Scottish Parliament elections (also known as Holyrood elections) shows that until 2015, both types of elections had given very different results. Party rankings resulting from the number of seats won almost systematically diverged. As was noted earlier, the 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010 General Elections all saw Labour come first, the Liberal Democrats second, the SNP third and the Conservatives fourth. By contrast, the first two Holyrood elections (in 1999 and 2003) saw Labour come first, the SNP second, the Conservatives third and the Liberal Democrats fourth, while the last two saw the SNP come first, Labour second, the Conservatives third and the Liberal Democrats fourth. In other words, in Holyrood elections, Labour hasn’t always been the winning party – it lost the last two elections, by the narrowest of margins (one seat only) in 2007 and then by a wide margin in 2010 – while on the other hand, the SNP has always come better than third, which was until 2015 its typical ranking in General Elections. Moreover, while in General Elections, there were hardly any seat changes over the 1997-2010 period, except when forced by a significant reduction in the overall number of Scottish seats in 2005, Scottish Parliament elections have been marked by a steady and marked decline of Labour over the years, as well as by a spectacular rise of the SNP since its low of 2003, as table 4 reveals.

Table 4- Scottish Parliament election results, in terms of seats (total of 129)

1999 2003 2007 2011

Labour 56 50 46 37

SNP 35 27 47 69

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Conservatives 18 18 17 15

Lib Dems 17 17 16 5

Greens 1 7 2 2

SSP 1 6 0 0

SSCUP - 1 0 0

Independents 1 3 1 1

Labour went from winning 56 seats in 1999 to winning 50 in 2003, 46 in 2007 and finally 37 in 2011. By contrast, after losing seats between 1999 and 2003 (when it went from 35 seats to 27), the SNP gained at least 20 extra seats at each subsequent election (winning a total of 47 seats in 2007 and then a record 69 seats in 2011, a result which gave it a total majority in the Scottish Parliament, the first party to do so since the Parliament’s creation). Holyrood elections have therefore been characterised both by a much greater degree of instability and by tougher electoral competition than General Elections in Scotland. As a consequence, the party systems that have resulted from these two types of elections are very different. General Elections have given birth in Scotland to a “predominant- party system” (to use Giovanni Sartori’s phraseology), in other words, a pluralist system in which one party regularly wins an absolute majority of seats in Parliament, though not necessarily a majority of votes.6 Scotland has had such a system (with Labour in the role of the predominant party) since the 1960s. Post-May 2015, the question now is whether General Elections will continue to give birth to a predominant-party system in Scotland, but with the SNP having replaced Labour in the role of the predominant party. As for the party system born of Scottish Parliament elections, it has – for the time being – been very different: not a pluralist system with only one big party, but a pluralist system with two big parties (Labour and the SNP), two medium-sized ones (the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats – though the latter might have become a small party as a consequence of their participation in the 2010-2015 British coalition government), and one small party which has consistently been represented in the Holyrood Parliament, namely the . One might object that differences in electoral systems partly explain such differences in outcomes and in party systems. In Holyrood elections, the semi-proportional Additional Member System is used, meaning that Scottish people elect both constituency MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) through the majoritarian First Past the Post system also used for General Elections, and regional MSPs through a proportional list system. In other words, if electoral competition has been tougher in Holyrood elections, it is partly as a result of the differences in electoral systems. However, one element that can be compared directly is the number and share of constituency votes won. Whether one looks at Holyrood election results in terms of constituency votes only, or in terms of both constituency and regional votes, one comes to the same conclusion: voting behaviour has generally differed from voting behaviour in General Elections, as can be seen in table 5.

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Table 5- Scottish voters’ order of preference, in terms of votes, in General Elections (GE) and Scottish Parliament elections (SP)

1997 GE 1999 SP 2001 GE 2003 SP 2005 GE 2007 SP 2010 GE 2011 SP 2015 GE

Labour/ Labour/ Labour/ Labour/ Labour/ SNP/ Labour/ SNP/ SNP/ SNP/ SNP/ SNP/ SNP/ Lib D/ Labour/ SNP/ Labour/ Labour/ Tories/ Tories/ Lib D/ Tories/ SNP/ Tories/ Lib D/ Tories/ Tories/ Lib D/ Lib D/ Tories/ Lib D/ Tories/ Lib D/ Tories/ Lib D/ Lib D/ Others Others Others Others Others Others Others Others Others

NB: in the case of Holyrood elections, the order of preference is the same whether one considers constituency votes only, or both constituency and regional votes. Until 2015, Scottish people had always voted differently in Holyrood elections from how they had voted in the General Elections that immediately preceded them, except in the very first one, in 1999, when people were new to voting for the Scottish Parliament. Let us now compare the 2015 General Election to the Holyrood election that preceded it (which occurred in 2011), so as to establish to what extent the 2015 result was unprecedented. Such a comparison reveals that the 2015 General Election was less exceptional than commentators unfamiliar with Scottish politics might have thought, as to a large extent, it was the result of a convergence in voting behaviour for Scottish Parliament elections and General Elections. This convergence is apparent in at least two respects. First of all, Scottish voters’ party rankings were identical in 2011 and 2015: in both cases, their order of preference was SNP/ Labour/ Conservatives/ Liberal Democrats/ Others (as can be seen in table 5). As was noted earlier, such convergence in voting behaviour had only happened once in the past, on the occasion of the 1997 General Election and the 1999 Holyrood election. Secondly, in both elections, the SNP won very comfortably over the Labour Party: the margin of the SNP victory was colossal in 2015 (50.0% of the vote against Labour’s 24.3%), but it had already been very significant in 2011 (45.4% of the constituency vote against Labour’s 31.7%), as table 6 shows. Moreover, the same table reveals that the share of the vote won by the medium- sized parties (the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) was very similar in 2011 and 2015. The small parties (the Greens, for instance) do not tend to field constituency candidates in Holyrood elections, preferring to concentrate their efforts on winning regional list votes, meaning that a comparison between General Elections and Holyrood elections is in their case impossible.

Table 6- Results of the 2011 Scottish Parliament election (constituency votes only) and the 2015 General Election in Scotland: number of votes and share of the vote

2015 General Election 2011 Scottish Parliament election (constituency (Scotland) votes only) Number of votes (share of the Number of votes (share of the vote in %) vote)

902,915 1,454,436 SNP (45.4%) (50.0%)

630,437 707,147 Labour (31.7%) (24.3%)

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276,652 434,097 Conservatives (13.9%) (14.9%)

Liberal 157,714 219,675 Democrats (7.9%) (7.5%)

47,078 UKIP - (1.6%)

39,205 Greens - (1.3%)

21,534 8,827 Others (1.1%) (0.3%)

Thirdly, and more generally, we might be witnessing a convergence in party systems for both types of elections. Since the 2015 General Election result, several senior Scottish politicians (such as Lord Steel for instance7) have warned of the dangers of Scotland becoming a “one-party state” – or rather, in more technical terms, a predominant-party state, according to Sartori’s classification of party systems.8 Will the next Scottish Parliament election confirm that Scotland has become a predominant- party polity for both General Elections and Holyrood elections? At the time when this article was written, polls suggested that the SNP would confirm its dominant position in 2016 and that Labour would continue to lose seats. The results of a poll made public on 9 June 2015 and carried out between 13 and 30 May 2015 are presented in table 7.9

Table 7- Possible results of the 2016 Holyrood election (TNS survey of 1031 Scots aged over 16 between 13 and 30 May 2015)

Constituency vote Regional vote Seats

SNP 60% (+15 pts) 50% (+6 pts) 73 (+4)

Labour 19% (-13 pts) 19% (-7 pts) 25 (-12)

Conservatives 15% (+1 pt) 14% (+2 pts) 17 (+2)

Greens - 10% (+6 pts) 10 (+8)

Lib Dems 3% (-5 pts) 5% (no change) 4 (–1)

UKIP - 2% (+2 pts) 0

Predicted turnout: 67% (+17 pts). The SNP could win an incredible share of the vote in 2016: 60% of constituency votes, which is unheard of for any party in any election in Scotland, and even 50% of regional votes. This could translate into a total of 73 seats out of 129 in the Scottish Parliament. This would represent a huge majority considering the fact that the electoral system is partly proportional. As for Labour, it could lose 12 seats, including all of its constituency seats (meaning that all of its seats would come from the regional lists).

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Explaining the convergence in Scottish voting behaviour

The convergence in Scottish people’s voting behaviour in General Elections and Holyrood elections leaves us with two questions. First of all, why have we witnessed such a convergence? Several factors may have led to this outcome. One explanation for the 2015 General Election results might seem obvious: it is what we could call the “referendum effect”. The SNP’s spectacular general election results are to be seen in the context of the equally spectacular rise in its membership – and in the memberships of all the pro-independence parties – since the failure of the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014. In other words, the parties that lost the referendum seem to have won the political argument. The SNP in particular has clearly benefitted from the long referendum campaign, while Labour has suffered from it, in large part because of its awkward association with the Conservative Party under the “Better Together” banner. However, it would be wrong to see the General Election results through the sole angle of the “referendum effect”. The collapse of Labour and the rise of the SNP in Scotland have deeper roots. One of these roots could be a form of “Labour fatigue”: Scottish people have voted Labour at every single General Election in half a century – as well as regularly voting Labour in other types of elections – and they have now found in the SNP what they see as a suitable centre left alternative. Another explanation lies in the parties themselves and in their internal structure and way of functioning. The rise of the SNP was made possible by its structural reforms of 2004, carried out under John Swinney, which led to its professionalization and (as was argued at the time) its modernisation.10 These reforms were instrumental to the party’s first electoral victory in 2007. Concerning Labour, many Scottish Labour members believe the party’s decline north of the Border is mainly due to its lack of structural autonomy from the central Labour executive. When Scottish Labour leader resigned a few weeks after the independence referendum, she called on the Labour Party as a whole to “ recognise that the has to be autonomous and not just a branch office of a party based in London”.11 More specifically, Scottish Labour should “be allowed to make [its] own decisions and control [its] own resources.” She also accused some of her Westminster colleagues of being “dinosaurs […] who think nothing has changed”, a metaphor which was later taken up by another senior Scottish Labour member, Andy Kerr,12 who warned in an online article that “the tectonic plates have shifted. We have a new normal [sic], and we can die like the dinosaurs, or we can embrace change and survive”. He agreed with Lamont that “[t]he seeds of Labour’s wipeout were sown long ago and were the predictable consequence of our failure to devolve the political culture of the Scottish Labour party to match our devolved powers.”13 To him, Scottish Labour needed to “base its party machine in Edinburgh and develop a closer relationship with the Scottish Parliament. Labour could then rebuild through the parliament, local government and the community.” He also argued that Scottish Labour was to the left of Labour as whole (“Our instincts are more communitarian, cooperative, pro- public service, pro-European, anti-Trident, and, most importantly, anti-austerity”), and that this was something which should be celebrated. In summary, the idea developed by several Scottish Labour members is that Scottish Labour should reinforce and celebrate its difference and its autonomy, both in terms of structure and in terms of ideology.

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Conclusion

The second and final question that the convergence in Scottish voting behaviour for Holyrood and General Elections leaves us with is the following: will this convergence be temporary or long-lasting, and will it continue to concern General Elections and Holyrood elections only? In other words, will the SNP become the main party in Scotland whatever the election? Table 8 reveals the SNP and Labour’s latest election results for all elections concerning Scotland.

Table 8- The SNP and Labour’s latest election results in Scotland

Scottish Parliament European Parliament British Parliament Local councils (2012) (2011) (2014) (2015)

69 seats out of 129 425 seats out of 1,223 2 seats out of 6 56 seats out of 59 SNP (+22) (+62) (+0) (+50)

37 seats out of 129 394 seats out of 1,223 2 seats out of 6 Labour 1 seat out of 59 (-40) (-9) (+46) (+0)

Besides the Holyrood election and the General Election, the SNP also came first in the latest local elections in Scotland. However, though it is true that Labour came second in the local elections, it should be noted there was an overall increase in the number of Labour councillors elected (compared to 2007). Secondly, the SNP didn’t manage to beat Labour in the latest European election, in 2014, when it had hoped to win a third seat which went to UKIP instead. Therefore Scotland is not yet a predominant-party polity for all elections. It is however undeniable that the SNP’s current majorities in the Scottish Parliament and in the Scottish group of MPs at Westminster are huge. Even more worryingly for the Labour Party, Scottish people seem to have stopped (at least for the time being) voting tactically for Labour in General Elections. The key question for the party is therefore whether it is becoming the new “nasty party” in Scotland,14 a phrase which used to be reserved for the Conservative Party. Labour’s general election rout in Scotland is reminiscent of the Conservatives’ total Scottish wipeout of 1997, from which it still hasn’t recovered, almost 20 years later, which is a rather ominous sign for Labour in Scotland.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GARDHAM, Magnus. “Poll: 60% of Voting Scots Intend to Support SNP in Next Year’s Holyrood Election”, The Herald, 9 June 2015.

GREAT BRITAIN HOUSE OF COMMONS. Debates. 8 June 2015, vol.596, col.919.

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RIDDOCH, Lesley. “Will Labour Face their own Portillo Moment?”, 5 February 2015.

SARTORI, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

SETTLE, Michael. “Lord Steel Warns of Danger of ‘One-Party State’ in Scotland”, The Herald, 25 June 2015.

STURGEON, Nicola. “We, the Scottish People, Cannot Now be Ignored”, The Guardian, 9 May 2015.

Daily Record, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/johann-lamont-resigns-scottish- labour-4502765.

Labour Hame website, http://labourhame.com/autonomy-split-the-difference/ .

NOTES

1. Nicola Sturgeon, “We, the Scottish People, Cannot Now be Ignored”, Guardian, 9 May 2015. 2. Great Britain House of Commons debate, 8 June 2015, vol.596, col.919. 3. Ibid., col.951. 4. Ibid. 5. As noted previously, Labour retained the seat of Edinburgh South. The Conservative Party retained that of Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, and the Liberal Democrats the seat of Orkney & Shetland. 6. Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. For a French version of the same book, see: Partis et systèmes de partis. Un cadre d’analyse, Bruxelles : Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2011. See page 289 of the edition in French for a definition of his concept of “predominant-party system”. 7. See for instance Michael SETTLE, “Lord Steel Warns of Danger of ‘One-Party State’ in Scotland”, The Herald, 25 June 2015. 8. SARTORI, op. cit. The phrase “single-party states” is not applicable either, as to him, those are states where only one party has the right to form a government. 9. See Magnus GARDHAM, “Poll: 60% of Voting Scots Intend to Support SNP in Next Year’s Holyrood Election”, The Herald, 9 June 2015. There is one slight mistake in the Herald article: if the SNP won 60% of the constituency vote in 2016, this would correspond to a rise in 15 percentage points, not 10 as indicated. 10. Two examples of reforms introduced at the time are the use of “one-member-one-vote” for the election of party leader and the fact that it became much more difficult to challenge the position of party leader. 11. Interview for the Daily Record, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/johann-lamont- resigns-scottish-labour-4502765. Accessed on 27 July 2015. 12. Andy Kerr was Scottish Minister for Health and Community Care in 2004-2007. 13. http://labourhame.com/autonomy-split-the-difference/. Accessed on 27 July 2015. 14. As suggested by Lesley Riddoch in an article for the National newspaper (“Will Labour Face their own Portillo Moment?”, 5 February 2015).

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ABSTRACTS

The 2015 General Election outcome in Scotland was historic, for several reasons: the SNP won a General Election in Scotland for the first time, it won almost all Scottish seats, and Labour did not win for the first time in half a century. The aim of this paper is to put this undeniably historic outcome into context and into perspective, through an analysis of General Election results in Scotland since 1997 and a comparison between those results and Scottish Parliament election results. It will be argued that besides the obvious ones, the 2015 election outcome was exceptional for another, less obvious reason, namely that it was the result of a convergence in voting behaviour in Scotland for General Elections and for Holyrood elections.

En Écosse, c’est un résultat indéniablement historique qui sortit des urnes à l’occasion des élections législatives britanniques de 2015 (victoire du SNP en Écosse à ce type d’élections pour la première fois de son histoire, victoire massive puisqu’il remporta la quasi-totalité des sièges écossais, et défaite du parti travailliste pour la première fois en cinquante ans). Cependant, cet article s’emploie à mettre ce scrutin en perspective, par une étude des résultats des élections législatives britanniques en Écosse depuis 1997, ceux-ci étant ensuite comparés aux résultats des élections législatives proprement écossaises (celles qui concernent le Parlement écossais et non plus la Chambre des Communes britannique). L’argument avancé est que le caractère exceptionnel des élections de 2015 en Écosse provient aussi d’une autre raison moins évidente, à savoir que celles-ci furent le signe d’une convergence des comportements électoraux des Écossais pour les deux types d’élections législatives qui les concernent (les britanniques et les écossaises).

INDEX

Mots-clés: comportement électoral, élections législatives britanniques, élections législatives écossaises Keywords: voting behaviour, General Elections, Scottish Parliament elections

AUTHOR

NATHALIE DUCLOS

Université de Toulouse 2-Jean Jaurès

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Northern Ireland: Devolution as an Electoral Issue in the 2015 UK General Election L’Irlande du Nord : la dévolution en tant qu’enjeu électoral lors des élections législatives de 2015

Valérie Peyronel

By comparison with its counterparts, Scotland and Wales, devolution in Northern Ireland is very particular. After 26 years of Direct Rule from 1972 to 1998, the Agreement1 (usually better known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed on April 10, 1998 after nearly a decade of harsh negotiations including representatives of the unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland2 as well as representatives of the British and Irish governments3 and external mediators.4 It provided Northern Ireland with a new opportunity to make devolution work on the basis of a shared Northern Ireland Executive and a shared Assembly at Stormont, thus guaranteeing both communities and their political representatives equal representation in political debates. Operating devolution in this so-called post-conflict context has been difficult, complex, and the deal was broken several times,5 causing the temporary suspension of the Northern Ireland institutions and compelling Downing Street and Westminster to take over, as in the old troubled times. However, both the Northern Ireland Executive and Stormont have now been functioning for eight years in a row, and a lot has been achieved over the last 17 years, notably in terms of police and justice reform,6 urban renovation7 and community relations, 8 north-south economic relations, 9 as well as economic modernisation (in particular attracting Foreign Direct Investment in innovative high-technology sectors).10 But the situation still remains complicated and contentious. Indeed devolution in Northern Ireland has to do with much more than simply entrusting local representatives with the power to decide on local matters, and the duty to develop a locally sustainable political, social, economic and cultural system. In Northern Ireland,

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devolution requests the stakeholders, as well as the citizens, to abide by the very condition of showing their capacity to live and work peacefully together, despite vitally different political aspirations: remaining in the UK for the unionists, reuniting Ireland for the most extreme nationalists. The 1998 Agreement states that the decision on whether Northern Ireland should remain British or become Irish again lies in the people of Northern Ireland’s hands: “The participants […] recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.”11 So far, no referendum has been organised on this very hot issue, but the sword is hanging above Northern Ireland’s political future.

The Stormont House Agreement: Setting the Context of the General Election Campaign

In the 2011-2015 period separating the two general election campaigns, the citizens of Northern Ireland’s capacity to work together and smoothly operate devolution was put to the hard test. First of all, the context of very slow economic recovery characterising the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis was very stressful, although, to some extent, the recovery has been more marked in NI than in other parts of the UK. Acute disagreements occurred on several issues, prompting David Cameron as well as his counterpart, Enda Kenny, the President of the Republic of Ireland, to support Teresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in her attempt to bring multi-party negotiations in NI to a favourable conclusion. In an interview on October 7, 2014, David Cameron disclaimed accusations of being “detached” regarding Northern Ireland: “The point of devolution is for the devolved institutions to deliver for the people of Northern Ireland”, requiring “people working together to make compromises”.12 The bones of contention between the opposed parties referred to finance and welfare, to institutional reform, to identity and cultural issues (among which flags and emblems), and finally to dealing with the past and with victims. Obviously, the multifaceted scope of the disagreements (along the usual unionist/ nationalist divide) reflected the intricacy of the devolution process in Northern Ireland, where matters of cultural traditions and cultural conflict interfere with or matter just as much as (if not more than) more general and national stakes such as nationwide economic and welfare policies. But with the forthcoming general election in sight, it was David Cameron’s interest not to stumble on a failed Northern Ireland devolution process, and for the Northern Ireland party leaders to secure votes by defending their respective voters’ interests on the above-mentioned issues. The Stormont House Agreement, which was signed on December 23, 2014, four days after the official start of the General election campaign, tackled the four issues. Interestingly, the Agreement document starts with the “Finance and Welfare” issue, then “Flags, identity, culture and tradition”, followed by “The past”. “Institutional reform” comes last. More importantly, devolution and community relations issues are intertwined in each of these four chapters. In the “Finance and welfare” chapter, the financial and economic arrangements of the Agreement definitely point to more devolution. The Agreement advocates local responsibility for a balanced budget and a reform of public services to improve quality and reduce administrative costs, but also, to compensate this austerity package, It also

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recommends the development of flexibilities and top-ups from the block grant to better address local needs. It underlines the need for the devolution of corporation tax as from April 2017, and possibly some additional fiscal devolution for Northern Ireland including aggregates Levy, Stamp Duty, Land Tax and Landfill Tax. But beside tackling the budgetary and economic aspects, the text also mentions the appointment of an independent audit of departmental spending in charge of identifying how divisions in society impact the delivery of goods, facilities and services, and of considering how best to reconfigure service delivery in a manner consistent with a shared discrimination-free future. As far as “Flags, identity, culture and tradition” are concerned, the Agreement states that the power to take responsibility for parades and related protests should, in principle, be devolved to the NI Assembly. But it also plans the establishment of a Commission by June 2015 seeking to identify maximum consensus on their application of decisions regarding flags and emblems as well as broader issues of identity, culture and tradition. To deal with “The past”, which is the third issue at stake, the Agreement guarantees local empowerment thanks to the creation of an Oral History Archive by 2016 and the creation of a Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) “to take forward investigations into outstanding Troubles-related deaths”.13 The involvement of the UK Government is made clear by its explicit commitment to full disclosure to the HIU. Finally, in order to better deal with victims and survivors an Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) is to be appointed by both the British and Irish Governments. Finally the chapter on Institutional Reform provides for reforms to improve the operation of devolution in Northern Ireland: reducing the number of Assembly members (5 per constituency) by 2021; organising arrangements by March 2015 to enable “those parties which would be entitled to ministerial positions in the Executive, but choose not to take them up, to be recognised as an official opposition and measures to facilitate their work”;14 drawing up a range of other provisions to “promote greater efficiency in the conduct and discharge of Executive business”;15 Furthermore, the Agreement even states that The UK Government also stands ready to consider potential further areas of devolution and changes to intergovernmental machinery which are under discussion elsewhere in the UK and likely to command broad support among parties in Northern Ireland.16 But the conditions under which these reforms can be implemented are clearly stated, and all the parties must commit to keeping the post-conflict process up and alive. Indeed, Article 69 in the Stormont House Agreement states that as no consensus has yet been reached by the parties on a Bill of Rights, the latter have to commit to fostering a proper context for a successful shared society: serving the people of Northern Ireland equally and to act in accordance with the obligations on government to promote equality and respect and to prevent discrimination; to promote a culture of tolerance, mutual respect and mutual understanding at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage shared and integrated education and housing, social inclusion, and in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life; and to promote the interests of the whole community towards the goals of reconciliation and economic renewal.17

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Furthermore article 72 lays an obligation upon the shared Northern Ireland Executive to “commit to a continuing effort to eradicate sectarianism in all forms”18 and the reviewing process includes the Northern Ireland Executive party leaders as well as the UK and Irish governments (article 72) reflecting the three-stand approach. Martin Mc Guinness, of Sinn Féin, and Northern Ireland’s current Deputy First Minister said that the deal could give the Northern Ireland Executive a “”, qualifying this optimistic statement by admitting that it was yet incomplete: “Of course every one of us would have liked to have had a more comprehensive and complete agreement but this is as much and more than we have ever been able to do on these issues in the past.”19 DUP leader Peter Robinson, the current First Minister of Northern Ireland, also declared that the deal was an achievement. However, the SDLP, who finally did sign the agreement, did so reluctantly after having warned that “the outcome [was] not comprehensive or decisive across all issues”.20 Alliance leader, David Ford, declared that the Agreement “fell short”21 of expectations and the UUP expressed that the proposals included “many aspects of uncertainty”.22

Electoral Stakes in Northern Ireland

Such was the devolution context in which the 2015 Westminster electoral campaign started: devolution indeed, but devolution under the tight control of the British government and the Conservative current political agenda; an austerity package and budget control as a pre-requisite to the devolution of corporation tax (and possibly even more fiscal devolution in the longer term); the obligation to keep dealing with community relations and post-conflict issues as a cornerstone and continuous prerequisite for devolution and, finally, what sounded like an unusually more consensual political climate in Northern Ireland. But beyond the apparent consensus, there was a general election to be run and the question was for the parties to orchestrate their campaign so as to simultaneously gather the support of their voters for the Westminster election and make Northern Ireland’s voice heard next to Wales and Scotland while paving the way for the forthcoming local elections due to take place in Northern Ireland in 2016. In an article published on April 1, 2015, a little more than one month before the election, Professor John D. Brewer, a specialist of post-conflict politics at Queen’s University in Belfast, underlined the “parochialism” of the political debates in Northern Ireland, even in the frame of a general election: The issues that will dominate political discourse in Britain in the coming weeks will be largely absent in Northern Ireland. There will be silence over Europe and the referendum. Immigration will hardly feature, nor even will austerity, or cheating on tax or benefits. The legacy issues from Northern Ireland’s conflict will dominate as a surrogate for political contestation over the morality of the war, the morality of the settlement, and the morality of dealing with the past.23 Indeed in Northern Ireland, local and general elections are closely related, in so far as the scores reached by each of the communities’ political representatives in any election (local, national or even European) is a contribution to the inner fight for power within Northern Ireland, even in spite of the devolved power-sharing structure which is meant to guarantee equal representation of the unionist and the nationalist sides. John Brewster describes a continuous process of “sectarian politics” which the terms of the

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1998 Agreement have not infringed (or very little so). Of course, sectarianism is particularly vividly expressed in the occasion of local elections, as the stakes are more directly related to locally contentious issues and every seat in the power-sharing assembly must be won so as to win over the other community: The main electoral battles are not between the two main governing parties, Sinn Féin (SF) on the Nationalist side and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) on the Unionist side. In devolved elections, they compete to become the single largest party, thereby winning the right to choose the First Minister; Rather than being between the two parties, the outcome is determined by their ability to win the sectarian vote within their “tribe”.24 But considering the very small number of seats for the Northern Ireland MPs in Westminster,25 the general election and, even more so, the European elections, are a smaller incentive to cut-throat competition for votes among the parties in Northern Ireland. Whatever their position, Northern Ireland’s representatives’ voices cannot make a difference in the national debate, unless they partner up with representatives of the major parties. One piece of evidence of the little influence Northern Ireland MPs may have on Westminster debates is the fact that Sinn Féin, usually a very fiery party, does not even take its seats in Westminster. Officially their attitude is dictated by their symbolic refusal to take seats in a British Parliament. But should there be any means for them to have the final say in the debates their position might be quite different In the 2015 general election campaign, however, there were two motives for a stronger interest by the parties of Northern Ireland. Indeed, when a general election takes place little before the local elections, as was the case with the forthcoming local elections due to take place in 2016, it serves as a test for each party’s potential and for their electoral support. As John Brewster put it: “What matters in the race is primarily prestige within the landscape of the identity politics back home.”26 Another important incentive to win seats in Westminster this time was the perspective of a possibly hung Parliament with neither of the two main parties, Labour or the Conservatives, being able to win a majority. The interest of the larger parties in Northern Ireland (like their counterparts’ in Scotland and Wales) was spurred by the possibility of being offered an unusual opportunity to have more influence in Westminster, to voice their concerns about any matter regarding Northern Ireland, directly or indirectly.

Devolution and the UK in the Manifestos

How were the issues that had been addressed in the Stormont House Agreement to make the devolution “work better” used and debated during the General Election campaign? And to what extent were local and national concerns intertwined? In spite of the consensus reached in the Stormont House Agreement, the basic line of the unionist/nationalist divide did not shift during the campaign and the general election campaign also very much staged local concerns. As for the institutional framework, on the unionist side, the UUP and the DUP manifestos took a very clear stand in favour of devolution and the necessary unity of the Kingdom. The UUP campaign was particularly pro devolution and pro UK: “A stable Union is the most important result a good unionist should hope for in his Election….While our MPs will seek to do the best they can for the people of NI, we will also work in the best interests of the UK as a whole.”27

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But the DUP, while not questioning the devolution, expressed firmer views on the responsibilities of Westminster, expected, on the one hand, to guarantee the institutional framework necessary for the smooth functioning of the devolved power- sharing structure in Northern Ireland, and, on the other hand, to remain supportive: “ For us to deliver the kind of changes and improvements that we want to see, we will need the support of Westminster to make sure that politics operates better in Northern Ireland. This includes a guaranteed seat in the Cabinet and an agreed minimum level of representation for Northern Ireland in the House of Commons.”28 At the other end of the political spectrum, Republican Sinn Féin, while having supported the Stormont House Agreement and praised this new chance given to devolution in Northern Ireland, reaffirmed in their general election manifesto “the right to a Referendum on Irish unity [as] one of several outstanding issues within the Good Friday Agreement and other agreements which the British Government [needed] to act upon”, even “ [calling] for the Irish Government to plan for Irish unity”.29 Obviously, as the only party in Northern Ireland, in the UK and in the Republic of Ireland holding a North-South national Irish position, Sinn Féin’s stand is very singular, and its participation both in the local elections in Northern Ireland and in the British election is also meant to enlarge its electoral basis as an all-party Ireland. So while firmly participating in the positive outcome of the Stormont House Agreement so as not to be side-lined in the power-sharing dynamics in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin also had to make their nationalist position very clear in their manifesto. The SDLP’s position was more ambiguous, as the party supported more devolution to Northern Ireland (among other fields in broadcasting, national insurance and minimum wage, energy and mineral resources), but as a means to pave the way for a united Ireland, advocated as a final outcome by a party who, although not as radically positioned as Sinn Féin, would not betray its nationalist obedience: “In a united Ireland, we see the continuation of a Stormont Assembly and we see the same rights and protections that the SDLP delivered as part of the GFA”.30 The Alliance Party, quoting the Scottish referendum experience, and faithful to its median position, advocated a “move towards a federal UK”, with “additional powers conferred on the devolved administrations.”31 As far as economic and welfare issues are concerned, all parties presented the economic recovery and development of Northern Ireland, with a strong emphasis on the development of the private sector, as an absolute priority, and in line with the Stormont House Agreement, they all pleaded for fiscal devolution. The UUP manifesto was very precise, claiming that the devolution of corporation tax was an essential means to make Northern Ireland less dependent on the block grant, insisting that Northern Ireland had “paid [its] way” when Northern Ireland was a “major economic powerhouse”, and that it was time, after years of dependency on British subsidies, to “shift from dependency to wealth generation”.32 In particular, the devolution of corporation tax would enable Northern Ireland to compete against the record 12.5% Foreign Direct Investment attractive corporation tax rate in the Republic and would “represent a 7.5% positive differential with Great Britain”.33 While nationalist Sinn Féin also shed the light on the comparison between the Republic and Northern Ireland, the focus was laid on the potential reunification of the island with a usual Sinn Féin national all-island scope: “The potential of our island economy is strong. Harmonising tax regimes […] is central to

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creating a fully integrated and healthy economy […] and creating a better business climate for advancement of entrepreneurial spirit north and south.”34 The DUP’s and the SDLP’s approaches on tax issues were broader, the unionist DUP advocating a “UK wide tax policy improvements to encourage economic growth in Northern Ireland”35 while the nationalist SDLP pleaded for more fiscal independence to generate more wealth: “A Scottish-style commission to begin the devolution of further powers which will allow us to take control of additional fiscal levers”.36 The Alliance Party manifesto, while advocating more fiscal transparency and fairness and a better administration of tax, was silent on the issue of the devolution of corporation tax, thus not opposing it. But tax devolution is just as far as the consensus went in the manifestos. Indeed, divergences clearly appeared on economic and welfare issues during the campaign. However, quite interestingly, the traditional unionist/nationalist divide was superseded by what sounded more like a right wing/left wing one, the parties taking different stands on the British Government’s austerity programme and its impact on devolved Northern Ireland. The UUP somewhat stood out, advocating very liberal economic strategies, supporting cost-saving reforms in the public sector and encouraging the development of the private sector as a means to boost long-term economic recovery: “switching from a culture of Dependency on welfare and the Block Grant to a mind-set where we are focused on generating serious wealth for all our people” to bridge the huge prosperity gap between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK”.37 While the DUP also supported the idea of “sustained growth in the private sector”,38 it joined Sinn Féin and the SDLP in opposing any further budget cuts and a reform of the public services that would be detrimental to the people of Northern Ireland. The title of Sinn Féin’s manifesto was unequivocal in this regard: “Equality not Austerity”, as was the SDLP’s: “Prosperity, not Austerity”. The third major theme tackled in the Stormont House Agreement, “Dealing with post- conflict issues” was more consensual during the electoral campaign. In line with the Stormont House Agreement, three parties made convergent proposals (although not completely similar) to address post conflict issues, as part of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and of the devolution process: “Building a society that welcomes diversity”39 in the UUP’s manifesto, “uniting communities and tackling sectarianism” 40 in Sinn Féin’s, “continuing sustained lobbying for a strong Bill of Rights”41 in the SDLP’s. The Alliance party was most explicit about the role played by local institutions in building a more peaceful society in Northern Ireland: “Most of the mechanisms for delivering a shared future for Northern Ireland such as the powers to integrate education and build shared communities are devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. However Westminster has an important role to play in ensuring that a shared future and good relations are central to Northern Ireland’s work.” 42 In contrast, though, the stand taken by the unionist DUP in its manifesto was very minimal. In the manifesto introduction, Peter Robinson wrote “We want to create a shared and united Northern Ireland”43 but the remaining part of the sentence presented this unity as a prerequisite for economic prosperity and not as a full-fledge objective. Chapter 4 of the manifesto, entitled “Traditions and identity”, proposed various programmes meant to reinforce the cohesion between Northern Ireland and other parts of the UK, but there was no mention at all of any means to settle intercommunity disputes or reinforce cohesion within Northern Ireland.

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The General election Results in Northern Ireland

The results of the election confirmed the predominance of unionist vote in Northern Ireland, both in terms of vote share and in terms of seats.

2010 2015

Parties Seats Vote share Seats Vote share

DUP 8 25% 8 25.7%

UUP 0 15.2% 2 16%

Sinn Féin 5 25.5 % 4 24.5%

SDLP 2 16.5 % 2 13.9%

Alliance 1 6.3 % 0 8.6%

Source: table adapted by the author from The Electoral Commission UK, http:// www.electoralcommission.org.uk/fnd-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past- elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections, accessed June 9, 2015.

With a total of 41.7% of vote share and 10 seats, the unionists took the lead over the nationalists with only 38.4% of vote share and 6 seats. Compared with 2010, the unionists won 1.7% in the vote share but the first-past-the-post system enabled them to win two seats, while the nationalists lost 3.6% in vote share and lost one seat. The unionists managed to win one seat from nationalist Sinn Féin and one from the moderate Alliance Party. This success was the result of a coalition campaign between the DUP and the UUP, spurred by the common defence of the Union, as well as, on the one hand, by the perspective of a better representation of unionist Ireland in a no- majority Westminster and, on the other hand, by the failure, for the UUP, of the 2010 UUP-Labour alliance. As unionist politician Simon Hamilton declared: “I think the big message of this election is that it’s a great result for unionism”.44 Analysts also explain Sinn Féin’s declining vote share by the fact that the party’s campaign was very much based on putting an end to austerity, while, as one of the two major parties operating the Northern Ireland shared Executive and Stormont, they had been part of the implementation of the austerity package imposed by the British Government and by Westminster. According to analyst Jordan Shilton, Sinn Féin’s “ posture as a left alternative to the austerity measures that have been implemented throughout Britain since 2008, including in Northern Ireland, is increasingly being discredited”.45 But the major loser in the 2015 general election in Northern Ireland, as both the result of the DUP-UUP coalition and the first-past-the-post system, was the Alliance Party: despite the fact that they scored better in vote share in 2015 than they had done in 2010 (8.6% in 2015 compared with 6.3% in 2010), they lost their only seat46 in Westminster. However, the fact that their vote share was the highest since 1992 is evidence that among their traditionally more moderate middle-class electorate, Alliance keep gaining momentum and the forthcoming 2016 elections might tell a slightly different story from the 2015 General election one.

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Conclusion

In spite of a more favourable and apparently more consensual political context fostered by the recently signed Stormont House Agreement, the 2015 General election campaign in Northern Ireland once again illustrated the divergences between the parties regarding a large range of issues relating to the functioning of the devolved institutions. The basic unionist/nationalist divide, however, was blurred on some issues to the benefit of a more traditional liberalism vs welfare debate. However, devolution as such has not been questioned, and the unionist victory has made no difference in that regard. Some issues like the devolution of corporation tax have even gathered the support of all the parties involved. However, with the forthcoming 2016 local elections in sight, it will be interesting to observe, on the one hand, how the five major parties capitalise on the 2015 General election results (and, in particular, what the Alliance party’s results will be) and, on the other hand, whether, in the meantime, the Northern Ireland shared Executive will manage to implement the Stormont House Agreement which is meant to support a better and more consensual devolution system in Northern Ireland.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALLIANCE, Step forward, not back, Manifesto for 2015 Westminster Election, 32 p.

BBC, “Northern Ireland talks. Broad Agreement is brokered on some key issues”, BBC News, December 23, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30589804

BBC, “Alliance Party ratifies Northern Ireland Agreement”, BBC News online, January 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30737797

BBC, “Election 2015: Sinn Féin loses Fermanagh and South Tyrone”, May 8, 2015, http:// www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-northern-ireland-32629703

BREWSTER, John, D., “Post conflict elections in Northern Ireland”, April 1, 2015, Discover society, http://discoversociety.org/2015/04/01/post-conflict-elections-in-northern-ireland/

DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, DUP Westminster Manifesto 2015, 31 p.

McCANN, David; “SDLP not to ratify Stormont House Agreement”, Slugger O’toole online, January 10, 2015, http://sluggerotoole.com/2015/01/10/sdlp-not-to-ratify-stormont-house-agreement/

McHUGH, Michael, “ warns over Stormont House Agreement ‘uncertainty’ “, Belfast Telegraph, January 5, 2015.

SHILTON, Jordan, “Sinn Fein loses ground in UK elections in Northern Ireland, World socialist website, May 13, 2015, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/05/13/nire-m13.html

SINN FEIN, Equality not Austerity, 2015 Westminster Election Manifesto, 15 p.

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SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY, Prosperity not Austerity, Westminster manifesto 2015, 24 p.

UK GOVERNMENT, The Agreement, April 10, 1998, https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/the-belfast-agreement

UK GOVERNMENT, Stormont House Agreement, December 23, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement,

ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, Ulster Unionist Party manifesto, One Chance for Change, Westminster Manifesto 2015, 24 p.

WALKER, Stephen, “ David Cameron says he hopes Northern Ireland Executive will not collapse”, BBC News online, October 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland- politics-29525766

NOTES

1. UK government, The Agreement, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast- agreement, 10 April 1998. 2. There are four main parties in Northern Ireland. On the unionist side, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the largest one. It was founded in 1971 by Reverend Ian Paisley and has traditionally been supportive of a strong loyalism to Britain. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) governed Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1972 and the return to direct rule ? as a result of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Since the creation of the DUP, it has lost ground as a more moderate unionist party. On the nationalist side, the major party is Sinn Féin (which means “Ourselves alone”), which is represented both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. The original party was founded in 1905, under the Union, by Arthur Griffith, but the current party was created after a split in 1970. Sinn Féin is known for its association with the Irish Republican Army, despite its denials. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is the moderate nationalist party. It was founded in 1970 and was the major nationalist party until 1994, when it started losing ground to Sinn Féin, a few years before the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement which was to restore devolved powers in Northern Ireland. The fifth party is the Alliance party. It was founded in 1970 as a moderate non sectarian unionist alternative, but with time has become a median non sectarian party. 3. The Belfast Agreement was signed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. 4. US President Bill Clinton and former US Senator George Mitchell were involved in the process. 5. Devolution was suspended for three months in February 2000, twice in 2001 for a day and for almost five years in October 2002. The last and very long interruption was due t the refusal of UUP to share power with Sinn Féin, after it was revealed that the IRA had spied upon Stormont. 6. The police and justice have been reformed since the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, so as to guarantee a more equal representation of Catholics and Protestants in the police, and a fairer and non sectarian treatment of all the citizens of Northern Ireland by the judiciary. 7. In post conflict strategies, urban renovation is considered as a means to pacify community relations by offering a common attractive physical environment facilitating contact and reciprocal understanding thinks to shared activities. Urban renovation is also necessary to attract investment and foster economic recovery. 8. Since 1998, state- or European Commission-sponsored programmes have been implemented to improve community relations.

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9. The 1998 Agreement provided for an improvement of north-south relations, in particular via the creation of a North/South Ministerial Council. Since 1998, north/south economic relations have boomed, supported by business initiatives like Intertrade Ireland. 10. ICT and electronics, Life and health sciences, Aerospace and defence. 11. The Agreement, article 1(i), p. 3. 12. Stephen WALKER, “David Cameron says he hopes Northern Ireland Executive will not collapse”, BBC News online, October 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland- politics-29525766, accessed October 9, 2014. 13. UK GOVERNMENT, Stormont House Agreement, December 23, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement, p. 6, accessed March 31, 2015. 14. Ibid, p. 11 15. Ibid, p. 11 16. Ibid, p. 12 17. Ibid, p. 13 18. Ibid, p. 14 19. “Northern Ireland talks. Broad Agreement is brokered on some key issues”, BBC News, December 23, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30589804, accessed January 5, 2015. 20. David McCANN; “SDLP not to ratify Stormont House Agreement”, Slugger O’Toole online, January 10, 2015, http://sluggerotoole.com/2015/01/10/sdlp-not-to-ratify-stormont-house- agreement/, accessed January 12, 2015. 21. BBC, “Alliance Party ratifies Northern Ireland Agreement”, BBC News online, January 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30737797, accessed January 12, 2015. 22. Michael McHUGH, “Ulster Unionist Party warns over Stormont House Agreement ‘uncertainty’”, Belfast Telegraph, January 5, 2015, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/ northern-ireland/ulster-unionist-party-warns-over-stormont-house-agreement- uncertainty-30883469.html, accessed January 12, 2015. 23. John D. BREWSTER, “Post conflict elections in Northern Ireland”, April 1, 2015, Discover society, http://discoversociety.org/2015/04/01/post-conflict-elections-in-northern-ireland/, accessed April 15, 2015. 24. Ibid. 25. 16 seats 26. Op. cit., John BREWSTER. 27. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, Ulster Unionist Party manifesto, One Chance for Change, Westminster Manifesto 2015, p. 4. 28. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, DUP Westminster manifesto 2015, p.4. 29. SINN FEIN, Equality not Austerity,2015 Westminster Election Manifesto, p. 7 30. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY, Prosperity not Austerity, Westminster manifesto 2015, p. 21. 31. ALLIANCE PARTY, Step forward, not back, Manifesto for 2015 Westminster election, p. 10. 32. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, One Chance for Change, op.cit., p. 11 33. Ibid. 34. SINN FEIN, Equality not austerity, op.cit., p. 11 35. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, DUP Westminster Manifesto 2015, p. 10 36. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY, Prosperity not Austerity, op.cit., p. 4 37. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, One Chance for Change, op.cit., p 11. 38. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, DUP Westminster Manifesto 2015, op.cit., p. 10 39. ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY, One Chance for Change, p. 21. 40. SINN FEIN, Equality Not Austerity, op.cit. p. 4. 41. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY, Prosperity not Austerity, op.cit., p. 21.

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42. ALLIANCE PARTY, Step Forward Not Back, op.cit., p. 6. 43. Ibid, p. 4. 44. BBC, “Election 2015: Sinn Féin loses Fermanagh and South Tyrone”, May 8, 2015, http:// www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-northern-ireland-32629703, accessed May 9, 2015. 45. Jordan SHILTON, “Sinn Féin loses ground in UK elections in Northern Ireland”, World Socialist Website, May 13, 2015, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/05/13/nire-m13.html, accessed May 25, 2015. 46. The seat held in Westminster was East-Belfast.

ABSTRACTS

The 2015 General Election in Northern Ireland was set in the particular context of the Stormont House Agreement, which was reached on December 23, 2014, in a renewed attempt to make devolution in Northern Ireland, as defined in the 1998 “Good Friday” Agreement, operate more smoothly. On top of tackling the inescapable issues of finance and welfare in a still sluggish post- financial crisis economic context, the Stormont House Agreement indeed addressed several dividing issues, such as flags, identity, culture and tradition, dealing with the past and institutional reform. This article analyzes the stands taken during the electoral campaign by the five main parties in Northern Ireland (the Democratic Unionist Party, the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social and Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin and the Alliance Party) on the various issues raised in the Stormont House Agreement, underlining their convergences and divergences. It also briefly looks at the results and challenges ahead, in the particular context of the so called “post-conflict” Northern Ireland.

Les élections législatives de 2015 en Irlande du Nord se sont tenues peu après qu’ait été conclu, le 23 décembre 2014, l’Accord de Stormont House, une nouvelle tentative destinée à faire fonctionner la dévolution en Irlande du Nord, telle que définie par l’Accord de 1998 dit du « Vendredi Saint », de manière plus efficace. En sus des sujets de politique financière et sociale inévitables dans un contexte économique post-crise financière encore morose, l’Accord de Stormont House aborde en effet plusieurs sujets controversés comme les drapeaux, l’identité, la culture et la tradition, la gestion du passé et les réformes institutionnelles. Cet article analyse la position des cinq principaux partis d’Irlande du Nord pendant la campagne ((le Democratic Unionist Party, le Ulster Unionist Party, le Social and Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin and l’Alliance Party) sur les différents thèmes inclus dans l’Accord de Stormont House, en soulignant les points de convergence et de divergence. Il examine également brièvement les résultats ainsi que les défis à venir, dans le contexte particulier de ce que l’on appelle l’Irlande du Nord de l’après-conflit.

INDEX

Keywords: Northern Ireland, devolution, general election 2015, Stormont House Agreement, post-conflict Mots-clés: Irlande du Nord, dévolution, élections législatives 2015, Stormont House Agreement, après-conflit

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AUTHOR

VALÉRIE PEYRONEL

Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3

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The Green Party: ‘Green Surge’ or Work in Progress? Le parti vert : ‘Poussée verte’ ou travaux en cours ?

Brendan Prendiville

The Green Party1 first stood for elections in 1974 and for a long time was remarkable only for its spectacular lack of success. Up to 2001, it systematically lost all its deposits and without the help of Edward Goldsmith, it would, no doubt, have disappeared from the political stage before M. Thatcher came to power in 1979.2 It had to wait until the 2005 general election to poll more than 1% of the national vote (1.04%) and it was only five years later that it won its first parliamentary seat, when Caroline Lucas wrested the Brighton Pavilion constituency from the Labour Party.3 In national, parliamentary elections therefore, the Greens have come a long way. In the recent 2015 elections, the Green Party had, overall, a good election campaign. Apart from what the media termed a ‘car crash’ interview in which Natalie Bennett, the Green leader, was unable to answer a question on the costing of Green housing policy4, a certain number of policy proposals considered to be beyond the political pale5 and a majority Green council in Brighton under fire for its low recycling rate, the media interest in the Greens was high, and relatively favourable. Caroline Lucas received glowing praise for her work in Parliament, the political visibility of the Green Party shot up (which is one of the principal aims of a minority party in a non-majority electoral system) and more media light was shed on the work of local greens around the country, in councils other than Brighton. This article has been entitled The Green Party: ‘Green surge’ or Work in Progress?, that is, did this green surge really take place or was it simply the media building up interest in a campaign which was often lacking in interest? And was this election a non-event for the Greens who are still as far away from institutional political power as ever or can they take some positives away from it? We will firstly analyse the parameters of the green surge in terms of its internal and external dimensions. That is to say, certain factors which contributed to the green surge were partly of the Greens’ making (membership, candidates) while others were largely out of their control (polls, TV

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debate). Secondly, we will consider the politics of this surge by analysing two aspects of the campaign: the threat that the Greens represented for the Labour Party in particular and the reasons why more voters were saying they would vote Green than in previous general elections. The final part will be taken up by a discussion of the results and how the campaign may have helped the Greens to move forward.

Green surge

The so-called green surge of the 2015 British general elections was, in fact, not the first of its kind. Following the European elections of 1989 in which the Greens received almost 15% of the vote, its membership rose to 18,523 in January 1990, having stood at 11,000 the previous year.6 Four years later (1993), it was clear that this surge was a flash in the pan as membership had dropped to 5,500 and the Greens had received 0.5% of the national vote in the 1992 general elections. How does the 2015 green surge compare? The first, internal factor of this surge that became clear some time before the electoral campaign started was the rise in the numbers of people joining the two British Green Parties. By the end of 2014, membership of the Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW) had more than doubled and five months later it had quadrupled from its original figure of 15,000 in January 2014 to over 66,000 in May 2015 (Chart 1). Similarly, this rise was paralleled by new members joining the Scottish Greens, both before and following the Scottish referendum. From 2,000 members in January 2014, the Scottish Greens grew to 9,000 in June 2015.

Chart 1: Political Party Membership in Britain (2010-2015)7

Towards the end of 2014, the term green surge acquired a hashtag and became a media event in itself with figures being published on a regular basis, highlighting how the traditional political landscape was changing even before votes had been cast. There was particular interest when the membership of the two Green parties overtook that of the Liberal Democrats and of UKIP in January 2015, thereby becoming the third largest political party grouping in Britain with 75,557 members.8 Time will tell how solidly

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grounded this membership rise is but given that the rise continued even after the votes were counted,9 Green activists north and south of the Scottish border were no doubt feeling somewhat more confident than their counterparts in the aftermath of the 1989 European elections. The second internal factor concerned the number of candidates the Greens put up for election in 2015. Since their inception, the Greens, as any minority party under the ‘first past the post’ electoral system, have been hampered by their inability to put up the number of candidates they would have wished. The electoral deposit - at present £500 reimbursed with a minimum vote of 5% - has always been a sizeable financial barrier to Green progress. Although the Greens today are in a better financial situation (Table 1), especially since the growth in membership, the disparity between the minority GPEW and the institutional parties remains sizeable (Table 2) Table 1: Green Party (GPEW) Funding (2010-2014)10

Donations (£) Public Funds (£) Total (£)

2014 648,660 63,356 712,016

2013 190,337 54,886 245,223

2012 254,483 59,896 314,379

2011 158,830 24,858 183,688

2010 146,832 0 146,832

Table 2: Party funding (UK 2014)11

Donations (£) Public Funds (£) Total (£)

Conservative 28,950,917 152,663 29,103,580

Labour 18,523,701 7,541,143 26,064,844

Lib Dems 8,096,689 492,198 8,588,887

SNP 3,772,594 352,854 4,125,448

UKIP 3,500,570 - 3,500,570

Green Party 648,660 63,356 712,016

This healthier financial situation explains the Greens’ decision to put up 537 candidates in England and Wales, that is, in the vast majority of the available constituencies.12 A look at the evolution of candidate presentation rates over the years (Chart 2) gives an indication of the confidence within the Green party going into this election.

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Chart 2: Green Party Candidates (1974-2015)13

The first external factor was the importance of favourable polling for the Greens in the months leading up to the election. Already in 2014, the polls were looking good (Chart 3) even if the rise was not as smooth as this chart suggests.

Chart 3: Opinion Poll YouGov (Green Party)14

Given the past electoral history of the Greens, to be polling at 7%, four months before a general election was very encouraging and it got even better in January 2015 when an Ashcroft poll put them at 11%.15 A large part of this polling surge was due to the support they received from young people. During the course of 2014, the percentage of young people between 18-24 supporting the Greens went from 7% in January to 19% in

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December (Graph 1). However, encouraging as this was for the Greens, turn out rates of voting for this cohort are, traditionally, also the lowest.

Graph 1 : Youth support for the Greens (2014)16

The second external factor was the question of the TV election debates from which the Greens were initially excluded before the broadcasters had a change of mind and, under pressure from the public, included them. The debates became an issue on 13th October when the main broadcasters released plans to hold several leaders’ debates with the main party leaders as well as Nicolas Farage, leader of UKIP. There were no plans however for the Green leader, Natalie Bennett, to participate in any of them. This produced much anger from the Green Party as well as threats to take legal advice on this exclusion. It also, more importantly as it transpired, produced a citizen reaction when an online petition was created to protest against this exclusion. At the beginning of election year (7th January 2015), almost 300,000 people had signed this petition amidst a national campaign to support the Greens’ presence in the leaders’ debates. However, the following day (8th January), Ofcom17 judged that the Green Party would not be included in the live TV debates when it decided not to give it “Major Party Status”. 18 Disappointing as this was, the campaign to include the Greens in these debates continued buoyantly into the New Year with one of its highlights being the launch of a poster campaign on 19th January around a picture of Caroline Lucas and Natalie Bennett standing next to the caption “What are you afraid of, boys?” (Image 1)

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Image 1: Green election campaign poster19

On the 22nd January, the main broadcasters put an end to this campaign by announcing that the Greens would indeed be invited, along with the Welsh (Plaid Cymru) and the Scottish (SNP) nationalist parties, to take part in two of the four TV election debates. This was seen as a victory for the Greens and, with hindsight, can be explained by two factors. The first factor was the success of the aforementioned petition followed up by the equally successful poster campaign which had a series of repercussions. This poster was clearly critical of male domination of the three major parties but it was also seen, and indeed explained by Natalie Bennett on different occasions, as a perfect example of how Westminster incarnated the ‘old boys’ club’ which, on top of excluding women, would not listen to, or could not hear, voices from outside the political Establishment. In the words of Green party member, Dr David McQueen: “...the poster campaign of 19th January clearly touched a nerve amongst broadcasters and political opponents with the smiling faces of Lucas and Bennett used to mock the ‘old boy’s (sic) club of Westminster”.20 The second factor which, paradoxically, contributed to the Greens’ inclusion in the TV debates was the decision of the Prime Minister, D. Cameron, to support them in this matter. That is, on 10th January, the PM declared that it was unfair to exclude the Greens if UKIP were included. This concern for political fairness on the part of the PM could be seen in two ways. Firstly, it was part of a long British, cultural tradition of supporting the underdog, that is the person or group that is seen as getting a raw deal. Secondly, and more cynically, it could be greeted, and indeed was greeted, with a certain amount of scepticism by political commentators such as Nick Robinson (BBC) who considered that the Conservative Party leader was using the Greens as a stick to beat the Labour Party with. He quoted the PM’s “private view” as being that “... if we, the Conservatives, are to get hurt by the people to our right, UKIP, then Labour and the Liberal Democrats should get hurt by people to their left, the Green Party”.21 The opposition leader, Ed Miliband, believed that the PM was: “chickening out” while Nigel Farage (UKIP) was of the opinion that D. Cameron was “...using the Greens ‘as an excuse’ not to have a debate with UKIP...”.22 As for the Greens themselves, reaction differed; from the cautious comment of Natalie Bennett: Obviously David Cameron has his own political interests but I think we should give the Prime Minister credit for recognising that the debates would be unbalanced and bad for British democracy if Ukip is included and the Green party excluded.23

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to the undisguised elation of Green Baroness Jenny Jones of Moulsecoomb: Ofcom’s decision to deny the Greens “major party” status, she says, represented “pure delight, as far as we’re concerned. They made us the story, and it enraged people.” The Tories have also been helpful. “Dear old Cameron, God bless his cotton socks, said we should be in the debates, and put all the Tory bloggers – and the Sun – on our side! It’s made all the difference for us.”24 So, be it in terms of new party members, the increased number of Green candidates, the polling figures or the publicity gained from the TV debate, the political profile of the GPEW in the months running up to the election was higher than expected and raised hopes as to the election result. What political analysis can be drawn from this?

Politics

Initially, as in previous electoral campaigns, the Greens were seen by many political actors and commentators as an irrelevance. This time, however, the situation was different, with a political landscape that was already very different from the previous general election campaign. Since 2010, the majority party system had been weakened by the continuing rise of ‘minority parties’, the effect of which was to contribute to a form of fragmentation of the traditional, bipartisan British party system in the eyes of the public. This sense of political fragmentation had been reinforced with the formation of a coalition government in 2010 and continued with the rise of UKIP and the SNP, both of which were platforms for an anti-Westminster Establishment discourse.25 Whatever the reasons, the rise of UKIP had been impressive. In 2014, the party entered Parliament by winning two by-elections, in Clacton and Rochester and Strood, polling 60% and 39% of the vote, respectively.26 In European elections, the party went from 16.5% of the vote in 2009 to 27.5% in 2014 and in the two most recent local elections it had taken 139 from a possible 147 seats contested in 2013 and 163 from a possible 169 seats in 2014. In Scotland, the SNP was doing similarly well, especially since the Scottish referendum of September 2014.27 The loss of the independence referendum had clearly boosted the SNP’s popularity and on the eve of the general election it was set to take fifty seats or more. Both of these minor parties were direct threats to all three of the major parties, UKIP to the Conservatives in particular and the SNP to Labour. In this second part, we shall analyse the political ramifications of this backdrop to Green expectations. What electoral danger did the Greens represent and what appeal did they have for the voters?

Green threat

The arrival of the Greens onto this ‘minorities’ political stage went, at first, unnoticed. Traditionally, the Liberal Democrats have the best record on the environment28 and would, therefore, have been the first party to feel threatened by a resurgent Green Party. And feel it they did as many of their members were defecting to the Greens due to disappointment with their participation in the coalition government. By the beginning of October 2014, the GPEW estimated that around 50% of their new members were disappointed Liberal Democrats29 and studies before the election revealed that a similar percentage of ex-Liberal Democrat voters of 2010 were intending to vote Green

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in 2015.30 However, the Liberal Democrats were not the only party to wake up to the Green threat in October 2014. The Labour Party also realised that their own vote was under threat and reacted by creating a Green Party Strategy Unit (GPSU) headed by a prominent Labour politician, Sadiq Kahn (shadow Justice Secretary), who was “given the job of heading up Labour’s anti-Green ‘unit, and trying to hammer home the well-worn warning that “every vote for the Green Party only makes it one vote easier for the Conservatives to win the election.”31 This fear that Green support would split the Labour vote was encapsulated by the slogan ‘vote green, get blue’ and one of the main strategies of this unit was to dissuade potential green voters from voting Green by questioning the Green Party’s capacity to govern. This was done by pointing to the only experience of governing the Greens had which was in local politics, in the town of Brighton where they had controlled the local council since 2013. Brighton was the first majority Green council in the country and its performance was closely followed by supporters and opponents. In the light of the green surge, it was virtually inevitable that opponents would latch on to any difficulties the Greens were having there and this is exactly what the Labour Party did. On 28th October, Lord Bassam of Brighton wrote an article in the New Statesman 32 employing what the political columnist Adam Bienkov termed a “‘good cop, bad cop’ strategy”, that is an attempt to woo Green voters by stressing how left-wing the Labour party had become since 2010 while directly attacking the Green council in Brighton to demonstrate how incompetent it was.33 Two weeks later, visited Brighton and subsequently wrote an article in The Independent using a very similar approach to Lord Bassam; extolling Labour’s left-wing credentials and attacking Brighton Greens. These two similar articles (among others34) by high-profile Labour politicians seemed to have two aims. Firstly, to steer potential Green voters all over the country who were not members of the Green Party, away from voting Green. And, secondly, to re-gain both the parliamentary seat of Brighton, taken from the Labour Party by the Green Caroline Lucas in 2010, and the Brighton local council which was up for election on the same day. According to Adam Bienkov, the GPSU had limited success in that the numbers of voters supporting the Greens continued to rise after the unit’s creation, be it nationally or, locally, in Brighton. As we saw in the first section of this article, the national green surge continued apace regardless of the GPSU’s creation and locally, in Brighton, this also seemed to be the case. In June 2014, for example, Lord Ashcroft carried out a constituency poll in Brighton which showed the Greens and Labour virtually neck a neck with Labour ahead by one point; five months later, the Greens were ten points ahead of Labour.35 Clearly, the local difficulties the Greens experienced in Brighton were not affecting its national campaign to retain the parliamentary seat of their only MP. When it became clear that attacking the Greens was not working, the New Statesman journalist, Anoosh Chakelian, suggested a different, social class based solution to Labour’s dilemma: “As I have reported before, the best rhetoric Labour can use is to emphasise the costly, predominantly middle-class nature of the ‘green lifestyle’”.36 She quoted one of Ed Miliband’s aides who claimed that: “We’ve found the best line of attack is to attack the Greens as an upper-middle class lifestyle choice”.37 There were several reasons why the Labour Party was unable to stem the green tide but they seemed unrelated to weaknesses displayed by the Greens. Firstly, criticism of the Green council’s performance in Brighton, as we have seen, did little to deter people

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from promising to vote Green. Secondly, the aforementioned poor media performance of the Green Party leader N. Bennett could have been a major setback for the Greens but after a couple of days, the media storm seemed to have blown over. Indeed, according to Prof. Philip Cowley, for people who intended to vote Green, this slip-up by Natalie Bennett mattered little as Green supporters were more concerned “about sending a message about the sort of society” they wanted to live in rather than the details of specific policies.38 P. Cowley’s remark could also explain why the severe criticism of Green policies from the Right39 and the Left40 seemed to have little effect on the Green vote.

Green attraction

On the other hand, the reasons why potential Green voters were growing in numbers was a reflection of the numerous attractions the Greens represented to a variety of socio-political groupings: The Greens were in a new political position, given the Liberal Democrats’ decision to participate in the coalition government of 2010. By doing so, the Liberal Democrats lost their place as the protest party they had long held within the British political system. Moreover, subsequently, they lost a lot of credibility with their supporters when they made a complete U-turn on the question of raising university fees in 2010 having sworn to oppose this rise during the electoral campaign of that year. Many of those supporters who could not bring themselves to supporting the Labour Party, now saw the Green Party as the best replacement. Alongside the disappointed Liberal Democrat supporters stood the alienated supporters from the Blair-Brown days of New Labour who did not see Ed Miliband as a particularly radical change. This alienated, Labour left-wing felt much more in tune with the anti- austerity discourse of the Greens which was the only party to take this stance in the campaign. In addition, many of the Green Manifesto policies41 appealed to this group, such as “Bringing the railways into public hands”, ending the drive to “NHS privatisation”, raising the minimum wage to £10 by 2020, abolishing zero hour contracts and introducing “a wealth tax of 2% a year on the top 1%”. Further to the left of the Labour Party, many Green sympathisers, particularly young ones, saw in the Green Party, the British equivalent of the Greek (Syriza) and Spanish (Podemos) alternative Left which was also fighting austerity. Certain radical Green policies were also attractive to this group such as “cancelling Trident replacement and decommissioning existing nuclear forces and facilities” or reviewing “currently controlled drug classifications, within a legalised environment of drug use”. A further aspect of the Greens which appealed to critics of Establishment politics was the ‘clean’ image they had with regard to the MPs’ expenses scandal in which they were not involved and the fact that their financing was seen as being above board with no large donations to cause them political embarrassment. Another, was the importance the Greens gave to gender equality. The Greens are the only party with a large majority of women in positions of power. On the Greens’ website (section ‘Our People’), two thirds of the official Green representatives mentioned are women: Parliament (House of Commons: Caroline Lucas; House of Lords: Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb), Party (leader: Natalie Bennett; deputy leader: ), MEPs (, ), London Assembly (Jenny Jones42). This prompted the Daily Telegraph

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reporter, Sophy Ridge, to declare “If there is a political glass ceiling, the Greens seem to have smashed straight through it”.43 The Greens were also seen by many new supporters as the only party which held a resolutely anti-UKIP stance. Indeed, in an article of the Open Democracy website, Adam Ramsey stresses this stance as a reason why many people decided to join the Green Party: One consistent message from new members is that they felt so horrified by the rise of UKIP that they had to do something. The sense that the Greens have been the only party standing up to UKIP rather than pandering to them seems to have attracted many to the party. A case in point here is the surge in Green membership around the Rochester and Strood by-election, where the party ran with the slogan “say no to racism”.44 Clearly, the Greens had an attraction for different reasons but how far did this translate into results and where could these results lead them?

Work in Progress?

The vote count for the Greens was their best ever result, despite being well below what pre-electoral polls had suggested. In the UK as a whole, the Greens received 3.8% of the national vote and, although this almost quadrupled their share of the 2010 vote it was a far cry from the Ashcroft poll that put them on 11% of voting intentions in January 2015. In the seats they contested, their average vote more than doubled. Table 3: Green Parties (UK): General Election Results (2010-2015)45

Year Total Votes Vote share (UK) Average vote share (seats contested)

2010 285,612 1% 1.9%

2015 1,157,630 3.8% 4.2%

If we consider the individual results of the three Green Parties in the UK (Table 4) over the same period, we can see that each one increased its score in 2015, with the GPEW quadrupling its national share of the vote. Table 4: Green Party: Regional Results (2010-2015)46

England and Wales

Year Total Votes Vote share Average vote share (seats contested)

2010 265,243 1% 1.2%

2015 1,111,603 4.1% 4.3%

Scotland

Year Total Votes Vote share Average vote share (seats contested)

2010 16,827 0.7% 2%

2015 39,205 1.3 2.6%

Northern Ireland

Year Total Votes Vote share Average vote share (seats contested)

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2010 3,542 0.5% 2.5%

2015 6,822 1% 3.49%

This increased vote was seen by the Greens as an encouragement, as was the number of deposits saved. Up to 2001, they had never saved a deposit and this time, they saved 131 of them (Table 5). Table 5: Green Party (UK) Electoral Deposits, 2001-201547

General Deposits saved

1974 (Feb 0 )

1983 0

1992 0

1997 0

2001 10

2010 7

2015 131

Before the elections, the Greens had laid out their ambitions by targeting 12 priority constituencies (Table 6) and, although they didn’t reach expectations in winning any more seats, the increase in the vote was encouraging in places like West, Holborn and St Pancras (where the Party leader stood), and Sheffield Central. The surprise came in Norwich South which had a good score (13.9%) but a marginally lower one (-1%) than in 2010. However, this constituency was one of only two UK constituencies with a Green candidate in which the Green score did not increase.48 Table 6 : Green Targets 201549

Constituency 2015 (GPEW) Candidate Greens Total votes Share votes% Change since 2010

Brighton Pavilion C. Lucas 22,871 41.8 +10.5

Bristol West D. Hall 17,227 26.8 +23

Cambridge R.Read 4,109 7.9 +0.3

Holborn and St Pancras N.Bennett 7,013 12,8 +10.1

Liverpool Riverside M.Dobson 5,372 12.1 +8.6

Norwich South L.Grahame 6,749 13.9 -1

Oxford East A. Duncan 5,890 11.6 +9,2

Reading East R.White 3,214 6.4 +4.2

Sheffield Central J. Creasy 6,999 15.8 +12.1

Solihull H. Allen 1,632 3 +3

St Ives T. Andrewes 3,051 6.3 +3.5

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York Central J. Tyler 4,791 10 +6.5

Where does this leave the Greens? The first answer is that the results left them very frustrated, on comparing their 3.8% of the popular vote with the 4.7% of the SNP and seeing that they ended up with one parliamentary seat to the SNP’s fifty-six. Indeed, one of their first reactions was to join with the two other minority parties which participated in the TV debates (UKIP and Plaid Cymru) to protest against this further example of the ‘First Past The Post’ electoral distortions. The green activist, Peter Tatchell, also put his finger on this weakness of the British electoral system: “The Conservative Party secured 37 per cent of the votes cast but gained 51 per cent of the seats. Given the voter turnout of 66 per cent, this means they won the support of a mere 24 percent of registered electors”.50 However, despite this dubious electoral backdrop, the performance of the Greens can also be seen as ‘work in progress’ when looking at the bigger political picture. The first encouraging sign is that they managed to translate pre-election polls into actual votes much more efficiently than in previous campaigns. This is, of course, a reflection of the membership surge but also of the changing perception people seemed to have of them in terms of their capacity to take a share in government. On his political blog in January 2015, Adam Bienkov illustrated this point by referring to a YouGov poll in which more people chose the Greens than any of the four minority parties (SNP/Greens/UKIP/Liberal Democrats) to take part in a coalition government.51 The second factor can be seen in the validation of the long term strategy the Greens adopted in the 1990s. In 1993, following a long period of internal conflict, the GPEW adopted a reform entitled ‘Basis for Renewal’ which was a form of compromise between those members who preferred to focus on social movement-type activism (‘decentralists’) and those who believed that the Greens needed to enter the political system by taking elections more seriously (‘electoralists’).52 This compromise was built around the idea that, as in other European Green Parties, the British Greens would attempt to do both, by keeping a foot in both the political system and civil society. This strategy would involve being present in local activism (e.g. anti-fracking campaigns) and extending Green policy beyond its traditional environmental concerns to include social issues. It is a strategy which had already borne fruit in 2010, with the election of Caroline Lucas and the 1.2m votes of this 2015 election could be seen as an extension of this. The Green Manifesto blends social (A Decent Livelihood: A one Planet Economy, Equalities, Health and Well-Being, A Place to Learn: Education, A Place to Live: Housing) and environmental issues (Earth, Energy and the Climate).53 A third factor is the progress of an alternative, green political culture which is a fundamental dimension of green philosophy. That is, the Greens believe that gaining political power is meaningless without a corresponding change in socio-cultural behaviour. In many ways, this is a corollary of the ‘Basis for Renewal’ compromise between grass roots activism and the formal political activity of seeking electoral representation and the dilemma for the Greens has always been to reconcile these two aims. The book that Caroline Lucas recently published54 illustrates these dual Green concerns and her actions inside Westminster (e.g. wearing an anti-sexist T-shirt in the House of Commons as part of campaign against page 3 of The Sun) as well as outside

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(e.g. taking an active part in the anti-fracking protest at Balcombe) reflect this Green need to reconcile words and deeds.

Conclusion

In reply to the question of our title, there was clearly a green surge before the election in different respects (membership, polls, etc.), the result of which was a quadrupling of the national Green vote. Given the electoral system, this did not produce any more seats but it did produce more confidence within the UK Green parties. Are the Greens still a case of ‘work in progress’? No doubt, yes; that is, they need to convince many more people to vote for them before any share of national political power can be envisaged. One MP can hardly be seen as work done. There is, however, a more encouraging side to the idea of ‘work in progress’ whereby the strides that were made during the electoral campaign have consolidated UK Green party structures while also vindicating the ‘Town Hall to Westminster’55 strategy that came out of the 1990s reforms. The immediate task for the Greens is to retain all the support they have received in the last year. In the aftermath of the 1989 success, they were unable to do this and membership soon fell. This time, their political experience and organisation seem stronger but the challenge they face is sizeable given that the majority of their voters came from other political families. According to an Ashcroft poll (Chart 5) held on 7th May, half of the Green votes came from ex-Liberal Democrats (50%) with almost as many ex-Labour voters (18%) as ‘loyal’ Green voters (19%).

Chart 4: Who voted for the Greens? 56

The post-election British political landscape is one in which five parties could challenge for a share of power in the next election. It is a landscape which has all the appearances of a multi-party system stuck in a two-party system straightjacket and during the course of this Parliament, this could produce different outcomes. From the position of the minority parties, it may be an opportunity to reintroduce the issue of proportional representation onto the political agenda. However, from that of the weakened Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, it could also raise the possibility of a centre-left

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realignment. The latter scenario reinforces the need for the Greens to embed their newfound supporters as soon as possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIRCH, Sarah. “: Prospects for Green Party Support in Britain”, Parliamentary Affairs, 2008, 62(1), pp. 53-71.

BURCHELL, Jon. The Evolution of Green Politics. London: Earthscan, 2002.

CARTER, Neil. “The Green Party: Emerging from the Political Wilderness?”, British Politics, vol. 3, no 2, 2008, pp. 223- 240.

GREEN PARTY, “For the Common Good”, General Election Manifesto, 2015.

LOWE, P. & GOYDER, J. Environmental Groups in Politics. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983,

LUCAS, Caroline. Honourable Friends. London: Portobello Books Ltd, 2015.

PRENDIVILLE, Brendan. “British Environmentalism: a party in movement?”, The UK’s Political Landscape in the 21st Century: Players, Strategies, Achievements, Revue LISA/LISA e-journal, XII-n°8, 2014.

PRENDIVILLE, Brendan. “UK General Elections 2010: The Environment”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, vol. 16, no 1, Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2011.

YOUNG, Stephen. The Politics of the Environment. Manchester: Baseline Books, 1993.

NOTES

1. There are three Green parties in the UK: the Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW), the Green Party in Scotland, often called the Scottish Greens, and the Green Party in Northern Ireland. Unless otherwise stated, in this article, the Greens (or Green Party) refers to the Green Party of England and Wales. 2. Edward Goldsmith was founder of The Ecologist magazine in 1970 and instrumental in the founding of the Green Party, then called ‘People’, in 1973 (Brendan PRENDIVILLE, “British Environmentalism: a party in movement?” in David HAIGRON (ed.), The UK’s Political Landscape in the 21st Century: Players, Strategies, Achievements, Revue LISA/LISA e-journal, XII-n°8, 2014). He was also an important financial backer of the party during difficult times. 3. Subsequently, in 2013, the Labour Party lost its majority on the local Brighton council to the Green Party and according to Rob Shepherd (Green Party media officer), “a running battle began between the two parties. In the local elections of 2015, Labour regained its majority on the council” (“How the Green Party is responding to Labour's fear of a "Ukip of the left"”, New Statesman, 17 November 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/11/how-green-party-responding- labours-fear-ukip-left (accessed 7.7.2015). 4. “Incredibly Awkward Interview With Natalie Bennett”, LBC Radio, 24 February 2014, http:// www.lbc.co.uk/incredibly-awkward-interview-with-natalie-bennett-105384

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5. Ed West, “Welcome to the completely bonkers world of the Green Party manifesto”, The Spectator, 21 January 2015, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/01/welcome-to-the- bonkers-world-of-the-green-party-manifesto/ (accessed 7.7.2015). 6. Stephen YOUNG, The Politics of the Environment, Manchester: Baseline Books, 1993, p.37. 7. Alex Hunt, “UKIP: The story of the UK Independence Party's rise”, BBC News website, 21 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073 (accessed 7.7.2015); Tim Wigmore, “The rise of the "anti-Ukip" party: how the Greens are hammering Labour”, New Statesman, 7 January 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/rise-anti-ukip- party-how-greens-are-hammering-labour (accessed 7.7.2015); Frances Perraudin, “Lib Dem membership figures up 10,000 since general election”, The Guardian, 13 May 2015, http:// www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/13/lib-dem-membership-figures-up-10000-since- general-election (accessed 7/7/15). 8. This position is strengthened if we add the 400 members (2015) of the Green Party of Northern Ireland (Steven Agnew, “Greens' growth has just begun”, Belfast Telegraph, 3 March 2015, http:// www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/debateni/steven-agnew/greens-growth-has-just- begun-31105781.html (accessed 9.7.2015). 9. According to Frances Perraudin, “around 4,000” people joined the GPEW in the week following the General Election (The Guardian, op.cit.). By way of comparison, the French Greens (Europe Ecologie Les Verts/EELV) had 9,300 members in 2015 (Eric Dupin, “Le grand ratage des écologistes français”, Le Monde Diplomatic, Avril 2015, http://www.http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/ 2015/04/DUPIN/52853 (accessed 20.11.2015). 10. http://www.ukpolitical.info/Donations.htm (accessed 9/7/15) 11. Ibid. 12. In a similar way to the Greens (“Greens crowd-source proposed internet law”, 3News, 23 April 2014, http://www.3news.co.nz/politics/greens-crowdsource-proposed-internet- law-2014042312#axzz3i1IplwXW, (accessed 9/7/15), the GPEW also used social media to crowd source funds in order to finance prospective candidates (http://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/green- party-in-your-seat, accessed 9/7/15). One particular example of this was in Brixton (Jason Cobb, brixton “Green Party launches crowd funding campaign to help pay for leaflets in Streatham constituency”, Brixtonbuzz, 7 January 2015, http://www.brixtonbuzz.com/2015/01/green-party- launches-crowd-funding-campaign-to-help-pay-for-leaflets-in-streatham-constituency/; accessed 9.7.2015). 13. Neil CARTER, “The Green Party: Emerging from the Political Wilderness?”, British Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2008, pp. 223-240.; http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/ electoral-data?; accessed 30/7/15). In 1974, five candidates stood in the February election and four in the October election. The rise in 1992 could be partly explained by the confidence generated by the 1989 European Election result. 14. https://yougov.fr/, accessed 9/7/15. 15. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2015/01/ashcroft-national-poll-con-29-lab-28-lib-dem-9- ukip-15-green-11/ (accessed 9/7/15). 16. http://www.buzzfeed.com/jamieross/young-people-are-abandoning-labour-for-the- greens#.rq7W2dExWK (accessed 9/7/15). 17. The British communications regulator. 18. http://media.ofcom.org.uk/news/2015/major-parties-consultation/ (accessed 9/7/15). 19. http://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/green-party-in-your-seat (accessed 9/7/15) 20. http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2015/political-communication-and- image-management/did-the-green-surge-make-any-difference/ (accessed 9/7/15). 21. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30726499 (accessed 9/7/15). 22. Ibid.

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23. Anoosh Chaelian, “David Cameron refuses to appear in television debates unless the Greens are included”, New Statesman, 8 January 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/ david-cameron-refuses-appear-television-debates-unless-greens-are-included (accessed 9.7.2015). 24. John Harris, “The Green surge: is this the party that will decide the election?”, The Guardian, 21 January 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/21/green-surge-party-that- will-decide-election (accessed 9.7.2015). 25. This anti-Establishment discourse had been particularly prevalent since the MP expenses scandal which began in 2009. 26. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073 (accessed 9/7/15). During the 2010-2015 parliament, the membership figures of UKIP more than doubled, rising from 17,184 in 2011 (ibid.) to 41,514 in 2015 (Matthew Holehouse, “Greens now have 'more members than Ukip’ ”, The Telegraph, 15 January 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/green-party/11347050/ Greens-now-have-more-members-than-Ukip.html (accessed 9.7.2015). 27. John Curtice, “Survation Add To Labour’s Woes”, What Scotland Thinks, 18 November 2014, http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/11/survation-add-labours-woes/ (accessed 9.7.2015). 28. Brendan PRENDIVILLE, « UK General Elections 2010: The Environment », Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, vol. 16, no 1, Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle. 29. Ben Riley-Smith, “Liberal Democrat conference: Seven reasons why the 2015 general election will be a five-horse race”, The Telegraph, 6 October 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ politics/liberaldemocrats/11138579/Liberal-Democrat-conference-Seven-reasons-why-the-2015- general-election-will-be-a-five-horse-race.html (accessed 9.7.2015). 30. James Dennison, “Green Party voters look like Lib Dems, think like Labour voters and are as dissatisfied as ‘Kippers”, New Statesman, 17 February 2015, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/green-party- voters-environmentalists-socialists-or-protest-voters/ (accessed 9.7.2015). 31. John Harris, “The Green surge: is this the party that will decide the election?”, The Guardian, 21 January 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/21/green-surge-party-that- will-decide-election (accessed 9.7.2015). 32. Steve Bassam, “The difference between radicalism set in reality, and the Green Party”, New Statesman, 28 October, 2004, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/10/difference- between-radicalism-set-reality-and-green-party (accessed 13/7/15). Lord Bassam (Labour) was the leader of Brighton Council between 1987-1999. 33. Rob Shepherd (“Green Party media officer and a Green candidate for Preston Park, Brighton, in the 2015 council elections”) replied to Lord Bassam’s criticism of the Green council a couple of weeks later (“How the Green Party is responding to Labour's fear of a "Ukip of the left"”, “New Statesman, 17 November 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/11/how-green- party-responding-labours-fear-ukip-left (accessed 13.7.2015). 34. One article by Luke Akeshurt even made the claim that “the Greens are not a welcome addition to the UK’s political spectrum” (“We must not make the same mistake with the Greens that we did with the Lib Dems”, LabourList, 28 October 2014, http://labourlist.org/2014/10/we-must-not- make-the-same-mistake-with-the-greens-that-we-did-with-the-lib-dems/ (accessed 13.7.2015). 35. Adam Bienkov, “Labour are losing votes to the Greens and they don't know why”, Politics.co.uk, 19 December 2014, http://www.politics.co.uk/blogs/2014/12/19/labour-are-losing- votes-to-the-greens-and-they-don-t-know-wh (accessed 13.7.2015). 36. Anoosh Chaelian, “Why Labour can't counter the Greens' popularity with green policies”, New Statesman, 16 January 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/why-labour-cant- counter-greens-popularity-green-policies (accessed 13.7.2015). 37. Interestingly, this line of argument is reminiscent of the 1960s Labour politician & theorist, , who referred to “parts of the conservationist lobby” as having an approach which was “indifferent to the needs of ordinary people...(reflecting)…a set of middle and upper class value

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judgments (and wishing) “to kick the ladder down behind them” ( Anthony CROSLAND, A social democratic Britain, London: , 1971, p.5). 38. http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/02/whats-more-important-to-voters- coherent-policy-or-the-chance-to-send-a-message/ (accessed 14/7/15). 39. Matthew Holehouse, “Drugs, brothels, al-Qaeda and the Beyonce tax: the Green Party plan for Britain”, The Telegraph, 5 March 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/green-party/ 11356354/Drugs-brothels-al-Qaeda-and-the-Beyonce-tax-the-Green-Party-plan-for-Britain.html (accessed 14.7.2015). 40. Conor Pope, “The Greens are a joke, and Labour shouldn't be frightened of saying so”, New Statesman, 22 January 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/greens-are-joke- and-labour-shouldnt-be-frightened-saying-so (accessed 14.7.2015). 41. “For the Common Good”, General Election Manifesto, Green Party, 2015 (https:// www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/manifesto/ Green_Party_2015_General_Election_Manifesto_Searchable.pdf (accessed 14/7/15). All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the Green Party Manifesto. 42. Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Jenny Jones are one and the same person. 43. Sophie Ridge, “Forget Ukip: why the Green Party could decide the election”, The Telegraph, 1 December 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/11264812/Forget-Ukip- why-the-Green-Party-could-decide-the-election.html (accessed 14/7/15). Alongside this focus on gender equality inside the party, among the major parties: “The Green Party, led by Natalie Bennett, has the highest percentage of female candidates - 37.5%” ( http://www.bbc.com/news/ election-2015-32378852, accessed 14.7.2015). 44. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/green-membership-overtakes- lib-dems-and-ukip-here%27s-13-reasons-why (accessed 14/7/15). 45. The Electoral Commission (http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/ electoral-data?; accessed 30/7/15). 46. Ibid. 47. CARTER, op. cit.; http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral- data? (accessed 30/7/15). 48. The Greens put up 573 candidates in the 2015 UK elections. Apart from Norwich South, the other constituency score to fall was in Aldridge-Brownhills (-0.1%). 49. http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/constituencies (accessed 14/7/15). 50. Peter Tatchell, “Whatever you think of Ukip or the Greens, our electoral system is robbing them”, The Telegraph, 14 May 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/ politics-blog/11606354/Whatever-you-think-of-Ukip-or-the-Greens-our-electoral-system-is- robbing-them.html (accessed 17.7.2015). 51. The question was: “Imagine there was a hung parliament at the next election, with no single party having enough MPs to form a government by themselves. Thinking about the other similar parties, do you think it would be a good or a bad thing if the following parties held the “balance of power” that is, they had enough MPs to influence who ended up forming a government?” (http://www.politics.co.uk/blogs/ 2015/01/19/why-labour-s-anti-green-strategy-isn-t-working, accessed 17/7/15) 52. Brendan PRENDIVILLE, 2014, op.cit. 53. The Greens would argue that both social and environmental themes are part and parcel of each other be it in the Manifesto chapters or in real life. 54. Caroline LUCAS, Honourable Friends, London: Portobello Books Ltd, 2015. 55. This slogan was coined at the time of ‘Basis for Renewal’ to illustrate the decision to build up solid local electoral bases around the country before attempting to enter Parliament. 56. Source: http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/LORD-ASHCROFT-POLLS- Post-vote-poll-summary1.pdf, accessed 19 July 2015.

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ABSTRACTS

The Green Party has come a long way since it began standing for election in 1974. In the 2010 General Election it won its first parliamentary seat (Caroline Lucas, Brighton Pavilion) & this time, hopes were high of not only retaining that seat but also of gaining one, and possibly two others. These hopes were heightened by what the media termed the “Green Surge” in the year leading up to the election during which membership rose considerably, reflected in increasingly optimistic polling figures. The result didn’t live up to expectations in terms of seats but a sizeable increase in the number of votes left the Greens optimistic for the future. This article will analyse the reasons for this Green Surge, the politics of it and the situation the British Greens find themselves in following the results.

Depuis sa première participation aux élections législatives de 1974, le Parti vert britannique a fait beaucoup de chemin. Lors du scrutin de 2010, Caroline Lucas l’a fait entrer au parlement en remportant la circonscription de Brighton Pavilion. Cinq ans plus tard, les militants espéraient conserver au moins ce siège et, peut-être, en gagner un, voire deux autres. Ces espoirs ont grandi au cours de l’année 2014 lorsque le nombre de nouveaux adhérents au Parti vert est monté en flèche, accompagné de sondages électoraux encourageants. Les médias ont alors parlé de « poussée verte ». Néanmoins, en termes de sièges, les résultats n’ont pas répondu aux attentes et Caroline Lucas reste toujours la seule élue à Westminster. Par contre, l’augmentation importante du nombre de voix accordées au Verts génère un certain optimisme pour l’avenir électoral du parti. Dans cet article, nous présenterons une analyse de cette poussée verte pré-électorale, les ramifications politiques qu’elle a engendrées et la situation du Parti vert au lendemain du vote.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Parti Vert, écologie politique, élections législatives, poussée verte, partis minoritaires, environnementalisme Keywords: Green Party, political ecology, General Elections, Green Surge, minority parties, environmentalism.

AUTHOR

BRENDAN PRENDIVILLE

Université de Rennes 2

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UKIP's Performance in the 2015 General Election: A Series of Unfulfilled Expectations Les élections législatives de 2015 au Royaume-Uni : Quel bilan pour le UKIP ?

Karine Tournier-Sol

2014 was undoubtedly the best year in UKIP's history. The party's continuous rise since 2012 culminated in its historic victory at the European elections in May 2014. Following this political earthquake, the positive dynamic enjoyed by UKIP showed no sign of slowing down and translated into the (no less historic) election of the first two UKIP MPs in by-elections triggered by the defections of two Conservative MPs, Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless. As 2014 drew to an end, the party's electoral prospects for the upcoming general election therefore looked unexpectedly good, with opinion polls predicting that UKIP was on its way towards winning up to a dozen seats. Expectations were thus high among the Ukippers in the run-up to the election campaign, all the more so since another hung parliament seemed very likely, possibly giving UKIP a role to play in determining the balance of power. However, despite these encouraging signs, there were still major obstacles for UKIP to overcome in the forthcoming general election. Until then, the party's electoral success had been limited to second-order elections, which are traditionally used by voters to express their dissatisfaction with the party in government. The question was therefore whether the populist party was only a recipient of the protest vote or whether it could turn its growing support into positive endorsement in a general election – a first-order election in which the first-past-the-post system acts as a barrier to the representation of small parties. The 2015 general election therefore represented UKIP's biggest challenge so far. It would also put to the test the process of professionalisation the party had recently entered with the aim of achieving a new dimension in British politics. The stakes were thus high, especially for its leader, Nigel Farage, who stood for the constituency of South Thanet and had announced that he would resign if he did not

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win the seat, considering that he would not be a credible leader anymore. UKIP therefore seemed to be at a critical moment of its history. As it turned out, the results fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only returned one MP to Westminster. This paper aims at examining UKIP's performance in the 2015 general election by first focusing on the campaign, in which the party found it hard to exist and capture attention, despite Nigel Farage's confrontational tactics. The election was also marked by the party's efforts to demonstrate that it had reached a new stage in its evolution and had gained credibility, notably through a wide-ranging and fully- costed manifesto, which we shall turn to in a second part. Finally, although the "UKIP effect" was not as significant as expected, the results of the election will be analysed and put into perspective in the third part, which will also reflect on the brief civil war which erupted in the party ranks in the aftermath of the election. This will lead us to conclude on the party's prospects in the perspective of the EU referendum which David Cameron's victory has now firmly put on the political agenda.

A disappointing campaign

In the early months of 2015 – referred to as "the pre-campaign" – UKIP kept a relatively low profile. Its charismatic leader, usually keen to capture media attention, was surprisingly absent from the headlines – so much so that rumours of ill-health started to circulate, prompting Nigel Farage to respond publicly at the party spring conference by insisting that he was as "fit as a flea".1 He later explained that this unusual reserve had been part of a deliberate political strategy to save his energy and "best lines for the campaign proper".2 In the final weeks of the campaign, he finally admitted suffering from back pain and receiving treatment. Unfortunately for UKIP, its supposedly low-key strategy during the pre-campaign was not emulated by all its official representatives, and as often in the party's history, a series of scandals erupted, causing embarrassment in the run-up to the general election. In March, UKIP MEP and parliamentary candidate was expelled from the party over an expenses scandal. Shortly afterwards, David Coburn, the only Scottish UKIP MEP, also made the headlines for comparing Scottish minister to Islamist terrorist Abu Hamza. In the weeks up to the election, gaffes and controversial comments multiplied, leading several parliamentary candidates to stand down. This was actually nothing new or exceptional, and while Nigel Farage complained of media bias, the fact is that this gaffe-prone aspect of UKIP is very much linked to its nature as a party of amateurs, in contrast with the professional politicians that it castigates in its political discourse. Although opinion polls have repeatedly shown that those scandals do not affect UKIP support, at the time they distracted attention from the party's message and reinforced the impression that the UKIP campaign was having trouble taking off. Certainly more harmful for the party was the manifest confusion over its immigration policy, which is now the central focus of the party and also the main driver of UKIP support. In the space of a few days, its immigration targets changed from 50,000 to 30,000 before being dropped altogether, thereby blurring the party's message on its core policy and undermining its credibility. Such ambiguity is particularly detrimental for populist parties like UKIP whose success is built on a clear, simple and straightforward discourse. When the official campaign started on 30 March, UKIP had

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lost ground, as reflected in the opinion polls which showed that, on average, support for UKIP had slipped from 19% in the autumn to 14% in the first months of 2015. Unsurprisingly, UKIP chose to focus its campaign on immigration, which was the "biggest election issue of all" as Nigel Farage wrote in the Daily Express. 3 Symbolically, the UKIP leader launched his party's campaign in St Margaret's Bay, near Dover, where he unveiled UKIP's first election poster, featuring three escalators leading up to the top of the White Cliffs in Dover and saying: "Immigration is three times higher than the Tories promised" – the poster itself being a modification of one which had been used for the European elections a year earlier. Nigel Farage argued that not only does immigration put pressure on wages and public services, but it also has a cultural impact on communities and "has left Britain almost unrecognizable"4 from what it was 10 to 15 years ago. Those arguments had already been aired during the pre-campaign and were to be developed further. In particular, UKIP wanted new immigrants to pay for private health insurance for 5 years before benefiting from the NHS – the same system had been suggested for schooling, sparking controversy, and it was eventually dropped. But the most contentious idea put forward by the UKIP leader was to prevent migrants suffering from life-threatening diseases, such as AIDS, from coming to the UK so that British taxpayers would not have to pay for foreigners' expensive treatments. The highest point of the campaign was certainly the seven leaders' debate broadcast on ITV on 2 April. As a good TV performer, Nigel Farage was a clear favourite in this debate, all the more so since one year earlier he had come out as the definite winner of the two debates he had had with Nick Clegg on Europe ahead of the European elections. The UKIP leader started by playing the usual populist card, saying that the six other leaders were all the same, supporting EU membership and thus open-door immigration, contrary to him and his party. Later on, he resorted to more aggressive tactics and repeated his opposition to what he termed "health tourism": Here’s a fact, and I’m sure other people will be mortified that I dare to talk about it. There are 7000 diagnoses in this country every year for people who are HIV positive, which is not a good place for any of them to be, I know, but 60% of them are not British nationals. You can come into Britain, from anywhere in the world, and get diagnosed with HIV, and get the anti-retroviral drugs which cost up to £25,000 per year per patient. I know there are some horrible things happening in many parts of the world, but what we need to do is to put the NHS for British people and families who, in many cases, have paid into this system for decades.5 This intervention provoked outrage on social media, and on the TV set Leanne Wood, leader of Plaid Cymru, replied to Farage: "You ought to be ashamed of yourself". This was typical Farage, playing the provocative card to capture attention, thereby appearing as a divisive, polarising figure arousing strong feelings, whether positive or negative, as polls demonstrated after the debate. Yet, unfortunately for him, the leader who made the strongest impression that night was Nicola Sturgeon, who appeared to have stolen the show away from him, appearing as the new rising star. In a further move to attract attention in this campaign where he found it hard to exist, Nigel Farage used confrontational tactics again during one of the BBC debates, turning on the audience and its "left-wing standards", obviously playing polemical to strike the voters' minds. While resorting to aggressive tactics to catch attention, the party's campaign also endeavoured to prove that UKIP had reached a new political dimension. The party tried to position itself as a credible political force with a role to play in the balance of power

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after the election as opinion polls predicted another hung parliament. Nigel Farage declared that he was ready to strike a deal with the Conservative party in return for an immediate referendum on EU membership. UKIP clearly aimed to achieve a new political status in this election and to appear as a plausible coalition partner. Part of this rebranding strategy was the party's manifesto which was supposed to herald a new era for UKIP.

UKIP's manifesto: a bid for credibility

UKIP launched its manifesto on 15 April. The document, entitled "Believe in Britain", is 76 pages long. Its ambition was clearly to show that UKIP has reached a new stage in its evolution, reflecting the process of professionalization it has been undergoing in the last couple of years. The party's efforts to gain credibility is illustrated by its claim that its programme is fully-costed as it has been audited by an independent think-tank, in contrast with the 2010 general election manifesto which had been later dismissed by Nigel Farage as "nonsense and drivel". 6 , UKIP's deputy chairman and policy chief in charge of writing the manifesto, presented it as an answer to UKIP's detractors: "Our manifesto also throws down the gauntlet to those who have ridiculed us, jeered at us and lied about our voters, our people and our policies. It tells the truth about what UKIP stands for".7 The party's wish to be taken seriously is mirrored in its endeavour to present a wide-ranging programme, going beyond immigration and Europe, although according to the manifesto, funding of its plans was mainly to be provided by withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Throughout the document, UKIP reasserted its populist credentials, presenting itself as the only real alternative to the other parties which it claims are all the same. The party obviously targets former abstainers who have been identified as part of its potential electorate: "Now there is something to vote for".8 UKIP aims at giving power back to the people, through regular referenda and the promotion of local democracy. In a typically populist discourse, the language is straightforward and frequently invokes common sense: “UKIP will bring back power to the people with common sense, local policies which will make people’s lives easier. UKIP councilors know who is boss: we only answer to you."9 Reducing immigration was UKIP's number one priority, impacting other policy areas as the party considers that immigration puts pressure on employment, housing and public services such as education and the NHS. The party advocates a five-year ban on unskilled immigration and the introduction of an Australian-style points based system to select migrants according to their skills. The manifesto also seeks to clarify the confusion over immigration figures which had undermined its credibility, setting a cap of 50,000 highly-skilled work visas per year – which is noticeably different from an overall migration target. However, the party is also very careful to shun accusations of racism, in an attempt to counteract the negative impact of recurrent racist statements within its own ranks: "Immigration is not about race; it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem; it is the current immigration system that is broken".10 Under a UKIP government, new migrants would have to pay into the system for five years before being able to claim benefits, access to NHS services or social housing – the manifesto seems to have dropped the idea of imposing private schooling. The document also takes up the idea of "health tourism" on which Nigel Farage has been vigorously campaigning: "UKIP will put the ‘national’ back into our national health service. (…) The NHS is the National Health Service,

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not the International Health Service".11 In a typically populist rhetoric, UKIP presents itself as the only party ready to face reality on this matter, contrary to "the other parties (which) have their heads stuck well and truly in the sand".12 In the field of work, UKIP intended to allow British companies to employ British citizens first, in an echo to Gordon Brown's "British jobs for British workers" controversial phrase in 2007 but also to the 's slogan. According to UKIP, the UK's incapacity to control its borders is the result of its membership of the EU and the principle of the free movement of people – hence the necessity of "Brexit", which is the very raison d'être of UKIP. The party would therefore hold an in/out referendum as soon as possible, on the basis of the following (and very biased) question: "Do you wish Britain to be a free, independent, sovereign democracy?"13 In a bid for respectability and credibility, the manifesto invokes 's vision of Britain's relationship with Europe: “We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not combined. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed."14 According to UKIP, Britain's relations with Europe should be limited to a trade partnership, and the country should aim to "foster closer ties with the Anglosphere"15 – a typically eurosceptic argument used to move beyond EU membership and defend a more global vision of Britain's role in the world. The third main element of UKIP's policies is tax cuts. The party wants to abolish the inheritance tax and increase the threshold for paying 40% income tax to £55,000, in a clear appeal to high earners. At the same time, the party pledges to take minimum wage earners out of income tax, thereby reflecting its recent shift of focus towards the working-class, which a recent academic study has identified as the main basis of UKIP support.16 Accordingly, UKIP has been increasingly and openly targeting traditional Labour voters lately in a move to widen its electoral appeal. Yet, the party's origins and ideology also keep it close to the right-wing of the Conservative party.17 UKIP has justified this catch-all dimension by an aspiration to transcend the traditional cleavage between left and right, in a political strategy to woo voters from all persuasions and backgrounds: "This party is not about left and right – this party is about right and wrong".18 Another policy which caught the media's attention during the campaign was UKIP's plan to cut overseas aid by more than two-thirds, because "charity should begin at home". 19 The party also expressed the intention to close the "wasteful" Department for International Development (DfID) and merge its functions into the Foreign Office. Other Departments were to be abolished as well, such as the Department for Energy and Climate Change (reflecting UKIP's sceptical stance on climate change) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. By contrast, the party was committed to increasing the defence budget, first to 2% of GDP and then "substantially". 20 UKIP also pledged to invest an extra £3bn a year into the English NHS, in a tactical move designed to reassure voters following damaging rumours that the party was intent on privatizing the NHS. As far as education is concerned, UKIP supports the creation of grammar- schools and argued in the manifesto that it would ultimately like to have one in every town. The party also promised to remove tuition fees for students taking approved degrees in Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics and Medicine (STEMM), provided they work and pay tax in the UK for five years after graduation. Students from the EU were to pay the same fee rates as international students. In terms of political reform, in the manifesto UKIP stuck to its previous pledge to introduce "English vote for English laws" and was in favour of a proportional voting system.

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Finally, UKIP rejected multiculturalism which "has led to an alarming fragmentation of British society" and aimed to promote Britishness and "a unifying British culture".21 UKIP's manifesto therefore aimed at demonstrating the party's new credibility on the British political stage as a result of its evolution towards professionalisation. Yet, unfortunately for the party, its choice to focus its campaign on immigration – the issue on which the party enjoys the greatest amount of support compared with other parties – did not pay off, as it actually played a relatively small part in the election campaign which was more centred on the economy. Europe was not an issue either, as David Cameron's referendum pledge seemed to have cleared the air on that matter. UKIP was therefore denied the space it had been used to occupying in recent years and was squeezed out of the campaign, finding it hard even to exist, which helps to account for Nigel Farage's aggressive tactics to capture attention. The party also suffered from the competition with the new insurgent leader of the SNP, Nicola Sturgeon, who combined charisma and novelty, attracting media attention to the detriment of the more familiar Nigel Farage and UKIP. As election day approached, the impression was that the UKIP campaign had failed to take off.

The election results: from disappointment to civil war

The general election results on 7 May fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only returned one MP to Westminster – namely Douglas Carswell, a former Conservative MP. Yet, the party performed strongly in terms of vote share, coming third ahead of the Liberal Democrats with 12.6% of the vote, thereby quadrupling its 2010 score. UKIP gathered nearly 4 million votes nationwide, the discrepancy between votes and seats being a result of the first-past-the-post system. Comparatively, the SNP got 4.7% of the votes and gained 56 seats in the House of Commons. UKIP denounced the unfairness of the "broken" electoral system which had "disenfranchised"22 millions of voters, and announced its intention to make electoral reform a new priority. However disappointing the results turned out to be in terms of seats won, UKIP's performance still remains remarkable: for the first time in its history, the party came second in 120 constituencies across England and Wales -both Tory (76) and Labour (44)- prompting it to declare that it has now "become the voice of opposition to the establishment".23 The party has definitely raised its electoral profile and seems to have replaced the Liberal-Democrats as an alternative to the two major parties. The challenge for UKIP now is to find the means to build on these second places in the perspective of the 2020 general election, by improving its party machine in order to turn its substantial support into actual seats. Evidence of UKIP's progress is also borne out by the fact that the party increased its vote share by more than any other party in 468 constituencies across the country since the previous general election.24 Although the "UKIP effect" was not as significant as expected, be it during the election campaign or in the number of seats won by the party, its indirect influence is worth examining: which party did UKIP take votes from? For a long time, UKIP was mostly seen as a threat to the Conservatives. The party has worked hard to shed its image as a splinter group of the Conservative party, resulting from the ideological proximity between the two parties but also from the significant number of Tory politicians who have defected to UKIP over the years since its foundation – as was the case for its first two elected MPs in the autumn 2014. In order to distance itself from the Conservative

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party and widen its electoral support base, UKIP has operated a strategic populist shift which has boosted its potential damaging effect on Labour. Recent academic research by Ford and Goodwin has demonstrated the extent of that threat, showing that a growing proportion of UKIP support comes from traditional Labour backgrounds-the "left-behind" voters.25 Increasing awareness of this new electoral potential has incited UKIP to target the blue-collar vote with measures such as taking minimum wage earners out of the income tax, with Nigel Farage explicitly acknowledging his intention to extend his party's political territory: "We are now parking our tanks on the Labour party’s lawn".26 As a matter of fact, UKIP supporters should not be regarded as a homogeneous group, but rather as a coalition of disaffected electors from the three main parties, as well as former abstainers, who vote UKIP for different reasons. The catch-all dimension of UKIP was illustrated by the 2014 European elections, in which the party finished first, taking votes from the three major parties to an unprecedented extent. However, several studies27 have shown that the sharpest increase in recent UKIP support has come from non-Tory supporters, vindicating the party's populist strategy. This has been reflected in the recent inroads UKIP has made into Labour heartlands in the North, while early UKIP support was mainly concentrated in the South of England. The general election results tend to indicate that many Conservative supporters who may have considered defecting to UKIP finally cast their votes for David Cameron, for fear of the "coalition of chaos" between Labour and the SNP which the Prime Minister had warned of in the run-up to the election. Cameron had also directly appealed to Conservative defectors to UKIP to "come back home" 28 to the Tories or risk handing power to Ed Miliband. The "Vote UKIP, Get Labour" message reiterated by the Conservatives for months may also have persuaded a wider proportion of UKIP supporters to opt for tactical voting in specific areas, as Nigel Farage had himself suggested during the campaign – the Conservative party being the only one to offer a referendum on membership of the European Union apart from UKIP. The result was that the Labour party was the main victim of UKIP in this election: in Labour-held seats where UKIP advanced strongly, the Labour vote dropped by 4%. In comparable circumstances, the Tory vote only fell by 2 %. The insurgent party might even have deprived Labour of a handful of seats, as the UKIP vote was higher than the size of the Tory majority in 9 seats which the Conservative party won from Labour.29 Moreover, UKIP's disappointment was partially mitigated by the fact that in the local elections taking place on the same day as the general election, it won control of its first council in Thanet, somewhat compensating for Nigel Farage's failure to win a parliamentary seat in the area. Following his defeat, Farage kept his word and announced that he was stepping down as party leader, thereby turning a new page of UKIP's history – only to turn it back three days later, prompting an internal civil war reminiscent of UKIP's past leadership quarrels. Indeed, Farage declared that he had finally withdrawn his resignation following a meeting with the party's national executive committee which had unanimously rejected it, pleading with him to remain as leader. This U-turn triggered an internal crisis within the party, exposing inner dissensions about Nigel Farage's leadership and his handling of the election campaign. Senior party figures, among whom the party's economics spokesman Patrick O'Flynn, deplored the "shock and awe" tactics adopted by Nigel Farage during the campaign under the

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influence of his inner circle of advisers who were taking the party in a hard-right direction comparable to the Tea party movement in the US. They criticised Nigel Farage's aggressive campaign, notably on the issue of foreigners with HIV – a policy which was overtly condemned by Douglas Carswell after the election. , one of the party's biggest donors, publicly called for the UKIP leader to stand down and give way to a less controversial figure. Farage's critics felt that a proper election contest was needed, and concerns about a drift towards "personality cult" were raised, which might lead UKIP to be seen as Nigel Farage's party – which is already the case actually as UKIP is very much a one man band. While dismissing the extent of internal dissent and underlining the "phenomenal" support he enjoyed within the party, Nigel Farage let go of two of his closest aides who had been targeted by his detractors. The UKIP leader quickly resumed his grip on the party, purging it of two senior party figures who had been central in the row, Suzanne Evans and Patrick O'Flynn, who both stood down from their paid roles within UKIP and atoned for the turmoil they had caused. This aborted blitzkrieg, which lasted ten days, revealed inner tensions as to the running of the election campaign, the direction of the party and the divisive figure of Farage himself. Those questions are very likely to resurface in the future, all the more so since the party's only MP Douglas Carswell is definitely at odds with Farage over tactics and direction. The evolution of the party towards institutionalisation calls for organisational and ideological changes which are currently under way, but which are also a potential source of tensions within UKIP.

Conclusion and future prospects

UKIP's disappointing campaign therefore produced disappointing results. The party lost half its representation in the Commons, retaining only one MP – an ex-Tory, meaning that UKIP has still not managed to win a parliamentary seat which did not involve a Tory defector. Nigel Farage struggled to exist during the campaign, as immigration turned out not to be a central issue and he was eclipsed by the new rising SNP leader. He resorted to aggressive tactics and rhetoric in order to capture attention, causing a sense of unease within the party ranks which came to the surface in the aftermath of the election. Beyond the general election, what was at stake in the episode of factional infighting was the referendum campaign to come: dissenters were concerned that Nigel Farage's divisive figure could work against the paramount objective of taking the UK out of the European Union, by alienating moderate voters. This was explicitly articulated by Stuart Wheeler and Douglas Carswell, who called for a less confrontational figure to take the lead. Those concerns were dismissed by Nigel Farage, who presented his party, and himself, as the natural leaders of the eurosceptic cause and therefore of the No campaign. He is clearly not ready to relinquish his role in the party and take a back seat at the precise moment when the referendum he has dedicated his entire political career to obtaining is about to take place – this is the fight of his life: “I’ve put 20 years of my life into trying to get a referendum and now is not the time to walk away".30 Although Farage asserts that his party is "100% united" in the referendum campaign to come, it seems hardly plausible in the wake of the brief civil war which has just taken place. Nigel Farage's credibility has been severely damaged by this episode of "unresignation", which might leave

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traces in public opinion as well. His attitude conflicts with his recurrent denunciation of professional politicians clinging to power for their own interests in supposed contrast with his party and himself – the difference is not that clear anymore. In response to this apparent contradiction, Farage's argument that holding a leadership election in the run-up to the referendum would be a "massive, massive mistake" hardly conceals an authoritarianism which is a typical feature of populist parties. In the words of Patrick O'Flynn, it risks making UKIP appear as an "absolute monarchy"31 whereas it purports to embody popular democracy. From a wider perspective however, the post-election internal strife should not hide the tremendous progress made by UKIP in this general election, despite the fact that it only translated into a single seat. It shows that contrary to what some detractors had anticipated, the UKIP bubble has not burst yet: the insurgent party is here to stay, not only for the referendum campaign but also most probably beyond that. For the time being, the party's prospects for the 2020 general election look promising. Who will lead the party then is another question, although Nigel Farage has recently declared that he wants to remain leader for 20 more years – a provocative joke which some in his party may have found hard to laugh at.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FARAGE, Nigel, The Purple Revolution: the Year that Changed Everything, London: Biteback Publishing, 2015.

FORD, Robert & GOODWIN, Matthew, Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain, Oxon: Routledge, 2014.

TOURNIER-SOL, Karine, "Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no 1, January 2015, pp. 140-156.

UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, 2015.

NOTES

1. Daniel BOFFEY, "'I'm fit as a flea' insists Nigel Farage as poll shows UKIP has lost ground", The Guardian, 28 February 2015. 2. Nigel FARAGE, "UKIP is the only party that offers a real alternative", Daily Express, 31 March 2015. 3. Loc. cit. 4. Rowena MASON, "Nigel Farage: immigration has left Britain almost unrecognisable", The Guardian, 31 March 2015. 5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vc6YH4-IHME , date accessed 10 April 2015. 6. "Nigel Farage: 2010 UKIP manifesto was 'drivel'", BBC News, 24 January 2014. 7. UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, 2015, p. 5.

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8. Ibid., p. 3. 9. Ibid., p. 58. 10. Ibid., p. 11. 11. Ibid., p. 16. 12. Loc. cit. 13. Ibid., p. 71. 14. Ibid., p. 70. 15. Ibid., p. 67. 16. R. FORD & M. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain, Oxon: Routledge, 2014. 17. Karine TOURNIER-SOL, "Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, n o 1, January 2015, pp. 140-156. 18. Nigel FARAGE, Speech to the Party Conference, 26 September 2014. Available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSHlrjga6uI, accessed 27 September 2014. 19. UKIP, Believe in Britain, UKIP Manifesto, 2015, p. 68. 20. Ibid., p. 65. 21. Ibid., p. 61. 22. Newsletter, UKIP Campaign Team, 8 May 2015. 23. Loc. cit. 24. Louis DORE, Jon STONE, "The map that shows how UKIP took British politics by storm", The Independent, 15 May 2015. 25. R. FORD & M. GOODWIN, Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain, Oxon: Routledge, 2014. 26. Nigel FARAGE, Speech to the Party Conference, 26 September 2014. 27. See for example Peter Kellner's analysis in "UKIP's support is changing, and with it the contours of British politics", The Guardian, 17 November 2014. 28. Nicholas WATT, "David Cameron urges Conservative defectors to UKIP to vote for Tories", The Guardian, 6 April 2015. 29. Andrew GRICE, "Labour figures admit underestimating UKIP threat cost them seats in the general election", The Independent, 12 May 2015. 30. Matt DATHAN, "Nigel Farage: I want to be UKIP leader for the next 20 years", The Independent, 18 May 2015. 31. Rowena Mason, "Nigel Farage is a 'snarling, thin-skinned and aggressive' man, says campaign chief", The Guardian, 14 May 2015.

ABSTRACTS

As 2015 began, UKIP's electoral prospects for the upcoming general election looked definitely good; expectations were high among the Ukippers, all the more so since another hung parliament seemed very likely, possibly giving the party a role to play in determining the balance of power. As it turned out, the results fell short of the party's expectations as UKIP only returned one MP to Westminster. This paper aims at assessing UKIP's performance in the 2015 general election by first focusing on the campaign, in which the party found it hard to capture attention,

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despite Nigel Farage's confrontational tactics. The election was also marked by the party's efforts to demonstrate that it had reached a new stage in its evolution and had gained credibility, notably through a wide-ranging and fully-costed manifesto, which will be examined in a second part. Finally, although the "UKIP effect" was not as significant as expected, the results of the election will be analysed and put into perspective in the third part, also reflecting on the brief civil war which erupted in the party ranks in the aftermath of the election. The paper will conclude on the party's prospects in the perspective of the EU referendum which David Cameron's victory has now firmly set on the political agenda.

Alors que s'ouvre l'année 2015, les perspectives électorales du UKIP pour les législatives à venir sont résolument favorables. Les attentes sont donc fortes au sein du parti, d'autant plus que les sondages laissent présager qu'aucun parti n'aura la majorité absolue à Westminster, offrant ainsi au UKIP la possibilité de jouer un rôle éventuel d'arbitre à l'issue du scrutin. Finalement, les résultats s'avèreront bien en deçà des espérances du parti, et la déception sera grande au lendemain des élections. Cet article se propose d'évaluer la performance du UKIP lors de ces législatives, en se concentrant d'abord sur la campagne pendant laquelle le parti a peiné à exister malgré les tactiques conflictuelles adoptées par Nigel Farage pour attirer l'attention. Cette élection devait également marquer une étape supplémentaire dans l'évolution du parti dont la volonté de gagner en crédibilité s'est notamment illustrée à travers son manifeste électoral qui sera examiné en seconde partie. Enfin, l'analyse des résultats montrera que si "l'effet UKIP" n'a pas été à la hauteur des espérances du parti, il reste néanmoins que celui-ci a effectué une forte progression en termes de voix. La dernière partie s'arrêtera aussi sur la crise interne qui a secoué le parti suite aux élections, avant de conclure sur les perspectives du UKIP, en particulier en prévision du référendum sur l'appartenance du Royaume-Uni à l'Union européenne qui doit avoir lieu avant la fin de 2017.

INDEX

Mots-clés: UKIP, Nigel Farage, élections législatives 2015, campagne électorale Keywords: UKIP, Nigel Farage, general election 2015, election campaign, .

AUTHOR

KARINE TOURNIER-SOL

Université de Toulon

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