PW Vol X, #5.Indd

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

PW Vol X, #5.Indd APRIL/MAY 2005 Inside 4 Learning from Iraq 5 Reforming the United Nations 6 20th Anniversary Reception 8 Short Takes Vol. XI, No. 1 8 Stojan Cerovic Remembered ■ ■ UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE WASHINGTON, DC www.usip.org 9 Arthur M. Crocker Remembered 11 Letter from Mindanao Pathways Peace An Institute conference on Israeli-Palestinian relations struck a rare note: optimism. to David Satterfield, former deputy rospects for resuming assistant the Arab-Israeli peace secretary of state process are brighter than at for Middle East any time since 2000, accord- affairs, and ing to participants in Path- Martin Indyk, ways to Peace, a half-day research former U.S. Psymposium convened by the ambassador to Instituteʼs Scott Lasensky. The Israel and now meeting, held in late January at a director of the Washington-area hotel, included Saban Center at presentations from Ambassador the Brookings David Satterfield, a senior State Institution. Department official; Martin Indyk, director of the Saban The meeting was the first for the Alexandria Declaration Center at the Brookings Institu- installment in the Institute’s and follow-on programs to pro- tion and a former U.S. ambassador expanding research efforts into mote interreligious dialogue. The to Israel; and several distinguished the Middle East peace process. Institute is also working with the scholars, including current senior As part of the Arab-Israeli Middle East Children’s Associa- fellow Jacob Shamir. Futures research project, a number tion on peace education, and has a Participants expressed cautious of reports to be published in 2005 number of grant recipients work- optimism that Israeli-Palestinian will examine a variety of local, ing on both academic and applied negotiations could be renewed, regional, and international factors subjects related to the conflict. pointing to an exceptional con- shaping the peace process. The “It is widely asserted that the fluence of events, including the Institute has long been involved in Arab-Israeli issue is critical to death of Yasser Arafat, Israel’s activities to promote Arab-Israeli America’s position in the Middle disengagement plan, Palestinian peace. How Israelis and Palestin- East,” Lasensky noted, “but what elections and the emergence of ians Negotiate, the latest volume are the specific linkages? And how new leadership, and the entry of in the Institute’s series on cross- does the peace process impact Israel’s Labor Party into a coali- cultural negotiation, was published our larger agenda?” These broad tion government. this spring. Support continues See Pathways to Peace, page 2 2 that the best way forward is to was the key to American success Pathways to Peace focus on a defined, short-term in the Middle East, he said. Bush continued from page 1 agenda that can restore trust and has made the opposite mistake: enable both peoples to “reaffirm He assumed that since the Arab- questions—as well as the nar- their faith in the very enterprise Israeli conflict was not identical rower but vital question of what of peacemaking.” He urged the to resolving our problems in the strategies and tactics the United United States to re-activate the Middle East, he could safely States might employ to advance first phase of the Roadmap and ignore the former. The challenge, the peace process—dominated the ensure that a complete Israeli said Spiegel, is to get the balance meeting. pullout from Gaza does not leave right. And the problem with the Satterfield opened the confer- Israel vulnerable on security. Bush administration’s policies is ence by emphasizing that the He urged greater support for that the long-term promotion of Bush administration remains economic assistance for post- democracy is doing nothing to actively engaged in the Middle withdrawal Gaza, and suggested stifle terrorism or proliferation, East: “We are committed to trying U.S. support for a new UN reso- while the wars on terrorism and lution ratifying Gaza withdrawal. proliferation are doing nothing Progress on this conflict, said to promote democracy. Spiegel Makovsky, would vindicate the recommended a less ambitious president’s policies, which predi- agenda. The immediate task, he cated U.S. engagement on the said, is to do what is necessary to removal of Arafat and reform of ensure that Israel withdraws from Palestinian leadership. Gaza and the northern West Bank At the same time, however, and that President Abbas stems Makovsky warned against too the violence and advances political ambitious an agenda. Final Status talks could endanger the entire Former National to make this conflict come to an process, he said, by energizing Security Adviser end,” said Satterfield, who called rejectionists opposed to the Abbas Zbigniew the present moment “the greatest government, undermining the Brzezinski talks opportunity for peace in years.” political dynamics on the Israeli Peace Watch (ISSN 1080-9864) is pub- with Chester But he insisted that the basis for side, and precipitating a crisis lished six times a year by the United States Institute of Peace, an independent, Crocker and constructive negotiations is still— before either side was fully ripe nonpartisan federal institution created Institute Board by Congress to promote the peaceful as the Bush administration has to proceed to final status talks. resolution of international conflicts. The Chair J. Robinson long maintained—that Israel cease He also rejected the notion that views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect views of the Institute or its Board West prior to settlement work and the Pales- there is a “grand linkage” between of Directors. the symposium. tinians end violence. Settlement events in Iraq and the broader To receive Peace Watch, visit our web site activity must stop, said Satterfield, Middle East and progress on the (www.usip.org); write to the United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, because it “ultimately undermines Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Arab Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; Israeli as well as Palestinian inter- resentment of the United States call 202-429-3832; or fax 202-429-6063. A complete archive of Peace Watch is ests and futures.” He was equally stems from complex historical and available at www.usip.org/peacewatch. forceful about Palestinian options: cultural forces unrelated to Pales- President: Richard H. Solomon a Palestinian state, he said, “can’t tinian grievances. (On the other Executive Vice President: Patricia Thompson Publications Director: Mike Graham be built on the foundation of ter- hand, he did note a “negative Editor: David Aronson Production Manager: Marie Marr Jackson rorist violence.” linkage”—in that if U.S. forces are Design: Kenneth P. Allen Three leading experts, David defeated in Iraq, this will no doubt Photo Credits: Staff, AP/ Wide World Makovsky, of the Washington embolden rejectionists throughout Photos, Bill Fitzpatrick Institute for Near East Policy; the region.) Board of Directors Steven Spiegel, of the University Steven Spiegel was more criti- Chairman: J. Robinson West. Vice Chair- man: María Otero. Members: Betty F. of California at Los Angeles; cal of the Bush administration— Bumpers, Holly J. Burkhalter, Chester A. and Robert Malley, of the Inter- and indeed, of previous adminis- Crocker, Laurie S. Fulton, Charles Horner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Mora L. McLean, national Crisis Group, prepared trations as well. Until President Barbara W. Snelling. Members ex officio: Arthur E. Dewey, Department of State; detailed policy papers and Bush, U.S. presidents have con- Michael M. Dunn, National Defense debated their recommendations sistently believed that resolving University; Peter W. Rodman, Department of Defense; Richard H. Solomon, for U.S. policy. Makovsky argued the Palestinian-Israeli conflict Institute president (nonvoting). 3 reforms. If this mutual disengage- ment is successful, then the next step would be to convene an inter- national conference by the Quartet to plot out future confidence- building reinforcing measures. As to the broader agenda of the United States—building democ- racy, limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fighting terrorism—the jury is still out, but the likelihood is that Robert Malley of the International Crisis Group, David Makovsky of these goals are mutually contra- the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Steven Spiegel of UCLA, dictory and will end by undercut- and Institute program officer and symposium organizer Scott Lasensky ting one other. offered contrasting views of the most effective path to a viable peace. Robert Malley proposed a more ambitious agenda. Putting off 54 percent among Palestinians. In ciated Press ran an article that efforts to forge a comprehensive addition, there has been a signifi- was reprinted in dozens of media settlement until the Palestinian cant rise in the number of Israelis outlets, including ABCNews.com, leadership can demonstrate and Palestinians who support a CNN.com, and the San Francisco improved governance and real “mutual recognition of identity” Chronicle. Other print media that security for the Israelis is the proposal, in which both groups mentioned the conference includ- old, familiar, and failed path, he would recognize the legitimacy of ed the New York Times, the Finan- said. Conditions today require a each other’s state after the major cial Times, the Jerusalem Post, and more aggressive posture, one that issues have been resolved. The Haaretz. In addition, C-SPAN takes advantage of the unique overall conclusion: Palestinians aired the entire proceedings of the conjunction of events. Malley and Israelis are as “ripe” as they conference at least four times over recommended that the United have ever been to proceed with the five days immediately follow- States present the parameters peace negotiations. ing the event. for a comprehensive Israeli- Ambassador Martin Indyk “I have always believed in two Palestinian agreement, in concert delivered the keynote address. fundamental truths about the con- with forward momentum on the He echoed prior speakers in flict,” said Lasensky. “At its core, Syrian-Israeli track.
Recommended publications
  • Rethinking the Two-State Solution
    PolicyWatch #1408 : Special Forum Report Rethinking the Two-State Solution Featuring Giora Eiland and Martin Indyk October 3, 2008 On September 23, 2008, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Giora Eiland and Ambassador Martin Indyk addressed a Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. General Eiland is former head of the Israeli National Security Council and currently a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Ambassador Indyk directs the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks. GIORA EILAND Within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies a paradox. Although the two-state solution is well known and widely accepted, and although there is international consensus regarding the need for it, little progress has been made to that end. This means that neither side desires the solution nor is willing to take the necessary risks to move forward and come to an agreement. Ultimately, the most the Israeli government can offer the Palestinians -- and survive politically -- is far less than what any Palestinian leadership can accept. As such, there is a gap between the two sides that continues to widen as the years go on. In many aspects, the current situation is worse than it was eight years ago. In 2000, there were three leaders who were both determined and capable of reaching an agreement: U.S. president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. That type of leadership is missing today. In addition, while the two sides enjoyed a reasonable level of security, cooperation, and trust in 2000, the subsequent intifada has created a completely different situation on the ground today.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Policy in the Middle East Martin Indyk
    U.S. Policy in the Middle East Martin Indyk s much as the Obama administration would challenge to the Alawite regime in Syria but has now like to disengage from the Middle East and spread viciously to Iraq and could well spread to the Ashift its focus and energies to Asia—above all Gulf where a majority Shiite population in Bahrain to India and China—it finds itself constantly sucked is controlled by a Saudi-backed Sunni monarch, and back into the vortex as the region grows ever more in Yemen, where Shia Houti tribesman are challeng- volatile, chaotic, and dangerous . President Obama has ing a Sunni regime in Sana’a . Saudi Arabia—the been determined to end American involvement in the world’s largest oil producer—now faces instability country’s two longest-running wars—Iraq and Afghan- on almost all its borders . istan—and to avoid involvement in any other region- al conflicts, especially the Syrian civil war . And yet, In Egypt, the traditional leader of the Arab world, a the surprising success of the Islamic State of Iraq and military-backed regime has deposed and suppressed the Levant (ISIL) in taking control of broad swathes the Muslim Brotherhood party, generating an ad- of Syrian and Iraqi territory and the threat it poses to ditional schism across the region between Islamist Baghdad in the south, Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and po- and moderate Sunnis . This tension recently spilled tentially Jordan in the west, have forced the president’s over into the Arab-Israeli arena where Hamas, the hand and led him now to order air strikes on northern stepchild of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, at- Iraq .
    [Show full text]
  • Reimagining US Strategy in the Middle East
    REIMAGININGR I A I I G U.S.S STRATEGYT A E Y IIN THET E MMIDDLED L EEASTS Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, Ashley L. Rhoades C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA958-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0662-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover composite design: Jessica Arana Image: wael alreweie / Getty Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East
    U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 143, April 2016 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing fromthe publisher. ©2016 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: An F-16 from the Egyptian Air Force prepares to make contact with a KC-135 from the 336th ARS during in-flight refueling training. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Amy Abbott) Contents Acknowledgments V I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 1 James F. Jeffrey 1. Introduction to Part I 3 2. Basic Principles 5 3. U.S. Strategy in the Middle East 8 4. U.S. Military Engagement 19 5. Conclusion 37 Notes, Part I 39 II. RETHINKING U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY 47 Michael Eisenstadt 6. Introduction to Part II 49 7. American Sisyphus: Impact of the Middle Eastern Operational Environment 52 8. Disjointed Strategy: Aligning Ways, Means, and Ends 58 9.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkish American Relations Course Outline
    Turkish American Relations SUNY New Paltz Spring 2012 Tuesdays 9:25 am - 12:05 pm Coykendall Science 029 Professor Ş. İlgü Özler Office: JFT 912 Phone: 257-2635 Office Hours: T and W 1-3pm E-mail: [email protected] Course Description This course is designed to introduce students to the study of Turkish politics and foreign policy with a special perspective on relations with the United States. The course will be run simultaneously with a partner institution class from Sehir University in Istanbul. Students will get a chance to collaborate with peers from Turkey on several projects. The relations between the United States and Turkey have been historically strong especially during the height of the Cold War. There have been disagreements on policy between the countries over Cyprus, Iraq and the Kurds, Syria and Iran. Yet, both sides identify the alliance between the US and Turkey vital to their national interests. United States and Turkey have common interests under NATO, over EU issues, energy policy among others. The course will focus on creating a broad understanding of Turkish foreign policy and American foreign policy toward Turkey as well as develop understanding over specific issues of contention (Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Israel) and cooperation (EU, energy). Course Objectives Students are expected to • familiarize themselves with Turkish politics and political system, • develop skills in reading foreign policy texts and identify the main argument, • build knowledge about the Turkey in relation to the Middle East, European Union and the United States. • to develop skills of cross cultural communication. The ability to communicate with people who may have a different perspective on issues is essential part of diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Revolution
    The Evolution of the Revolution THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE KENNETH M. POLLACK MARCH 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary ince the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede S Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build further progress. a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood both state and non-state actors. These groups include that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liber- overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United ation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was lim- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the ited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors the help of others. openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, However, for the next two decades, the Axis was Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthis little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity in Yemen. of effort to an amalgam of states,semi-states , and Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was pri- Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It marily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against and make its members feel less isolated in the face the strong except when they are badly constrained of American hostility.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options
    ISSUE BRIEF 08.25.20 The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D, Fellow for the Middle East conflict, the Gulf states complied with and INTRODUCTION enforced the Arab League boycott of Israel This issue brief examines where the six until at least 1994 and participated in the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council— oil embargo of countries that supported 1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 1973, for example, the president of the (UAE)—currently stand in their outlook and UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian claimed that “No Arab country is safe from issue. The first section of this brief begins by the perils of the battle with Zionism unless outlining how positions among the six Gulf it plays its role and bears its responsibilities, 2 states have evolved over the three decades in confronting the Israeli enemy.” In since the Madrid Conference of 1991. Section Kuwait, Sheikh Fahd al-Ahmad Al Sabah, a two analyzes the degree to which the six brother of two future Emirs, was wounded Gulf states’ relations with Israel are based while fighting with Fatah in Jordan in 3 on interests, values, or a combination of 1968, while in 1981 the Saudi government both, and how these differ from state to offered to finance the reconstruction of state. Section three details the Gulf states’ Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor after it was 4 responses to the peace plan unveiled by destroyed by an Israeli airstrike.
    [Show full text]
  • Reassessing the Special Relationship: How the United States Can Reclaim Its Influence with Israel
    THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES IMES CAPSTONE PAPER SERIES REASSESSING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN RECLAIM ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL AYELET HANFLING & GREGORY MCGOWAN APRIL 2014 THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY © OF AUTHORS, 2014 Table of Contents I.) Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 II.) Methodology and Structure....................................................................................................... 5 III.) Background .............................................................................................................................. 7 IV.) Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 13 Alliance Theory ......................................................................................................................... 13 U.S.-Israeli Alliance Theory ..................................................................................................... 16 The policy angle: What worked and what didn’t ...................................................................... 19 V.) Research Findings ................................................................................................................... 26 Credibility.................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • GOVT, 5E Learning Outcomes Map
    GOVT, 5e Learning Outcomes Map Sidlow/Henschen GOVT 2305 GOVT5 Federal Government LEARNING OUTCOMES Upon successful completion of this course, students will: • "Are Americans Right About Their Constitutional Rights?" Explain the origin Chapter 2: The Constitution • Animated Learning Module: Separation of Powers: • "Articles of Confederation." and development Learning Outcomes: A Constitutional Principle; The Amendment Process • "Declare yourselves." of constitutional • 2–1 Point out some of • Primary Source Activity: The Constitution • "Federal Judge Finds California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard Unconstitutional." democracy in the the influences on the • Simulation: The Constitution: Idealism vs. • "The final draft of the Constitution was signed by thirty-­‐nine delegates at the United States. American political Pragmatism Constitutional..." tradition in the • Interactive Timeline: The Constitution: The • "Virginias 1776 declaration of rights served as a model for the U.S. Bill of Rights, added to colonial years. American Revolution and the Nation's Constitution the..." • 2–2 Explain why the • Tutorial Quizzing • "We The People: New Congress To Read Constitution On House Floor." Today [Video] 5 Jan. American colonies • Glossary and Flashcards 2011. rebelled against • Crossword Puzzle • Anderson, Kenneth. "Foreign law and the U.S. constitution." Britain. • Learning Objectives • "Magna Carta" • 2–3 Describe the • Audio Chapter Summary • Beard, Charles A. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution." structure of • Bellamy, Richard. "The democratic constitution: why Europeans should avoid American style government constitutional judicial review." established by the • Boehm, Ted. "Court got it right on warrantless entry case." Articles of • Congress, Continental. "The Articles of Confederation." Confederation and • Franklin, Benjamin. "Benjamin Franklin's Speech on the Constitution." some of the strengths • Hamilton, Alexander.
    [Show full text]
  • Middle East Strategy
    Toward A New U.S.­­-Middle East Strategy at BROOKINGS A Saban Center at Brookings - Council on Foreign Relations Project Toward A New U.S.-Middle East Strategy is a joint Saban Center at Brookings – Council on For- eign Relations project staffed by Middle East experts from both policy establishments. The strat- GULF TRIP REPORT egy group, formally launched in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates July 2007, is conducting in-depth research, fact-finding trips to the region, dialogue with regional officials, and consultation with American policymakers in an ef- February 16-20, 2008 fort to develop a new Middle East Richard Haass and Martin Indyk* strategy for the next president. The project marks the first time in the history of the Brookings In the third week of February 2008, we engaged the leading policymakers in Qatar Institution and the Council on and the United Arab Emirates in detailed conversations about what they are looking Foreign Relations that a group of their experts are partnering to de- for from a new American president. We also participated in the U.S.-Islamic World velop policy recommendations. Forum and engaged in a series of conversations with Middle Eastern officials and civil society representatives. Co-Ch a i r s Bo a r d o f ad v i s o r s While all those with whom we spoke are fascinated by the American presidential Richard Haass Strobe Talbott primary elections and seem to be following the results closely, few have yet focused on the possibility that a significant change in U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution of Dual Containment Policy (The Policy of Clinton’S Administration - Clinton’S Doctrine) in the Persian Gulf
    Sociology and Anthropology 2(3): 106-112, 2014 http://www.hrpub.org DOI: 10.13189/sa.2014.020305 Evolution of Dual Containment Policy (the Policy of Clinton’s Administration - Clinton’s Doctrine) in the Persian Gulf Seyed Mohsen Mirhosseini Yazd University, Iran *Corresponding Author: [email protected] Copyright © 2014 Horizon Research Publishing All rights reserved. Abstract During 1993-1997, the policy of dual as sanctions, embargoes, and limitation on transfer of containment was selected by Clinton’s administration to sensitive technologies to Iran and Iraq. The main sanctions prevent Iran and Iraq from any action jeopardizing the were on the oil and gas industry in Iran. For example, the U.S. interests of the international community especially the congress prepared a bill that would impose sanctions on any United State of America. The new policy of dual foreign corporation that invested 40USD million or more in containment was the result of the new world order in which the Iranian oil and gas industry (after one year reduced to the U.S. found itself as the hub of the new world after the USD20 million). The bill was known as the Iran-Libya collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, this new policy put away Sanction Act (ILSA) because Libya was later added by the the balance of power policy that was the main policy of senate (Alikhani, 2000). previous American administrations which had sought a During the Dual Containment period, the kingdom of balance of power between Iran and Iraq in order to contain Saudi Arabia and the sheikhdom of Kuwait were mainly these two nations from any aggression to the global peace worried about the conventional threat from Iraq and saw Iran and security.
    [Show full text]
  • America and the World in the Age of Obama
    America and the World in the Age of Obama Columns and articles by Ambassador Derek Shearer Table of Contents Preface Hillary As An Agent of Change 1 Change That Really Matters 5 Sex, Race and Presidential Politics 8 Why Bipartisanship is a False Hope 11 Balance of Payments: Homeland Insecurity 14 Economics and Presidential Politics—“It’s Globalization, Stupid” 16 Beyond Gotcha: In Search of Democratic Economics 18 Rebranding America: How to Win Friends Abroad and Influence Nations 21 Waiting for Obama: The First Global Election 23 The Proper Use of Bill and Hillary Clinton 26 Clintonism Without Clinton—It’s Deja Vu All Over Again 28 Russia and the West Under Clinton and Bush 30 What’s At Stake: The Future vs The Past 34 The Road Ahead: The First 100 Days and Beyond 37 The Shout Heard Round the World: Obama as Global Leader 41 An Obama Holiday: What to Give a Progressive President and His Team 47 Bye, Bye Bush, Hello Barack: A Door Opens in 2009 52 Hoops Rule: The President and the Hard Court 55 After the Stimulus: It’s Time for a New Foundation 57 Advice to the President: Abolish the Commerce Department 62 Money, Banking and Torture: It’s Just Shocking! 65 Give Hope A Chance: The Renewal of Summer 68 Obama’s America: What is Economic Growth For? 71 Obama’s First Year: A Nobel Effort 75 Joy to the World: Good-Bye Bing Crosby, Hello Bob Dylan 78 Passage to India: Monsoon Wedding Meets Slumdog Professor 84 The Occidental President: Obama and Teachable Moments 88 Happy Days Are Not Here Again: Obama, China and the Coming Great Contraction
    [Show full text]