Princeton Theological Seminary the Humanity Of
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PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST IN THE THEOLOGY OF CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA AND MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR BRUCE L. MCCORMACK IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF IS001 – CHRISTOLOGY AFTER CHALCEDON BY DAVID W. CONGDON NOVEMBER 18, 2007 Congdon 1 1. Introduction The modern debate1 over whether Christ assumed a fallen human nature has again become a heated controversy in the last several years.2 While most of the new participants in the debate have sought a kind of via media between a simplistic “unfallen”-vs.-“fallen” dichotomy,3 Oliver Crisp stands out as a vigorous opponent of the “fallenness” position. In his recent book, Crisp argues against a fallen human nature on the following grounds: (1) Jesus would be sinful by virtue of sharing in original sin (i.e., original guilt); (2) even without sharing in original sin, Jesus would be liable to damnation by virtue of sharing in original corruption; (3) it is “metaphysically impossible for the impeccable divine nature of the Word to be joined in hypostatic union with a fallen human nature”; and (4) holding to the “fallenness” account requires jettisoning the Chalcedonian definition and adopting a version of Nestorianism.4 The first two assertions concern the doctrine of original sin, and they rest upon his assumption that “classical” theology is identifiable with “Augustinian” theology, which he calls the “majority report in the Christian tradition.”5 The third and fourth assertions are grounded in his scholastic understanding of the incarnation and presuppose what 1 The modern debate goes back to the controversial arguments of Edward Irving and Thomas Erskine of Linlathen in favor of the fallenness position. See Edward Irving, The Collected Writings of Edward Irving, ed. G. Carlyle, vol. 5 (London: Alexander Strahan, 1865) and Thomas Erskine, The Brazen Serpent, or Life Coming Through Death (Edinburgh, 1831). Irving’s position later received a more persuasive presentation in the work of Karl Barth and, more recently, T. F. Torrance and J. B. Torrance. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 4 volumes in 13 parts, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956-75), I/2, 147-59; II/1, 397-8; James B. Torrance, “The vicarious humanity of Christ,” in T. F. Torrance, ed., The Incarnation (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981), 141. 2 See Kelly M. Kapic, “The Son’s Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call for Clarity,” IJST 3:2 (2001), 154-66; Oliver Crisp, “Did Christ have a Fallen Human Nature?” IJST 6:3 (2004), 270-88; W. Ross Hastings, “‘Honoring the Spirit’: Analysis and Evaluation of Jonathan Edwards’ Pneumatological Doctrine of the Incarnation,” IJST 7:3 (2005), 279-99; R. Michael Allen, “Calvin’s Christ: A Dogmatic Matrix for Discussion of Christ’s Human Nature,” IJST 9:4 (2007), 382-97. For a Catholic argument for the fallenness of Christ’s humanity, see Thomas Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993). 3 Kapic lays out the basic arguments on both sides in order to clarify the debate. He argues that the standard accusation against the fallenness position—viz. that Jesus is thus a sinner—is “a mistaken charge,” but one that has a strong basis in the Protestant tradition (160). R. Michael Allen expands upon and corrects Kapic’s brief treatment of Calvin and argues that Calvin’s doctrine of original sin and his understanding of the relation between the two natures of Christ leaves ample room open for the “fallenness” position, though Calvin himself sticks with the traditional account of Christ’s impeccability. Neither Kapic nor Allen attempts to offer his own view on the matter, but rather each clears a little more ground for the fallenness position. Allen, in particular, critiques Crisp’s appeal to Reformed orthodoxy by demonstrating that Calvin does not fit within this scholastic tradition. 4 Oliver Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111-13. 5 Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 95n10. Do not cite without express permission of the author Congdon 2 Marilyn McCord Adams, in her study of medieval christology, calls the metaphysical “size-gap” between God and creatures.6 With these four christological claims, Crisp seeks to place himself within a long theological tradition that denies the possibility of God assuming a fallen human nature in Jesus Christ. In this paper, I challenge Crisp’s argument on two grounds: (1) while he may represent one important tradition within the church, Crisp’s position is thoroughly “Western” and “scholastic” in character and thus neglects the contributions of the Greek fathers; and (2) his position on the human nature of Christ is metaphysically, rather than systematically, driven,7 and therefore unlike the doctors of the church, Crisp articulates his christology in isolation from soteriology. Both of these criticisms apply to almost everyone in the current debate over the fallenness of Christ’s humanity, but they are especially relevant to Crisp. In this paper, I place his “reconsideration” of the incarnation in conversation with the soteriologically determined christology of Cyril of Alexandria and Maximus the Confessor for the purpose of highlighting the relevant contribution of patristic theology to contemporary christological debates. Whereas Crisp engages in a “metaphysics of the incarnation,”8 Cyril and Maximus always ground their doctrines of Christ’s person in his saving work: Cyril posits an incarnational soteriology in which the human flesh is the instrumental medium for the presence of divine life, while Maximus posits a recapitulational soteriology which grounds redemption in the human obedience of Christ. I conclude by offering some brief reflections on the future of the debate over the fallenness of Christ’s humanity. 2. Cyril of Alexandria: Jesus Christ as the presence of divine life 6 Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology, The Aquinas Lecture 1999 (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1999), 11. 7 I have adopted the language of “systematically driven” from Adams, whose thesis I wish to apply here to Cyril and Maximus: “My hypothesis in this paper is that conclusions about Christ’s human nature are systematically driven, and vary principally with a theologian’s estimates of the purposes and proprieties of the Incarnation on the one hand and of the multiple and contrasting job-descriptions for Christ’s saving work on the other” (9). 8 Ibid., 69. Do not cite without express permission of the author Congdon 3 Cyril of Alexandria is well known for his involvement in the fifth century christological controversies that resulted in the Council of Ephesus and the Council of Chalcedon. He has been both praised and criticized for his (in)famous slogan, “one incarnate nature of the Logos.” The champion of Chalcedonian orthodoxy to some, to others he is the progenitor of the monophysites. While these broader debates will be left to others, here I will examine Cyril’s understanding of Christ’s human nature in light of his soteriological presuppositions. As John McGuckin notes, Cyril’s christology is “fundamentally about soteriology and worship”; his doctrine of Christ’s unified person serves his understanding of Christ’s redemptive work.9 Cyril’s single subject christology leads him to conceive of Christ’s humanity as the medium or “economic instrument” through which God gives Godself to humanity, thus deifying humanity in the “dynamic soteriological event” of the incarnation.10 2.1. The Economy of Grace. Cyril’s soteriology—and thus his christology—is grounded in the patristic axiom formulated most famously by Athanasius: “The Son of God was made man that we might be made God.”11 Deification (theopoeisis) and incarnation are intimately linked in Cyril’s theology: the kenosis12 of the Son is the actualization of humanity’s plerosis.13 The event of 9 John McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), 175. 10 Ibid., 184, 195. 11 Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word, ¶54 in Edward R. Hardy, ed., Christology of the Later Fathers (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1954), 107. 12 The doctrine of kenosis has a complicated theological history. In Protestant orthodoxy, the debate over the doctrine of kenosis concerned whether the Logos divested himself of certain divine attributes in becoming a human person in Jesus and, if so, which attributes and how. Cyril’s doctrine of kenosis, however, has nothing to do with a limitation of divinity and everything to do with the addition of humanity. In other words, it is a kenosis not by subtraction but by addition. God does not give up or limit any divine attributes; rather, God takes on the humility of human flesh. Cyril makes this especially clear in his Scholia on the Incarnation, where he comments at length on Philippians 2:6-11: “Since [God the Word] was fullness, as God, this was why he was emptied out for the sake of our likeness. He was humbled on account of the flesh, but even so he did not descend from the height of divine majesty for he kept his lofty throne. He is one, therefore, who was true God before the incarnation, and even in the manhood remained what he was, and is, and shall be” (¶12-13 in McGuckin, 305, 307). On the doctrine of kenosis, see Bruce L. McCormack, “Karl Barth’s Christology as a Resource for a Reformed Version of Kenoticism,” IJST 8:3 (2006), 243-51. McCormack argues for a Reformed version of kenosis “by addition and not by subtraction” (248). A Cyrillian doctrine of kenosis would also be by addition, but unlike the eternal kenosis of the Son posited by Barth, Cyril locates the kenosis of the Logos only in the economy of the incarnation.