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Implied Assertions As Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence Roger C

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Implied Assertions As Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence Roger C University of California, Hastings College of the Law UC Hastings Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 1990 "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence Roger C. Park UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Evidence Commons Recommended Citation Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783 (1990). Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/602 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Faculty Publications UC Hastings College of the Law Library Park Roger Author: Roger C. Park Source: Minnesota Law Review Citation: 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783 (1990). Title: “I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You”: Implied Assertions as Hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence Originally published in MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission from MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW and University of Minnesota Law School. "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence Roger C. Park* INTRODUCTION Definitions of hearsay are either assertion-centered or dec- larant-centered. Under an assertion definition, an out-of-court statement is hearsay when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Under a declarant definition, an out-of-court statement is hearsay when it depends for value on 2 the credibility of the declarant. Over much hearsay territory, the difference between the two definitions has no effect.3 Most utterances that would be nonhearsay under the assertion definition also would be nonhearsay under the declarant definition. The two definitions can produce different results, however, in classifying an "im- plied assertion."4 An utterance is being used to prove an implied assertion when it depends for value on the credibility of the declarant, but is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter as- serted.5 An example of such an utterance is a letter describing a voyage, offered in evidence not to prove anything about the voyage, but to prove that the person to whom the letter was ad- dressed was a person of ordinary understanding. When offered for this purpose, the letter is not being offered to prove the * Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I thank Charles W. Ad- ams, Richard D. Friedman, Edward J. Imwinkelried, and Roger W. Kirst for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, while exonerating them from any re- sponsibility for the contents. I am grateful to Stefan Sarles for his valuable work as a research assistant, and also to colleagues John J. Cound and Donald G. Marshall for their illuminating comments about implied assertion issues. This article is dedicated to my wife, Suzanne Park, with love and gratitude. 1. FED. R. Evm. 801(a)-(c). 2. See infra note 17. 3. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 4. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 5. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. HeinOnline -- 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783 1989-1990 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:783 truth of what it asserts. Its use in evidence, however, does re- 6 quire reliance on the declarant's credibility. Hearsay scholars tend to prefer the declarant definition to the assertion definition or to conclude that the two defintions are the same.8 I disagree with both positions, and attempt in this Article to refute them. First, I believe that to treat the two definitions as the same in all circumstances requires an ex- tremely strained reading of the language of the assertion defini- tion and, in the federal system, a willingness to ignore the Advisory Committee's Note.9 Second, the declarant definition is not superior to the assertion definition, or at least not so clearly superior that a change in the Federal Rules of Evidence is needed. Change would eliminate a familiar formula that pro- vides quick and satisfactory guidance for most situations, and would raise new interpretive problems.10 Moreover, the asser- tion definition has led to acceptable results under modern caselaw.11 A rigorous application of the declarant definition would require that certain reliable utterances that are now ad- missible as nonhearsay find a new route to admission.12 This need would entail either creating still more hearsay exceptions, or torturing the contours of existing exceptions. A perfect hearsay definition is unattainable. This Article examines treatment of implied assertions under modern caselaw. Part I explains the two definitions and introduces the implied assertion problem. Part II reviews mod- ern federal caselaw applying the Federal Rules assertion defini- tion to implied assertions. Part III analyzes whether the Federal Rules should adopt a declarant definition in light of modern caselaw. The Article concludes that the existing defini- tion remains preferable to a declarant definition. 6. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 7. See, e.g., Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 707-10 (1962); Seidelson, Implied Assertions and FederalRule of Evidence 801: A Quandaryfor Federal Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 741, 774-75 (1986): Wellborn, The Definition of Hear- say in the FederalRules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49-64 (1982). 8. See, e.g., commentators cited infra note 20; see also Falkner, The "Hear-Say"Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 133, 136-38 (1961). 9. See infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text. 10. See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text. 11. See infra PART II. 12. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanhing text. HeinOnline -- 74 Minn. L. Rev. 784 1989-1990 1990] IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY I. A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE IMPLIED ASSERTION PROBLEM A. Two DEFINITIONs OF HEARSAY The primary reason for excluding hearsay is that the trier of fact has no adequate basis for evaluating the declarant's credibility, because the declarant was not subject to cross-exam- ination under oath in the trier's presence.' 3 Sometimes the trier can use the declarant's statement without relying on the declarant's credibility. This is true, for example, when the statement "John hit me" is offered solely to show that the de- clarant was conscious at the time of making the statement.14 What is important is that the statement was made, not the credibility of the person making it. The opposing party can test the credibility of the trial witness reporting the statement, and need not test the declarant's credibility. In contrast, when the out-of-court statement "John hit me" is offered to prove that John hit the declarant, the trier must rely on the declarant's credibility to reach the desired conclu- sion. A mistake or lie by the declarant would undermine the value of the evidence. Because the out-of-court declarant is not on the witness stand, the opponent has no opportunity to ex- plore defects in credibility through cross-examination. One might expect this explanation for excluding hearsay to foster a definition that treats out-of-court statements as hearsay whenever they depend for value on the declarant's credibility - that is, whenever the "hearsay dangers"'15 of defects in 13. See, e.g., 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at 3 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974); Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974). Secondary reasons for exclusion include the danger of fabrication by the in-court witness, the risk of overreaching by statement-seek- ing investigators, and the danger that adversaries will be unfairly surprised when testimony of one witness unexpectedly comes from the mouth of an- other. See Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 62-65, 79-80, 83-84, 102-04 (1987). 14. Admittedly, cross-examination of the declarant might serve some pur- pose. For example, it would help clarify whether the in-court witness was ac- curately describing the declarant's verbal conduct. Cross-examination is unnecessary, however, for probing the declarant's credibility. 15. The phrase "hearsay dangers" comes from Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948). Dif- ferent commentators have given the four dangers different names: Morgan refers to sincerity, misuse of language, perception, and memory. I&i at 182-88; see also Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 685 (1987) (describing dangers as perception, memory, sincerity, and ar- ticulateness); Graham, "StickpersonHearsay": A Simplified Approach to Un- derstandingthe Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 895-898 (1982) HeinOnline -- 74 Minn. L. Rev. 785 1989-1990 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:783 memory, perception, narration, or sincerity could affect the value of the testimony.16 Many courts and commentators have defined hearsay on the basis of whether the trier must rely on 8 the declarant's credibility.17 Although these definitions vary,' I will refer to them collectively as the declarant definition be- cause they focus on the declarant's testimonial capacities. The Federal Rules definition differs at least superficially from the declarant definition. I will call it the assertion defini- tion, because it focuses on whether an assertion was made, and the purpose for which the assertion is being offered in evidence.
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