CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FIFTH COLUMN IN THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

The fifth column was a major instrument of strategy in the Peloponnesian War. This is clear from the fact that each side employed fifth columns regularly throughout the war. As we have already noted, the necessities of warfare made the exploitation of a fifth column the most efficient method of capturing a city.1 This combined with the internal divisions in ·the Greek cities 2 resulted in the courting of fifth columns by each side. In addition to the captures accomplished or attempted by treachery, attacking forces sometimes hoped for help from within even when no plot to betray the city had been arranged. When Agis marched on the walls of Athens in 4u he was looking for some movement to agree to terms favorable to Sparta following the oligarchic coup (8.71.1). After the destruction of Eetionea, Thucydides says that Hege­ sander was hovering off Epidaurus, perhaps in accordance with a prearranged understanding, but probably in the hope that, given the dissension in Athens, an opportunity might arise (8.94.2). In other words, Hegesander was probably "fishing" for a fifth column. The expedition of Sicanus to Acragas which was in stasis also may have been an angling for an act of support, perhaps' even betrayal, by the pro-Syracusan faction. 3 Whether or not a city was in stasis, it was good strategy for an attacking army to negotiate with a group inside if possible. Nicias did this at Cythera and the result was the capitulation.4 Even more indicative of the role which the fifth column played in stategic thinking are two cases in which the idea that a betrayal was in the works was falsely planted to achieve an objective. After the summer of 415 the Athenian generals 6 based at Catana

1 Supra, ch. 3. 8 Supra, ch. 4. 3 Supra, p. 72, n. 5. ' Supra, ch. 5; cf. the Peloponnesian intentions at Stratus (2.81.2; supra, ch. 3). 6 Thucydides does not name the generals (6.64.1), who were Nicias and Lamachus. Plutarch, Nicias 16.1-3, gives Nicias only as the author of the plan. Diodorus also records the incident, but does not name the generals THE FIFTH COLUMN IN THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR II]

used the following stratagem: they sent to Syracuse a native of Catana thought by the Syracusan generals to be one of their supporters.1 He said that he came from the pro-Syracusans in Catana and named members of the Syracusan party who the generals knew were still there. He told them that the Athenians spent the night in the city away from their arms; that if the Syracusans would fix a date and arrive at dawn, their supporters in Catana would close the gates on the Athenians in the city and set fire to the ships while the Syracusans captured the camp outside. The Syracusans accepted the proposal, set the date and marched to Catana only to find that the Athenians had sailed to Syracuse and landed by the Olympieum (6.64-65). In the winter of 412/n Astyochus stopped for the night at Corycus, near Erythrae, on his way to Miletus. During the night he received a letter from Pedaritus at Chios revealing that some Erythraean prisoners, held by the Athenians at Samos, had been freed for the purpose of betraying Erythrae and had arrived there. 2 Astyochus immediately set sail for Erythrae and Pedaritus joined him there. They investigated and discovered that the whole story had been concocted to secure the freedom of the prisoners (8.33.3-4). It was the most unusual use of the fifth-column idea in the war. So far we have been concerned with the strategic use of fifth columns to accomplish immediate objectives such as the capture of a particular city or the landing at Syracuse. Beyond this, the fifth column was an important factor in overall strategic planning on each side. Descriptions of the Peloponnesian War as a war of attrition have usually referred to the original war plan of Pericles,3 but Kromayer has pointed out that the whole war was one of attrition. 4 As the war progressed both sides took to the offensive,

(13.6.1-4). As the passage in Thucydides makes clear, there was a pro­ Syracusan party in Catana, but there is no evidence of any treasonable action undertaken by this group. 1 This use of a "double agent" was a neat intelligence operation; supra, ch. 6, p. n4, n. 3, and Appendix I. 8 How Pedaritus got this information is not known. The whole episode again illustrates the development of military intelligence and efficient security (by the Spartans). 8 H. Delbri.ick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 1 (Berlin 1900) 100-108; Beloch, G.G. 21, 300-01; Henderson, Great War, 47-68; Kromayer, Heerwesen, 152-53; Adcock, War, 80-81. • Kromayer, Heerwesen, 154.