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Περίληψη : Spartan Admiral of the Peloponnesian Fleet During 411- 410 B.C

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Περίληψη : Spartan Admiral of the Peloponnesian Fleet During 411- 410 B.C IΔΡΥΜA ΜΕΙΖΟΝΟΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ Συγγραφή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα Μετάφραση : Ντόουσον Μαρία-Δήμητρα , Καμάρα Αφροδίτη Για παραπομπή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα , "Mindarus", Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=8209> Περίληψη : Spartan admiral of the Peloponnesian Fleet during 411- 410 B.C. He transferred the ships from Miletus to the Hellespont in order to ensure the cooperation of the satrap Pharnavazus and to hinder the Athenians’grain supply from the northern coast of the Black Sea. He was defeated near Cynossema followed by a defeat near Abydus. In the spring of 410 B.C. Mindarus suffered the ultimate defeat from Alcibiades during the Cyzicus naval battle when he was killed. Τόπος και Χρόνος Γέννησης 5th c. BC - Sparta Τόπος και Χρόνος Θανάτου 410 BC – Cyzicus Κύρια Ιδιότητα Admiral 1. Introduction Mindarus was an admiral of the Peloponnesian Fleet during the Ionian War in the period 411 – 419 B.C. The main sources of information with regard to his activity are ancient authors, mainly Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus and it is almost exclusively confined to his military activity in the area of the Hellespont. 2. Biography In 411 B.C. Mindarus succeeded Astyochus as admiral of the Peloponnesian Fleet in Miletus. Discontented however from satrap Tissaphernes’attitude who did not keep his promise to reinforce the Spartan fleet with Phoenician ships, he headed accompanied by 73 ships towards the Hellespont, with the intention of accepting the proposal of Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of Daskyleion, to instigate a rebellion of the coastal cities under Athenian rule which formerly belonged to the satrapy of Pharnabazus. At the same time Mindarus estimated that by leading his fleet to the Hellespont he would manage to hinder the Athenians from obtaining grain from the N coastline of the Black Sea.1 Meanwhile, he had already sent to the Hellespont 16 ships which had occupied part of the area.2 Additionally, he had sent 13 ships to Rhodes under the command of Dorieus to suppress the revolt of the Rhodians.3 After that he unexpectedly left Miletus so that the Athenian fleet would not take notice of his plans. Due to severe weather however he initially sailed to Ikaria and then to Chios. This delay partially hampered his plans due to the fact that the Athenians were informed of his movements and mustered their forces on Lesbos so as to prevent the Peloponnesian fleet from sailing towards the Hellespont.4 Mindarus and his Peloponnesian fleet managed to set sail away from Chios in secret and he reached Rhoeteum, the southern side of Hellespont entrance. The 18 Athenian ships in Sestus were threatened by Mindarus’presence in the Hellespont. The Spartan admiral pursued the Athenian ships that tried to depart, but they finally reached Lemnos and Imbros counting 4 losses.5 Mindarus united all the fleet’s ships, those he had taken with him from Miletus and those he had sent earlier to Abydus, acquiring thus exceptionally important naval forces that amounted to 86 ships. After that, he besieged Elaeus N of the Hellespont. The capture of the city was difficult so Mindarus terminated the siege and headed with the fleet to Abydus. As soon as the Athenians were informed of the presence of the hostile fleet in the Hellespont, they hasted to confront it and settled themselves in Elaeus where they started all Δημιουργήθηκε στις 1/10/2021 Σελίδα 1/4 IΔΡΥΜA ΜΕΙΖΟΝΟΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ Συγγραφή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα Μετάφραση : Ντόουσον Μαρία-Δήμητρα , Καμάρα Αφροδίτη Για παραπομπή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα , "Mindarus", Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=8209> military preparations. In September 411 BC during the naval battle at Cynossema the Athenians, under the leadership of the generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, defeated Mindarus and the Peloponnesian Fleet. The Spartans lost 21 ships while the Athenians lost 15.6 After the sea battle, the two opponents rallied their forces. As the Spartan admiral wanted to assemble all his forces so as to confront again the Athenians, he called for reinforcements from Euboea and Dorieus from Rhodes. 7 In November 411 BC the Athenians and the Peloponnesians confronted each other in the naval battle at Abydus. At first the battle was undecided until Alcibiades appeared nwith the Athenian forces and managed to destroy the Lacedaemonians.8 After Mindarus’second defeat, he requested reinforcements in both army and fleet from Sparta, while at the same time he was preparing along with Pharnabazus for the siege of cities allied to the Athenians in the area of the Hellespont.9 In the Spring (March or April) of 410 BC Mindarus from the sea and Pharnabazus from the land, having reassembled their forces, confronted again the Athenians at Cyzicus. At the Cyzicus naval battle the Athenians assembled all their forces and thanks to a device by Alcibiades achieved an absolute victory. As Mindarus was not able to reciprocate, he fled into the mainland, while Pharnabazus ‘ troops collapsed as soon as the mercenaries withdrew. The Peloponnesians were defeated. Mindarus was killed as he was heroically fighting to defend his fleet.10 The Spartans’desperate situation can be seen in the letter that Hippocrates, vice admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, sent with the unpleasant news to Sparta which is cited by Xenophon : “The ships are gone, Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We do not know what to do”.11 None of the ancient writers considers Mindarus to be responsible for the defeat of the Peloponnesians in the three military encounters at Cynossema, Abydus and Cyzicus. He had the misfortune of facing one of the most capable and cunning opponents, Alcibiades; He was thus unable to beat the naval supremacy of the Athenians. Contemporary scholars recognize Mindarus as one of the most significant Spartan admirals despite his failures.12 1. Thuc.VIII.85,99; Diod. S.13.38.5; OCD 3 (Oxford 1996) p. 983, see entry Mindaros (S. J. Hdkinson); Kagan, D. The Fall of the Athenian Empire ( New York 1987), p. 211-214; IΕE, Γ1 (Αθήνα 1972), p. 288. 2. Thuc. VIII.80,99; Kagan, D. The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 214; Buck, R.J. Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy (Historia Einzelschriften120, Stuttgart 1998), p. 31. Those forces were sent for the instigation of the rebellion of Byzantium and the neighbouring cities from the Athenian sovereignty that took place in the summer of 411 B.C. 3. Diod.S.13.38.5. Thucydides does not mention this incident. RE XV.2 (Stuttgart 1932), cols. 1767-1789, see entry Mindaros (V. Ehrenberg); Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire ( New York 1987), p. 214; Buck,R.J., Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy (Historia Einzelschriftten120, Stuttgart 1998), p.31. 4. Thuc.VIII.100; Lewis, D.M. – Boardman, J. – Davies, J.K. – Ostwald, M., CAH V: The Fifth Century B.C.2 (Cambridge 1992), p. 481; Henderson, B.W., The Great War between Athens and Sparta (London 1927), p.426-428; Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 215-217. 5. Thuc.VIII.101-102; Henderson, B.W., The Great War between Athens and Sparta (London 1927), p.429-430; Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 217-218. 6. Thuc. VII.103-105; Diod. S. 13.39-40· RE XV.2 (1932), cols. 1767-1769, see entry Mindaros (V. Ehrenberg)· Henderson, B.W., The Great War between Athens and Sparta (London 1927), p. 430-433· Buck, R.J., Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy (Historia Einzelschriften 120, Stuttgart 1998), p. 31- 32· Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 218-225· ΙΕE Γ1(Αθήνα 1972), p. 288-289. 7. Thuc. VIII. 107; Diod. S. 13.41· Xenophon, Hell. 1.1.1-5· Buck, R.J., Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy (Historia Einzelschriften 120, Stuttgart 1998), p. 33-34· Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 227-231· Lewis, D.M. - Boardman, J. - Davies, J.K. - Ostwald, M., CAH V: The fifth Century B.C.2 (Cambridge 1992), p. 482· Bleckmann, B., Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponnesischen Kriegs Δημιουργήθηκε στις 1/10/2021 Σελίδα 2/4 IΔΡΥΜA ΜΕΙΖΟΝΟΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ Συγγραφή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα Μετάφραση : Ντόουσον Μαρία-Δήμητρα , Καμάρα Αφροδίτη Για παραπομπή : Ντόουσον Μαρία - Δήμητρα , "Mindarus", Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=8209> (Stuttgart - Leipzig 1998), p. 42-45. The naval reinforcements from Euboea did not reach Hellespont, because they were destroyed due to a hurricane that occurred in Athos. Dorieus upon arrival was pursued by the Athenian forces. Xenophon mentions that Mindarus saw the persecution at Ilion, where he was sacrificing to the Temple of Athena and he urged into helping Dorieus, while according to Diodorus Mindarus was already in Abydus. See. Krentz, P., “Xenophon and Diodoros on the Battle of Abydus”, in The Ancient History Bulletin 3.1 (1989), p. 10- 14. 8. Naval Battle and battle of Abydus : Xenophon Hell. 1.1.6-8· Plut. Alc. 27; Diod. S. 13.45-46· Buck, R.J., Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy (Historia Einzelschriften 120, Stuttgart 1998), p. 33-35· Kagan, D., The Fall of the Athenian Empire (New York 1987), p. 231-233· Lewis, D.M. - Boardman, J. -Davies, J.K. - Ostwald, M., CAH V: The fifth Century B.C.2 (Cambridge 1992), p. 482· RE XV.2 (Stuttgart 1932), cols. 1767-1769, see entry Mindaros (V. Ehrenberg)· Bleckmann, B., Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (Stuttgart- Leipzig 1998), p. 42-56· ΙΕE Γ1 (Αθήνα 1972), p.
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