Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Brazil by Octavio Amorim Neto Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro
[email protected] Prepared for presentation at the IX Meeting of the Brazilian Political Science Association, Brasília, August 4-7, 2014. The author thanks the excellent research assistance provided by Igor Acácio. 1 Civil-military relations are one of the pillars of democratic theory and practice. Democratic regimes in which civilian control of the military is weak are generally of lowquality because the legitimate representatives of popular sovereignty do not direct the organization that ultimately ensures that the state has the monopoly of the use of force. These representatives often see their decisions vetoed by the military, also running the risk of being toppledfrom power by the latter. Civil-military relations are also the main institutional component of defense policy and national security (Huntington 1985 [1957]). If these relations are marked by severe imbalances, sharp hostility and lack of cooperation, a country may see its planning and military effectiveness severely compromised. In short, as shown by Feaver (1999), civil-military relations live under the shadow of two tragic poles: the military coup d’état and defeat on the battlefield. Republican Brazil knows deeply the first pole, but ignores the second. There were many successful coups and failed coup attempts from 1889 on. But since then, the country has only been at war in 1917-1918 and 1942-1945, and even then, as a minor and subordinate actor in the two world wars. That is to say, with the end of World War II, Brazilian civil-military relations began to be structured predominantly around the involvement of the military in domestic politics.