Chief of Staff, US Gen T. Michael Moseley Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen William R. Looney III Commander, Air University Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz http://www.af.mil

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj James C. Ulman Editor Maj Roger Burdette Professional Staff http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Debbie Banker, Editorial Assistant Darlene H. Barnes, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Journal Web Site Catherine Parker, Managing Editor

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air http://www.au.af.mil Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the . It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and Air and Space Power Journal opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those 401 Chennault Circle of the authors and should not be construed as carrying Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004 the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air e-mail: [email protected] University, or other agencies or departments of the US Visit Air and Space Power Journal online government. at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.

IInsidenside ccover.inddover.indd 2 88/24/2007/24/2007 11:45:24:45:24 PPMM Fall 2007 Volume XXI, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective Revisiting Leadership in the Armed Forces ...... 5 Air Commodore Aslam Bazmi, Pakistani Air Force, Retired

Focus Area Coalition Operations ...... 15 Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features Predator Command and Control: An Italian Perspective ...... 43 Col Ludovico Chianese, Military Institutional Communication: Its Geostrategic Importance ...... 55 Dr . Alexandre Sergio da Rocha Offensive Airpower with Chinese Characteristics: Development, Capabilities, and Intentions ...... 67 Erik Lin-Greenberg A Rescue Force for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of the Long War ...... 78 Lt Col Marc C . “Dip” DiPaolo, USAFR Col Lee dePalo, USAF Col Michael T . “Ghandi” Healy, USAF Lt Col Glenn “Hooter” Hecht, USAF Lt Col Mike “Trump” Trumpfheller, USAF

Departments Prelaunch Notes Celebrating the Air Force’s 60th Birthday and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Article ...... 11 Ricochets and Replies ...... 12 The Merge Lean Is No Flavor of the Month ...... 16 Randall Schwalbe Staying in Touch ...... 19 Col Stephen Schwalbe, PhD, USAF Reply to “Maj Gen William ‘Billy’ Mitchell: A Pyrrhic Promotion” ...... 21 Lt Col Donald G . Rehkopf Jr ., USAFR The “Hyphenated Airman”: Some Observations on Service Culture ...... 23 Lt Col D . Robert “Bob” Poynor, USAF, Retired

2007-3 contents.indd 1 7/31/07 12:34:45 PM PIREPs A New Form of Air Warfare ...... 27 Lt Tim Larribau, French Air Force The Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea: Defending Costa Rican Sovereignty ...... 33 Mario E . Overall Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict ...... 35 Dr . Hank J . Brightman

Ira C. Eaker Award Winners ...... 42 Vignettes The Sputnik Legacy: 50 Years in Retrospect ...... 26 Lt Col John E . Shaw, USAF The Cuban Missile Crisis: Forty-Five Years in the Balance ...... 88 Charles Tustin Kamps

Review Essay True Confessions of an Ex-Chauvinist: Fodder for Your Professional Reading on Women and the Military ...... 89 Dr . David R . Mets

Doctrine Note Revised USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8, Counter–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations ...... 103 Lt Col Charles E . Costanzo, PhD, USAF, Retired

Book Reviews Space: The Frontiers of Modern Defence ...... 105 K . K . Nair Reviewer: Dr . Raminder Kaur A Perfect Hell: The True Story of the Black Devils, the Forefathers of the Special Forces ...... 106 John Nadler Reviewer: Jim McClain Liaison Pilot ...... 107 James R . Bryce Reviewer: Col James E . Roper, USAF, Retired Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century ...... 107 Dennis E . Showalter, ed . Reviewer: Dr . Roy F . Houchin II Mavericks of the Sky: The First Daring Pilots of the U.S. Air Mail ...... 109 Barry Rosenberg and Catherine Macaulay Reviewer: Col Phillip S . Meilinger, USAF, Retired Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive ...... 110 Stephen P . Randolph Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets From POW to Blue Angel: The Story of Commander Dusty Rhodes ...... 111 Jim Armstrong Reviewer: CAPT D . Scott Thompson, USN, Retired

2007-3 contents.indd 2 7/31/07 12:34:45 PM 300 días en Afganistan ...... 112 Natalia Aguirre Zimerman Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare ...... 113 Hy S . Rothstein Reviewer: Maj Benjamin R . Maitre, USAF The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920–1950 ...... 114 Robert Wohl Reviewer: Dr . Mark J . Conversino Securing America’s Future: National Strategy in the Information Age ...... 115 Daniel M . Gerstein Reviewer: Capt Raymond P . Akin IV, USAF Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare ...... 116 David C . Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins Reviewer: Maj David Benson, USAF Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry ...... 116 Mike Gruntman Reviewer: Lt Col Kenneth Allison, USAF The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America’s Vietnam War ...... 117 John M . Shaw Reviewer: Dr . Nicholas Evan Sarantakes And Nothing Is Said: Wartime Letters, August 5, 1943–April 21, 1945 ...... 118 Michael N . Ingrisano Jr . Reviewer: Lt Col Kristine E . Blackwell, USAF Buffaloes over Singapore: RAF, RAAF, RNZAF and Dutch Brewster Fighters in Action over Malaya and the East Indies, 1941–1942 ...... 119 Brian Cull with Paul Sortehaug and Mark Haselden Reviewer: Capt Murdock M . Moore, USAF, Retired Battle-Tested: Carrier Aviation in Afghanistan and Iraq ...... 120 Rebecca Grant Reviewer: Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired Warriors and Scholars: A Modern War Reader ...... 121 Peter B . Lane and Ronald E . Marcello, eds . Reviewer: Dr . John H . Barnhill Old Glory Stories: American Combat Leadership in World War II ...... 121 Cole C . Kingseed Reviewer: Lt Col Richard Hughes, USAF Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer” ...... 123 David Cesarani Reviewer: Dr . Frank P . Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success ...... 124 Anthony H . Cordesman Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF

Mission Debrief ...... 125

2007-3 contents.indd 3 7/31/07 12:34:46 PM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired US War College Department of Homeland Security Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF NASA Marshall Space Flight Center The Pentagon Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Montgomery, Alabama RAND Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Richard I. Lester US Army War College Eaker College for Professional Development Dr. Mark Clodfelter Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired National War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Conrad Crane Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired Director, US Army Military Studies Institute Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. Dik A. Daso National Air and Space Museum Mr. Brent Marley Smithsonian Institution Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Col Michael D. Davis Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Air University West Chicago, Illinois Dr. William L. Dowdy Dr. Daniel Mortensen Alabama State University Air University Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Stephen Fought Dr. Bruce T. Murphy USAF Air War College Air University Col Richard L. Fullerton Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired USAF Academy Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired National War College USAF Public Affairs Center of Excellence Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF Lt Col Stephen M. Rothstein, PhD, USAF Air University USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Ohio State University Air University Dr. Grant T. Hammond Col Michael A. Stanley, USAF, Retired Center for Strategy and Technology USAF Air War College Air University Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Thomas Hughes Toffler Associates USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Sci-Ops Consulting Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Dr. Christopher H. Toner The Pentagon USAF Air Command and Staff College Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Navarre, Florida Auburn University Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell USAF Air Command and Staff College Christiansburg, Virginia Dr. Tom Keaney Dr. Harold R. Winton Johns Hopkins University USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies



2007-3 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 7/31/07 12:35:16 PM APJ

Revisiting Leadership in the Armed Forces*

Air Commodore AslAm BAzmi, PAkistAni Air ForCe, retired

any books and articles have extensively discussed the subject of leadership. In dealing with some of its aspects, therefore, one Mwill likely repeat (albeit somewhat differently) what someone has already said. basically, the essentials of good leadership in the profession of arms have changed little over the past de­ cades. although we still hold sound leader­ ship in high esteem, poor leadership has be­ come much less tolerable today and much more dysfunctional than it was 0 years ago. Rapid progress made in the modern techno­ logical era demands that present-day leaders use their abilities, attitudes, and perceptions to overcome the polarity caused by the vanity of human power and the neglect of life’s pris­ tine values.

What Is Leadership? Leadership makes people place their faith and trust in a single leader whom they follow and for whom they are willing to give their best. Leaders must be able to inspire their fol­ lowers by demonstrating superior qualities of body, mind, and character. Their success de­ rives from inspiring their subordinates to think, feel, and act the way they do. a gift of charac­ ter, leadership can be polished and improved. Field Marshal bernard Law Montgomery of Great britain definedleadership as “the will to dominate, together with the character which in­ spires confidence” (emphasis in original).1 To lead and dominate others, one must first ac­ quire force of character tempered by energy, a sense of purpose and direction, integrity, en­ thusiasm, and moral courage. People look up

*Reprinted with permission of Shaheen, journal of the Pakistani air Force.



SLP-Bazmi.indd 5 7/31/07 12:49:51 PM  AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

to leaders and trust their judgement; leaders sists in being honest and admitting one’s mis­ inspire and warm the hearts of their followers. takes when things go wrong. It shows itself in Indeed, Field Marshal sir William slim of aus­ the ability to make decisions, keeping inter­ tralia viewed leadership as “the projection of ests of the service and the country in view personality.”2 In its highest sense, leadership is against personal interest or self-perpetuation. the goal that all officersmust continually seek Lack of moral courage can impel persons with if they wish to remain worthy of their rank and ostensibly strong nerves and great character insignia. to make absolutely wrong decisions. Lacking moral courage and not ready to accept defeat, adolf Hitler cost millions of people their lives. Qualities of a Military Leader His generals, deficientin courage, turned him The qualities that we associate with great into an unbridled demon. by demonstrating leadership are so numerous that no one can moral courage, a leader can avoid many a possess all of them. The following sections wrong decision. The ability to make an un­ briefly discuss a selection of traits typical of popular decision calls for resolution, which celebrated leaders—traits that military officers leaders can cultivate. should strive to acquire. some leaders unfairly keep themselves too much in the sun and their followers too much Conspicuousness in the dark. Under no circumstances should commanders be vague, remote, or inaccessible. during the period of indecisive inactivity cre­ When they walk unannounced into any camp, ated by an emergency, some people may begin workshop, or office, people should recognize to act doggedly and inspire others to follow them immediately. It is more important to be them by virtue of their physical prowess, out­ recognized than to be popular. standing appearance, or some kind of unique Moral courage requires a leader or com­ attribute. such individuals may not have mander to report adversely on an inefficient thought of being leaders but simply respond subordinate and to differ with a superior whose to situations more quickly and assertively than actions run counter to the best interests of the others. alternatively, leaders-to-be may con­ service. Like Winston Churchill, who, at the sciously assume that role and make themselves beginning of World War II, offered to oppose conspicuous. In the armed forces, we do not Germany with his “blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” have to adopt either of these methods because a leader should not waver under stress and conspicuousness comes naturally to us by vir­ strain.4 by cultivating the virtue of moral cour­ tue of our uniforms and insignia on the one age and the disposition to acknowledge one’s hand and, on the other, by the training that mistakes, a leader opens up the possibility of prompts all personnel to turn to those of radical reformation. after demolishing the higher rank for guidance. officers in the barrier of conceit, an officer can fully discuss armed forces should therefore earnestly strive any problem with his or her subordinates and to acquire qualities that will mature and refine may often findthe solution most suited to the their leadership abilities. situation.

Courage Example speaking of John Churchill, duke of Marlbor­ Good leaders work more than they talk, trying ough, Voltaire praises “that calm courage in to become living symbols of their organiza­ the midst of tumult, that serenity of soul in tion’s value system. Tactical leadership based danger . . . [which is] the greatest gift of na­ on example and demonstration promotes ture for command.”3 Most people have physical group cohesion. Leaders exert an immediate courage but lack moral courage, which is in­ and pervasive influence on those under their dispensable for a leader. Moral courage con­ command. To serve as a good example to their

SLP-Bazmi.indd 6 7/31/07 12:49:51 PM REVISITING LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMED FORCES 

subordinates, they must, therefore, set for own self-esteem. The principal quality that fol­ themselves a strict moral code and code of dis­ lowers look for in a leader is integrity. cipline. If they wish to earn their followers’ Ethical and intellectual integrity calls for respect and loyalty, they must meticulously moral courage as well as self-analysis and self- correct their own attitude towards their supe­ criticism. of all virtues, honesty to oneself is riors as well as subordinates. Quietly spoken the most difficult to cultivate, but once mas­ by true leaders, a “Will you please?” commands tered, the others follow quite smoothly. one a more immediate response than a bellow can easily find excuses for poor performance. from people uncertain of themselves and an analysis of these excuses would reveal that afraid of their own authority. although they contain a measure of truth, all leaders must independently establish people exaggerate them to justify their own their own credibility. They must know their conduct to themselves. If people are honest job and demonstrate that knowledge. To serve with themselves, they can be honest with others. as an example means saying, “Come on,” not some members of our armed forces pay lip “Go on.” officers must realize that junior of­ service to integrity when they take examina­ ficers closely note the way they talk and be­ tions, participate in course exercises, fill out have. They discuss their leaders’ idiosyncrasies travel-allowance/daily-allowance claims, report among themselves, comparing and contrast­ sick to avoid some unpleasant duty, and make ing them with other officers and finally pass­ confidential reports on subordinates—when­ ever conscience and convenience seem to ing judgement. The efficiencyor poor perfor­  mance of a unit or section depends in great conflict with each other. at the end of the workday, officersshould ask themselves, “Have measure on this popular assessment. Every of­ I earned today’s salary?” This attitude will ficer, therefore, should remain extremely wary awaken dormant consciences and prod these about his or her conduct. officers to discharge their duties with a true The credibility of leaders is a strong index sense of responsibility. To quote former UCLa of their troops’ high morale and unfailing loy­ basketball coach John Wooden, “There is no alty, which cannot be secured by mere preach­ pillow as soft as a clear conscience.” ing. according to brig Gen s. L. a. Marshall, officersof integrity are fearless and straight­ “The doctrine of a blind loyalty to leadership forward. They may not be adept at the art of is a selfishand futile military dogma except in public relations, but they are certainly de­ so far as it is ennobled by a higher loyalty in all pendable. They do not need to prop them­  ranks to truth and decency.” selves up with such utterances as “by God!” to Leadership’s reputation of firmness, com­ establish credibility; people simply love to petence, and fairness is an effective antidote work under their command. to the pernicious “meltdown of trust” syn­ drome—an unfortunate phenomenon of con­ Broad Vision temporary civilization. by willingly making sacrifices, taking risks in the interest of the a person’s perspective is conditioned by the mission and the soldiers, and looking deeply amount of knowledge and understanding he inside to figure out what truly motivates people, or she has. a narrow outlook often creates a a leader can cultivate and maintain a climate serious barrier to enlightened leadership. of mutual trust and confidence. Leaders must transcend the petty confines of morbid discrimination, eschewing any consid­ Integrity eration of branch, rank, language, sect, and so forth. only broad vision can enable a leader In today’s competitive environment, some lead­ to deal with a complex situation or experi­ ers tend to abandon ethical considerations. by ence, especially under trying conditions. an doing so, they stand to lose not only the re­ officer with myopic vision gets bogged down spect and trust of their followers but also their in minor issues, falls easy prey to prejudices,

SLP-Bazmi.indd 7 7/31/07 12:49:52 PM  AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

and remains captive to his or her own paro­ Harnessing Leisure chial thinking. The greater the number and variety of inter­ In essence, no natural or hereditary system ests a person has, the greater would be his or exists for categorizing people as either leaders her level of satisfaction and happiness. The or followers. such a false conception creates narrow scope of our education pushes most of arrogance and snobbery on the one hand and our young men and women past the high unhappiness and prejudice on the other. The school and even the college stage without in­ very delicate officer-subordinate relationship culcating any worthwhile interest in life. al­ requires active cooperation and a great deal lowing these people to share and enjoy varied of mutual giving and taking—with more giv­ activities outside their working hours would ing by the officer and more taking by the sub­ enable them to discover and pursue the ones ordinate. they like best and, in turn, help them develop maturer and fuller personalities marked with Sense of Responsibility a great sense of purpose and meaning. It would also help overcome any tendencies to­ Temperamentally, the leader must be ready to wards introversion and would impart a more accept responsibility. In the present environ­ balanced outlook, thus making such people ment of specialization, people tend to confine more useful leaders and better members of themselves to their professional field,treating the service. extra but necessary tasks as an unwelcome burden. In fact, those additional duties nor­ Modesty mally afford people a good background as well as an opportunity to fully develop a sense a certain amount of egoism has a definitemo ­ of responsibility. one of the principles of good tivating value for all human endeavors. but we should not allow the passion for power to get human management entails making workers out of hand. all of us naturally aspire to de­ realize that any job, small or insignificant velop a sense of individuality. a position of au­ though it may seem, is important and vitally thority offers a rare opportunity to satisfy this related to the end product. This understand­ urge. Unwary officers may demand too much ing will give those individuals a sense of im­ adulation and personal loyalty, surrounding portance, belonging, and, ultimately, pride in themselves with sycophants, yes-men, and “rub­ their achievement. Thoroughness in every ber stamps.” They may want their own way too sphere leads to general efficiency, on which much and too often, and may become too depends the effectiveness and very survival of opinionated and obstinate about taking ad­ the military in an emergency. vice from colleagues and subordinates. In some cases, they may consciously enjoy a feel­ Creative Thinking ing of superiority and aloofness, manifesting itself in vanity, conceit, and self-pride. The desire to improve the general scheme of a love for power and authority, although things is a valuable asset. People with closed legitimate, should not unduly influence and minds are likely to more easily accept the exist­ color an officer’s behavior. It sounds shallow ing arrangement of things (status quo) without of an officerto say to his or her juniors, “I have questioning usefulness, correctness, or quality. 2 years’ service in this field.a re you trying to Enslavement to the status quo can deprive people teach me?” Learning is a lifelong process. Just of a chance to practice the art of creative think­ as “the rivers and seas . . . receive the homage ing. It is desirable to foster and cultivate among and tribute of all the valley streams . . . [but people the passion to improve things—even by] being lower than they . . . [become] kings for the sake of change. of course, this can be of them all” (according to the Chinese sage carried too far, but with a little careful thought, Lao Tse), so is there no harm in learning from one can strike a sensible balance. a soldier, a sailor, an airman, or a civilian.

SLP-Bazmi.indd 8 7/31/07 12:49:52 PM REVISITING LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMED FORCES 

Modesty is the key to greatness. Merchandise sphere, marked by common joy and shared of good quality will sell well without publicity. happiness. officers genuinely interested in Vain, conceited, boastful, and showy lead­ the personal affairs of their subordinates will ers fail to earn respect. Modest, self-confident receive the love and respect of their followers. commanders can earn the love of their col­ Let us heed ken blanchard’s advice: “The key leagues and subordinates, but those filledwith to developing people is to catch them doing exaltation and wrongheaded pride expose something right.” an officer must not be mi­ themselves to ridicule. a wise leader’s tongue serly in administering doses of praise at appro­ is under his mind, but a foolish leader’s mind priate intervals in order to sustain group is under his tongue. power. a subordinate commended for a cer­ tain quality will definitely strive to live up to it. Meditation shrewd officers jot down and remember important details from the personal lives of To gain spiritual strength, leaders should set their subordinates. These particulars may per­ aside time to remember allah. Meditation in tain to their dates of birth and marriage, their the small hours of the night will soothe their pastimes, the names of their children, and so souls and minds. In adversity, leaders should forth. Commanders who call even their lowest- neither lose heart nor become despondent. ranking personnel by their first names need Rather than becoming impatient, they should not worry about punctuality and lack of disci­ plough hard and let the seed grow into a pline among their staffs. plant, leaving its fruition to God. Those who believe in the dictum “Hard work works” and Motivation place their faith in God always remain happy and peaceful. To be successful, officers should learn the art of fostering the spirit of willing cooperation in Group Dynamics their subordinates, especially by using feed­ back. They should keep their people apprised Wise officers do not exact obedience by sheer of the state of affairs in the unit as well as the command. They talk of “we” rather than “I.” progress made on any matter of general inter­ aware of the fine distinction between “power est that they have referred to higher authori­ over” and “power with,” they think of their ju­ ties for a decision (or inform specific individuals niors as colleagues. despite being in positions if only they are affected). of authority, they do not unduly concern some officers create the spirit of competi­ themselves with their own importance and sta­ tion among their personnel to promote effi­ tus. Their leadership is a happy blend of per­ ciency. a system of incentives has proven very sonal authority, persuasion, and inspiration. effective in motivating people to hard work. People whom they command feel honored Though intangible, such incentives spur people and exhilarated by the power exercised over to reach higher goals despite heavy odds. a them. such a unit or squadron becomes a person who feels respected and wanted will happy and efficient community. officers who strive harder to maintain and even enhance create such a healthy environment are an in­ such recognition. valuable asset to the service. They set a good example of mutual respect and regard, free Discipline from obsequiousness or obnoxious authority. Their followers never try to pull the wool over Humans have an inherent and instinctive craving their eyes. Morale remains high, and life in for discipline. Children do not like a weak teacher the unit becomes a pleasurable experience. or father, nor do women like a weak husband. Maintaining good relationships among the similarly, people in uniform also have a low opin­ personnel working together in a unit or sec­ ion about a weak officer. Real discipline emanates tion is rightly considered the bedrock of loy­ from willing submission to someone’s better alty and efficiency. It creates a family atmo­ judgement. Unfortunately, some airmen, sol­

SLP-Bazmi.indd 9 7/31/07 12:49:53 PM 10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

diers, and sailors may not respond to the call of with those that the military establishment con­ duty. If persuasion fails, the exercise of authority siders indispensable. Military officers, how­ should unhesitatingly take the form of punish­ ever well trained and groomed, are not likely ment, inflicted as soon as possible after a violation to practice pristine, ethical military conduct of rules. If investigations are necessary, they in isolation. The present sociocultural degen­ should proceed without delay. eration has become equally visible in the rank Commanders who impose discipline in a and file of our military service. only an ethi­ whimsical and inconsistent manner quickly lose cally sound and professionally capable leader­ the respect of subordinates and lower their mo­ ship can stem the rot in military virtues. Fac­ rale. Fair and consistent discipline, free from fa­ ing today’s complexity and austerity, our voritism, is less likely to incur resentment than military commanders must make clear choices inconsistent discipline. Consistency does not im­ regarding priorities and then support those ply that the penalty depends entirely upon the priorities with more than words. offense, without taking into account the per­ as we select, educate, train, and then trust sonal history and background of the offender. our budding leaders, we need to provide Fairness requires that commanders take a le­ them a suitable environment in which to nient view of the first transgression and impose work. This responsibility essentially devolves severer penalties for subsequent offenses. upon the higher echelons of leadership in the armed forces. officers must conduct themselves as role models; merely delivering Conclusion sermons and finely worded speeches would q never before in our history have society’s achieve little. values and expectations been more at variance

Notes

1. bernard Law Montgomery, Military Leadership, Walker . s. L. a. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Trust Lectures on Leadership no.  (London: Geoffrey Command (14; repr., norman: University of oklahoma Cumberlege, oxford University Press, 14), 4. Press, 2000), 200. 2. Field Marshal sir William slim, “Leadership in . Pakistani air Force personnel are entitled to claim Management,” Australian Army Journal 1, no. 1 ( June travel and daily allowances while off station on official duty. 2003): 14, http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/abstractsonline/ . ken blanchard, The Heart of a Leader: Insights on the aaJournal/2003_W/aaJ_ June_2003_Retrospect.pdf (ac­ Art of Influence (Tulsa, ok: Honor books, 1), 120. cessed  January 200). . Lao Tse, The Tao and Its Characteristics, trans. James 3. sir Edward Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: Legge, Project Gutenberg, e-text no. 21, http://www From Marathon to Waterloo (London: R. bentley, 11), .kevinfitzmaurice.com/book_lao_tzu_tao.htm (accessed http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/  January 200). tfdbt10.htm (accessed  January 200). . blanchard, Heart of a Leader, 4. 4. “speeches and Quotes: blood, Toil, Tears and sweat,” The Churchill Centre, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/ pages/index.cfm?pageid=31 (accessed  January 200).

SLP-Bazmi.indd 10 7/31/07 12:49:53 PM APJ

Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS

Celebrating the Air Force’s 60th Birthday and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Article

he US Air Force’s 2006 Vision Docu­ the power of hard-hitting new ideas to influ­ ment reminds Airmen to “never for­ ence events. The contribution of Air and Space get that behind us is a proud and Power Journal (ASPJ ), the professional journal lasting heritage and in front of us is a of the Air Force, to our service’s intellectual Tlimitless horizon.”1 As we celebrate our ser­ throw weight predates our service’s birth in vice’s 60th birthday, we recall our heritage, 1947. Now published in six languages, ASPJ replete with heroic Airmen, amazing aircraft has become a respected international forum and spacecraft, and world-changing achieve­ for discussing the latest air, space, and cyber ments. Our belief that “man’s flight through knowledge. On the Air Force’s 60th birthday, life is sustained by the power of his knowl­ we clearly see a limitless horizon for our ser­ edge” has been part of that heritage.2 Gen vice and its professional journal. James h. Doolittle, one of our greatest heroes, All ASPJ editions promote professional dia­ once said, “if we should have to fight, we logue among Airmen worldwide so that we should be prepared to do so from the neck up instead of from the neck down.”3 can harness the best ideas about air, space, General Doolittle’s words ring true today. and cyberspace power. Chronicles Online Journal Previous generations of Airmen forged our (COJ ) complements the printed editions of heritage from knowledge that included tech­ ASPJ but appears only in electronic form. Not nical expertise, innovative doctrinal concepts, subject to any fixed publication schedule or and creative leadership skills. Although all article-length constraints, COJ can publish military organizations shared some of this timely articles anytime about a broad range of knowledge, much of it was unique to Airmen, military topics. who operated in different domains than their Articles appearing in COJ are frequently re­ brethren. in today’s world, where knowledge published elsewhere. The various ASPJ lan­ has become the coin of the realm, Airmen guage editions routinely translate and print must arm themselves with cutting-edge ideas them. Book editors from around the world se­ about how best to apply air, space, and cyber lect them as book chapters, and college pro­ power in defense of national interests. They fessors use them in the classroom. We are also must understand how to integrate their pleased to present the following recent COJ activities with land and sea operations. article (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell We must develop new knowledge and de­ .af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html): liver it rapidly to Airmen who need it. During the Cold War, “throw weight” meant the weight • Dr. Fred h. Allison, “Close Air Support: of an intercontinental ballistic missile’s payload, Aviators’ entrée into the Band of Brothers” but we can now give the word a new knowledge­ (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ related meaning. intellectual throw weight is airchronicles/cc/allison.html)

11

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-3.indd 11 7/31/07 12:36:59 PM 12 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

The ASPJ staff seeks insightful articles and Notes book reviews from anywhere in the world. We 1. 2006 Vision Document, 1, http://www.af.mil/shared/ offer both hard-copy and electronic-publication media/document/AFD-060228-054.pdf (accessed 12 May opportunities in english, Spanish, Portuguese, 2007). 2. Austin “Dusty” Miller, quotation on the eagle and Arabic, French, and Chinese. To submit an ar­ Fledglings statue at the US Air Force Academy. ticle in any of our languages, please refer to the 3. “Jimmy Doolittle: Doolittle Quotes,” Pacific Air submission guidelines at http://www.airpower Forces, http://www.pacaf.af.mil/library/pacafheritage/ .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. jimmydoolittle/doolittle/index.asp (accessed 27 May 2007). To write a book review, please see the guide­ lines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/bookrev/bkrevguide.html. q

APJ

We encourage you to send your comments to us, preferably via e-mail at [email protected]. You may also send letters to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112­ 6004. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.

LEADERSHIP: AN OLD DOG’S VIEW FIT (AND READY) TO FIGHT excessive analogizing can sometimes become Author 2d Lt Nickolas Stewart makes an inter­ cloying, but Mr. C. r. Anderegg’s “Leadership: esting case for hand-to-hand combat training An Old Dog’s View” (Summer 2007) was so for Air Force personnel in his article “Fit (and spot-on it was never in such danger. As a sled ready) to Fight: Strengthening Combat readi­ dog now closer to the end of the trail than the ness through Controlled-Aggression Training” beginning, i appreciate the point of view Mr. (Summer 2007). Like him, i was surprised to Anderegg provides. it confirmswork yet to be learn that the Air Force does not already pro­ done and a satisfied rest some miles ahead. vide its personnel basic training in unarmed Thanks much. combat. i agree completely that basic martial- Maj Mary A. Enges, USAF arts training would be a useful skill for those Salt Lake City, Utah who may need it in a combat setting. in fact, personal self-defense capabilities are impor­ Mr. Anderegg’s article is excellent. As an “old tant even for personnel who are not deployed. dog” myself, i could relate to the way the au­ however, i am concerned that the author does thor drew leadership analogies from the dog’s not fully distinguish between martial-arts train­ experiences. i gleaned valuable insights from the article. First, adversity is only a life experi­ ing and “real-life” combat training. ence that we live and learn from for our own The martial arts are admirable pursuits, but betterment. Second, improved leadership skills none of them can adequately prepare the can result from that learning. practitioner for the true “no-rules” environment of unarmed combat. even the mixed martial Gerald O’Neil Defense Contract Management Agency arts’ famed ultimate-fighting championship Boston, Massachusetts has rules that simply do not exist in real life

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-3.indd 12 7/31/07 12:37:00 PM RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 13

(e.g., no biting or eye gouging). Perhaps least STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE: THE NECES­ realistic of all, almost all martial-arts contests SITY FOR VALUES OPERATIONS AS involve just two opponents whereas a real fight OPPOSED TO INFORMATION OPERA­ almost never does. i agree that martial-arts TIONS IN IRAq AND AFGHANISTAN training is related to “real” fighting and that Perhaps one of the best articles in the Spring some specific martial-arts techniques may be 2007 Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ ) was useful, but i do not think that specific Col William Darley’s “Strategic imperative: martial-arts training (e.g., iron Tiger immer­ The Necessity for Values Operations as Op­ sion) is necessarily the answer to the problem posed to information Operations in iraq and Lieutenant Stewart describes. Afghanistan.” A fundamental tenet for any it is extremely difficult to train people in military operation is to understand the envi­ real fighting for two reasons. First, it involves ronment we operate in, but unfortunately we techniques that can permanently maim or kill Americans continue to hide behind our igno­ an opponent, so they are extremely difficultto rance of Afghani and iraqi culture with sim­ practice realistically. As my instructor once plistic labels. in that sense, our cultural under­ joked, “i can show you the touch of death— standing (or lack thereof) makes Vietnam but i can only show you once.” Attempts to comparisons to current operations far closer train for real life often sacrifice key elements to the mark than many currently admit. Of of realism and thus can instill a false sense of course, there is probably a very fine line for security in the practitioner. in the 13 years i potentially political issues that ASPJ covers, trained in martial arts (and the six years i but at a minimum, i expect excellent critical taught it), i found far more people who thought thinking and analysis from the Journal and they were competent fighters than people hope to see more hard-hitting articles like who actually were. Second, and more impor­ Colonel Darley’s in future issues. tantly, real fightingis firstand foremost about Maj Javier M. Ibarra, USAF a mind-set and the “weapons of opportunity” Robins AFB, Georgia that the author mentions. it is more impor­ tant that a person bite an opponent, find a Colonel Darley’s article is spot-on and long chair to use as a club, or be willing to take any overdue. his point about American civil reli­ other action to win than to have practiced a gion being individual liberty is accurate. i specific kick, strike, takedown, or maneuver. would only expand his point slightly to include Although martial-arts skills may be useful the absurd adoption of political correctness, a tools in a fight, the amount of effort and notion that virtually paralyzes US efforts to de­ training required to use them effectively in fend itself against the attack of radical islam. combat seems excessive. in short, i would en­ Straight talk and sober recognition of this vision personal self-defense training as more threat are the only solution. i applaud Colonel closely resembling a seminar that outlines Darley’s courage. More—not less—discussion basic pressure points, strikes, and weapons of of this issue is desperately needed. opportunity. We want someone who can exe­ Maj Daniel Adler, USAF cute a kick and punch effectively, know where McGuire AFB, New Jersey to jab a thumb into a person, and—most im­ portantly—always look for an improvised weapon with which to dispatch his or her op­ IS RED FLAG OBSOLETE? ponent. A structured martial-arts program i read Gary “Buch” Sambuchi’s comment in would be exceptionally time-consuming and the Spring 2007 Air and Space Power Journal un­ might not necessarily translate into real-life der the heading “is red Flag Obsolete?” As a combat skills. former crew chief at hill AFB, Utah, i am in­ Joe Carignan clined to agree with Mr. Sambuchi. if one Tinker AFB, Oklahoma looks at past technological advances, one sees

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-3.indd 13 7/31/07 12:37:00 PM 14 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

that we relied on technology for even the most COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER: mundane air-to-air combat tasks. With this in­ AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION FOR THE creased dependence on technology, our basic LONG WAR air-to-air skills decreased so much that we had to relearn them in Vietnam. i have found i agree with what Col howard Belote says in through the years that one cannot transform his article “Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air- military forces without basic skills as a founda­ Ground integration for the Long War” (Fall tion for growth. Do we have limitations? Of 2006). it is about time someone stood up and course we do. We learn from these limitations said this. We are in the shape we are in now by developing the ability to adapt to a chang­ because of the Air Force’s long neglect of the ing environment filled with unknowns and close air support and tactical air control party strategically forecasting to meet future needs. (TACP) communities. excessive focus on stra­ if we look at the war on terrorism, we see that tegic warfare, centers of gravity, and so forth high tech cannot replace the basics of air-to­ left us unprepared and inadequately manned ground warfare in Afghanistan and iraq with the right air experts to conduct counter­ against a low-tech enemy. Although the US Air insurgency operations. rarely did i see an Air Force’s future may be in cyberspace and space Force Weapons School graduate serving with operations, one cannot merely stuff a pilot the Army in the air liaison officer (ALO) into a fighter aircraft and say, “Fly, fight and ranks. Thanks for the article and the insight. win!” without having taught him the basics of The TACP/ALO community thanks you. air-to-air or air-to-ground combat. Michael “Rhino” Evans Nellis AFB, Nevada Capt Steven “Schaff” Schaffhouser, USAF Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Pennsylvania

Editor’s Note: The original article that Captain Schaffhouser and Mr. Sambuchi comment about is Lt Col Rob Spalding’s “Why Red Flag Is Obsolete” (Fall 2006).

Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of language, values, religious systems, societal norms, history, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. —Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007

Prelaunch Ricochet 2007-3.indd 14 7/31/07 12:37:01 PM ASPJ

Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS

Coalition Operations

ccording to Joint Publication tions. We would do well to learn about potential ( JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, “a coalition partners before a crisis erupts. coalition is an ad hoc arrangement be­ coalition members can contribute tremen­ tween two or more nations for com­ dous resources, but the challenge lies in inte­ monA action. coalitions are formed by different grating them as efficiently as possible. thus, nations with different objectives, usually for a careful planning based on the capabilities and single occasion or for a longer period while ad­ needs of each partner becomes essential. doc­ dressing a narrow sector of common interest. trine such as that found in JP 3-16 guides the ba­ Operations conducted with units from two or sic military aspects of coalition planning, but air, more coalition members are referred to as coali­ space, and cyber power remain integral to prac­ tion operations” (emphasis in original).1 JP 3-16 tically all coalition operations; consequently, Air­ adds that “US commanders and their staffs should men need to prepare themselves to think creatively have an understanding of each member of the about new situations. Although they already excel MnF [multinational force]. Much time and ef­ at applying their service’s distinctive capabilities, fort is expended in learning about the enemy; a Airmen should study coalition capabilities and similar effort is required to understand the doc­ seek new ways to integrate international contri­ trine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, butions. Learning about potential coalition part­ customs, history, and values of each partner. this ners is a never-ending process. will ensure the effective integration of MnF part­ We can follow JP 3-16’s call to learn about our ners into the operation and enhance the syner­ coalition partners by studying what they say in gistic effect of the coalition forces.”2 their professional writings. this issue of Air and US military forces conduct coalition opera­ Space Power Journal (ASPJ ), the professional journal tions on a daily basis. We already enjoy close of the Air Force, contains articles and book re­ partnerships with many militaries, but our na­ views written by authors from Brazil, France, tion’s global involvement means that we need to guatemala, , Pakistan, the United Kingdom, prepare ourselves for unexpected contingencies. and the United States. this diverse international no one can predict the membership, purpose, cast offers a variety of perspectives on the chal­ or timing of the next coalition operation. We lenges we face today. Some of these views will be might join a coalition that includes almost any familiar to ASPJ readers, but others may appear nation in the world. operations Enduring Free­ novel and thought provoking. Because coalitions dom and iraqi Freedom involve combat and in­ will almost certainly remain an enduring part of clude our closest allies, but many coalitions form the international security scene, the ASPJ staff as humanitarian responses to natural disasters, dedicates this issue to advancing the professional such as the tsunami of 2004. Some of them as­ dialogue about coalition operations. q semble slowly, and members may join and leave; others, however, can almost literally blossom overnight. coalitions typically involve numerous military, governmental, and nongovernmental Notes groups not accustomed to working together. the 1. Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, unpredictability and complexity of these opera­ 7 March 2007, i-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new tions highlight the importance of quickly coordi­ _pubs/jp3_16.pdf (accessed 6 June 2007). nating diverse organizations under crisis condi­ 2. ibid., i-3.

15

Focus Area.indd 15 7/31/07 12:35:45 PM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected].

Lean Is No Flavor of the Month

Randall Schwalbe*

t CoL GrAhAm rinehart’s article success rate of 99.9997 percent. In other “how the Air Force Embraced ‘Partial words, out of one million opportunities for er­ Quality’ (and Avoiding Similar mis­ ror, only three actually occur. Lean is only in­ takes in New Endeavors)” (Winter directly concerned with quality output. It fo­ L2006) is poignant and timely on two levels: (1) cuses primarily on the elimination of waste he tells the truth, and (2) he exposes the rea­ and the flowof value within a process (not nec­ son the Air Force has trouble accepting these essarily a project). gee-whiz, flavor-of-the-month improvement I disagree with the following statement by programs. As a manufacturing operations ana­ Colonel rinehart: “the proclamation that lyst with Boeing’s Satellite Development Cen­ ‘the continuous process improvements of ter, I have given all this rhetoric considerable AFSo [Air Force Smart operations] 21 will be thought and found that Colonel rinehart’s the new culture of our Air Force’ could just as argument has a fundamental flaw:he confuses easily have been made for the era of total quality with process improvement. Yes, the latter Quality management” (34). on the one hand, begets the former, but design defines quality. tQm has very little relevance in the service Lean techniques produce quality products and sector, so its ignominy drags Lean into the services faster and cheaper. one can define depths of ridicule because of the confusion both product and service in terms of quality between the two terms. on the other, Lean is (how good the service is for the price). Lean is hugely relevant in the service sector as well as interested only in the cost of quality (i.e., the in manufacturing. Keep in mind that manu­ amount of skill, material, and time required facturing consumes resources and materials to provide the service or make the product— to produce something, but services merely to create value, not determine it). consume. thus, Lean training and applica­ total Quality management (tQm) and Six tions take on different approaches for manu­ Sigma deal with managing the resultant quality facturing versus service, but, all in all, given a of a product and reducing product variability. process and a customer, one can apply Lean. Lean involves reducing process variability. think Colonel rinehart makes another provoca­ about it: Six Sigma is a program named after tive comment when he says, “But not everyone the quality capability of a process that yields a has forgotten tQm. As one retiring chief mas­

*the author is a manufacturing operations analyst with Lean Enterprise, Boeing Satellite Systems, El Segundo, California.

16

Merge-Schwalbe-R.indd 16 7/31/07 12:44:32 PM THE MERGE 17

ter sergeant recently put it, ‘I’ve been zero de­ to wake up and seriously smell the competi­ fected, total quality managed, micromanaged, tion. Consider the toyota Production System one-minute managed, synergized, had my para­ in terms of how it makes changes (the scien­ digms shifted, had my paradigms broken, and tific method that is just as important as the been told to decrease my habits to seven’ ” change itself) and how management and the (35). Notice that he never mentions Lean in workforce cooperate within a company. Pro­ this derisive statement. the only real para­ duction analysts of firms study, analyze, digm shift needed is the true commitment by fret over, and mimic toyota’s system but con­ executive management to get Lean, which is tinuously come up short. many blame this gap merely a commonsense way of eliminating on our cultural differences. to a degree this is waste from processes. For everyone else, the true; however, each individual—particularly paradigm shift consists of working and living those in power—can make daily choices that in a Lean environment, surrounded by perva­ will collectively close that gap. In the mean­ sive Lean thinking and a pursuit of process time, toyota has just displaced Chrysler as one perfection. of the Big three automakers (in terms of US Whenever I read articles or books about sales) and is gunning for Ford this year. Lean, certain key phrases indicate whether or hopefully, with the guidance and spirit of not the author has thoroughly considered the AFSo21, we will all learn how to avoid repeat­ principles or is merely parroting other works. ing the mistakes that have plagued previous For example, suppose someone suffers from a improvement initiatives. however, have we severe rash in three areas of his or her body. truly explained what Lean is and how it ap­ this person’s mission in life is to “maximize plies to the service sector? As a case in point, if value and minimize waste in [all] operations a series of tasks or planned activities produces [(processes)]” (34). therefore, to maximize a unique, deliverable item by a predetermined the quality of life, he or she selects two of the deadline, we call the event a project. As men­ three major rash areas and applies therapeu­ tioned before, Lean does not have a direct im­ tic ointment, thus attempting to minimize pact on a project. however, if a task within a waste but not eliminate it. this may sound like project is process-centric, then Lean can have picayune wordsmithing, but the array of in­ a direct impact on that task. this matters be­ accurate or misleading statements in the name cause, all too often, managers plan projects of Lean is one of the primary reasons that (to get something done) and try to infuse people disdain it. moreover, would our chief Lean at the same time. Lean has virtually no master sergeant mind living with the reduced effect on projects as a whole, so recklessly rash? those who tolerate unreasonable regu­ thrusting it on a project simply gives birth to lations do precisely that. Lean is the total ab­ more naysayers. Conversely, if managers focus sence of “irrashional” policies and regulations. Lean on a particular task that behaves like a “the Four Pillars of Partial Quality” section process, then it will have a direct impact. of of Colonel rinehart’s article seems a bit bi­ course, if a management team is setting up a zarre. I became exhausted just reading through production line or service operation, then what amounts to simply another unwitting Lean plays a significant role in establishing testimony that focusing on manufacturing- the strategy to get the most value for the least centric quality in a service environment merely amount of resource consumption. encourages inane behavior and produces most importantly, we must avoid confusing more fodder for Lean critics. Does not using a these three business strategies: quality pro­ wrench to drive a nail invite criticism? grams, project-management techniques, and Finally, Colonel rinehart demonstrates how Lean initiatives. rather, we should concen­ success blinded US companies to the need to trate on applying simple Lean principles on stay globally competitive. It is taking almost bona fide processes and maintain a balanced forever (over 50 years and counting) for execu­ focus on functionality and producibility (mak­ tive managers of most important companies ing things easier to build) during the design

Merge-Schwalbe-R.indd 17 7/31/07 12:44:33 PM 18 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

effort. Doing so will produce a dramatic drop rank and file about adjusting policies and di­ in the cost to get quality or more quality for rectives in order to eliminate unnecessary the price. So step back, take a deep breath, activities. q and persuade Air Force “management” to El Segundo, California agree to listen to recommendations from the

Merge-Schwalbe-R.indd 18 7/31/07 12:44:34 PM Staying in Touch

Col Stephen SChwalbe, phD, USaF*

he DeparTmenT of Defense(DOD) ficers? Currently, we have no mechanism in has not positioned itself to efficiently place to make that determination. The col and effectively exploit continuing leges within air University keep separate data personal relationships between its bases on international officers who have at militarTy officers and international officers. al tended in residence. however, they do not though the department spends millions of indicate the status of any relationships between dollars every year to encourage the develop them and their american classmates. Because ment of lifelong friendships among these in of the critical nature of foreign-language ca dividuals, it currently has no mechanism to pability, however, the air Force began con track such relationships. Given the current en ducting voluntary, servicewide surveys in 1996 vironment, having a “foreign-friendship” data to identify personnel with linguistic profi base of international officers who could pro ciency and recorded the results in the Foreign vide assistance during a crisis (from resolving Language Skills assessment (FLSa) database, the arrest of an airman to facilitating over resident on the virtual military personnel flight permission) would prove quite useful. Flight Web site. This information allows air ranD analyst William mcCoy Jr. concludes Force leaders to easily identify airmen who that “military officers believe that the primary have language training.5 The DOD and air reason the United States trains foreign military Force need a similar means of tracking volun personnel is to establish military-to-military tary data regarding active friendships with for relationships that may be useful in times of eign officers. crisis.”1 For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Because of his involvement with pakistan’s DOD oversaw the spending of $70 million for special forces during the Soviet invasion of af its International military education and Train ghanistan, pervez musharraf became close ing (ImeT) program, which involved over with many senior US military officers. When 10,000 foreign military students in the United musharraf seized power in pakistan in 1999, States.2 By establishing ImeT, Congress in pres. Bill Clinton called him to find out what tended to “encourage effective and mutually was going on. Instead of returning the call, beneficial relations . . . between the United musharraf contacted Gen anthony Zinni, States and foreign countries.”3 The program’s USmC, with whom he had worked during the objectives include developing “rapport, under Kargil war with India earlier that year.6 nu standing, and communication links” with stu merous examples, not all involving american dents likely to hold key positions in their home flag officers, clearly demonstrate the need to country’s government. The DOD, then, seeks institutionalize this information so the United to use ImeT as “an instrument of influence” States can fully exploit such relationships. by establishing foreign friendships with ameri Foreign officers or officials may offer assis can officers.4 tance purely of their own volition, partly based however, when a need arises, how would on the strength of their ties with the US offi DOD leadership determine which american cer. although these types of relationships are officers personally know particular foreign of probably common among senior officers in

*Colonel Schwalbe, now retired, formerly served as associate dean of distance learning and professor of international security studies, air War College, maxwell aFB, alabama.

19

Merge-Schwalbe-S.indd 19 7/31/07 12:45:03 PM 20 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the DOD, no one really knows enough about as such, it is the most appropriate organiza them to analyze and take advantage of them. tion to manage the proposed database. as a caveat, such a friendship database pro periodically, SaF/Ia could send out a task gram should not become the responsibility of ing to all air Force officers, asking them to the intelligence community even though it submit voluntary information about any on has a wealth of experience with this kind of going relationship with a foreign officer or offi information. nor should it come under the cial and to respond to a variety of questions purview of the Officeof Special Investigations, designed to evaluate the strength of their ties. a situation that might deter US officers from Similar to the numerical range utilized by the volunteering data about their foreign friend FLSa database, a “1” could represent infre ships. rather, responsibility should fall to the quent contact (e.g., only an annual holiday Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the season’s greeting), and a “5” could indicate air Force for International affairs (SaF/Ia), almost daily correspondence. Such informa which directs the service’s international pro tion would allow DOD leadership to commu grams, activities, and policies. That agency ful nicate with and request assistance from the fills its mission by managing the air Force’s appropriate US officers. security assistance, armaments cooperation, although SaF/Ia has contemplated estab and international programs (such as ImeT), lishing a foreign-friendship database for some and by conducting comparative weapons analy time, that officehas not applied the necessary ses. Working closely with many foreign offi resources. This article advocates the develop cials, SaF/Ia selects airmen to work in US ment and execution of such a repository as q embassies abroad as part of either the Defense soon as possible. attaché Office or Security assistance Office. Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes 1. William h. mcCoy Jr., Senegal and Liberia: Case 4. Ibid. Studies in U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal 5. Unfortunately, the database is not comprehensive, Defense and Development, ranD note (Santa monica, storing information offered voluntarily by only active duty Ca: ranD, 1994), 3. airmen (not those in the Guard or reserve). See the vir 2. actually ImeT receives its funding from the De tual military personnel Flight Web site at http://wwa.afpc partment of State’s international-affairs budget. .randolph.af.mil/vs. 3. “International military education and Training 6. “pervez musharraf,” http://pervez.musharraf.net/ (ImeT),” FAS: Federation of American Scientists, http:// pervez_musharraf.htm. www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/ImeT2.html.

Merge-Schwalbe-S.indd 20 7/31/07 12:45:03 PM Reply to “Maj Gen William ‘Billy’ Mitchell: A Pyrrhic Promotion”

Lt CoL DonaLD G. Rehkopf JR., USafR*

t CoL WiLLiam J. ott’s “maj Gen right to vote in some states, among other legal William ‘Billy’ mitchell: a Pyrrhic restrictions—would have a building at a ser­ Promotion” (Winter 2006) is a well- vice academy named after him. after all, does researched, balanced, timely article, that not amount to rewarding crime in gen­ Lbut does it go far enough in relating a mean­ eral and insubordination in particular? in­ ingful message to readers of the professional deed, in 2005 the former judge advocate gen­ journal of the air Force? in today’s “zero­ eral of the air Force, a major general, was tolerance” service, mitchell’s conviction by relieved of his duties, punished under article general court-martial would have doomed 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and more than his career. His subsequent resigna­ “retired” at the grade of colonel.1 How could tion would have been approved—but under an intellectually honest officer support a be­ “other than honorable” conditions. Even had lated promotion for mitchell—validly denied he not resigned and had a benevolent chain him while on active duty, as Colonel ott aptly of command allowed him to remain, he would demonstrates—yet at the same time support have received (a) a referral officer perfor­ (or even just live with) a zero-tolerance stan­ mance report (further damaging his career), dard for our current officer corps? (b) an unfavorable information file,and prob­ But this is not an either/or dichotomy. En­ ably (c) a special security file, which would sign Chester Nimitz’s conviction by general have revoked (at least temporarily) any secu­ court-martial for dereliction of duty occurred rity clearance/access he might have had. ab­ at the beginning of his illustrious career, but, sent a pardon, no one in today’s air Force although it placed a bump therein, this set­ would (or could, if he or she valued his or her back obviously did not prevent him from ulti­ career in the “judgment” category) support a mately becoming admiral of the Navy. Like subsequent promotion. indeed, today mitchell mitchell’s, Nimitz’s career probably would not also would almost certainly face a “grade de­ have survived in today’s military either. Com­ termination” by the secretary of the air Force pared to mitchell’s conviction, however, Nimitz’s prior to acceptance of his resignation or ap­ does demonstrate the value of “individualized proval of his retirement. justice” and the need for placing such matters i point this out, not because i advocate low­ in the perspective of the service. thus, al­ ering the standards expected of officersbut to though we may have our own opinions about put things into context. Regardless of mitchell’s the propriety of legislation that authorizes accomplishments, both in combat and in the mitchell’s promotion, Colonel ott’s article development of air doctrine, it is simply in­ serves a vital purpose in both educating read­ conceivable today that a man convicted under ers about this issue and demonstrating that a general court-martial—who would lose his “honoring” our heroes involves more than a

*the author is presently assigned to the inactive Ready Reserve. He previously served on active duty for fiveyears and as an individual mobilization augmentee for 21 years as an assistant staff judge advocate.

21

Merge-Rehkopf.indd 21 7/31/07 12:44:03 PM 22 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

successful public-relations campaign in Con­ Note gress. We can only hope that the people 1. air Force Print News, “aF’s Former top military Law­ charged with giving advice in this matter take yer to Retire in Reduced Rank,” 10 January 2005, Air Force into account the ramifications of their Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123009569 (accessed 8 march 2007). recommendations. q Rochester, New York

Merge-Rehkopf.indd 22 7/31/07 12:44:04 PM The “Hyphenated Airman” Some Observations on Service Culture

Lt CoL D. RobeRt “bob” PoynoR, USAF, RetiReD*

hen I entered the Air Force American,” is just part of the background noise in the early 1970s, I could relate in contemporary American society, especially to my job on several levels. First, for those who grew up from the latter 1980s on­ I was an Airman, part of a mili­ ward when this phenomenon became preva­ Wtary service with a proud and powerful, yet lent. having been raised in it and absorbed it, short, history. Second, I was part of Strategic many young Airmen feel at ease identifying with Air Command, Gen Curtis LeMay’s formidable groups. however, tribalism can be anathema to shield that protected America from the com­ military culture. In order to explain why this is mie horde. third, I was a missileer, a trigger an issue within the service, we must first look at puller in a job with little tolerance for error. how and why this phenomenon appears in so­ Finally, I identifiedwith my squadron; we were ciety. (What follows is a thumbnail summary the “Odd Squad,” with a different weapon sys­ gleaned from numerous readings. readers may tem than the other three squadrons in the disagree with my viewpoint.) wing, a situation that lent itself to an unusual Multicultural tribalism is a contemporary degree of camaraderie. manifestation of cultural Marxism, which in its this self-identification on several levels is not original model consciously sought to delegitimize unusual. Within any given population, a common and eventually destroy capitalist Western society. identity will arise with which the group identifies. One key method entails chiseling away at national this cultural identity serves to bind its members cohesion by fostering divisions among the popu­ together and is part of normal socialization. lation. Initially this division followed classic Marx­ there’s nothing intrinsically bad about any of ism by emphasizing economic differences; more this—again, it’s quite normal behavior. recently, it has expanded to include other crite­ Problems can emerge when people identify ria, most notably race, gender, and ethnicity. em­ themselves too strongly with one of the lower- phasizing differences between tribes thus be­ level identities at the expense of a larger group comes politically useful since achieving national identity—a phenomenon called “tribalism.” I consensus becomes more difficult. Closely allied believe that tribalism in the Air Force—identi­ with tribalism is the process of establishing the fication with one’s career field—has recently political value of grievances against the “domi­ become too strong and in fact interferes with nant culture”—usually interpreted in the United the average Airman’s ability to identify with the States as white, male, and Christian. this victim­ overarching Air Force culture and mission. Ar­ hood seeks redress of perceived grievances of the guably, this also may have deleterious effects past through mandatory restructuring of society, when it comes to thinking about war fighting. usually through proportional representation Many younger Airmen don’t see anything (i.e., quotas) of “oppressed” groups. this ap­ wrong with their embrace of tribalism within proachattackstheclassicliberalnotionofachieve­ the service. After all, multicultural tribalism, ment through merit and emphasizes equality of which in our society results in the “hyphenated outcomes, not opportunity.1 It also erodes confi­

*Mr. Poynor is a military doctrine analyst at the Air Force doctrine development and education Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. he is the editor of Air Force doctrine document (AFdd) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, and AFdd 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April 2007.

23

Merge-Poynor.indd 23 7/31/07 12:43:19 PM 24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

dence in the nation to govern fairly, thus aiding the Air Force shifted to “air and space power,” the goal of delegitimization.2 supposedly (in classic multicultural language) how does this admittedly dense foray into so­ to “acknowledge the inherent differences in cial politics affect the Air Force? Airmen are prod­ the two media and the associated technical and ucts of the culture in which they were raised; thus, policy-related realities.”4 the Air Force now they unconsciously bring with them into the ser­ talks about “Air, Space, and Cyberspace.”5 vice some of the background social issues they’ve these changes have implications for how absorbed, so identification with a tribe in the Airmen think about applying their capabilities. form of a career field doesn’t seem unusual. Of all the services, only the Air Force lacks an this is exacerbated by dramatic changes in organic-employment paradigm in which its forces career-field demographics that have occurred function in some sort of combined-arms model. since the Air Force’s inception. When the Air Instead, we tailor our force packages and provide Force was established, its main mission was fly­ them to the joint force commander through a ing. every Air Force base had a runway, and the joint force air component commander. even so, service had literally thousands of aircraft of all the Air Force is trending toward functional stove- types. Because no one was very far from “the piping in organization and employment. US sound of freedom” coming off the ramp, every­ transportation Command centrally manages one could easily relate to the unofficial Air Force intertheater air mobility, the latter represented mission of flying and fighting. Since those early in-theater by a director of air mobility forces; days, however, the number of aircraft has de­ similarly, US Strategic Command centrally man­ clined dramatically as each platform became ages space capabilities, represented by a director more effective. Also, as technology expanded, of space forces. In emerging discussions about entirely new career fields grew up, most notice­ cyberspace, some people have suggested centrally ably space- and information-related specialties, managing all cyberspace forces and perhaps pre­ as well as other increasingly sophisticated sup­ senting them through a director of cyberspace port functions. thus, over the past few decades, forces. I recently read a suggestion for a “director fewer and fewer Airmen related directly to flying of unmanned aerial systems” to represent that operations, and the number of pilots, who com­ community (admittedly, I’m not sure about the prise our warrior class and previously held most seriousness of that last suggestion). I have also re­ leadership positions, dropped correspondingly. viewed a proposal from the other services’ Aggravating this picture is the Air Force’s medical communities to create their own US tendency to identify with technology instead of Medical Command (strongly resisted by the Air a unifying theory of war and to organize in Force’s medical community). In each instance, a peacetime around technological stovepipes.3 functional stovepipe is forming to optimize some Airlifters identify themselves with Air Mobility aspect of operations and organization. Command, fighter pilots with Air Combat Another occasionally heard argument sup­ Command, space personnel with Air Force porting some of this stovepiping concerns the Space Command, and so forth. however, the complaint that “pilots don’t understand what Air Force’s war-fighting organization is the air we can do”—the in-service manifestation of and space expeditionary task force, comprised the victimhood meme mentioned previously of forces tailored for a specific mission. Appar­ as another aspect of cultural Marxism. It has ently, the Air Force begins thinking in terms no place in the Air Force, but the fact that it of something approaching a combined-arms comes up at all offers another indication of how model only when it actually goes to war. deeply those entering the service have inter­ Arguably, the service’s changing view of it­ nalized the hyphenated-American model. self has not helped. For most of its early exis­ An unfortunate consequence of these tribal tence, we talked of “airpower.” Around the arrangements is that these stovepiped capabili­ 1990s, we expanded the vision to “aerospace ties, with their associated command and con­ power” in recognition of the increasing value trol, may be severable from the commander of of space and, later, information power. In 2001 Air Force forces (COMAFFOr) and plugged

Merge-Poynor.indd 24 7/31/07 12:43:19 PM THE MERGE 25

anywhere into a joint force. this presents the veniently links to its new mission statement, possibility of a lack of unity of command of Air defining airpower as “the synergistic applica­ Force capabilities because they could be penny­ tion of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities packeted out across a joint force, leaving the to project global strategic military power.”6 COMAFFOr with only regionally based, fixed- this is a case of one step forward, two steps wing strike forces. It amounts to optimization back. By explicitly linking the definitionof air- at the tribal level at the expense of the larger power to the three domains of the mission institution. this profound challenge to how statement, the Air Force again identifies itself the Air Force organizes and presents forces is with technological stovepipes—and in terms happening without the institutional scrutiny I of a very contemporary view. believe it warrants. I suggest that the Air Force devise a defini­ A key part of solving the Air Force’s frac­ tion of airpower that encompasses the broad tured self-vision involves a conscious return to concepts which underpinned the original ra­ a unifying concept about what the service of­ tionale for a separate service—something along fers to the nation. Instead of stringing more the lines of “exploitation of the vertical dimen­ and more adjectives together (i.e., air, space, sion of the operational environment to lever­ and now cyberspace), we should return to age elevation, speed, range, and transparency simply “airpower” and define it as something to project national power at long ranges and more unitary. In short we must stop institu­ on short notice.” Such a definition should ex­ tionalizing tribalism by offering an easily grasped plain what Airmen do as well as how and why vision that binds all Airmen together. they apply military power. Arguably more time­ (I’m not saying that all tribalism is bad. At less than something that speaks in terms of cur­ the micro level, identification with a unit is cer­ rent trendiness, it should not tie itself to the tainly healthy, especially in combat forces, for technological solution of the moment. building esprit and fostering teamwork. I see Before the Civil War, people thought of the the problem at the macro level, when Airmen United States as a collection of separate entities— try to articulate what airpower presents. too “the United States are. . . .” After the war, the per­ frequently, tribalism gets in the way.) ception changed to a unitary whole—“the United In fact, the Air Force is investigating such a States is. . . .” the question for the Air Force be­ unitary model in the current revision of its basic­ comes whether we are a collection of tribes or doctrine publication. however, the service ap­ some unitary whole—Airmen. If the latter, what is q pears on the cusp of taking the expedient path the overarching expression of our identity? with a proposed airpower definition that con- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes 1. One should not confuse the philosophical notion archives_roll/2002_04-06/fonte_ideological/fonte_ideo of classical liberalism (with a small “l”) with the current logical.html. political manifestation of Liberalism (with a capital “L”). 3. See Carl h. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Classic liberalism stresses “the importance of human ratio­ Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force nality, individual property rights, natural rights, the protec­ (new Brunswick, nJ: transaction Publishers, 1994). tion of civil liberties, constitutional limitations of govern­ 4. “terminology,” Doctrine Watch, no. 18 (15 August ment, free markets, and individual freedom from restraint.” 2002), https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/ Cultural Marxism has co-opted the contemporary usage of doctrineWatch/dWArchive.pdf. Liberalism into the opposite of its original meaning—“a revival of the very policies of state intervention and pater­ 5. Gen t. Michael Moseley and Michael W. Wynne, nalism against which classical liberalism fought.” Wikipedia: “SeCAF/CSAF Letter to Airmen: Mission Statement,” 7 The Free Encyclopedia, s.v., “Classical Liberalism,” http:// december 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_liberalism. jvp.asp?id=192. 2. For example, see a summary of John Fonte’s article 6. Based on discussion during the current revision of “the Ideological War within the West” at American Diplo­ Air Force doctrine document (AFdd) 1, Air Force Basic macy, 10 June 2002, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/ Doctrine, 17 november 2003.

Merge-Poynor.indd 25 7/31/07 12:43:20 PM The Sputnik Legacy 50 Years in Retrospect

Lt CoL John E. Shaw, USaF

or its small size, the metal sphere that to the american public, the soviets could hardly hurtled into Earth orbit 50 years ago on 4 object to later overflights of their own territory by october 1957 has had an extraordinarily Us satellites. this de facto resolution of the over­ large influence on human events. sputnik flight problem worked to american advantage as time Fproduced the immediate effect of great pride for wore on since spaceborne assets became the most the soviet Union and great embarrassment for the reliable and effective capability for collecting intel­ United states. the communist nation supposedly ligence on the increasingly hermetic soviet Union. so far behind the Western allies had shown the But today, from our vantage point of 50 years, world the formidable nature of its technology and, perhaps the most significant effect of sputnik in­ therefore (by the logic of the day), its ideology. Nei­ volved not what it led the superpowers to do but ther could anyone escape the reality that, now, no what it distracted them from—specifically, direct part of the United states lay beyond the reach of conventional or even nuclear confrontation. the soviet missiles. soviet satellite kicked off what we might call the as the immediate shockwave of sputnik dissi­ “Great space War.” With the race for the moon, the pated, however, the longer-term effects, ironically, subsequent dueling of spy satellites and space sta­ began to run counter to soviet expectations and in­ tions, and the culmination in confrontations over terests. First, in the tradition of the Uss Maine, the the strategic Defense initiative, this became a form rms Lusitania, and the Uss Arizona (and, of course, of surrogate warfare in the Cold War era—a stage the broader attack on Pearl Harbor), the iconic on which the superpowers could pit resources, “vessel” named sputnik galvanized american will and enhanced determination—political, technological, ideologies, and wills against each other in a man­ and cultural—to settle for nothing short of victory in ner far less deadly than open warfare. space. the first “victory” campaign there came to be as we look back at sputnik’s legacy, we can rea­ defined—through implicit agreement between the sonably ask what will take the form of the next superpowers by their resource commitments and fo­ “sputnik” in the medium of space. What event will cused efforts—by the race for the moon, ultimately produce a similar galvanizing of will and focusing won by the United states in 1969 but contested up to of effort on the part of Us national-security space the very last by the soviet Union. efforts? Will an announced Chinese lunar (or pos­ second, sputnik resolved the simmering issue sibly martian) mission or even a “space Pearl Har­ of satellite overflight. Could satellites pass over na­ bor” that devastates Us space capabilities become tions unopposed whereas aircraft could not? the the next catalyst for a discontinuous leap in effort, soviets’ haste to beat the americans into space with focus, and capabilities? the lessons of sputnik— sputnik settled the issue before it could even be­ the firstsalvo firedin the human attempt to exploit come a matter of significant dispute. Having boasted the space medium—remain relevant as we seek to of sputnik, which passed over the United states sev­ chart the proper course for the control and exploi­ eral times a day and even became visible at twilight tation of the ultimate high ground. q

To Learn More . . . Dickson, Paul. Sputnik: The Shock of the Century. New York: Walker and Co., 2001. mcDougall, Walter a. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

26

Vignette-Shaw.indd 26 7/31/07 12:50:54 PM APJ

Editor’s Note: pIrep is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.

A New Form of Air Warfare

Lt tim Larribau, French air Force*

n 11 September 2001 (9/11), nontechnological, but nonetheless effective, four American commercial airliners threat. However, we can consider the 9/11 at were hijacked by 19 fanatical mus tack not only from the terrorist perspective lim terrorists. three of the planes but also from an air-warfare perspective. Con Ohit the twin towers of the World trade Center sidering the attacks in this manner, we must in new York City and the pentagon in Wash acknowledge that the principles of aerial war ington, DC. the fourth crashed in the penn fare remain a forceful reality and that, as in sylvania countryside. everyone remembers the 1918, we must start by winning the air war in dreadful images of this new form of warfare order to have hope of prevailing on the that has locked the world in a gruesome fight ground, even if the air war has taken an unex against a very inventive breed of international pected turn. terrorists. many people have commented about the tragic events of 9/11. According to one wide Indirect Air Superiority spread idea, Western-style warfare, based largely On 9/11, most journalists and commenta on aviation, space, and high technology, is no tors saw only the human tragedy that was oc longer effective against these new threats. In curring and perceived few of the reactions it fantrymen and other ground-minded soldiers would trigger. However, some people spoke of can indeed find attractive the idea of going airliners transformed into manned flying back to a more traditional style of warfare bombs. For military aviators, this notion has a based on human intelligence and close com heavy meaning. It is indeed from this perspec bat with an enemy smart enough simply to re tive that we must consider the 9/11 attacks. fuse to engage in Western-style warfare. this Unable to launch conventional military idea relegates air forces and airmen to a sup weapons against their targets, the terrorists porting role in the broadest sense of that term, commandeered commercial airliners, camou bringing to the forefront the personal quali flaged as disoriented civil aircraft until the ties of infantrymen who will confront this new point of impact. Apart from the fact that they

*the author, who trains French Air Force reservists in bordeaux, France, formerly served as an aide to the French Joint Chief of Staff for Operational planning at Creil, France.

27

PIREP-Larribau.indd 27 7/31/07 12:46:50 PM 28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

were indeed civilian airliners filled with pas cially the Israeli Air Force help maintain and sengers, we must understand that the terror renew this status. Furthermore, since russia ists succeeded in flying four powerful bombs and China do not represent severe threats, no in US airspace and that three of them reached entity today possesses sufficient aerial and mili their designated targets unimpeded by Ameri tary means to challenge America’s airpower. cans. the power of these bombs derived from Any terrorist group or rogue state, therefore, the aircraft’s impact speed and fuel capacity. can use aerial hijacking quite effectively as an burning aviation fuel attains temperatures of asymmetrical mode of action. several thousand degrees, lethal for any infra structure or building, let alone human beings. the hijacking of the airplanes, the time it The Military Challenge took authorities to understand that a serious problem existed, and the absence of proce of Hijacking dures for handling this situation generated a therefore we must no longer view the hi particularly strong sense of surprise. even if jacking problem as only a terrorist action that they had known of a terrorist attack within concerns the civilian population but as a di their airspace, Americans could not imagine rect assault on the air superiority we claim to its nature and therefore could not adapt and keep over our skies and air routes. A hijacker respond adequately. seeks to seize air superiority in a temporary In terms of air warfare, the first lesson but irreparable way, and we must vigorously learned concerns the fact that Americans really oppose this seizure of control, regardless of did temporarily lose air superiority, with tragic the hijacker’s ultimate intentions. to the ex consequences. During several dozen minutes, tent that hijackings take on a military dimen the US military and civilian air authorities sion, the Air Force should undoubtedly think found themselves in a state of uncertainty and, about the problem and work with police and at best, in an inadequate defensive posture. homeland-security services to provide authori Just a momentary loss of air superiority proved ties with adequate solutions and procedures. enough to cause terrible losses. because each civil aircraft is susceptible to A dear concept to airmen (often accused of becoming a piloted bomb, the struggle for air dogmatism on this matter), air superiority superiority begins very early with passenger therefore remains the decisive element of control and close monitoring of airline com large-scale military action, even if it must con front heretofore unexpected aspects. Air su panies, airport zones, and the companies and periority assumes more importance than ever people who work at airports. Airline flight as we now recognize some nonmilitary, indi crews must also become more than mere pi rect ways of challenging an enemy’s airpower. lots and flightattendants. they must be cogni these insidious new ways no longer require a zant of the military dimension of hijacking. large-scale aerial confrontation, as in the battle perhaps we must also modify the recruitment of britain, but lend themselves perfectly to and training of flight crews to incorporate a asymmetric conflicts. true military-defense aspect aboard airliners. today everyone accepts the fact that since most transatlantic vessels of the seventeenth and the end of the Cold War, the airpower of West eighteenth centuries carried companies of ern countries—first of all, that of the United soldiers—ancestors of modern-day marines— States—remains impervious to any challenge in charge of police duties on board the ship by a conventional strategy and sizable air and of its military defense in case of attack. force. the United States possesses extensive these vessels also carried enough weapons and aerial experience and pursues sustained tech munitions to enable the sailors themselves to nical and doctrinal developments in this field. participate in the defense of their ships. Like Its alliances and military cooperation with the wise, airline flightcrews must be able to mount north Atlantic treaty Organization and espe a coherent response to a hijacker’s attack.

PIREP-Larribau.indd 28 7/31/07 12:46:50 PM PIREP 29

Obviously, nothing can absolutely prevent superiority. If we lose it, we must spare no sac a well-prepared terrorist group from taking rificeor effort to recover it. the battle of brit control of an aircraft. religious conviction or ain, the Yom Kippur War, and 9/11 all show ideological fanaticism, coupled with lengthy the necessity of maintaining air superiority at paramilitary training and meticulous military any cost. preparation of the operation, can produce a level of efficiency that will prove hard to counter with only flightcrews and technical personnel Significance of the 9/11 instead of security professionals. We have in Target Selection deed considered placing armed and trained security agents, such as police officers or mar Once they had acquired freedom of action shals, on board, but this solution alone will in American airspace, the terrorists executed not suffice.For terrorists, the presence of a se their prepared plan of simultaneously attack curity agent represents nothing more than an ing four targets on the US east coast. the additional factor to integrate into attack plan choice of these targets gives food for thought ning, and they can certainly envision counter in that it corresponds to familiar concepts of measures to the agent’s predictable reaction. Western air strategy. the first two aircraft hit the key to resisting an airplane hijacking the twin towers of the World trade Center— lies in gaining time and multiplying obstacles business buildings that housed numerous that can delay hijackers who attempt to seize banks and financial enterprises. Located in control of aircraft. reorganizing duties inside the business district of new York City, America’s the aircraft by pairs, small groups, and, finally, economic and financial capital, the towers were by the entire commercial flight crew should surrounded by hundreds of similar structures, permit personnel to implement a graduated not far from Wall Street’s famous new York series of specific procedures and responses to Stock exchange, which exerts a leading influ provide enough time to inform authorities ence on Western and world economies. about events and take at least elementary mea the third plane hit the pentagon, the huge, sures in coordination with competent authori legendary military complex that holds the De ties. A recurring series of obstacles, both human partment of Defense; Joint Chiefs of Staff; and procedural, becomes equally dissuasive headquarters of the US Air Force, navy, Army, because it forces assailants to lengthen their marine Corps, and Coast Guard; and hun preparation time and multiplies their risks. Sadly, we must also anticipate the case in dreds of departments and operations centers which hijackers still manage to take control of essential to the leadership and management an aircraft in flight. the lessons of 9/11 leave of the US armed forces as well as the defense very few choices about which course of action of US interests worldwide. to take. even the temporary loss of air superi many people have speculated that the fourth ority can have dreadful consequences on plane, which crashed in the pennsylvania many levels. Hijackers must never enjoy free countryside, targeted either the White House dom of action in the air, no matter their inten or the Capitol in Washington, DC. the for tions. because of the very short response time, mer, the American equivalent of the French we must put rapid procedures in place either palais de l’elysée, is the home and workplace to force the plane to land as quickly as possi of the president of the United States—head of ble or simply to shoot it down. this way of the federal government, responsible for na thinking does not give much priority to pas tional defense and foreign affairs, among senger life and well-being, but we must not al other things. the White House therefore houses low an uncontrolled or hijacked airplane to the highest-level American policy maker. the fly at will in our skies. parliament building of American politics, the In the case of aircraft hijacking, as in con Capitol contains the House of representatives ventional warfare, we must gain and keep air and the Senate—two chambers that represent

PIREP-Larribau.indd 29 7/31/07 12:46:50 PM 30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the American people, charged with control terrorism. previously, terrorist attacks could ling government actions and legislation. be characterized as either publicity stunts for We could easily add the initial victim of the the benefit of the news media or very limited attacks as a fourth target—the population. by intimidation operations. the events of 9/11, definition, terrorism assaults civilian popula though, featured acts of war with strategic tions to create fear and lead to actions guided aims, and those in madrid only confirm this by fear. Although no aircraft specifically tar new kind of terrorist action. geted residential areas, the terrorists obviously planned to inflict a massive human toll. In sum the terrorists took aim at (1) the eco The Limits nomic structure of the United States and per Despite its tactical success and the shock it haps world commerce, (2) the military leader induced in world opinion, the 9/11 attack ship, (3) the political organization, and (4) yielded only very limited long-term results. Al the civilian population. though often compared in its suddenness and thus partitioned, this target list resembles death toll to the Japanese attack on pearl Har not only the classifications designated by sev bor in 1941, 9/11 differed in some major ways. eral air strategists, but also some events in the history of air warfare. the first to write about Out of the 300 aircraft that hit pearl Harbor, the psychological effects of subjecting civilian the Japanese lost only 29, which means that populations and large cities to strategic bomb the main tool of the attack emerged nearly ing, Italian general Giulio Douhet asserted unscathed and could, eventually, renew the as that massive, murderous air attacks on the ci sault or conduct another relatively soon after vilian population could shake the democratic wards. From a human point of view, the Japa legitimacy of a government. During World War nese naval airmen returned to their carriers II, the Germans applied this theory against cit fortified with new experience, ready to fight ies in Great britain, as did the british against again in other battles and thus sustain the German cities—although the two events failed long-term war effort. Only the absence of stra to prove the theory because neither produced tegic vision on the part of the Japanese mili the intended destabilizing effect. tary leaders prevented them from better ex Consequently, we could deem the action ploiting their initial success. against the civilian population perhaps the Conversely, the 9/11 terrorists chose a least pertinent of the 9/11 scenarios; however, course of action that definitively precluded this case does not reflect a classic air attack any renewal of the attack. their conquest of but a terrorist assault by aerial means. With freedom of action in American airspace was as the train bombings of march 2004 in madrid, brief as it was sudden, and the aircraft selected Spain, we saw how terrorism can have a desta for the attacks were destroyed. Furthermore, bilizing effect on a nation’s democratic life if the attack systematically killed the hijackers, it occurs during an electoral period. An attack who obviously could no longer profit from on the scale of 9/11 during such a time could their training, experience, and motivation. Al- directly affect democracy and, therefore, a Qaeda thus lost the time invested in their re nation’s policy. cruiting, training, and infiltration.t he terror the choice of the three other targets clearly ist organization’s leaders therefore had to relates to the doctrine of strategic paralysis forgo the services of these highly qualified and systems analysis of an enemy. A larger- personnel and begin the recruiting and train scale, successful strategic attack on a nation’s ing cycle anew. economic structure as well as military and po A military operation, whether for informa litical leadership can deeply transform the na tion collection or combat, undeniably gains ture of a conflict. the terrorists’ clear intent to quality and usefulness if it survives intact as a decapitate the United States politically, mili unit and participates in a coherent series of tarily, and economically heralded a new era in diverse operations that can perpetuate its suc

PIREP-Larribau.indd 30 7/31/07 12:46:51 PM PIREP 31

cess. therefore, after pearl Harbor, the Japa ing and surprising conventional airpower. nese could envision a landing on the Hawai Asymmetrical confrontation is a relatively new ian Islands or any other exploitation of their notion in military strategy. the traditional tactical success that would certainly have made military forces of the great powers attained the pacific war much more difficult for the very high levels of competence as a conse United States. the tactical success of a suicide quence of successive conflicts in the nine terrorist attack carries within itself the seeds of teenth century, the two world wars, and the strategic defeat because the motivation, train indirect confrontations of the Cold War. this ing, specialized intelligence, and courage of military strength obliged weaker nations or the terrorist are lost, along with the surprise organizations to avoid direct, traditional con effect of his attack. Loss of motivation and frontations that would quickly sweep them training is compounded by the absence of ex away. terrorism against civilians and gaps in perience brought back and shared with the military capabilities, guerilla warfare, black organization, which harms the terrorists’ cause markets, and illegal trafficking therefore rep over the long term. resent modes of action that evade traditional target selection for 9/11 may have seemed military power that has proven too ponderous impressive since the terrorists eschewed sub to respond adequately. the principle of pro way stations or parking lots in favor of ele portional response to attacks, contained in the ments essential to the functioning of their ad rules of legitimate defense, also forbids dis versary; however, target selection actually proportionate military reactions. moreover, the reflected a certain naïveté because all the tar perpetrators of these asymmetric attacks are gets were only links in a global system, and generally civilians hidden among the civilian their destruction would not have brought population as well as the social and economic down the whole system. the US defense estab fabric of a society, a situation that demands lishment is not entirely centralized inside the perfectly targeted and measured military reac pentagon, and other command centers could tions to avoid disastrous collateral damage. no doubt have maintained the continuity of the wars of decolonization during the sec American defense. Likewise, a successful at ond half of the twentieth century show clearly the difficulty of countering these new modes tack on the White House or Capitol would not of action, especially when they are associated have brought down the government because with determined political action or, as in the constitutional procedures fill the gap left by a Vietnam War, if they blend with conventional deceased president or members of Congress. military actions. the Vietminh’s ability to lead Finally, destruction of the World trade Center an exhausting and psychologically unsustain would not cause the infinitely complex US able guerilla war while knowing how to inflict and world economic structures to collapse. classical military defeats at opportune mo However, we must not overlook the negative ments contributed significantlyto French and effect of these attacks on the world economy American defeats. Asymmetric conflicts be or even on the US economy. In terms of eco come very dangerous when, guided by a stra nomics, air transportation clearly suffered the tegic vision and a well-defined policy, they most from these attacks. cause sustained destabilization through con ventional and nonconventional courses of ac Understanding the Emergence tion. therefore, asymmetric warfare poses a substantial challenge to conventional forces, of Asymmetric Threats who must adapt to these new hit-and-run war in Air Warfare fare methods without giving up the full range of their conventional capabilities. the events of 9/11 therefore mark the In aviation terms, asymmetrical threats are emergence in air-warfare strategy of a form of quite new. Hijacking and short-range attacks asymmetrical confrontation that allows elud by surface-to-air missiles against civilian air

PIREP-Larribau.indd 31 7/31/07 12:46:51 PM 32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

craft offer only a glimpse of the potential ways Conclusion paramilitary groups might affect aviation. to day, our reactions to these predictable or po these new modes of asymmetrical war have tential asymmetrical uses of aviation are at not rendered air warfare obsolete, but we best vague and clumsy. the systematic barring must adapt and find new asymmetric courses of certain objects such as nail clippers or Swiss of action that transcend traditional airpower Army knives, while ordinary nylon string, thought. We no longer need sustained air su pens, or credit cards might prove more dan periority to conduct significant air wars, but gerous, betrays a degree of feverishness among losing control of the sky, even for a few min public authorities, who remain in a frightened utes, can have terrible consequences. more defensive stance. Similarly, the restrictive se than a question of techniques or means, we curity measures that France imposed on lei must augment known doctrines with a differ sure and commuter airlines in the last few ent approach to air warfare, and we must study years might appear excessive, showing that it that new approach and understand it as ter does not have a clear understanding of the rorism reaches a truly strategic level. threats. Civil, military, industrial, and leisure aviation authorities should make a serious ef because we obviously do not yet fully grasp fort to find a new asymmetric approach to air these new facts, the Western powers remain in warfare and to counter possible threats from a defensive posture that is as uncomfortable the air. national defense, according to the for air passengers and airlines as it is for the French Constitution of 1958, remains the con authorities. However, we must react quickly cern of all citizens, and now more than ever, and effectively by regaining not only the initia every aviator—whether professional or ama tive but also an even more complete mastery teur—must embrace the role of air and terri of the skies, as well as the use of yet unknown torial defense by aerial means. means to maintain air superiority. q

The Air Force executes a global mission. Our approaches to opera­ tions, interoperability and training exemplify our global, interna­ tional perspective. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

PIREP-Larribau.indd 32 7/31/07 12:46:51 PM The Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea Defending Costa Rican Sovereignty

Mario E. ovErall*

video on the popular YouTube the Civil Guard, which, over the years, trans Web site shows a dramatic scene in formed itself into today’s Public Security which paramedics give first aid to Force, controlled by the Ministry of Public Se the inhabitants of an unspecified curity and composed of various services, in Aregion affected by floods and landslides. Be cluding the Counterdrug Police, national low, very discreetly, a Mcdonnell douglas Coast Guard, Public Force Reserve, and, obvi Md‑500 helicopter with its motor running ously, the SvA, worthy successor to the former waits for the sick who need transportation to a Costa Rican air force. better‑equipped aid station. Suddenly, the pic For its part (and according to constitutional ture changes, showing us people in a Piper mandate), the SvA’s mission involves support PA‑31 lowering someone on a stretcher, com ing the other services of the Public Force in plete with an intravenous bottle. images fol preserving internal order in the country, pri low one after another, accompanied by the marily through surveillance efforts and tactical/ classic Beatles song “Let it Be.” the same logistical transport, in addition to the public‑ Md‑500 flies over flooded areas; a versatile relations outreach missions previously dis Cessna Soloy U206G transports sick children; cussed. however, that mandate also delegates refugees surround pilots in olive‑drab flight to the Public Force (hence to the SvA) the suits, posing for a photo; and so forth. Finally, protection of national sovereignty, practically the wings and emblem of the Servicio de vigi converting them into an army and air force, lancia Aérea (Air vigilance Service) (SvA) of despite how much these institutions pride the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security ap themselves on not being such things. pear just below the word Thanks! 1 Military terminology and organizational this video represents perhaps the latest il structures do not exist in entities under the lustration of how the SvA tries to project its authority of the Public Force, and one can image as a part of the Fuerza Pública (Public even find a department of human resources Force), fully engaged in support during disas in their organizational charts, along with a ter situations and utterly dedicated to helping lengthy list of directorates and secretariats in the population. nevertheless, aside from this the best national‑government style. Regard moving footage, a closer inspection permits less, both the Public Force and SvA undeni the discerning eye to realize that the SvA’s ably have the capacity, as well as the requisite functions go much farther—up to the point of equipment and training, to undertake military‑ crossing the thin line that separates a humani style operations. in fact, in the late 1980s, the tarian entity from a formally established air arm. SvA managed to operate two armed Cessna one of the oldest democracies in the re o‑2As in an efficient manner along the ni gion, Costa Rica abolished its army on 1 decem caraguan border area in response to the ber 1949 after undergoing a revolution that conflict that counterrevolutionary guerrillas reformed the nation’s structure. thereafter, then waged against the Sandanista govern internal security became the responsibility of ment of nicaragua.

*the author is Webmaster of the Latin American Aviation historical Society, Guatemala (http://www.laahs.com).

33

PIREP-Overall.indd 33 7/31/07 12:47:44 PM 34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the SvA’s current aircraft inventory, sta But it is precisely in these types of antidrug tioned at Juan Santamaría international Air operations that the SvA has shown its sharp port and tobías Bolaños international Air teeth. Since 2004 the service has maintained port, consists of two Mcdonnell douglas an airmobile quick‑reaction team known as Md‑500e helicopters (tail numbers MSP012 the “Seals,” consisting of police officers spe and MSP018), three Cessna Soloy U206G cially trained to perform operations to inter light aircraft (tail numbers MSP004, MSP005, cept and capture aircraft as well as boats in and MSP006), a Cessna t210n (tail number volved in illegal activities, using primarily the MSP009), a Cessna 210 (tail number MSP010), SvA’s two Md‑500es configured for assault and two twin‑engine Piper PA‑31s (tail num transport. in this sense, the SvA works very bers MSP003 and MSP019). in addition, the closely with the drug enforcement Adminis service possesses a de havilland C‑7A (tail tration and Coast Guard—the local ones as number MSP002) for tactical‑transport mis well as those from the United States, which sions, but a lack of spare parts has grounded also maintains a detachment of surveillance that aircraft for several years. incidentally, boats in the country. the SvA’s only medium‑transport helicopter, SvA aircraft also constantly conduct opera a Mil Mi‑17 (tail number MSP016), was sold tions to seek and eradicate drug plantations, to the Colombian army in 2002. often in the talamanca Mountains, where 179,000 marijuana plants were recently de stroyed. during that operation, SvA aircraft not only provided armed cover to police forces conducting a search of the region on foot but also established an air bridge to facilitate the logistics of the operation. despite its very modest size, at least in Cen tral American terms, the SvA has proven very efficient in fulfilling assigned tasks, especially those related to protecting Costa Rican sover eignty, despite the resource limitations en demic in the region’s armed forces. in fact, the SvA relies almost entirely on aid provided by friendly governments such as taiwan, France, and the United States. however, one An MD-500 of the SVA on a surveillance flight over the General Cañas Highway, San Jose, Costa Rica commonly sees at least one SvA helicopter or light aircraft participating in any situation that As in the rest of Central America, the drug‑ involves the Costa Rican Public Force, be it an trafficking problem is a matter of national accident on the hectic General Cañas high concern for Costa Rica—hence for the Public way or the capture of a large drug shipment q Force and especially the SvA, both fully en along the Guanacaste coast. gaged in the antidrug struggle in coordina tion with the US government. the United States maintains a considerable number of surveillance aircraft based at Juan Santamaría Note international Airport near the capital and at 1. “vigilancia Aérea 2,” YouTube, 20 october 2006, http://youtube.com/watch?v=FYsPKajGisg (accessed 20 the Liberia international Airport on the At April 2007). lantic coast of the country.

PIREP-Overall.indd 34 7/31/07 12:47:45 PM Nash in Najaf Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict

Dr. Hank J. BrigHtman*

ou, the IraqI army and police In order to fully understand how two seem­ forces, don’t walk alongside the occu­ ingly disparate entities—ISFs and DIs—will piers, because they are your arch­ ultimately work together in an effort to im­ enemy.”1 this call for solidarity prove both of their respective positions, one Yamongst indigenous security forces (ISF) and must examine the basics of game theory and domestic insurgents (DI) by Shiite cleric and the associated concepts of bargaining and leader Muqtada al-Sadr in april 2007 is simply equilibrium. In the following discussion, such the latest evidence in support of this research­ terms as player, improved, optimal, corruption, pre­ er’s three years of applying game theory to the ferred, and so forth, are used in their mathe­ Iraqi conflict.a lthough other studies have ex­ matical rather than their usual sense. amined operation Iraqi Freedom from per­ spectives such as democratic nation building in an area of the world where such forms of Flashback to Logic 101: government historically have not been the norm, The Prisoner’s Dilemma this article represents the firstknown effort to Developed by Merrill Flood and Melvin apply the game-theory concepts of “Pareto im­ Dresher at the raND Corporation in 1950, proved” and “Paretooptimal” strategies(named the “prisoner’s dilemma”—an activity often after Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto) as played out in college logic, mathematics, and well as “Nash” and “preferred” equilibriums economics classes—demonstrates that if two (the former named after american mathema­ players, suspect a and suspect B, act only in tician John Nash) to the Iraqi conflict. their own self-interest, both will suffer dire Specifically, this article examines how, consequences.2 For example, if each suspect is through application of game theory to this held in a separate interrogation room and model, uS and coalition forces will ultimately told that by either confessing to the crime or suffer casualties at an increasing rate the longer “ratting out” his or her accomplice, each can they remain in Iraq. this will occur because receive a reduced sentence, then both sus­ both DIs and ISFs will turn away from attacking pects will either implicate the other or confess each other towards a point of mathematical cor­ to the crime. this is commonly referred to as ruption. at this theoretical point, american and a zero-sum game because one prisoner’s gain coalition troops will become the target of broad­ becomes the other’s loss. If each condemns based DI attacks, with intelligence frequently the other, then both will incur the maximum provided by ISFs. For the purposes of this article, penalty. however, if both confess indepen­ ISF refers to the Iraqi military as well as state and dently, each will incur some penalty—albeit local police, and DI refers to the various domes­ likely a lesser one because they have shown tic insurgent groups within Iraq. they are willing to “cooperate” with the au­

*Dr. Brightman is an associate professor and chairperson of the Criminal Justice Department at Saint Peter’s College in Jersey City, New Jersey, and an information warfare officer with the uS Navy (reserve Component), currently serving on active duty for special work and assigned to the War Gaming Department of the uS Naval War College as a visiting professor.

35

PIREP-Brightman.indd 35 7/31/07 12:46:12 PM 36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

thorities. Lastly, if the two suspects work to­ payoffs proves difficult at best.3 Because eFGs gether and adopt the common strategy that are distinguished by multiple moves, players would appear at firstblush to benefiteach one must possess an overall broad strategy (as they less (remaining silent), the benefit to both would in the SFG) as well as smaller substrate­ will actually increase—because the State, lack­ gies to counter the other players’ moves ing a confession or statement of the other’s throughout the game. guilt, will likely charge each with a lesser of­ In the eFG, as time progresses, the model fense. the lesson learned from the prisoner’s becomes susceptible to influence from out­ dilemma and similar scenarios is that players side forces, termed “strange attractors.” Be­ in competition with each other sometimes cause payoffs in the eFG are not as readily ap­ gain more by conspiring than by attempting parent and the rules are generally more to combat each other to the last. complex than in the SFG, these strange attrac­ tors affect the players’ willingness to adhere to previously stated rules and therefore decrease Game Theory 101: the overall stability of the game. A Primer Mathematicians refer to scenarios such as Achieving Equilibrium: the prisoner’s dilemma as simple form games “Can’t We All Just Get Along?” (SFG)—also referred to as normal form games—which commonly have two players, as time elapses, both SFGs and eFGs be­ each of whom strives to receive the highest come less stable due to player frustration (and, payoff at the end of a simultaneous move (i.e., in some cases, physical fatigue). accordingly, by seeking what is referred to in economics as each player will begin to reduce his or her ex­ a Pareto optimal position). one determines pectations for the ultimate payoff. Consider payoffs—outcomes with real value to each the gambler who feeds quarters into a slot ma­ player—through a process called quantifica­ chine for an hour. this is essentially a two- tion, conducted by primary stakeholders who player SFG (the gambler and the house), con­ have a direct, vested interest in the outcome sisting of a single turn, with the focus on an of the game. In the Iraqi conflict,the two play­ immediate payoff. ultimately, the gambler will ers within the SFG are the ISFs and DIs. the likely walk away from the “one-armed bandit” united States and coalition forces are not con­ down $25 after 45 minutes without winning sidered players in this game (explained later the jackpot—an especially likely outcome if in this article). the player is down to her last dollar (limited additionally, in extensive form games resources), has agreed to meet her sister-in­ (eFG)—which feature two or more players law in an hour to catch a Las Vegas show (time engaged in multiple move-for-move ex­ constraints), and is feeling pangs of hunger changes—players generally worry less about because she has not yet eaten lunch (player intermediate payoffs than the ultimate payoff fatigue). Similarly, the professional poker player at the conclusion of the game. obviously, may be willing to cut his losses at five-cardstud quantificationof the eFG is far more complex (an eFG because it involves multiple turns, than in the SFG because one must consider players, payoffs, strategies, and substrategies) both short-term and long-term payoff values. and accept a smaller pot rather than play Moreover, as mathematicians John von Neu­ through to the end and face a new dealer later mann and oskar Morgenstern discovered, in the game (a strange attractor) who clearly eFGs are frequently not zero-sum games (i.e., knows the fine art of dealing. one player’s loss does not always perfectly cor­ as players’ expectations for the ultimate relate with another player’s gain, depending payoff start to fade with the passing of time (in on the complexity of the rules); therefore, the case of the eFG, with the destabilizing in­ predicting the outcome based solely on the fluence of strange attractors), each player be­

PIREP-Brightman.indd 36 7/31/07 12:46:13 PM PIREP 37

gins to think about how, by negotiating with and, in the case of an eFG, if strange attrac­ the opponent, he or she might end the game tors are introduced into the model (e.g., so- without suffering additional losses. one refers called eyewitnesses, purported new evidence, to the point at which players start to work co­ etc.). thus, the passing of time and the influ­ operatively towards agreement as bargaining ence of strange attractors preempt achieving towards equilibrium (or, in economics, Pareto the preferred equilibrium and instead yield improvement). When both players have reached the inchoate or Nash equilibrium. the pres­ a point at which they can achieve the highest ence of uS and coalition forces in Iraq, espe­ aggregate payoff, the game ends in preferred cially over time, may actually hasten a Nash equilibrium. response between ISFs and DIs. however, the influence of strange attrac­ tors in a model that will become increasingly unstable (bifurcated) over time often induces Corruption between Players: players to hasten their desire for a Pareto im­ The Simple Form Game and proved position instead of a superior (Pareto optimal) position—even though doing so may the Iraqi Conflict lessen their ultimate payoff because they did equipped with a working knowledge of SFGs, not play through to the end of the game. one eFGs, Pareto improvement, Pareto optimal, refers to the point at which both players reach and Nash and preferred equilibriums, one Pareto improvement, despite the fact that they can not only examine each player’s prospec­ may have received a greater payoff had they tive payoffs but also predict the point at which waited, as Nash equilibrium. First theorized by Princeton university professor John Nash, this both the inchoate (Nash) and preferred equi­ equilibrium is sometimes described as an in­ libriums will occur in the Iraqi conflict. In or­ choate or interrupted equilibrium because der to identify these points, the remainder of the players reach a point of compromise prior this article assumes a two-player game, namely to the conclusion of the game’s ultimate pay­ with ISFs and DIs. admittedly, attempting to off.4 Several Nash equilibriums may exist at contain the myriad of security entities under various points prior to achieving preferred the ISF umbrella will likely prove as much of a equilibrium. Most SFGs and eFGs do not start generalization as placing the many native ter­ out with players seeking to work cooperatively rorist organizations that exist in Iraq within (i.e., striving for Pareto improvement). how­ the DI grouping. the many law-enforcement ever, as each player’s “winner take all” strategy and military organizations that comprise the clearly becomes less viable with the passing of ISF category, along with numerous hegemonic time, both players realize that the longer it entities that make up the DI set, represent a takes to come to consensus and the more re­ variety of heterogeneous cultures, values, be­ sources they expend in their individual quest liefs, and often competing interests. for dominance, the smaller the ultimate pay­ Figure 1 provides a summary of payoffs off should they emerge victorious (an economic quantifiedfor both players in the simple-form, concept known as rubinstein Bargaining).5 zero-sum game for the Iraqi conflict as well as ultimately, players strive to reach consensus if each player’s Pareto optimal strategy (point for no other reason than they wish to lessen value equals four). It also identifiesthe respec­ their losses. tive quadrants in which the Nash and pre­ In applying Nash equilibrium to the prison­ ferred equilibriums will occur. er’s dilemma, one sees that this equilibrium In figure 1’s SFG, the payoffs for both play­ point (both players confessing to the crime) ers are based on varying degrees of remaining will preempt the preferred equilibrium (both active or passive. each player hopes that the players remaining silent). this is especially other will not move (i.e., will remain passive), true with the passing of time (prisoners do not thus achieving a Pareto optimal position for like being left alone in interrogation rooms) himself or herself. however, if this one-move

PIREP-Brightman.indd 37 7/31/07 12:46:13 PM 38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

tions to Pareto improved positions. therefore, the inchoate or Nash equilibrium will inevitably preferred occur at the “2, 2” quadrant. equilibrium = When one applies these concepts to the sum of highest SFG for the Iraqi conflict,the challenges faced payoffs by uS and coalition forces in Iraq become readily apparent. ultimately, the model will become mathematically corrupted. Both play­ Nash ISF ers will move from seeking Pareto optimal to Passive Active Pareto improved positions (i.e., ISFs and DIs will lessen their expectations, hastening equi­ e librium). Moreover, for reasons already dis­ 2, 2 4, 1 assiv cussed, Nash equilibrium will preempt the two P Insurgents players from attaining the preferred equilib­ rium (the quadrant in which equilibrium at e the highest aggregate payoff value in the tiv 1, 4 3, 3 c model will occur) wherein DIs continue to A carry out attacks with improvised explosive de­ vices throughout Iraq, and ISFs continue to Figure 1. Iraqi conflict as a simple ormf game arrest or kill terrorists. It is important to understand that one can think of all equilibriums (Nash and preferred) SFG is repeated over and over again, it be­ as solutions. one can use software such as the comes clear to both players that neither is will­ publicly available Gambit application (origi­ ing to remain passive. over time, as player nally developed by theodore turocy and an- frustration increases, resources begin to dwindle, drew McLennan in 1994 and now in its 11th and fatigue sets in, the players will begin bar­ release) to test the probability and frequency gaining towards equilibrium (i.e., seeking Pareto of these solutions occurring within the param­ improvement as opposed to Pareto optimal). eters of the model.6 repeated test runs of the as illustrated, one would attain the pre­ zero-sum Iraqi conflict SFG yield the same re­ ferred equilibrium in this SFG at the “3, 3” sult: a Nash response in which ISFs and DIs quadrant because the highest aggregate pay­ are willing to “sacrifice” uS and allied forces off occurs at this point in the game. one must to achieve Pareto improvement is inevitable. remember that preferred equilibrium has no evidence already exists to suggest that bar­ connection to the player’s Pareto optimal gaining between players has begun, such as strategy; rather, it is simply a mathematical ex­ Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s proposed Na­ pression for the point at which one can derive tional reconciliation Plan, which would af­ the greatest quantified payoff value. ford partial amnesty to some DIs.7 as both players continue bargaining, the game moves from a competitive to a coopera­ tive mode, leading to increased communica­ US Interests in Iraq: tion, which in turn yields further bargaining The Extensive Form Game between players. Inflexible rules and intransi­ gent positions become more elastic, and the Mathematically speaking, neither the united players proffer side payments to hasten agree­ States nor its coalition forces can be consid­ ment. at this point, the game is said to have ered players in the Iraqi conflict SFG because become mathematically corrupted because the united States cannot quantify payoffs. the players are no longer following the rules this also holds true in the eFG because amer­ established prior to initial play. they have also ica’s citizenry does not have a direct, primary- moved from focusing on Pareto optimal posi­ stakeholder interest in the conflict (i.e., they

PIREP-Brightman.indd 38 7/31/07 12:46:14 PM PIREP 39

are not part of the quantification process). ture attacks, and terrorists provide bribes to only the Iraqi people—represented in this Iraqi soldiers in exchange for overlooking game by the two primary players (ISFs and caches of household weapons. the revelation DIs)—are fundamentally and intimately af­ that the late terrorist leader abu Musab al- fected by the payoffs at each turn within the Zarqawi’s cell phone contained telephone eFG, as well as by the ultimate payoff at the numbers for some of Iraq’s senior Interior conclusion of the game. Ministry officials and lawmakers provides fur­ Indeed, from a game-theory perspective, ther evidence that Pareto improvement may one finds very few conflicts in american his­ have already commenced between ISFs and tory wherein uS forces have had the ability to DIs.8 In March 2006, Sgt Paul e. Cortez, Pfc participate in the quantification process as a Jesse Spielman, SPC James Barker, and Pvt primary player, save for the colonists in the Stephen D. Green raped and murdered 14­ american revolutionary War, union and Con­ year-old abeer qassim al-Janabi and then federate forces in the Civil War, and service­ killed her family.9 Subsequently, in September men in the uS intervention during World War 2006, insurgents killed three uS soldiers simply II after the Japanese attack at Pearl harbor. because they served in the same unit as the No one should ever dismiss the brave and noble four former solders who carried out this hei­ actions of uS forces in other conflicts, but from nous crime. Iraqi Interior Ministry officials an eFG perspective, one can mathematically refused to condemn the killing of the uS sol­ consider the united States a player only when diers, which Iraqis widely regarded as an america directly involves itself in the quantifi­ “honor killing.”10 the insurgents’ ability to cation of payoffs. For a party to assume this capture and kill uS service members suggests role, its stakeholder interest must have value a level of access to operational-security plans equal to that of the other players. this is not for uS forces previously unavailable to terror­ to suggest that uS and coalition forces do not ist entities.11 affect the model or its two players (ISFs and using the Gambit software application, we DIs) in the Iraqi conflict eFG. Indeed, those can model the eFG for the Iraqi conflictfrom forces function as strange attractors. the perspective of DIs: player one in the domi­ For the purposes of the current situation in nant strategy position (i.e., DIs make the first Iraq, uS and coalition forces, multinational move). the results (fig. 2) appear similar to business interests, third-party foreign-terrorist those for the SFG (fig. 1). organizations, and other interested parties would all be considered strange attractors whose predominant role involves hastening Conclusions: the model towards equilibrium. as time pro­ Where Do We Go from Here? gresses and the model continues to bifurcate, the eFG becomes inherently less stable; thus, as both the SFG and eFG models show strange attractors play a greater role in mov­ when applied to the Iraqi conflict, both players ing the players towards cooperative bargain­ (ISFs and DIs) will ultimately abandon their ing (Pareto improvement). as was the case in Pareto optimal strategies and instead begin the SFG presented earlier, the eFG becomes bargaining towards equilibrium. When this corrupt. Players begin working in cooperation happens, the model will become corrupted, (bargaining towards equilibrium) rather than and a Nash solution will preempt the pre­ competing for a Pareto optimal position. ferred equilibrium. In the eFG, the presence In the Iraqi conflict, bargaining towards of strange attractors such as uS and coalition equilibrium entails emergent conspiracies be­ forces, foreign-terrorist entities, and other tween the two players—ISFs and DIs—as the third-party interests may serve only to hasten game becomes less stable. Police officers begin this process in an increasingly bifurcating tipping off insurgents as to where raids will model. release of The Iraq Study Group Report take place in exchange for protection from fu­ of December 2006, which specifically cites that

PIREP-Brightman.indd 39 7/31/07 12:46:14 PM 40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Domestic Insurgents and Indigenous Security Forces

Response: 4, 1 DI Pareto DI Pareto 4, 1 Response: ISFs do not Optimal Optimal DIs do not respond respond

Response: Action: Action: Response: ISFs aggressively DIs attack ISFs conduct DIs aggressively respond respond 3, 3 ISFs raids on DIs 3, 3

Response: Response: Player 1 = DIs ISFs limit DIs limit raids 2, 2 Player 2 = ISFs 2, 2 attacks on ISFs

DIs and ISFs will reach Nash N ash ash N solution (2, 2) before preferred equilibrium (3, 3)

Figure 2. Iraqi conflict as an xtensivee form game

“violence is increasing in scope and lethality,” the form of military or civilian service in sup­ coupled with increasingly nonlinear attacks port of Iraqi Freedom or the rationing of uS against uS and coalition forces (e.g., improvised goods to support the Iraqi people (compara­ chlorine chemical attacks, use of women as sui­ ble to rationing during World War II). only cide bombers, etc.) suggests that the model ex­ then could america effectively participate in plored in this article continues to destabilize.12 the quantificationprocess. It is highly unlikely Moreover, additional conflicts between Israeli that present-day americans or their elected forces and the Lebanese hezbollah Party may representatives would be willing to commit to introduce additional strange attractors into the personal sacrifices, such as a military draft, war model, further hastening the “2, 2” Nash payoff taxes, or the rationing of food and supplies. ac­ even more quickly than initially predicted using cordingly, it is not mathematically possible for the Gambit software application. america to achieve player status in Iraq. It is possible for the united States to as­ one must note that uS policy decisions sume a player role in Iraq rather than serve as take into account elements beyond the theo­ a strange attractor. however, to do so, stakes retical constructs of the SFG or eFG. even if for americans would need to equal those of the Iraqi people in order for the quantifica­ america cannot obtain player status, excellent tion process to occur. the united States would reasons may exist for the united States and have to commit hundreds of thousands—if coalition forces to remain in Iraq, such as not millions—of military and civilian person­ nation-building and humanitarian purposes. nel to Iraq for decades, which it could accom­ however, american policy makers and the plish in the short term only by fully mobilizing public must be prepared to accept the fact all reserve-component forces and initiating a that if uS forces remain in Iraq, the soldiers, military draft to meet future needs. uS and sailors, airmen, and marines bravely serving Iraqi culture and values would need to be­ there will remain a strange attractor in a mathe­ come inextricably linked. each american matical model that is destabilizing over time. would have to feel a stakeholder interest in Within this game, DIs and ISFs will eventually Iraq, evidenced through personal sacrifice in arrive at Nash equilibrium. q

PIREP-Brightman.indd 40 7/31/07 12:46:15 PM PIREP 41

Notes 1. associated Press, “radical Cleric Calls on Iraqis to 7. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki unveiled the Na­ halt Cooperation with u.S. Military,” FOXNews.com, 8 april tional reconciliation Plan on 6 June 2006 for the purpose 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,264814,00 of relieving tension between various religious and ethnic .html (accessed 10 april 2007). elements vying for power in Parliament. under the terms 2. Following World War II, private and quasi- of this plan, approximately 2,500 Iraqi detainees held in governmental think tanks such as the raND Corporation uS and allied custody would be released without preju­ were established as a means to further research in areas dice or further governmental action. Jaime Jansen, “Iraq such as war gaming and hostile-action contingency plan­ Government to release 2,500 Detainees in reconciliation ning. Flood and Dresher were among the firstof this new Bid,” Jurist: Legal News and Research, http://jurist.law.pitt breed of mathematicians focusing on multiplayer simula­ .edu/paperchase/2006/06/iraq-government-to-release tions. Douglas hofstadter expanded upon and clarified -2500.php (accessed 10 april 2007). much of their original research in this area. See Douglas 8. Killed in a targeted bombing north of Baghdad by r. hofstadter, Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence uS and coalition forces on 8 June 2006, abu Musab al- of Mind and Pattern (New York: Basic Books, 1985). Zarqawi was considered the leading figure behind many 3. In 1944 Princeton university professors John von of the bombings and kidnappings in Iraq, from the 2003 Neumann and oskar Morgenstern authored their land­ invasion up until his death. al-Zarqawi was credited with mark economic paper “expected utility theory,” which implementing a complex terror-cell structure comparable focused exclusively on the application of strategic game to al-qaeda’s other operations around the world. ellen theory to social problems. their technique was subsequently Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Insurgent Leader al- used to examine virtually every social-organizational prob­ Zarqawi Killed in Iraq,” washingtonpost.com, 8 June 2006, lem imaginable, from settling antitrust disputes to the http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ uS-uSSr arms race during the Cold War. “the von 2006/06/08/ar2006060800114.html (accessed 10 april Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory,” The His­ 2007). 9. In February 2007, Sergeant Cortez accepted a plea tory of Economic Thought, Bernard Schwartz Center for eco­ bargain and will be eligible for parole in 10 years. Special­ nomic Policy analysis, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/ ist Barker was sentenced to 90 years in a military prison, essays/uncert/vnmaxioms.htm (accessed 10 april 2007). and Private Green was dishonorably discharged. “u.S. 4. See Carlo C. Jaeger et al., “Decision analysis and Soldier Sentenced to 100 Years for Iraq rape, Killing,” Al­ rational action,” working papers, chap. 3, http://www jazeera.com, 23 February 2007, http://www.aljazeera.com/ .pik-potsdam.de/~cjaeger/working_papers/v3chap03 me.asp?service_ID=13000 (accessed 10 april 2007). .pdf (accessed 10 april 2007). 10. See associated Press, “Group: Soldiers Killed over 5. ariel rubinstein’s theory of 1982 states that in an rape-Slaying,” USA Today, 11 July 2006, http://www.usatoday alternating bargaining game in which one player makes .com/news/world/iraq/2006-07-10-group-claim_x.htm an offer followed by the other, the ultimate value of the (accessed 10 april 2007). payoff will decrease the longer the game is played. ulti­ 11. DI access to the operations data of uS and coali­ mately, the players will be willing to settle for a lesser tion forces appears to be growing in Iraq. In addition to payoff simply to end the game. See Lucy White, “Pru­ knowing the details with respect to where and when uS dence in Bargaining: the effect of uncertainty on Bargain­ forces would be located on the day this ambush took ing outcomes,” harvard Business School, 9 December place, The Iraq Study Group Report notes that the alliance 2003, http://www.people.hbs.edu/lwhite/pdf/newfiles/ between insurgent groups and government officials in prudence%20in%20bargaining.pdf (accessed 10 april some cases has compromised operational security. James 2007). a. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: 6. the Gambit Software Application for Game Theory has Vintage Books, 2006), 5, http://permanent.access.gpo been used extensively in mathematical modeling and .gov/lps76748/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (accessed 10 simulation since its inception in 1994. the current ver­ april 2007). Lastly an attack in Karbala on 22 January sion of the software, developed by richard McKelvey, an- 2007, which left 27 people dead, including two marines, drew McLennan, and theodore turocy, allows the user to went undetected because the terrorists had uS and Iraqi explore player strategies, contingencies, and outcomes military uniforms and passes. Damien Cave, “troops for Nash equilibrium as well as for several other game- Killed by ‘Insurgents’ Wearing uS army uniforms,” In­ theory models. the current version of the Gambit soft­ fowars.com, 22 January 2007, http://www.infowars.com/ ware application is available free of charge at “Software articles/iraq/troops_killed_by_insurgents_wearing_us tools for Game theory,” Gambit, http://econweb.tamu _army_uniforms.htm (accessed 10 april 2007). .edu/gambit/support.html (accessed 10 april 2007). 12. Baker et al., Iraq Study Group Report, xiii.

PIREP-Brightman.indd 41 7/31/07 12:46:15 PM Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the top Air & Space Power Journal articles of the 2006–2007 academic year

First Place Second Place Third Place CDR John J. Klein Dr. J. Carl Ficarrotta Maj Ravi I. Chaudhary “Space Power: “Military Ethics: Some “Transforming American Air­ An Ill-Suited Space Lessons Learned from lift: Effects-Based Mobility, the Strategy” Manuel Davenport” C-17, and Global Maneuver” (Fall 2006) (Winter 2006) (Spring 2007) Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004 or via e-mail at [email protected]. All military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or government civilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, you will automatically be entered in the competition.

42

Eaker.indd 42 7/31/07 12:39:55 PM APJ

Predator Command and Control An Italian Perspective

Col ludoviCo Chianese, italian air ForCe

Editorial Abstract: The author, an Italian Air Force officer, compares operations with Italian Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Iraq with past and present US Predator doctrine and operations. After a brief overview of the significanceof doctrine and command and con­ trol, Colonel Chianese analyzes problems he encountered during operations and recommends ways to improve strategic vision and policy for Italian UAV operations.

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. —Giulio Douhet

43

Chianese.indd 43 7/31/07 12:40:31 PM 44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

urinG OperatiOn iraqi Free­ operations.2 instead, we must capture the ac­ dom, the italian air Force flew its cumulated body of knowledge, consciously and new predator fleet in support of formally incorporating it into doctrine, which combat operations. the predator, an consists of fundamental principles by which Damerican-made, medium-altitude unmanned militaries shape their actions in support of na­ aerial vehicle (uaV) used for surveillance and tional objectives and, on operational and tac­ reconnaissance, has a range of up to 400 nautical tical levels, in support of the commander’s in­ miles and can flyat altitudes up to 25,000 feet. tent.3 ideally, all major operations are based Cruising at a speed of 70 knots, it can loiter on a campaign plan that reflects doctrinal for hours over targets.1 even though italian principles and tenets derived from the “accu­ predator operations generally have been con­ mulated body of knowledge” mentioned above. sidered successful, some issues still need solv­ But in some instances, the italian air Force ing in order to maximize efficiency and effec­ has not followed these almost obvious recom­ tiveness. Changes in the character of air war­ mendations, performing some military opera­ fare are occurring now, and the italian air tions with neither a precise doctrinal strategy Force must adapt to them. During that ser­ in mind nor a strategic directive—or simply vice’s predator operations in iraq, most prob­ without completely applying appropriate ba­ lems originated in the command and control sic principles and tenets of doctrine. By way of (C2) structure, reflecting a lack of strategic accounting for this situation, historian Frank doctrine, an incomplete application of basic Futrell suggests that airmen, not known as doctrinal principles, and an inadequate level prolificwriters, have “developed an oral rather of operational command. than a written tradition.”4 additionally, some in this article, the author compares his leaders believe that “adherence to dogmas has knowledge of the italian predator operation— destroyed more and cost more battles derived from his experience as the italian air than anything in war.”5 in fact, bad doctrine component commander from December 2005 overly bounds and restricts creativity, and if to april 2006 in tallil, iraq—with doctrine as “not properly developed, and especially if pa­ well as past and present uS predator opera­ rochialism is allowed to creep in, doctrine will tions. after a brief overview of the significance point to suboptimal solutions.”6 in the case of of doctrine and C2, the article then introduces italian predator operations in iraq, no strate­ italy’s Operation antica Babilonia (Operation gic doctrine existed for uaVs in general or for “ancient Babylon”) and describes the C2 struc­ predators in particular. although the first two ture for the italian predator, pointing out the reasons may have played some role, the main main problems encountered during opera­ reason for not having such guidance was the tions and proposing some final recommenda­ lack of previous experience with this specific tions to stimulate, develop, and integrate a asset and insufficient time to develop sound, strategic vision and policy for italian uaVs in timely doctrine. future expeditionary and national missions. even if uaVs are no longer considered a technical innovation in the united States, where research and development related to these The Significance of Doctrine aircraft are significantly advanced, they repre­ the word doctrine has different connota­ sent a significant leap forward for the italian tions. For many people, it recalls lofty and ar­ air Force. But an air force needs more than cane discussion by theorists and academicians advanced technology to provide effective ca­ that offers little to average military personnel pability. after purchasing predator technology trying to operate down at the unit level. the “off the shelf,” italy’s air service rapidly fielded uS air Force points this out very well in its it in iraq before developing a strategy or doc­ basic doctrine manual, warning us against set­ trine for employment. predictably, its preda­ tling for the rules of thumb so often used in tor force suffered the consequences, learned

Chianese.indd 44 7/31/07 12:40:31 PM PREDATOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 45

many valuable lessons, and should profitfrom every objective under one responsible com­ this experience. mander.”10 Simplicity calls for “avoiding un­ necessary complexity in organizing, preparing, planning, and conducting military operations.”11 Command and Control One must also prioritize air and space power, of Airpower: thus assuring that demand for air and space forces will not overwhelm air commanders in Doctrinal Basics future conflicts.12 But these abstract principles in the realm of doctrine, C2 has always require an operational capability to put them been considered an important issue for mili­ into practice. Gen ronald r. Fogleman, for­ tary organizations and leaders. a vital and inte­ mer uS air Force chief of staff, once said that “a commander without the proper C2 assets gral part of war fighting, it requires careful 13 planning and execution in order to be effec­ commands nothing except a desk.” effective tive. in the beginning of italian aviation his­ C2 becomes possible only by dedicating sig­ tory, the famous air theorist Giulio Douhet nificant resources for equipping, training, wrote that “the war in the air is the true war of and exercising C2 operators; thus, uS air movement, in which swift intuition, swifter de­ Force doctrine directs commanders to “en­ cision, and still swifter execution are needed. sure their people are fully proficient at using designated C2 systems when performing war­ it is the kind of warfare in which the outcome 14 will largely be dependent upon the com­ time duties.” mander.”7 indeed, italians in iraq learned what americans had experienced in Serbia, Antica Babilonia: just seven years before, as noted in the Air War over Serbia Report: Italy’s Debut in UAV Operations in the air war over Serbia, command and con­ italy’s involvement with the multinational trol worked well at the tactical level. For example, forces in iraq began on 15 april 2003 when the rapid re-targeting of attack aircraft against Franco Frattini, minister for foreign affairs, targets detected by the predator unmanned aerial addressed parliament on the government’s in­ vehicle was innovative and quite successful. at tent to support the military coalition in iraq. the operational and strategic levels, however, about a month later, Defense Minister antonio air Force leaders repeatedly noted two domi­ Martino instructed the military to plan the de­ nant problems. the firstwas that command and ployment of a national contingent to enforce control structures and coordination procedures united nations Security Council resolution were overlapping and confusing. the principle of unity of command must be reinforced in fu­ 1483. the resulting military operation, known ture training, doctrine, and operations.8 as antica Babilonia, began on 15 July 2003, consisting of an italian joint task force formed the italian air Force experienced surprisingly around an army infantry brigade.15 similar problems in iraq. that service could at that time, iraqi Freedom had just “ended have better exploited american lessons learned major combat” and had started security, stability with predators to compensate for its lack of transition, and reconstruction operations.16 experience with this asset, especially in the C2 Combined Joint task Force 7 in Baghdad in­ architecture, since uS forces have operated cluded two uS-led multinational divisions in uaVs in general and predators in particular north and northwest iraq, a polish-led multi­ since 1995.9 national division in south-central iraq, and a at an even higher level, each military leader British-led multinational division in southeast should be able to apply C2 principles and te­ iraq. By 15 May 2004, coalition forces had or­ nets universally since they are considered com­ ganized into two commands, Multi-national mon knowledge. unity of command, for ex­ Force-iraq as the operational command, and ample, “ensures concentration of effort for Multi-national Corps-iraq as the tactical com­

Chianese.indd 45 7/31/07 12:40:32 PM 46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

mand, with italy’s participation described by a Predator Command and Control Architecture: national operational directive.17 For antica A Complicated Puzzle Babilonia, three italian general officers assumed the following observation, found in a uS joint key positions in the Baghdad headquarters.18 publication on multinational operations, cer­ a sector within the British multinational divi­ tainly applied to antica Babilonia: “no single sion was assigned as an area of responsibility command structure meets the needs of every (aOr) to the italian joint task force, com­ manded by a fourth italian general.19 multinational command but one absolute re­ unfortunately, the end of major combat mains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the did not mean that peace had returned to iraq. 23 the italian 3,000-soldier contingent, based in command structure.” italy, however, did not an-nasirya, the capital of Dhi qar province, always keep in mind the principle of simplicity faced violent conflict between uS-led coali­ when it established the predator C2 system. in tion forces and insurgents.20 For the most part, fact, it opted for a model that allowed for coali­ antica Babilonia focused on stabilization op­ tion employment of its forces but also ensured erations, security-sector reforms, training, and national control, particularly for key assets nation-building measures.21 Deployed forces (fig. 1). Drawing on its experience with the and assets underwent adjustments according north atlantic treaty Organization (natO), to the changing threat. Land forces were aug­ italy used the latter’s doctrine to define its mented by a joint air task group of two heli­ command relationships. For example, the ital­ copter squadrons and, since January 2005, by ian Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa (defense a uaV squadron equipped with rq-1 predators chief of staff) always wields operational com­ for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.22 mand (OpCOM), the highest level of com-

Defense Chief of Staff (OPCOM) Rome

Multi-National Division-Southeast Chief, Permanent Joint Task Force (OPCON) (OPCON) Basra, Iraq Rome

Italian Joint Task Force National Contingent Commander (OPCON) Dual Hatted (OPCON) Mittica, Iraq Mittica, Iraq

Joint Air Task Group Air Component Commander (TACON) CAOC TACON (ADCON) Airspace OPCON Tallil, Iraq Tallil, Iraq Coordination OPCOM Al Udeid Air Base, ADCON Qatar OPCON to Helicopter UAV Coalition Tallil, Iraq Tallil, Iraq

Figure 1. UAV and helicopter command and control in Antica Babilonia. (Adapted from Direttiva Op­ erativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R [Roma: Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze, April 2005].)

Chianese.indd 46 7/31/07 12:40:33 PM PREDATOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 47

mand in the military hierarchy, comparable to ception to this command relationship in that combatant command in the uS military. His the Comandante del Comando Operativo di Vertice functions are similar to those of the uS chair­ Interforze (COi) or chief of the permanent man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although the joint task force retained OpCOn of those italian officer has command authority over uaVs as a national-only asset, made available the service chiefs. the defense chief of staff in to the coalition on an excess-availability basis. rome retained OpCOM of the italian forces the COi and his staff plan, prepare, and di­ deployed to iraq. the following command re­ rect joint military operations and exercises for lationships applied: the defense chief of staff. the COi does not deploy from his location in rome but can de­ • tactical control (taCOn): “the detailed ploy a theater joint task force with OpCOn of and, usually, local direction and control of assigned assets.28 movements or manoeuvres necessary to 24 in antica Babilonia, the chief of the perma­ accomplish missions or tasks assigned.” nent joint task force retained predator OpCOn, • operational control (OpCOn): “authority unlike that of helicopters, for all missions delegated to a commander to direct within the aOr, exercised through the na­ forces assigned so that the commander tional contingent commander, who also com­ may accomplish specificmissions or tasks manded the italian joint task force on the coali­ which are usually limited by function, tion side and represented unity of command time, or location; to deploy units con­ of the italian contingent through a dual-hatted cerned, and to retain or assign tactical arrangement. even though the same person control of those units. it does not include holds these positions (national contingent authority to assign separate employment commander and commander of the italian of components of the units concerned. joint task force), the remainder of this article neither does it, of itself, include adminis­ uses the terms separately to indicate the chain trative or logistic control.”25 of command (national only for national con­ tingent commander, coalition for italian joint • OpCOM: “authority granted a commander task force) under discussion. to assign missions or tasks to subordinate On the other hand, missions requested by commanders, to deploy units, to reassign other italian national agencies and the coali­ forces, and to retain or delegate opera­ tion, if not in direct support of the italian con­ tional and/or tactical control as he or tingent, required case-by-case direct approval she deems necessary. . . . it does not in­ from the chief of the permanent joint task clude responsibility for administration.”26 force, who exercised OpCOn directly over • administrative control (aDCOn): “direc­ predator operations. the air component com­ tion or exercise of authority over subor­ mander, head of an air-forward command ele­ dinate or other organizations in respect ment acting both as tasking authority for the to administration and support, including predator squadron and coordinating agency organization of service forces, control of with iraqi Freedom’s combined air operations center (CaOC) in al udeid, qatar, exercised resources and equipment, personnel man­ 29 agement, unit logistics, individual and unit taCOn of the uaVs. although helicopters training, readiness, mobilization, demo­ and uaVs were part of the same joint air task bilization, discipline and other matters not group of the italian joint task force, the former included in the operational missions of fell under taCOn of the joint air task group the subordinate or other organizations.”27 commander but the latter under taCOn of the air component commander.30 the com­ OpCOn of most italian forces, however, mander of the joint air task group also exer­ was transferred to the British commander of cised aDCOn over the uaV personnel. Multi-national Division-Southeast in Basra. in summary, the italian defense chief of the predators represented a significant ex­ staff assigned the mission and tasks (under his

Chianese.indd 47 7/31/07 12:40:33 PM 48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

OpCOM authority) to a different subordinate their administration and support. this ar­ commander—the COi commander or chief rangement often caused friction. of the permanent joint task force—in order to in 2005 official quarterly reports from ital­ deploy a joint task force in iraq. the chief of ian air component commanders to their supe­ the permanent joint task force then delegated rior command in italy showed continuous evi­ OpCOn to the joint task force commander, dence of confusion, rivalry, and overlapping except for predators. Figure 1 shows the dual- authority between officers appointed as air hatted relationship of the italian joint task component commanders and joint air task force on the left of the diagram (representing group commanders.33 personnel assigned to the coalition chain of command) and the na­ the uaV squadron frequently referred their tional contingent commander on the right of problems either to the air component com­ the diagram (representing the italian chain of mander or the joint air task group com­ command). uS air Force doctrine calls for mander, without really understanding who caution when “multihatting” commanders be­ was responsible for what. the national opera­ cause doing so could distract them from fo­ tional directive lacked sufficient detail to dis­ cusing on the right level of war at the right tinguish between the authority of the joint air time. On the other hand, not multihatting a task group commander and air component commander may degrade unity of effort, which, commander. according to that directive, the as we will see later, occurred in the case of ital­ joint air task group commander was responsible ian predator activities at the tactical level. for providing all daily support to personnel and for filing efficiency reports for every single Unity of Command and Unity of Effort italian aviator deployed in tallil, iraq, except theaircomponentcommander.Hecommanded 31 unity of command is a principle of war. as a full staff, which enabled robust support in stated before, such concepts are not always ensuring the execution of his decisions. taken into consideration, as was the case with On the other hand, although the air com­ italian predators in iraq. Figure 1 shows that ponent commander had only one officer and the predator squadron had two separate lines one warrant officer directly supporting him, of authority: a relationship with the com­ he exercised full authority over predator mis­ mander of the joint air task group (aDCOn) sions and tactical command over personnel and one with the air component commander involved in them, from planning through exe­ (taCOn). Despite having a single commander cution. the authority of the air component at the operational level—the national contin­ commander, typically functional in nature, gent commander / commander of the italian was often misinterpreted by some operators joint task force—in practice, this double rela­ and sometimes by the two commanders them­ tionship meant that two different tactical com­ selves, especially in overlapping activities involv­ manders existed for the same uaV squadron. ing both supporting and operational tasks such this apparently minor issue turned out to be as management of the intelligence-exploitation one of the main sources of C2 problems. cell, distribution of imagery-intelligence prod­ presumably, the original rationale behind ucts, and management of technical personnel. this structure entailed having a single com­ this slowed decision-making processes, and mander for all air assets (commander of the personnel appeared generally confused and joint air task group). But when predators were sometimes even reluctant to speak up about “plugged in” to what was a joint helicopter problems. For example, in May 2006, when an squadron in 2005, headquarters in rome re­ italian uaV crashed due to a malfunction, quired a national-only line of command and there was no specific, detailed plan for its introduced the air component commander.32 emergency recovery.34 although analysts had While the air component commander exer­ predicted the problem in previous months cised taCOn over the predators, the joint air and despite intensive effort to lay down plans task group commander had responsibility for and procedures, lack of a decision about who

Chianese.indd 48 7/31/07 12:40:34 PM PREDATOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 49

had approval authority prevented agreement simplicity constitute fundamental principles on a final plan.35 of war that one must apply across the range of Because of the location of the joint air task military operations and at all levels of war.39 group commander and air component com­ the italian predator operation should not have mander under separate chains of command, been an exception to this basic doctrine. unity of effort required a strong working rela­ tionship and a shared sense of mission. the Consequences of Misplaced Operational Control two commanders eventually committed to OpCOn of the italian predators during antica daily meetings in tallil to solve issues related Babilonia resulted in several problems, such to uaV C2, but one should not consider this a as inappropriate employment in relation to permanent fix. Competition for resources, their capabilities and characteristics, slower lack of understanding of aircraft capabilities, decision-making processes, and confused tar­ and competing mission priorities could de­ get prioritization.40 Simply “falling in on” the stroy even the most cordial arrangement. existing joint task force clearly showed a lack One must not leave the effective C2 of pre­ of operational innovation. For instance, the cious air assets to chance. air Force Doctrine headquarters of the joint task force would re­ Document (aFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, quest uaV support with little or no advance tells us that “unity of command ensures con­ notice in response to the immediate tactical centration of effort for every objective under needs of ground troops, as if the predators one responsible commander. this principle were an air-defense asset ready to be “scram­ emphasizes that all efforts should be directed bled.” this practice probably resulted from and coordinated toward a common objective.”36 the italian joint task force’s familiarity with aFDD 1 also calls for centralized control and the pointer, a man-portable, low-altitude, decentralized execution to assure concen­ short-range small uaV. However, a predator, trated effort.37 During World War ii, the allies unlike a pointer, needs at least one hour of learned from their mistakes and adapted their ground checks, so by the time it reaches the doctrine accordingly: area of operations, it is too late to meet the as Supreme allied Commander in europe, immediate intelligence requirements of ground General eisenhower invoked new doctrine by forces. this procedure initially caused signifi­ insisting upon a single air commander report­ cant problems with the CaOC in al udeid be­ ing directly to him. the allied campaign in cause, although italian helicopters did not north africa during World War ii began with air not require inclusion in the CaOC’s air task­ power parceled out to various commanders. . . . the limitations of this arrangement quickly be­ ing order, the predators did. predators, which came apparent, particularly during the battle at usually flyat higher altitudes than helicopters, Kasserine pass. During the 1943 Casablanca Con­ require air-trafficdeconfliction. Failure to fol­ ference, roosevelt and Churchill approved a low airspace-control orders and air-trafficpro ­ new command structure that centralized control cedures greatly increases the risk of a mishap under an airman. this new concept quickly found with other aircraft flying in the same altitude its way into army doctrine: “Control of available block. airpower must be centralized and command must Because the CaOC included no italian liai­ be exercised through the air force commander if son officer, the predator mission had no advo­ this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a de­ cate and frequently lacked the information cisive blow are to be fully exploited.”38 and coordination channels to make timely de­ the above example draws its lessons learned cisions. On several occasions, the author wit­ from one of the largest conflicts in history, nessed ineffective predator missions because whereas the italian air effort in iraq drew sup­ he could not obtain air-traffic deconfliction port from a relatively small number of heli­ over busy areas such as Baghdad or last-minute copters and predators (10 and four, respec­ changes to the air tasking order. Flights were tively). unity of command, unity of effort, and sometimes cancelled at the last minute, result­

Chianese.indd 49 7/31/07 12:40:34 PM 50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

ing in frustration and wasted effort for both could prove dangerous because of the strong the predator crews and the tasking agencies in temptation to control these aircraft at the tac­ rome. tical level, which would prevent optimum em­ When broadcasting capability of satellite ployment and even abort operational innova­ imagery became available and the chief of the tion. in particular, one could conclude that permanent joint task force in rome began to predators are too expensive if one uses them receive predator imagery, strategic needs soon simply to watch what happens on the other side trumped tactical ones, and the C2 architec­ of the hill—a role for which pointers and other ture appeared even more inappropriate than kinds of uaVs have been specifically engineered. before. When, for example, other com­ imperfect understanding of the characteris­ mands—such as the British in Basra or intelli­ tics and missions of predators could jeopardize gence agencies in rome—tasked specific stra­ the potential roles of uaVs in the italian armed tegic missions, only vague priority criteria forces since their cost-effectiveness might ap­ existed to deconflict missions assigned at the pear insufficient. tactical level. this situation forced the air in the near future, technology will offer component commander to seek clarification italians better opportunities to link predator and case-by-case authorizations from rome, a imagery to a strategic headquarters in italy or task made even more difficult by limited se­ a CaOC anywhere in the world. uaVs may cure communications. Since predators originally “fell in” as an or­ have an attack role, and their flights will re­ ganic tactical asset under the deployed joint quire integration into a more complex and task force commander, no special mechanism robust air effort—likely at a CaOC. One will was in place at higher levels of command to understand and employ them as more than a deal with immediate operational issues. there tactical asset, but current italian C2 relation­ was no continuously functioning operations ships and capabilities are not up to the task. center with visibility or decisional authority Learning how to command and control uaVs over uaV missions in rome, the source of from a distance takes time and resources—im­ many strategic predator missions. One had to provisation is not an option. process necessary clearances during working hours, coordinate extensively with different Operational Control: An Examination of Alternatives offices, and—since no one was officially in ultimately, one develops doctrinal principles charge—obtain authorizations from the high­ from real-world experience.42 in iraq, the est levels. this resulted in confusion, frustra­ chief of the permanent joint task force chose tion at all levels of command, a slower decision- to delegate OpCOn of uaVs to the national making process, and unclear prioritization of missions. additionally, some italian joint task contingent commander, who, in practical force commanders regarded predators as a terms, served as the land component com­ limited resource for the fulfilment of the ital­ mander deployed into the aOr (air force per­ ian contingent’s mission in iraq, despite the sonnel comprised only 3 percent of the total 43 significant expenditure of money needed to italian force). this modus operandi—assign­ rent the satellite bandwidth required to fly ing OpCOn of air assets to the deployed joint strategic missions tasked by rome.41 these ex­ task force commander—has been used in ev­ amples demonstrate why we must take a fresh ery past italian expeditionary joint operation, look at our doctrine and ad hoc C2, particu­ and the joint task force commander is usually larly the assumption that uaVs should remain an army officer. But since 1995 americans under a land component commander de­ have never assigned predator OpCOn to a de­ ployed in-theater. ployed land component commander, and we in doctrinal terms, americans have never should remember that uS forces have accu­ assigned predator OpCOn to a commander mulated more than a decade of operational deployed into a theater. the italian choice experience with uaVs.

Chianese.indd 50 7/31/07 12:40:34 PM PREDATOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 51

the first european deployment of uS any element outside the theater would have predators occurred during Operation nomad destroyed the usefulness of near-real-time im­ Vigil in april 1995 in support of Joint task agery. Surprisingly though, even the attain­ Force provide promise, based in Gjader, alba­ ment of full capability on 17 February 2006 nia. the joint task force’s headquarters pro­ changed nothing in the C2 structure, raising vided tasking through the Southern region the question “Why?”48 Joint Operations intelligence Center in naples, One possible explanation is that the italian italy. the natO CaOC in Vicenza, italy, per­ air Force has mainly deployed helicopters in formed the required airspace coordination.44 past joint or combined expeditionary opera­ the second european deployment occurred tions.49 typically considered an organic asset in March 1996 for Operation nomad endeavor of terrestrial units according to italian army in support of Operation Joint endeavor, with doctrine, helicopters have always remained predators based in taszar, Hungary. tasking under the OpCOn of the deployed task force came from a forward element of uS european commander since they better served tactical, Command through the uS national intelli­ rather than strategic, roles. Over the years, gence Cell at Vicenza, italy. OpCOn of the this has reinforced a doctrinal mind-set that if predators remained with european Command, one had to deploy land forces, any air asset 45 and natO’s CaOC exercised taCOn. (usually helicopters) would come under the One finds the same architecture in 1999 authority of a land component commander, during Operation allied Force in Kosovo, who also headed the joint task force. So when where the united States used predators for predators first deployed to iraq, a lack of op­ 46 the firsttime in the targeting role. Before al­ erational experience and the absence of preda­ lied Force, predators could transmit targeting tor doctrine led planners to assume they could imagery to their operators on the ground as be managed just like helicopters; thus, the part of the intelligence-collection network. deployed task force commander exercised During the Kosovo operation, the americans OpCOn of these aircraft. another plausible invented new processes to exploit predator reason for this choice is that the italian joint data feeds with advanced technology and pro­ task force already included a reconnaissance, cedures for analysis. Doing so enabled review surveillance, and target-acquisition army regi­ of predator video in real time, and analysts im­ ment equipped with pointer uaVs.50 the mediately provided pilots with the location of similar roles of predators and pointers may mobile Serb targets. in afghanistan and iraq, have led to the assumption that one could tasking came from uS Central Command’s manage their C2 in the same way. CaOC in al udeid, while imagery was cen­ trally analyzed in the united States, where operators remotely controlled the predator Recommendations missions and received imagery via satellite communications.47 So, forward air-command Based on the considerations discussed so far, elements exercised taCOn only—limited to what would represent the most appropriate C2 launching, recovering, and maintaining the architecture for italian predators in future ex­ aircraft; in none of these missions did the peditionary operations? First, the italian air americans delegate OpCOn to a land compo­ Force should review its air doctrine from an ex­ nent commander deployed in the aOr, as the peditionary perspective and articulate a strate­ italians have done in iraq. gic vision for near-term and midterm uaV op­ this does not mean second-guessing ital­ erations. it should incorporate current and ian military planners since at the beginning of future uaV capabilities and missions for sup­ the operations, that was the only option avail­ porting the joint force with near-real-time re­ able. in fact, until predators reached full op­ connaissance and surveillance and possibly tar­ erational capability, one could broadcast their get acquisition, as well as widely accepted imagery only within the theater, so OpCOn by doctrine on C2.51 additionally, uaV units

Chianese.indd 51 7/31/07 12:40:35 PM 52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

should support a single chain of command.52 and coalition operations.55 For instance, it the italian experience in iraq has confirmed awarded a $589 million contract to Lockheed what uS doctrine recognized as early as 1993: Martin Corporation to serve as the aOC when “uaV units are tasked to support more Weapon System integrator, evolving C2 cen­ than one command . . . simultaneously, degra­ ters to support net-centric joint and coalition dation of effectiveness can result.”53 operations worldwide.56 although the italian Second, uaV doctrine should also empha­ air Force may have neither the requirements size the appointment of a single air compo­ nor resources to go this far, it does need to nent commander, rather than two command­ carefully determine the aOC’s role in the C2 ers, in order to grant better unity of command of its uaVs, the ways in which it can play a role and simplicity. Deployed air units, typically a in better integrating uaV operations, and the joint air task group, should remain subordi­ resources it will apply toward the problem. nate to a single deployed commander with Figure 2 provides a basic sample layout for fu­ tactical command over all air assets and should ture C2 architectures in expeditionary opera­ receive a single air tasking order from the ital­ tions that assumes full connectivity with de­ ian air and space operations center (aOC), ployed uaVs: (1) a single, dual-hatted airman natO CaOC, or coalition CaOC, depending for helicopters (or other air assets) and preda­ on the nature of the conflict. tors (unity of command and simplicity) and (2) third, doctrine should describe the roles predator OpCOn assigned to the italian air of the national aOC and lay a foundation for Force’s joint force air component commander determining the necessary capabilities and re­ in italy and exercised through the aOC. sources it requires.54 the uS air Force has Giving OpCOn of uaVs exclusively to the dedicated tremendous effort to standing up joint force air component commander will en­ its aOCs as a “weapon system” to support joint sure command of air forces by an airman. the

Defense Chief of Staff (OPCOM) Rome

Chief, Permanent Joint Task Force Coalition/NATO Commander (OPCON) (OPCON) Rome, Italy

National Contingent Commander Joint Force Air Component Commander (OPCON on land forces) Dual Hatted (OPCON) Deployed Ferrara, Italy, or any US/NATO CAOC

Joint Air Task Group Air Component Commander (TACON) (TACON) TACON Deployed Deployed OPCON OPCOM OPCON to Helicopter UAV Coalition Assets Assets

Figure 2. Suggested notional C2 structure for future UAV deployments

Chianese.indd 52 7/31/07 12:40:35 PM PREDATOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 53

peculiarity of air assets in general, and preda­ aviation is toward unmanned systems, we must tors in particular, requires specifically trained be ready. the italian air Force, in particular, personnel and consolidated experience in the must ensure that its unmanned-aviation tech­ C2 of the air domain—better achieved by an nology is paired with sound, timely doctrine— airman. aFDD 1 makes it clear: “the axiom that starting with the fundamentals of C2. ‘airmen work for airmen, and the senior air­ if properly applied without overly bound­ man works for the joint force commander . . .’ ing or restricting creativity, basic principles not only preserves the principle of unity of and tenets such as unity of command, unity of command, it also embodies the principle of effort, simplicity, priority, airmen command­ simplicity.”57 as predators and future uaVs ing airmen, and appropriate levels of C2 will move closer to Douhet’s original vision, be­ offer a good starting point for future uaV coming a decisive asset in a “true war of move­ doctrine. in the specific case of predators, we ment,” they will indeed require “swift intuition” should not limit lessons learned to italian na­ and “swifter decision.” it follows, then, that we tional experience. rather, we must include other valuable perspectives, such as those of must empower the joint force air component the americans, since they have operated the commander to both command and control. same system worldwide for more than a de­ cade. Our way forward will require not only an Conclusion investment in technology but also an intellec­ tual investment. as Douhet’s proud succes­ antica Babilonia was the first military opera­ sors, we cannot morally afford to ignore his tion with predator uaVs for the italian armed teachings. For the italian air Force, the time forces. Because the general trend in military to change is now. q

Notes

1. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v., “Mq-1 predator,” bat ended. “president Bush announces Major Combat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/rq-1_predator (accessed Operations in iraq Have ended,” The White House, 1 May 8 February 2007). 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 2. air Force Doctrine Document (aFDD) 1, Air Force 05/20030501-15.html. Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 1. 17. “Multi-national Force-iraq,” SourceWatch, 2 Sep­ 3. ibid., 3. tember2006,http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title 4. quoted in ibid., 2. =Multi-national_Force-iraq. the national operational di­ 5. J. F. C. Fuller quoted in ibid., 4. rective (Direttiva Operativa Nazionale in italian) is the mili­ 6. ibid. tary directive describing the assigned mission and C2 rela­ 7. quoted in aFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 16 Feb­ tionship among units. Direttiva Operativa nazionale ruary 2001, 1. (this document was replaced by a new ver­ COi-O-153-r (roma: Comando Operativo di Vertice sion as of 1 June 2007.) interforze, april 2005). 8. quoted in ibid., 13. 18. the three generals held the following positions: 9. “rq-1 predator Mae uaV, Mq-9a predator B,” chief, coalition operations (Multi-national Force-iraq), GlobalSecurity.org, 20 October 2006, http://www.global deputy commander/itSnr (Multi-national Corps-iraq), security.org/intell/systems/predator.htm. and deputy commander (Multi-national Division-Southeast). 10. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20. Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-Opr-153-r. (restricted) 11. ibid., 26. information extracted is unclassified. 12. ibid., 32. 19. an italian general was permanently ap­ 13. quoted in aFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 43. pointed as deputy commander, Multi-national Division- 14. ibid. Southeast. Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-Opr-153-r. 15. Ministero della Difesa, “Comando Operativo di (restricted) information extracted is unclassified. Vertice interforze (COi), Cosa è,” 2003, http://www.difesa 20. Wikipedia: L’enciclopedia libera, s.v., “Guerra in iraq” .it/SMD/COi/cosa-è.htm. (see “il coinvolgimento italiano”), http://it.wikipedia 16. On 1 May 2003, from the aircraft carrier uSS Abra­ .org/wiki/Guerra_in_iraq#il_coinvolgimento_italiano ham Lincoln, pres. George W. Bush declared major com- (accessed 5 February 2007).

Chianese.indd 53 7/31/07 12:40:36 PM 54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

21. Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-Opr-153-r. 40. “Operazione antica Babilonia,” air Component (restricted) information extracted is unclassified. Commander quarterly report (poggio renatico: Comando 22. ibid. Operativo Forze aeree, May 2006). 23. Joint publication (Jp) 3-16, Multinational Opera­ 41. ibid. tions, 7 March 2007, ii-5. 42. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 7. 24. natO Standardization agency, aap-6 (2007), 43. Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-O-153-r (roma: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions(English and French), Comando Operativo di Vertice interforze, april 2005). 2-t-2, http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm. 44. “rq-1 predator Mae uaV, Mq-9a predator B.” 25. ibid., 2-O-3. 45. ibid. 26. ibid. 46. Statement of General John P. Jumper, Commander, United 27. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 93. the italian States Air Forces in Europe, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 26 October armed forces refer to aDCOn as comando gerarchico—typical 1999, http://house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/ of an air expeditionary unit commander. normally, this 99-10-26jumper.htm. authority includes tactical command over operational 47. according to the author’s experience in the daily units, so the predator’s case has been an exception. uaV tasking process in tallil, all predator missions had to 28. Ministero della Difesa, “Comando Operativo.” be coordinated with uS Central Command air Forces’ 29. For this operation, the term air component com­ CaOC in al udeid, qatar, which disseminated the air mander identifies the uaV (only) air component com­ tasking order after the appropriate air-traffic deconfliction. mander. His authority did not affect helicopter assets, 48. “Operazione antica Babilonia.” which remained under a separate authority (commander 49. after World War ii, italian tactical aircraft have of the joint air task group). the author was uaV air com­ flown in joint and combined combat operations in only ponent commander from December 2005 to May 2006. two cases: Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991, the Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-O-153-r. firstcombat mission since World War ii) and allied Force 30. the joint air task group (Reparto Operativo Au­ in 1999. “L’aeronautica Militare Oggi: La Guerra del tonomo in italian) was based on an air force helicopter Golfo,” Aeronautica Militare, 9 September 2002, http:// squadron for combat and a dual-role www.aeronautica.difesa.it/SitoaM/Default.asp?idsez=21 &idarg=25&idente=1394; and Wikipedia: L’enciclopedia libera, (attack and mobility) army squadron. ibid. s.v., “Operazione allied Force” (see “La partecipazione 31. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20. italiana”), http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operazione_allied 32. the joint air task group was based on two air force _Force#La_partecipazione_italiana. squadrons (one equipped with helicopters for search and 50. Direttiva Operativa nazionale COi-O-153-r. rescue and the other equipped with predators for intelli­ 51. unlike the uS predator, the current version of gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions) and the italian air Force’s predator lacks target-designation one army squadron (equipped with attack helicopters). capability. 33. the air component commander reported daily 52. Jp 3-55.1, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and quarterly to the italian Comando Operativo Forze Target Acquisition and Support for Joint Operations, 14 april aeree (COFa), based in poggio renatico (Ferrara), italy. 1993. even if it is no longer current, this publication under­ Commanded by the joint force air component com­ lines some capstones and tenets that remain important, mander, the COFa had only logistic support authority such as those in chapter 2, “employment.” See http:// over predators. nevertheless it received quarterly reports www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-55_1/3-55_1c2.htm. from the air component commander and joint air task 53. ibid. group commander, as the air force command. 54. the italian aOC is presently embedded in a ma­ 34. Official news of the predator accident was reported jor command—the COFa (see note 33), colocated with to the joint force air component commander in italy in natO’s CaOC 5 in poggio renatico, italy. this means May 2006 at the COFa during a briefing by the air compo­ that the integration between the national and natO C2 nent commander on the postmission report. this informa­ functions could also be enhanced for future coalition tion has also appeared in the quarterly Operation antica uaV operations if natO’s joint force air component Babilonia report, but details remain classified. On the Web, commander and his aOC exercise OpCOn. one can find general information in specialized inter­ 55. the air and Space Operations Center - Weapon national magazines. See “italian predator Crashes in iraq,” System, an/uSq-163 Falconer, for example, is the senior Air-Attack.com, 18 May 2006, http://www.air-attack.com/ element of the uS theater air control system. the cost of news/news_article/1617/italian-predator-Crashes-in this program in 2004 was $26.982 million. See various un­ -iraq.html. classifiedexhibits regarding the air and Space Operation 35. author’s participation in postmission briefings and Center - Weapon System, February 2005, http://www experience drafting procedures for predator recovery in .dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/airForce/0207410F.pdf. Operation antica Babilonia. 56. John McHale, “eSC awards $589 Million aOC 36. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20. Weapon-System integrator Contract,” Military and Aerospace 37. ibid., 29. Electronics, October 2006, http://mae.pennnet.com/articles/ 38. aFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 5. article_display.cfm?article_id=275862. 39. Jp 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, ii-1. 57. aFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, x.

Chianese.indd 54 7/31/07 12:40:36 PM Military Institutional Communication Its Geostrategic Importance

Dr. AlexAnDre Sergio DA rochA*

Editorial Abstract: Foreign-language military journals such as Air and Space Power Journal in Portuguese have supported US national policy since the 1940s by disseminating the Air Force’s operational concepts and fostering coalition military operations. Dr. da Rocha, a Bra zilian professor, highlights the strategic importance of the world’s Portuguese-speaking na tions, contending that journals published in languages other than English are especially vital for building international understanding among militaries.

ince the end of World War ii, the US military has recognized the importance of military institutional communication and has used academic-professional Sjournals as a prime medium for conducting it. Reading the editorial in the fourth-quarter 1999 issue of Airpower Journal, Brazilian edition (now Air and Space Power Journal em Português), one discovers that the Portuguese and Spanish editions of the Journal, originally called Air University Quarterly Review, began with a letter dated 1 december 1948 from Gen George c. Kenney, Air University commander, to Gen hoyt S. Vandenberg, chief of staff of the US Air Force (USAF). General Kenney asked for permission to launch the aforementioned foreign-language publications.1 By granting permis sion, the USAF followed the example set by the US Army, whose professional journal, Airpower Journal to Aerospace Power Journal and Military Review, had appeared in Spanish and then, more recently, to Air and Space Power Portuguese since 1945. in fact, the USAF swiftly Journal (ASPJ ), but the effort has continued embraced the cause of foreign-language insti uninterrupted for more than 50 years, and its tutional communication because the Spanish purpose has never changed. and Portuguese editions of Air University Quar Many senior military leaders from the terly Review began only about one year after United States and Spanish- and Portuguese- the USAF became an independent service in speaking countries have expressed their ap 1947. the journal’s name later changed from preciation for the contribution made by the

*the author wishes to thank Mr. Almerisio Lopes, editor of Air and Space Power Journal em Português, for kindly providing or confirming data related to the Journal, especially about the number of articles contributed.

55

Da Rocha.indd 55 7/31/07 12:41:18 PM 56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

foreign-language editions of the Journal, as we this article makes three points. First, dis can read in the 50th-anniversary commemora semination of core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, tive issues of both those journals from 1999. operational art, and current issues in order to however, their messages are not just congratu promote significant operational advancements is latory in nature. in fact, they provide an as very important—if not essential—to support sessment of the publication’s value to the ing US military activities worldwide in defense USAF and the air forces of countries that com of US national-security interests. this claim prise the target audience of these editions. was true in the aftermath of World War ii and Referring to the journals, Gen Lloyd W. is even more so today in an era when com “Fig” newton, then commander of Air educa bined military operations and coalition war tion and training command, commented, fare are clear US foreign-policy imperatives. “through the years, their thought-provoking Second, academic-professional journals in articles have helped provide the intellectual languages other than english are particularly framework for our institutions and have pro appropriate for reaching the goals of USAF moted significant operational advancements” (em leaders, mentioned above. third, due to geo 2 phasis added). Maj Gen (Brigadeiro) José strategic considerations, the existence of spe Américo dos Santos, then commander of the cialized vehicles for military institutional com University/Air War col munication in Portuguese is even more lege, pointed out that the Portuguese edition imperative today than it was 59 years ago, when was relevant and instrumental for “updating General Kenney asked for approval to publish data regarding military equipment and em what is now the Portuguese edition of ASPJ. ployment doctrine.”3 he also declared that “Airpower Journal has . . . becom[e] the refer ence publication of choice in the country’s The Need to Share Knowledge professional military education environment.”4 Gen Michael e. Ryan, then the USAF chief of in her article “Operation iraqi Freedom: staff, noted that coalition Operations,” Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner, Royal Air Force, writes that both Latin American editions have become widely read and respected by airmen through we, the US and UK militaries, left the end of out the more than 25 Spanish- and Portuguese- phase three of Operation iraqi Freedom having speaking countries of the Western hemisphere, worked successfully as a coalition and having europe, and Africa. the journals disseminate core faced practical challenges along the way. We can USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art and see that these were largely overcome through a current issues. Both editions play a very important combination of fortuitous timing (an extended role in strengthening our relationship with their air planning period), strong personal relationships force audiences. they also serve to educate, develop (particularly at the senior levels), mutual depen and nurture these officersas their careers progress. dence and burden sharing . . . and a motivation By shaping the dialogue among airmen, the to find common ground and to engineer solu journals bring them closer together across the tions to any problems that threatened the coali 5 geographical and cultural lines separating them. tion’s integrity. Most importantly, trust was es (emphasis added) tablished at all levels. For the future, whether we So one can see that the medium for military consider either mindset, doctrine, and culture, institutional communication with Spanish- and or equipment, concept of operations, and in teroperability—it is mutual cooperation and contact Portuguese-speaking countries initiated by the which will provide us with the best chance of USAF immediately after its own inception has staying in step.6 (emphasis added) had a specific goal of “disseminat[ing] core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational Lt col Frank M. Graefe of the German air art and current issues” (General Ryan’s words) force expressed similar concepts in his article in order to promote “significant operational “tomorrow’s Air Warfare: A German Perspec advancements” (General newton’s words). tive on the Way Ahead”:

Da Rocha.indd 56 7/31/07 12:41:19 PM MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 57

due to the United States’ military-pioneering ties through the proper working of weapon role and technological superiority, that country systems and tools for guidance, communica will predominantly determine the developments tion, and so forth, or the commander’s expec in warfare over the next several decades. there tations about the strategic and operational per fore, one would do well to take a closer look at formance of troops under his or her watch, the US policy documents and strategy papers that will without shared understanding, misunderstand govern such developments and to draw lessons from the US conduct of operations during Op ings will certainly occur—and misunderstand eration iraqi Freedom. doing so will help iden ings in warfare oftentimes lead to death and tify the changes that coalition partners of the undesired destruction. United States have to follow in order to ensure com patibility in terms of the conduct of operations.7 (em phasis added) The Need for Military Institutional Awareness of the need for mutual under Communication in Languages standing between the US military and its mili other than English tary allies seems so important to US policy makers that a number of schools in the United Regardless of the value of contacts among States afford the opportunity for contact militaries of different countries, they do not among these militaries. Such is the case with constitute a suitable replacement method for Air War college, Air command and Staff col disseminating core USAF doctrine, strategy, lege, and Squadron OfficerSchool, all located policy, operational art, and current issues at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; through academic-professional journals—the command and General Staff college, Fort main source of what Gen José Américo re Leavenworth, Kansas; Army War college, car ferred to as updating data regarding military lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; naval War college, equipment and employment doctrine. newport, Rhode island; naval Postgraduate School, Presidio of Monterey, california; as The Need to Publish in Languages other than English well as the inter-American defense college; today one can imagine deeming english an national defense University; and the center international language. if so, then english for hemispheric defense Studies, all located language media for military institutional com in Washington, dc. munication would achieve the objective of At these institutions, the mutual coopera disseminating core USAF doctrine, strategy, tion and contact (mentioned by Squadron policy, operational art, and current issues in Leader Gardner) to foster compatibility in order to promote significant operational ad terms of the conduct of operations (pointed vancements. this, however, is not the case. out as an interoperability requirement by col John conway’s article “the View from Lieutenant colonel Graefe) do effectively occur. the tower of Babel: Air Force Foreign Language in fact, such contact also offers a way to better Posture for Global engagement” discusses the familiarize allied militaries with US military need for proficientforeign-language speakers doctrine, strategy, policy, and operational art in the Air Force to assure appropriate mutual and to enable significantoperational advance understanding and operational effectiveness ments. these outcomes are also important when American troops interact with personnel products of the successful USAF institutional from non-english-speaking countries during communication efforts by the foreign-language military operations.8 Such mutual understand ASPJ editions because operational advance ing requires (1) that people speak a common ments are a prerequisite for interoperability. language, and (2) that they communicate in When people must work together, knowledge the other country’s language instead of in sharing becomes essential as a basis for achiev english. thus, the USAF understands that it ing shared understanding. Whether involving should not expect effective conveyance of its the meaning of words denoting specificactivi message to allies without providing US per

Da Rocha.indd 57 7/31/07 12:41:19 PM 58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

sonnel proficient in foreign languages—even to tary recruiting. Abroad, legitimacy will affect the deal with the simplest matters concerning situa military contributions of our allies, basing op tions of everyday life. in terms of disseminating tions, transportation routes for force deploy core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational ment and re-supply, and grassroots support for art, and current issues in order to promote sig terrorist or insurgent attacks against U.S. forces, among other considerations. . . . nificant operational advancements—certainly a more subtle and complex matter—one could . . . Legitimate military operations will promote not expect full understanding without ex public expressions of support from a wide variety pressing the ideas in the foreign reader’s own of non-aligned sources: national leaders or their language. Again, to recall the ideas of Squad official spokespeople, international organiza ron Leader Gardner and Lieutenant colonel tions, political or special interest groups, other Graefe, such an understanding is essential to opinion leaders like academics or clerics, or populations as a whole.9 interoperability. Moreover, military institutional communi So legitimacy can be essential to the success of cation is not directed only to a military audience military operations, especially in coalition whose interests could focus on topics such as warfare. technical instruction, knowledge about ad Legitimacy implies conforming to recog vances in available war-fighting technology, nized principles or accepted rules and stan doctrine, and operational art. One must pay dards, which brings about, in people affected attention to other issues beyond the specific by a decision or action whose legitimacy comes aspect of military interoperability. For example, under scrutiny, the willingness to bear the re through military institutional communica sults of such a decision or an action. Of course, tion, foreign military and civilian leaders can good information about the basis and justifi become better informed about US military cation for the decisions or actions at stake goals and procedures. having these leaders serves as a fundamental part in building their understand this information can prove crucial legitimacy. the dissemination of good infor to American interests when a country has to mation requires making it available in the lan decide whether or not to participate in US-led guage of the people whose acknowledgment coalitions or vote for or against American in of the legitimacy of such decisions or actions terests on relevant matters of common defense one desires. therefore, military institutional or foreign policy in international deliberating communication has relevance to disseminat forums. Because democracy is gradually be ing information about technology, doctrine, coming a global way of life, one cannot, in and operational art. this communication per turn, restrict such decisions to a national elite haps becomes even more important to instill or an oligarchy. Rather, the decision needs to ing within the population of a country whose find legitimacy among the other country’s support for those actions one desires, the idea population. of legitimizing planned or executed military in his article “Planning for Legitimacy: A actions. One can view recent decisions to be Joint Operational Approach to Public Affairs,” gin publishing Arabic, French, and chinese Maj tadd Sholtis shows the importance of le editions of Air and Space Power Journal as sup gitimacy as a center of gravity for military pub porting this reasoning. thus it seems clear lic affairs: that a country with global interests, such as Legitimacy derives from real and readily appar the United States, must maintain a significant ent behaviors or effects that define the func effort in military institutional communication tional relationships between the military and in languages other than english. key publics. domestically, such behaviors would include the extent of political maneuvering or The Utility of Academic-Professional Journals public protests against military actions, imposed tactical restrictions on fire and maneuver, and Academic-professional journals meet the re blows to unit morale, defense spending and mili quirements of disseminating ideas and retain

Da Rocha.indd 58 7/31/07 12:41:20 PM MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 59

ing legitimacy. First, they are essential for up trappings of democracy—use homonoia as a dating the target audience’s information on preferred tool for manipulating people. So a issues that concern them. indeed, the number procedure of institutional communication of military officerswho become aware of tech that self-imposes the constraints of a rational nological innovations or innovative strategic discussion conducive to consensus benefits analyses by reading academic-professional from a net advantage as a foundation for le journals is far greater than the number of gitimacy. this is precisely what happens in the those who can leave their units for an extended case of academic-professional journals. time to learn or participate in exchange pro grams with professional-military-education in stitutions abroad. Also, journals can reach a Geostrategic Considerations greater variety of audiences, including aca in Finding Target Audiences demics, decision makers, and people at large who have an interest in political and strategic for Military Institutional studies. Such individuals exercise a multiplier Communication effect merely by conveying the acquired ideas to other people and offering new ones emerg having established that military institutional ing from reflection about what they have communication with non-english-speaking learned through the journals. in this case, they countries must occur through academic- present feedback that generates debate and professional journals in languages other than helps to illuminate technical issues as well as english, we must examine which languages promote intellectual solidarity among research deserve preference. in fact, budgetary con ers who participate in the conversation—both straints always impose the need for choices effects are important to accomplishing the based on priorities. As mentioned before, goals of military institutional communication. more than 50 years ago the USAF, like the US Moreover, if the journal maintains high aca Army, became aware of the usefulness of pub demic standards, it acquires intellectual pres lishing journals in Spanish and Portuguese for tige, which adds value to the information the military institutional communication. One can journal conveys, making the published infor easily understand the choice of the Spanish mation automatically worthy of attention and language for a journal on the grounds of obvi reflection from potential readers. now comes ous US interests in Spanish-speaking countries the legitimacy issue. located in its neighborhood—Mexico and Legitimacy is far better attained by means central American countries—whose citizens of open and serious debate through an aca comprise a significant percentage of the US demic journal than through propaganda. Free population. But why Portuguese? and good-faith academic debate seeks to reach in his article “Origins of Western hemi a consensus, which means a “kind of collective spheric defense: Airpower against the U-Boats,” consciousness attained as a result of rational Maj Roger J. Witek comments on the geostra discussion.”10 consensus contrasts with homonoia, tegic importance of the South Atlantic from a Greek word literally meaning sameness of an airpower point of view. in his discussion, minds and connoting a “kind of collective con the South Atlantic means primarily Brazil and sciousness attained through an emotional Argentina, one a Portuguese-speaking coun venue, resulting from behavioral condition try and the other Spanish-speaking.12 taking ing through the employment of rites, forceful into account the role played by different coun discipline and other means—more or less tries during World War ii, one sees that nego subtle—to crystallize reflexes.”11 tiations which led to the establishment of a US history clearly shows that consensus serves air base in the Brazilian city of natal, essential as a typical source of decisions in democracies, to US military operations in north Africa, re while dictatorships—especially those that dis flect Brazil’s geostrategic importance. how guise themselves by adopting some external ever, a classic geostrategic analysis of Brazil’s

Da Rocha.indd 59 7/31/07 12:41:20 PM 60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

stature in the international equation lies be world powers. Analysts commonly rank the yond the scope of this article. Among the rea world’s economies by GnP values—well sons for not conducting such an analysis are known, widely employed economic indicators. innovations in war-fighting technology that Military expenditures synthesize several vari have brought significantchanges to the strate ables, encompassing not only the size of the gic meaning of several variables that one military but also its technological sophistica should consider. tion, factoring in the relationship between hence, we will look for more objective pa weapon complexity and expenditure. Both rameters to help make our point. We base our features seem reasonable criteria for gauging contention that the Portuguese language has potential military effectiveness. Additionally, been and remains indispensable to US mili military expenditure has the advantage of tak tary institutional communication on the values ing into account aspects related to science of a potential indicator (Pi)—an index of the and technology, at least in military applica geostrategic relevance of various countries in tions. the product of these four variables for the world, based on variables traditionally as each country represents its Pi value. to ensure sociated with expectations of a country’s pos uniformity of data, we have drawn the vari sibly becoming a world power. After classifying ables’ values from the current edition of The the countries of the world by Pi, one sees that World Factbook, published by the central intel Brazil merits a significant communication ef ligence Agency. Since that reference does not fort in its language. include the value for Russian military expen ditures, we obtained that figurefrom the Web The Potential Indicator—Trying an Objective Analysis site of the Armed Forces of the Russian Fed Building indicators is a traditional technique eration. For Russia, despite the lack of assur for quantifying variables relevant to measur ance of methodological uniformity in obtain ing a phenomenon. When such measurement ing the value, one may reasonably assume that depends on several variables, the numerical values do not diverge by an order of magni indicator that measures it must consist of a tude. Because our analysis uses orders of mag composite of those variables, and the indica nitude only, an occasional discrepancy will not tor’s value must be directly proportional to invalidate the argument. the variables positively correlated with the to validate this indicator, we applied it to phenomenon—as well as inversely related to countries usually considered the most important those negatively correlated with it. in the world through the use of the size-of traditionally, one evaluates a country’s po economy criterion, as shown by those nations’ tential in the psychosocial, political, economic, respective GnP values. the results validate Pi and military realms. thus, the Pi proposed as an indicator of relevance on the world scene here consists of a composition of meaningful (table 1). the table does not show Portuguese- variables from these four realms of national and Spanish-speaking countries because they power. Moreover, for optimum usefulness, appear in tables 2 and 3. One can see that the one must build the indicator on variables with Pi values reflect the importance generally as objectively measured, well-known, and avail sociated with countries. Specifically, the calcu able values for every element—in this case lus of the US Pi is consistent with its position countries—that we compare. therefore, we as the world’s sole superpower. the Russian Pi have chosen the following variables: popula reflectsthe country’s importance after the col tion (psychosocial), territorial area (political), lapse of the Soviet Union. gross national product (GnP) (economic), and We can also determine the Pi for countries military expenditures (military). to which the USAF distributes Portuguese and these variables are widely acknowledged as Spanish editions of ASPJ (tables 2 and 3). partial Pis. One usually deems countries with table 2 shows that the Brazilian Pi greatly ex large populations and vast territories potential ceeds that of any other Portuguese-speaking

Da Rocha.indd 60 7/31/07 12:41:21 PM MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 61

Table 1. PI values for states whose GNP exceeds 1x1012 US dollars

A B C D PI Population Territorial GNP Military (integer part of x10 6 people area x US$ 10 9 expenditure AxBxCxD) x 106 km 2 (PPP)a x US$ 10 9 World 6,446.131 148.940 59,380 750.000 42,757,463,462,020 United States 295.734 9.631 12,370 370.700 13,060,654,048 China 1,306.314 9.597 8,158 67.490 6,902,496,661 Japan 127.417 0.378 3,867 45.841 8,537,829 India 1,080.264 3.288 3,678 18.860 246,385,489 Germany 82.431 0.357 2,446 35.063 2,523,854 United Kingdom 60.441 0.245 1,867 42.836 1,184,271 France 60.656 0.547 1,816 45.000 2,711,374 Italy 58.103 0.301 1,645 28.182 810,780 Russia 143.420 17.075 1,535 18.000 67,663,010 Canada 32.805 9.985 1,077 9.801 3,457,596

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), http://www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook (accessed 6 March 2006). Data on Russian military expenditures comes from Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, http://www.ufaqs.com/wiki/en/ar/Armed%20Forces%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation.htm. aGNP in purchasing power parity (PPP) (US dollars)

country. table 3 shows that Mexico has the strated by the special-status policies applied greatest Pi among Spanish-speaking countries. to these countries by the United States— One can also categorize countries by the for instance, US agreements to provide india order of magnitude of their Pi (table 4). with the latest generation of weaponry three countries have Pis of an extremely high without requiring interruption of that order of magnitude: the United States, china, country’s nuclear program. Brazil follows and india. Such values reflectthe geostrategic Russia in an intermediate category—very high importance of china and india, demon Pi—between the three gigantic countries

Table 2. Portuguese-speaking countries (target audience for the Portuguese edition of ASPJ)

A B C D PI Population Territorial GNP Military (integer part of x10 6 people area x US$ 10 9 expenditure AxBxCxD) x 106 km 2 (PPP)a x US$ 10 9 Angola 11.827 1.247 28 0.184 76 Brazil 186.113 8.512 1,580 11.000 27,533,289 Cape Verde 0.418 0.004 3 0.014 0 Guiné-Bissau 1.416 0.036 1 0.009 0 Mozambique 19.407 0.802 26 0.117 47 Portugal 10.566 0.092 195 3.497 663 Sao Tome and Principe 0.187 0.000001 0.2 0.0007 0 East Timor 1.041 0.015 0.4 0.004 0

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), http://www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook (accessed 6 March 2006). aGNP in purchasing power parity (PPP) (US dollars)

Da Rocha.indd 61 7/31/07 12:41:21 PM 62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Table 3. Spanish-speaking countries (target audience for the Spanish edition of ASPJ)

A B C D PI Population Territorial GNP Military (integer part of x10 6 people area x US$ 10 9 expenditure AxBxCxD) x 106 km 2 (PPP)a x US$ 10 9 Argentina 39.538 2.767 537 4.300 252,619 Bolivia 8.858 1.099 24 0.132 31 Colombia 42.954 1.139 303 3.300 48,920 Chile 15.981 0.756 181 3.430 7,501 Costa Rica 4.016 0.051 40 0.064 1 Dominican Republic 9.050 0.049 59 0.180 5 El Salvador 6.705 0.021 34 0.157 1 Spain 40.341 0.505 1,014 9.906 204,632 Ecuador 13.364 0.284 53 0.655 132 Guatemala 12.014 0.109 21 0.202 6 Honduras 6.975 0.112 21 0.101 2 Mexico 106.203 1.973 1,066 6.043 1,349,813 Nicaragua 5.465 0.129 16 0.032 0 Panama 3.140 0.078 22 0.147 1 Paraguay 6.348 0.407 31 0.053 4 Peru 27.926 1.285 169 0.829 5,028 Uruguay 3.416 0.176 33 0.257 5 Venezuela 25.376 0.912 162 1.678 6,291

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), http://www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook (accessed 6 March 2006). aGNP in purchasing power parity (PPP) (US dollars)

Table 4. Distribution of countries according their PI values

Extremely High Very High High Fairly High Significant Order of Magnitude Order of Magnitude Order of Magnitude Order of Magnitude Order of Magnitude (>108) (10 7) (10 6) (10 5) (between 10 3 and 10 4) United States Russia Japan Italy Colombia China Brazil Canada Argentina Chile India France Spain Venezuela Germany Peru Mexico United Kingdom

(United States, china, and india) and pow gentina is located between italy and Spain in ers such as Japan, canada, France, Germany, the group whose Pi is an order of magnitude Mexico, and the United Kingdom. One should smaller than Mexico’s—fairly high Pi. Among note that Mexico follows the main european Spanish-speaking countries, we find colom countries and Japan, even though its Pi is an bia, chile, Venezuela, and Peru in the signifi order of magnitude lower than Brazil’s. Ar cant Pi category.

Da Rocha.indd 62 7/31/07 12:41:22 PM MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 63

PI as a Leading Criterion for Military Institutional of special concern in US foreign policy, inde Communication pendently of their Pis. however, since Brazil has a Pi just below Pi offers an objective criterion to assert a lan that of the three giants (United States, china, guage’s geostrategic importance, putting aside and india) and Russia, and above that of Ja fallacious reasoning, which could distort pan, canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and sound judgment. For instance, some people the United Kingdom, the US military cannot pay attention to the number of countries that afford to lack Portuguese-language media for share a language as their native tongue—an military institutional communication. there immaterial observation. each country is a dis fore, Portuguese editions of professional mili tinct political entity, with different people and tary journals merit continued priority from governments expressing different interests the US military leadership. Furthermore, such and political wills on the world scene. english a quantitative argument corresponds with quali has acquired its present global relevance be tative considerations when one notes the in cause it is the language of the world’s sole super creasing influence of Brazilian foreign policy power, not because it is the language of a in Portuguese-speaking African countries such number of countries without any geostrategic as Angola and Mozambique—regionally rele meaning—or because of the number of eng vant countries whose Pi analysis lies beyond lish speakers around the world. the scope of this article. however, the recent One should note that during the apogee of decision to publish a French edition of Air and the British empire, no one acknowledged Space Power Journal, aimed at reaching primarily english as the international language because, the French-speaking African countries, shows regardless of the United Kingdom’s status as a that the USAF recognizes Africa’s growing very important world power, its geostrategic geostrategic importance. Moreover, the posi level of importance was comparable to that of tion of Brazil in South America and its policy other colonial powers. Only after the United of continental integration—inscribed as a rule States became a superpower, especially after in the Brazilian constitution as of 1988—ex its rise to the status of sole superpower, did tend its influence to Spanish-speaking neigh english become the world’s lingua franca. bors with fairly significant Pis. Similarly, the relevance of Spanish to US military As a matter of fact, US officialshave made a institutional communication has no relation number of comments regarding Brazil’s geo ship to the number of Spanish-speaking coun strategic importance. during her confirma tries or Spanish speakers. Rather, the promi tion hearing before the Senate Foreign Rela tions committee after being nominated by nence of that language reflects the existence of Pres. George W. Bush as secretary of state, countries such as Mexico (whose Pi has an order condoleezza Rice declared that “the U.S. rela of magnitude of 106) and Argentina (whose Pi 5 tionship with Brazil is ‘extremely critical to has an order of magnitude of 10 ). the region’ [and] applauded Brazil’s leader Of course, in specific cases one must take ship of the U.n. stabilization mission in into account geostrategic considerations other haiti.”13 during his visit to Brasilia, Brazil’s than Pi. For instance, one cannot analyze Por capital, on 6 november 2005, President Bush tugal and Spain by their Pi while ignoring remarked, “Relations between Brazil and the their pertinence to the european Union. in United States are essential.”14 Another US of this sense, Argentina’s Pi is more relevant to a ficial, commerce deputy Secretary david geostrategic analysis of Argentina than Spain’s Sampson, stated that “the United States and Pi is to Spain because the latter, as a member Brazil are ‘close friends’ and that strong U.S. of the european Union, findsitself in a differ Brazil leadership is important for the Latin ent context. Likewise, specificAmerican inter American region.”15 ests in central America and the caribbean however, one findsthe most expressive syn make the countries in those regions a source thesis of Brazil’s present relevance on the

Da Rocha.indd 63 7/31/07 12:41:23 PM 64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

world scene in an article titled “eyes on the national dialogue and enhance the already ac Americas,” which comments on canada’s con knowledged geostrategic importance of Brazil. nections with Latin America and describes Brazil as “an emerging priority”: The Portuguese Edition of While multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere is critical, canada’s relations with individual Air and Space Power Journal: countries of the region are also vital. A key tie is A Success Story with Brazil, an emerging giant comprising half of South America’s population and GdP [gross One can cite the Portuguese edition of domestic product], identified in canada’s re ASPJ as an example of the USAF’s successful cent international Policy Statement as a priority efforts in military institutional communica nation. tion. indeed, General José Américo writes that “Brazil is a major, sophisticated and influential “Airpower Journal has established itself as an player on the multilateral scene, whether it is in important vehicle for the exchange of ideas and world trade negotiations as leader of the G20 or has created a partnership between [the US Air in Un peacekeeping operations,” notes Florencia Force’s] Air University and the Brazilian Air Jubany, a senior policy analyst at the canadian University.”18 numerical data reinforces the Foundation for the Americas (FOcAL) in Ottawa. veracity of his assessment (table 5). the num “Brazil is also a central actor in the Americas, ber of articles by Portuguese-speaking authors and shares many points of convergence with published in the english and Portuguese edi canada’s own foreign policy.” tions of ASPJ since 2000 is impressive. the Jamal Khokhar, director General of the Latin existence of the Journal’s Portuguese edition America and caribbean Bureau at FAc [Foreign enabled the contribution of 24 Portuguese- Affairs canada], says that canada and Brazil speaking authors, who wrote 26 articles. during “not only share a hemisphere, they share goals, the same period, the Journal’s english edition priorities and—perhaps most important of all— published five articles by Portuguese-speaking values.” this makes the two countries natural partners, he says. “We are living in a world of ris authors. the Portuguese edition creates a valu ing powers and Brazil is one of those powers. able venue that allows english- and Portuguese canada appreciates Brazil’s leadership and be speaking militaries to exchange ideas about lieves it can make a difference in the hemi professional topics. sphere.”16 Brazil is a force behind South American in tegration and has played a moderating role, Table 5. Number of contributions to ASPJ by which is critical given the economic hardships Portuguese-speaking authors in neighboring Andean nations such as Bolivia and ecuador and the potential for political ASPJ ASPJ unrest there.17 Brazil’s consistent adherence Year (English) (Portuguese) to the principle of people’s self-determination 2000 4 worldwide and to the strengthening of its own 2001 1 2 democracy instills in its neighbors the confi 2002 1 dence to make the Brazilian government’s for 2003 1 mal or informal mediation a factor of stability 2004 4 in South America. Moreover, the good per 2005 2 4 sonal relations cultivated by Brazilian presi 2006 1 6 2007 1 4 dent Luis inácio Lula da Silva with President Total 5a 26b Bush as well as South American leaders such as Argentinean president nestor Kirchner, Source: Data provided by ASPJ staff. Venezuelan president hugo chavez, and Bo aThe five articles were written by four different authors. livian president evo Morales facilitate inter bThe 26 articles were written by 24 different authors.

Da Rocha.indd 64 7/31/07 12:41:23 PM MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 65

Conclusion to a geostrategic need in the aftermath of World War ii that remains fully valid today. Since the end of World War ii, the US mili One should avoid simplistic criteria for tary has been aware of the importance of us choosing the languages to promote military ing journals to disseminate core US doctrine, institutional communication. For example, strategy, policy, operational art, and current the number of countries or individuals who military issues for the benefit of militaries speak a particular language is immaterial com from non-english-speaking countries. that is pared to objective geostrategic considerations. why academic-professional journals such as Rather, a quantitative Pi comprised of popula the Spanish and Portuguese editions of Mili tion, territorial area, GnP, and military expen tary Review and Air University Quarterly Review— ditures can better measure the relative promi now Air and Space Power Journal—have come nence of nations. the Pis of various countries about. Such publications provide information can differ by orders of magnitude. the United to the US military’s allies concerning defense States, as the world’s sole superpower, has a Pi 10 policies, strategy, military technology, military whose order of magnitude is 10 , followed by 9 8 organization, and many other topics needed china (10 ), india (10 ), and Russia and Brazil 7 to enhance interoperability in case of partici (both 10 ). Among Spanish-speaking coun 6 pation in combined war-fighting operations. tries, Mexico has the greatest Pi (10 ). Academic-professional journals serve several Pi is an objective criterion of geostrategic im purposes. they promote debate, offer innova portance whose analysis validates the priority tive solutions to problems, and disseminate of the Portuguese language in the US mili tary’s efforts in institutional communication. information that allows easier understanding Of course, this does not suggest that the Span and more favorable analysis of US military ac ish language or efforts driven by other strate tivities by both military and civilian officials,as gic considerations are not worthy. instead, this well as people interested in political and stra article makes the point that the US military tegic studies. Such dissemination is also part must use Portuguese for communication be of an effort to build a sense of legitimacy cause the numeric value of Brazil’s Pi rein among allies regarding American military ac forces the recognition of that country’s geo tivities, generating the political and military strategic importance, as already acknowledged support needed in coalition warfare. by US and canadian officials. the successful the use of languages other than english is example of the Portuguese edition of Air and indispensable despite the increasing number Space Power Journal in attracting the participa of people familiar with that language. indeed, tion of Portuguese-speaking authors shows that full understanding of complex matters requires a Portuguese communication channel favors communication in the speaker’s or reader’s the exchange of ideas and dissemination of native tongue. it is not a coincidence that knowledge among an audience whose geostrate Spanish and Portuguese were the very first gic importance as a target for military institu languages chosen for such a dissemination of tional communication is guaranteed by the very knowledge. in fact, this choice was a response high order of magnitude of Brazil’s Pi. q

Notes

1. Almerisio B. Lopes, “editorial,” Aerospace Power Journal, 3. Maj Gen (Brigadeiro) José Américo dos Santos, Edição Brasileira, 4° trimestre, 1999, http://www.airpower “Airpower Journal: 50 anos de intercâmbio,” Airpower Journal, .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/4tri99/editoria.htm. Edição Brasileira, 4° trimestre, 1999, 8, http://www.airpower .maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/4tri99/santos.pdf. 2. “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Latin American edi 4. “Fiftieth Anniversary,” 65. tions of Aerospace Power Journal,” Aerospace Power Journal 13, 5. ibid., 63. no. 4 (Winter 1999): 64, http://www.airpower.maxwell 6. Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner, “Operation iraqi .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/win99/latam.pdf. Freedom: coalition Operations,” Air and Space Power Journal

Da Rocha.indd 65 7/31/07 12:41:23 PM 66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

18, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 98, http://www.airpower.maxwell Space Power Journal em Português, 4° trimestre, 2003, 14–30, .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/win04/win04.pdf. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/ 7. Lt col Frank M. Graefe, “tomorrow’s Air Warfare: apj-p/2003/4tri03/witek.html. A German Perspective on the Way Ahead,” Air and Space 13. Scott Miller, “Western hemisphere important to Power Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 39–40, http://www U.S. Agenda, Rice Says: United States Will Work to Pro .airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/ mote democracy, development in Region,” US depart fal05/fall05.pdf. ment of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/ 8. col John L. conway iii, “the View from the tower 2005/Jan/19-751896.html. of Babel: Air Force Foreign Language Posture for Global 14. Granja do torto, “President Bush Meets with Presi engagement,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Sum dent Lula of Brazil,” the White house, http://www.white mer 2005): 57–69, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ house.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051106-1.html airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/sum05.pdf. (accessed 6 March 2006). 9. Maj tadd Sholtis, “Planning for Legitimacy: A Joint 15. “U.S.-Brazil cooperation on trade is crucial, Says Operational Approach to Public Affairs,” Chronicles Online U.S. Official: commerce department Official Outlines Areas Journal, 8 June 2005, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af for closer cooperation,” US department of State, http:// .mil/airchronicles/cc/sholtis.html. usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2006/Jan/27-588350.html 10. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha, “Os Meios de Comuni (accessed 6 March 2006). cação Social como Fator de Poder no Mundo, em Particular no 16. “eyes on the Americas,” Canada World View 28 (Winter Continente Americano, e sua Influência na Formação da Cons 2006): 7, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/ ciência Nacional ” (paper presented to the iV Simpósio de issue28/menu-en.asp (accessed 12 november 2006). estudos estratégicos [Argentina-Brasil-Uruguai], Brasília, 17. Since the first publication of this article in the Air 1990), 13. and Space Power Journal em Português, developments in South 11. ibid. American international politics have only reinforced this 12. Maj Roger J. Witek, “Origins of Western hemi claim. spheric defense: Airpower against the U-Boats,” Air and 18. “Fiftieth Anniversary,” 65.

Da Rocha.indd 66 7/31/07 12:41:25 PM Offensive Airpower with Chinese Characteristics Development, Capabilities, and Intentions

Erik Lin-GrEEnbErG*

Editorial Abstract: Although China has traditionally employed its airpower in largely defensive air operations, this doctrine appears to be undergoing a significant shift. The author contends that China is developing limited capabilities in offensive airpower as a deterrent against its neighbors and American forces in the Pacific. Rather than implement a strategic airpower doctrine, China will develop “offensive airpower with Chinese characteristics,” a doctrine that uses traditionally tactical platforms to carry out strategic operations in China’s periphery.

n the 50th anniversary of the is capable of both attacking and defending.”1 People’s Liberation Army Air Force this marked a major shift in Chinese strategy. (PLAAF) in november 1999, Chi­ Since its establishment, the PLAAF intended nese president Jiang Zemin an­ its aircraft acquisitions, personnel training, Onounced that China would “strive to build a and doctrine for defensive air operations.2 to powerful, modernized People’s Air Force that carry out the offensive operations described

*the author wishes to thank edward Steinfeld; Lt Col timothy Slauenwhite, USAF; and the editors of the Air and Space Power Journal for their invaluable guidance and advice.

67

Lin-Greenberg.indd 67 7/31/07 12:42:40 PM 68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

by Jiang Zemin, the PLAAF needed to mod­ History of the Development of ernize its aircraft inventory; revise strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine; and revamp Chinese Offensive Airpower training programs. In recent years, the Chinese Certain events in the history of the PLAAF military has undergone rapid modernization caused its modern capabilities in offensive air to develop air-warfare capabilities. warfare to lag significantly behind those of this article examines the PLAAF’s air-warfare other world powers. the incompatibility of of­ capabilities and explains the nature of offen­ fensive airpower with Mao tse-tung’s doctrine sive Chinese airpower. In recent years, the of “People’s War” and the withdrawal of Soviet PLAAF has acquired new combat platforms military aid in 1960 during the Sino-Soviet rift and increased joint and combined training hampered the growth of strategic Chinese air- but has yet to develop strategic capabilities power by preventing the acquisition of new that allow it to strike targets outside the Pacific technologies and the development of a doc­ region.3 (According to Air Force Doctrine trine of offensive air warfare. Document [AFDD] 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Prior to a series of doctrinal changes in the strategic operations consist of “offensive 1980s and 1990s, the People’s Liberation action[s] . . . that most directly achieve our na­ Army (PLA), seeking guidance on confront­ tional security objectives by affecting the adver­ ing a more technologically advanced enemy, sary’s leadership, conflict-sustainingresources, looked to Mao’s concept of People’s War. that and strategy.”)4 China’s lack of such capabili­ concept would defend China from attack by ties leads to questions about its intentions re­ using large numbers of troops armed with garding the use of offensive airpower. the low-tech weapons to overwhelm an adversary PLAAF’s paucity of effective long-range offen­ through quantity rather than quality of per­ sive airpower stems from multiple factors, pri­ sonnel and weaponry.5 In such a war, the army, marily insufficient offensive weapons systems, along with paramilitary forces, would work excessive command centralization, and China’s with the populace to engage in both conven­ inexperience in offensive air operations. Geo­ tional and guerrilla operations to overextend political factors have also limited that coun­ adversary forces. Once this occurred, conven­ try’s desire to develop more significant strate­ tional troops would attack and destroy isolated gic capabilities. groups of enemy soldiers.6 Additionally, the article posits that China is the development of offensive airpower developing limited offensive-airpower capa­ proved inherently incompatible with People’s bilities as a deterrent against actions by its War. Since Mao based his war-fighting doc­ neighbors and American forces in the Pacific. trine on defense of the Chinese mainland, the Rather than implement a doctrine of strategic PLAAF primarily had responsibility for guard­ airpower, China will develop “offensive airpower ing the nation’s airspace.7 From its formative with Chinese characteristics,” a doctrine that years during the Korean War, the PLAAF uses traditionally tactical platforms to carry out armed and trained its personnel to fly air- strategic operations in the country’s periphery. superiority missions, focusing only limited at­ the article begins by examining historical fac­ tention on development of strategic capabili­ tors that contributed to the stagnation of the ties. After suffering high casualties during its growth of offensive air warfare and then ana­ first bombing mission against a South Korean lyzes the PLAAF’s development and possible intelligence facility in november 1951, the intentions for its offensive air force. Lastly, it PLAAF withdrew from regular service the considers the implications that Chinese air- bombers it had acquired to fly missions power has for the United States and the means against targets in South Korea.8 After this in­ by which the latter can counter its develop­ cident, China focused on air superiority. ment in order to maintain regional stability in A nation hoping to effectively employ stra­ Asia. tegic airpower requires technologically ad­

Lin-Greenberg.indd 68 7/31/07 12:42:40 PM OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 69

vanced aircraft; command, control, intelligence, People’s War and China’s reliance on the So­ surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) sys­ viet Union for military assistance ensured that tems; and significant pilot training, none of China would build a fleet of antiquated air­ which conformed to the low-tech nature of craft rather than a modern air force capable People’s War. PLA troops would overwhelm of carrying out offensive operations. enemy forces using low-tech weapons—not high-tech systems such as strategic bombers. thus, rather than develop modern weapons China’s Quest for systems for long-range offensive missions, Mao’s air force acquired Soviet tactical aircraft Offensive Airpower of Korean War vintage. the Soviet Union’s After an extended period of minimally de­ military aid to China in the form of aircraft veloping equipment and doctrine, the PLAAF and training initially helped the fledgling began to modernize rapidly. this process PLAAF establish combat capabilities, but Chi­ started in the early 1990s after the first Gulf nese dependence on Soviet assistance limited War demonstrated that US airpower could the development of indigenous aircraft and easily defeat militaries based on the Soviet doctrine. Soviet aid to the PLAAF began dur­ model, such as those of Iraq and China. the ing the Korean War and continued until the use of strategic airpower by the United States Sino-Soviet rift in 1960. termination of this and its allies to strike leadership and military material aid and the withdrawal of Soviet ad­ infrastructure in Iraq—and later in the Bal­ visers left China with an antiquated air force kans—forced PLAAF analysts to recognize and limited resources for modernization. the China’s inability to defeat a modern military.13 PLAAF supplemented and replaced Soviet- to address deficiencies in waging a modern supplied aircraft with Chinese-produced copies. through the 1970s, China’s fleet included war, the PLA launched a revolution in military various platforms, including Chinese versions affairs to enhance capabilities by acquiring of the MiG-17 Fresco (J-5) and MiG-19 Farmer new equipment, improving command and (J-6) interceptors as well as the tu-16 Badger control (C2) infrastructure, and increasing 14 (h-6) intermediate-range bomber.9 Many h-6s military training. A significantportion of this remain in service today. development focused on improving the offen­ the PLAAF made no significant progress sive capabilities of the PLAAF. in developing aircraft capable of carrying out offensive air operations until the 1970s. early Acquiring New Equipment in that decade, China attempted to develop After a period of limited programs designed an indigenous strategic bomber using British- to develop indigenous aircraft, the PLAAF has made Rolls-Royce Spey turbofans.10 After increased its acquisition of both domestic and abandoning this project due to technical and Russian aircraft. the procurement of advanced financial difficulties, the Chinese launched a program to reengine their h-6 bombers with strike, refueling, and Airborne Warning and the Rolls-Royce turbofans but cancelled this Control System (AWACS) aircraft represents project as well for financial reasons.11 Al­ the most visible component of China’s air force though China upgraded the avionics and modernization. Specifically, it has acquired electronic-countermeasures systems of its 1950s­ advanced multirole combat aircraft, including era h-6 bombers, the PLAAF did not acquire the Russian Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30, Chinese a long-range strategic bomber capable of pro­ J-8 and J-10 fighters, Ilyushin transports, and jecting airpower beyond the Chinese mainland indigenously produced AWACS platforms.15 during this period.12 Concurrently, the United these aircraft provide China with tactical air- States developed the B-52 Stratofortress, B-1 to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, but the Lancer, and F-111 Aardvark, all of which it has lack of a long-range bomber prevents it from employed strategically. the low-tech nature of projecting airpower beyond the Pacific.

Lin-Greenberg.indd 69 7/31/07 12:42:40 PM 70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the backbone of the current Chinese (PLAnAF) current refueling fleet represents bomber fleet consists of approximately 120 only a small fraction of the 585 aerial tankers h-6 intermediate-range bombers, supple­ operated by the US Air Force.19 China’s pilots mented by Q-5 and Jh-7 fighter-bombers. the also have limited air-refueling experience. De­ h-6, the largest of China’s bombers, has a spite acquiring tankers nearly two decades weapons payload of 20,000 pounds compared ago, the PLAAF did not conduct overwater to the American B-52’s 60,000. the opera­ refueling until 2005.20 Furthermore, because tional range of the h-6 is also significantly most of its combat aircraft cannot be aerially smaller than that of the B-52, restricting the refueled, China needs an extensive upgrade aircraft’s operations to the Pacific. the Q-5 and program to remedy this deficiency. Jh-7 have even smaller payloads and ranges, limiting their reach to nations in China’s pe­ Advancements in Command and Control riphery. In January 2007, Internet reports in­ dicated that China had begun producing up­ Operations that depend on the synergistic ef­ graded variants of the h-6 capable of carrying fect of aerial tankers, strike aircraft, tactical cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions fighters,and other airborne platforms require up to 3,000 nautical miles.16 new h-6K aircraft significant coordination that can be achieved enable China to operate further beyond its only through comprehensive and flexible C2. borders, but the lack of forward operating Current Chinese C2 relies on outdated com­ bases prevents it from projecting airpower munication systems, delaying the dissemina­ 21 globally. tion of orders and directives. Development A second component of China’s equipment- of indigenous airborne C2ISR platforms such modernization program involves the acquisi­ as the KJ-2000 and KJ-200 AWACS—a major tion of aerial-refueling platforms. the PLAAF component of improving C2 technology in considers the ability to extend the range of its the PLAAF—has enabled China to carry out combat fleet critical to carrying out opera­ airborne surveillance, C2, and battle manage­ tions beyond the Chinese periphery.17 J-8 and ment. the crash of a PLAAF KJ-200 during a J-7 fighters,which comprise most of the PLAAF test flight in June 2006 that killed all 40 people fleet, have the range to reach potential con­ on board set back the Chinese AWACS pro­ flict zones such as the Paracel and Maccles­ gram since the victims were key technical staff fieldIslands, but without aerial refueling, they in designing and testing the KJ-200.22 Despite cannot loiter or engage adversary aircraft. the mishap, China has continued to develop having too few forward operating bases also AWACS aircraft for operational use. Indeed, it limits the PLAAF’s ability to carry out long- is likely that the KJ-2000 has recently entered range offensive operations. Unlike the United operational service with the PLAAF.23 States, which can launch operations from stra­ Although one can improve technology tegically located air bases throughout the through the acquisition of modern equip­ world, China has no major air bases outside its ment, the PLAAF will need time to alter its C2 mainland. Without aerial refueling, China can­ philosophy. the Chinese military has not tra­ not carry out effective offensive operations, let ditionally delegated authority to junior per­ alone adequately protect what that country sonnel, a situation that leads to a highly cen­ considers its territorial airspace. tralized C2 infrastructure in which senior to address its need for aerial-refueling ca­ officers make tactical decisions.24 thus, the pabilities, China converted a few h-6 bombers PLAAF’s intentions with regard to operating into refueling aircraft in the 1990s and in 2005 its new airborne C2 platforms remain unclear. ordered eight Russian Il-78 tankers.18 Al­ typically, junior- and midgrade officers serve though China’s aerial refueling has improved, as air-battle managers on most non-Chinese its effectiveness in an operational environ­ C2ISR platforms, but the PLAAF uses senior ment remains questionable. the PLAAF’s and officers in control towers. to employ its air­ People’s Liberation Army navy Air Force’s borne C2ISR technology effectively in offen­

Lin-Greenberg.indd 70 7/31/07 12:42:41 PM OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 71

sive operations, the PLAAF must first change unsuccessful attempt to purchase tu-22 long- its approach to command by delegating au­ range bombers from the Russian government thority to junior personnel—something Chi­ likely represented an effort to develop strate­ nese military leaders may prove reluctant to do. gic aerial capabilities similar to those of the United States. Despite this failure, the Chi­ Improved Training nese continued to develop air-warfare capa­ bilities through the 1990s. nAtO air opera­ In recent years, the PLAAF has revamped its tions during Operation Allied Force in 1999 training program to improve the quality of further influenced PLAAF modernization, re­ personnel and enhance combat effectiveness. flected in the fact that Chinese strategists fo­ It has established training exercises that allow cused on the role of airpower and long-range Chinese pilots to fly realistic missions in a strike in diminishing the use of ground forces.30 variety of flying conditions. Moreover, the Following the Balkan war, China accelerated PLAAF has introduced tactical training that its acquisition of platforms that the US Air focuses on potential combat confrontations Force had employed in Allied Force, such as with taiwan and the United States, enabling multirole fighter aircraft and aerial tankers.31 pilots to practice both air-to-air and air-to­ this acquisition program continues today. ground tactics designed to improve China’s Although offensive airpower can be either precision-strike capabilities.25 During aggres­ tactical or strategic, the US government classi­ sor training (recently added), Chinese Su-27s fies China’s quest for offensive airpower as and J-8s simulate the tactics of taiwan’s Mirage strategic.32 the Department of Defense be­ 2000 and F-16 fighters.26 lieves that PLAAF modernization will result in China has also increased joint and com­ a Chinese air force with strategic capabilities, bined training to improve its ability to operate but China’s current aircraft acquisition and with foreign militaries outside the mainland. development tell a different story. Most of the the Chinese integrated joint operations plan PLAAF’s new Russian and indigenous aircraft of 2002 led to an increase in the PLAAF’s are air-superiority fighters and fighter-bombers, joint training.27 Future military operations will both characteristic of tactical operations. even likely include more joint operations, meaning with the support of C2 aircraft and tankers, that other components of the PLA—primarily the PLAAF’s short-range tactical aircraft would the PLAnAF—will support the PLAAF in car­ have difficulty traveling far beyond the Chi­ rying out offensive operations. A Sino-Russian nese periphery. In 2005 Russia offered to sell exercise in 2005 emphasized the PLAAF’s China long-range tu-22 and tu-95 bombers, precision-attack capabilities, employing aerial the same aircraft the Chinese attempted to tankers, bombers, tactical aircraft, and air­ obtain in the mid-1990s; however, China has borne forces.28 An exercise held with the tajik yet to purchase those platforms.33 China’s de­ military in 2006 demonstrated China’s airlift cision to acquire short-range aircraft rather than capabilities.29 Both exercises reflect the coun­ strategic bombers indicates the current limita­ try’s ongoing attempts to improve offensive tion of its airpower projection to the Pacific. capabilities but also reveal the limitation of the acquisition of multirole fighters and current capabilities to nations along China’s AWACS aircraft, along with China’s deficit in periphery. long-range strategic bombers, forces outsiders to question how Chinese military leaders de­ fine offensive airpower, which currently appears Offensive Airpower with to combine tactical platforms with tactical and Chinese Characteristics strategic doctrine—referred to in this article as offensive airpower with Chinese charac­ China’s pattern of aircraft acquisitions sug­ teristics. this doctrine uses tactical multi- gests that a doctrinal shift has occurred in the role fighters to attack traditionally strategic PLAAF. Following the first Gulf War, China’s targets, including C2, industrial, and leader­

Lin-Greenberg.indd 71 7/31/07 12:42:41 PM 72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

ship infrastructure; additionally, they carry could result in sanctions and jeopardize for­ out tactical missions such as close air sup­ eign investment, thereby devastating China’s port and air superiority. growing economy.36 In addition to causing the nature of China’s development of of­ economic harm, an unprovoked attack on tai­ fensive airpower indicates that the country wan or other key US regional allies could pos­ limits its view of potential threats to nations sibly lead to an American-led military response. along its periphery and does not currently the potential economic harm and military re­ seek to project airpower beyond the region. percussions of such conflict have led Beijing Despite the restricted nature of its capabili­ to rely on diplomacy rather than force. In re­ ties, China will likely continue to modernize cent years, China has increased cooperation its air force and may eventually develop global with regional economic and security organiza­ power projection. tions such as the Association of South east Asian nations. In 2002 the Chinese demon­ strated their commitment to diplomacy by Implications and Responses signing the Declaration on the Conduct of for the United States Parties in the South China Sea, a document intended to prevent conflict over the Spratly the possibility of China’s ever employing Islands and other disputed islands.37 offensive air capabilities against its neighbors even though the likelihood of China’s initiat­ or American forces in the region remains ing a war in the Pacific region remains small, questionable. the country’s white paper on offensive development of the PLAAF still national defense of 2004 states that PLAAF poses a threat to regional stability. the ability doctrine has shifted from air defense to both of China to project military power throughout defensive and offensive missions; it also indi­ the Pacific jeopardizes American influence in cates, however, that China adheres to a na­ the region. the United States has maintained tional policy of a defensive nature and “will military dominance in the Pacific since the never go for expansion.”34 Although this policy end of World War II, but recent Chinese mili­ implies a mission of purely territorial defense, tary development has the potential to shift the development of the PLAAF’s offensive capa­ balance of power there. even with China’s bilities appears to contradict this assertion. promise of a peaceful rise, its acquisition of Recently acquired platforms such as the h-6K, platforms such as the J-10 and Su-27 fighters supported by AWACS aircraft and aerial re­ may lead the PLAAF to become a regional, fuelers, enable China to project its power re­ technological peer competitor to the United gionally into hot spots such as taiwan and the States and other Pacificnations. Chinese mili­ Spratly Islands, over which China and Viet­ tarization may lead neighboring states such as nam clashed in 1988. If China is indeed com­ Japan and Korea, which recently expressed mitted to building a defensive military, of­ concern over the lack of transparency in China’s fensive airpower with Chinese characteristics military buildup, to develop more aggressive would find use only as a deterrent. military postures.38 China might respond by As part of its “peaceful rise,” China ostensibly increasing its own military capabilities, result­ hopes to improve relations with other Pacific ing in a spiral process that could lead to in­ nations. Military conflict in the Pacific would tense diplomatic or military confrontations.39 impede trade in the region, hurting China’s It might also use airpower to project power to export-dependent economy. Japan and taiwan, Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan, the nations that Chinese defense analysts con­ that supply China’s burgeoning energy de­ sider the most threatening, are among China’s mand.40 Any form of PLAAF involvement in top trade partners.35 Relying on exports and these nations could produce tension with foreign investment for domestic modernization, the United States and Russia, both of which the Chinese probably would not attack their wish to gain influence in the geostrategically neighbors since a war instigated by Beijing important region.41

Lin-Greenberg.indd 72 7/31/07 12:42:42 PM OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 73

to maintain the current balance of power gress restrict foreign defense contractors who in the Pacific,the United States must limit the sell military-use technology to China from PLAAF’s ability to wage offensive air opera­ participating in research and development by tions. Adm Dennis C. Blair, former com­ the US defense community. mander of US Pacific Command, declared, the commission also urged Congress to “We respect the authority of the People’s Lib­ press for continuation of the european Union’s eration Army in their mainland. Yet we must (eU) arms embargo on China, believing that make them understand that the ocean and sky lifting the embargo, imposed after the tianan­ [are] ours.”42 the Chinese have an inherent right to defend their sovereignty, but the men Square Massacre of 1989, would accelerate 45 United States must work with its global allies modernization of the PLA. even with the to limit the development of China’s offensive embargo in place, eU sales of military equip­ air capabilities. ment to China increased from 54 million eu­ ros in 2001 to 416 million in 2003.46 equip­ Limiting the Transfer of Military Technology ment sold to the Chinese military includes China depends heavily on foreign nations for British-manufactured propellers used on the the PLAAF’s modernization, looking to Rus­ Chinese Y-8 Airborne early Warning System, sia, Israel, France, and Germany for the pre­ Italian Aspide air-to-air missiles, components ponderance of its military technology. Out­ of the French AS-365 Dauphin military heli­ sourcing the development of the Chinese air copters, and advanced British and Italian avi­ force to foreign nations allows the United onics for the F-7 fighter aircraft.47 the export States to influence many of China’s weapons of military technology to China continues de­ suppliers through incentives or punitive mea­ spite the embargo because the eU left inter­ sures. Legally, the United States can block the pretation and enforcement of that action to transfer of weapons systems containing Ameri­ member states.48 Although some eU nations can technology. In recent years, however, it prohibit the sale of all military items to China, has even stopped the sale of advanced military others, such as the United Kingdom, limit their hardware that does not contain American embargoes to lethal weapons and military equipment. the fact that Israel, China’s second-largest equipment that could be used for internal re­ supplier, relies heavily on US military aid gives pression; those countries continue to export the United States significant leverage over nonlethal military technology, such as avionics, Israel’s program of weapons sales. In 2000 radars, and aircraft-propulsion systems.49 pressure from the United States prevented Is­ to limit the development of China’s offen­ rael from selling its Phalcon AWACS to China. sive capabilities, the United States must con­ the Israeli cancellation, which followed a US tinue to pressure the eU to continue its ban threat to withhold $2.8 billion in military aid, on weapons sales. In addition, it should urge delayed the introduction of an AWACS plat­ eU nations to standardize the guidelines re­ 43 form into the PLAAF until 2006. In late 2004, garding technologies that can be sold to Israel attempted to upgrade spare parts for China. States that abide by these guidelines harpy unmanned aircraft, which Israel Air­ and halt the transfer of military technology to craft Industries had sold to China in 1994. Al­ China should receive incentives such as mili­ though Israel did not send the upgraded parts to China, the United States froze Israeli par­ tary aid and the right to participate in US-led ticipation in the US-led development of the joint weapons-development programs (e.g., F-35 Joint Strike Fighter due to security con­ the Joint Strike Fighter project). States that cerns—a decision in line with recommenda­ choose to continue to sell advanced military tions made by the US-China Commission in hardware to China should face restrictions 2004.44 the commission suggested that Con­ similar to those imposed on Israel in 2004.

Lin-Greenberg.indd 73 7/31/07 12:42:42 PM 74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Limited Engagement well as professional-development exchanges, the latter allowing personnel from both the to discourage the offensive development of PLAAF and US Air Force to learn about the the PLAAF, the United States must couple other’s operations and leadership systems. military deterrence and embargoes with lim­ the US Air Force should invite PLAAF per­ ited cooperation with the Chinese military. sonnel to participate in professional military Some Americans fear that cooperatively en­ education programs at all levels, on the con­ gaging with China’s armed forces would allow dition that China reciprocate by providing the Chinese to learn doctrine and tactics that Americans similar access to PLAAF training could improve their ability to wage war against 50 programs. Bilateral exchanges should occur the United States. Although these concerns throughout the spectrum of leadership, from are justified, engagement promotes greater enlisted schools and officer accession pro­ transparency in military affairs, improves mu­ grams through senior education institutions tual understanding between the United States such as the national Defense University. and China, and helps establish lines of com­ these programs allow for the direct interac­ munication among senior leaders that can re­ tion of military personnel without political duce the possibility of accidents between US 51 interference. Direct military-exchange pro­ and Chinese forces. grams at all levels contribute to mutual trust Primarily, the US navy has carried out cur­ and understanding.52 rent US military engagement with China. that Recognizing China as a critical global actor, service has successfully monopolized recent the United States is encouraging that nation Sino-US engagement efforts because a navy to act as an international stakeholder.53 the admiral traditionally heads US Pacific Com­ US Air Force can help China achieve this sta­ mand and because naval forces conduct a sig­ tus through combined training in humani­ nificant portion of US military operations in tarian relief. Since its creation, the US Air the region. Developing ties between naval Force has provided airlift support to relief op­ forces remains important, but the Chinese erations following disasters. these missions consider both the navy and the air force pri­ offer vital assistance and improve the image of orities in PLA modernization. Given China’s the nation that carries them out.54 the US Air emphasis on strengthening its air force, the Force should initiate exercises with the PLAAF US Air Force should play a role equal to that that allow Chinese and American airmen to of the navy in engaging the Chinese military. work together while responding to simulated Interaction between the US Air Force and the large-scale humanitarian crises. this direct in­ PLAAF should avoid exposing US military ca­ teraction will increase mutual understanding pabilities in areas such as force projection and and respect between the air forces and may C2ISR operations. Instead, it should focus on encourage China to participate as a responsible conducting professional exchanges and devel­ actor in the Pacificregion. A Chinese decision oping capabilities that enable China and the to employ military aircraft in humanitarian United States to respond collectively to re­ operations would increase the legitimacy of gional humanitarian and security issues. China’s peaceful rise. Promoting transparency and mutual under­ Critics may argue that combined exercises standing between the PLAAF’s and US Air will strengthen China’s military capabilities by Force’s leadership is fundamental to building increasing the PLAAF’s ability to deploy per­ trust between China and the United States. sonnel and equipment rapidly. the PLAAF high-level meetings between senior officers already possesses airlift capabilities, as demon­ and defense ministers can further this objec­ strated by recent Sino-tajik and Sino-Russian tive, provide an environment where senior military exercises. Instead of providing the leaders can establish lines of communications Chinese with additional military capabilities, to reduce chances of misunderstanding in the combined relief exercises with the United event of a crisis, and plan future exercises as States would serve as a catalyst for China to

Lin-Greenberg.indd 74 7/31/07 12:42:43 PM OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 75

play a more active role in assisting its neigh­ question the effectiveness of current Ameri­ bors during humanitarian crises. the increased can tactics because, since the end of the Cold transparency and understanding that will re­ War, the United States has lacked a peer com­ sult from interaction between American and petitor to guide the development of tactics. Lt Chinese airmen greatly outweigh the minimal Gen Liu Yazhou of the PLAAF described the national-security risks of limited combined US Air Force’s tactical development as “cross­ training with the PLAAF. ing a river by feeling the stones in it,” refer­ Combined training should be supplemented ring to a phrase coined by Chinese leader by high-visibility exchanges such as participa­ Deng Xiaoping that describes modernization tion of the US Air Force’s aerial-demonstration through cautious experimentation.57 Yazhou teams in Chinese air shows. the thunder- may have a valid point about US Air Force tac­ birds, which performed in Beijing in Septem­ tics, given that its aggressor training is still ber 1987, continue to appear in numerous largely based on fightingthe no-longer-extant international air shows.55 Prominent events Soviet Air Force.58 to ensure continued mili­ such as air shows and port visits by naval vessels tary superiority in the Pacific, the United demonstrate to both the Chinese and Ameri­ States must couple the acquisition of new war- can publics the enhanced relationship be­ fighting platforms with tactical development tween the two militaries without revealing ad­ that prepares American forces for a potential vanced capabilities. All instances of the US military conflict with China. Air Force and the PLAAF’s working together should be publicized in both the United States and China to demonstrate increasing Conclusion cooperation and friendship between the two the PLAAF’s increasing offensive capabili­ countries. ties, combined with the uncertainty of China’s military intentions, create a potential threat to Military Readiness the United States and its regional allies. After China ostensibly seeks to avoid using offensive an extended period of stagnation in the devel­ military force, but the element of surprise re­ opment of offensive airpower, the PLAAF has mains a pillar of Chinese doctrine.56 thus, the entered a period of rapid modernization that US military must prepare itself to respond to includes the acquisition of platforms such as any offensive action taken by China. the US Su-27 and J-10 fighters, modernized h-6 Air Force currently forward-deploys B-1, B-2, bombers, aerial-refueling aircraft, and AWACS and B-52 bombers to Andersen AFB in Guam, platforms. It could use these systems to carry 1,800 miles southeast of China. these aircraft, out both strategic and tactical missions in a along with others in Japan, Korea, and hawaii, manner this article has referred to as offensive serve as a powerful deterrent to offensive ac­ airpower with Chinese characteristics. tion by the Chinese. Although China’s offensive capabilities are In addition to deploying advanced aircraft currently limited to regional operations, the to the Pacific, the United States must main­ PLAAF likely will attempt to develop global tain a qualitative advantage over Chinese strategic capabilities. the acquisition of plat­ weapons systems and doctrine. Although US forms such as aerial tankers and the upgraded Air Force equipment currently is technologi­ h-6 bomber suggests that China hopes to in­ cally superior to that of the PLAAF, recent crease its long-range offensive capabilities. A modernization of Chinese equipment may key component of such development would lead the PLAAF to become a peer competitor involve acquisition of a long-range bomber. to its US counterpart. thus, the US Air Force Development of such an aircraft may findhelp must develop tactics that enable effective em­ in China’s growing aviation industry, which ployment of its weapons against China in a hopes to produce a large commercial jet by potential conflict. Chinese military leaders 2020.59 Since technology and research from

Lin-Greenberg.indd 75 7/31/07 12:42:43 PM 76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the civilian project could be applied to devel­ and Latin America, where China has a grow­ oping a long-range bomber, production of an ing interest. Because future intentions of the indigenous bomber would likely begin in the Chinese military remain largely unknown, the same time frame as its civilian counterpart. United States must limit China’s offensive de­ Refining aerial refueling and C2 today may velopment and encourage development of a become part of a larger plan to strengthen the responsible Chinese air force by restricting support infrastructure required for long-range the PLAAF’s access to offensive weapons sys­ projection of airpower in the future. tems while promoting mutual understanding even if used only as a strategic deterrent, China’s ability to project airpower globally in between the US Air Force and the PLAAF the form of long-range bombers capable of through bilateral engagement. Given China’s striking north America would pose a signifi­ potential to change the balance of global air- cant threat to the United States. Increased power, the United States must act decisively to power-projection capabilities could also en­ limit and contain China’s offensive-airpower hance China’s influence in geostrategically capabilities before the PLAAF can project air- important regions of the world such as Africa power globally. q

Notes

1. “China: Jiang Zemin’s Short Message to Air Force,” 15. “Replacement of 3rd Generation Fighters in PLA People’s Daily Online, 10 november 1999, http://english Air Force,” Kanwa Defense Review, 14 november 2006, .people.com.cn/english/199911/09/eng19991109n107 http://www.kanwa.com. .html. 16. Fisher, “China’s ‘new’ Bomber.” 2. Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces (Washington, 17. Yang hui, “PLA Air Force enhances Aerial Refuel­ DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976), 7-1 through 7-6. ing Capability: A Major Breakthrough in Long-Range 3. Jacqueline A. newmyer, “China’s Air Power Puzzle,” Combat Capability,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, 2 October 2005. Policy Review, no. 119 (June/July 2003): 71–85. 18. “Il-78 tanker,” sinodefence.com, 25 April 2007, 4. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/il78.asp Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 40, https://www.doctrine (accessed 14 May 2007). .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_htML/Doctrine 19. “Weapons,” Airman: The Book 50, no. 1 (Winter _Docs/afdd1.pdf. 2006): 39. 5. Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the 20. Kenneth Allen, “Reforms in the PLA Air Force,” People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of China Brief 5, no. 15 (5 July 2005), http://www.jamestown Defense, 2006), 17. .org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373114 (accessed 6. Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, 1-7. 30 April 2007). 7. Xiaoming Zhang, “China and the Air War in Korea,” 21. “Command and Control,” Federation of American Journal of Military History 62, no. 2 (April 1998): 360–61. Scientists, 23 June 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ 8. Ibid. china/c3i/index.html (accessed 9 December 2006). 9. Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, A41–A42. 22. “China Accelerates Production of KJ200 AWACS,” 10. “Future Bomber Programme,” sinodefence.com, 20 Kanwa Defense Review, 14 november 2006, http://www August 2005, http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/ .kanwa.com. groundattack/hx.asp (accessed 15 October 2006). 23. “Chinese Air Force Deploys AWACS for Actual 11. Richard Fisher Jr., “China’s ‘new’ Bomber,” Inter­ Combat,” Kanwa Defense Review, 27 July 2006, http://www national Assessment and Strategy Center, 7 February 2007, .kanwa.com. http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.146/ 24. John F. Corbett Jr. and edward C. O’Dowd, “PLA pub_detail.asp (accessed 12 May 2007). Organization and Management” (paper presented at Chi­ 12. “Future Bomber Programme.” nese Military Studies: A Conference on the State of the 13. Dai Xu, “Interview with Lieutenant General Liu Field, 26–27 October 2000), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ Yazhou of the Air Force of the People’s Liberation Army,” China_Center/CMA_Conf_Oct00/paper13.htm (accessed Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics, 2005, 14. 11 December 2006). 14. Ka Po ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doc­ 25. “China’s Air Force Intensifies training to Boost trine Makes Readiness (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 105. Combat Strength,” Xinhua, 2 May 2006.

Lin-Greenberg.indd 76 7/31/07 12:42:44 PM OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 77

26. “Chinese Air Force experiences Frequent Acci­ daily.com/2005/04/reports-israel-frozen-out-of-f35 dents,” Kanwa Defense Review, 2 June 2005, http://www -development/index.php (accessed 30 november 2006). .kanwa.com. 45. Statement of Roger W. Robinson to the House Committee 27. “China’s national Defense in 2006,” Chinadaily.com, on Armed Services, US-China Economic and Security Review 29 December 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ Commission to the US House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 2006-12/29/content_771191.htm (accessed 15 May 2007). 2d sess., 16 June 2004. 28. “Details on Combined Operations of Sino-Russian 46. Prepared Statement of the Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Forces in Joint-exercises,” Jiefangjun Bao, 30 August 2005, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs http://www.chinamil.com.cn. before the House Committee on International Relations and 29. Bai Ruixue, “Joint Anti-terrorism Military exercise Armed Services, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 14 April 2005, of Chinese and tajik troops Begins in tajikistan,” Xinhua, http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=BAB92DDB 25 September 2006. -D0F7-4eAA-94AB-4302BF9724A0 (accessed 12 June 2007). 30. Annual Report to Congress, 17–20. 47. U.S. and European Union Arms Sales since the 1989 31. “PLAAF equipment,” GlobalSecurity.org, 25 May 2005, Embargoes (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Of­ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ fice, 28 April 1998), 8. plaaf-equip.htm (accessed 23 november 2006). 32. Annual Report to Congress, 15–16. 48. Ibid. 33. Peter Brookes, “An Alarming Alliance: Sino-Russian 49. Ibid., 3. ties tightening,” Heritage Foundation, 15 August 2005, 50. Charles R. Smith, “Defector Confirms Chinese Army http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a Spying on U.S.,” NewsMax.com, 27 March 2001, http:// .cfm?RenderforPrint=1 (accessed 30 April 2007). www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/26/195051 34. “Foreword,” China’s National Defense in 2004, In­ .shtml (accessed 11 December 2006). formation Office of the State Council of the People’s Re­ 51. Jing-Dong Yuan, “Sino-US Military Relations since public of China, December 2004, http://english.people tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls,” Parameters .com.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 57, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ (accessed 15 november 2007). usawc/Parameters/03spring/yuan.pdf (accessed 12 June 35. “US -China trade Statistics and China’s World 2007). trade Statistics,” US-China Business Council, 2006, http:// 52. Ibid., 51–60. www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (accessed 3 53. China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stake­ December 2006). holder? Statement by Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant 36. Annual Report to Congress, 40. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the 37. nguyen hong thao, “the 2002 Declaration on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3 August Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A note,” Ocean 2006, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written Development and International Law 34 (2003): 281, http:// _testimonies/06_08_3_4wrts/06_08_3_4_christensen community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/nguyen%20hong _thomas_statement.pdf (accessed 12 June 2007). %20thao-2002%20Declaration.pdf. 54. “A Major Change of Public Opinion in the Mus­ 38. “Japan Urges Denmark to Keep eU Arms export lim World: Results from a new Poll of Indonesians,” Terror Ban to China,” International Herald Tribune, 21 november Free Tomorrow, 2005, http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/ 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/21/asia/ upimagestft/Full%20Report.pdf (accessed 15 October AS_Gen_Japan_Denmark.php (accessed 12 June 2007). 2006). 39. Robert Jervis offers a detailed description of spiral 55. “thunderbirds,” Air Force Link, October 2005, theory in Perception and Misperception in International Politics http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=185 (accessed (Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58–113. 40. “Country Analysis Briefs: China,” Energy Informa­ 14 May 2007). tion Administration, August 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 56. Annual Report to Congress, 17. emeu/cabs/China/Oil.html (accessed 12 May 2007). 57. Dai Xu, “Interview with Lieutenant General Liu 41. Sarah Shenker, “Struggle for Influencein Central Yazhou,” 22. Asia,” BBC News, 28 november 2005, http://news.bbc.co 58. SSgt Allen L. Puckett, “Aggressors Putting Pilots .uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4467736.stm (accessed 14 through Paces,” United States Joint Forces Command, 23 May 2007). March 2005, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/ 42. Dai Xu, “Interview with Lieutenant General Liu 2005/no032305a.htm (accessed 8 December 2006). Yazhou,” 25. 59. “China to Develop Large Commercial Aircraft by 43. “Chinese Air Force Deploys AWACS.” 2020,” International Herald Tribune, 12 March 2007, http:// 44. “Israel Frozen out of F-35 Development,” Defense www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/12/business/jet.php (ac­ Industry Daily, 19 April 2005, http://www.defenseindustry cessed 13 May 2007).

Lin-Greenberg.indd 77 7/31/07 12:42:44 PM A Rescue Force for the World Adapting Airpower to the Realities of the Long War

Lt CoL MarC C. “Dip” DipaoLo, USaFr CoL Lee DepaLo, USaF CoL MiChaeL t. “GhanDi” heaLy, USaF Lt CoL GLenn “hooter” heCht, USaF Lt CoL Mike “trUMp” trUMpFheLLer, USaF

Editorial Abstract: Despite an unques­ tionable abundance of talent and capa­ bilities, the Air Force rescue community has long been plagued by organizational instability, an unclear purpose, and a significant amount of both internal and external professional frustration. The au­ thors advocate redefining the community’s core thinking and missions to promote what it does best—fostering stability, eco­ nomic growth, and freedom in locations beset with isolation and hopelessness—as solutions to these problems.

he QuADrEnniAl DEFEnsE review years. Over time, the rescue community has report begins with a simple state­ wandered down several paths that it hoped ment: “The United States is a nation would demonstrate a military utility that engaged in what will be a long war.”1 matches its substantial capabilities, but none TWith that understated introduction to the have led to lasting success—the endurance of lexicon, the contest known as the long war is the debate offers proof enough of that. One now prompting significant change across could describe the options pursued (simulta­ every instrument of national power. That is neously) by the community as “too limited” especially true within the Department of De­ (restricting rescue forces solely to support the fense (DOD), and the Air Force rescue com­ air component), “too broad” (literally claim­ munity is not immune. ing a doctrinal responsibility to rescue any­ As Air Force rescue assesses its ability to one, anywhere in the world, and at any time), contribute to the nation’s efforts in the long or “too much” (attempting to demonstrate of­ war, one should note that people have debated fensive and special-operations capabilities and, the question of its overall relevance for many in so doing, pushing the imperatives of recov­

78

DiPaolo.indd 78 7/31/07 12:42:07 PM A rEsCuE FOrCE FOr THE WOrlD 79

ering air-component personnel to the periph­ wide for its compassionate acts. In short, it ery of its focus). This has resulted in organiza­ should become a rescue force for the world. tional instability, a sustained lack of clarity of With a unity of purpose defined in those purpose, and a significant amount of profes­ terms, rescue can create strategic-level effects sional frustration within and about Air Force that it never could have attained via the well- rescue. To be sure, the community has an worn paths it has trod for the last 15 years. abundance of talent and raw capabilities. But The remainder of this article substantiates rescue has lacked a vision for the future that those points, describes what the Air Force’s not only remains true to its Air Force origins rescue force could become, and explains why and doctrinal responsibilities but also pro­ that is important to the Air Force’s rescue vides venues to continually exploit its unique community, the service itself, and victory in capabilities. the long war. The potential for that sort of future exists, but rescue will need to change its thinking in order to achieve it. Instead of trying to be Groping for a Vision something it is not, rescue should focus on After a little more than 15 years of work, what it does best and apply those capabilities the Air Force should feel satisfied with the to the long war’s most pressing requirement— CSAR capability that it has built. Starting from winning the global ideological conflict be­ almost nothing in 1989, it activated multiple tween the isolation and sense of helplessness squadrons and associated support organiza­ that breed terrorism on the one hand and a tions in the continental United States (CONUS) vision of shared interests and interdepen­ and around the world, fielded about 100 hh­ dency that fosters stability, economic growth, 60G Pave hawk helicopters, organized effec­ and freedom on the other. The benevolent tive staffs, modernized employment concepts core of the Air Force’s rescue mission has di­ that had remained unchanged since Vietnam, rect relevance to the hearts-and-minds contest built an improved capability for hC-130s, fos­ that will ultimately determine the long war’s tered development of pararescue capabilities outcome. Success in that contest lies at the by categorizing and managing them as a very center of US strategy for defeating global weapon system, and much more. The steady jihadism, and, between periods of peak de­ stream of improvements continued even as mand for its conventional wartime mission, the rescue community endured the program­ rescue’s capabilities can make a significant, matic and leadership turmoil caused by five airpower-centered Air Force contribution to changes in major-command ownership since that success. 1989. One should also note that all of this oc­ The rescue community should build a curred while the Air Force’s small community brighter, more stable future for itself by main­ of rescue professionals maintained a forward- taining conventional air-component combat deployed presence in Southwest Asia that has search and rescue (CSAR) capabilities as its stood watch over the lives and safety of every first priority. Subordinate only to that, rescue service’s war fighters in that region during ev­ should exploit its unique abilities by initiating ery hour of every day since 1993. and maintaining a program for a continuous Despite those (and many more) significant series of targeted, highly visible engagements achievements, Air Force rescue continues to designed to deliver life, health, and goodwill grope for a defining purpose—one that matches to remote but strategically important locations its capabilities and is larger than simply sitting around the world. It should strive to establish alert in anticipation of a fighterpilot having a itself as something unique within the DOD—a bad day. When combined with the absence of globally capable enterprise recognized for its a long-term vision for rescue within the com­ expeditionary use of airpower to conduct munity, the search for greater venues for per­ “white hat” engagements and known world­ formance manifests itself in a myriad of intra­

DiPaolo.indd 79 7/31/07 12:42:07 PM 80 Air & sPACE POWEr JOurnAl FAll 2007

community conflicts that defy consensus and force. . . . In the long run, winning the war on resolution. Most of those conflictsinvolve pur­ terror means winning the battle of ideas.”4 suit of some new capability offered without This daunting challenge will require the cre­ context for how or why it would fitin with the atively applied effects of every instrument of rest. Without such context, the capability itself our national power if we wish to succeed. becomes the vision. The eventual arrival of re­ Winning that ideological battle—the con­ placements for the hh-60G and hC-130 will test for hearts and minds—will mean routine only compound the problem since their im­ and frequent engagement in the weak and proved capabilities will simply trigger a flurry failing states that stretch from North Africa to of new initiatives designed to “get rescue to the Philippines and from Central Asia to Cen­ the fight.” But they will emerge, as before, tral Africa, as well as in the world’s ungoverned without some goal in mind. Which fight? spaces such as the vast Sahel in Africa.5 They When? For what strategic purpose? Those ba­ are “regions plagued by politically repressive sic questions do not receive the thoughtful regimes, widespread poverty and disease, rou­ analysis they deserve. Instead, the pursuit of tine mass murder, and—most important—the more military relevancy continues in 100 dif­ chronic conflicts that incubate the next gen­ ferent directions. eration of global terrorists.”6 Strategist Thomas Within that persistent, conceptual haze, Barnett collectively describes these regions as rescue has produced an entire generation of “the least connected to the global economy operators for whom the very concept of Air [representing] . . . the limits of the spread of Force rescue has no intellectual underpinning globalization . . . where the connectivity of the and no common theoretical reference point. global economy ha[s]n’t generated stability, Without that, there can be no articulation of a and development, and growth, and peace, path toward some coherent goal that will pro­ and clear rule sets, and democracies. This is vide an enduring benefit to the Air Force and where the disconnected people are, and on that basis—no surprise—that’s where the ter­ DOD—and no way for rescue professionals to 7 envision a future worth creating. rorists come from.” Barnett calls the combined space occupied by those regions the “non-integrat[ed] gap” Containing Disconnectedness (a convenient term that we shall adopt here for its brevity), and he categorizes the enemy Of course, one must contemplate any future we face there in a nontraditional way. Instead for Air Force rescue in context of the long of targeting a bloc of hostile nations, rogue war, and that reality makes a proper under­ nation-states, or even individual rogue lead­ standing of the nature of the conflictcentrally ers, we should recognize our enemy for what important. Fortunately, the West’s understand­ it really is—the “disconnectedness” that de­ ing of the origins of terrorism has improved fines the gap.8 Barnett is not out on an intel­ significantly since 11 September 2001. Al­ lectual limb; this condition is the very basis for though a detailed discussion of that subject much of our current national-security strategy. lies well beyond the scope of this article, we So in that context, a simple metric becomes now recognize that terrorism is primarily available for basic assessment of any action we rooted in climates of intractable political contemplate taking inside the gap (military or alienation, injustice, and perceived helpless­ otherwise): will it tend to decrease disconnect­ ness.2 In that context, the national strategy for edness? Certainly, we will sometimes require a Combating Terrorism makes the important ac­ range of forceful military actions to create the knowledgment that “the War on Terror is a necessary conditions, but decreasing discon­ different kind of war.”3 As described in the na­ nectedness really means winning the ideo­ tional security strategy of the united states of logical battle, which, in turn, means success in America, the primary difference is that “in the the long war. Granted, conventional military short run, the fight involves using military action is an important part of that huge effort,

DiPaolo.indd 80 7/31/07 12:42:07 PM A rEsCuE FOrCE FOr THE WOrlD 81

but from a strategic point of view, kinetic op­ reach that point, the community must focus erations are only a trailing indicator that pre­ on several initiatives. ventive engagement efforts have failed. In­ stead, military force will frequently represent Maintain Robust Capabilities for Conventional a necessary step backward that we will occasion­ Combat Search and Rescue ally take in order to move the next necessary Most importantly, rescue must maintain and two steps forward. continually improve its ability to assist isolated That concept is neither new nor controver­ personnel in the deep operational environ­ sial. The terms humanitarian civic assistance, civil affairs, theater security cooperation, capacity build­ ment, and CSAR’s mission needs should con­ tinue to drive the major acquisition and train­ ing, and foreign internal defense (FID) all refer to 9 established DOD efforts expressly designed to ing efforts of the community. Nothing else is reduce disconnectedness by forging stronger possible if this part of the contract with the Air ties, promoting human rights, improving the Force lapses. True, keeping this task at the image of the United States and the West, in­ center of rescue’s consciousness invites accu­ creasing stability, and setting conditions that sations that the community is a “one trick will permit flows of foreign direct investment. pony,” capable only of rescuing downed fighter The DOD does those things all over the world, pilots. Those who denigrate that noble mis­ every day. In strategic terms, the struggle to sion in such a way are not simply wrong—they build connectivity with failing states represents fail to comprehend several facts about it. the real central front in the long war. if we wish First, it is a moral duty. Leadership at all levels to find an enduring future for rescue, we will find it supports the premise that we have an obliga­ there—in the gap, helping our nation and the West­ tion to war fightersto “bring everybody home.” ern world win the ideological battle. Adm edmund Giambastiani, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes the reci­ procity of that compact when he refers to “the A Rescue Force for the World power of a force multiplier as we send our young people into harm’s way with the prom­ The most direct and useful advice for res­ 10 cue professionals who make decisions to shape ise that we will not leave them behind.” The their future would urge them to do what they moral obligation strengthens when one con­ do best. If an Air Force rescue wing can do siders that the weight of operational failure anything, it can deploy to austere, remote lo­ during CSAR shifts primarily to those in the cations in order to provide hope to desperate worst position to bear it—the people who people who need it. That’s what rescue does need rescuing. when it recovers a fighterpilot, and that’s what Second, CSAR reduces strategic-level risk. the community should focus on in a big way By ensuring that rescue forces can reach any during the long war. Rescue should use its ca­ part of the operational environment, effective pabilities and inherently compassionate mis­ CSAR counters the enemy’s ability to trans­ sion as both a ticket into the gap and as a non­ form a tactical-level incident into an event lethal, even antilethal, weapon in the long with strategic consequences. Our enemies re­ war’s ideological-political struggle. alize the importance of possessing a captive, With leadership, unity of purpose, and per­ and they know that one captive and 30 sec­ sistence, Air Force rescue could vault itself onds of video give them a worldwide audience. from its position as tactical-level support player That scenario not only hurts US efforts by put­ hovering at the periphery of conventional ting pressure on our strategic objectives and combat operations into a high-visibility posi­ by creating significantoperational and public- tion of strategic relevance during the greatest affairs challenges, but also helps the enemy by conflict of this generation. It could transform creating legitimacy, publicity, help in recruit­ itself into a rescue force for the world. To ing, and a boost to his financing.

DiPaolo.indd 81 7/31/07 12:42:08 PM 82 Air & sPACE POWEr JOurnAl FAll 2007

Third, success in that mission means capa­ conducted. If the Air Force doesn’t focus on bility for success in many others. The training recovering its own, how will our senior mili­ and integration required to do conventional tary leadership change its thinking about ac­ CSAR create the flexibility that rescue forces ceptable risk? If we allow that capability to at­ use to succeed at a myriad of other types of rophy, what other missions won’t take place? missions. The classic CSAR mission to recover What possibilities will we fail to exploit be­ a downed pilot fuses such capabilities as real- cause the people carrying out the operation time intelligence analysis and sensor fusion, would findthemselves at risk with no device to time-sensitive targeting, net-centric data man­ mitigate it? how would those decisions affect agement, interagency coordination, close air the decisions and operations of the other ser­ support (CAS) by fixed- and rotary-wing air­ vices? What effect would they have on the de­ craft, ad hoc air refueling, terminal area con­ cisions of policy makers?11 trol, small-team tactics, and battlefield medi­ All of the capability and flexibility that put cine, all at a time and place of the enemy’s those questions to rest comes from building a choosing. For proof that conventional CSAR force focused on the demanding needs of the training produces the most capable force pos­ air component. Ultimately, when the Air Force sible, we need only examine the results of ma­ builds its one-trick-pony capability to recover jor combat actions during Operation Iraqi downed pilots, it isn’t building a chow hall Freedom. During those operations, launched that serves only Air Force people—it is build­ from austere, self-supported locations, more ing a set of the most flexible, versatile, and than two-thirds of the personnel recovered by useful capabilities on the battlefield. Building Air Force rescue forces came from another and maintaining robust conventional CSAR component—an outcome made possible be­ capabilities benefits the entire joint force. cause rescue crews had received the best train­ ing available. Go to the Gap Fourth, it reduces operational-level risk across the board. If rescue forces are properly While maintaining its robust capability to sup­ organized, trained, and equipped, their re­ port the air component, rescue should seize sponse to an isolating event will be neither too every opportunity to exploit its existing capa­ small to be effective nor so large that it ad­ bilities inside the gap as an explicitly white-hat versely affects the overall air war. Needlessly rescue force. After air-component require­ retasking the role of a CAS or sensor platform ments, operations inside the gap should be­ to support a CSAR mission will cause someone come the central organizing principle of the to suffer. how will it affect the soldiers and rescue community. The specific objectives of marines who rely on that support for their those operations should call for supporting own effectiveness and survivability? What hap­ theater programs designed to forge connec­ pens to the high-value target at the receiving tivity between the West and the gap, using end of that package’s precision-guided muni­ rescue’s unique brand of airpower and broad tions? The presence of a dedicated, profes­ array of operational and life-saving skills to sional rescue force and well-rehearsed CSAR benefit its inhabitants in a memorable way, command-and-control decision making helps and strengthening the depth and breadth of prevent those kinds of mistakes. Further, dur­ experience of an inherently expeditionary ing a properly executed CSAR mission, sup­ rescue force. Missions undertaken for those porting assets are at risk only as long as neces­ purposes will motivate and inspire the rescue sary, preventing needless exposure to the community and demonstrate genuine rele­ enemy and facilitating regeneration of the vance in the long war. Not least, it will help the tasked capabilities. Air Force by providing what it seeks—a highly Last, one finds the weightiest benefit of a visible representation of the best that airpower robust CSAR capability in the immeasurable has to offer. This is not merely a parochial in­ effect on operations yet to be planned and terest of either the rescue community or Air

DiPaolo.indd 82 7/31/07 12:42:08 PM A rEsCuE FOrCE FOr THE WOrlD 83

Force. Instead, it goes to the very core of US operations tempo in support of operations in strategy for defeating terrorism. Former secre­ Iraq and Afghanistan, plenty of enthusiastic tary of defense Donald Rumsfeld put it suc­ volunteers would go on the road to partici­ cinctly when he said, “extremists know that pate. That was certainly the case when, in war and anarchy are their friends—peace and March 2000, an hh-60G squadron on its way order their enemies. . . . We cannot allow the home from a deployment to Operation North­ world to forget that America, though imper­ ern Watch in Turkey was rerouted to Mozam­ fect, is a force for good in the world.”12 bique to provide humanitarian assistance after Before any of that can happen, the rescue ruinous floods ravaged the country, isolating community and, in turn, the Air Force need to hundreds of thousands of people. Upon ar­ recognize those types of missions as legitimate rival, squadron members flew 240 missions in contributions to the strategic efforts of the na­ 17 days and delivered more than 160 tons of tion. Without that realization, Air Force res­ humanitarian-relief supplies in an effort still cue will remain stuck in place. With it, that viewed as a significantaccomplishment within community can become a frontline force for the hh-60G community.14 beating the enemy’s strategy instead of the No one should doubt the effectiveness of enemy’s army, thereby contributing to the rar­ humanitarian operations in the long war’s est and most sublime kind of military victory. ideological contest. The response to US hu­ Disaster Response. The most obvious sce­ manitarian efforts after the devastating tsu­ nario for employment inside the gap would nami struck Indonesia in 2004, described by occur during some sort of natural or humani­ Adm Mike Mullen, chief of naval operations, tarian disaster. If Air Force rescue performs provides an illuminating example: well and consistently, it would soon become every theater’s 911 force during those types of I was struck by the results of a nationwide poll con­ crises. Starvation in ethiopia, floods in Bangla­ ducted two months [after the relief effort]. . . . The poll found that, as a direct result of our hu­ desh, noncombatant evacuation operations in manitarian assistance—and for the first time Chad, or earthquake in Iran? Send Air Force ever in a Muslim nation—more people favored rescue. Other services can and will continue U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism than opposed to contribute their own unique capabilities to them (40% to 36%). Perhaps more critically, the those types of events, and this article certainly poll also found that those who opposed U.S. ef­ does not propose that Air Force rescue would forts in the war on terror declined by half, from (or should) provide the largest or most persis­ 72% in 2003 to just 36% in 2005. According to tent force. In many cases, however, an expedi­ the group Terror Free Tomorrow, who commis­ tionary Air Force rescue unit may be the first sioned the poll, it was a “stunning turnaround of DOD force to arrive on scene and, by exploit­ public opinion” and demonstrates that “U.S. ac­ ing capabilities inherent in its organic air- tions can make a significant and immediate dif­ ference in eroding the support base for global power, initiate operations in locations or under terrorists.”15 conditions that other services may find pro­ hibitive.13 Participation in those operations One detects an implied caution in those re­ would put an unmistakable Air Force pres­ sults, however. A population ruined by a natu­ ence at ground zero. Over time, rescue’s in­ ral disaster or some other humanitarian crisis herent capabilities to rapidly assess changing will long remember any failure of the United and chaotic situations, establish order, perform States to respond if it perceives that America effective command and control, and save lives had the capacity to do so. Participation in will be widely recognized by the regional com­ those operations comes with an opportunity batant commands and (more importantly) by cost, but the price of inaction may prove far populations at risk around the world. greater. The world has expectations. Those types of large-scale requirements are Keep in mind, too, that the enemy also gets rare, and even now, at a time when the rescue a vote in the outcome. On 8 October 2005, a community must endure a particularly high 7.6-magnitude earthquake rocked the Kashmir

DiPaolo.indd 83 7/31/07 12:42:09 PM 84 Air & sPACE POWEr JOurnAl FAll 2007

region, killing 73,000 people and leaving 3 Central America, or Southeast Asia and set up million more homeless. The london Daily Tele­ a clinic; pararescuemen can get hands-on ex­ graph reported from Islamabad that “immedi­ perience; and a unit can bring its flight sur­ ately after the earthquake, the best organised geon as well as other medical professionals aid relief came from groups such as Pakistan’s and stay for a couple of weeks. People who main radical Islamic party, Jamaat i-Islami, have never seen a doctor in their lives can get which previously backed the Taliban govern­ a wound treated or a checkup or some simple ment of neighbouring Afghanistan. . . . Sev­ antibiotics.20 And this should not occur just eral Islamist groups have been praised by nor­ once—but again and again and again. mally hostile sectors of the Pakistani media for Those types of efforts in humanitarian civic providing aid relief.”16 assistance comprise just one of a host of mis­ US response to the earthquake was late but sions that could serve as the basis for repeated not fruitless, and the Pakistanis took note. Ac­ deployments. Unlike the fairly rare occurrence cording to Pakistani doctor Muhammad Farid, of disaster-relief efforts, combatant commands “ ‘It has changed our opinion about the offer a wide variety of theater-engagement op­ United States. . . . Anti-American Muslim cler­ portunities as part of their theater security- ics were wrong about the American relief cooperation plans.21 Some opportunities, such workers. . . . They have been accusing all these as deployments for training (DFT), are not people of spreading immorality, but these are primarily humanitarian in nature. A DFT the people who came to save our lives.’ ”17 In seeks to facilitate training of the deployed November of that year, Pakistani newspaper unit, but interaction with the host-nation mili­ editor Najam Sethi told reporters that the tary is inevitable, allowing the United States to United States “‘has had a better profile in Paki­ engage in direct military-to-military interaction. stan in the last few weeks than in the last 15 Because turboprop aircraft and helicopters years.’”18 In the words of Admiral Mullen, are common to air forces of gap countries, “these good deeds go far further in delivering DFT requests are dominated by interest in de­ the ‘peace and prosperity’ message than any ployment of Air Force rescue units. During cruise missile ever could.” We were effective those visits, the host-nation military sees the inside the gap when “we started showing them professionalism of US forces firsthanda nd be­ a side of American power that wasn’t perceived comes comfortable working with Americans. as frightening, monolithic, or arrogant.”19 They also provide an opportunity for the That is what rescue can bring to the table on United States to emphasize important con­ behalf of the Air Force. cepts such as respect for human rights and ci­ Other Engagement Missions. Although easy vilian control of the military. to visualize, major disasters and humanitarian- The variety of available missions ensures relief events are rare, and we should not con­ plenty of opportunity to turn a gap-focused sider them the mainstay of an “into the gap” strategy into action. Those occasions will con­ strategy for Air Force rescue. The real benefit tinue to expand since the inherently humani­ will come from repeated, consistent, and short- tarian and nonthreatening nature of rescue duration deployments into target countries. operations will enable rescue to go where no Specifically, the core of rescue’s engagement other Air Force unit can go. For example, af­ activity will come from preplanned deploy­ ter the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a res­ ments in support of combatant commanders’ cue exercise involving US and former Soviet theater security-cooperation strategies, designed states became one of the first tools used to to achieve predefinedobjectives. Those objec­ promote direct military-to-military engage­ tives should exploit rescue’s greatest strength— ment.22 Rescue also served as a tool for en­ its ability to deploy to austere, remote loca­ gagement with China. Reflectingon those en­ tions to provide hope to desperate people counters, Gen Paul hester, Pacific Air Forces who need it. What would that look like? For commander, said that he’s “still looking for starters, rescue personnel can go to Africa, ways . . . for people to come together in a non­

DiPaolo.indd 84 7/31/07 12:42:09 PM A rEsCuE FOrCE FOr THE WOrlD 85

threatening way for other nations to do busi­ communicate with and support the US Agency ness together.”23 for International Development, embassies, Why Foreign Internal Defense Is Different. Doctors without Borders, and many others. Some individuals may perceive that the course These new challenges are abundant and described for rescue is already occurring via growing. The DOD needs more capacity to the FID mission of the Air Force’s 6th Special help solve them, and the Air Force would like Operations Squadron. FID has a specific mean­ to highlight airpower’s ability to do that kind ing, and this squadron exists for a specificpur ­ of work. pose—“to assess, train, advise and assist for­ We can accomplish none of the preceding eign aviation forces in airpower employment, in a vacuum. Rescue’s efforts need to become sustainment and force integration.”24 Although a carefully coordinated part of existing theater- it could serve as an outsourced provider of engagement strategies, and each operation FID activity if tasked, rescue’s best contribu­ must be meticulously planned. We will need tions to the ideological contest will come from time to turn concepts into actionable plans, doing what it does best—helping people. Fur­ learn security-cooperation processes, and es­ ther, rescue’s ability to go practically anywhere tablish relationships with combatant-command (including countries that do not have an air staffs and DOD security-cooperation agencies. force) provides an engagement capability when We have much work to do, and leaders at all US interests or relations in such countries are levels need to emphasize its importance to the not strong enough to establish a FID program. rescue community, the Air Force, and the na­ however, Air Force rescue professionals tion. If executed properly and managed well, who set out to organize an expeditionary, gap- rescue’s efforts inside the gap could become centered strategy for their community would the stuff of legend—representing a force that do well to note how Air Force Special Opera­ generates respect, appreciation, and influ­ tions Command trains its FID personnel and ence among populations with widely disparate the methods used to organize its engagements. backgrounds. Done right, Air Force rescue Through years of experience, 6th Special Op­ could become an entity with an image that erations Squadron has defined a template for transcends the DOD, and one can envision success that rescue can adapt for its own pur­ the day when even nations hostile to the poses. Above all, that unit has established an United States would welcome the arrival of education and training program designed to 25 the guardian angels of the US Air Force into maximize the effectiveness of its cadre. In­ their airspace. formed by the FID experience, rescue profes­ sionals should create their own curriculum for professional development that augments con­ A Glimpse into the Future ventional CSAR training. Language and cultural- awareness training are important starting Imagine a future in which Air Force rescue points, but much remains. For example, the shares its existential focus on robust CSAR ca­ following areas need attention: learning how pabilities with beneficent engagement inside United Nations (UN) humanitarian or peace- the gap so that both concepts drive the evolu­ enforcement operations are organized, par­ tion of training, organization, and operations ticipating in the UN’s International Search in the rescue community. Imagine, as a result, and Rescue Advisory Group, providing advice the transformation of the Air Force’s one-trick to US Pacific Command’s Multinational Plan­ pony into a world-renowned humanitarian ning Augmentation Team or the DOD’s Center force filled with multilingual regional experts for Complex Operations, striving to reduce who have operated all over the world in sup­ concerns that some nongovernmental organi­ port of every imaginable type of contingency zations may have about working with the US operation—a force experienced in working military, learning the unique support require­ with every conceivable flavor of government ments of the Red Cross, or figuringout how to and nongovernmental agency as it extends its

DiPaolo.indd 85 7/31/07 12:42:10 PM 86 Air & sPACE POWEr JOurnAl FAll 2007

long track record of audacious, high-visibility, those units will bring to the Air Force when white-hat assistance to desperate and appre­ they become colonels. ciative people. envision that force based not Imagine a future in which Air Force res­ in two CONUS supersquadrons but in the cue’s capabilities transported into the gap are seam states that link the gap to the rest of the the service’s most visible image of airpower’s world—places such as Romania, honduras, contribution to victory in the ideological con­ 26 South Africa, and Singapore. Imagine a fu­ test that defines the long war. With a unifying ture in which Air Force rescue has become the vision manifested in operations and images tool of choice for opening relationships with known and respected around the world, res­ wary nations and gaining access to parts of the cue will do things that nobody else can do world that would otherwise remain off-limits to the United States. Think also of the oppor­ and, by doing them, contribute to increasing tunity to accumulate a detailed, regionally the West’s influenceacross many of the globe’s specific knowledge base that would enhance ungoverned and disconnected spaces. envi­ safe operations should the Air Force or an­ sion the transformation of rescue into some­ other service need to return. Think of the en­ thing new and, in the process, its promotion during relationships that could be facilitated to a position of strategic relevance in the great­ when an Air Force rescue unit makes a visit. est conflict of our generation. Imagine, if you And think of the value that the captains in will, a rescue force for the world. q

Notes

1. Quadrennial Defense review report (Washington, DC: in scope, the writers attempt to garner additional opera­ Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), v, http://www tional flexibilityby using more terms with more expansive .defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. definitions. In the introductory text to AFDD 2-1.6, they 2. The national security strategy of the united states of attempt to suggest that the new doctrine merely puts America (Washington, DC: The White house, March CSAR into the larger personnel-recovery context, but this 2006), 10, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ reassurance is unconvincing. A few pages later, for example, nss2006.pdf. it defines the Air Force “PRO [personnel recovery opera­ 3. national strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washing­ tions] philosophy” in the following remarkable statement, ton, DC: The White house, September 2006), 1, http:// referenced two more times elsewhere in the document: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf. “Although Airmen may place natural emphasis on the re­ 4. national security strategy, 9. covery of fellow Airmen, Air Force PRO philosophy is based sahil], meaning bor- on the assumption that PRO forces must be prepared to] لحاس The Sahel (from Arabic .5 der or coast of the Sahara desert) is the boundary zone in recover any isolated personnel anytime, anyplace” (iii, Africa between the Sahara to the north and the more fer­ viii, 3). Think about that for a moment. When the chief of tile region to the south, known as the Sudan (not to be staff of the Air Force talks about the doctrinal require­ confused with the country of the same name). ment for the service to recover its own, he describes it as 6. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” “absolutely fundamental to the culture of the Air Force” Esquire, March 2003, 174, http://www.thomaspmbarnett and “an ethical and moral imperative.” Bruce Rolfsen, .com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm. “The Chief Speaks,” Air Force Times, 4 September 2006, 7. Thomas P. M. Barnett, interview by harry Kreisler, http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-AIRPAPeR Institute of International Studies, University of California– -2049967.php. The rescue community’s pursuit of some­ Berkeley, 8 March 2005, “Describing the Pentagon’s New thing more meaningful has reduced that moral impera­ Map,” transcript at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/ tive to a mere “natural emphasis.” That disconnect offers people5/Barnett/barnett-con0.html. powerful evidence of the lack of a shared vision within the 8. Ibid. Air Force rescue community. 9. An important first step would involve redefining 10. Adm edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., US Navy, vice- the boundaries of expectations erased in the latest ver­ chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (remarks to the Worldwide sion of its main doctrine document: Air Force Doctrine Personnel Recovery Conference, Washington, DC, 9 Janu­ Document (AFDD) 2-1.6, Personnel recovery Operations. ary 2007). That volume used to be called Air Force Doctrine for Combat 11. Operation enduring Freedom offers an excellent search and rescue but as of 1 June 2005, it has been entirely illustration of how the decisions of policy makers can be rewritten and retitled. Perceiving CSAR as “too limited” affected if CSAR is not available. Despite the incredible

DiPaolo.indd 86 7/31/07 12:42:10 PM A rEsCuE FOrCE FOr THE WOrlD 87

pressure on the president of the United States to initiate enhanced their medical training by participating in civilian- attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan as soon as pos­ paramedic ride-along programs or by logging required sible, the commencement of hostilities was delayed ex­ clinical time in civilian medical facilities in the United States. plicitly because CSAR was not yet in place to support air­ 21. The DOD broadly definesthe term security coopera­ craft making strikes in northern Afghanistan. Bob Wood­ tion as “interactions with foreign defense establishments ward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), to build defense relationships that promote specified US 163–64. interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities 12. Donald h. Rumsfeld, “Commentary: A Force for for self-defense and multinational operations, and pro­ Good,” American Forces Press Service, 11 September 2006, vide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=787. a host nation.” Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 13. examples of that particular operational advantage Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as were evident during operations after hurricane Floyd amended through 1 March 2007), 480, http://www.dtic (North Carolina, 1999), floods in Mozambique (2000), .mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. and hurricane Katrina (2005). In a more traditional war­ 22. Daniel L. haulman, One Hundred Years of Flight: time context, one also sees it in Afghanistan, where Air usAF Chronology of significant Air and space Events, 1903–2002 Force rescue forces frequently conduct personnel-recovery (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force history and Museums Pro­ and medical-evacuation missions during periods of ex­ gram in association with Air University Press, 2003), 143. treme darkness when conventional Army helicopters can­ 23. SSgt Julie Weckerlein, “PACAF Commander not fly. Speaks of enhancing Partnerships,” Air Force Print News, 14. “hh-60G Pave hawk,” fact sheet, Air Force link, July Washington, DC, 26 September 2006, http://www.af.mil/ 2006, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=107. news/story.asp?storyID=123027913. 15. Adm Mike Mullen, “What I Believe: eight Tenets 24. “6th Special Operations Squadron,” Air Force fact That Guide My Vision for the 21st Century Navy,” United sheet,n.d.,http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/ States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2006, 14. factsheet.asp?id=3496. 16. Isambard Wilkinson, “Islamist Groups Win Sup­ 25. Lt Col Wray R. Johnson, “Whither Aviation Foreign port for Pakistan Quake Aid,” Telegraph.co.uk, 11 February Internal Defense?” Airpower Journal 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 2005,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/ 79–82, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ news/2005/11/02/wpak02.xml. apj/apj97/spr97/johnson.pdf. 17. David Rohde, new York Times reporter, cited in 26. A major outside-CONUS basing strategy is neither Colin Adams, “Winning hearts and Minds in Kashmir,” unrealistic nor without precedent. Some may recall that religion in the news 8, no. 3 (Winter 2006), http://www the Air Rescue Service used to be a global enterprise with .trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/Vol8no3/Winning%20hearts bases in Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Azores, Bermuda, Labra­ %20and%20Minds%20in%20Kashmir.htm. dor, Korea, United Kingdom, Japan, Philippines, Spain, 18. Ibid. and so forth. See Donald D. Little’s Aerospace rescue and 19. Mullen, “What I Believe,” 14. recovery service, 1946–1981: An illustrated Chronology (Scott 20. This sort of engagement is not entirely unfamiliar AFB, IL: Office of MAC history, Military Airlift Com­ to the pararescue community. For years its members have mand, 1983).

The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective inte­ gration and synchronization of available assets toward the achieve­ ment of common objectives. —Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007

DiPaolo.indd 87 7/31/07 12:42:11 PM The Cuban Missile Crisis Forty-Five Years in the Balance

Charles TusTin Kamps

uring OctOber 1962, the world was flexibility to do anything from engaging individual riveted by the events of the cuban mis­ missile sites to providing air support for OPLAn sile crisis, when the united States and 316’s ground forces. that, of course, was only part Soviet union stood on the brink of nu­ of the Air Force mission. in line with overall priori­ clearD war. the crisis could have ended in Armaged­ ties, defense and counterstrike against the Soviet don since uS forces were preparing two operation union were paramount. While Air Defense com­ plans (OPLAn) that would have pitted the super­ mand (ADc) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed inter­ powers against each other in direct combat. the ceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours, united States averted disaster, however, when the one-third of the total ADc force maintained 15­ Kennedy administration imposed a naval “quaran­ minute alert status. Strategic Air command, at de­ tine” (blockade) on cuba and negotiated a quid fense readiness condition two, had one-eighth of its pro quo with the Soviets that removed their missiles 1,436 bombers on airborne alert while dispersing from cuba and ours from turkey. others and reducing ground-alert times. Some 145 Why should we have any interest in plans we never intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready executed 45 years ago? the answer is balance. For a alert. Our nuclear force was poised to strike. country like ours, with global responsibilities, the next by 22 October, tactical Air command (tAc) enemy may prove as deadly as the current one—or had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and re­ worse. A sense of balance and perspective to see the connaissance aircraft deployed to face cuba on long view is just as necessary as correct analysis of to­ one-hour alert. However, tAc and the Military Air day’s fight. in the cuban missile crisis, Pres. John F. Kennedy had inherited a military optimized for the transport Service had problems. the concentra­ nuclear mission to the detriment of other capabilities. tion of aircraft in Florida strained command and We found ourselves playing catch-up. support echelons; we faced critical undermanning OPLAn 316 envisioned a full invasion of cuba in security, armaments, and communications; the by Army and Marine units supported by the navy absence of initial authorization for war-reserve after Air Force and naval air strikes. the ability to stocks of conventional munitions forced tAc to mount such an operation came at some cost. At the scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a low end of the normal priority chain, Army units in major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 the united States lacked everything from major reserve squadrons. end items to personnel. Similarly embarrassing, the even worse, we exhibited the same naïveté of navy could not supply sufficient amphibious ship­ pre-Vietnam days by expecting fightersto eliminate ping to transport even a modest armored contin­ SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites simply by flying low gent from the Army. and employing napalm as well as strafing. the fact Planners designed OPLAn 312, primarily an Air that we were off balance for operations against Force and a navy carrier operation, with enough cuba offers a lesson for the future. q

To Learn More . . . brugioni, Dino A. Eyeball to Eyeball. edited by robert F. Mccort. new York: random House, 1991. gribkov, gen Anatoli i., and gen William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. chicago: edition Q, 1994. (Additionally, one may access many declassifieddocuments on numerous internet sites, such as the Digital National Security Archive, http:// nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do.)

88

Vignette-Kamps.indd 88 7/31/07 12:50:22 PM APJ

True Confessions of an Ex-Chauvinist Fodder for Your Professional Reading on Women and the Military

Dr. DaviD r. Mets*

T wAS 5 June 1953. One of the world’s She died in her sixties during her lunch hour great feminists (my mother) pinned one at an electronics-parts factory about the time of the yellow bars on my new uniform. Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mys­ Talk about working outside the home—a tique, so my mother did not live Isingle parent, she had done that every day of to see that pride tarnished. her life! Talk about women in combat—I But so far I have lived an­ watched her knock out an assaulting male half other five decades to again her size with one blow! when I was a boy, witnessradicalchanges every time I felt like crying, she would say, “Oh, in that world. No stop it! You’re just like your sister.” when I was l o n g e r a lad and would whine that something was too can a heavy for me to lift, she was wont to say, “Oh, come on. Your little sister could lift it!” In June 1953, I had survived the jump from the 30-foot tower, fully clothed, into the Naval Academy pool. I had found the nerve to get into the boxing ring with a 200-pound class­ mate.1 I had flown in open-cockpit biplanes. I had finallymastered the obstacle course. I had survived the stormy transatlantic crossing in a world war II “tin can” (i.e., destroyer). I had taken small boats through the surf in am­ phibious exercises. I had managed being up­ side down, underwater in the cockpit of the Dilbert Dunker.2 That month I felt like say­ ing to that great feminist, “See Ma, I finally did something that my sister could not.” I did not say that, of course, but a great femi­ nist appeared to have created a chauvinist— and at the time we were both proud of it.

*I received assistance to improve earlier drafts of this article from Brig Gen Janet Therianos, USAF; Ms. Cathy Parker; COL Jack Sin­ nott, USA, retired; and Col Herman Gilster, USAF, retired. The faults that remain are entirely my own.

89

Mets.indd 89 7/31/07 12:49:04 PM 90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

new lieutenant congratulate himself on doing gest a dozen important books that might aid something his sister cannot. No longer can a in that endeavor. women now constitute more recipient of shiny, new silver wings thump his than 20 percent of the service and are eligible chest, congratulating himself on his manli­ for every job in the Air Force, save special opera­ ness. Maybe 100 years from now, American tions. They have written by far the greater part history will proclaim that the world changed of the literature on gender and the military. more in the last half of the twentieth century Clearly, leaders of both genders must under­ than in the first. In an article in the journal stand women’s importance to the success of Foreign Affairs, Francis Fukuyama seems per­ the mission. Too, outside the service at least, suaded that this new world will continue evolv­ some individuals assert that women compli­ ing in the twenty-first century—increasingly feminized in both political and military af­ cate mission accomplishment—and the mili­ fairs. That is to the good, he says, for such an tary leader should be aware of their argu­ environment in the west will be increasingly ments. At the end of the article, following the peaceful and well ordered.3 pattern of the inspiration for the Fodder se­ My aim in this “Fodder” piece resembles ries—Col Roger Nye’s book Challenge of Com­ that of all its predecessors: to provide some in­ mand: Reading for Military Excellence—I identify sights for the air warrior/scholar on an impor­ two books for the overview and the rest for tant dimension of the profession and to sug­ depth and mastery.

A Timeline: Women in the Military 1947 USAF founded 1954 USAF Academy legislation signed 1969 President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force founded Air Force ROTC opened to women 1970 First American female generals (Army) 1972 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) passes Congress USAF Academy plans admission of women 1973 Draft ends women enter flight training in Army and Navy 1974 Involuntary discharge for pregnancy ends 1975 President signs bill admitting women to service academies 1976 First women admitted to service academies women in the Air Force (wAF) abolished women admitted to USAF flight training 1981 Supreme Court rejects women’s draft 1982 ERA ratification fails 1991 Tailhook scandal Combat-flying exclusion repealed 1994 Combatant ships opened to women 1999 women fly combat in Operation Allied Force 2003 Sexual-assault scandal at USAF Academy

Mets.indd 90 7/31/07 12:49:04 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 91

Historical Background of the ill-fated 18th (Prohibition) Amendment and in the various peace movements. The lat­ Women in Combat ter seemed to promise that the feminine influ­ Conventional wisdom has always identified ence, once women got the vote, would tend women as the nurturing gender and peace­ toward a more peaceful world—unhappily it 7 fully inclined, but it characterizes males as vio­ did not immediately turn out that way. In one lent and aggressive. People still vigorously de­ of the most influential books since the end of bate whether those traits reflect learned world war II—The Feminine Mystique (1963)— behavior or a genetic predisposition.4 Un­ Friedan argues that the First Feminist wave doubtedly, women have fought and fought had made a very promising start, opening the well in wars since time began. However, ac­ way to political participation and higher edu­ cording to Joshua Goldstein, those are excep­ cation for women as well as enhancing the tions to the usual—rather rare exceptions in promise for further progress. But then she la­ fact. He argues for the occurrence of only two ments that something went radically wrong. massive, sustained experiences of women in combat. One involved the African kingdom of Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin) from Women in World War II the eighteenth to the late nineteenth century; American women made a major contribu­ a third of its army at times consisted of regular tion in world war II, as they had in world war female organizations—successful ones at that. I. They left the home in droves to participate The second entailed the use of women in in war industry and other parts of the economy. combat in the Red Army of world war II. They also populated several auxiliary organi­ Those women fought bravely and compe­ zations for the military, conducting various tently, but the Soviets ended their combat em­ noncombat functions and thus releasing many ployment as soon as feasible and did not again men for combat duty—still in support func­ place them in combat specialties after the war. tions as they had served in smaller numbers Although Goldstein describes himself as pro- from 1917 to 1918. In world war II, my femi­ feminist, he does assert that the historical re­ nist mother worked as a crane operator in the cord demonstrates that women have never Bethlehem Steel shipyard in Quincy, Massa­ served as primary fighters anywhere—even in chusetts, building aircraft carriers (earning the two cases mentioned above, they repre­ high pay for a woman). Many women got used sented the minority. Elsewhere, they saw heavy to the better wages and what they considered use during wartime in support functions but more meaningful work than the usual house­ hardly ever in combat—and then inadvertently work drudgery. when the men came home, 5 for the most part. anticipating a bright new world of peace and prosperity, most of the women had to go—but where? Our crane-operator feminist had to The First Feminist Wave take a job on the line of a tack factory doing In America individual women have fought random checks confirming that the boxes here and there. However, their participation coming off the line indeed contained 100 in what is often known as the First Feminist tacks—hour after hour, day after day, and wave usually had to do with other things. month after month! Feminists were prominent in the abolitionist According to Friedan (looking at the world movement before the Civil war and afterwards through what appears to me the rather nar­ in the long campaign to acquire property and row lens of an upper-middle-class New York voting rights for women. That culminated in suburban housewife), women were “driven” back the passage of the 19th Amendment to the and trapped into the relatively meaningless Constitution right after world war I.6 Too, the drudgery of keeping house for their children first wave had functioned as a prime mover in and professional husbands, who worked in

Mets.indd 91 7/31/07 12:49:04 PM 92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

the great city. what trapped them? Partially, watergate scandal and the fall of Saigon shook the postwar colleges. Curricula for women American confidence to its very foundations. stressed such functional matters as managing Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, moved to homes—not expanding minds. Reading The stabilize things, but he didn’t last long. wom­ Feminine Mystique, I am not altogether certain en’s votes were becoming evermore powerful, who the trappers were, for, presumably, women and before Ford lost the election of 1976, went into the home-economics courses, mar­ Congress ordered the admission of women to riage, and suburbs voluntarily. But I guess the federal military academies, very much Friedan thought that the culture trapped them, against the preponderance of military opinion.11 not their individual husbands. Protesting that Thus, a new day was dawning for the women’s she did not hate men, Friedan claimed not to movement as Jimmy Carter came into office disparage the role of the homemaker. Rather, with an administration even friendlier to she thought that women needed “something women.12 Not long after, the Soviets moved more” to reach the apex of Maslow’s pyramid into Afghanistan and became active in the and thus fill the self-actualization requirement— Horn of Africa, seeming to mount new threats always through higher education and mean­ to the interests of a weakened America. Presi­ ingful (paid) careers outside the home.8 dent Carter moved to signal the Kremlin on That seems likely since Friedan received the dangers of their actions by reversing the her education at Smith College and then did decline in defense spending. He also pro­ graduate work in California, majoring in psy­ posed making women subject to draft registra­ chology. Her great book appeared just about tion—allegedly to signal his seriousness to the the time of Abraham Maslow’s heyday. Maslow’s Soviets.13 By then women had gained admis­ theory and Friedan’s book have both been sion to the academies and flyingschools of all criticized for having too narrow a focus.9 A the services, but, temporarily at least, that was splendid writer, however, she made a massive im­ about as far as Congress seemed willing to go pact with The Feminist Mystique, even though it in 1979. Some military women, especially offi­ dealt with an elite minority of women. Doubt­ cers, wanted the combat specialties opened less, a huge number of overworked American for females—but few in either the officer or women would have been delighted to experi­ enlisted ranks advocated doing so on anything ence a little of the boredom suffered by her other than a voluntary basis.14 affluent homemakers in westchester County. Women and the The Vietnam War and the All-Volunteer Force Ending of the Draft Meanwhile, a fortuitous juxtaposition of two The war in Vietnam proved traumatic all events greatly assisted both the all-volunteer the way around. Military life came in for wide force and the women’s movement. As the sec­ disparagement, and the antidraft movement ond wave of the feminist movement gathered caused huge strains on American society. After steam, Congress passed the ERA, which seemed Pres. Richard Nixon visited China and then certain to receive early ratification.15 As the concluded Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty draft ended in 1973, it quickly became quite I, the threat to national security seemed much clear that the services’ source of male recruits diminished. As always, women played a promi­ in any but the lowest mental categories was nent role in the peace movement and the drying up. However, women in the highest draft protests. Friedan’s restless housewives two brackets were ready and willing to serve. strove to escape their suburban traps. Nixon In many cases, they could earn much more in attempted to stem the rising discontent by salary and benefitsby joining the services than ending the draft in 1973.10 To cap all that by remaining in the civilian economy. The off, the near-simultaneous occurrence of the same did not hold true for top male prospects.

Mets.indd 92 7/31/07 12:49:05 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 93

Thus, the rapid increase in high-quality female still in pretty good condition.22 In 1976 the fe­ enlistees made up for the shortfall of good male males brought in to serve a similar function recruits. Although during that same period, came from the ranks of junior female officers combat specialties on the surface and in the who volunteered for the task, finding them­ air remained closed to women, the flying selves especially challenged in the physical di­ schools and academies admitted them in in­ mensions of the program. However, in the creasing numbers. Nevertheless, women were end their participation did help a little be­ a great help in support areas; indeed, the all- cause the initial crop of female cadets was in volunteer force probably could not have suc­ fine condition from the outset and compared ceeded without them.16 favorably to the surrogates who had preceded them to Colorado. In fact, during that first summer, the Air Force Academy experienced The Academy Mandate less attrition among women than did the other schools.23 Unlike the other academies, the Air Men seem cursed with the eternal need to Force Academy quartered females separately repeatedly prove their manliness.17 In days of at that time and again during the first semester. old, when society occupied itself with hunting By the second semester, in the spring of 1977, and gathering, combat and hunting offered the women had moved into the integrated men the only opportunities for proving their squadrons, and the officer upperclasswomen manhood. By 1953 other alternatives had be­ 24 18 had moved on to new assignments. come available. As I suggested in my opening It was almost immediately clear that the paragraphs, in my case at least, that need was women would hold their own academically— an important factor in my selecting a Naval and they have done so in all the years since. Academy appointment over admission to a ci­ Some of the male cadets then, and still, vilian college. That school and its sister acade­ thought that the system favored the females, mies had long had the reputation of repre­ quickly claiming that their physiological char­ senting the last bastions of male chauvinism. acteristics did not meet the demands of military It also made them a favored target for the Sec­ life. Too, results in the area of military train­ ond Feminist wave. ing and accomplishment seemed to indicate In the spring of 1972, the superintendent that the women did not compete on an equal of the Air Force Academy, Lt Gen Albert Clark, plane, though some of them did excel and saw the handwriting on the wall and set his achieve high cadet rank. women’s attrition over staff to planning for the admission of women the first four years was higher than desired, as cadets.19 The rank and file there and at the but high attrition all the way around charac­ other academies, however, had little enthusi­ terized those early postdraft years. The rate at asm for the prospect.20 Not until October 1975 which women left the program continued as a did Congress pass and the president sign the source of disappointment into the 1990s.25 legislation, and the women prepared to arrive From the beginning, planners anticipated in July of the next year. Harking back to the problems with sex and pregnancy. The women original experience at the Air Force Academy had training in avoiding sexual assault and in the 1950s, junior officers were brought in rape from the first summer onward. Self- to serve as surrogate upperclasswomen for the defense courses came a little later. Developing early days. The other academies did not follow an equitable policy on pregnancy proved es­ suit.21 There, upperclassmen provided leader­ pecially difficult because of the problem (then) ship. In Colorado the scheme did not work in proving paternity, yet a female cadet clearly out very well. The upperclasswomen came in could not perform her duties during preg­ for training several months early, but the re­ nancy. Involuntary discharge for expectant sults proved disappointing. In the 1950s, most mothers had ended in the rest of the Air Force of the surrogate upperclassmen had been new two years earlier, but it was hard to see how a graduates of the older academies and were woman could stay up with her class during

Mets.indd 93 7/31/07 12:49:06 PM 94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

pregnancy and maternity leave. Ultimately the Corps—largely infantry, artillery, and armor policy permitted a pregnant cadet to go home units.31 The movement advocating civil rights to have her baby and then return to reenter a for Blacks had provided important precedents later class if she could prove that she no lon­ for the notion with their combat in world war ger had legal responsibility for the child.26 II and Korea. The final proof of full citizen­ In the early years, athletics also caused ship became a willingness to fight and die for problems. Nonathletes at all the academies the country. had always grumbled about the special privi­ Then and now, the arguments addressed leges they thought intercollegiate competitors two issues. According to one side, equity de­ enjoyed—special training tables, for example. manded admission of the excluded group to Since a good deal of military training occurred combat for the sake of the Declaration of In­ during meals at the standard tables and since dependence and its assertion that all men are none of that went on at the training tables, created equal. The other side urged effective­ cadets deemed the latter a very valuable privi­ ness firstand then equity. The military existed lege. This proved especially troublesome for to fight and win the nation’s wars. whatever women. The first classes boasted very high detracted from that purpose deserved rejec­ achievers, and almost from the outset a far tion. The armed forces, the argument went, greater proportion of women than men made were not social laboratories designed to find the intercollegiate squads, thus escaping the cures for our domestic woes.32 usual Doolie (i.e., freshman) training at meals.27 Further, from the first summer onward, the command attempted to make Doolie training Effect of the First Gulf War more “positive”—which meant less shouting During the Gulf war of 1991, tens of thou­ and humiliation for the freshmen. That plus sands of women deployed with US armed the high proportion of women on athletic forces to combat theaters. Still excluded from squads led to disgruntlement among the men combat arms, several were killed by Scud mis­ and tended to confirmtheir notions of the ex­ siles and two were taken prisoner. Continuing istence of a pro-female bias. Even after 30 technological advancements, such as standoff years, in anonymous surveys a significant mi­ weapons, seemed to make the distinctions be­ nority of male cadets still declare that women tween combat and support specialties less rele­ do not belong at the academy—a perennial vant, a point women made to strengthen their problem for command.28 case to remove the last barrier. witness the case of Maj Marie Rossi, an Army transport- helicopter pilot killed in an aircraft accident Combat Exclusion as the war ended. Proponents argued that the For a long time, the feminist movement fact that she carried troops and goods forward held that the last two great barriers to full to combat areas subjected her to as much risk equality were the admission of women to the as the male pilots of combat-helicopter gun­ academies and the combat-exclusion legisla­ ships. The increasingly technological nature tion passed by Congress in 1948—both tough of combat, they maintained, made differences obstacles.29 As noted above, President Carter in upper-body strength less relevant. The cap­ was rebuffed when he took a shot at the latter, ture of one enlisted woman and one officer shortly after women began attending the acade­ did not seem to result in the horrors for fe­ 33 mies. But Congress still would have no part of male prisoners that many people feared. registering women for the draft.30 The law pre­ vented the assignment of women to aircraft Effect of Tailhook crews with combat missions and to all war­ ships. Service policy denied them admission The media and military did much to “hype” to combat specialties in the Army and Marine the substantial contribution that women made

Mets.indd 94 7/31/07 12:49:06 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 95

to the Gulf war, but that publicity alone prob­ people suffered from a “witch hunt” while cer­ ably would not have proved sufficientto move tain guilty parties—beneficiaries of immunity Congress and the services to remove some of and other factors—went unpunished.38 the combat exclusions. Back in 1948, I had an aviation rating in the enlisted Navy—thor­ oughly bored and stationed at North Island Women Go into Air and Sea Naval Air Station, observing manly naval avia­ Duty during Combat tors zoom overhead in their beautiful Corsairs and Bearcats. It appeared to me that I could The combination of publicity coming out escape into a world of adventure and manli­ of the Gulf war and Tailhook armed the advo­ ness by applying for admission to the Naval cates of women in combat.39 Congress soon Academy. I never became a naval aviator, but repealed the legal impediments of 1948 to the picture I had was not altogether fantasy. combat flying and shipboard service, leaving Not long after world war II, Navy flyers it to the services to open the way. In the mid­ formed an association to promote the future 1990s, the Navy and Air Force soon did so, of naval aviation. By the 1990s, the Tailhook placing women at sea aboard combatants and Association had long held an annual conven­ in fighterand bomber cockpits. They soon got tion, usually in Las Vegas, Nevada.34 Although their baptism of fire,flying in combat over the 40 these gatherings did include seminars and Balkans and Iraq. The Army and Marine speeches by some heavyweights, they always Corps, which had not come under those laws, included late-hour parties that sometimes got had a better case for exclusion, based on physio­ pretty raucous.35 logical differences in average upper-body 41 The one in 1991 occurred shortly after the strength. Thus, restrictions against women conclusion of the Gulf war during a time of in ground-combat arms and special forces re­ national exuberance. Atop that, Navy men have main in place. never acquired a reputation for teetotaling or for reticence in pursuit of the opposite gen­ der.36 That combination made the Tailhook Continuing Problems convention of 1991 one of the most famous, Breaching the last barrier did not end the or infamous, in the history of the organiza­ tale. Culture involves more than merely chang­ tion. Even the most charitable descriptions ing laws, training, and barrages of publicity. make a mockery of the “officer and a gentle­ we know from our reconstruction experience man” idea, and both the chief of naval opera­ after the Civil war that it is sometimes possible tions and the secretary of the Navy had to to drive attitudes underground temporarily, leave their offices early because of the scandal. but to truly change culture makes for a daunt­ No court-martial convictions ensued, but many ing challenge.42 Moreover, human relations male officers were otherwise punished, some­ are dynamic, not static. The balance is forever times to the ruination of their careers. Some changing. Society may have succeeded in civi­ bad behavior occurred on the part of female lizing the Tailhook Association, only to find officers too, but none of them was punished. sexual-abuse scandals popping up at the Aber­ On the other hand, the assault victims never deen Proving Grounds and the Air Force had the satisfaction of seeing their attackers Academy.43 Even without the scandals, as convicted in court. Lt Paula Coughlin, how­ noted, significant portions of the male cadet ever, the most famous of them, did receive a and midshipman populations still do not $400,000 settlement from the Tailhook Asso­ think women belong at any of the academies.44 ciation and a $6,700,000 judgment against the we have yet to reach consensus among some Las Vegas Hilton for failure to provide secu­ of the most distinguished intellectuals in the rity. She later resigned from the service.37 The land as to whether aggressiveness is a genetic naval investigative system got some bad pub­ or an acquired trait. we face a long and diffi­ licity, and many argue that some innocent cult task in obtaining a true consensus among

Mets.indd 95 7/31/07 12:49:06 PM 96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

cadets, albeit we think that leadership and had orders to investigate the charges and make training can do much to control any antisocial recommendations. It did so rather rapidly, tendencies.45 and by March the secretary and chief had insti­ After both the Gulf war and Tailhook, in tuted the Agenda for Change at the academy. the spring of 1993, sexual-assault trouble oc­ Moreover, Air Force leadership almost imme­ curred at the Air Force Academy. The superin­ diately replaced the superintendent and com­ tendent of the day, Lt Gen Bradley Hosmer, mandant. Congress also appointed former himself an academy graduate, did begin im­ congresswoman Tillie Fowler to lead a com­ portant and effective reforms to control the mission to investigate and recommend. Its re­ problem: establishing a sexual-assault hotline port, issued in September 2003, generally sec­ available around the clock, founding a Sexual onded the many measures in the Agenda for Assault Services Committee to coordinate Change but lamented the loss of confidential policies and information, and creating Sexual reporting for the victims of sexual assault. It Assault Awareness week (later, a month) dedi­ also accused the walker working Group of cated to training and education. The academy failing to cite the shortcomings of Headquar­ also founded the Character Development Cen­ ters Air Force in the whole affair.48 ter during those years. women had reached Meanwhile, the Department of Defense the highest cadet ranks in the years since 1976, instructed its inspector general (IG) to estab­ and female graduates were prospering on the lish accountability for the difficulties at the line of the Air Force. However, the experience academy. That report, which came later, as­ with graduate Kelley Flinn alone would have signed faults by name to some of the academy been enough to warn us all against compla­ and headquarters leaders—though that in­ cency.46 Still, we had room to hope that re­ cluded neither the sitting commandant nor forms were working to some extent and that 49 things were improving. most of his predecessors. The Air Force had At the onset of 2003, however, a storm also tasked its IG to review the academy’s ac­ broke that rivaled the Navy’s Tailhook prob­ tions in response to sexual-assault charges over lem. Three women cadets or ex-cadets sent an the previous 10 years. Only a few of those had e-mail to the world, including members of resulted in court-martial actions, and the IG Congress and the media, saying that the sexual- agreed with the academy’s investigation and 50 assault problem at the Air Force Academy was handling procedures in all cases but one. running wild, that women could not report as­ Very often, one person’s firm conclusion is saults because they feared punishment while another’s pure speculation. Yet I offer the the perpetrators went unpunished, and that conclusions below as so fairly well established the command remained unconcerned.47 The that readers of this journal might want to con­ events prompting the e-mail took place in the sider them as assumptions for their personal, immediate aftermath of al-Qaeda’s attack on professional study of the subject of women in the world Trade Center and the Pentagon. the military. I also offer a list of suggested hy­ The secretary and chief of staff of the Air potheses that readers might want to use in Force had been fully occupied with those their professional reading on the subject of events when the trouble in Colorado burst this article. Folks on all sides of the debates upon the scene. They dispatched a working consider some of them the ground truth, but group to the academy almost immediately. this journal’s audience might want to test Led by Mary walker, the Air Force counsel, it them for validity in their further readings.

Mets.indd 96 7/31/07 12:49:07 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 97

My Tentative Conclusions • women can fight and have fought with competence and aggressiveness. • women can handle scientific, technical, and mechanical work. • women can fly and have flown high-performance aircraft. • women can perform and have performed effectively at sea. • women are at least the intellectual equals of men. • women, on average, are not as strong in upper-body strength as men, and they have less physical endurance in the short term, though they enjoy a longer life expectancy. • Culture changes only slowly. • A built-in political conflictsurrounds the integration of women, based on the demand for equity on the one hand and the requirement for military effectiveness on the other. • Tension exists between the need to protect the confidentiality and privacy of an al­ leged victim of sexual assault and the equal need to consider the alleged perpetrator innocent until proven guilty. • Tension exists between the need to protect the privacy of alleged victims and the need to have timely information for enabling a legal prosecution of perpetrators. • women have successfully integrated themselves into all the federal academies and will remain there for the foreseeable future.

Suggested Hypotheses for Further Study and Debate • The question of whether male aggressiveness and propensity for violence are acquired or biological characteristics remains unproven. • Part of the trouble with sexual harassment and sexual assault arises from biological roots; another part has its origins in cultural norms. • Men generally have a psychological need to prove and prove again their manliness. • women do not have a similar need to prove their femininity. • Sexual tension is inevitable in mixed-gender units. • Undesirable features of a culture can be controlled to some degree through legisla­ tion, training, and leadership. • The definitions of sexual assault and harassment are broad and inconsistent. • women may never be admitted to ground-combat units in the US forces. • women now comprise about 20 percent of the Air Force; they have largely been inte­ grated, but it remains to be seen whether increased numbers will solve remaining challenges.

Mets.indd 97 7/31/07 12:49:07 PM 98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

The intense study of all the books in the her understanding of a complex issue. Too, it sampler offered below will certainly not make contains works from various viewpoints in the us experts on the subject of women in the mili­ hope that unreformed chauvinists or extreme tary, but it may help an air warrior build a con­ feminists will have some new fodder to chew ceptual framework for ideas to expand his or on. q

A 12-Book Sampler for Reading on Women in the Military*

Two for the Overview The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan. New York: Norton, 1963. This catalyst for the second wave of feminism argues that middle-class women trapped in the suburban home are subject to unfair limitations in their growth potential. Cofounder of the National Organization for women, the author served as its first president. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa by Joshua S. Goldstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. A fine scholar analyzes the subject from a multidisciplinary viewpoint at many different levels. A must-read. Ten for Depth and Mastery Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military by Martin Binkin. washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993. A fairly dispassionate, short analysis of the subject. Women and the Military by Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach. washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977. An earlier analysis made the point that juxtaposition of the end of the draft and the matur­ ing of the Second Feminist wave made the increasing use of women in the military possible and essential. The Air Force Academy: An Illustrated History by George V. Fagan. Boulder, CO: Johnson Books, 1988. Though a coffee-table book, the scholarship is fine,and the history is an honest one, cover­ ing the admission of women to the Air Force Academy, among other things. The author has been associated with the academy since its founding. Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military by Linda Bird Francke. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. written by a hard-core feminist who conducts an extensive and well-written analysis of the subject, this book concludes that the full integration of women is impossible because of the unyielding macho culture of the services.

*None of us will live long enough to read all of the literature on gender and war, so my list is only suggestive, not authoritative. It includes works from both sides of the argument and some from men—though women have penned the vast preponderance of the literature.

Mets.indd 98 7/31/07 12:49:07 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 99

The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America’s Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars? by Stephanie Gutmann. New York: Scribner, 2000. writing equally well and from the opposite viewpoint from Francke, Gutmann makes the basic argument that the attempt to integrate women into all service specialties is making the military a hollow shell. Women in the Military: An UnfinishedRevolution by Jeanne Holm. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. written by a famous Air Force major general, this book argues that the integration of women into the military is highly beneficial but has not gone far enough. Women in the Line of Fire: What You Should Know about Women in the Military by Erin Solaro. Emeryville, CA: Seal Press, 2006. This well-written, recent argument advocates elimination of the remaining barriers to women in ground-combat units of the Army and Marine Corps. The Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military by Brian Mitchell. washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1989. written by a hard-core opponent of integrating women into the military. Dress Gray: A Woman at West Point by CPT Donna Peterson. Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1990. The author is an early and articulate graduate of the US and a firm be­ liever in the utility of women in the Army. She left the service after a short time but clearly retains a very high opinion of the Military Academy despite the obstacles she faced as a cadet. Bring Me Men and Women: Mandated Change at the U.S. Air Force Academy by Judith Hicks Stiehm. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. written by a feminist who speaks with authority about the initial integration of women at the Air Force Academy. She resided at the academy for several months while researching the book. The 13th in a Baker’s Dozen Bullies and Cowards: The West Point Hazing Scandal, 1898–1901 by Philip w. Leon. westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. This splendid little book by a Citadel professor shows that such events as Tailhook, cheat­ ing scandals, and sexual-assault troubles are not altogether new. Read it to obtain some perspective on the subject.

Notes 1. For a long time, women at the academies partici­ side. A midshipman, fully clothed, donned an inflatable pated in a self-defense course instead of boxing. However, life vest and a parachute harness, and strapped himself according to Vice Adm Rodney Rempt, women at the Naval into the cockpit. Released down the slide, the dunker in­ Academy recently have become involved in boxing. “State verted in the water so that the victim found himself up­ of the Academy” (remarks, Conference Commemorating side down underwater. He had to unstrap the seat belt, 30 Years of women at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, swim downward, get out of the parachute harness, inflate 8 September 2006). the life vest, rise to the surface, and climb into a floating 2. The Dilbert Dunker was a mock airplane cockpit inflatable raft. If the midshipman did not do so in a cer­ on a slide next to a pool. Lifeguards were posted on each tain time, the lifeguards dived in to rescue him—and he

Mets.indd 99 7/31/07 12:49:07 PM 100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

got the chance to try and try again, or he did not gradu­ Air Force and their promotions at the lower and middle ate. At the time, the same applied to a midshipman jump­ levels have been better than those for their male counter­ ing from the tower: either he jumped and swam across parts, they are still not very numerous at the top levels. the pool or he did not graduate. 8. Dr. C. George Boeree, “Abraham Maslow, 1908–1970” 3. Francis Fukuyama, “women and the Evolution of http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/maslow.html (accessed world Politics,” Foreign Affairs 77 (October 1998): 24–40. 29 August 2006). Boeree explains Maslow’s theory as ar­ He does declare, though, that some limits exist. The so­ ranging psychological needs in various layers of a pyra­ cialization process can restrain male tendencies toward mid. The bottom layer includes physiological needs such violence and domination to some extent, but they are to as food, air, and water. The second layer includes safety some degree founded in biology and thus not easily elim­ needs such as protection and stability, which become a inated. He also points out a growing and important role concern after the first layer is largely satisfied. The next for females in the support parts of the armed forces, but above are belonging or love needs, and the fourth layer he characterizes integrating combat units as attempting the includes having the respect of others plus one’s own self- unnatural, given the utter dependence upon male bond­ respect. Threats to any of the layers below could drive a ing, which the proximity of women will certainly under­ person’s concerns downward. At the apex of the pyramid mine. His persuasive arguments do not go uncontested, is self-actualization, which may have been what Friedan for in subsequent issues feminist scholars stoutly oppose was talking about when she argued that suburban, middle- his arguments with convincing pieces of their own. Among class wives needed “something more.” other things, they question whether male violence and ag­ 9. Ibid.; and Joanne Boucher, “Betty Friedan and the gression are really genetically based and whether individual Radical Past of Liberal Feminism,” New Politics 9, no. 3 characteristics of either gender really determine issues of (Summer 2003), http://www.wpunj.edu/icip/newpol/ war and peace. See Barbara Ehrenreich et al., “Fukuyama’s issue35/boucher35.htm (accessed 28 August 2006). Follies,” Foreign Affairs 78 (January/February 1999): 118–29. 10. Pamela M. Prah, “Is the Pentagon Using a ‘Back­ 4. Fukuyama, “women and the Evolution of world door’ Draft?” CQ Researcher 15 (19 August 2005): 2, Politics,” 24–26. The notion that the genders are biologically http://library.cqpress/cqresearcher/document.php?id= different in the psychological dimension is an anathema cqresearcher2005081900&ty (accessed 8 September 2006). to many feminists, but he points to significant and grow­ 11. Lt Gen Albert P. Clark, USAF, “women at the Ser­ ing evidence that male violence and aggressiveness have vice Academies and Combat Leadership,” Strategic Review some genetic roots—and not just among humans. See 5 (Fall 1977): 64. also Sarah Glazer, “Are There Innate Differences between 12. Judith Hicks Stiehm, Bring Me Men and Women: the Sexes?” Congressional Quarterly 15 (20 May 2005): 1–2, Mandated Change at the U.S. Air Force Academy (Berkeley: http://library.cqpress/cqresearcher/document.php?id University of California Press, 1981), 91. Indeed, during +cqresre2005052000&ty (accessed 8 September 2006). the inaugural parade of 1977, the usual order in the ranks 5. Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender was reversed so that President Carter could see the short Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 60–64, 66–68; and Martin van women as they passed the reviewing stand. Creveld, “why Israel Doesn’t Send women into Combat,” 13. Prah, “Is the Pentagon Using a Backdoor Draft?” Parameters 23 (Spring 1993): 5. Van Creveld agrees on this 1318. Both Congress and the Supreme Court quashed the point. See also Cecile S. Landrum “The Israeli Fighting Carter proposal at the time. Cong. Charles B. Rangel pro­ women: Myth and Facts,” Air University Review, November– posed a similar draft measure in 2003, but it was voted December 1978, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ down in the House, 402–2, with Rangel voting against his airchronicles/aureview/1978/nov-dec/landrum.html own proposal. (accessed 6 March 2007). The myth was that Israeli 14. Rodman D. Griffin, “what Role Should women Play women had always fought alongside men in their many in the Shrinking Military?” CQ Researcher, 25 September wars against Arabs, but that notion was discredited in 1992,http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document Landrum’s article, among other places. women had .php?id+cpressrre1992092500&ty (accessed 7 September briefly fought in desperate circumstances of a defensive 2006). nature in 1948—and then only in small numbers. In all 15. Glazer, “Are women Returning?” 13; and Lt Gen the wars that followed, they were excluded from combat. Albert P. Clark, USAF, “women at the Service Academies,” 6. Sarah Glazer, “Are women Returning to a 1950s Strategic Review 5 (Fall 1977): 64. Mind-Set?” Congressional Quarterly 16 (14 April 2006): 11–12, 16. Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, Women and the http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id Military (washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977), =cqresrre2006041400&ty (accessed 8 September 2006). 64–77; and Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harass­ 7. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: ment and Violence at the Military Service Academies (washing­ Norton, 1963), 81–101. Clearly the women’s vote has long ton, DC: Department of Defense, June 2005), 8, http:// been a formidable factor in national politics, but the in­ www.dtic.mil/dtfs/doc_recd/High_GPO_RRC_tx.pdf. At crease in female participation in office has not been pro­ the opposite pole is former secretary of the Navy (and US portionate and remains rather thin. Jane S. Jaquette, Naval Academy graduate) James webb, who argued that “women in Power: From Tokenism to Critical Mass,” For­ male midshipmen still tried and needed to prove their eign Policy, no. 108 (Fall 1997): 37. Similarly, though the manhood by traditional means. But, he says, the presence numbers of women have been increasing rapidly in the of women at the Naval Academy denied them the oppor­

Mets.indd 100 7/31/07 12:49:08 PM TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST 101

tunity. See his article “women Can’t Fight,” Washingto­ 27. In “State of the Academy,” Rempt reports that at nian, November 1979, 273. that moment, 41 percent of the Naval Academy women 17. Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural were on intercollegiate squads. History (New York: Free Press, 1996). Kimmel dedicates 28. Brian Mitchell, The Weak Link: The Feminization of his entire work to the proposition that American men the American Military (washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, have always been obsessed with a forlorn hope of proving 1989), 48–60. Mitchell’s book is obviously hostile to their manhood—and that doing so is impossible. Thus women in the military. See also Clark, “women at the Ser­ they are doomed to be eternally frustrated unless they vice Academies,” 69. adopt the Kimmel solution: men can succeed only by giv­ 29. Stephanie Gutmann, The Kinder, Gentler Military: ing up the chase and welcoming females, gays, and non­ Can America’s Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars? white races as equals. Only then can they fulfilltheir need (New York: Scribner, 2000), 147. for self-actualization. Although a sociologist in the state 30. Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished university system of New York, Kimmel has not written a Revolution (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 353–56. sociological study here—or even a cultural history. One of 31. Clark, “women at the Service Academies,” 65. the chapters, “The Masculine Mystique,” suggests that he 32. Goldstein, War and Gender, 101; and Paolo Valpoline is envious of Friedan and would like this book to serve as et al., “Gender and war,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 31 (23 June the male counterpart to Friedan’s tremendously success­ 1999), http://www8.janes.com/search/documentview.do? ful work. In Bring Me Men and Women, Judith Hicks Stiehm (accessed 9 September 2006). says that some Navy men testifiedin Congress that admis­ 33. It seems that the Iraqis did treat both prisoners sion of women might impair motivation for the males better than had been anticipated, and at firstboth denied who sought appointment to demonstrate their manliness having been sexually assaulted. However, some time after (31). See also webb, note 16. she had been liberated, Maj Rhonda Cornum, an Army 18. Andrea L. Smalley, “ ‘I Just Like to Kill Things’: doctor, admitted that though her general treatment had women, Men and the Gender of Sport Hunting in the not been that bad, she had been sexually assaulted but United States, 1940–1973,” Gender and History 17 (April not raped. Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, the captured enlisted 2005): 183–209. Smalley argues that in modern times, in­ woman, reported that her own treatment had been civi­ sofar as sporting magazines were concerned, hunting was lized. Gutmann, Kinder, Gentler Military, 153; and Goldstein, not a gender-specificsport until after world war II. In the War and Gender, 94–96, 149. nineteenth century and up until world war II, it gener­ 34. So named because of the metal hook beneath and ally had been something that members of the upper class at the rear of the aircraft fuselage. It is designed to engage had done in their leisure time; members of the working the arresting gear on the carrier deck and rapidly halt the class stayed too busy to indulge. But the increasing entry aircraft upon touchdown. of women into the male workplace and the expansion of 35. Gutmann, Kinder, Gentler Military, 159. hunting to include the working classes caused editors to 36. Griffin, “what Role Should women Play?” emphasize hunting as a macho endeavor that would help 37. Ibid., 187; and Christopher Hanson, “women males establish their masculinity. warriors: How the Press Has Helped—and Hurt—in the 19. George V. Fagan, The Air Force Academy: An Illus­ Battle for Equality,” Columbia Journalism Review, May/June trated History (Boulder, CO: Johnson Books, 1988), 186. 2002, 4–5, http://www.cjr.org/issues/2002/3/media 20. Clark, “women at the Service Academies,” 64–65. -grossman.asp (accessed 14 November 2006). Hanson ar­ 21. Ibid., 69. gues that the television magazines have perhaps inadver­ 22. At least two future four-star generals were among tently weakened the women’s movement. Their format the first crop of surrogate upperclassmen: Gen Charles has taken the form of the TV journalist acting in effect as Gabriel and Gen Jerome O’Malley. the knight in shining armor, galloping to rescue a female 23. Lois B. DeFleur et al., “Sex Integration of the U.S. victim as in The Perils of Pauline. The point is that they Air Force Academy: Changing Roles for women,” Armed model the female officers as victims in need of protec­ Forces and Society 4 (Summer 1978): 620. tion—hardly compatible with the vision of the vigorous, 24. Fagan, Air Force Academy, 193–95; and Stiehm, brave combat leader who can take care of herself. Bring Me Men and Women, 110–29. 38. william H. McMichael, The Mother of All Hooks: The 25. Stiehm, Bring Me Men and Women, 121, 129; Gold­ Story of the U.S. Navy’s Tailhook Scandal (New Brunswick, stein, War and Gender, 97; Sharon Hanley Disher, “30 Years NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), xii–xiii, 302–3, 325–37. of women at USNA: A Success Story,” Shipmate 69 (Sep­ 39. Ibid., 95. tember 2006): 17; Rempt, “State of the Academy”; and Lt 40. Greg Seigle, “Gender and the Military,” Jane’s De­ Col Laura A. H. DiSilverio, Winning the Retention Wars: The fence Weekly 31 (23 June 1999), http://www8janes.com/ Air Force, Women Officers, and the Need for Transformation, search/documentview (accessed 8 September 2006). Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 41. That part of the process may not be over yet, as wit­ 2003), http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild nessed by CPT Adam N. wojack, USA, “Integrating women _papers/DiSilverio/DiSilverio.pdf. into the Infantry,” Military Review 82, no. 6 (November– 26. “Mom, the Cadet,” Time in Partnership with CNN, December 2002): 67–74. wojack, a serving infantry offi­ 28 November 1977, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ cer, favors integrating women into combat arms, and article/0,9171,919137,00.html (accessed 14 September Military Review is an official Army journal (note, however, 2006). that the article includes a disclaimer that opinions are

Mets.indd 101 7/31/07 12:49:09 PM 102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

those of the author only). The admission of women to she had not been on the line long enough to have quali­ combat aircraft and warship crews seems to have cooled fied as an aircraft commander. Her book was on the the drive against exclusion but certainly did not eliminate streets two months after she left the service. it. See Erin Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire: What You Should 47. “Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Know about Women in the Military (Emeryville, CA: Seal Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy” (Arlington, Press, 2006). Solaro’s entire volume argues for eliminat­ VA: The Panel, 22 September 2003), 10, (hereinafter ing the last barriers of exclusion from the Army’s and Ma­ Fowler Panel Report), http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/ rine Corps’ ground-combat units. data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/23/ 42. Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, Military Culture: A Para­ 5c/8b.pdf; “Evaluation of Sexual Assault, Reprisal, and digm Shift? Maxwell Paper no. 10 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Related Leadership Challenges at the United States Air war College, 1997), 16, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/ Force Academy,” Report no. IPO2004C003 (washington, aul/aupress/Maxwell_papers/Text/mp10.pdf. DC: Officeof the Inspector General at the Department of 43. Goldstein, , 97–98. War and Gender Defense, 3 December 2004), i (hereinafter DOD IG Re­ 44. In “State of the Academy,” Rempt reports that the port); and “Air Force Inspector General Summary Report latest surveys show that the percentage of male midship­ Concerning the Handling of Sexual Assault Cases at the men who so state is now down to six or seven. United States Air Force Academy” (washington, DC: Air 45. Goldstein, War and Gender, 96–97; and Dunivin, Military Culture, 26. Force Inspector General’s Office, 14 September 2004), 46. Kelly Flinn, Proud to Be: My Life, the Air Force, the Con­ (hereinafter AFIG Report), http://www.af.mil/shared/ troversy (New York: Random House, 1997). Flinn graduated media/document/AFD-060726-033.pdf#search=%22A with the class of 1993, went through pilot school, and be­ %20inspector%20general%sexual%assault%22 (accessed came the firstwoman admitted to the B-52 program. After 14 September 2006). training, she was assigned to a far-northern base and be­ 48. Fowler Panel Report, 1–7; Report of the Defense Task came sexually involved with the spouse of an enlisted per­ Force, 3–4; and “Report of the working Group Concerning son. In the process, she lied to her commander and dis­ the Deterrence and Response to Incidents of Sexual As­ obeyed orders to stay away from the man. Threatened sault at the U.S. Air Force Academy” (washington, DC: with a court-martial on those grounds, she chose to leave Headquarters US Air Force, June 2003), i. the service instead of facing those charges. The media 49. DOD IG Report, v, 42–140. made much of her position as a qualified B-52 pilot, but 50. AFIG Report.

Fighting and winning the [global war on terrorism] requires commit­ ment, capability, and cooperation from allies and partners around the world. We depend on our international partners to secure their territory, support regional stability, provide base access and overflight rights, and contribute a host of air, space and cyber power capabilities as interoperable coalition partners. As the pace of economic, political and cultural globalization increases, the importance of strong global partnerships—both now and in the future—is abundantly clear. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement

Mets.indd 102 7/31/07 12:49:09 PM Revised USAF Doctrine Publication Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8, Counter–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations

Lt CoL CharLes e. Costanzo, PhD, UsaF, retireD

he ThreaT or use of chemical, Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction biological, radiological, or nuclear (Washington, DC: The White house, 2002). weapons by hostile regimes and ter­ The earlier edition of aFDD 2-1.8 addressed rorists represents one of the most proliferation prevention, counterforce, active Tdifficult challenges facing our nation and our defense, and passive defense as major compo­ air Force.” So observes Maj Gen allen G. Peck, nents to counter hostile nuclear, biological, or commander, headquarters air Force Doctrine chemical (NBC) operations. The revised and Center, Maxwell aFB, alabama, in the fore­ expanded document adds consequence man­ word to air Force Doctrine Document (aFDD) agement and treats all fiveareas as pillars sup­ 2-1.8, Counter–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, porting an overall strategy, thus bringing and Nuclear Operations, 26 January 2007.1 This aFDD 2-1.8 into closer alignment with na­ publication substantially revises and signifi­ tional strategy and joint doctrine. Moreover, cantly improves its predecessor, published on the earlier version devoted only five pages to 16 august 2000. The new doctrine document proliferation prevention, counterforce, active replaces the previous air Force approach to defense, and passive defense, while the latest counter–chemical, biological, radiological, covers the five pillars in 32 pages. Clearly, and nuclear (C-CBrN) operations with a more measures to prevent proliferation or actions robust methodology and provides air Force– taken to deter, deny, degrade, destroy, or de­ specific guidance for those operations. fend against CBrN weapons are important, Chapter 1 introduces the concept of air but the inclusion of consequence management Force pillars for C-CBrN operations as well as in the revised aFDD gives an expeditionary air their relationship to joint mission areas, and force critical understanding of how to manage chapters 2–6 elaborate upon those matters. and mitigate the consequences of an attack. These interlinked, operational-level pillars— The new document also describes, albeit proliferation prevention, counterforce, active briefly, the strategic enablers (intelligence, defense, passive defense, and consequence international partnerships, and strategic com­ management—are designed to support the munications) that underpin the five pillars and overarching guidance provided in the National enhance the air Force’s C-CBrN operations. Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass De­ Its predecessor discussed only the use of com­ struction (Washington, DC: Chairman of the mand, control, communications, computers, Joint Chiefs of Staff, [2006]); they also sup­ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance port the pillars identified in Joint Publication (C4ISr) assets and counter-NBC terrorism as 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of crosscutting elements that could affect the Mass Destruction, 8 July 2004, and the National components of counter-NBC operations. ad­

103

Doctrine Note-Costanzo.indd 103 7/31/07 12:39:28 PM 104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

ditionally, terminology in the new aFDD 2-1.8 much-improved document. Further, the new, not only adopts the same title (strategic en­ expanded aFDD—almost twice as long as its ablers) but also uses names and descriptions predecessor—offers in-depth treatment of similar to those in the National Military Strategy C-CBrN operations. however, it still does not to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, again provide a detailed elaboration of CBrN bringing air Force doctrine closer to joint weapon characteristics, the discussion of guidance. Furthermore, chapter 7, “Support which remains generic and not entirely infor­ operations,” improves upon the logistics and mative. Nevertheless, in light of the threat sustaining activities discussed in the earlier posed by CBrN weapons, all airmen should document. Finally, chapter 8 addresses the re­ carefully study the revised aFDD 2-1.8. q quirement for education, training, and exer­ cises in C-CBrN operations in much the same way as did the earlier publication. The emergence of more guidance in the Note seven years following the appearance of the 1. The air Force Doctrine Center will be renamed the first version of aFDD 2-1.8 provided a rich air Force Doctrine Development and education Center, foundation for updating it, resulting in a effective 1 august 2007.

I am an American Airman. I am a warrior. I have answered my nation’s call. I am an American Airman. My mission is to fly, fight, and win. I am faithful to a proud heritage, a tradition of honor, and a legacy of valor. I am an American Airman, guardian of freedom and justice, my nation’s sword and shield, its sentry and avenger. I defend my country with my life. I am an American Airman: wingman, leader, warrior. I will never leave an Airman behind, I will never falter, and I will not fail. —The airman’s Creed

Doctrine Note-Costanzo.indd 104 7/31/07 12:39:28 PM and payloads on bullock carts in the 1960s to devel oping the world’s first satellite to provide support for educational projects (EDUSAT)—he is also mindful of the fact that India’s space programme is overly focused on national civil development and welfare to the neglect of military needs. This has led to some irksome situations: despite the pres ence of the civilian Department of Space, which has the largest constellation of remote-sensing satellites in the world, the Indian military still has to scout for commercial imagery from agencies such as the United States’ Space Imaging and Israel’s Ofeq. To alleviate such problems, the author proposes “a national space programme where the civil and military aspects complement and draw strength from each other” (p. 255). He asserts that this “makes enormous economic sense” (p. 19). For one, no “budget-draining” is required to transfer Space: The Frontiers of Modern Defence by K. K. civilian to military space endeavours: “Launchers Nair. Knowledge World (http://knowledgeworld make no difference between civil and military pay online.com/index.htm), 5A/4A Ansari Road, loads” (p. 226). For another, unlike conventional Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002, 2006, 254 pages, $25.00 (hardcover). military systems, which need constant updating at great cost, space systems do not require such ex Early in 2007, China tested its satellite-killing penditure once installed. weapon, a medium-range KT-1 ballistic missile. The To this end, the book proposes a road map for news met with international condemnation, particu military utilisation until the year 2037. Well aware larly in the United States, whose monopoly in space- that fineplans may become mothballed when faced based navigational and surveillance technology was with the inertia of institutions, however, the author threatened. India, too, felt the anxiety even though suggests training and educating leaders and spe critics argued that China had a right to challenge cialists who could take India to the next level in the United States’ monopoly of space. China had terms of the militarization of space. pressed for treaties outlawing arms in space, which Overall, the book provides a good balance among the United States had summarily ignored. the informational, theoretical, and propositional. India, a tiger economy with fragile relations with Chapter 5, on the inadequate legislation pertain the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and China, ing to technologies in outer space, is particularly may have much to be concerned about. Squadron excellent. Leader K. K. Nair writes a persuasive treatise cover My contention with the book is that it makes ing most, if not all, areas of the use of space for In some dubious generalisations under the banner dia’s national security. Knowledgeable in theory as of objectivity. For instance, the author states with well as versed in strategic and practical import, the out any evidence that “war and conflict are inher author has a comprehensive grasp on the terrain. ent parts of human nature” (p. 68). His premise is With an eye to the history and capability of other also based on the idea that the “high ground” established and emerging space powers, Space: The must be conquered (p. 42), failing to take on Frontiers of Modern Defence is composed with a pur board the importance of stealth and strategy, pose—to encourage the merging of air defence which can sometimes resist surveillance: high and space defence in India, which, up until now, ground did not help either in the thick jungles of have largely operated in separate spheres. the Vietnam War with the United States or, as the Whilst Nair lauds India’s progress and achieve author also mentions, in the detection of the ments—from transporting its rockets on bicycles Pokhran II tests by US satellites.

105

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 105 7/31/07 12:38:55 PM 106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Nair’s proposals for the militarization of space countries? This is on top of the unmentioned con are overly glowing. There is no mention of techno sequences of increased use of space that could add logical problems in both space and air domains, to the space-debris problem. Out of sight, out of which have littered India’s past. Nor is space-based mind, it seems. information foolproof, as evident in the Gulf War There is a fine line between protecting national of 1991, in which all attacks by precision-control assets and becoming an aggressor nation at the cost missiles were deemed to result in collateral as op of other national developments for the betterment posed to civilian casualties. Accidents still happened. of society. Striking the balance is key. In fact, one findsmuch recourse to the example of Operation Desert Storm as the “first space war” Dr. Raminder Kaur because every aspect of military operations de University of Sussex, United Kingdom pended largely on support from space-based sys tems (p. 18). Nair offers little coverage of other wars or a sketching out of potential scenarios for A Perfect Hell: The True Story of the Black Devils, India that could make the case of space-based de the Forefathers of the Special Forces by John fence more convincing. Nadler. Presidio Press (Random House Publish When it comes to accounting for China and ing Group) (http://www.randomhouse.com/ Pakistan, the book spares no criticism—firstly, for rhpg), 1745 Broadway, 18th floor, New York, the collusions between the two countries. Nair New York 10019, 2006, 416 pages, $15.95 (trade deems them the most dangerous for wanting to paperback); 2007, 384 pages, $7.99 (softcover). carve out national territory in outer space despite the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which considers Special forces—again? In the 1960s, few people space the province of all mankind (p. 144). knew about the training and employment of a cer Secondly, the author analyzes the ominous signs tain group of American soldiers in what has today of China’s mighty aspirations to conquer space. become known as “black ops.” Today, it is fashion This could “trigger a space weaponisation race in able and often desirable for military and civil lead addition to the prevailing nuclear competitions ers to have special-operations experience in their and tensions” (p. 133), which raises the question, records, whereas decades ago, it could have ended does India want to encourage this? Furthermore, careers. But in the days before such formal organi why doesn’t the United States come in under the zations existed, one group of warriors was willing to scalpel here for setting the whole agenda in the make the ultimate sacrifice; as is often the case, first place? they came from varied backgrounds and had di There are several other unanswered questions. verse expertise. In A Perfect Hell, John Nadler writes Nair suggests that since space research is already about the First Special Service Force (FSSF)—the well funded in India, some of this can be comple “Black Devils.” Imagine a group of rogues, prize mentary to the needs of the military. But when it fighters, farmers, professional soldiers, and so forth, comes to other countries, he notes how costs of from several Allied countries thrown into the hinter space-based defence can act as a “limiting rider” (p. lands of Montana, and you have the makings of a 86). Undoubtedly extra funds will be required for multinational commando team. defence-specific developments. Where will these This was a force to be reckoned with, one that come from and at what costs? How is it to be devel lost more than 2,777 men to death and injury over oped—indigenously or in cooperation with other time. Such a close-knit group of special young men countries? It is not clear whether he is arguing for would not willingly tell their story to outsiders, space enhancement of ordinary wars or also the much less attend reunions or ceremonies honoring militarization of space. their own. That Nadler was able to create this book Can India’s resources cope with the increased shows that he possesses a rare talent for persuading expenditure if it is seen as an aggressor nation in such heroes to open up and allow the rest of us to space? Is it in a position to counter perceived ene have the honor of knowing their story. mies with antisatellite and directed-energy systems More than a compilation of historical facts and as well as microsatellite configurations and jam figures,this book allows us to sit down with the sur ming weaponry, and can it have the potential to vivors and hear their own words. Although not a detonate nuclear devices in space that can release special operator or warrior like the men in the an electromagnetic impulse which could cripple FSSF, Nadler, who has found himself in harm’s way, space assets in the targeted vicinity? Does it want to has managed to re-create their blood, sweat, and start playing that war game with more powerful tears. These men, all of them handpicked volun

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 106 7/31/07 12:38:55 PM BOOK REVIEWS 107

teers, only knew that their country wanted single memories, he sets out to tell the reader what a liai men to serve in a “suicide unit.” Thousands re son pilot did in the war—and he does a good job. sponded. By doing so, they created a permanent Bryce engages the reader immediately by his place for themselves in military history, achieving a rejection of the fighter-pilot path, a candid self- kind of immortality. assessment based on his dislike of the Vultee BT-13 When the Black Devils descended upon Helena, Valiant trainer. His sincerity binds the story, draw Montana, the local populace saw them as both ing the reader across the country and then the items of interest and, over time, as native sons. Atlantic. When they departed for the war, they took with Operating generally in rear areas, Bryce hauls them fond memories and left families behind— the mail, couriers, and senior officers,staging from many of them never again to see their wives or chil muddy and treacherous pastures. Spotting for the dren, some unborn. artillery was not a liaison function, but Bryce fliesa The FSSF saw its firstcombat action on Monte la few reconnaissance missions. Detailed maps allow Difensa, a military objective that had thwarted the the reader to follow him and the 72nd Liaison entire US Fifth Army. This first mission, including Squadron from Italy across France and into north no more than 600 men, involved taking the high ern Germany by VE-day. Bryce witnesses the horrible ground—literally. Before relating the battle, Nadler consequences of war and survives to face his own explores the high-level studies proposed by Churchill mortality. and other Allied leaders that called for commando Bryce could have moved his story faster with forces to confront the conventional forces the Al more show and less tell. He could have increased its lies would face during the liberation of Europe. reference value with more specific history and sta Nadler incorporates the thoughts and words of the tistical information on the 72nd Liaison Squadron. FSSF members whose lives were affected by the de What was its official mission? How was it tasked? cisions of the supreme powers. Using a myriad of What was its combat record? What became of it? war stories, facts, and maps, the author tells the Parts of the book would benefit from a bit more story well. beef. For example, he offers, “I suddenly lost con Nadler has created a book that should be re trol of the aircraft and crashed into the side of the quired reading in the service academies and non hill” (p. 42). That little sentence would have filled commissioned officer schools, regardless of service a colorful chapter in my book. branch. Why? Because joint service operations have Overall, Liaison Pilot is a worthwhile two-hour become the norm. A rarity among the “been there, read. Its greatest appeal lies in the offer of a candid done that” genre of books, A Perfect Hell has pic look back in time. The protagonist is likeable. The tures that, by themselves, make it worthwhile. They story is genuine and unique. show a side not often seen in commando stories— the faces of the men who were there and the condi Col James E. Roper, USAF, Retired tions under which they lived. We see the spirit and Colorado Springs, Colorado souls of those brave few who led the way. A very readable book with no discernable historical flaws, A Perfect Hell has my highest recommendation. Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Secu rity for the 21st Century edited by Dennis E. Jim McClain Showalter. Imprint Publications (http://www Cape Coral, Florida .imprint-chicago.com), 207 E. Ohio Street, no. 377, Chicago, Illinois 60611, 2005, 256 pages, $24.95 (softcover). Liaison Pilot by James R. Bryce. Sunflower Univer sity Press, 2002, 120 pages, $10.95. From 26 through 28 January 2005, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission and the In Flying by visual rules in marginal weather with dustrial College of the Armed Forces at the Na out radios says much about the times and survivors tional Defense University conducted a symposium of such a training regimen. During World War II, entitled “Eisenhower and National Security for the the US Army Air Forces mobilized for war in Eu 21st Century” at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. rope, where conditions were even worse. TSgt That symposium produced Forging the Shield, a col James R. Bryce flew tiny airplanes, principally the lection of essays written by a broad-based and inter Stinson L-5, during this time. In this brief memoir nationally recognized group of individuals and ed woven from his wartime letters, pilot log, and vivid ited by Dennis E. Showalter, professor of history at

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 107 7/31/07 12:38:56 PM 108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado. while they shape technological and interagency According to Showalter, the authors capture the contributions for tomorrow’s world. unique nature of the Eisenhower presidency by re Roger D. Launius, chair of the Division of Space vealing the fingertip sophistication of Eisenhower History at the Smithsonian Institution’s National as commander in chief as well as his ability to com Air and Space Museum, and Capt John W. Yaeger, prehend the complex relationship between na USN, retired, director of institutional research at tional security and the vulnerable infrastructures of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, discuss modern societies. As a consequence, their efforts aspects of Eisenhower’s long-term vision. In “Eisen enhance our overall understanding of Eisenhower’s hower and Space: Politics and Ideology in the Con presidency by highlighting his shortcomings as well struction of the U.S. Civil Space Program,” Launius as his successes. Ultimately, in Showalter’s estima suggests that, more than perhaps any president in tion, this assessment demonstrates that in the the Cold War era, Eisenhower had a formal strategy 1950s, Eisenhower “was as president the right man for defeating the Soviet Union. Consequently, the in the right spot” (p. 5). president’s strategic vision did more to establish Alex Roland, professor of history at Duke Uni conditions for success than any other single set of versity, focuses on Eisenhower as policy maker in a decisions during that 40-year conflict. In what general discussion about the president’s approach might be called a preemptive strike to prevent a dis to lobbying efforts by scientists, congressmen, busi ruption of his strategy, Eisenhower transformed the nessmen, and officers of the military services or, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics into as the president referred to them, the “military the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, industrial complex.” Roland’s essay, “The Grim defining the agency with a limited mission that Paraphernalia: Eisenhower and the Garrison State,” never sought to make it the “miracle solution to all sets the stage for three chapters on the administra current difficulties”that aggressive space advocates tion’s efforts to deal with this phenomenon. “Clan wanted (p. 153). Yaeger’s “Eisenhower and Joint destine Victory: Eisenhower and Overhead Recon Professional Military Education” explains how the naissance in the Cold War” by R. Cargill Hall, chief president nurtured a system of professional mili historian emeritus of the National Reconnaissance tary education, giving our armed forces an intellec Office;“Eisenhower and the NSA: An Introductory tual as well as an operational framework that has Survey” by David A. Hatch, National Security Agency endured well after the Cold War. Similarly, Univer historian; and “The Invisible Hand of the New Look: sity of California professor Gregg Herken’s “‘Not Eisenhower and the CIA” by Clayton D. Laurie, his Enough Bulldozers’: Eisenhower and American torian of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1953–1961” examines yet Central Intelligence Agency, provide insightful another aspect of the president’s long-term vision. “must-reading” for Airmen. Hall describes two of Herken details how Eisenhower and his secretary the administration’s greatest achievements—high of state, John Foster Dulles, presided over the most altitude aerial and space reconnaissance of the So rapid and dramatic growth of America’s nuclear ar viet Union—and the ways that these twin technolo senal, setting the course for a unique 50-year nu gies contributed to the end of the Cold War. Hatch clear weapons policy. During his administration, reveals Eisenhower’s behind-the-scenes, proactive the nation’s nuclear stockpile grew from 1,750 to involvement with communications intelligence and approximately 23,000 weapons (p. 85). Along with its enhancement of the agency’s ability to deliver an increase in the number of weapons came dra concise, clear evidence with definitive conclusions. matic growth in their nominal yield: from the 20 Laurie analyzes the administration’s expanded use kiloton atomic bombs, the original mainstay of the of paramilitary operations, espionage, and political arsenal, came the multimegaton thermonuclear action as a substitute for larger conventional mili weapon. Though believing that nuclear war would tary forces whose use anywhere risked superpower be an unprecedented catastrophe, the president confrontation and a third, potentially atomic, world and his secretary of state recognized the necessity war. In offering how similar achievements in the fu of preparing for all military contingencies, even ture may contribute to our national security in the those they disliked. Staying the course rather than twenty-firstcentur y, each of these authors combines reacting to the whims of change, working in a joint a solid foundation of Eisenhower’s past presidential and interagency environment rather than attempt achievements with a peek at what might be needed ing a single-service or single-agency solution, and in the future. These are essential elements for to embracing the many exigencies of a volatile world day’s Airmen if they wish to understand their past rather than preparing for only a few are still

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 108 7/31/07 12:38:56 PM BOOK REVIEWS 109

sound principles for our nation’s future military spite the fact that no twentieth-century president leadership. had taken office (or would take office) with more Sergei N. Khrushchev, Senior Fellow at the direct experience in foreign policy, the Korean War Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International illustrated just how little personal influence Eisen Studies, provides a unique international under hower had on the war’s causes, conduct, and conse standing of Eisenhower’s foreign policy in “Reflec quences. Using recently released American and tions on Eisenhower, the Cold War and My Father.” Chinese documents, Zhai explains in “Crisis and The essays of Saki R. Dockrill, chair, Contemporary Confrontation: Chinese-American Relations during History and International Security, Department of the Eisenhower Administration” why Beijing viewed War Studies, King’s College, University of London; the United States as a primary enemy hostile to Allan R. Millett, Major General Raymond E. Mason China’s revolution and its unification with Taiwan. Jr. Professor of Military History, Ohio State Univer In detailing Eisenhower’s foreign policy objectives sity; and Qiang Zhai, professor of history at Auburn regarding communist China, he highlights the dif University–Montgomery, create a portrait of Eisen ferences between policy makers in Washington and hower as international statesman in an era of global Beijing, specificallyshowing why Mao Tse-tung and crisis and confrontation. Sergei’s remembrances of his associates considered America’s actions antago his father’s attitudes towards Eisenhower are in nistic. Just as our military and civilian leadership sightful. Although younger Soviets, like Sergei, strove to understand other cultures as they strug might have believed that the election of a general gled to win the Cold War, so must America’s current as our president sent a clear signal that the United and future leadership strive to understand other cul States was preparing for war, his father, Nikita tures if we hope to win the war against terrorism. Khrushchev, did not. To older Soviets, Eisenhower As general and president, Eisenhower took great was an honest man beside whom they had fought in interest in the intellectual development of the offi World War II. He had not stolen victory from Gen cer corps, asserting the importance of both profes Georgi K. Zhukov when Hitler left the gates to Ber sional military education and advanced education at lin open to American forces. “We can deal with the best civilian institutions. His remarkable legacy these people,” the older Khrushchev believed (p. 8). of domestic and international leadership endures Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was not as strong as within Forging the Shield, an important work that Air the United States, and it was his responsibility to men should read and emulate. conceal that weakness from America. In “Eisenhow er’s Methodology for Intervention and Its Legacy Dr. Roy F. Houchin II in Contemporary World Politics,” Dockrill discusses Maxwell AFB, Alabama Eisenhower’s approach to intervention and its out come, examining the ideas behind the president’s grand strategy for the Cold War and the relation Mavericks of the Sky: The First Daring Pilots of the ship between the perceived threat and the nation’s U.S. Air Mail by Barry Rosenberg and Catherine security. Utilizing the competition of ideas and ide Macaulay. William Morrow (http://www.harper ology, intelligence gathering, covert operations, collins.com/imprints/index.aspx?imprintid= and proxy battles in the Third World, Eisenhower’s 518003&HCHP=TI_William+Morrow), Harper- New Look doctrine combined the unity, not the Collins, 10 East 53rd Street, New York, New York conformity, of the Western alliance with limited 10022, 2006, 352 pages, $25.95 (hardcover). mobilization, emphasis on American nuclear deter rence, use of allied ground forces, and “all feasible Today we take aviation for granted and think al diplomatic, political, economic and covert opera most nothing of boarding an airplane to fly any tions” to deal with the Soviets (p. 24). In “Eisen where on the planet. Yet, the airplane was invented hower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and barely a century ago, and many people still alive Hopeful Precedent,” Millett examines how the Ko can recall the sight of a plane overhead as a source rean War fit into Eisenhower’s vision of a proper of wonderment. national-security policy in an era of Cold War com A lively and entertaining book, Mavericks of the petition with the Soviets. For Millett, the Korean Sky begins in 1918 when the airplane was a teenager War serves as an example of the strengths and weak and flight remained almost a magical event. The nesses of a security system based on forward, collec country had just entered the world war, and aircraft tive, and conventional defense, reinforced by the were destined to play an important, highly publi deterrent influence of nuclear weapons of varied cized role. At the same time, farsighted politicians destructive capabilities and delivery systems. De envisioned a dramatic role for aviation in civil affairs.

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 109 7/31/07 12:38:57 PM 110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Postmaster General A. S. Burleson and his deputy, tration turned the job over to the emerging airline Otto Praeger, believed that aircraft could carry the industry. During the previous nine years, airmail mail back and forth across the country in a fraction pilots flew nearly 14 million miles, crashed 200 air of the time it took to move by train or truck—a tre planes, and suffered 43 fatalities. Although costly, mendous boon for business and the American by 1927 airmail had become an established reality. economy in general. In a move almost breathtaking An enjoyable read, Mavericks of the Sky is largely in its audacity, Burleson and Praeger persuaded a accurate in a general sense. Unfortunately, the au skeptical Pres. Woodrow Wilson, a reluctant Con thors seem unfamiliar with many details regarding gress, and an unwilling Army to inaugurate airmail early flight,especially the military variety, and make service. a number of errors. The Wright brothers tested the The undertaking was audacious because of the firstmilitar y airplane at Fort Myer, not College Park extremely primitive state of aviation at the time. (p. 105); Billy Mitchell was not the “commander of Built of wood and fabric, airplanes proved notori U.S. Air Forces in Europe” (p. 75); Maj Carl Spatz ously unreliable, barely able to fly at 100 miles per had not yet changed the spelling of his name in hour and 10,000 feet. Cockpit instrumentation was 1918 (p. 75); the Liberty engine was not “the big virtually nonexistent, with usually only an airspeed gest, most powerful piece of hardware ever strapped indicator, altimeter, and whiskey compass available. into a wood and canvas biplane” (p. 1); no one As yet, no provisions existed for flying in clouds, could ever term Eddie Rickenbacker “baby-faced” rain, or even at night, other than using the unreli (p. 86); and neither the de Havilland DH-4 nor the able senses of the pilots themselves. Reading this Junkers JL-6 were multiengine aircraft (pp. 226, account, one wonders how any of the early aviators 233). These avoidable gaffes aside, the authors survived. Praeger, the flawedhero of this story, had have written a good yarn about a little-known part never flownbut was adamant that airmail would be of early aviation. a success, despite the obstacles of weather and tech nology. His stubbornness not only would cause re Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired sentment and more than a few deaths, but also West Chicago, Illinois would provide results. Rosenberg and Macaulay fill their account with stories of pilots who possessed more courage than Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, common sense, launching off into the clouds with and the Easter Offensive by Stephen P. Randolph. no clue as to when, if ever, they would break into Harvard University Press (http://www.hup.harvard the open. They flewin rain and snow, at night, and .edu), 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Massachu in the fog with nary a navigation aid or even the setts 02138, 2007, 416 pages, $29.95 (hardcover). rudiments of an airway structure to guide them. There were no beacons, runway lights, weather sta In past issues of this journal, I thought I had rec tions, radios, or even aeronautical charts to ease ommended to prospective air warriors all they would the process. No sane pilot today would even con ever need in books on the air war in Vietnam. I had sider flying in the conditions the early airmail pi told them about Marshall Michel’s two studies: lots encountered daily. Their stoicism in the face of Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972 adversity was legendary. After one crash landing (Naval Institute Press, 1997) and The Eleven Days of that the pilot, Dean Smith, walked away from, he Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle (Encounter wired headquarters: “Flying low. Engine quit. Only Books, 2002). I had also recommended Wayne place to land on cow. Killed cow. Wrecked plane. Thompson’s To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force Scared me. Smith” (p. 228). and North Vietnam, 1966–1973 (Smithsonian Institu Because the country was at war in Europe, the tion Press, 2000). None of those three said much Army hesitated to spend its scarce aviation resources about the tactical air war in South Vietnam, cover on flying the mail, yet when airmail service began ing the air battles over the North instead. The air on 15 May 1918, a US Army pilot climbed into a war in the South is well handled in John Schlight’s military plane—a Curtiss “Jenny”—and took off The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, from Washington, DC, with a sack of mail, heading 1965–1968 (Office of Air Force History, 1988). But to New York. The military flew the mail for three now I must add one more splendid work to that months before handing the task over to civilians impressive array: Col Stephen Randolph’s Powerful who worked for the US Post Office. and Brutal Weapons. The US Air Mail Service flew from 1918 to Sep Starting in 1974, Randolph served 25 years in tember 1927. At that point, the Coolidge adminis the Air Force before he retired, flying F-4s and F-15s

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 110 7/31/07 12:38:57 PM BOOK REVIEWS 111

as well as participating in Operation Desert Storm. book on air war this year should make it Randolph’s That experience and the fact that he is a splendid fine work. writer qualified him well for his assignment on the Joint Staff. He is now a civilian faculty member at Dr. David R. Mets the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Maxwell AFB, Alabama Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, teaching sub jects having to do with strategy and space. The De From POW to Blue Angel: The Story of Commander veloping Air Leaders Initiative some years ago was Dusty Rhodes by Jim Armstrong. University of commissioned to address a shortage of senior offi Oklahoma Press (http://www.oupress.com), 2800 cers who had not only a firm grasp of their technical/ Venture Drive, Norman, Oklahoma 73069-8216, tactical specialties but also a broad knowledge of 2006, 317 pages, $29.95 (hardcover). politics and culture. At the time, Randolph seemed to have been at least one officer who fit that pre Jim Armstrong’s From POW to Blue Angel is a scription. page-turner that reinforces the cliché “truth is of The beauty of Powerful and Brutal Weapons is that ten more compelling than fiction.” Dusty Rhodes it seamlessly melds the domestic, political, diplo could have been the Forrest Gump of Navy air in matic, cultural, technical, tactical, and strategic fac his generation, for he seemed present at every im tors affecting the air war in 1972. Meticulously re portant event in naval aviation and seemed to have searched, it depends heavily on primary sources done everything of historical interest. Certainly, from all sides of the fight—American, North and there were plenty of exceptional occurrences in his South Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese. Randolph life, but none of them really qualify as noteworthy. uses a chronological organizing scheme, starting Rather, we are struck by the entire span of his mili with the Easter Offensive in the South and moving tary life: what he saw, what he did, whom he served on to the mounting of Linebacker One. with, and how he handled it all with great courage, The book yields a fine illustration of the notion grace, persistence, and good humor. that strategy making is a two-way street dealing with An Eagle Scout and all-American boy, Rhodes a thinking, reacting, and intelligent enemy. It also joined the young American Navy aviators who rushed shows some of the difficulties involved in civil- to the Pacificto join the fightagainst the most well- military relations, especially the interplay between trained and advanced navy in the history of the politics and military action while negotiations to world—one whose air arm had just sunk most of end the war continued in Paris. Randolph deals the US Pacific Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. His un with tensions between the Washington leadership’s forgettable baptism of fire occurred during the desire to bring heavy pressure to bear on Vietnam Battle of Santa Cruz Island on 26 October 1942. ese leaders in the North and military requirements This classic Pacific sea battle was only the second of the close-run ground battles in the South. He major combat engagement in the history of navy does not glorify the fightereffort, giving due credit warfare in which opposing surface forces never saw to the role of the gunship and airlift crews who lost one another—aircraft on both sides accounted for their lives in the successful defensive battles in Mili all of the strike power. Early in his fleet-aviationex tary Region III. He avoids the common traps of try perience, Rhodes bonded with the Who’s Who of ing either to condemn the American effort or to wartime naval aviation: aces Swede Vegtasa, Butch duck the blame for frustrations of the war in 1972. Voris, and Butch O’Hare; great aviation leaders He gives due credit to the work of the naval aviators Jimmy Thatch and Tommy Flatly; and more—all up north. To Randolph, airpower was neither om icons of aviation and the war in the Pacific.He also nipotent nor valueless in affecting decision mak recounts meeting the brilliant Japanese fleet admi ing in Hanoi. Along with the successful diplomacy ral Isoroku Yamamoto. Through his unblinking involved in the opening of China and the conclu personal insight, we come to know these interest sion of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I with Mos ing and ultimately famous people. cow, airpower was among the deciding factors in Are there lessons here for today’s military mem bringing an end to the war and limiting our hu bers? Absolutely. Armstrong has written a wonder miliation there. ful human-interest story about real people from We now have great literature on the air war in the “Greatest Generation”—a special man, his peers, Vietnam. Powerful and Brutal Weapons is one of the and family at a special time and place in our na best air-campaign studies—if not the best study— tion’s history. It is also an eminently military story available. Readers who can accommodate only one of backbone, persistence, and optimism in the face

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 111 7/31/07 12:38:57 PM 112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

of devastating enemy attacks, brutal adversity in An e-mail epistolary written in Spanish, 300 dias captivity, personal setbacks in a war-strained mar en Afganistan bristles with harrowing tales of child riage, professional challenge in a new era of avia birth but consists mostly of brief commentaries tion, and resurrection among his peers through about clothing, shopping, food, weather, weddings, hard work and dedication. and other aspects of daily life. These skillfully writ The book’s human aspect sets it apart. The ten diary entries tease out fascinating deeper mean themes are timeless, and the details are riveting. A ings in mundane events. A perceptive observer, Dr. talented young man sets off to war and glory but Aguirre clearly has a sense of adventure. Her accounts encounters a ruthless reality check in his first hec of a vacation in Iran and trips into the Afghan tic combat experience. Surviving that encounter, countryside are fascinating. She scatters antimilitary he maintains his dignity during a dehumanizing quips throughout the text, but the most egregious tenure as a prisoner of war in the enemy camp, one comes from the editor’s prologue, which in shares eyewitness accounts of the Allies’ Tokyo dulges in political sermonizing and gratuitous bombing campaign, and experiences the touching slams against President Bush. The author clearly intimacies of men thrown together in a humiliating disapproves of the Iraq war, which began during internment. Ultimately, he perseveres and after her stay in Afghanistan, referring to “the clumsy Bush” struggling with postwar realities, both professional (p. 74) and dismissively noting that “the military is and personal, he triumphs. now quite taken with the idea of posing as humani From POW to Blue Angel relates the experiences tarians and handing out two or three blankets so of a participant in one of our nation’s most interest they can take photos and make the world think ing and challenging periods—and does so in a very they are helping a lot” (p. 74). On the other hand, personal way. Much more than the story of one Dr. Aguirre makes humorous references to the hy man’s triumphs in aviation, it is a fascinating ac giene habits of her French MSF coworkers, con count of one of the key turning points in the his cluding that “the French are quite pretentious and tory of modern warfare. Read this book. You will arrogant” (p. 29). However, the author displays less enjoy it. judgment by characterizing the Taliban as “a phe nomenon born of political chaos, but that grew CAPT D. Scott Thompson, USN, Retired only because it was fed by American and European Middletown, Rhode Island economic interests” (p. 52). The book presents conflictingassessments, both of women’s role in Afghan society and of the author’s 300 días en Afganistan by Natalia Aguirre Zimerman. attitude towards the military. Dr. Aguirre under Editorial Anagrama, S.A. (http://www.anagrama standably dwells on the plight of Afghan women, -ed.es), Pedró de la Creu, 58, 08034 Barcelona, who suffer the world’s highest death rate during Spain, 2006, 192 pages, $15.00. childbirth. She praises their strength and contends they are less oppressed than Western news media say Why would military professionals read a Colom (pp. 51–53), yet she also relates the systematic do bian gynecologist’s account of her service in Af mestic abuse they suffer. One chapter describes how ghanistan as a member of Médecins Sans Frontières a mother of several daughters was threatened with (MSF) (Doctors without Borders)? One reason is divorce if she did not produce a son (pp. 140–44). that MSF and other nongovernmental organiza Some readers may become frustrated by Dr. Aguirre’s tions (NGO) are an important part of the opera ambivalent attitude towards the military. Despite tional environment. The author, Dr. Natalia Aguirre, her opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, she is not the stereotypical Birkenstock-sandaled NGO realized that Saddam Hussein’s defeat might per member that some military members might envision. mit greater MSF access to Iraq, enabling that orga Instead she is an articulate medical professional nization to expand its humanitarian mission. Her who genuinely wants to help people. A native of views of the war in Afghanistan are equally contra Medellin, Colombia, she is no stranger to violent dictory. Dr. Aguirre strongly criticizes the Taliban insurgencies, so she adapted well to post-Taliban and tells how some of its members nearly killed one Afghanistan, where she operated childbirth clinics. of her female nurses for attending school (pp. 99– Dr. Aguirre did not set out to write a book, but her 101), yet she shows little regard for the military messages to friends back home during her nearly forces that overthrew the Taliban. Her comments yearlong stay in Kabul from 2002 to 2003 grew into suggest that NGOs value some services the military such a gripping anthology of daily vignettes that a can provide yet are careful not to associate too publisher decided to turn them into a book. closely with it. Some of the book’s contradictions

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 112 7/31/07 12:38:58 PM BOOK REVIEWS 113

may derive from its origin as a series of e-mails bility of engaging opponents with irregular methods. chronicling the vicissitudes of the author’s life, but Employing SOF in a mission does not automatically they also reflect the sometimes uneasy military- constitute a special operation. Initial operations in NGO partnership. Afghanistan rightfully consisted of using conven Readers seeking military lessons learned will tional means to defeat a conventional opponent. find none in 300 dias en Afganistan, but the book Since the fall of the Taliban regime, however, the opens a window into the mind-set of NGO mem conflict has become unconventional, while US ac bers. The author’s Colombian background gives tions in the region have remained conventional. US and European readers a noticeably different A retired career special-forces officer with 30 perspective on events they hear about every day. Dr. years’ active duty, Rothstein writes from a perspec Aguirre’s witty and sometimes irreverent prose tive of experience. His concise prose punctuates makes her book refreshingly readable. each point of the book, and he personalizes the case study of the conflict in Afghanistan through Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF extensive interviews with members of specific units Maxwell AFB, Alabama and with leaders who directed the employment of those units. The author’s concise, well-documented review of the literature, which defines the context Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconven of special operations and the arena of unconven tional Warfare by Hy S. Rothstein. Naval Institute tional warfare, transforms several vague definitions Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), into clear terminology. Gradually developed on a 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, foundation of contemporary history and theoretical 2006, 224 pages, $26.95 (hardcover). analysis, the author’s insights into the current state of US capabilities in unconventional warfare pres The initial phase of the US military campaign in ent an efficiently constructed volume that reflects Afghanistan received praise as a formidable display Rothstein’s provocative thought. of American military prowess, especially the role of For the reader who has but a few minutes to US special forces in ousting the Taliban regime and spare, the book’s introduction, which reads much pursuing members of al-Qaeda into their own back like an executive summary, explains the author’s yard. American civilian and military leaders alike main points quite well. Yet the true value of the have issued repeated statements insisting on the book lies in its examination of the American mili importance of unconventional capabilities in fight tary system and how that system’s structure resists ing a war against terrorists. Yet today in the Middle the concepts of unconventional warfare. In pre East, increasing numbers of coalition forces con senting the fundamentals of organizational theory tinue to battle a persistent enemy. Have operations and dependency relationships, the author identifies in Afghanistan actually been unconventional, or have the self-reinforcing nature of contemporary mili we used special operations forces (SOF) simply to tary organizations and the way they further promul conduct what in essence remains a conventional gate their established procedures. At times the many campaign? lists, intended to define unconventional warfare, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconven­ seem only to obscure a basic definition, but perhaps tional Warfare is a study of what defines unconven that is really the point: to realize that because uncon tional warfare and how we must posture SOF in ventional warfare in fact defies the limits of an orga order to engage irregular threats successfully. The nizational structure, one must conduct it through an title of the book speaks directly to its purpose: to outward perspective that allows continuous adjust highlight the inability of the US military to conduct ment to the environment in which it occurs. unconventional warfare effectively. Using opera As an analytical tool that frames a view of what tions in Afghanistan as a contemporary case study, constitutes unconventional warfare and the way author Hy Rothstein examines how the American one should use SOF to combat irregular threats, military has historically waged war and how it can Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional not help using conventional methods to fight in Warfare represents a valuable reference to the con the future. Framing his study in a conceptual dis temporary military professional fighting the global cussion of what constitutes unconventional warfare, war on terrorism. For the astute reader, Rothstein’s the author explains why our military finds itself ill use of Afghanistan as a case study to illustrate his equipped to fight such a conflict. He argues that arguments also provides insight into the insurgency despite significantinvestment in developing special in Iraq. By conducting a far-reaching analysis of operations, the military lacks the institutional capa SOF in particular and unconventional warfare as a

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 113 7/31/07 12:38:58 PM 114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

whole, the book offers innovative insight into how Readers should not consider this book a history the US military conducts war. Nevertheless, readers of airpower, and Wohl also notes that his work is looking for easy answers should beware: the au not a soup-to-nuts survey of the cultural history of thor’s recommendations are as unconventional as aviation. He builds his narrative around key themes the type of warfare he seeks to define. and personalities, however, and in so doing, pro vides a comprehensive account of aviation through Maj Benjamin R. Maitre, USAF out the period from 1920 to 1950. Readers will rec Naval Postgraduate School, California ognize many of the historical figures whom Wohl weaves into his narrative, while other characters are likely known only to historians of the period. The author mentions Billy Mitchell, for example, just in The Spectacle of Flight: Aviation and the Western passing while the Italian nationalist, poet, and ad Imagination, 1920–1950 by Robert Wohl. Yale venturer—and Fascist icon—Gabriele D’Annunzio University Press (http://www.yale.edu/yup), P.O. receives a rather thorough treatment. Box 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Wohl masterfully synthesizes cultural and po 9040, 2005, 376 pages, $39.95 (hardcover). litical history with the history of technology in pro viding a fascinating and insightful account of Benito Air travel—and air warfare—are commonplace Mussolini’s harnessing of the “spectacle of flight” today. Military airpower has moved beyond the to the Italian brand of Fascism. Mussolini sought to widespread devastation that marked its use in the reclaim Rome’s imperial heritage for Italy and Second World War, civil air travel long ago lost place that nation among the ranks of the world’s much of the excitement and glamour once associ great powers. In light of the Italian Air Force’s lack ated with it, and millions trudge through sprawling luster military performance in the Second World airport/shopping complexes as part of their nor War, the reader will find Wohl’s engaging and de mal routine. It is therefore quite easy to overlook tailed account of Italian air marshal Italo Balbo’s the fascination aviation once inspired in Europe record-setting transatlantic flightsto Brazil and the and the United States as well as the great changes United States, for example, especially surprising wrought across the world by powered flight. In his and illuminating. Though the Italian aviation in superb book Spectacle of Flight, Robert Wohl reminds dustry could not keep pace with that of other major us of that time when airplanes and aviation repre powers when war eventually broke out, Italy’s Fas sented the dawning of a new age in human civiliza cist ideology nevertheless embraced the traits and tion: “No other machine seemed to represent as ideals perceived in aviation and aviators. Thus, fully humankind’s determination to escape from Mussolini, himself a pilot (though not an excep age-old limitations, to defy the power of gravity, tionally good one), more than any other leader of and to obliterate the tyranny of time and space” the period, made aviation “both an indispensable (pp. 1–2). instrument and a resplendent manifestation” (p. Spectacle of Flight is an engaging and richly illus 106) of the “glory” of his regime and nation. This trated cultural history of powered flight during was aviation’s ultimate cultural impact. three critical decades in the development of both Many of the studies of aviation during this pe civil and military aviation. Wohl is well qualified to riod focus on the technical aspects of aircraft devel write on the subject. Distinguished Professor of His opment or on the broad debate over the proper tory at the University of California at Los Angeles, role of aircraft and air forces in warfare. Spectacle of he also served as Lindbergh Professor at the Na Flight takes its place alongside works such as Joseph tional Air and Space Museum and currently teaches J. Corn’s The Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with European intellectual and cultural history. Wohl Aviation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) set out to write a one-volume cultural history of and The Airplane in American Culture (Ann Arbor: aviation. The subject proved so rich that what he University of Michigan Press, 2003), edited by originally conceived as an introduction became his Dominick Pisano. Wohl moves his narrative beyond firstbook on the subject—A Passion for Wings: Avia­ the more well-known accounts of military events tion and the Western Imagination, 1908–1918 (New and technological progress, convincingly demon Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). In the vol strating that the spectacle of flight became firmly ume under review, Wohl considers the cultural his ingrained in the popular cultures of America and tory of flight during a period when, in his words, Western Europe by the eve of the Second World the airplane was “a magical contrivance that had War. In doing so, he moves seamlessly from one ele little to do with most people’s everyday lives” (p. 4). ment of his narrative to the next. For example,

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 114 7/31/07 12:38:59 PM BOOK REVIEWS 115

Wohl thoughtfully analyzes the relationship be the national security process” (p. 3), calls for more tween cinema and literature on the one hand and balanced treatment of national security across the aviation on the other. Indeed, in Wohl’s view, film 11 elements of power that he discusses. Colonel making and flying“both aimed at nothing less than Gerstein contends that America still clings to ves the liberation of humankind from the constraints tiges of policies developed in the industrial age. of everyday reality, and both were forms of escape” However, because the country is transitioning to the (p. 112). information age, it must gear both the domestic- Yet, the West’s fascination with aviation also pro and foreign-policy engines accordingly. duced some unwelcome results. Wohl demonstrates While addressing complex political concepts that the awe with which Western publics viewed and strategies, the author also explains each ele aviation in the 1930s allowed Hitler’s regime to co ment of power and the historical perspective be erce its opponents with the mere threat of aerial hind the United States’ current geopolitical posi attack. While Giulio Douhet’s predictions of civil tion as a “hyperpower.” The introduction claims collapse under air attack never materialized, the that the text is divided into two parts, but there are massive destruction of the air campaigns of the Sec actually three. The first describes America’s cur ond World War and the technological advances rent status, the second definestraditional elements that made those campaigns possible transformed of power, and the third critiques the government’s warfare and human civilizations forever. Wohl con existing direction for national security in the twenty- cludes that in the aftermath of the war and the de first century. cades that have passed since then, “aviation may Gerstein does an exceptional job of drawing not have lost its appeal and meaning as a form of readers in by opening his analysis with three fic adventure for a privileged few [but it has lost the] tional scenarios, each presenting either a domestic ability to transform men and women and raise or international threat to US national security. The them above themselves” (p. 322). stories prime the mind and highlight the well- To say as well that the book is lavishly illustrated supported opinion that current policies indeed de might mislead the reader into thinking that this is rive from a bygone age. Next, the author dedicates not a serious work of scholarship; nothing could be a good portion of the book to backstory and his further from the truth. The photographs and illus torical perspective, which not only serves as a re trations complement the author’s discussion of view for avid amateur historians or political scien aviation’s impact on movies, literature, art, and tists, but also offers invaluable information to popular culture. Crafted in a style and manner that readers uninitiated in global politics and grand will attract the casual reader, Spectacle of Flight is also strategy. The supporting data is extensively re the product of extensive research. This fine book searched and packed with figures (the appendices will appeal to cultural, intellectual, and social histo are virtual treasure troves of data and bibliographic rians as well as those who study military and avia bread crumbs). tion history. Spectacle of Flight belongs on every Air The book’s real force comes from the last half of man’s reading list. the argument, which plainly outlines Gerstein’s Dr. Mark J. Conversino proposed way ahead, including a very insightful Maxwell AFB, Alabama and arguably accurate assessment of America’s stra tegic need. The government must use all of its sym metric and asymmetric resources to survive and ef Securing America’s Future: National Strategy in the fectively counter future threats from other states or Information Age by Daniel M. Gerstein. Praeger nongovernment actors. The author promotes us (http://www.greenwood.com/praeger.aspx), ing “soft” elements of power to shore up the more 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, traditional “hard” powers of the Department of De 2005, 288 pages, $44.95 (hardcover). fense, the former including science and technology, economics, culture, human rights, education, and, Daniel M. Gerstein’s Securing America’s Future most importantly, information. Critics argue that presents a compelling argument for redesigning the United States already leverages these powers the country’s national security strategy to better fit globally. The more subtle point is not if America the needs of society in the information age. The uses the soft powers but if it uses them effectively. core thesis, “elements of power other than the tra Gerstein clearly depicts an image of bureaucracies ditional or hard power political-military-intelligence that consistently fail to communicate and issues a components . . . must become coequal partners in plea to regain efficiencyas well as integrate, coordi

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 115 7/31/07 12:38:59 PM 116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

nate, and synchronize across the spectrum of gov ise, the core of the book clearly communicates in ernment agencies and the “tools of state.” novative ways for recruiting, training, and retaining Securing America’s Future—carefully researched these battlewise individuals while also defining their and complex, yet aimed at a general audience—re use in combat. Some of the authors’ original ideas invigorates the concept that an organization should include recruiting proven, battlewise civilian profes always strive to use every asset at its disposal to ob sionals in such critical areas as security forces and tain its objectives. Daniel Gerstein calls for changes allowing them to enter at higher ranks; developing in national security strategy that will allow the new training methods to improve critical decision- United States to harness all the elements of power making skills under fire; and increasing the reten and aggressively meet the new demands of the in tion of battlewise personnel by increasing incentives formation age. Both novice and expert can use this to more closely match those of civilian corpora book as a catalyst for dialogue and as a foundation tions. Finally, the authors break new ground by for further research. placing lower-level leadership rather than higher- level leaders, such as members of a joint air opera Capt Raymond P. Akin IV, USAF tions center, at the center of the networked battle- Los Angeles AFB, California space. Upper-echelon leadership still has access to the information and can provide guidance, but lower-level leaders have responsibility for “pulling” Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority information from the network and making decisions in Networked Warfare by David C. Gompert, when the time arises—they too must be battlewise. Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins. Center for Authors David Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Technology and National Security Policy (http:// Justin Perkins bring great credibility to the subject. www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/contact.html), National Mr. Gompert, distinguished research professor at Defense University, 300 5th Avenue SW, Fort National Defense University (NDU), has held sev Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319, 2006, eral senior policy positions at the State Department, 174 pages, $15.00 (softcover). Available online National Security Council, and the RAND Corpora at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/pubs/B -W tion. Dr. Lachow, senior research professor at NDU, _BOOK.pdf. has extensive experience in both technology and defense issues. Mr. Perkins, research associate at Just as the airplane dramatically changed war NDU, previously served as chief operating officer fare, so now will information technology. The ability for World Blu, Inc., a national consulting firm. A to integrate forces and provide limitless informa foreword by Rear Adm Raymond C. Smith, USN, tion to the war fighter will forever change how we retired, and an afterword by Linton Wells II pro think and how we fight. But according to Linton vide perspective from senior leaders and put power Wells II, principal deputy assistant secretary of de behind the landmark ideas described in this book. fense for networks and information integrations, An outstanding, well-written study that will set a “To realize the revolutionary potential of the net new standard for how we look at networked com work, several factors need to evolve together. These bat, Battle-Wise offers a carefully considered frame include doctrine, organization, training, material, work for preparing ourselves for this next revolu leadership, personnel, and facilities” (p. 165). Al tion in combat. We should consider adopting the though most of the current focus is on the tech authors’ innovative, timely ideas as we further de nology of network-centric warfare, an aspect that finethe concept of operations and implementation will improve as technology evolves, Battle-Wise con strategies of network-centric warfare. centrates on the integral foundations of network- centric warfare, doctrine, training, and people, Maj David Benson, USAF which will revolutionize the way we fight. Air Force Fellow Because all of our current potential adversaries Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois already use networking information, the authors make the novel assertion that, to stay ahead, we must realize that the key is not technology but the Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft cognitive capabilities of the people who use it: “Im and Rocketry by Mike Gruntman. American In proving decisionmaking—creating battle-wise su stitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (http:// periority—deserves attention not as a peripheral www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=2), 1801 Al detail or afterthought of networked warfare but as exander Bell Drive, Suite 500, Reston, Virginia its ultimate differentiator” (p. 85). From this prem 20191-4344, 2004, 475 pages, $59.95 (hardcover)

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 116 7/31/07 12:39:00 PM BOOK REVIEWS 117

As a certified space professional with over 20 Wooldridge (TRW) (p. 233). The author also cov years’ experience in space operations and engi ers the “why” behind the formation of Aerospace neering, I’ve never seen such a detailed record of Corporation as a nonprofit institution to help the the world history of rocketry and spacecraft. In the US Air Force make advances in ballistic-missile and 18 chapters of Blazing the Trail, Mike Gruntman cov military-space systems (p. 233). ers the “humble beginnings” to the “first thousand Gruntman spices up the book with “engineering years” and provides a thorough description of the humor.” For example, in discussing the develop “long road that led us from simple fireworks to ment of one satellite, he notes how a specially pro intercontinental ballistic missiles and powerful duced, expensive white paint was “required” for space launchers that open the ways to the cosmos” thermal control. However, it turns out that a com (p. 455). He also discusses the infrastructure re mon household paint was used by mistake. Never quired to support the development and testing of theless, the thermal control worked as required, rockets and spacecraft, including the building of offering an early lesson in cost control (p. 427). test and launch sites. Gruntman combines a heavy Fundamental courses in space operations and dose of engineering details with some political in extended research projects on rocketry and/or sights and sprinkles of humor to produce a well- spacecraft should acquire this well-written, single- written space-reference book. source “encyclopedia” as a must-use reference. Although it provides encyclopedia-type detail, Also, Blazing the Trail is definitelya must-read for all overall, Blazing the Trail is easy to read and well for military and/or space-history enthusiasts. matted. However, since the term spacecraft comes first in the title, I expected more history on space Lt Col Kenneth Allison, USAF craft than on rocketry. Just the opposite is true— Air Force Fellow, RAND about 70 percent on rockets and 30 percent on Santa Monica, California spacecraft. The first detailed discussion on space craft occurs in chapter 15, “The Breakthrough,” after over 300 pages on rocketry. Nevertheless, The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive Gruntman interweaves technical and engineering and America’s Vietnam War by John M. Shaw. facts, such as the size and performance of early University Press of Kansas (http://www.kansas rockets, with some key political factors behind both press.ku.edu), 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Law their successes and failures. For example, in chap rence, Kansas 66045-4444, 2005, 352 pages, ter 16, “Opening the Skies,” the author outlines in $34.95 (hardcover). detail the geopolitical environment and factors leading to development of the United States’ first In describing his greatest victory, Field Marshal reconnaissance satellite and formation of the Na His Grace the Duke of Wellington called the Battle tional Reconnaissance Office. Additionally, the of Waterloo “the nearest run thing you ever saw in book contains over 300 figures, helping to bring your life.” In an impressive debut work, John M. the words to life and providing a unique perspec Shaw has produced a study suggesting that Welling tive of the faces and places instrumental in “build ton’s quotation is far more descriptive of the Ameri ing the foundation” of future systems. The pictures can experience in Southeast Asia than most people of early systems make it easier to visualize how early might think. Prior coverage of the American inva rockets and spacecraft evolved from the fairly simple sion of Cambodia has focused on the political ram to the extremely complex. Given the extensive ifications of this campaign. In an account that em number of illustrations, I was surprised that the phasizes the operational level, Shaw accepts Richard book does not include a “Table of Figures” to sup Nixon’s argument that the move into Cambodia port quick reference and research. However, the was the most successful operation of the war: “While frequent sidebars do help in this regard. historians debate the political fallout of the Cam Although not outlined as clearly and consis bodian incursion, there can be no doubt of the tently as the history of spacecraft and rockets, the military consequences. At a comparatively light cost book offers a unique discussion of the heritage of in friendly casualties, the incursion crippled Ha many US space corporations. For example, Gruntman noi’s principal forward stockpiles along South Viet cites how disagreements with Howard Hughes led nam’s borders” (p. 169). As a result, the balance of to the resignation of two leading specialists (Simon power shifted towards Saigon in the early 1970s. Ramo and Dean Wooldridge [Ramo-Wooldridge]) A now-retired US Army lieutenant colonel with and, with financialhelp from Thompson Products, a PhD in history who has taught at both the US eventually to the formation of Thompson Ramo Military Academy and Air Force Academy, Shaw

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 117 7/31/07 12:39:00 PM 118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

brings a good deal of military and academic exper And Nothing Is Said: Wartime Letters, August 5, tise to bear in this account. He bases his findingson 1943–April 21, 1945 by Michael N. Ingrisano Jr. an impressive and extensive examination of Ameri Sunflower University Press, 2002, 540 pages, can military records, showing that by 1970 the $22.95 (softcover). Americans had essentially defeated the Vietcong and that the North Vietnamese Army posed the The title of Michael Ingrisano’s book—And most direct threat to the Saigon government, with Nothing Is Said—is misleading. In fact, he had a lot bases less than 100 miles away. The North Vietnam to say to his fiancée, Bettejeane Louise Hill, while ese, though, were vulnerable to attack after having he served with the Army Air Corps in the European operated out in the open for so long in Cambodia. theater during World War II. Between 5 August The Army of the Republic of Vietnam gave an ade 1943 and 21 April 1945, “Mike” sent “Bette” 343 let quate showing in the invasion. Americans per ters that recounted his daily routine (minus opera formed well and were hardly a military falling apart tional details), expounded on a variety of topics from political dissension at home, poor leadership, from books to a wife’s place in the workforce, and and heavy drug use among its troops. Shaw, though, voiced hopes for their future together. The book is quick to show that the US Army had clearly de collects these letters, discovered after Bette’s pass clined in quality from its first days in Vietnam. ing in 1985. Unfortunately, the other half of the These findings in and of themselves are provoca conversation is missing since Bette’s letters to Mike tive, much less his claim that the operation was an never made it back from the war. enormous success. What is particularly impressive The Ingrisanos’ story resembles accounts told about this book is how even small features—such as by many other members of their generation. A na the photo section—support its overall focus. tive of Brooklyn, New York, Mike graduated from Cambodian Campaign is also well written and has high school in 1942 and then took a job with Sears, already won the Army Historical Foundation’s Dis Roebuck, and Company until September of that tinguished Writing Award. Shaw conducted a num same year, when he left to enlist in the Army Air ber of interviews for this project, and he uses quota Forces. Bette grew up in Kansas and attended a tions in an effective fashion to enliven his narrative. year of college in Kansas City before leaving to go The text, though, is littered with military acronyms, to work. The two met while Mike was attending ad but that will hardly be a problem to readers of this vanced radio/mechanic training in Kansas City. By journal. the time he finished,he knew that Bette would play This book will not be the last word on the offensive an important role in his life. But after parting in into Cambodia. There are a number of topics that Kansas City, except for a brief visit before Mike left Shaw does not address at length, such as the per for Europe, they wouldn’t see each other again for spective of individual soldiers at the tactical level or almost two years. For the next 21 months, he flewas what Wellington called “the other side of the hill.” a C-47 crew member with the 316th Troop Carrier But if one stops to compare the state of the litera Group stationed in Egypt, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, ture on war 40 years after the fact to a comparable and England, receiving an honorable discharge ex stage of two other big conflicts—the Civil War and actly three years after the date of his enlistment—a World War II—it seems likely that this book will re proven combat veteran with nine Battle Stars. main the authoritative account of US actions at the A touching account, And Nothing Is Said suc operational level for decades to come. ceeds on one level but disappoints on another. The Should military officers read Cambodian Cam­ book does well in providing some insight into one paign? Yes. In fact, it should end up on reading lists early Airman’s war experiences. Though mission at various schools in the professional military edu details, by necessity, are limited, the reader can still cation system. Shaw has produced a study that gather from Ingrisano’s letters a sense of the opera highlights a troublesome fact about military opera tional tempo and emotional toll that the danger tions in Vietnam and many other wars: operational ous flights had on crews. To provide some context, success does not always bring with it strategic vic he inserts entries from the squadron’s war diary be tory. It is altogether possible for soldiers, sailors, tween the letters (both the diary excerpts and the marines, and airmen to achieve their objectives letters are largely unedited). Although these entries and for that to mean nothing in the end. fillin some detail, their abbreviated descriptions of events still deny the reader a complete picture. Dr. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes Readers looking for a riveting account of an US Army Command and General Staff College Airman’s journey through World War II should Fort Gordon, Georgia look elsewhere. Despite the wealth of material con

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 118 7/31/07 12:39:01 PM BOOK REVIEWS 119

tained in Ingrisano’s trove of letters, the book fails some day Ingrisano will write a book about his life. to tell a story. As a lover of biographies, this reader If he does, it will be a pleasure to read. is committed to the belief that everyone has a story to tell. Ingrisano obviously does, and one finds Lt Col Kristine E. Blackwell, USAF hints of it in both the introduction and epilogue. Air Force Fellow In between, however, the letters are too disjointed Washington, DC and full of personal sentiments to render a captivat ing narrative thread. The book’s setting contains all the elements of a Buffaloes over Singapore: RAF, RAAF, RNZAF and great tale—interesting characters, compelling ac Dutch Brewster Fighters in Action over Malaya tion, and deep emotion—but they lie buried within and the East Indies, 1941–1942 by Brian Cull the dense and personal love letters. The many nug with Paul Sortehaug and Mark Haselden. Grub gets—an allusion to a harrowing mission or a Street / the Basement, 10 Chivalry Road, Lon thoughtful description of a fellow Airman—make don, SW11 1HT, United Kingdom, 2003, 288 the reader wish Ingrisano had deviated from the pages, $36.95 (hardcover). book’s format to provide a fuller account of an event or a person. He adds a few lines of explana Paraphrasing Lord Wellington, one can say, tion in places, but, more often than not, intriguing “The Battle of Britain was won on the flying fields references are brief and fleeting, while the letters of England.” After reading Buffaloes over Singapore, I repeat feelings of longing, declarations of love, and would add, “The Battle of Singapore was lost on the speculation about his and Bette’s future together. playing fields of Malaya.” I would also add—less in Certainly, these sentiments are reasonable, just, jest—that this book is a first-rateprimer on how not and the stuff that gave many service members the to fight an air war. strength to make it through the war, but most are On 7 December 1941, no one “in the know” re best left for private reflection—not publication. ally expected the Japanese to attack British Malaya, Nonetheless, for those who enjoy the history of despite their demonstrated aggressiveness in China the World War II era, a number of the letters con (1931–41) and French Indochina (1940–41). If they tain interesting observations on popular fiction, did attack, British Far East Command knew that the movies, and controversial social issues of the day. four squadrons of newly arrived, American-made Ingrisano offers captivating “everyman” commen Brewster Buffalo fighters, flown by Royal Air force tary on a culture and events that are now fixed in (RAF), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and history but, for him, were part of an unfolding Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) pilots, world: “Say, Honey, I meant to ask you about this would soon sweep the Japanese air fleet (1,000 Sinatra rage that we hear so much about” (p. 180). strong) from the skies. “We attended a formal review and Gen. ‘Ike’ Eisen Any air officerabove flightlieutenant knew that hower decorated a few of the boys that are closely the Buffalo wasn’t a first-class“kite.” It couldn’t suc attached to us. He is a rather nice chap. He went ceed against the Germans or Italians, but Head thru the ranks and talked to a lot of the boys. . . . I quarters RAF decided that the Buffalo would suffice saw Ike’s Scottie—he has 4 stars on his collar just like his boss” (p. 260). For this reader, observations against the poorly constructed (canvas and paper), such as these provide some of the most enjoyable fourth-rate fightersthe Japanese flew(according to moments in the book. the RAF’s air intelligence). Some of the Buffalo’s In the end, Mike and Bette have evolved into less seasoned pilots wanted the Japanese to attack, fuller characters, but the reader is still left with a thinking that a few easy air kills could only sharpen sense of incompleteness. What did they finally do their combat air skills while they awaited transfer to with the oft-mentioned bottle of Seagram’s whiskey the European war. that Bette lovingly kept safe until Mike’s return? In the meantime, pilots, intelligence officers, What happened to “Harry,” Mike’s future brother- and the command staff plotted promotion, partied, in-law and seemingly top-notch fellow who also and generally enjoyed the “good life.” Their com served in the war? What was the rest of the story placency ended on 8 December 1941. Four hours behind a teaser in the epilogue concerning a “black before Pearl Harbor felt its first aerial bomb, Japa ball” from the University of Kansas? And Nothing Is nese naval gunfire saturated northeast Malaya’s Said provides an incomplete snapshot of what was beaches. Despite the fact that members of the As surely a rich life, full of worthwhile stories. But they sociated Press had noticed a large Japanese convoy remain untold here, which is a shame. Perhaps heading south, the British were caught off guard.

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 119 7/31/07 12:39:01 PM 120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

Japanese pilots and aircraft were not fourth-rate, Rebecca Grant has done it again. This detailed as anticipated. Rather, their pilots proved themselves work educates and entertains the reader in an area well trained, experienced, and aggressive. Their of aviation with which many Air Force readers may Zero fighters outsped, outclimbed, and outturned not be familiar. An action-packed history of the use the Buffaloes. of carrier-based airpower against terrorism targets The heavier Buffalo could dive better than the embedded within Afghanistan and Iraq, Battle-Tested Zero, but for a diving attack, a pilot needed warn not only deals with recent naval-aviation deploy ing time to gain sufficient altitude. British radar ments in support of major military thrusts into those deployed in Malaya would have given the Buffalo countries but also addresses how technology has that advantage, but the radar sets were quickly changed carrier operations since World War II. moved far to the rear, to “protect [their] secret.” An accomplished author, Dr. Rebecca Grant has Doing so preserved the “secret” but not the slow- a proven track record of writing informative, in climbing Buffaloes or, eventually, British Southeast sightful, and useful books for the general military Asia. population—specifically those individuals inter Buffalo pilots who did manage to climb, dive, and ested in airpower and maneuver forces. She has survive often found their homes under new man produced numerous works on other military opera tions in the Middle East and on the value of mili agement of the Japanese. Panicky airfield evacua tary technology (including stealth). Copiously docu tions were the rule. Kota Baru, the finestairfield in mented (over 600 notes), Battle-Tested effectively northeast Malaya, fell to a sniper attack. Nearby examines the role of carrier-based airpower in sup Alor Star gave the Japanese 1,000 barrels of high- port of political decisions pertaining to military ac octane aviation gas and tons of bombs. Such “gifts,” tion in Afghanistan and Iraq; it also gives the reader coupled with the excellent pilots who flewthe Zero the sense of “being there” in the air and space op fighters, enabled the Japanese to quickly gain air erations center, in the ready room, on the flight superiority over all of Malaya. deck, and in the cockpit when our naval aviators The British might have regained air superiority were planning, flying, and debriefing their opera after a convoy battled its way to Singapore carrying tions sorties. 51 Hawker Hurricane fighters. Instead of sending Dr. Grant’s study would be valuable in the class the superb Hurricanes into battle en masse, the rooms of Air Force professional military education local air staff used them to replace Buffaloes lost to schools for a number of reasons. Specifically, it il attrition. On Singapore’s last day of battle, many lustrates the joint and combined interactions that still-crated Hurricanes ended up being pushed off took place in these major regions of conflict,which piers while Buffaloes twisted and turned in combat are still relevant to our national defense. The book overhead—even with plenty of pilots available to also addresses issues of interest to Air Force policy fill empty Hurricane cockpits. Long after the Japa architects, mission planners, and operations per nese gained air superiority over Singapore, the RAF sonnel—for example, the value and use of manned still sent pilots there for training. Unfortunately, versus unmanned systems; ways of effectively com the fledglings proved too inexperienced to fly. Ap bining precision with nonprecision weapons; rela parently, making the training pipeline look good tionships of Department of Defense (DOD) forces was more important than admitting to Headquar with those of the Central Intelligence Agency; and ters RAF in London that the air battle wasn’t going the nature of Army operations (101st Airborne, well. In sum, Buffaloes over Singapore is a first-rate 10th Mountain Division, and others) as well as those story of second-string pilots flying a third-rate of other DOD forces. The author also considers the fighter under the command of, at best, a fourth- international diplomatic value and political realities rate air staff. of deploying aircraft carriers as a military presence. Chapter 10, “Strategic Directions,” is particularly Capt Murdock M. Moore, USAF, Retired noteworthy. Here Grant summarizes how carrier- Dayton, Ohio based aviation has evolved into its present form in the twenty-first-century battlespace. Battle-tested lessons center on strategic issues that the new-age Battle-Tested: Carrier Aviation in Afghanistan and carrier brings to the fight. These lessons represent Iraq by Rebecca Grant. Iris Press (http://www requirements that current and future decision .irisresearch.com), 236 Massachusetts Avenue makers must address if they wish to optimize the NE, Suite 204, Washington, DC 20002, 2005, contribution of carrier aviation to our national war- 187 pages, $45.43 (softcover). fighting capability.

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 120 7/31/07 12:39:01 PM BOOK REVIEWS 121

I recommend Battle-Tested for the serious student terpretation that became common in the late 1960s of airpower, the casual reader of current events, after hanging around the fringes since the onset of and the airplane enthusiast (the latter will espe the Cold War. cially appreciate the many pictures of flight opera My favorite among the participants, Col Henry tions). The embedded airpower of the Navy carrier, Cole, uses a light touch to deal with his time as a in concert with our Air Force assets, makes a sig rifleman in Korea. The perfect presenter, Cole is a nificantcontribution to military force projection in draftee who left the service, got his education, re support of our national political objectives. We joined the Army as an officer, earned a PhD, and need to know what these naval forces bring to the published historical studies while serving as an ad fight, how they operate, and what our decision junct professor at the Army War College. He also makers can (or should) do to maximize these epitomizes the American warrior, at least in this ar forces. Battle-Tested gives us this information. ticle, taking it all as it comes with a touch of grace and an abundance of humor. Other articles are Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired more serious but not necessarily less effective. Springfield, Virginia Because the book ranges through so many con flicts,cold and hot, coverage of any era is limited to only two or three articles. Rather than a survey of Warriors and Scholars: A Modern War Reader ed the topic, Warriors and Scholars works more as a col ited by Peter B. Lane and Ronald E. Marcello. lection of conference sessions, definingthe confer University of North Texas Press (http://www ence topic in such a way as to encompass whatever .unt.edu/untpress), P.O. Box 311336, Denton, papers are available. On a positive note, each article Texas 76203-1336, 2005, 320 pages, $24.95 can stand alone, so the browsing reader need not (hardcover). worry about losing an overarching message. Lest I seem overly negative, I should stress that Coeditors Peter Lane and Ronald Marcello, his this collection contains much that is interesting, tory professors at the University of North Texas, even insightful. No matter how much we think we have compiled presentations made at eight of the know, we can always learn more from those who university’s 24 annual Military History Seminars, were there. Each lived his own war, and each tale held since 1983 to feed the interest of the north can only add to our knowledge of what it was like, a Texas community in military history. The scope of knowledge that can never reach a point of saturation. coverage loosely ranges from World War II to the Those who approach the topic as professionals— current war in Iraq. The contributors include both detached and scholarly—also enhance our knowl professionals—including three historians and a edge of the American military experience. psychologist—and war veterans, the latter author Warriors and Scholars is nicely put together, and ing nine of the 13 articles. The veterans range from the editors have invested a great deal of time and a corporal to a four-star general and an ambassa energy in making sure that all necessary explana dor, so the personal perspectives are quite diverse. tory footnotes are in place. The result is a satisfactory The book is divided into sections of one to three work if not one that heads every must-read list. articles. Because Europe and the Pacific receive separate treatment, over one-third of the book (five Dr. John H. Barnhill articles) deals with World War II. Other sections in Houston, Texas clude, naturally, the early Cold War, the Korean War, Vietnam, the late Cold War, and terrorism. As with most compilations, the quality of the articles Old Glory Stories: American Combat Leadership in ranges from excellent to interesting—happily, not World War II by Cole C. Kingseed. Naval Institute one is a dog. Little of the material is groundbreak Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), ing, but most of it is informative and interesting, 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 particularly the personal presentations. 5034, 2006, 280 pages, $36.95 (hardcover). The piece by Robert Divine, the most promi nent of the historians among the contributors and Although we have various works on leadership a giant in the profession for half a century, ad during World War II, Old Glory Stories by Col Cole C. dresses the decision to use the bomb to end World Kingseed, USA, retired, is refreshing in that, in a War II. It is disappointing only because it mostly single volume, it evaluates combat leadership at the recapitulates standard material from a consensus- strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. history perspective. It downplays the New Left in Moreover, the text goes beyond a mere historical

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 121 7/31/07 12:39:02 PM 122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

review of leaders such as Dwight Eisenhower, Doug mon Buckner, who commanded Tenth Army (con las MacArthur, and Omar Bradley. Indeed, Colonel sisting of both Marine and Army corps-sized units) Kingseed provides insight into such lesser-known during the battle for Okinawa—where he was killed though no less significant warriors as Joseph “Vine in action. gar Joe” Stilwell, Jonathan “Skinny” Wainwright, The book covers “dual-theater” commanders Lucian K. Truscott, Walter Krueger, and J. Lawton Alexander “Sandy” Patch, J. Lawton Collins, and “Lightning Joe” Collins. Charles H. Corlett, who commanded divisions and However, the book goes beyond a review of lead corps in the steaming jungles of Guadalcanal, New ership at the general-officer level, which comprises Guinea, Kwajalein, and the freezing Aleutians be “The Generals,” part 1 of the work. In “The War fore joining the campaigns in Europe. Kingseed riors,” part 2, Colonel Kingseed evaluates and edu superbly illustrates the perception of these battle- cates readers on the exploits of such legends as Col hardened professionals as “interlopers” by Army Paul Tibbets, Capt Joe Dawson, Maj Dick Winters, leaders in Europe. The author notes that, despite and several lieutenants: Vernon J. Baker, Audie L. General Corlett’s expertise in amphibious warfare, Murphy, and Lyle J. Bouck. Of particular interest is senior leaders readily dismissed his suggestions a chapter on Maj Charity Adams Early, the first (made after reviewing the Overlord plan). One can African-American female to command a battalion only imagine what lives might have been saved at in the European theater of operations. Like many Omaha Beach had they listened to the “outsider” others, she faced a twin fight—one against the rac with a proven record. ism of the Army and another against the Axis. Kingseed spins a fascinating tale of Colonel Tib- Throughout, the author provides a balanced evalua bets, who exemplifiesaerial-combat leadership, be tion of the leadership traits, personalities, and chal fore moving on to platoon and company command lenges encountered by theater and Army group ers who “led the way.” One learns of Joe Dawson, commanders (those in charge of several armies), as among the first to clear Omaha Beach on D-day; well as company commanders and platoon leaders. months later, on a high ridge overlooking , Colonel Kingseed follows Eisenhower, MacArthur, Germany, Dawson’s G Company, with other parts of and Stilwell from cadet days to the pinnacle of their the 16th Regiment, held off numerous division- service, adding to our knowledge of the relation sized attacks—for 49 days. This is just one of the ship between the two supreme commanders. More many examples of junior officers taking care of over, the author educates us on Stilwell, one of the business. The author also documents the exploits oft-forgotten theater commanders who led forces of Len Lomell, first sergeant of a Ranger company in the extremely challenging China-Burma-India at Pointe Du Hoc on D-day, and of Lyle Bouck, theater. While combating the Japanese, the general whose platoon held up the German advance during constantly fought with the Allies over strategy and the Battle of the Bulge for 18 crucial hours. with the Army for supplies and manpower. As King- Furthermore, the book explores a topic that seed notes, “Stilwell was not called Vinegar Joe for many military historians gloss over—the leadership nothing” (p. 32). of African-American warriors in World War II. Al After analyzing Army group commanders, the though many Americans know of the Tuskegee Air author highlights the exploits of Army command men, very few have heard of Vernon J. Baker, a pla ers in the Pacific theater, whom he rightfully cate toon leader who served with great distinction in gorizes as forgotten warriors. When one thinks of Italy and received the Medal of Honor for his ex that area of operations, images of fast-carrier task ploits—52 years later. Like Maj Charity Adams, who forces and Marine landings immediately come to commanded a service battalion in the European mind. However, the Army deployed over 21 divi theater, Baker experienced the Army’s institutional sions to the theater (the Marines had six) as well as racism. Yet, like so many others, these outstanding the Fifth, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Twentieth Air warriors set the example for all Americans to fol Forces (US Army Air Forces). Needless to say, most low. Baker’s courage under fireand Adams’s superb Americans (and quite a few Airmen) are unaware leadership are inspirational; Colonel Kingseed de of this fact. After providing a detailed account of serves much credit for bringing their stories to General Wainwright’s ordeal after the surrender of light—they are the culminating chapters of the Corregidor, the book also outlines the leadership book’s second part. of General Krueger, Sixth Army commander, who Clearly, Colonel Kingseed (who earned a PhD in started in Australia, fought hard-won battles in New military history) conducted extensive research for Guinea, and then went on to liberate the Philip Old Glory Stories, which is well written and well docu pines. Kingseed also objectively analyzes Lt Gen Si mented. He recounts the experiences of interview

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 122 7/31/07 12:39:02 PM BOOK REVIEWS 123

ing many of these heroes in person and the ways ing out his responsibilities. Eichmann never rose to that experience inspired his writing and profes high levels in the Nazi military hierarchy and was sional thought. The author’s expertise is evident serving only as the equivalent of a lieutenant colonel throughout, especially his objective analysis of the when the war concluded. But one needs to put this subjects and his handling of the historical context. fact into perspective. For example, he participated In sum, Old Glory Stories is a relevant, engaging work in the infamous Wahnsee Conference in early 1942 with lessons for today’s Airmen—including those when the Nazi leadership decided to set in motion in the senior ranks—on combat leadership, a com its Final Solution. However, Eichmann’s role there modity that remains in demand. was mostly that of a staff officer helping plan the conference and drawing up the minutes—hardly Lt Col Richard Hughes, USAF the activities of a key mover and shaker, as por Maxwell AFB, Alabama trayed by some. After the conference, it is true that he assumed management of certain related activi ties having more significancethan his later descrip Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, tion suggested: “All the work was paperwork.” He and Trial of a “Desk Murderer” by David Cesarani. still managed to fly beneath the radar in many in Da Capo Press (http://www.perseusbooksgroup stances, mainly due to his field-grade rank and ad .com/dacapo/home.jsp), Eleven Cambridge Cen ministrative status. ter, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, 2006, 368 After the war, Eichmann also escaped prosecu pages, $27.50 (hardcover), $18.00 (softcover). tion, in part because the victorious Allies did not even know who he was. The Nuremberg trials came Asked to recall some of the more notorious evil and went with little attention paid to him. Eichmann doers from the Second World War, many people successfully avoided the authorities in Germany for would likely think of Adolph Eichmann. Even to several years and in 1950 went to Argentina, where day, he evokes an unforgettable image of a brutal his family joined him soon after. For the next de leader and one of the top Nazi officials at the cen cade, he blended into the surroundings, living a ter of the genocide surrounding the Holocaust’s very modest but secure life in a South American “Final Solution” in Europe. From the late 1930s to country known for harboring many Nazi fugitives. the end of the war in 1945, he directed the logistical During this time, Jewish authorities investigating apparatus of mass human deportation and extinc the Holocaust started to uncover the significant tion within vast areas of the Third Reich. As such, role Eichmann had played in transporting victims he had direct responsibility for transporting two of the Final Solution. Consequently, these Nazi million Jews to their deaths. Obviously, Eichmann hunters laid out an elaborate plan to find,capture, fits into the category of an anti-Semitic mass mur and bring him to justice in the state of Israel so he derer who blindly followed orders, no matter how could pay for his actions. terrible they were. That’s exactly what happened in 1961. Eichmann But was he really like the rest of the Nazis, and became an unwilling center of world attention why did he do it? Noted British historian David when Israeli operatives secretly nabbed him and Cesarani advances these two major inquiries in his then flewhim back to Israel to stand trial for crimes insightful biography Becoming Eichmann. In con against humanity. The first “live” global media ducting the first serious analysis of Eichmann in event, the trial attracted a large audience, many of almost 40 years, the author uses an extensive list of whom followed it right up to Eichmann’s execution sources (many of them unavailable in the 1950s by hanging in 1962—considered proper justice for and 1960s) and research to examine his theories. a supposedly ordinary man who became the “geno Cesarani makes a thorough and complex assess cidaire” of millions of Jews and others before and ment of Eichmann that goes to great lengths in ex during the war. ploring a fundamental question: was this “desk Is the author convincing with his assessment? murderer” as bad as history now shows, or was he That remains to be determined, but he presents a really just a competent administrator and techno powerful argument that will probably cause serious crat who did not realize the magnitude of his geno scholars to reassess Eichmann’s role during those cidal actions? tumultuous times. Certainly, Becoming Eichmann re Tracing his life from its solid beginnings up inforces the idea that one need not be abnormal to through the prewar and conflict years, the author become a practitioner of genocide. Stated another paints a complete picture of a fairly normal man way, if an ordinary man such as Eichmann could do caught up in the times and very proficient at carry what he did, it is conceivable—depending on nu

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 123 7/31/07 12:39:03 PM 124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2007

merous factors and influences—that others in any but he also touches on the air force and navy), po given society might be capable of committing the lice, and other security forces units as they existed same crimes. Although nothing will appreciably during Saddam’s regime and after his removal. elevate or diminish Eichmann’s final standing, it will Cordesman’s research begins with the fall of Bagh be interesting to see if a shift in opinion occurs re dad and the ensuing chaos as police units collapse, garding his ranking in the Nazi gallery of despots. armed resistance turns from full units to a smatter Although not easy to read, Cesarani’s study is ing of individuals or groups, and crime and corrup logically presented, thoroughly documented, ex tion begin to take hold. Summarizing the first 12 ceptionally researched, and enlightening. Dedi months of the US occupation of Iraq, Cordesman cated scholars and students of the Second World criticizes US policies and reports: “The United War and Holocaust will consider Becoming Eichmann States not only initially failed to properly assess the an important new work. growth of terrorism and insurgency during the first year following the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the Dr. Frank P. Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired insurgency also rose and became steadily more ef Newport News, Virginia fective. . . . While the US training teams and US commanders in the field made steadily better ef forts to organize and train Iraqi forces to protect Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success by themselves, the United States as a whole concen Anthony H. Cordesman. Praeger Publishers trated on manpower numbers” (p. 49). (http://www.praeger.com), 88 Post Road West, Iraq had more than the insurgency to consider. Westport, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2005, 440 Crime and corruption had always been a part of pages, $49.95 (hardcover). Saddam’s regime. After his fall, without an effective and visible police force to rein it in, the criminal Readers will most likely approach Iraqi Security element in Iraq grew. In some cases, criminals and Forces in one of two ways. They will either set it aside insurgents worked together when it proved advan in disgust after reading the introduction or enthu tageous to both parties. Creation of a replacement siastically devour it, soaking up every word—as I did. Iraqi police force started in mid-to-late 2003, fal Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. tered as it faced this wave in crime, and restarted in Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic earnest with the advent of the Civilian Police Assis and International Studies in Washington, DC. The tance Training Team in early 2004. Cordesman author of a wide range of studies on US security, notes that “the creation of effective police forces energy, and Middle East policy—as well as more was never a luxury that could wait on defeating the than 20 books—Cordesman has seen his analyses insurgents. Giving Iraq stability and giving the Iraqi featured prominently in major international media government full legitimacy meant that the Iraqi po outlets. Iraqi Security Forces, the product of his latest lice had to become as visible as possible” (p. 116). research on US policy and actions in Iraq, hits chords Although Cordesman’s research constitutes the that some readers will findunsettling, causing them bulk of the book’s 12 chapters, the final one com to shake their heads in disagreement over the au mands the reader’s attention. I found his recom thor’s research, findings, and/or recommendations. mendations solid and well grounded in his thor Others will think that he is stating the obvious. Re ough research. He reiterates that the United States gardless, one should take to heart Cordesman’s and coalition must base their reporting of Iraqi se recommendations, located in the final chapter. curity forces on solid metrics and that the report I had personal experience with some of the Iraqi ing must be credible as well as transparent. security forces programs during my tour at Com Not everyone will agree with Cordesman’s re bined Task Force 7 in Baghdad. During that time, I search and conclusions; in fact, some may take of witnessed opening developments of the Iraqi Civil fense. If nothing else, skeptical readers should at Defense Corps and the stand-up of the Civilian Po least take to heart his recommendations. There is lice Assistance Training Team. I read with interest too much in Iraqi Security Forces to ignore. Any reader Cordesman’s comments, comparing them to my involved in planning, policy development, informa own experiences and finding them accurate. Satis tion operations, public affairs, or even the execution fiedthat Cordesman had done his legendarily thor of future operations similar to Iraqi Freedom must ough job of research, I eagerly read on. read this book—lest we repeat these mistakes. Iraqi Security Forces walks the reader through events dealing with the breadth of Iraq’s security Maj Paul Niesen, USAF forces—its armed forces (most specifically the army, Scott AFB, Illinois

2007-3 Book Reviews.indd 124 7/31/07 12:39:03 PM APJ

ir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’s Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting any Aprofessional journal, is published in English, of the Air and Space Power Journal language editions, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese. entering your name and e-mail address, and then Each version is independent and has an editor—a clicking on the “submit” button. You will immedi­ native speaker of the particular language and an ately receive an e-mail asking you to reply in order to confirmyour subscription. You won’t receive your expert in the region of coverage—who selects its subscription unless you reply to that message. Elec­ content. We’re always looking for good, thought- tronic subscription is free. provoking articles up to 5,000 words in length, written in any of our published languages. All sub­ missions will be edited in accordance with the Is Your Organization standards set forth in the Air University Style and Author Guide (available online at http://aupress Receiving Its Proper Number .maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide of ASPJ Copies? .pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for sub­ The following criteria guide the free distribu­ mitting articles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af tion of Air and Space Power Journal to military and .mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contact government organizations. These criteria are only us by e-mail at [email protected]; regular mail planning factors—not absolute limits. If your or­ at Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, ganization has different needs, please contact Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004; phone at DSN us at [email protected]. 493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax at DSN 493-5811. • One copy for each general on active duty with the US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces. • One copy for every five active duty US Air Force of­ Subscribing to ASPJ: ficers in grades second lieutenant through colonel. Both Printed and Electronic • One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces Subscriptions Are Available office of public affairs. • Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit down Printed copy to squadron level. • The Journal is available free to all USAF organiza­ • Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-group tions as described below in the section “Is Your Or­ function. ganization Receiving Its Proper Number of ASPJ • One copy for each US Air Force or US government Copies?” Other US government and foreign military library. organizations may also receive the Journal for free by • Other US military, US government, or foreign mili­ contacting the editor at [email protected]. tary organizations wishing to receive the Journal should • Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations contact us at [email protected]. may receive the Journal by contacting the Superinten­ dent of Documents by any of the following methods: If your organization is not receiving the desired writing to New Orders, Superintendent of Docu­ number of copies, please contact us. ments, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954; calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (toll­ free outside the DC area), or (202) 512-2104 (fax); Cumulative Article Index or visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/ military_ journals.jsp on the Internet. The Journal’s A cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alpha­ officialdesignation is AFRP 10-1, Air and Space Power betically by the author’s last name, is available at Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5. The cost is http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ $32.00 ($44.80 for international mail). Major credit apjindex.html. cards are accepted. The Editor Free electronic copy • You can receive the Journal electronically by logging on to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force Link

125

Mission Debrief.indd 125 7/31/07 12:36:14 PM OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Air Commodore Aslam Bazmi, Pakistani Air Col Ludovico Chianese, Italian Air Force (BS, Dr. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha (BSc, PhD, Force, Retired (MA, University of Essex, Italiana; MS, Italian Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) is a pri­ United Kingdom; MA, Government College, Joint Staff Course; MSS [Master of Strategic vate consultant and university professor. He Lahore, Pakistan), is a member of the faculty Studies], Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala­ has served as an advisor to the Inter-American at the National University of Sciences and bama), is assigned to the Comando Operativo Defense College; as a member of the Brazilian Technology (NUST Institute of Information delle Forze Aeree (COFA), A5 Branch, in Poggio delegation to the Inter-American Defense Technology, Rawalpindi Cantt, Pakistan). He Renatico, Ferrara. He started basic flying train­ Board; as head of the Psychosocial Studies Di­ served as assistant chief of the Air Staff (Edu­ ing at Laughlin AFB, Texas (T-37 and T-38), vision of the Brazilian National War College; cation) from April 2005 to July 2006. His es­ and Fort Rucker, Alabama (UH-1H), and at­ and as a professor and director of the Institute says and poems have been published in the tended operational training courses in Italy of Physics at the Federal University of Rio de Pakistani Air Force (PAF) journal Shaheen, the on several rotary-wing aircraft, including the Janeiro, as well as special advisor to the president PAF Academy magazine Parwaz, and the Flight Agusta-Bell 205, Sikorsky HH-3F search and of that university. Dr. da Rocha has authored a Safety Newsletter. Air Commodore Bazmi is the rescue/combat search and rescue, Agusta- number of journal articles, essays, and chap­ author of two collections of poems, two collec­ Bell AB-212, and Breda Nardi NH-500E, be­ ters in books. tions of essays, and articles that have appeared coming a helicopter instructor pilot and flight in the national print media. examiner. Colonel Chianese has served in a variety of overseas missions, including Somalia (1993), Lebanon (1994), Albania (1999–2000), Malta (2000–2003), and Iraq (2006) in opera­ tional and command positions.

Dr. David R. Mets (USNA; MA, Columbia Uni­ versity; PhD, University of Denver) is professor Erik Lin-Greenberg (Massachusetts Institute emeritus at Air University’s School of Ad­ of Technology) studies political science at the vanced Air and Space Studies and military de­ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where fense analyst at the Air Force Doctrine Devel­ he is a cadet in Air Force Reserve Officer opment and Education Center. He studied Training Corps Detachment 365. He has naval history at the US Naval Academy and served as an external-affairs intern at the First taught the history of airpower at both the Air Coast Guard District Headquarters in Boston, Force Academy and West Point. During his 30­ where he was an escort for a visiting People’s year career in the Navy and Air Force, he Armed Police Force (Maritime Police) delega­ served as a tanker pilot, an instructor naviga­ tion from the People’s Republic of China. tor in strategic airlift, and a commander of an AC-130 squadron in Southeast Asia. On an­ other tour there, he was an aircraft com­ mander for more than 900 tactical-airlift sor­ ties. A former editor of Air University Review, Dr. Mets is the author of Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (Presidio, 1988) and four other books.

126

Bios.indd 126 7/31/07 12:38:26 PM CONTRIBUTORS 127

Lt Col Marc C. “Dip” DiPaolo (USAFA) is an Lt Col Mike “Trump” Trumpfheller (BA, San Lt Col Glenn “Hooter” Hecht (BS, University Air Force reservist and staff officer at the De­ Diego State University; MS, Embry-Riddle of Pittsburgh; MS, University of Phoenix) is fense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Of­ Aeronautical University; MMOAS [Master of deputy director for personnel recovery policy, fice, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Wash­ Military Operational Art and Science], Air Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel ington, DC. He previously served as chief of Command and Staff College; MAAS [Master Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, plans and HH-60G Pavehawk flight examiner of Airpower Art and Science], School of Ad­ Washington, DC. Previous assignments include with the 920th Rescue Wing, Patrick AFB, vanced Air and Space Studies) is commander HH-60G Combined Test Force commander, Florida. While assigned to that wing, he was a of the 33d Rescue Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Nellis AFB, Nevada; chief, Conventional Re­ flightlead for the invasion of Iraq in 2003; Op­ Japan. He previously served as Checkmate covery Branch, Joint Personnel Recovery eration Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; branch chief, Pentagon, Washington, DC, and Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; assistant director urban operations in Baghdad, Iraq; and Joint instructor pilot, Air Force Weapons School, of operations, 41st Rescue Squadron, Moody Task Force Katrina. Colonel DiPaolo is a Nellis AFB, Nevada. AFB, Georgia; chief, Wing Weapons and Tactics, graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air 347th Wing, Moody AFB; flight commander, Command and Staff College, and Air War Col­ HH-60 Division, USAF Weapons School, Nellis lege. In his civilian capacity, he is chief of the AFB; chief, Weapons and Tactics, 66th Rescue Joint Requirements Branch at the Joint Per­ Squadron, Nellis AFB; US Army exchange pilot, sonnel Recovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and UH-1N mission pilot at Detachment 8, 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California. Colonel Hecht is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, USAF Weapons School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Col Lee dePalo (USAFA; MS, Webster Univer­ sity; MSS [Master of Strategic Studies], Air War College) is commander of the 563d Rescue Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. He previ­ ously served as director, Air Force Executive Re­ Col Michael T. “Ghandi” Healy (USAFA; ME, view Secretariat, Headquarters USAF, Washing­ North Carolina State University; MS, National ton, DC; commander, 41st Rescue Squadron, War College) is chief of the Special Operations Moody AFB, Georgia; operations officer, 66th Support Team (US Special Operations Com­ Rescue Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada; chief, mand) to the Department of Homeland Secu­ Southwest Asia Branch and personnel recovery rity. He has commanded the Air Force’s CV-22 action officer, Special Operations Command, developmental test team, two HH-60G squad­ MacDill AFB, Florida; MH-60G instructor pilot, rons, the 55th Rescue Squadron, and the 34th evaluator pilot, plans and exercises officer, flight Weapons Squadron. He also served as deputy commander, and assistant operations officer, 55th commandant of the USAF Weapons School Special Operations Squadron, , and as deputy division chief of USAF Mobility, Florida; chief, MH-60G Branch, Standardization Combat Search and Rescue, and Special Op­ and Evaluation section, 16th Operations Group, erations Forces Requirements on the Air Staff. Hurlburt Field; HH-3E evaluator pilot and chief, A graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Standardization and Evaluation, 56th Air Rescue Command and Staff College, and Air War Col­ Squadron, Naval Air Station, Keflavik, Iceland; lege as well as a distinguished graduate of the and HH-3E pilot and scheduling officer, 41st Air US Naval Test Pilot School and National War Rescue Squadron, Patrick AFB, Florida. A College, Colonel Healy has flown over 3,700 graduate of Squadron Officer School, Army hours in 41 different types of helicopter, Command and General Staff College, Armed fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft, includ­ Forces Staff College, and Air War College, Colo­ ing combat time in Operations Enduring Free­ nel dePalo is the author of Maxwell Paper no. 35, dom and Southern Watch, and in support of USAF Combat Search and Rescue: Untapped Combat counterdrug operations in the Caribbean. Power (Air University Press, 2005).

Bios.indd 127 7/31/07 12:38:27 PM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

Copy this page, fill it out, and mail it along OR with a check or credit card number to Fax your orders: (202) 512-2104 Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 371954 Phone your orders: Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954 D.C. Metro area toll-free outside D.C. area (202) 512-1800 (866) 512-1800 Make all checks payable to Order online: Superintendent of Documents http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp

Order Processing Code: *5679 ❏ Yes, please send me ____ subscription(s) of the Air and Space Power Journal (AURE) for $32.00 each ($44.80 foreign).

The total cost of my order is $______. Price includes regular shipping and handling and is subject to change. International customers please add 25%.

______Company or personal name (Please type or print) ______Additional address/attention line ______Charge your order. Street address It’s easy! ______City, State, Zip Code ______Daytime phone including area code ______Purchase order number (optional)

For privacy protection, check the box below: ❏ Do not make my name available to other mailers

Check method of payment: ❏ Check payable to Superintendent of Documents ❏ GPO Deposit Account ❏ VISA ❏ MasterCard ❏ Discover ❏ American Express

(expiration date) Thank you for your order! ______Authorizing signature 11/95

Important: Please include this completed order form with your remittance.

subscription.indd 128 7/31/07 12:37:50 PM EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus) Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, National Defense University Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Left to right: Maj Rosana Conceição de Lima Bauer, aide to the commander, Brazilian Air Force; Lt Col Roberto Torres Alpino, Brazilian Air Force student at USAF Air War College; Lt Gen Gilberto Antonio Saboya Burnier, vice -chief of staff, Brazilian Air Force; Gen Juniti Saito, commander, Brazilian Air Force; Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, USAF Air University; Maj Gen Paulo Renato Silva e Souza, Brazilian military and air attaché to the United States; and Mr. Almerisio Lopes, editor of Air and Space Power Journal-Português, during the Brazilian delegation’ s visit to Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala­ bama (22 May 2007).

IInsidenside ccover.inddover.indd 3 88/24/2007/24/2007 11:45:57:45:57 PPMM