SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM

AUGUST 2019 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by GEC-SH for Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM

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USAID Solutions for Peace and Recovery (SPR)

DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) CONTENTS ACRONYMS ...... II ABSTRACT ...... 1 INTRODUCTION...... 2 SECTION 1. SITE LOCATION AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF A FRIENDLY CONFLICT ...... 3 1.1 LOCATION AND POTENTIAL OF THE SITE ...... 3 1.2 HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF A CYCLICAL CONFLICT ...... 6 SECTION 2. CURRENT CONTEXT AND SOCIOLOGY OF ACTORS ...... 7 2.1. THE CURRENT CONTEXT: A ‘RED SITE’ GRANTED TO BANRO ...... 7 2.2. THE MAIN STAKEHOLDERS INTERACTING IN THE MUKUNGWE SITE ...... 8 SECTION 3. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY ...... 11 3.1 DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY ...... 11 3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF MINING...... 12 3.3 MILITIA MOBILIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNITY SECURITY ...... 12 SECTION 4. REFLECTIONS ON POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ...... 13 4.1. FROM ‘RED’ TO ‘GREEN’ SITE: ACTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL ...... 13 4.2 CLEANING UP FRAGMENTED AND PREDATORY MINING GOVERNANCE ...... 15 CONCLUSION ...... 16 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 17

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | i ACRONYMS

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

LUBOMUSHIR LUBOna, MUSHinga and IRongo

MSI Management Systems International

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy)

SAESSCAM Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (Small-Scale Mining Assistance and Management Service) USAID United States Agency for International Development

ZEA Artisanal Exploitation Zone

ii | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV ABSTRACT

This paper is a contribution to the debate that is now part of the social, political and economic landscape of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and rendered under several concepts, like conflict minerals, blood minerals, red mineral sites, etc. The aim is to understand how a constellation of governance structures involved in the governance of the mining sector in finds a favorable context in the conflict system around the mining site of Mukungwe, and how that has a dangerous impact on human security. The outcome of this analysis is to answer a central question: What can be done to move from conflict minerals to peace and development minerals in South Kivu in general and in the in particular.

Keywords: Conflict System, Mining Governance, Conflict Minerals, Ores of Peace, Human Security, Mukungwe Mining Site, Banro

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 1 INTRODUCTION

Judith Verweijn described the current governance system in eastern DRC’s mining sites as “a militarized mining sector!” (2016: 49). Not only does this expression best describe the logic that drives actors’ strategies to ensure control of mining sites and access to their abundant resources, but it also clarifies the place of violence, in all of its forms, in the power relations between the various actors involved in the DRC mining sector. These actors contribute to the perpetuation of conflict minerals (tantalum, gold and tungsten),1 particularly those targeted by the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, adopted in 2010. All mining sites in North and South Kivu fit this profile, including the site of interest for this article, Mukungwe.

Commonly known as Maroc,2 the Mukungwe site is the most contentious of those in the immediate vicinity of , South Kivu. For nearly 50 years, three families who became influential have been fighting for control of the gold, the main mineral mined at this site.3 The positioning of local communities and both state and non-state actors in relation to this conflict eventually contributed to the establishment of a system of conflicts with disastrous consequences. The most prominent consequences are: the use of militias to “secure” the site; the emergence of new forms of public authorities on the mining site; the establishment of a predatory governance system involving both state and non-state actors; and the continued deterioration of the local populations’ living conditions.

All of this contributes to confirming a certain fatalistic conception that draws its arguments from a conspiracy theory and states that “the Democratic Republic of Congo is victim of its natural resources” (Katoka, B. 2017).4 As a result, expressions such as “conflict minerals,” “blood minerals” (Boltanski, C., 2014), “red mining sites” and others seem to fit into the socio-political and economic landscape of the DRC. These issues help mobilize researchers and international human rights organizations in a dynamic search for solutions not only to the systematic plundering of the DRC's mineral resources, but also to the chronic precariousness observed among the population in the mining areas.5

This article thus seeks to provide answers to a central question: What can be done to move from conflict minerals to peace minerals and the development of South Kivu in general and particularly in the Walungu territory? This issue is both simple and complex. It is simple because of the temptation to believe that a serious involvement of the State through the implementation of the Bakajika Law,6 and laws in general, would be

1 The U.S. Congress adopted Article 1502 of the Act to address the problems of mining and trading of conflict minerals by armed groups that contribute to financing conflicts in the DRC in general and in its eastern provinces, with obvious consequences for the ever-increasing humanitarian crisis in the region. 2 The designation Maroc has nothing to do with the Cherifian Empire. It originates from the name of a vast estate that the late President Mobutu allegedly granted to his friend Habyarimana, the former president of Rwanda, in the Walikale territory around the Bisie mine. Several Bashi, originally from Walungu, were involved in artisanal gold mining in Walikale and were forced to leave the concession to return to their Walungu territory, where the site had just been discovered. They named the site after their former workplace in Walikale. 3 The conflict around the mining site has pitted the Kurhengamuzimu family (Mushinga Groupement leader) against those of his two subjects, Chunu and Rubango, in the fight over the control of gold production. 4 Read Pierre-André Taguieff, (2005, La foire aux illuminés. Ésotérisme, théorie du complot, extrémisme, Paris, Mille and Une Nuits, p. 612.) 5 Read De Putter, T. and C. Delvaux, “Certifying Mineral Resources in the Great Lakes Region,” in Foreign Policy, 2013/2 (Summer), pp. 99–112, Geenen, S., and F. Iragi Mukotanyi, “Large Fish Eat Small”: Multiple Aspects of Conflict Over a Mining Lease in South Kivu, in African Policy, 2013/3, pp. 121–141. 6 The Bakajika Law emphasizes that the soil and subsoil belong to the State, thus bringing natural and legal persons to quickly align with land tenure security, while being ready to sell the land as soon as the interests of the State are established.

2 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV sufficient to resolve the issue. However, it is complex in the sense that extraneous factors interfere with a predatory mining governance system in place since the outbreak of the cycle of rebellions that have been burning the country for several decades.

Answering this central question is best with a systemic approach (Easton, D., 1974) to conflict around mining sites. The structures involved in the governance of the mining sector that are present on mining sites are approached as micro-governance systems. These structures contribute both to the consolidation of conflict systems in and around mining sites and to the weakening of the State, which is now in competition with new forms of public authorities who are sometimes more organized than the State.

The authors collected the data for this article through both direct and semi-structured interviews, conducted through a sampling by reasoned choice (Depelteau, F., 2000) and focus groups at the Mukungwe mine site in April 2018. Focus groups have had the merit, as Christophe Evans (2011) states, of going further in data collection by following and recording, in a dialectical perspective, each other's arguments on all aspects of the subject under discussion.

Thus, this article has four sections. The first locates the Mukungwe site and retrospectively analyzes the conflict cycles between the three aforementioned families since 1980. The second focuses on the current context of conflict and the constellation of State and non-State actors involved, as well as their involvement in establishing a system of conflict with negative consequences. The third section examines the impact of this situation on the populations living near the site in terms of human security, with a particular focus on community and food security. The final section focuses on possible solutions.

SECTION 1. SITE LOCATION AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF A FRIENDLY CONFLICT

The conflict around the Mukungwe mine site is about 50 years old. This section aims to understand the factors that contribute to the perpetuation of these conflicts. However, before that, it is useful to locate this site and briefly describe its potential in terms of minerals.

1.1 LOCATION AND POTENTIAL OF THE SITE

The Mukungwe mining site is in the territory of Walungu, Ngweshe Chiefdom, Mushinga groupement. Walungu Territory is one of eight that form the province of South Kivu.7 Its surface area is 1,636 km2 for a population estimated at 701,411 inhabitants in 2014. GPS coordinates can be obtained for the mining site (Mukungwe and the Mshinga groupement).

Border territories of Walungu are Kabare to the north, Mwenga to the south, to the east and the Ruzizi River, which separates it from the Rwandan region of Bunagana and the Burundi province of Cibitoke. To the west, Walungu shares borders with . This geographical position makes the territory an open space that is accessible to regional influences. Historical data shows that well before colonization, the influence of the Bashi was evident both in the Ruzizi plain and in Rwandan Kiyaga (Bishikwabo, C.A. 1980).

7 South Kivu Province comprises eight rural territories: Kabare, Walungu, Mwenga, Shabunda, Uvira, Kalehe, and Fizi.

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 3 MAP 1. ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF WALUNGU TERRITORY

Source: Balagizi et al, 20148

Thus circumscribed, the territory of Walungu is subdivided into two large chiefdoms: Ngweshe and Kaziba. The Ngweshe Chiefdom of interest for this article comprises 16 groupements: Burhale, Ikoma, Irongo, Izege, Kamanyola, Kamisimbi, Kaniola, Karhongo, Lubona, Luciga, Lurhala, Mulamba, Mushinga, Nduba, Rubimbi and Walungu (De Saint Moulin, L., 2005).

The administrative management of this space is hybrid, as is the case for several decentralized administrative entities in the region. It brings together modern administrative structures and traditional administration. Thus, a territorial administrator appointed by Kinshasa works alongside two assistant administrators. Given the vastness of the territories, the central government has created administrative management positions in Mubone, Luntukulu, Nyangezi, Lurhala and Walungu centers.

As for the traditional authorities, each chiefdom has a chief commonly known as “Mwami” (king). He is the guarantor of traditions. The succession at the head of the chiefdom is from father to son. Although they work with the administrative authority, customary chiefs have a certain independence from it. The current DRC Constitution recognizes chiefdoms as a territorially decentralized entity with management autonomy, while the territory remains a decentralized entity.

At the head of each groupement is a groupement chief who often comes from the royal family directly or indirectly. Each groupement comprises several villages headed by the local chief (village), who is appointed and dismissed by the groupement chief after consultation with the community chief. Exceptionally, the

8 Balagizi, K., A. Chifizi, E.M. Bagula, J.M. Cizungu, T.M. Adhama, P.M.M. Masilya, M. Isumbisho, Chapter 15. Effect of the “CETEP” fertilizer on dwarf bean crop yields in South Kivu. In Isumbisho and Sanginga P. (2014). Towards good governance of collective natural resources in the African Great Lakes region. VERTIGO, Montreal, Quebec, ISBN 978-2924372-00-5,

4 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV groupements of Karhongo (Nyangezi) and Mushinga (which includes the locality of Mukungwe) are independent land outside the authority of the Mwami of Ngweshe.

The locality of Mukungwe, the subject of this study, is 60 km southwest of the city of Bukavu and constitutes in itself, a border area between the Mushinga, Irongo and Rubimbi groupements as well as the Mulambi groupement (Burhinyi chiefdom community in ). It is one of 17 localities forming the Mushinga groupement, customarily governed by the Kurhengamuzimu family.

MAP 2. MUKUNGWE MINING SITE

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 5 Mukungwe is one of the most attractive yet problematic gold mining sites for a few reasons:

• The rural context of the region, where more than 95 percent of the population is extremely poor with unproductive agricultural land; • Conflicts and “contested” land ownership rights; and • Walungu Territory’s position nearer to Bukavu, where the main State actors in mining governance operate.

In addition to the conflicting trio that has been confronting it for nearly 50 years, this site has always been at the center of political actors’ concerns. Its excessive militarization between 1998 and 2003, and again in the second half of the 2000s, had a serious impact on the security situation in Walungu Territory. Pierre Jacquemot (2009) notes in this regard that the natural resources of the DRC, “which feed the greed of certain foreign powers,” have never been foreign to the violence imposed on the Congolese population. Mukungwe’s gold was no exception.

Validated in 2012, the mine was certified “red” because members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militias were present at the time (Gregory-Salter and Phuzumoya, 2014). Six years later, in 2018, militarization of the site became more complex. It now takes a subtler form, involving members of the FARDC acting this time in a “personal capacity,” civilian gangs formed largely by former young “gangs or anti-gangs” members recruited by site managers and, of course, young girl and boy mine operators ready for the ultimate sacrifice to “protect their lands.”

1.2 HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF A CYCLICAL CONFLICT

The interests of the conflicting trio clashed after a second acquisition by Mr. Chunu Katangondwa, a native of Mulambi (Burhinyi), from the chief of the Kurhengamuzimu groupement. In 1964, while residing in Mushinga with his aunt (who was close to the chiefdom chief), Chunu received the hill of Lukwera, a gift. However, the area was wild at the time and gorillas did not hesitate to explore the banana plantation near the buyer’s house. Chunu then decided to request another piece of land from the groupement chief, in accordance with the provisions of traditional law.

After respecting all of the traditional procedures, Chunu Katangondwa paid the property tax, the kalinzi, to access the usufructuary’s rights. In this context, the Kalanga estate was granted to him as pasturage for his cows. From then on, he and his family, including all of his offspring, immigrated from Burhinyi to Mushinga to settle on the land he acquired under customary law. He lived in harmony for a long time with the Kurhengamuzimu and the family of another Burhinyi migrant subject named Mr. Rubango, who acted as supervisor of the chief's customary lands in Mukungwe.

Chunu used his new concession as a pasture until the early 1970s, when artisanal miners discovered a large gold deposit. After being informed, the chief of the groupement wanted to regain control of this area by proceeding with a “contentious” interpretation of traditional law, which was not recorded in writing. For the chief, the rights granted by Kalinzi could apply only to the soil, not to the subsoil. For Chunu’s family, however, there was no soil without subsoil, so the Kalinzi had to be applied to both the soil and the subsoil. This was the beginning of the oldest mining conflict in South Kivu.

6 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV This situation escalated the conflict, creating episodes that oscillated between complicity and betrayal, agreements and disagreements, actual or supposed assassinations, revenge, etc.9 Several possible solutions have been explored to restore peace between the families in conflict without success. Some of these solutions include the mediation sessions facilitated by the Mwami Ndatabaye Weza III, chief of the Ngweshe chiefdom; the use of judicial institutions; and conciliation and mediation sessions under the facilitation of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Governance and Peace Observatory.

Since 1988, the courts and tribunals that tried to separate the protagonists have contributed to worsening the situation by siding with either Chunu or Kurhengamuzimu, depending on the context. In 1989, village notables, including the Cishungu, Magala, Ciburhi, Kaluka, Cisabo and Madaka chiefs and others, attempted to mediate between the protagonist families. They succeeded in convincing the parties to share mining revenues fairly, but not for a lasting peace and not for long.

In 1996, Kurhengamuzimu, enamored with his power, pushed Chunu and his family into exile in Kasongo and his family moved, to both Burhinyi and to Goma. Rubango regained strength and became Kurhengamuzimu’s right-hand man.

Two years later, in 1998, the Mudundu 40 Militia (formed by children and supporters of Kurhengamuzimu in the context of the second Congolese rebellion) occupied the Mukungwe site and controlled the area. The Mudundu 40 Militia established its base in Mushinga and occupied the area until 2003.

On April 7, 2003, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebellion launched a large-scale offensive attack against the Mudundu 40, which already controlled almost all of Walungu Territory and other regions in Kabare and Mwenga territories. When defeated, the Mudundu 40 Militia lost control of the Mushinga groupement and the Mukungwe mine site. Odilo, the warlord, was integrated into the FARDC and settled in Kinshasa, while other members of the group and members of the Kurhengamuzimu family, including the then-chief of the groupement, went into exile. Rubango's family took advantage of this situation to gradually establish its authority on the Mukungwe site.

SECTION 2. CURRENT CONTEXT AND SOCIOLOGY OF ACTORS

While Rubango’s family now controls Mukungwe, the Congolese government has granted the site to the multinational corporation Banro. However, Banro has not yet taken possession of it, following the hostility of a fringe of the local population who are loyal to the chief of the groupement. In the meantime, the site has seen the deployment of almost all structures that operate in an artisanal exploitation zone (ZEA), as provided for by Congolese legislation, although it does not have this status. This section analyses the logic of the actors involved.

2.1. THE CURRENT CONTEXT: A ‘RED SITE’ GRANTED TO BANRO

The mining sector in South Kivu was almost exclusively industrial until the early 1980s, when it became mixed (industrial and artisanal) after the liberalization of mining and the sale of minerals by the Mobutu regime in 1982 (K. Vlassenroot, and T. Reaymaekers, 2004). In this context, local communities in mining

9 Geenen, S and K. Claessens, 2012. On the other side of the hill. The contested control of Mukungwe, South Kivu, in: F. Reyntjens, S. Vandeginste, M. Verpoorten, (eds.) L'Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2011–2012, Paris, Le Harmattan: 181-203.

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 7 areas have engaged in the exploitation and sale of minerals to meet their basic needs. The strong return of foreign industrial companies since the second half of the 1990s, amid repeated wars, has finally triggered a “David versus Goliath” type fight between multinationals that receive large mining concessions from the Congolese government and artisanal miners who are often forced to leave their villages.

In September 2013, the Congolese government entrusted the Mukungwe mining site, which provided a source of income for officers in the former 10 military region (ex-10 région militaire), to the Canadian Banro Corporation. At the same time, artisanal exploitation of gold was prohibited on this site. Members of the FARDC militia were to leave the site immediately. The miners and their families had three months to leave the site and find their fortune elsewhere. Banro even agreed to compensate the affected families.

The government’s transfer of the Mukungwe site to Banro forced the families in the conflict to take a stand. While the Kurhengamuzimu and Chunu were in favor of the multinational corporation, the Rubango were hostile to them. The Rubango even developed a kind of moral populism with the ultimate objective of assembling a fringe of the population against the traditional authorities of Mushinga (accused of having sold the land bequeathed by the ancestors), the presence of Banro in Walungu Territory in general and Mukungwe in particular.

Alex de Waal (2016) noted that “moral populism emerges from a crisis of mutuality, often associated with a major societal trauma such as conquest and subjugation, civil war, economic collapse, to the point where institutionalized governance breaks down or tyrannical revolutionary government unleashes mass atrocity.”

The Walungu Territory perfectly matched this profile as the Mukungwe mining site came under Rubango’s control. The latter thus adopted an anti-Western discourse and adopted an attitude toward remobilizing young people against the interests of foreigners, whom they deemed incompatible with indigenous rights and local development.

The creation of the armed group Watoto Chui (“The Leopards”) finds its justification there, as a militia associated with mining operators and miners. These strong young people are recruited from family members who manage the site and at l'Essence, a suburban area of the Ibanda Commune in Bukavu city. Their mission is to protect the interests of the Mukungwe mining site. Due to the situation, the Mukungwe mining site is far from transitioning from a “red site” to “green” one. The Watoto Chui have set up security mechanisms ranging from a simple collection of information on suspected persons and alleged accomplices of Banro, to stoning and assassination without remorse. However, in the meantime, the exploitation of gold continues.

2.2. THE MAIN STAKEHOLDERS INTERACTING IN THE MUKUNGWE SITE

A constellation of State and non-State actors interacts in the mining sector in Mukungwe, with the main objective of direct access to minerals or the benefits they provide. Among them are mining operators, female prostitutes, female vendors, people under legal age, members of the FARDC and state services involved in the governance of the mining sector.

Commonly known as artisanal miners (creuseux artisanaux), mining operators are the key players in the mining sector. In Mukungwe, their numbers generally fluctuate between 200 and 5,000 people, depending on periods of low or intense productivity and latent or violent conflicts. Mining operators are highly organized, performing a variety of tasks. Currently, Mr. Kashala Lubala leads their committee.

8 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV Like almost all mining sites in South Kivu, Mukungwe is home to a category of “very fragile miners”: those who are underage. These children range in age from 8 to 18 years old and have dropped out of school for various reasons. They are forced into adulthood far before reaching age 18. Their situation is highly concerning, as they are overexploited by mining operators and exposed to diseases of all kinds by female prostitutes. Does the fact that they are children push them to be part of the cycle of conflicts without thinking or without interest? How does being a minor define their contribution and role to the conflicts?

Female prostitutes, also known as “diggers without spades” (creuseuses sans bêches), should not be confused with street vendors who access the site every day to sell food and return home in the evening. Some women may combine both activities (prostitution and trade), but the category of street vendors also includes married women (who trade with implied consent or expressed consent of their spouse), women who are known as girl-mothers and women who have fled their homes (women living alone).10 How do they influence conflicts? How do conflicts affect their daily lives?

In addition to these actors, Mukungwe receives State actors and services while the site is officially closed. FARDC elements and the Congolese National Police, invited by the Rubango family, are present on the mining sites. Their affinities with the Watoto Chui and the fact that they are not disturbed by their respective hierarchies suggest the existence of a vast network perpetuating, in other forms, the logic of militarizing mining sites, as theorized by Judith Verweijn (2016).

Several State actors are involved in the Mukungwe mining site. Some officially act on behalf of their specific services, while others maintain parallel predatory structures. The actors most present at the sites, among others, are the Walungu territorial administration; agents of the provincial mining division; the Small-Scale Mining Assistance and Management Service (SAESSCAM); and the Mine Police. How do they interact in the face of conflict? Are they dividers or connectors? Supporters or opponents? Positive change actors or protectors of both parties?

Finally, a category of non-State actors operates in Mukungwe with the specific aim of seeking solutions to the conflict system there. Among them are: the non-profit association Governance and Peace Observatory (l’Asbl dénommé Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix); residents of LUBOMUSHIR, an acronym derived from the three neighboring groupements of Lubona (LU), Mushinga (MUSH) and Irongo (IR); and the Mukungwe Development Committee. In addition to these actors, philanthropic services are concerned with the safety and health of mining operators and their dependents. This includes the Mubumbano Health Zone Office, which has a health post and a reproductive health facilitator on site, such as Mother MED and Chantal Iranga M'Lwanwa, who are in permanent contact with the active women of the mining site.

All of these power relations and the underlying links are represented in the sociogram in Figure 1.

10 A much more in-depth study is devoted to the situation of women and children in the mine site. It will be the subject of a specific publication.

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 9 FIGURE 1: SOCIOGRAM

Chunu 3 Politiciens locaux Rubango 2.5

Chefs locaux du 2 Kurhengamuzimu groupement 1.5

1 PDG Puits BANRO 0.5

0

Bitotochui SEASCAM

Chunu

Milice matonge Armée Rubango

Kurhengamuzimu Négociants Police BANRO Tribunal

Legend: 0 = link of mistrust; 1 = violent conflicts; 2 = latent conflicts; 3 = links of friendship

This sociogram suggests a system of conflicts between various actors and structures that revolves around access to resources in Mukungwe. This system has five subsystems that interact where the interests are essentially focused on controlling this space of opportunities, which often creates a conflict between them. Gold is the main mineral mined on the site, but on the fringes of mining, several social and economic structures can create antagonism between the subsystems, including gold traders, local politicians, traditional chiefs and others.

The first subsystem centers on the conflicting Kurhengamuzimu – Chunu – Rubango trio, the core of a whole system of conflicts. The central issue within this subsystem is the effective control of Mukungwe as an area of economic opportunity. Resource mobilization and strategies to achieve it have evolved over time: use of militias, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, judicial institutions, influence-peddling in the political sphere in Kinshasa, armed groups more or less structured such as the Mudundu 40 Militia, and even tacit alliances with certain personalities in neighboring countries.

The second subsystem is built around the supporters and courtiers of one or more members of the conflicting trio. It takes into consideration that mining operators’ loyalty is necessary to reassure the groupement chief that the major players share the dividends from mining. It also considers traders (négociants), whose cooperation is important in assessing state structure taxes and royalties due to the family managing the mining site. The intrigues between the subjects of the groupement chief, the

10 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV instrumentalization of matrimonial alliances, and the exploitation of the influence of local notables configure the conflict dynamics at the level of this subsystem.

The third subsystem refers to the conflicting interests in the periphery of the Mukungwe mine site. The locality of Madaka, the main city of the Mushinga groupement, is at the center of expression of those contradictions and the business climate thermometer in the Mukungwe mining site. Located less than 10 km from the site, this “small” center shelters the supporters of the conflict trio and is the obligatory temporary accommodation site for representatives of the state services operating in Mukunguwe. The center of Madaka is a natural extension of the Mukungwe site, understood as a space of economic and political opportunities.

The fourth subsystem includes all State and non-State actors involved in mining governance. This category includes traders, commissioners, actors in the shadows, agents of the Provincial Division of Mines, the Mine Police, SAESSCAM agents, certain notable figures based in Kinshasa who have a parcel of authority over the actors and, of course, transnational networks that participate in the laundering of the conflict minerals in some way.

The fifth and final subsystem takes into account the constellation of national (Kinshasa), regional and international pressures: the Congolese State (to which the Bakajika Law recognizes the monopoly on the soil and subsoil), the multinational companies involved in mining in the DRC in general and Banro in particular (which is already involved in Twangiza and has the contract with the DRC for the Mukungwe site), the international community and all networks involved in the fight against conflict minerals.

The coexistence of these subsystems in Mukungwe has benefited not only from a socio-political context that led to the bankruptcy of the Congolese State, but also by the fragmented legal and ethical aspects of what remains of this State: officials converted into corrupt political operators seeking easy gains and using the umbrella of government power to commit fraud on a daily basis. The survival of these subsystems has contributed to the establishment of a predation mining governance system, following the principle that “everyone has their share but reporting to the chief is mandatory.”

SECTION 3. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY

After several years of confrontation between the protagonists, the Mushinga groupement is a disaster- stricken region. The gradual abandonment of farming activities in favor of mining, the circular militia mobilization for the protection of the mining site and the governance deficit at the level of state services are just some of the factors contributing to increased violence and precariousness in this part of the Walungu Territory.

3.1 DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY

Since the liberalization of mineral exploitation in the DRC, farming activities have seriously regressed in mining areas. The Walungu Territory in general and the Mushinga groupement are not exceptions. The gold rush has relegated other economic activities and even the education of younger children behind the scenes. The entire territory is seriously affected.

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 11 Local agriculture is in significant decline. The Rubimbi market, which supplied most of the cassava consumed in Bukavu in the 1970s and 1980s, has almost disappeared. All of the large plantations (Kinplant, Lukayo and Mulambi, among others) have closed and the expatriates who were in charge of them have returned to their home countries. Pastures are deserted because the cows have been stolen by armed groups or because the farmers have fled the ongoing insecurity in the region.

Physical insecurity and a lack of community security have forced local communities into subsistence agriculture, which cannot even meet the needs of the local population. Food consumed in and around mining sites usually comes from urban centers in the vicinity. Thus, Bukavu supplies Mukungwe, while the Rwandan province of Cyangugu supplies Bukavu.

Poverty is still increasing in the Mushinga groupement and food security is not guaranteed. Mukungwe thus reflects the Congolese paradox: “a region rich in minerals, but a very poor population.” A survey conducted by Alice Nalumva at the Mukungwe site highlights the fact that mining operators do not have stable incomes. Instead, their incomes depend on fluctuations in production and miners are often supported by well managers, who use their resources to provide their workers with food, sanitation and housing (Nalumva, A. 2017).

3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF MINING

The practices implemented by miners contribute to environmental degradation and can cause new ecological risks that can have a negative impact on people's health, livelihoods and safety. (Isumbisho, M. and P. Sanginga: 2014). The Mukungwe site fits perfectly into this picture.

Miners cut down trees to “timber” wells and control landslides inside them. This deforestation has consequences for the environment: climate disruption, climate change and seasonal disruption.

In addition to timbering, the use of drills is a major environmental stressor in Mukungwe. Faced with solid stone blocks, miners use drills and explosives (Lutambi) for mining to continue their extraction process. This practice results in air pollution. The foul odors and toxic smoke in wells cause illness.

Even if they refuse to admit it, miners use chemicals, mainly mercury. They also discharge oil from motor pumps and other machinery into the river, resulting in water pollution on the site. An observation with the naked eye establishes that the water from the Mukungwe River is unfit for consumption; the color and odors are repugnant. Mining activities have a negative impact on river water.

A polluted environment is a detriment to the health of the population. The diseases present in the Mukungwe mine are malaria, diarrhea (cholera), tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS; all but the latter are logical consequences of environmental degradation.

3.3 MILITIA MOBILIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNITY SECURITY

The use of community militias to secure mineshafts is not new to this mining site. As early as 1980, the Chunu family who occupied the site had set up a militia called the Matonge. They were young people, mostly recruited in Burhinyi. Their duty was to guarantee effective access to miners for the benefit of the Chunu family. In response to this militarization of the site, one of Kurhengamuzimu’s sons, Mr. Odilo, set up the Bigohwa militia.

12 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV Bigohwa’s name is not chosen at random. Cigohwa (Eryhthrina abyssinica) is a shrub with deciduous leaves, well known in Bushi for its resistance to the dry season, and to fire. In Mushinga's traditional collective imagination, this tree is the beam where all spirits rest and from which they engage with the life of the community. Amid the conflicts at the Mukungwe mine site, this tree symbolizes the magical-religious resistance to “people from elsewhere who came to occupy our lands.” The future commander of the Mundundu 40 managed, at the time, to restore his family's rights.

In 1998, the Mundundu 40 Militia grew to the point of asking the rebels of the Congolese Rally for Democracy to participate in the provincial government. Access to political power served to increase the level of security in the Kurhengamuzimu domain. On this occasion, Théotime Kurhengamuzimu became administrative secretary general of the Higher Institute of Rural Development (Secrétaire Général Administratif de l’Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural), while Mr. Patient Mwendanga, who was close to Mundundu 40, became the provincial governor in place of Mr. Ntirata (also close to Mundundu 40), whom the fighters preferred.

The alliance between the RCD and Mundundu 40 resulted not only in a lull at the Mukungwe site, but also in the last opening to a regional mining traffic network, of which Kigali became the most important center.

However, with the process of reunification of the DRC initiated in 2003 following the Global and Inclusive Agreement and the process of integrating armed groups into the FARDC, the M40 Militia was completely dismantled and the Kurhengamuzi was forced into exile, which left the space empty. The mining site was then occupied by the Rubango. This episode marks the beginning of the progressive exclusion of two of the other rival families from the Mukungwe site. To strengthen their position on the site, the Rubango family presented themselves as protectors of the Mushinga population and organized themselves to have some members of FARDC to strengthen their Watoto Chui.

This militarization of the Mukungwe site has obvious consequences for community security. A kind of armed peace has settled in this part of the Mukungwe site. The families currently excluded from the site, the Kurhengamuzimu and the Chunu, have formed a common front and have become supportive of Banro. They are working with the government, which believes that only an industrial operation entrusted to Banro could reduce tensions and facilitate Mukungwe's transition from a “red site” to a “green” one. The population of Mushinga is thus divided into pro- and anti-Banro. The conflict has not been well managed; it is essentially frozen and can resurface at any time.

SECTION 4. REFLECTIONS ON POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

A rational management of the conflict system described in the previous sections requires both a structural and a contextual approach. Also, action is necessary at several levels: local, provincial, national, regional and international. This section presents some possible solutions.

4.1. FROM ‘RED’ TO ‘GREEN’ SITE: ACTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The first step toward promoting minerals for peace and development is to move from a “red” site to a “green” one. In the case of Mukungwe, this requires a positive transformation of the conflict that has long opposed the Kurhengamuzimu, Chunu and Rubango families. Focus groups organized in Mushinga recommended two possible avenues. One suggests relaunching the dialogue between the protagonists

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 13 with a view to a peaceful settlement, while the second envisages a strong intervention by the State to stabilize the situation.

With regard to the dialogue between the protagonists, since the site has already been attributed to Banro, the debate should no longer focus on identifying a potential usurper, but on the following major concerns: Is the new buyer willing to consider the creation, in the immediate proximity of his property, of an artisanal exploitation zone (ZEA), as requested by a group of mining operators? If so, what would be the framework for operating such an area in coordination with Banro? On the other hand, are the parties to the conflict willing to renounce their “property rights” to Banro? For what consideration? Answering these questions requires a much more in-depth study.

The resistance of mining operators against Banro is easy to understand, however, when you consider the financial investment by those responsible for the gold wells at the Mukungwe site.11

This testimony says more:

“Simply imagine. We took loans from the banks to finance these wells; we had to feed the diggers according to their roles and numbers. We had to buy the equipment for this work, and we incurred a lot of expenditures to get these wells to production, which remains uncertain until now. And then someone wakes up and tells me to just leave the site. That person only wants rebellion in this country! Where will all the young workers here go?”12

The current context attests that the protagonist families and those responsible for the mining shafts of Mukungwe seem to have understood that, as the Belgian journalist Collette Braeckman wrote in 1999, DRC is “at the center of a real competition for ‘free and exclusive’ access to the planet’s last unexploited natural resources.” These natural resources do not constitute the sole concern of local and national actors, but they sit atop the agendas of major world powers.

Integrating this reality is an important step in the process of negotiating fair dividends with regard to mining contracts in relation to the rights of so-called “indigenous” people. This reality is essential to boost polycentric sustainable development. Taking this step is not easy in the context of Mukungwe. State intervention is absolutely essential.

The Congolese government’s limited involvement in conflict management around the Mukungwe mining site is obvious. Several serious human rights violations have occurred on the site in the past two years, and the State has not taken any serious steps to establish responsibility and punish the perpetrators. This has contributed to reinforce the divisions between the protagonists, creating mistrust between the protagonists and the State, and consolidating parallel forms of governance controlled by well managers and actors within the site: micro-States within the State. Therefore, the State absolutely must be repaired to overcome the current deadlock.

With regard to the second approach proposed, based on a strong intervention of the State, two actions would be useful. The first is that the State should contribute to the restoration of the social climate in

11 A separate article will be devoted to this issue. 12 Remarks by the PDG supporters, gathered in focus group, on 27/04/2018.

14 | SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM USAID.GOV Mukungwe by establishing a “special court” to rule on all crimes committed in Mukungwe and punish the perpetrators. This reaction from a mining operator is clear about this subject:

“How can you claim to have peace when you live with someone you saw kill your brother, son or friend? Here in Mukungwe, a 2-year-old child knows the person that killed his father and is only waiting until he gets older to take revenge. No more, no less!”13

While peace requires the restoration of truth and justice, the idea of such a court can contribute to increasing tension at the local level. This can then increase tension between the protagonist families and can give a new face to the existing conflict system. Instead, the State should assume responsibility and apply the law, as the “soil and subsoil” belong to it.

4.2 CLEANING UP FRAGMENTED AND PREDATORY MINING GOVERNANCE

The situation of non-Statehood generated by repeated wars has accelerated the militarization of mineral exploitation, the fragmentation of mining governance and the emergence of parallel forms of public authorities in the Congolese mining sector.

The DRC is now presented as the archetype of institutional collapse and state failure (Vlassenroot, K., 2008). Cleaning up mining governance therefore requires the restoration of the State.

Several studies have already examined the issues of African states.14 As Beatrice Hibou (1998: 151) writes, after focusing on its “import” or “transplant,” the debate on the notion of state in Africa has shifted to its withdrawal, even its collapse. Today, the concepts of “privatization” of the state and fragile states (Chestnut, J.M., and F. Gaulme, 2005:3) are at the center of the debate. All of these concepts focus on the “rebuilding of the state” in Africa. This last concept is not unanimously accepted.

Indeed, this concept focuses on the consolidation of democracy, the promotion of human rights and good governance, national integration and State capacity building, among other facets. It pays little attention to the ethical and moral personality of state actors, or their ability to apply the texts that govern the specific sectors where they operate. Several State actors involved in the governance of the Congolese mining sector wear two hats (double casquette). While working for the State, they also maintain parallel networks of access to resources.

The fragmentation of the Congolese mining sector’s governance is not solely due to the lack of a coherent policy to manage natural resources. It is largely due to the inconsistencies of a political class transformed into a club of political and economic operators who are highly involved, directly or indirectly, in mining. It is this paradigm that must absolutely change. There is still a long way to go.

While structural reforms are easy to carry out in a specific context, mentality change takes place over a long period. But in the meantime, while waiting on the advent of the reformed leaders, numerous principles can be followed in restoring governance in the mining sector:

13 Bwirabaluge Lemera, Interviewed in Mukungwe, 27 /04 /2018 14 Jean-François Bayart (1989) on belly politics and the criminalization of the state in Africa (1999)

USAID.GOV SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MUKUNGWE MINE’S CONFLICT SYSTEM | 15 • A clarification of traditional mechanisms for access to land and land security; • Harmonization between the provisions of traditional and agrarian law relating to access to land; • A redefinition, with the participation of communities established in mining areas, of the terms and conditions for signing mining contracts with multinationals; and • Definition of clear sustainable development projects with community participation at the grassroots level and establishment of joint monitoring mechanisms.

Indeed, as Kilosho (2018) emphasizes, the paradox in the DRC is that the mining sector does not succeed in catalyzing development; rather, it fosters poverty, the main drivers of which are conflicts between stakeholders who should collaborate and who jointly define the “rules of the game” to take advantage of egalitarian ways. Once the governance of the mining sector has been cleaned, this can extend to other production sectors, mainly in agriculture.

CONCLUSION

The first formulations of conflict around the Mukungwe mine site involve three families, Kurhengamuzimu, Chunu and Rubango, and date back to the early 1970s. In addition to competition for access to resources, these conflicts are based on the contradictory interpretation of unwritten traditional agrarian legislation: Must the Kalinzi apply to the soil only, or to the subsoil as well?

The conflict consolidated over time into a system of conflicts involving several State and non-State actors, local communities, regional actors and the multinational company Banro. This evolution is explained by the deficit of legal institutions that have failed to decide cases on their remit and the failure of the State to execute its sovereign functions, leaving space for a constellation of actors with a predatory logic.

This conflict has claimed several victims and has had a negative impact on human security in the Walungu Territory in general, and on the Mushinga groupement in particular. Particularly in Mukungwe, effects have included mass killings and attacks on community security, a decline in farming activities with an impact on food security, environmental degradation as a result of wild mineral exploitation, poverty and more.

To better solve this conflict and give hope for peace in this region, State involvement must be the foundation. This must take place not only in the structural reforms essential to the restoration of its authority, but also — and above all — in the restoration of the ethical and moral personality of people called upon to manage public goods in general and the mining sector in particular. Only a healthy socio- political environment could provide a business climate to convince multinationals such as Banro to adhere to a certain national natural resource management policy.

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