Note: This Translation Has Been Prepared by the Registry for Internal Purposes and Has No Official Character 14687
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Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official character 14687 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA) SECOND PHASE QUESTION OF REPARATION MEMORIAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO VOLUME 7 (Annexes 4.15 to 4.28) September 2016 [Translation by the Registry] LIST OF ANNEXES Volume 7 Annexes 4.15 to 4.28 Annex Page 4.15 Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998 1 4.16 Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Seventieth Ordinary 34 Session, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the DRC, 6-10 July 1999 4.17 South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth 35 Organizations and Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC — large-scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from 1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999 4.18 Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and 85 Factions in North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999 4.19 Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, Kisangani, 86 May 2000 4.20 Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000 99 4.21 MONUC, Historic record of Kisangani cease-fire operation, 19 June 2000 99 4.22 United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the 100 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000 4.23 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on 113 the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40, 1 February 2001 (excerpts) 4.24 United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission 133 to Kisangani (pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), paragraph 14), document S/2000/1153, 4 December 2000 4.25 Claim of Société textile de Kisangani (SOTEXKI) 146 4.26 Claim of Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL) 149 4.27 Claim of the Régie des voies aériennes 153 4.28 Claim of the Archdiocese of Kisangani 155 - 1 - ANNEX 4.15 Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998 - 2 - Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998 [Translation] CONTENT INTRODUCTION PART I: WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO I.1. The causes of the war I.1.1. Indirect causes I.1.2. Direct causes I.2. The warring parties I.2.1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and its allies I.2.2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its allies PART II: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KISANGANI AND THE SURROUNDING AREA II.1. Human rights violations under the authorities of the KABILA Government A. Civil and political rights B. Economic and social rights C. Use of children as soldiers D. Failure to protect civilians II.2. Human rights under the rebel authorities II.2.1. Inhuman treatment II.2.2. Infringements of the right to life II.2.3. Humiliating and degrading treatment II.2.4. Physical, psychological and moral duress II.2.5. Disappearances II.2.6. Looting II.2.7. Deterioration of health and humanitarian conditions and threats to medical workers II.2.8. Loss of material and social well-being - 3 - PART III: THE ATTITUDE OF THE WARRING PARTIES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES COMMITTED III.1. The governmental authorities III.2. The rebel authorities PART IV: THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR IV.1. The power struggle — developments on the ground IV.2. The inhabitants — their concerns and expectations IV.3. The efforts of the international community hesitant and inadequate (from August to early October 1998) IV.4. The future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDICES Appendix 1: Consitutional decree of 27 May 1998 Appendix 2: Chronology of events in Kisangani Appendix 3: Declaration of the war of rebellion, 2 August 1998 [not attached] - 4 - ABBREVIATIONS AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo ANR: National Intelligence Agency BSRS: Special Investigation and Surveillance Brigade DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo FAC: Congolese Armed Forces FAZ: Zairian Armed Forces FEC: Congolese Business Federation HCR-PT: High Council of the Republic — Transitional Parliament OFIDA: Customs and Excise Office OCPT: Congolese Post and Telecommunications Office PIR: Rapid Intervention Police RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy RVA: Air traffic control authorities SADC: Southern African Development Community UN: United Nations WHO: World Health Organization - 5 - INTRODUCTION The major preoccupation of the first person ever to fashion a weapon on this earth was to defend himself against attacks from wild animals. This defensive attitude has not endured over time. Various changes and modifications have diverted those who take up arms from their noble purpose of yesteryear. In our day and age most of the horrible scenes which plunge humankind in to mourning and sadness can be put down to the abuse of weapons for fratricidal wars, revenge, or rebellion, in short, violence in all its varying forms. This is what the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been enduring since the beginning of the 1990s. There have been countless deaths in the region during this period, beginning with the influx of Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994, going on through the so-called war of liberation waged by the AFDL in 1996, which brought Laurent Désiré KABILA to power as the president of the DRC, and continuing with the rebellion of August 1998. Even the so-called civilized powers, those world police officers in waiting who gladly seize any opportunity to strike out at or destabilize régimes branded as dictatorships, have taken no notice of the fate of innocent civilians or even the massacres that have resulted from the conflicts. No sooner had Mobutu and his Government exited the stage and Kabila taken power than those who wish to subjugate the world and will go to any length to tip the balance in favour of their own interests inflicted another war on the Congolese at a time when they least expected it. It seemed that the main purpose of the rebels was to effect a radical remedy to the totalitarian tendencies of the DRC’s current leader. They began in Goma and, in record time, they had conquered a number of the country’s cities and strategic centres including Bukavu, Uvira, Beni, Butembo, Bunia, and Kisangani, paving the way for their assault on Kinshasa, the capital and seat of Government. Kisangani, the third largest city in the country is the administrative centre of Orientale Province, which is the largest and most highly populated of the DRC’s 11 provinces. It has around 700,000 inhabitants of varying cultural origin. It has an international airport (Bangboka), a military air-base (Plateau Médical) and a port on the Congo river providing a direct link to the capital of the DRC, Kinshasa. There are roads from Kisangani to Uganda via Bunia, the Central African Republic via Bondo and Sudan via Isiro. In the political history of the country, Kisangani was the fiefdom of the national hero, Patrice Hemery LUMUMBA and the political centre of the Mulelist uprising of 1964. Under Mobutu Sese Seko it was the stronghold of the party of the State, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) and so this was where the lightning counter-offensive against the AFDL uprising was organized. In March 1997, the rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo met with remarkable success in Kisangani, encouraging him to continue his struggle until he was able to take power in Kinshasa. Kisangani is the focus of the area in which LOTUS conducted the investigations that led to this report. The report details the human rights violations which took place there, in particular from 4 August 1998 (the date on which sections of the Congolese Armed Forces supporting the rebels first attempted to take Kisangani) to 23 August 1998 (the date on which the rebel forces actually entered Kisangani) and the period from 23 August to 15 October 1998 (the end of the period of observation). The report acts both as a window and a mirror. Through the window, the outside world will most certainly come to acknowledge Kisangani’s tragic situation and, who knows, may be prompted to do what it can to ensure that these kinds of circumstances no longer arise anywhere in the world. In the mirror, those who call for and wage war can see and meditate on what they have done, if only for the sake of the universal nature of human values. Save for the introduction, the conclusions and the recommendations, this report is divided into four main parts. The first relates primarily to some of the main keys to an understanding of the - 6 - new war in the DRC. The second part focuses on the human rights violations in the region both before and after the taking of Kisangani. The third describes the warring parties’ attitudes towards human rights violations and abuses; and the final part sets out a few theories about the future of the DRC based on some free thinking about the situation. PART I: WAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO On 2 August 1998, to everyone’s great surprise, foreign radio stations announced that parts of the 10th Army Brigade in Goma had mutinied.