SECURING LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN THE DRC: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Study hans hoebeke, jair van der lijn, tim glawion and nikki de zwaan STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org SECURING LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN THE DRC: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Study hans hoebeke, jair van der lijn, tim glawion and nikki de zwaan

September 2019 Authors’ note

This paper is one of three in a collection comprising two policy studies and a policy report that synthesizes the two studies. In addition to this paper, the other two in this collection are the policy study Securing Legitimate Stability in CAR: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives and the policy report Towards Legitimate Stability in CAR and the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives. The research for this work was done in cooperation with Cordaid, a development and humanitarian organization, working to end poverty and exclusion. Cordaid does this in the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected areas, including the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cordaid’s Security and Justice program focuses on improving access to effective, accountable and inclusive security and justice services (through result-based financing approaches), ensuring that women and youth can participate meaningfully in peace and governance processes, and strengthening civil society capacity to lobby and advocate for positive change. Financial support for this project was received from NWO-WOTRO—commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands and developed in close collaboration with the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law.

© SIPRI 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. Contents

Abbreviations iv I. Introduction 1

II. Methodology 2

III. Ongoing international efforts 2

IV. What is the role of the state? 4 Socio-economic expectations 5 Governance and decentralization 5 V. How should security and justice be provided? 6 Security actors 6 Security coordination 8 Justice provision 9 VI. Who should be part of the social contract? 10

VII. Summary 11

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations 12 To international actors 13 To the Congolese Government 14 Abbreviations

ANR L’Agence nationale des renseignements (National Intelligence Agency) CENI Independent Electoral Commission CHESD Higher Institute for Security and Defence Studies CLSP Comités locaux pour la sécurité de proximité (local committees for neighborhood security) DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration DGM Direction Générale de Migration (Directorate General of Migration) DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ETD Decentralized entity EU European Union FARDC Armed Forces of the DRC HHI Harvard Humanitarian Initiative INGO International non-governmental organization ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S) MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NGO non-governmental organization PNC Police Nationale Congolaise (national police of the DRC) PNDDR3 Third phase of the national programme plan SCF Stabilization Coherence Fund SSAPR Security sector accountability and police reform SSR Security sector reform SSU Stabilization Support Unit STAREC National Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme VNG Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities) I. Introduction This report investigates the hypothesis that strengthening a state’s capacity to provide secur­ity and justice leads to a stronger, more inclusive social contract through which govern­ments gain popular legitimacy, which in turn contributes to increased and more ‘legitimate stability’. Legitimate stability refers to stability that is grounded in inclusive policies and service delivery, accountable governance, inclusive political pro­ cesses and a social contract between the state and its people, as well as social cohesion between groups in society. The research and fieldwork were conducted at a particular moment in the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite considerable controversy, national elections had ushered in the first peaceful transfer of power in the country’s 59-year history. The final four years of the regime of President Joseph Kabila (2001– 2019) had been frustrating and tense for the international community, and for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in particular. The administration of US President Donald J. Trump had sought to focus minds on the cost of one of the UN’s largest peacekeeping missions as it approached the 20th anniversary of a UN peacekeeping presence in the coun­try. MONUSCO has seen its footprint reduced in recent years and an independent strategic review of the mission is under way. Local UN staff and the wider international presence are focused on this review, which will inform the thinking of the United Nations Secretariat in New York and will be an important consideration for the UN Secur­ity Council. At the same time, President Felix Tshisekedi, who assumed office on 24 January 2019, has recently stated that the mission should remain in place.1 This opens a new window of opportunity to support local dynamics of change. There have been a number of positive developments since the January 2019 transfer of power, not least the return of the DRC as an actor on the regional and international stage, attempts to change attitudes in the security sector and a decidedly more com­ passionate approach to social suffering and insecurity. This is symbolic and raises a level of hope for change, but such hope will not endure indefinitely. Change will have to be felt to win over a cautious and sceptical population. Amid these developments, there has been cautious, renewed thinking about policy instru­ments that were tested in the period 2003–14, such as security sector reform (SSR) and justice sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and support for decentralization. The new administration may provide more fertile ground for tackling these issues in a more structured manner and for obtaining high-level buy‑in.2 However, the forces of inertia are strong and well-engrained in all structures. In addition, attachment to regional stability has clashed with ambitious plans for demo­cratic reform while sovereignty has clashed with a strong dependency on the pres­ence of foreign actors.3 Effective reform—connecting the state back to the expectations of the population, as it has been expressed during the fieldwork conducted for this project and in broader surveys—will not be without considerable risk. More than bad policies per se, bad practices by donors, such as the payment of all kinds of fees, and the duration

1 ‘Felix Tshisekedi on RFI et France 24, ‘Je ne pense pas que je suis une marionette’ [Felix Tshisekedi on RFI and France 24: I do not think that I am a puppet]’, RFI, 29 June 2019. 2 United Nations, Security Council, ‘With new president pledging reform, Democratic Republic of Congo making gains amid fresh violence in east, mission chief tells Security Council’, SC/13897, Meetings coverage, 24 July 2019. 3 For further reflections on these issues see Shephard, B., Beyond Crisis in the DRC: The Dilemmas of International Engage­ment and Sustainable Change (Chatham House: London, 30 Dec. 2014); Carayannis, T. et al., Competing Net­ works and Political Order in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Literature Review on the Logics of Public Authority and International intervention (LSE Conflict Research Programme: London, 18 July 2018); and de Vries, H., Going Around in Circles: The Challenges of Peacekeeping and Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CRU Report (Clingendael Institute: The Hague, Aug. 2015). 2 securing legitimate stability in drc of the crisis have severely hampered the development of the ‘local ownership’ or sense of responsibility among local elites that will be required for successful reform. Further­more, local democracy, while essential, is a massively complex and potentially explosive undertaking. Identity discourses are omnipresent and remain powerful while decentralized power structures depend on traditional chiefs, whose authority is largely derived from their guardianship of identity.

II. Methodology The research was conducted in South Kivu Province. Like neighbouring North Kivu, South Kivu has been the epicentre of violent conflict and instability in the DRC since the mid-1990s. A toxic mix of local and national factors and dynamics centred on govern­ance, land and identity has maintained a complex set of conflicts. These internal dynamics are fuelled by the spillover from internal political conflict and the political and economic ambitions of regional actors—Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The ruling regimes in these countries have shown little interest in effective stability in the DRC. This study was conducted in four localities: Bushwira, Kanyola, Sange and Kipupu. In each locality, around 60 people were interviewed, each selected at random in the street, both in town and in more rural contexts. In addition to questions about their own background and a control survey about the current security and justice situation, respond­ents were asked a series of open questions about governance, security and justice, and the social contract in their ‘ideal village’. While these questions sought to reveal respondents’ desires and wishes for the future, respondents often answered questions with the current situation foremost in their minds. The four localities were selected based on the diversity of their conflict contexts and of the level of state presence. While not representative of South Kivu, let alone the DRC, they reflect a wide range of experience in eastern DRC. Bushwira in Kabare terri­tory, which is close to Bukavu, is a generally calm area that has experienced hardly any conflict. Kanyola in Walungu territory is a post-conflict area. Sange is a city on the main road from Bukavu to Uvira. It has been affected by the conflict in Burundi and both Burundian rebels and its government troops are regularly active in the area. Congolese armed groups are also still active there. Kipupu, situated on the Hauts Plateaux in Mwenga territory, is a contested area. The state is present but armed groups operate close by. In all four localities, the international presence in the form of MONUSCO or international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) is very limited, as is the presence of local civil society. For the purpose of this study, 28 interviews were also conducted with senior members of MONUSCO and INGOs in January and June 2019, as well as 12 interviews with local members of civil society and researchers. Congolese research teams in all questioned over 250 inhabitants and 39 local stakeholders in the four localities in the period February to March 2019. Finally, a community meeting was held in Bushwira and the preliminary results were discussed with key stakeholders in Goma in June 2019.

III. Ongoing international efforts The DRC conflicts have garnered significant international attention and mobilized con­sider­able efforts to establish stability. The most visible has been the presence of MONUSCO.4 From the start of the post-war transition in 2003, the UN and a wide range

4 For a recent overview see EPON, Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC/MONUC- MONUSCO (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 2019). external assumptions and local perspectives 3 of actors, including the European Union (EU) and bilateral donors, have invested in attempts to re-establish state authority, including support for decentralization. These have included a number of SSR and justice sector reform programmes.5 Structural reform and SSR efforts were badly disrupted by political turmoil when elections planned for late 2016 were delayed, and the United States and the EU—the most important donors—imposed sanctions on senior officials in the political and security spheres as a result. In most cases, these projects had contributed to the adoption of high-quality legis­ lation. Some focused on concrete programmes at the provincial and local levels. Implementation of the new legislative frameworks and the sustainable development of owner­ship at the national, provincial or local levels, however, have been lacking. The DRC Government has been a reluctant partner at best in any attempts at structural reform since the 2006 elections. A lack of political will to alter the status quo is a recurring conclusion of several policy assessments.6 At best, this can be interpreted as a willingness to accept reform only insofar as it does not upset the existing balance of forces. Beyond the central state and its governance practices, a lack of ownership of the reform agenda is also prevalent at the local level and among most of civil society in the DRC. Much of civil society and most local elites have effectively become part of the system. The main policy framework for stabilization in eastern DRC is the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS or I4S), which was developed in 2008 to support implementation of the National Stabilization and Reconstruction Pro­ gramme (STAREC). The initial phase consisted mostly of technical responses, such as the construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure. The I4S was fundamentally revised in 2013. The revised policy aims to address the specific conflict dynamics in eastern DRC: the interplay between security dilemmas, mobilization around land and identity, the exploitation of natural resources and regional dynamics. The I4S also involves compacts with provincial authorities.7 The revised strategy seeks to support the re-establishment of the social contract between the state and society. The strategy is managed by a small unit within MONUSCO, the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU), and operates through two mechanisms: the multi-donor Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) and the alignment of bilaterally funded projects.8 In the wake of the 2012 M23 offensive, the DRC and several governments in the region signed a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement in February 2013.9 The agreement contains detailed commitments by the Government of the DRC, the region and the international community. In the DRC, implementation and follow-up are ensured by a national follow-up mechanism. A regional oversight mechanism also meets annually. UN implementation and support are managed by the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. The most important national commitments are SSR, consolidation of state authority in eastern DRC, decentralization, the delivery of basic social services and furthering the agenda on reconciliation, tolerance and democratization.

5 While many initiatives are more oriented towards training, the EU, the UN and some bilateral donors have attempted to work on SSR. The EU maintained two separate SSR missions focused on the police and the military. It also had extensive programmes supporting the rule of law and justice sector reform. 6 ECI et al., The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, Apr. 2012; and de Vries (note 3). 7 A provincial compact on South Kivu was signed in June 2017. It focuses on road maintenance, land access, illegal tax­ation, state agent deployment, the coordination of stabilization programmes and STAREC. 8 The main donors are Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the USA and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). 9 United Nations, ‘Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region’, Addis Ababa, 24 Feb. 2013. 4 securing legitimate stability in drc

The British funded Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) was an important reform programme that aimed to promote accountable policing and to improve the community-police relationship.10 SSAPR was established in three pilot provinces in 2009, one of which was South Kivu. Although intended to last five years, the programme was ended following police violence in Kinshasa and Bukavu. The aim had been to create collaboration between communities, the local authorities and the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC, national police of the DRC). This was organized through neighbourhood forums and local committees for community security. One of the few programmes in support of SSR still maintained is the Higher Institute for Security and Defence Studies (CHESD) in Kinshasa, which was established in 2016 with French support. The institute trains senior officers as well as regional partici­ pants and civilians working in the security field. Since the 2011 elections, there has only been tacit international support for DDR initia­tives. MONUSCO and the World Bank have remained engaged, but the third phase of the national programme plan (PNDDR3) was not fully funded.

IV. What is the role of the state? Participation levels in national elections, which have been organized since 2006, offer some national level insight into the level of confidence DRC citizens have in the authorities.11 The 2006 presidential election took place amid massive hope and expect­ation for change. As disillusionment set in, the level of popular participation in elections has fallen considerably, from 70.5 per cent in 2006 to 58 per cent in 2011 and 47.5 per cent in 2018.12 In a further sign of disenchantment, a high proportion of national parlia­mentarians failed to be re-elected in the 2011 and 2018 elections.13 People clearly want change, but falling participation levels also show that they lack trust in the system. Despite the obvious drop in turnout, the massive interest in successive voter regis­tration exercises, which precede elections, can be considered a reflection of both the level of attachment to the state and the importance of administrative practices as the voter card also serves as an identity card and is therefore vital for citizens.14 Despite its poor record of service delivery, the state remains central to popular aspir­ ations in the fields of security, justice, basic service delivery and economic develop­ ment. The surveys in South Kivu confirmed research findings that non-state actors, such as armed groups, are generally not considered good alternatives to the primary role of the state and state organs. Confidence in the security services, in particular the Armed Forces of the DRC (the FARDC) and the National Intelligence Agency (l’Agence nationale des renseignements, ANR), is quite low, but considerably higher than in non-state actors such as self-defence militias and armed groups, or in MONUSCO. In the words of a male trader from Rutanga, ‘MONUSCO can leave once peace has been estab­lished. For the moment, they consume a lot of money that the Congolese could use for their development and yet they do nothing to protect us’.15

10 UK Aid et al., Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report, Dec. 2015. 11 In 2011 there were large discrepancies between provinces. Electoral data for the 2011 elections is unreliable and the detailed results for the 2018 elections have not been made available. 12 The results of the elections, and the 2018 election in particular, are contested and the Electoral Commission has not yet published detailed results. Carter Center, International Election Observation Mission to Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report (Carter Center: Atlanta, GA, 2011); and Carter Center, Presidential and Legislative Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report (Carter Center: Atlanta, GA, 2011). 13 Local elections were held in the 2006 electoral cycle. 14 Interview with Congolese researcher, Goma, July 2019. 15 Male trader aged 35–44, Rutanga, translation by the authors. The interviews were transcribed into French by local researchers. All the interviews have been anonymized. All the interviews with the local population took place between January and June 2019. The dates are not given to avoid identification of specific respondents. external assumptions and local perspectives 5

The research in the four areas found some differences in popular expectations of the state. Areas with a recent history of armed violence had clear expectations of the state as the security provider. Areas that are more secure placed greater emphasis on the administration of justice, the provision of social services in the areas of education and health care, and the generation of jobs.

Socio-economic expectations

Respondents in all four areas aspire to see jobs created and an end to the isolation of their communities, and see this as a precondition for peace and well-being. A local humani­tarian worker stated ‘the exact role of the state is to give young people jobs, edu­cation and health care. Many young people are unemployed, which is why they commit themselves to armed groups. If the state gives them work, I think it can reduce insecurity’.16 Other surveys, such as those conducted by the Harvard Humanitarian Initia­tive (HHI), have found a similar preoccupation with socio-economic development as a condition for peace.17 As a result, people wanted jobs and development first and foremost. They saw an import­ant role for INGOs in the construction of schools and health centres. As a con­ sequence, people wanted to be better informed about the actions of the INGO’s work­ ing in their areas and to have a say in setting their priorities. Such organizations often work through local leaders, but these are often not considered legitimate as they tend to prioritize their own individual interests.18 ‘Salongo’ or community work was mentioned by several people during the fieldwork. Such initiatives have deep roots in the DRC and the region. It is common in Rwanda and Burundi and was a fixture of the Mobutu era (1965–97). The system also has a more complex side as it is often forced on individuals—often to their detriment.

Governance and decentralization

The 2006 Constitution of the DRC envisaged the decentralization of political power to reverse the earlier tendency towards a strongly centralized state. Implementation, how­ever, has been mostly lacking. Local elections have not been organized an there has been only limited transfer of financial resources and capacity to the local levels. The 2011 revision of the constitution allowed the central state to reclaim some measure of control over the provincial executives. Beyond the provinces, the decentralized entities (ETDs) are cities, communes, sectors and chiefdoms, all of which have legal person­ality and can levy taxes, and are supposed to have elected councils. Thus far, how­ever, local elections have not been organized at these levels, and local officials— apart from the customary chiefs who are selected using traditional arrangements—are all appointed. National and provincial political elites regularly intervene directly in the appoint­ment of traditional chiefs, which has contributed to numerous local conflicts.19 MONUSCO, the United Nations Development Programme and other donors have tried to get decentralization off the ground but beyond lip-service, there has been little interest from the DRC state in proceeding with the organization of local elections, and thereby giving up one of its main vehicles for exerting control at the

16 Humanitarian aid worker, aged 25 to 34, translation by the authors. 17 USAID et al., ‘Peace and social cohesion mixed methods research: eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Unpublished, Jan. 2019. 18 Interview, local researcher, Bukavu, 26 June 2019. 19 Such interference by national political leaders was at the origin of the conflict in the Kasai region that displaced over one million people and led to thousands of casualties. Hoebeke, H., ‘Kamuina Nsapu insurgency adds to dangers in DR Congo’, International Crisis Group, 21 Mar. 2017. 6 securing legitimate stability in drc local level.20 Donors are also concerned about the potential for conflict at the local level as identity politics can be highly explosive. A counter to this argument is that the failure to organize elections has not averted conflict and that more legitimate local officials could contribute positively to stabilization efforts. However, it is clear that the international community will support local elections if and when they are organ­ ized but will not actively push for them. There were calls from numerous respondents came for local elections. A man from Rukana said: Let them give us the right to vote for our local leader because [currently] they are appointed.21 A teacher from Mapera added: What should be changed to transform our current village into our ideal village? The most important thing is that we are given the Bourgmestre first because we were given the commune, then he will tell us what to do, he will plan how to do community work and our community is going to grow very well.22 Despite the lack of local elections, the level of confidence in local leaders in South Kivu—notably the customary chiefs—is higher than in the central state. A recent survey by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative shows that perceptions of the efforts of the author­ities to build peace improve as proximity to the people gets closer. However, even the highest level of approval—for village chiefs—was not high.23 In urban areas, civil society has some measure of influence and can mobilize against local leaders. This is much more difficult in rural areas where the customary authorities straddle different roles as ‘officials’ leading administrative entities and com­munity leaders with an important role in controlling access to land, which directly affects livelihoods. Traditional chiefs often consider members of their communities to be their subjects rather than their equals, which reduces the effectiveness of the con­trol that locally elected councils have over them. A young male pastoralist from Tulambo summed it all up: What needs to change is the governance of our village.24

V. How should security and justice be provided?

Security actors

Civil-military—and to a large extent civil-police—relations have long been difficult in the DRC. There is a high level of continuity with the FARDC and its predecessors. In colonial period the ‘force publique’ was the domestic arm of repression in the colony, set up as a state within a state with its own language, Lingala. The experience of a strong colo­nial state as ‘bula matari’ (the breaker of rocks) was continued under Mobutu. How­ever, in parts of the country, such as South Kivu, the state rarely possessed a mon­ opoly on the use of force as pockets of the province remained outside of state control.25 This situation has become widespread in eastern DRC since the outbreak of the 1998– 2003 war. Today, the state through the FARDC is the most powerful actor, but the relationship between it and the myriad of armed groups is complex and varied. There are regular align­ments between the Congolese army and armed groups but as interests change, or the balance of forces requires readjustment, these can quickly turn to confrontation. MONUSCO’s presence is essential as it has ensured the dominance of the state and FARDC over armed actors, such as the M23 and more recently an armed group

20 Interview with NGO representative, Bukavu, 27 June 2019. 21 Male aged 44 to 54, Rukana, translation by the authors. 22 Male teacher, aged 25 to 34, Mapera, translation by the authors. 23 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, ‘Peace and social cohesion: Eastern DRC’, Jan. 2019, p. 20. 24 Male pastoralist, aged 15 to 24, Tulambo, translation by the authors. 25 During Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s rebellion, the PRP remained active in the Fizi territory. external assumptions and local perspectives 7 coalition led by the former general William Amuri Yakutumba, which has risked upsetting the national balance.26 In its direct relationships with the people, the Congolese army maintains a ‘tradition’ of living off the land, that is, imposing itself on the local population. This is best captured in the saying ‘Civil aza bilanga ya soldat’ (the civilian is the crop field of the military). The research in South Kivu echoes previous research, which found that people have an understanding of the social problems of soldiers and their families that finds expression in an aspiration for the state to take better care of military (and police) personnel by, among other things, paying decent wages. It is believed that this will decrease harassment from and corruption among members of the FARDC, the PNC and the ANR. A male farmer from Bwagara said: The state must pay its agents properly, including the ANR and the police which are bothering the population.27 A young man from Musenyi stated: The exact role of the state in our ideal city is to neutralize all the armed groups present here and strengthen the capabilities of the national army, but we say that the state has left us and we suspect that it also contributes to insecurity because it has the power to put an end to these troubles, but it does nothing.28 Citizens currently must shop around for the security provider that is most effective at protecting their interests. This requires a lot of resources. They must navigate between and among political and community leaders at all levels, all the security agencies—the FARDC, the PNC, the Direction Générale de Migration (DGM, Directorate General of Migration) and the ANR—and the locally important reality of sorcerers and ‘secret societies’. The surveys in South Kivu show that where the FARDC is absent, numerous respondents want to see it establish a presence in order to remove armed groups. A male farmer from Bwagara noted: We are not led. Currently, we have three governments here—the govern­ment, the Mai-Mai and the Gumino [Banyamulenge militia]. These people in the Gumino and the May-May; it is they who sow divisions. Only the presence of the state can give us secur­ity by neutralizing all these groups.29 Where the FARDC is present, respondents prioritize rotation of the military and the effective payment of wages. The capacity and visibility of the PNC in rural areas are very limited. The police force has few means of transport or communication and is nearly irrelevant in the provision of security. It is also competing with the ANR, which has a presence throughout the country. Most respondents, however, wanted to see the rule of law applied by appropriate institutions—judges and the police. Most of the current armed groups, such as the multitude operating under the labels Mai-Mai or Raia Mutomboki (angry citizens), have their origins in the nationalist cause and discourse of ‘protecting the country against foreign aggression’ or a narrower pro­tection of their community against other communities that are considered non- autochthonous or ‘foreign’. The continuing presence of foreign armed groups and con­ cern about continued operations by neighbouring armies—with or without the consent of the national government—help to keep the nationalist discourse alive. Only a few justify their struggle in political or institutional terms—fighting the regime but doing so while referring to the constitution.30 Most are not anti-systemic forces. As predominantly community-based groups, they also maintain an ambiguous relation­ship with traditional chiefs—respecting their authority on the one hand while

26 Much as Mobutu’s Western partners did during the cold war. 27 Male farmer, aged 45 to 54, Bwagara, translation by the authors. 28 Male aged 25–34, Musenyi, translation by the authors. 29 Female health worker aged 25 to 34, Mikenge, translation by the authors. 30 Most recently, this was the narrative of Yakutumba’s alliance operating in South Kivu and the bordering areas of Maniema and Tanganyika provinces. International Crisis Group, Time for Concerted Action in DR Congo, Africa Report no. 257, 4 Dec. 2017. Rebels referred to Article 64 of the 2005 Congolese Constitution: ‘All Congolese have the duty to oppose any individual or group of individuals who seize power by force or who exercise it in violation of the provisions of this Constitution’. 8 securing legitimate stability in drc also potentially challenging traditional authority as a parallel power in the local polit­ ical economy.31 For many combatants, integration into the armed forces remains a key demand and a possible motive for joining an armed group.32 Most of the armed groups have developed into semi-criminal gangs exploiting natural resources and exerting considerable pressure over local people through taxation. They have very little popular legitimacy. Since the transfer of power to President Tshisekedi there has been considerable interest among the combatants in several armed groups in joining a DDR programme. This is driven by several factors as identified in a report by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC: exhaustion, disillusionment, FARDC operations against armed groups and the change of government.33 The scale of the movement is important but a response to the dynamic is hampered by the lack of a shared policy framework between the DRC authorities and international actors. This development is broadly in line with the population’s wishes on the future of armed groups. As for the combatants, of the 1000 combatants who joined the DDR process in Kivu in the early months of 2019, 300 decided to join the FARDC.34

Security coordination

There have been many national and international initiatives to coordinate the security response and contribute to a dialogue between state representatives, civil society and the population in the security field.35 At all levels of the state, the head of the civilian adminis­tration has the authority to organize security committees. These comprise represen­tatives of all the security services present in a given administrative area. In numerous locations these meet on a regular, often monthly, basis. Representatives of civil society may also be present. MONUSCO supports the Comités locaux pour la sécurité de proximité (CLSP, local committees for neighborhood security), which are committees established by a government decree in 2013. This MONUSCO support is buttressed by CORDAID and Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG), and linked to MONUSCO community liaison assistants and Community Alert Networks. The CLSP are directly involved in the frame­work of local police projects. The CLSP establish local security plans. In the con­text of the proximity police projects ‘forums de quartiers’ (neighourhood forums) have been created. The Catholic Church through its Peace and Justice Commission has set up local committees on participative governance. These monitor governance matters and discuss security issues. The effectiveness of these structures depends on the general political, security and socio-cultural context in which they operate.36 The Congolese state functions to a large extent through parallel structures of authority. These distort the formal lines that exist between institutions.37 In many areas there is a close proximity between non-state armed groups/criminal actors and political, military or community leaders.38

31 Stearns J., Verweijen J. and Baaz, M. E., The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity (Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project: London, 2013). 32 Of the 1200 combatants who have joined DDR schemes since the start of 2019, more than 350 opted for FARDC integration. These were moved to a FARDC training camp in Kongo Central Province. Interview with MONUSCO official, Bukavu, 28 June 2019. 33 United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2019/469, 7 June 2019. 34 Interview, MONUSCO DDRRR official, Bukavu, 28 June 2019. 35 Interviews with MONUSCO officials, civil society representatives and local researchers, Bukavu, 24–28 June 2019. 36 Interview with country representative, International NGO, Bukavu, 27 June 2019. 37 Jené, L. and Englebert, P., Tangled! Congolese Provincial Elites in a Web of Patronage, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Working Paper no. 64 (Overseas Development Institute: London, Jan. 2019). 38 Vogel, C. and Stearns, J. K., ‘Kivu’s intractable security conundrum, revisited’, African Affairs, vol. 117, no. 469 (Oct. 2018), pp. 695–707. external assumptions and local perspectives 9

There is little or no local ownership of structures. When the United Kingdom pulled out of the community policing project, for example, the meetings ceased. Donors and civil society recognize that participation in meetings, training sessions, and so on, is mostly dependent on payment of participation fees—for officials and civil society represen­tatives alike.39 These structures were not spontaneously discussed by the participants in the research in the four localities. During a focus group in Bushwira district, attended by community and local leaders, the regular organization of the local security com­ mittee was mentioned by officials only when directly asked about it. According to these officials, the meetings are useful for discussing security concerns but it was acknow­ledged that the state institutions currently lack the capacity and resources to implement their decisions. Experience with these coordination structures varies. The official security councils at the national and provincial levels are important, and this is the level where most resources are concentrated. In urban areas, civil society or activist groups can also exert some oversight and pressure. In rural areas, on the other hand, these meetings do not seem to offer many guarantees on establishing a dialogue with the population.40 Observers also perceive that these meetings have a tendency to con­ firm the predominance of the FARDC. Despite its shortcomings, the FARDC has more resources and often has the most capable representatives. Where meetings are organized as part of a donor initiative, very little effective ownership seems to have been achieved.41 MONUSCO is in the process of leaving numerous areas and whether any of the security initiatives put in place will survive remains to be seen. A general point of criticism of MONUSCO by the local population is that even where MONUSCO has a presence and is warned of an incident by an early warning network, reaction in time is highly unlikely. A state official from Rutanga stated: Personally I do not see what MONUSCO is doing. Its role is supposed to be to protect the people but we are dying in its presence; and when we ask for help, it reacts 30 minutes or an hour after the enemy has left.42

Justice provision

The research confirmed that current efforts by the international community and the Govern­ment of the DRC have done little to improve access to justice for Congolese citizens. Formal courts are often far away and the cost of accessing the system is high. Further­more, the courts are widely believed to be corrupt. Fines are considered too high, as are court fees, and this results in people spending long periods in—the often abysmal—prison system.43 Donor-supported initiatives such as mobile courts and the tribunaux de paix (peace courts) lack resources. To seek justice people turn to a number of actors. The PNC, the ANR and the FARDC are all used to manage conflicts that should otherwise be brought before the courts. Other sources of legal assistance identified by the survey were traditional chiefs, local officials, the churches and local prophets. Such a plurality of actors, corruption and monetary exchanges contribute to a context in which justice is often either unobtain­ able or reinforces the social make-up of society. Certain forms of justice, such as the use of a local prophet, Maman Mujakazi in Kabare, can also result in violent popular

39 Interview with civil society leader, Bukavu, 25 June 2019; and interview with MONUSCO official, Bukavu, 28 June 2019. 40 Focus group, Bushwira, 26 June 2019. 41 Interview with civil society leader, Bukavu, 25 June 2019; and interview with MONUSCO official, 28 June 2019. 42 Male state official aged over 55, Rutanga, translation by the authors. 43 Focus group, Bushwira, South Kivu, 26 June 2019. 10 securing legitimate stability in drc justice. Formal institutions are powerless to contain such phenomena as they are also linked to political leaders. The interviewees in all the localities were clear that people want the state justice system to be in charge.

VI. Who should be part of the social contract? ‘Tribalism’ or ethnic identity is an omnipresent factor in the DRC that sits at the centre of notions about the relationship between the citizen and the state and society.44 This is reflected in the inescapable discourses on autochthony in geopolitics: the idea that positions of authority can only be occupied by people who originate from a particular region. A trader from Citunga stated: I want native-born people to lead us so that we can live here in our village ourselves and not with strangers.45 Autochthony is also strongly connected to land ownership and thus to economic rights, but also the right to vote. In the early 1990s, Mobutu played this card to thwart democratization. It remains a potent force as the current conflict between the Banyamulenge and the Bafuliro and Babembe communities in the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu demonstrates.46 In the Kivu provinces this is compounded by the presence of populations with a cultural association with Rwanda and the complexity of relations with Rwanda—in par­ticular since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Further complicating factors are high popu­lation density, dependency on land for livelihoods and the tension between pastoralist and farming communities. International NGOs and MONUSCO have invested in several rounds of community dialogue and there is also a large body of work by these actors and academia that provides a better understanding of these dynamics. It was clear from the vast majority of the interviews that ethnic affiliation remains the predominant element of people’s worldview. This issue is regularly connected to liveli­hood issues, such as the coexistence of pastoralist and farming communities, and requires the judicial and administrative authorities to manage the inevitable conflict. The tensest relationship is that between the Banyamulenge community and others.47 This was widely noted in the interviews in Sange and Kipupu. One respondent in Sange stated that the Banyamulenge are welcome to stay as long as they recognize that they are foreign and therefore have no political rights. Most respondents expressed the need for reconciliation and to live together, but it is questionable how or even whether this could be possible.48 A student from Karhuliza told how: I want us to all live together, but the locals here to take responsibility because they know the problems of the area.49 A teacher from Nabinde added: In my opinion, we need a lot of work on the attitudes of the popu­lation, and the restoration of trust between the different communities.50

44 The term ‘tribe’ (tribu) is widely used by and among Congolese. South Kivu’s population is quite diverse. In a recent study, the largest ethnic groups were Shi (34%), Lega (27%), Bembe (14%) and Fulero (12%). The Rwandophone Hutu/Tutsi are a small minority at an estimated 0.4% of the population. This is in sharp contrast to neighbouring North Kivu, where Nande (57%) and Rwandophones (15%) constitute the two largest groups. See Calderon, A. B. and Engle­bert, P., ‘Tribulations tribales: estimations demographiques commentees des Ethnies Congolaises par Nouvelles provinces’ [Tribal tribulations: Annotated demographic estimates of Congolese ethnic groups in the new provinces], eds S. Geenen et al., Conjonctures de l’Afrique Centrale 2019 [Central African Conjuctions 2019] (Cahiers Africains, L’Harmattan: Paris, 2019). 45 Male trader, aged 15 to 24, Citunga, translation by the authors. 46 Interview, local researcher, Bukavu, 27 June 2019. 47 Several interviewees insisted on calling the Banymulenge ‘Banyarwanda’, as the term Banyamulenge links the community to an area in South Kivu that the Banyamulenge claim as their chiefdom. The conflict between Banya­ mulenge and other communities has deep roots in provincial history and is an important driver of conflict. Throughout the wars of recent decades, the aspirations of the Banyamulenge have been manipulated by various sides such as Rwanda and the DRC Government in Kinshasa. 48 Interview with male teacher aged 35 to 44, Mikenge. 49 Male student aged 25 to 34, Karhuliza, translation by the authors. 50 Male teacher, Nabinde, translation by the authors. external assumptions and local perspectives 11

Respondents see a role for the state and for NGOs in stimulating further dialogue. According to a farmer in Sange: The role of international actors will be to support the state in the restoration of peace and security; MONUSCO has no role but NGOs can contribute to peaceful coexistence, development and support for security and justice in our city.51 A humani­tarian worker, also from Sange, added: When it comes to community conflicts that can affect the security of the whole city, NGOs teach people to resolve these conflicts themselves peacefully by supporting mediation.52 These are, however, highly sensitive pro­cesses. Recent experience has shown that domestic and international actors can quickly be perceived as partisan.53 NGO-led inter-community dialogue initiatives require a detailed understanding of highly local, national and often regional dynamics. In several areas of South Kivu, spoilers are omnipresent. There is also the question of whether the selection of participants is robust. Selection bias can serve to legitimize drivers of change or reinforce problematic actors. Local citizens, while aware of the intricacies, are not necessarily in a position to act in such contexts.54 The importance of tribal identity is further reflected in the position of traditional chiefs. The research in the four areas confirms that confidence in local, traditional authori­ties exceeds that in the state, security providers or international actors. How­ ever, this confidence is also not that strong, and numerous respondents wanted to elect local leaders. In the words of a male farmer from Sange: We prefer a competent person who will be elected by the people because we want quality work and change at all levels.’55 This seems to confirm recent research in South Kivu into the controversial 2018 elections, which identified a decrease in the influence of traditional chiefs and ethnic affili­ation as determining factors in voter preferences. According to the authors, there has been an individualization of political behaviour, leading people to follow their personal convictions rather than group dynamics. The authors nonetheless note that the electoral process further deepened existing cleavages that are dividing popu­ lations.56 Interestingly, there was little mention of the role of churches in the ideal village. In contrast to the often exploitative chiefs, the churches often engage in the delivery of basic education and health services. The chiefs and the churches are also actors in the local justice sphere.

VII. Summary Through initiatives such as regular surveys conducted by the HHI, the understanding of local perceptions has vastly improved.57 At most levels there seems to be a shared— and even mostly realistic—understanding of the major issues that have impeded change, such as corruption, the lack of effective decentralization, governance through parallel systems of control, exploitation and the politics of identity. The research carried out for this report found a significant convergence between the strategic objectives of donors on achieving stabilization and the aspirations of the Congolese population: (a) a democratic, functioning, responsible government and the organ­ization of regular elections in line with the constitution; (b) accountable and effective security forces; (c) the disarmament and neutralization of armed groups;

51 Male farmer, aged 35–44, Sange, translation by the authors. 52 Male humanitarian worker, aged 35–44, Sange, translation by the authors. 53 Interview with local researcher, Bukavu, 23 June 2019. 54 Interview with experienced conflict mediator, Kinshasa, 6 July 2019. 55 Male farmer aged 45 to 54, Sange, translation by the authors. 56 Vlassenroot, K. et al., ‘Tumukule, Tumukwepe: How ‘Citoyenneté’ reshaped the democratic space during Congo’s 2018 elections’, Conflict Research Programme Blog, LSE, 31 May 2019. 57 Interview with MONUSCO official, Bukavu, 28 June 2019. 12 securing legitimate stability in drc

(d) access to the provision of justice; (e) a legitimate system of local government; and (f ) infrastructure development to open up rural areas. In the period following the 2006 elections until the election of President Tshisekedi in January 2019, donors and the wider international community were at a loss to establish a functioning dialogue with the Government of the DRC. The one major issue where popular expectations far exceed the frame of stabil­ ization efforts is socio-economic development. People see jobs, schooling and health care not just as part of the vision for the ideal village, but as a vital role for the state and a precondition for stabilization. If there are no jobs, what else will young people do but join an armed group? The state has been almost entirely absent in this area as the generalized corruption, lack of infrastructure and lack of vision on economic development of recent decades have hamstrung economic activity. Donors have focused on governance reform and there has been considerable investment in some infrastructure projects, notably roads, but the focus in the east has been on stabilization—often through quick impact initiatives—rather than development. Another area of tension is the politics of identity. This remains one of the most explosive, complex and deeply entrenched issues throughout the DRC. In their vision of an ideal village, most respondents aspired to social cohesion and inclusivity, albeit not all with a full acceptance of diversity. The politics of autochthony are a potent force in local and provincial politics throughout the DRC. While many citizens express their attach­ment to peaceful cohabitation as a key value in the ideal village, it often proves diffi­cult to move beyond intentions. For numerous actors, not least local politicians, com­munity leaders and the leadership of local armed groups, the persistence of such inter-community tension is often a source of power and continued relevance. The perpet­uation of military operations is also an important source of revenue and power for the command structures of the FARDC. After more than two decades of conflict and political instability, the DRC again sits at a fundamental crossroads. The new administration should enable the start of a new partner­ship with international actors. In sum, this study identifies some interesting ele­ments of the development of future policies: (a) in the eyes of the population, economic development is more than a post-conflict promise, it is a necessity for achieving stability; (b) the state security forces should become the primary security providers;­ (c) armed groups and MONUSCO have no place in the vision of the future; (d) the democratic legitimacy of local leadership needs to be improved; and (e) people aspire to social cohesion. All of this requires political choices more than technical solutions or short-term programmes. The development of local and national ownership among political leaders, officials and civil society will be the hardest challenge.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations The donor community needs to support strategic advisory missions, the drafting of legislative instruments, the provision of training and operational support to the mili­ tary, the police and the intelligence services and human rights training. There is also a need for a combination of military pressure—joint operations against major armed groups—and DDR programmes for domestic and regional armed groups. In addition, support will be required for the establishment of more mobile court systems and the military justice system as well as support to the Independent Electoral Com­mission (CENI), the leadership of which is up for renewal in the coming months, and the dissemination of legislation and good practice documents to local authorities. Finally, the construction or repair of roads and basic infrastructure is urgently required in many parts of the country. external assumptions and local perspectives 13

To international actors

Reduce strategic risk by improving information strategies. Despite the efforts of, among other things, Radio Okapi and MONUSCO’s community liaison assistants, there is a severe lack of understanding among the people of the role of MONUSCO. There are at least two key issues. First, in the eyes of most Congolese, MONUSCO is com­ pletely identified with its military component: the civilian component is almost invis­ ible. Second, the population has little or no understanding of the mission’s mandate when it comes to the use of force. Despite some successes, MONUSCO is often seen as impotent—and this is reflected in numerous surveys. INGOs face a similar problem: if there is no direct personal gain, their presence is not considered useful. MONUSCO and INGOs have a very light footprint in all four of the areas studied. Expectations of INGOs are mostly oriented towards the construction of infrastructure and the provision of training, education and health care. A more pronounced policy on public information is required. The current approach based on community leaders does not ensure enough ‘trickle down’. It can also be linked to the specific interests of the community leaders. ‘Outside actors’ often have a limited understanding of local dynamics and can be a source of direct or indirect revenue opportunities. They are also easy scapegoats for the lack of follow through on service delivery. Furthermore, state officials and community leaders often have a stake in the ongoing conflict and can play a double role. Public information therefore needs to be accompanied by considerable investment in understanding the dynamics of the local political economy.

Stimulate national and local ownership and build responsibility. Numerous national and international interlocutors have acknowledged and lamented the lack of effective owner­ship of reform processes in the fields of security and justice, and beyond. The method of international engagement, through projects with timelines that respond to donors’ criteria independent of developments on the ground, has become engrained in the mindsets of local partners such as state officials, civil society and the major churches. Participation in processes is a source of revenue for actors at all levels from senior ministers to provincial governors and beyond through the payment of travel costs and meals—including to officials meeting in their own office buildings. While perhaps justified at lower levels where salaries are effectively very low, this has become engrained in the culture of corruption and ‘self-service governance’. All of this happens in the open and with total impunity. When the funding stops the interest in whatever people are doing also ceases. The generalized practice of per diem payments and all kinds of other payments has to stop. The payment of adequate salaries is a key responsibility of the state to its officials. While donors need to work with projects for administrative purposes, as a rule they should be embedded in policies or the development of capacities with a long- term perspective. Sustainability should be the key criterion. National and provincial political leaders should set an example.

Take concrete steps to improve local governance. Thirteen years after the first demo­ cratic elections, there is a need for the newly elected national and provincial author­ ities to work with CENI to establish a realistic framework and timeline for local elections. There is considerable local interest in and urgent need for elections at this level. As a first step towards the organization of local elections, an assessment of the current state of local governance, the role and capacities of traditional chiefs and the resources available to the ETDs—particularly those endowed with natural resources— will need to be carried out. At the latest in the next electoral cycle, which starts in 14 securing legitimate stability in drc

2023, a credible and realistic strategy will need to be developed on the organization of local elections. The practice of appointing local leaders was not considered legitimate by numerous respondents who aspire to elect their local leaders. In preparation for the organization of local elections, institutions that investigate and adjudicate on conflicts related to customary authority must be expanded and their decisions enforced. At the same time, political leaders should end their instrumentalization of traditional chiefs. INGOs and MONUSCO should enhance their inter-community dialogue initiatives.

To the Congolese Government

Commit to effective reform of the security services. As a first step, the government must relaunch a dialogue with its major international partners on SSR. One of the key drivers of this dialogue will be the linkage between capacity building of the Congolese security forces and the MONUSCO exit strategy. The MONUSCO presence is not popular. People express little confidence in it and do not want it to remain in the country in the long term. Future drawdown should be at a pace that forces the govern­ ment to take responsibility for improving the delivery of security. The FARDC should focus on neutralizing armed groups. This will require a new DDR programme. In stabilized areas, the military should be quickly replaced with the police. To this end, the police forces operating in rural areas should receive more resources and better training.

Prepare for local elections and increase political accountability. There was a wide­ spread call among respondents for more representative and accountable local govern­ ance. Local elections represent a considerable risk to stability and particular risks can be anticipated, but these elections are also a necessary step to building accountable govern­ance structures. The government and its international partners must set up a viable timeline for the organization of local elections in the 2023 electoral cycle. All politics may be local, but people are mobile and the question of autochthony is likely to lead to conflict, in particular when local elections are organized. The research found a confused picture in which people perceive the world through an ‘identity lens’ but also seem to aspire to an acceptance of diversity.

Community reconciliation. National and provincial governments should work with local civil society and INGOs to build and improve dialogue between communities. This could in time lead to a rethink of decentralized structures and their leadership. The 100-day emergency programme of the new president is a good start but was strongly focused on urban areas. A broader vision needs to be developed once the new government is in place.

Socio-economic development. There is an urgent need for the Congolese state at all levels—together with its international partners—to reconnect with the population through a focus on economic reconstruction and development.

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Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2019 SECURING LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN CAR: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Study tim glawion, jair van der lijn and nikki de zwaan STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org SECURING LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN CAR: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Study tim glawion, jair van der lijn and nikki de zwaan

September 2019 Authors’ note

This paper is one of three in a collection comprising two policy studies and a policy report that synthesizes the two studies. In addition to this paper, the other two in this collection are the policy study Securing Legitimate Stability in DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives and the policy report Towards Legitimate Stability in CAR and the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives. The research for this work was done in cooperation with Cordaid, a development and humanitarian organization, working to end poverty and exclusion. Cordaid does this in the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected areas, including the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cordaid’s Security and Justice program focuses on improving access to effective, accountable and inclusive security and justice services (through result-based financing approaches), ensuring that women and youth can participate meaningfully in peace and governance processes, and strengthening civil society capacity to lobby and advocate for positive change. Financial support for this project was received from NWO-WOTRO—commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands and developed in close collaboration with the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law.

© SIPRI 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. Contents

Abbreviations iv I. Introduction 1

II. Methodology 1 Case studies in Bambari, Bangassou, Mbaïki and Ndélé 1 Table 1.1. Overview of study localities in the Central African Republic 2 III. Ongoing international efforts 2

IV. The state as the least bad option 3

V. Explaining the emphasis on the armed forces for reining in security 5

VI. Reconstituting the social contract 6

VIII. Conclusions 7

IX. Recommendations 9 Abbreviations

CAR Central African Republic EUTM Military training mission FACA Forces Armées Centrafricaines (Armed Forces of the Central African Republic) FPRC Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique IDP Internally displaced person INGO International non-governmental organization MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MISCA African Union-led support mission NGO Non-governmental organization UPC Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique I. Introduction After 10 days of negotiations, the Khartoum Agreement or Political Accord for Peace and Reconciliation was signed between the Government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and 14 armed groups in Khartoum on 6 February 2019. This marked the eighth attempt to resolve the violent crisis in the coun­try following the failure of every earlier agreement. Repeated violations of the Febru­ary accord as well as growing demonstrations against peacekeepers, however, suggest that a pathway out of conflict has yet to be found.1 External stabilization inter­ventions often have unforeseen impacts on local dynamics, state legitimacy and inclusivity, which in turn influence the prospects for achieving stability. This research explores the assumptions that underpin such interventions by international non- govern­mental organizations (INGOs) and UN peace operations on the provision of security and justice, and compares these with the perceptions and experiences of local popu­lations, public authorities and other key stakeholders. A leading assumption in the international policy discourse is that strengthening a state’s capacity to provide security and justice will lead to a stronger, more inclusive social contract through which governments gain popular legitimacy, which in turn con­tributes to increased stability.2 However, stakeholders have different views on what con­stitutes a social contract following a crisis. It is, therefore, useful to understand the assumptions of international donors and NGOs with regard to the provision of security and justice, and to contrast these with the views of the local population. The analysis shows that even when both sides use similar terms, such as the primacy of the ‘return of the state’, intervenors and local populations often mean different things, which can create false expectations and ultimately disappointment on both sides. For the purpose of this study, 22 interviews were conducted in January and June 2019 with senior members of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabili­ zation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and various INGOs. In addition, Central African research teams questioned more than 240 residents and 33 local stakeholders in four localities in CAR in February and March 2019. Finally, the preliminary results were discussed with key stakeholders in Bangui and in focus group discussions and interviews in three of the four localities from May to July 2019.3 The report highlights key discrepancies and develops guidance on how best to account for and navigate the risks and identify opportunities for achieving legitimacy and stability. 4

II. Methodology

Case studies in Bambari, Bangassou, Mbaïki and Ndélé

Four localities were selected for study based on their diverse contexts in relation to con­flict and the level of state presence (see table 1.1). While not representative of the e

1 The Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic reports 50–70 violations per week. United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic, S/PV.8558, 20 June 2019. 2 United Nations, General Assembly, Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution A/RES/70/1, 21 Oct. 2015; and United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Peacebuilding and sustain­ing peace: Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/707-S/2018/4318, Jan. 2018. 3 Similar discussions in the remaining locality, Ndélé, are planned for Sep. 2019. 4 The term ‘stability’ is often used in policymaking but has also been criticized for its militarizing effect on peace- and state-building on the ground. It is also contrasted with ‘fragility’. See the criticism in Glawion, T., De Vries, L. and Mehler, A., ‘Handle with care! A qualitative comparison of the Fragile States Index’s bottom three coun­tries: Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan’, Development and Change, vol. 50, no. 2 (2019), pp. 277–300; and Karlsrud, J., ‘From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism’, International Peace­ keeping, vol. 26, no. 1 (2019), pp. 1–21. 2 securing legitimate stability in car

Table 1.1. Overview of study localities in the Central African Republic

Bangassou Bambari Mbaïki Ndélé Inhabitants 35 000 40 000 25 000 20 000 (estimate) Distance to 730 km 380 km 110 km 640 km capital by road Security actors MINUSCA MINUSCA MINUSCA FPRC FACA FACA Gendarmerie MINUSCA Gendarmerie UPC Police Anti-balaka Gendarmerie Police Anti-balaka

Security Safe return of Rebel extortion Witchcraft, crime Rebel control bars concerns displaced Muslims state from returning Security Fairly secure Highly insecure Highly secure Average level of perceptions security

FACA = Forces Armées Centrafricaines (Armed Forces of the Central African Republic); FPRC = Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique; km = kilometre; MINUSCA = United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; UPC = Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique. ntire country, they contain a wide range of the lived experience of the current crisis. Mbaïki was not directly affected by the fighting during the crisis and is currently under govern­ment control. Ndélé, on the other hand, has been controlled by rebels since the begin­ning of the crisis in 2012, currently by the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). Bangassou was relatively calm for much of the crisis but witnessed a peak of violence in 2017. The town has seen little violence since mid- 2018 but remains tense and the army has been deployed. Bambari is still contested. MINUSCA and the government control one side of the town but the other has been heavily infiltrated by the rebel group Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC).

III. Ongoing international efforts A number of external efforts are helping to rejuvenate the security and justice sector in CAR. The most important are MINUSCA and the European Union (EU) training mission (EUTM-RCA). These are complemented by bilateral security cooperation and efforts by INGOs to reinforce social cohesion. MINUSCA took over from the African Union-led support mission (MISCA) in Septem­ber 2014. It currently has 11 500 military, 2000 police and 1200 civilian person­nel and is deployed in all 16 prefectures of the country. Its largest contributors of uniformed personnel are Rwanda, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt. MINUSCA has a mandate to protect civilians, support the peace process and help to extend state authority. 5 The EU set up a military training mission (EUTM) as a follow-up to its earlier train­ing mission (EUMAM) and short intervention mission of 2014–15 (EUFOR CAR). The EUTM’s 180 staff have so far trained 4000 soldiers of the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA, Armed Forces of the Central African Republic). During their six-month training period, FACA soldiers attend weapons manipulation courses and

5 The mandate is set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2448 of 13 Dec. 2018. For an analysis of UN intervention efforts in CAR see Karlsrud, J., ‘The UN at war: Examining the consequences of peace-enforcement man­ dates for the UN Peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1 (2015), pp. 40–54; Maiangwa, B. and Suleiman, M. D., ‘Liberal peace intervention in the Central African Republic: Limi­ tations and reworking a “hybrid” order’, African Security, vol. 10, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–24; and Welz, M., ‘Multi-actor peace oper­ations and inter-organizational relations: Insights from the Central African Republic’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 23, no. 4 (2016), pp. 568–91. external assumptions and local perspectives 3 undergo human rights sensitization. However, the EUTM has no measures in place for follow-up with the soldiers once the training has ended.6 Individual states have offered CAR security support. Russia has sent weapons and mili­tary trainers to the country. It has military advisers close to the president and a Rus­sian company, Lobaye Invest, has gained resource extraction rights. In July 2018 three Russian journalists who were investigating allegations of militia activity by the Rus­sian paramilitary Wagner Group were killed in suspicious circumstances. China has donated several dozen military vehicles.7 France and the United States have also made significant donations of arms and vehicles, respectively.8 INGOs often partner with national NGOs and local civil society to provide human rights sensitization training and have organized inter-communal dialogues to enable the return of over 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. They also support and partly substitute for the state in the provision of public services, such as in the areas of education and health, and of infrastructure.

IV. The state as the least bad option The population of CAR was disenchanted with the state under the rule of President François Bozizé (2003–13) and his predecessor Ange-Félix Patassé (1993–2003). Under both, the state further retrenched the provision of public services and accumulated mas­sive salary arrears. Bozizé violently repressed dissident voices. The Séléka rebel­ lion, which began at the end of 2012, raised a number of legitimate grievances that were shared by people living in remote areas in particular. Many in CAR projected their hopes for better governance on to the rebellion and thousands joined its ranks. How­ever, the brutal behaviour and organized theft of the Séléka having first taken towns and then on assuming power in Bangui rapidly turned the population against the rebellion. This increased popular support for the localized auto-defence groups that were resisting Séléka rule, which were broadly labelled ‘Anti-balaka’. Again, how­ ever, the Anti-balaka groups used extortion against the population, collecting fees at their checkpoints and using xenophobic violence against anyone accused of being ‘foreign’.9 Popular support for these groups has therefore waned. In the interviews, few respondents expressed any positive views on the Séléka or Anti-balaka groups— even in the areas supposedly under their respective control. In Ndélé, where the Séléka rebellion began in 2012, few violent incidents were recorded during the crisis period. This is often attributed to the fact that the FPRC rebels had undisputed control of the area. The FPRC has called for the protection of

6 On army reconstruction see Vircoulon, T., ‘La reconstitution de l’armée Centrafricaine: Un enjeu à hauts risques’ [The reconstitution of the Central African army: A high-risk challenge], IRSEM: Note de recherche, vol. 36, Apr. 2017. On Secur­ity Sector Reform in CAR more generally, see N’diaye, B., ‘Security sector reform in the Central African Republic’, eds H. Born and A. Schnabel, Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments (LIT: Münster, 2009), pp. 39–68. 7 AFP, ‘CAR asks UN to approve China arms deliveries’, News24, 11 June 2018. 8 On France see Baxter, P., France in Centrafrique: From Bokassa and Operation Barracuda to the Days of EUFOR (Helion & Co., 30° South Publishers: Pinetown, West Midlands, 2011). Several regional states also have unofficial interests and influence in CAR. See De Vries, L. and Glawion, T., ‘Speculating on crisis: The progressive disintegration of the Central African Republic’s political economy’, Clingendael CRU Report, Oct. 2015; Marchal, R., ‘CAR and the regional (dis)order’, eds T. Carayannis and L. Lombard, Making Sense of the Central African Republic (Zed Books: London, 2015), pp. 166–93; Palmateer, G. and Clark, J. F., ‘The uses (and abuses) of the Economic Community of Central African States: The hidden functions of regional economic community membership for African regimes’, eds J. Warner and T. M. Shaw, African Foreign Policies in International Institutions (Palgrave Macmillan USA: New York, 2018), pp. 127–48; and Plank, F., ‘The effectiveness of interregional security cooperation: Evaluating the joint engagement of the EU and the AU in response to the 2013 crisis in the Central African Republic’, European Security, vol. 26, no. 4 (Oct. 2017), pp. 1–22. 9 Succinct overviews and analyses of the crisis in CAR can be found in Carayannis, T. and Lombard, L. (eds), Making Sense of the Central African Republic (Zed Books: London, 2015); Glawion, T. and De Vries, L., ‘Ruptures revoked: Why the Central African Republic’s unprecedented crisis has not altered deep-seated patterns of governance’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 56, no. 3 (2018), pp. 421–42; and Lombard, L., State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (Zed Books: London, 2016). 4 securing legitimate stability in car the north-eastern population against state abuse and for greater development in the marginalized region. The initial popularity of the FPRC rebellion can be explained by com­paring the group’s demands with popular opinion. A female shopkeeper expressed her demands of the state as follows: The classic roles of the state are to protect the security of the population, and to facilitate development and the well-being of the population, but it is obvious that we are not seen as members of this state insofar as the state has left us in out of the loop.10 Despite the seeming overlap between rebel and popular demands, few respondents said that they felt secure in Ndélé and its surroundings. The vast majority expressed little confidence in the rebels. The same shopkeeper attributed the main cause of insecurity to the rebel groups: Creating security and justice in this city can be the ideal once the DDR programme has been implemented and solutions are found for the rebel groups who are the root cause of our local security problem.11 In Bangassou, where Anti-balaka groups staged a massive attack in May 2017, allegedly to protect the town against an imminent UPC attack and against MINUSCA, which they accused of supporting the rebels, only one respondent voiced any confidence in the auto-defence groups. All the others said that they had no confidence in them at all. A male farmer explained his views on security and justice: Without justice nothing can work: no one is above the law. Selekas and Anti-Balakas should be punishable by law.12 Among the respondents, the vast majority called for a return of the state. However, this should not be misinterpreted as turning the clock back to 2012. Instead, they described three key characteristics of a renewed state.13 First, it should be as strong as people perceived it to be under former president and emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966–79), when the state was said to be able to control its frontiers and suppress rebel­lion. Second, it should be accountable to the needs of the people, using taxes and resource revenues in a traceable manner for the provision of education, health services and infrastructure. Third, it should be decentralized through elections and significant budgeting powers at the local level, such as the village or quarter, and group chiefs and mayors. While citizens therefore have high expectations of the state, they are not oblivious to its striking ongoing deficiencies. Nonetheless, even in its depleted state, they see a redeployed government as the lesser of two evils compared to the rebel or Anti-balaka forces, which extort money from the population while providing little in return. This assessment of the state resembles international respondents’ statements on how the state should be. However, it differs markedly from ongoing international actions in connection with the restoration of state authority. The Khartoum Accord seeks to co-opt the leaders of the armed groups into the state, thereby legalizing their de facto power and status, rather than, as the population desires, stripping armed groups of their influence and taking them before the courts. While many international stake­holders in Bangui are unhappy with the provisions of the Khartoum Accord, they are willing to support it as they see it as the outcome of a legitimate negotiation process at the national and regional levels. International actors also emphasize state accountability but, contrary to the desires of the local population, much of this accountability is directed towards external donors. As one high-ranking MINUSCA official explained: The government is not really a government that operates, or operates

10 Female shopkeeper aged 35–44, a Muslim and Runga, translation by the authors. Most of the interviews were conducted in Sango or a local language and then transcribed into French. All the interviews have been anonymized. All the interviews with the local population took place between Feb. and Apr. 2019. The dates are not given to avoid identifi­cation of specific respondents. 11 Translation by the authors. 12 Male farmer aged 25–34, a protestant and a Zande, translation by the authors. 13 These three characteristic descriptions were debated with the population during focus group discussions and indi­vidual interviews in Bambari and Mbaiki in June 2019 and received almost unanimous support. external assumptions and local perspectives 5 as we want it to. It has no control over territory, supports the interests of some groups more than others and is more preoccupied with position and power. Frankly, the state is non-existent: MINUSCA is running the place. We are trying to push them in the right direction.14

V. Explaining the emphasis on the armed forces for reining in security The respondents desired robust enforcement of security. In their view, MINUSCA does not appear to be prepared to intervene in their key security concerns, which emanate from armed groups. Interestingly, many INGOs shared the assessment of locals that MINUSCA’s response to attacks is often too little and too late.15 Many local respondents describe their own armed forces, the FACA, as the only institution that is currently willing and able to protect them against violent threats. The focus group discussions and stakeholder interviews asked respondents why they put such an emphasis on the FACA, how they wanted it and other entities to provide security and what role international actors ascribe to the FACA. While the law and ongoing international training divide security responsibilities by task among several institutions, the populace divides responsibilities not by task, but by the level of gravity of the case at hand. In principle, the police should take care of crime in towns while the Gendarmerie secures rural roads and the army protects borders and fights organized armed groups. In reality, all three institutions are confined to a limited number of key towns and lack the means to visit secondary towns and villages on a regular basis. A leading member of the EUTM explained: We cannot really want to change the roles of the Central African Army and mix everything up. The FACA must respect the roles of the gendarme and the police. [...] They cannot prosecute crimi­nals or arrest people, otherwise we will have this confusion with checkpoints where they take money.16 It is likely that the emphasis that the locals put on the FACA rather than the police and Gendarmerie stems from the militarized context in which they live. This is backed up by the data. The emphasis on the FACA is highest in contested Bangassou and Bambari, where almost all respondents expressed full confidence in it. In relatively calm Ndélé and Mbaïki, however, most said that there was no FACA presence and expressed a less clear need for its deployment. The populace is not opposed to the police and the Gendarmerie, but feels that they should be responsible for smaller incidents in more peaceful times. An unemployed man from Bambari described his expectations of the FACA: Only the FACA can ensure security in Bambari but since they arrived they have not intervened throughout the city. The government must authorize the FACA to go everywhere, including the areas occupied by the Seléka to dislodge them and remove them from the city.17 In a war context, the emphasis on the army comes with a militarized interpretation of security. Few respondents mentioned the importance of complex judicial processes or the presumption of innocence. Rather, the army is believed to be able to provide quick fixes against armed groups, theft and road blocks through forceful arrests or even through active combat. State institutions are also expected to tackle issues of alleged witchcraft, whereas INGOs and UN institutions push for it to no longer be considered a crime. Such contradictory demands put the state institutions under stress. Respond­ ents were supportive of human rights principles but did not want international con­ sider­ations to impede robust security interventions that bend official rules. Their

14 Interview with MINUSCA official, Bangui, Jan. 2019. 15 Interviews with leading staff of INGOs in Bangui, Jan. and June 2019. 16 Interview with EUTM official, Bangui, June 2019. 17 Unemployed male from Bambari aged 25–34, a Catholic and Gbanziri, translation by the authors. 6 securing legitimate stability in car lived reality is one of total impunity for violent perpetrators. One woman living in a pastoralist area explained: May the FACA come and provide us with protection so that all Muslims, Fulani and Christians can return to their usual occupations as before. […] For there to be security, it is necessary to disarm the armed groups and bring the perpetrators of crimes to justice. They move around with impunity and taunt their victims.18 The population desires robust action from its state even within its limited means, while international actors demand adherence to complex rules and regulations even where the state’s resources hardly permit it. The return of the state for respondents in the international community means institutions that adhere to international standards and the rule of law, while to the local population it signifies a flexible, robust actor spear­headed by the FACA.

VI. Reconstituting the social contract The conflict is often described as a religious conflict but many respondents expressed a willingness to live peacefully among all ethnicities and religions. Many evoked an unspecified ‘former time’ when relations between different communities were unproblem­atic and wished for this situation to return. The vast majority of respondents were optimistic about the feasibility of a return by the many IDPs. A Christian woman farmer from Mbaïki told how: We are awaiting those who have left with open arms; they should return to the village so that we might live in harmony as before.19 Certain preconditions were mentioned for a successful return of IDPs and for inter-communal peace. First, those who have lost their livelihoods due to violence (e.g. their cattle, housing or shops) should be compensated to enable them to restart their businesses.20 In addition, those now illegally occupying the houses and shops of displaced people should be compensated for vacating them. These demands for com­pen­sation are directed almost exclusively at the international community, rather than at perpetrators or the state. INGOs are responding to such demands by organizing dialogue forums between those who remained during the crisis and the representatives of those who wish to return.21 Some INGOs have even stepped in to provide compensation to those who are illegally occupying shops and houses, or by constructing or reconstructing buildings for those who have been displaced. Intriguingly, almost no local respondent mentioned state responsibility for managing the return of IDPs.22 Second, many respondents mentioned the desire for justice targeted at the worst perpet­rators of violence during the crisis. Some respondents perceived an imbalance in prosecutions, whereby Anti-balaka leaders have been sentenced nationally and even inter­nationally, while ex-Séléka leaders have assumed government posts under the Khartoum Agreement. As one woman farmer in Bambari noted: My position is this— that the Peulh herders should remain with us; but that those who possess the weapons of war that [Ali] Daras[sa] has brought to Bambari—go home. I am very angry.23 International agencies are well aware of this imbalance and that the Khartoum Agree­ment is recompensing some of the perpetrators of the worst violence. In private, many leading figures in MINUSCA have been heavily critical of the decision to award rebel leaders government posts. In public, however, they defend the deal and attempt

18 Woman in her mid-50s, a Muslim and Peulh, translation by the authors. 19 Christian woman farmer from Mbaïki aged between 25 and 34, translation by the authors. 20 See also Lombard, L. and Picco, E., ‘Distributive justice at war: Displacement and its afterlives in the Central African Republic’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 4 Mar. 2019. 21 Interviews with leading staff of INGOs in Bangui, Jan. 2019. 22 While many of the 240 respondents mentioned the international role in aiding displaced people, only one person mentioned the state’s role in doing so without being asked about it specifically. 23 Woman farmer in Bambari aged between 45 and 54, a Catholic and a Banda, translation by the authors. external assumptions and local perspectives 7 to implement it. INGOs face a similar dilemma in that they are highly critical of armed groups in private but cannot voice their opinion openly without putting their staff at risk. The head of the CAR bureau of a large INGO couched his approach to armed groups pragmatically: Ideally, of course, the government would take over the territory. If aid workers shared this discourse, however, the militias on the ground would kill them.24 Third, many respondents—even among the Muslim community—mention a category of ‘foreigners’ that should not be able to return to their former homes as citizens. These alleged foreigners share certain characteristics: (a) most importantly, they cannot speak Sango, which for a vast majority is a foolproof indicator of their lack of ‘Central Africanness’; (b) they seem to have Arab roots; and (c) they are alleged to have caused the recent crisis. Muslims are thus broadly categorized into three groups: (a) converts from local or indigenous ethnic groups who stayed put during the crisis; (b) those with indigenous roots who were displaced during the crisis; and (c) those, labelled as foreigners, who allegedly collaborated with the Séléka and cannot be allowed to return. While the reintegration of the first two groups seems entirely possible given more peaceful conditions and a heightened level of state responsibility, the latter poses a genuine dilemma for a neutral approach to the right of return. Speaking of the militia leader Al-Katim, who is for many locals, with Ali Darassa, the epitome of a ‘bad foreigner’, a senior official in MINUSCA noted that: Al-Katim was in the FACA for 10 years. Most courts would recognize his nationality even if both his parents are Chadians and he does not speak French or Sango.25 This statement does not mean that the interviewee has an opinion on whether Al-Katim should be able to remain in CAR. It merely exemplifies the way that many inter­nationals approach the matter: as a legal and pragmatic issue, where everyone princi­pally has the right to remain—and an issue that must not be used as a tool for manipulation during elections. For many Central Africans, however, this issue is absolutely crucial and highly emotional. Many responses on the matter were categor­ ical and demonstrative: no Sango, not Central African.26 However, in a calmer setting that allowed an more in-depth discussion to delve into grey areas on the matter, respond­ents acknowledged the rights of legal foreigners to stay in their towns under certain conditions, such as if they report to the local mayor and adhere to the law.27

VIII. Conclusions A number of conclusions can be drawn from the findings on the discrepancies between and commonalities in the top-down international and bottom-up local views of the social contract. First, who should form part of the social contract is not a technical matter of organizing returns and paying compensation to illegal occupants, as it is perceived by international entities. Nor are there easy answers, such as the local view that Sango is the main marker of nationality and that people of Arab descent were the main perpetrators of violence. Eschewing the issue of national identity means ignoring a key underlying cause of the conflict. A properly implemented strategy coordinated between government, local communities and international organizations to enable the return of over one million people together with a grassroots debate on who should be entitled to citizenship and how it should be obtained must now progress hand in hand in order to build national unity. The two are already fusing in small-scale, exemplary projects such as those on the outskirts of Mbaiki.

24 Interview with head of bureau of a large INGO, Bangui, Jan. 2019, translation by the authors. 25 Interview with MINUSCA official, Bangui, June 2019. 26 Group discussion in Bambari, June 2019. 27 Group discussion in Boubouar, near Mbaiki, June 2019. 8 securing legitimate stability in car

However, this requires some level of stability, which raises a second question: Who should provide security and justice? Non-state armed groups—both the former Séléka and the Anti-balaka—possess extremely limited legitimacy among the population. The Khartoum Agreement, which treats them as key representatives of the disenfranchised popu­lation and thus accedes to many of their demands for state positions and control over resources, goes against the wishes of a population that wants armed groups disarmed and either to leave or to be forced to leave—and a return of the state. Both inter­national and local entities seem to have adopted a wait and see approach to the agree­ment for the time being, but have no clear plan B in the likely event that it fails. MINUSCA is often accused not only of not responding quickly enough to security concerns, but even of collaborating with rebels by providing them with weapons and trans­porting them in their vehicles. Some even allege that France and other nations have deliberately supported armed groups to legitimize their continued presence on the ground in order to extract the country’s riches.28 While these allegations are not supported by credible evidence, they circulate widely among the population. Senior MINUSCA staff say that such rumours and complaints from among the population can be found in many missions around the world, and see no need to significantly change their intervention. However, this has led to a rupture between INGOs and MINUSCA. In addition, these allegations are very real to local respondents and leave some people ready to disrupt the efforts of MINUSCA. Few local respondents expressed them­ selves in favour of a MINUSCA presence continuing beyond the immediate future. Sur­prisingly, it was in the contested town of Bambari that people favoured MINUSCA stay­ing in place the shortest time—none said more than three years—while in the relatively calm areas of Mbaïki and Ndélé significantly more respondents would welcome MINUSCA staying for 10 years. Many instead called for a return of the state as the sole legitimate provider of security and justice. This raises a third question: How should the state provide security and justice? To the local population state redeployment in the security and justice sector often means a forceful state represented by the FACA that combats rebel groups and forcefully counters criminal activity. International representatives, however, seek a more gradual redeployment and a strict adherence to international standards and the rule of law. These different interpretations of what the return of the state means pose a dilemma for intervenors. MINUSCA staff are unsure about whether to take primary responsi­ bility for key domains such as security, repatriation, compensation and service pro­ vision, and risk being used as a scapegoat by politicians while also becoming the key target of people’s frustrations. Alternatively, it could step back to demonstrate that it is state incapacity—especially in the FACA—more than international intervention that is falling short of people’s expectations for a rapid solution to the crisis. There is immense belief in the FACA both at the local level and in national politics, where expectations are being raised—of attacking and defeating rebel forces and gain­ ing control over all territory—that go far beyond the army’s capacity. However, because this huge support for the FACA can also be read as holding on to a last ray of hope, if the FACA now blatantly fails—as the rebels, the Anti-balaka and MINUSCA have in the eyes of the population—new armed movements could claim to be seeking redress for people’s widespread ongoing grievances. MINUSCA and the EUTM believe they can bring the FACA up to capacity and the required levels of behaviour within the next five to ten years, which would enable it to meet many of the expectations of the population. While they therefore appear to be heeding local demand, many respondents believe that the FACA is already capable enough but being held back by inter­national entities for political reasons. At the same time, INGOs are warning of the abuses a

28 Focus group discussion in Bangassou, July 2019; and focus group discussion in Bambari, June 2019. external assumptions and local perspectives 9 reinforced FACA might commit against the population. The situation in CAR is there­ fore potentially grave and the many worrying discourses and misunderstandings investi­gated during this extensive study show that, if viewpoints are not aligned and expect­ations transparently managed, worse could yet be ahead.

IX. Recommendations

The people of CAR and its civil society must continue dialogue on how return can best be achieved and how to live peacefully together. They should also continue the peaceful resistance against those who want to bring violence, and hold their leaders accountable. It is highly laudable that most respondents were willing to counten­ance and even optimistic about the return of fellow citizens who had been displaced by conflict. In addition, many courageous inhabitants are boycotting illegal tax­ation by rebels, telling the Anti-balaka to take road barriers down and demanding that MINUSCA intervene more swiftly when the population is threatened. Many respond­ents expressed a wish that corruption would end, officials would resume their positions and the state provide services beyond Bangui.

The Government of CAR must set in motion an extensive, public grassroots dis­ cussion on CAR citizenship; strengthen local levels of power and accountability and improve accountability to the people; and create a strong state in terms of the pro­vision of security and justice. The Government of CAR must focus the discussion on what brings the nation together. The process for gaining CAR nationality must be transparent. State representatives and government politicians who brand entire popu­ lation groups as foreigners should face penalties. Most mayors and chiefs are nominated rather than elected and therefore lack legitim­acy. Local elections should be held before presidential and parliamentary elections. Local budgets need to be increased and the use of these funds monitored. Respondents expressed clear opposition to the ongoing embezzlement of the funds that are required to provide people with urgently needed education and health services and infrastructure. Such services must be provided as far as possible under current con­ditions to prove that the state is willing to alleviate the grievances of its citizens. Before moving to heavily arm the FACA, the government must prove it can independ­ ently sustain the limited number of soldiers already deployed, in terms of communi­ cations, logistics and salaries, and will be able to prevent abuses of power.

MINUSCA must penalize contingents that fail to react immediately to grave secur­ity events; become more accountable to the population; increase its joint operations with the FACA, the Gendarmerie and the police, and continue to report abuses to the hierarchy in Bangui; and start providing limited services to the population. MINUSCA must act swiftly to win back hearts and minds. Failure to do so could put the safety of peacekeepers and civilian staff at risk. Priorities must focus on training and the operational quality of contingents, including CAR-specific linguistic and cultural competencies. Contingents that fail to establish a positive rapport with the population should be redeployed to less-contested areas or excluded from the mission. Their low level of effective­ness compromises the entire mission by fuelling rumours that MINUSCA wants the conflict to persist. A greater number of senior staff must be encouraged to interact directly and regularly with the population and its local leaders, rather than working only through an often ineffi­cient state. The most pressing security concerns must receive a response, even 10 securing legitimate stability in car where they seem unfounded—rumours are best combated through verification, and allegations of occult powers by unearthing the mundane interests behind them. MINUSCA must continue to carry out joint operations with the FACA, the Gendarm­ erie and the police, and continue to report abuses to the hierarchy in Bangui. There should be public discussion of the support currently provided to the security forces to encourage a transfer of responsibility to the government and a reduction in false expect­ations of the FACA. While acknowledging conflict sensitivity and respecting the domains of the state and NGOs, the mission could establish a positive rapport by providing simple remedies to sanitary or infrastructural needs. Such activities would also allow communication with the population, which would dissipate rumours of alleged hidden agendas.29

The European Union and the EUTM must train FACA personnel for the activities they actually carry out and the environment they will face, put in place follow-up mechan­isms for FACA soldiers once trained and set up control mechanisms to pre­ vent military coups d’état. It might not be official policy for the FACA to substitute for the work of the police or to live close to the population, but this is nonetheless the reality in CAR. Soldiers must be trained on how to engage with criminal activity and how to transfer cases quickly to the appropriate institutions. The EUTM should help to set up sanctions and incentive regimes to limit bad behaviour towards the population, even where the state fails to make basic provision. While the EUTM training is up to international standards, FACA personnel return­ ing from the field need to be followed up to address any deficiencies identified there. The training of future cohorts should be adapted to the lived experience. Strengthening the military might encourage army commanders to question and under­mine democratic institutions, as has happened in the past. Civilian control of the army must be reinforced.

International entities must do no harm, put pressure on but support the state and continue intercommunal dialogue. The level of need in CAR is huge and until recently the number of INGOs was limited. The crisis has led to increased funds being made available for huge projects. This should not be allowed to limit the scope for local owner­ship of aid projects or to substitute for state responsibilities in CAR. Projects are often beyond the absorption capacities of state and civil institutions. They should be adapted and if necessary scaled down to the local context and emphasize pressuring the state to take on its responsibilities rather than substitute for it. While not a solution to the crisis in itself, areas that witnessed intercommunal dia­ logue alongside concrete security action have achieved surprising successes on return and reconciliation.

All interested parties must prioritize local elections; penalize hate speech, put pres­sure on the state to take responsibility for its people, help to control illegal cross-border flows and support the return of IDP and refugee populations. All interested parties must prioritize local elections as the populace perceives the closest state levels to be the most important. Holding presidential elections first risks the local elections being postponed indefinitely as a new president might wish to reward local supporters by nominating them to positions as chiefs and mayors.

29 On the dangers of conflating military and civilian roles see Hammond, L., ‘The power of holding humanitarianism hostage and the myth of protective principles’, eds M. Barnett and T. G. Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2008), pp. 172–95. external assumptions and local perspectives 11

Presidential and legislative elections are currently planned for 2020, and municipal elections in 2021. Religious and inter-community opposition can be subject to political manipu­lation in the run-up to elections. Hate speech must be penalized. The root cause of the years of crisis in CAR is the state failing to heed its people’s legitim­ate demands. International pressure to co-opt armed group leaders who are regarded as illegitimate by the local population is likely to fuel tensions in the medium term. The Khartoum Agreement calls for the involvement of neighbouring countries in controlling illegal cross-border flows and supporting the return of refugee populations. Select and related publications Multilateral peace operations and the challenges of irregular migration and human trafficking Dr Jaïr van der Lijn SIPRI Background Paper June, 2019

Multilateral peace operations and the challenges of organized crime Dr Jaïr van der Lijn SIPRI Background Paper February, 2018

Multilateral peace operations and the challenges of terrorism and violent extremism Timo Smit SIPRI Background Paper November, 2017

African Directions: Towards an Equitable Partnership in Peace Operations Xenia Avezov, Dr Jaïr van der Lijn and Timo Smit SIPRI Report February, 2017

The Future Peace Operations Landscape: Voices from stakeholders around the globe Dr Jaïr van der Lijn and Xenia Avezov SIPRI Report January, 2015

Trends in Women’s Participation in UN, EU and OSCE Peace Operations Timo Smit and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm SIPRI Policy Paper October, 2018

Peacekeepers under threat? Fatality trends in UN peace operations Dr Jaïr van der Lijn and Timo Smit SIPRI Policy Brief September, 2015

Peacekeepers at risk: the lethality of peace operations Dr Jaïr van der Lijn and Jane Dundon SIPRI Policy Brief February, 2014

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2019 TOWARDS LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN CAR AND THE DRC: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Report jair van der lijn, tim glawion and nikki de zwaan STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org TOWARDS LEGITIMATE STABILITY IN CAR AND THE DRC: EXTERNAL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

Policy Report jair van der lijn, tim glawion and nikki de zwaan

September 2019 Authors’ note

This paper is one of three in a collection comprising two policy studies and a policy report that synthesizes the two studies. In addition to this paper, the other two in this collection are the policy studies Securing Legitimate Stability in CAR: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives and Securing Legitimate Stability in DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives. The research for this work was done in cooperation with Cordaid, a development and humanitarian organization, working to end poverty and exclusion. Cordaid does this in the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected areas, including the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cordaid’s Security and Justice program focuses on improving access to effective, accountable and inclusive security and justice services (through result-based financing approaches), ensuring that women and youth can participate meaningfully in peace and governance processes, and strengthening civil society capacity to lobby and advocate for positive change. Financial support for this project was received from NWO-WOTRO—commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands and developed in close collaboration with the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law.

© SIPRI 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. Contents

Abbreviations iv I. Introduction 1

II. State of the art and analytic concepts 2

III. Methodology 3

IV. Case introductions 5 Central African Republic 5 South Kivu province 6 V. What is the role of the state? 8 Perspectives on the ground 8 Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities 9 VI. How should security and justice be provided? 11 Perspectives on the ground 11 Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities 12 VII. Who should be part of the social contract? 14 Perspectives on the ground 14 Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities 14 VIII. Conclusions 15 Navigating discrepancies, similarities, risks and opportunities 16 IX. Policy recommendations 18 Abbreviations

ANR L’Agence nationale des renseignements (National Intelligence Agency) CAR Central African Republic CLSP Comités locaux pour la sécurité de proximité (local committees for neighborhood security) DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration DRC Republic of the Congo FACA Force Armée Centrafricaine, FARDC Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo FPRC Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique IDP Internally displaced person INGO International non-governmental organization MINUSCA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NGO non-governmental organization PNC Police Nationale Congolaise (national police of the DRC) SSR Security sector reform UPC Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique VNG Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities) I. Introduction External stabilization interventions often have unforeseen impacts on local dynamics in terms of state legitimacy and inclusivity. This affects the prospects for ‘legitimate stability’. The process through which such external interventions and local actors inter­ act and produce new, often unplanned, outcomes for good or ill is called ‘friction’.1 The project of which this is the synthesis report has explored the assumptions that under­ lay such interventions by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and UN peace operations in the field of security and justice provision and compared them with the perceptions and experiences of local populations and key stakeholders, such as public authorities, politicians, community leaders, civil society representatives and the leadership of armed groups. This report unpacks the similarities and differences between the aims and objectives of external intervenors and the desires of local com­ munities and key stakeholders. The dominant assumption in the international development policy discourse, as exemplified in Sustainable Development Goal 16 and the Sustaining Peace Agenda, is that strengthening a state’s capacity to provide inclusive security and justice will lead to a stronger social contract in which governments gain in popular legitimacy, which in turn contributes to legitimate stability.2 Similarly, UN peace operations, while origin­ally deployed under the UN’s peacekeeping principles—consent of the parties, impartial­ity and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate— have stretched these principles over the past two decades and are increasingly being given mandates to support and strengthen government institutions and to extend state author­ity. 3 During—and often also after—conflict, however, stakeholders do not have iden­tical views on how the social contract should look. Consequently, strengthening the state may not necessarily lead to greater stability and may not be perceived by all to be legitimate. Moreover, as populations are often also divided, a focus on community needs, which many INGOs have attempted—or a people-centred approach, one of the latest concepts in UN peace operations—is often difficult to operationalize.4 Given these questions, this research project set out to understand the assumptions external intervenors have made about the provision of security and justice, and to con­trast these with the desires and wishes of the local population concerning the social contract. The analysis looks at the discrepancies and similarities between the assumptions of external intervenors and the perceptions and experiences of local popu­lations and key stakeholders, as well as the risks and opportunities linked to achieving legitimate stability that result from them. This synthesis report first provides a short overview of the existing debates on the topic and describes the methodology used in the project. On the basis of two case studies on the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Kivu province in the Demo­ cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it examines the discrepancies, similarities, risks

1 Millar, G., Van der Lijn, J. and Verkoren, W., ‘Peacebuilding plans and local reconfigurations: Frictions between imported processes and indigenous practices’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 20, no. 2 (2013), pp. 137–43; and Björkdahl, A. et al. (eds), Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in Post-conflict Societies (Routledge: London and New York, 2016). 2 United Nations, General Assembly, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 Oct. 2015; and, United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/707-S/2018/4318, Jan. 2018. 3 The principles of peacekeeping were first formulated in UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim’s report on the establish­ment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). See United Nations, Security Council, Peace­ building and sustaining peace, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973), S/11052/Rev.1, 27 Oct. 1973; and De Coning, C. et al., ‘Towards more people-centric peace operations: From “extension of state authority” to “strengthening inclusive state-society relations”’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, vol. 4, no. 1 (2015), Art. 49, pp. 1–13. 4 United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council’, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015. 2 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc and opportunities identified with regard to the questions of the role of the state, the provision of security and justice, and inclusion and the social contract. Its recom­ mendations aim to contribute guidance on how best to identify, account for and navi­ gate the risks and opportunities identified. The synthesis report brings together the find­ings of two case studies, which are published separately.

II. State of the art and analytic concepts A fundamental issue in society is that when humans interact, there will always be the potential for violence. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Montesquieu discussed how to overcome a possible ‘war of all against all’, triggering a continuing dis­cussion on the social contract. Max Weber—who based his work on the reflections of Georg Jellinek—shaped the Western view on the definition of a functioning social contract: a state with a delineated territory, a specific population and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.5 However, statehood is a historical anomaly rather than a typical end-state of human society.6 While some authors have labelled non- state systems as deficient, that is as ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states, other scholars prefer to investi­gate their functioning as is, rather than in comparison with a Weberian state ideal. David K. Leonard, for instance, has reflected on how social contracts can be formed even today not just between individuals, but also between population groups.7 Together with Mohamad S. Samantar, he delved into the situation in Somalia, which is often described as a ‘failed state’, and found that people can seek security in their kin group, and that contracts are often struck between clan representatives rather than the general population.8 A key issue of the social contract is the provision of security—and in its extended form the production of a sense of justice—to provide the necessary legitimacy for people to con­tinue to adhere to the contract. State institutions will find it difficult to mobilize public support if they cannot provide security.9 The typical way in which a modern state provides security and justice is by monopolizing the legitimate use of force.10 The state must continually prove its primary claim on the use of violence.11 However, it can quickly stray beyond what is socially acceptable as commensurate violence and itself become a threat to people’s security.12 Andreas Mehler, for instance, found that state security forces were more often part of the problem than a solution to Africa’s secur­ity concerns.13 When investigating security and justice it is thus important to go

5 Weber, M., ‘Die drei reinen typen der legitimen herrschaft’ [The three pure types of legitimate rule], ed. J. Winckelmann,­ Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschaftslehre (J. C. B Mohr: Tübingen, 1988/1922), pp. 475–88. 6 Von Trotha, T., ‘Vom wandel des gewaltmonopols oder der aufstieg der präventiven sicherheitsordnung’ [On changes to the monopoly on the use of force or the rise of the preventive security order], Kriminologisches Journal, vol. 42, no. 3 (2010), pp. 218–35. 7 Leonard, D. K., ‘Social contracts, networks and security in tropical African conflict states: An overview’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 44, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1–14. 8 Leonard, D. K. and Samantar, M. S., ‘What does the Somali experience teach us about the social contract and the state?’, Development and Change, vol. 42, no. 2 (2011), pp. 559–84. 9 Migdal, J. S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1988), p. 288. 10 Von Trotha, T., ‘Jenseits des staates: Neue formen politischer herrschaft’ [Beyond the state: New forms of political domin­ation], eds J. E. Akude et al., Politische Herrschaft Jenseits Des Staates: Zur Transformation Von Legitimität in Geschichte Und Gegenwart (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden, 2011), pp. 26, 46. 11 Koloma Beck, T. and Schlichte, K., Theorien Der Gewalt Zur Einführung [Introduction to theories of violence] (Junius: Hamburg, 2014), p. 20. 12 Von Trotha, T., ‘Die Präventive Sicherheitsordnung’ [The preventive security order], ed. W. Ruf, Politische Ökonomie Der Gewalt: Staatszerfall Und Die Privatisierung Von Gewalt Und Krieg, (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden, 2003), pp. 51–75. 13 Mehler, A., The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic (GIGA Working Papers, 2009), p. 7. external assumptions and local perspectives 3 beyond state-centred regime survival to emphasize how they are perceived from the bottom-up.14 For many actors in the policy world, strengthening the state remains a preferred avenue for delivering security and justice.15 Peace operations are moving away from peace- and state-building and towards a narrow focus on security capabilities under the new term ‘stabilization’.16 The UN peace operations in both CAR and the DRC follow this logic. They follow the ‘pacification war’ idea, whereby a foreign power attempts to monopolize the use of force in the hands of a legitimate state institution.17 Such stabilization interventions risk strengthening status quo forces and entrenching auto­cratic regimes.18 This study examines the social contract from a critical perspective on top-down and bottom-up assumptions on how security and justice can or should be delivered in CAR and South Kivu province. It acknowledges that populations are not just recipients, but participants in the shaping of state institutions.19 It also recognizes that perceived ‘chaotic’ processes or the label ‘crisis’ in the two conflict-ridden countries are part of what shapes the state and its power structures.20 It therefore analyses all the security actors involved at multiple levels to observe how their various order-making measures affect other actors’ habits and people’s perceptions of security.21

III. Methodology This study involved two case studies: one in CAR and the other in South Kivu province in the DRC. Both areas have relatively similar population sizes of 4.7 and 5.7 million, respectively, but CAR is about ten times the size of South Kivu province (622 984 km2 as opposed to 65 070 km2). Both areas have a history of violent conflict and the presence of peace operations, and both currently host a UN peace operation—the UN Multi­dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). While these two case studies do not allow for extrapo­lation and generalization, they do provide relevant insights that are applicable to other areas. Each case study looked at the aims and objectives of external intervenors—the UN peace operation and two INGOs. In CAR these are MINUSCA, CORDAID and Plan International, while in South Kivu province these are MONUSCO, CORDAID and VNG International (the International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities). In addition to desk research on the most relevant policy documents and literature, over 20 interviews were held in CAR and nearly

14 Randeria, S., ‘Jenseits von soziologie und soziokultureller anthropologie: Zur ortsbestimmung der nichtwestlichen welt in einer zukünftigen sozialtheorie’ [Beyond sociology and socio-cultural anthropology: on the position of the non-western world in a future social theory], Soziale Welt, vol. 50 (1999), pp. 373–82; and Hönke, J. and Müller, M.-M., ‘Govern­ing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of “local” practice’, Security Dialogue, vol. 43, no. 5 (2012), pp. 383–401. 15 See e.g. Fukuyama, F., “‘Stateness” first’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 84–88. 16 Karlsrud, J., ‘From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 26, no. 1 (2019), pp. 1–21. 17 Von Trotha, T., ‘Jenseits Des Staates: Neue Formen Politischer Herrschaft’ [Beyond the state: New forms of political domination], 2011, pp. 41f. 18 Schneckener, U., ‘Unintended consequences of international statebuilding’, eds C. Daase and C. Friesendorf, Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 62–81. 19 Meagher, K., ‘The strength of weak states? Non-state security forces and hybrid governance in Africa’, Development and Change, vol. 43, no. 5 (2012), pp. 1073–1101. 20 Kalyvas, S. N., Shapiro, I. and Masoud, T. (eds), Order, Conflict and Violence (Cambridge: University Press: Cambridge, 2008). 21 Glawion, T., The Security Arena in Africa: Local Order-making in the CAR, Somaliland and South Sudan (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, forthcoming). 4 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc

30 interviews in South Kivu province with key representatives of the UN missions and INGOs in the period January to June 2019. In both cases, the desires of the local population and of key local stakeholders were also surveyed in four localities, which had been carefully selected to present the best overall picture. While they may not be representative of the entire CAR and South Kivu province, they contain a wide range of lived experience. In CAR the four localities were: • Mbaïki, which had been government-held throughout the crisis; • Ndélé, which had been rebel-held throughout the crisis and is currently in the hands of the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC); • Bambari, a contested town in which MINUSCA and the government control one side while the other remains heavily infiltrated by the group Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC); and • Bangassou, which saw a peak of violence in 2017 and is currently tense but calm and government-held. In South Kivu province the four localities were selected along similar lines: • Bushwira, a Kabare territory, is a generally calm area that has experienced hardly any conflict; • Sange, an Uvira territory, has been affected by the conflict in Burundi as both Burundian rebel and government troops are regularly active, and there is also some activity by Congolese armed groups; • Kipupu, a Mwenga territory, which is a contested area where the state is present but armed groups operate close by; and • Kanyula, a Walungu territory, which is a post-conflict area. The extent of the presence of the UN and INGOs in each of the localities in CAR and South Kivu province varied. Some have received more international attention than others. However, in the four localities in South Kivu Province, the international presence of MONUSCO and INGOs is relatively limited, as is the presence of local civil society. In total, about 480 short interviews were held in the period February to April 2019. In each locality, about 60 people were interviewed, each selected at random in the street, both in town and away from the urban area. In addition to questions about their own background and a control survey about the current security and justice situation, respond­ents were asked a series of open questions about governance, security and justice, and the social contract in their ‘ideal village’. While these questions sought to reveal respondents’ desires and wishes for the future, respondents often answered questions with the current situation foremost in their minds. The interviews were conducted by CORDAID’s civil society partners in local languages and recorded on tablets. In CAR these were: Cèrcle, Maison Prisca, Flamboyant and a team of Aristide Oula with Igor Acko. In DRC these were: SOS Information Juridique Multisectorielle (SOS IJM) and Action pour le Dévelopement et la Paix Endogènes (ADEPAE). The inter­views were subsequently transcribed and translated into French. The results of the interviews were discussed in focus group meetings in order to obtain further explan­ation and triangulation in April to June 2019. In addition, in the period February to April 2019 over 30 key stakeholders—from among the public authorities, politicians, com­munity leaders, civil society representatives and the leadership of armed groups— in CAR and nearly 40 in South Kivu province were interviewed by local researchers to gain a general understanding and triangulation. These interviews were conducted by Igor Acko and Sylvain Batianga-Kinzi in CAR and by four researchers of the external assumptions and local perspectives 5 groupe d’études sur les conflits et la sécurité humaine (GEC-SH): Elisée Cirhuza, Éric Batumike Banyanga, Christian Chiza Kashura and Oscar Dunia Abedi. The local researchers were also involved in the focus group meetings, as well as in guiding the CORDAID partners in the conduct of the interview process. Subsequently, in order to discuss the opportunities and risks that follow from the similarities and discrepancies between the aims and objectives of the external intervenors and the desires of the local communities, ‘policy labs’ were organized in Bangui and Goma, North Kivu province, in May and June 2019. These focus group- style discussions of the policy implications of the preliminary results included the local researchers and interested prospective end-users of the research, including but not limited to the UN peace operation and the INGOs examined in the context of this study. Additional interviews were held with representatives of external intervenors who were unable to participate in the policy lab. This involved a separate meeting in Bukavu, South Kivu province.

IV. Case introductions

Central African Republic

General François Bozizé gained power in a coup d’état in 2003. He survived multiple rebellions with the help of France, peace operations and mercenaries from the DRC and Chad. In 2012 the strongest rebel groups joined forces in the Séléka rebellion. Given his own experience of military coups d’état, Bozizé had left the armed forces (Force Armée Centrafricaine, FACA) underfunded and consequently very weak. The Séléka alliance took its opportunity to take power in 2013. However, its rule was brutal, leading to large-scale resistance throughout the country and its overthrow by militia groups, colloquially known as the ‘Anti-balaka’. The Séléka then splintered again into different groups, of which the FPRC and the UPC are the two most important.22 A tran­sitional government was set up in January 2014, until the constitutional order was re-established in 2016 under an elected government led by President Faustin Archange Touadéra.23 Under the auspices of the African Union, the Government of CAR and 14 armed groups negotiated a peace accord in Khartoum, which was signed on 6 February 2019, but many hundreds of violations have already been recorded.24 The state in CAR is extremely weak. There has never been a state monopoly on the legiti­mate use of force in the country, and it is often suggested that the state does not extend beyond the Bangui city limits. The north-east of the country is de facto ruled by Séléka splinter groups. Elsewhere, armed groups from neighbouring countries, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, regularly roam the territory. Many regions are de facto cut off from Bangui and from each other, due to the limited infrastructure and the fact that important transport routes are controlled by armed groups.25 More than one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are awaiting safe conditions for return. Society is increasingly divided according to local identities linked to clan, religion and economic activity.

22 Glawion, T. and De Vries, L., ‘Ruptures revoked: Why the Central African Republic’s unprecedented crisis has not altered deep-seated patterns of governance’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 56, no. 3 (2018), pp. 421–42. 23 Marchal, R., Brève Histoire d’une Transition Singulière: La République Centrafricaine De Janvier 2014 À Mars 2016 [Brief history of a singular transition: The Central African Republic from January 2014 to March 2016] (ROSCA-G&D: Paris, 2016). 24 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the CAR reports 50 to 70 violations per week. United Nations, Security Council, ‘Mankeur Ndiaye, the Special Representative and head of MINUSCA, briefed the Council’, S/PV.8558, 20 June 2019. 25 Cf. Lombard, L., State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (Zed Books: London, 2016). 6 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc

The government is reluctant to reform and is increasingly proposing military meas­ ures to resolve the violent conflict. The president’s constitutional position remains domin­ant, even though the Constitution of 2015 strengthens the legislature. The newly estab­lished Senate is yet to be constituted, while parliament does not balance the presi­dent as most members belong to his majority coalition. Judges and prosecutors are often exposed to violence and death threats, and lack functioning institutions to protect them. State representatives—such as prefects, judges and security forces—in periph­eral areas are characterized above all by their powerlessness. They are given very few personnel or resources to carry out their tasks. While the institutions in the capital are gradually establishing themselves, the periphery continues to be neglected. Local mayors, ‘Chefs de groupe’ and ‘Chefs de quartier’, have in many cases been appointed decades previously, while in many parts of the country the judiciary is inaccess­ible to the population. The FACA is in the midst of a restructuring process.26 The Ministry of Defence has plans to set up a garrison army with bases distributed through­out the country. For the first time since the outbreak of the crisis, several hundred soldiers have been stationed outside Bangui and have even been involved in combat operations. The main burden of creating a secure environment, the protection of civilians and monitor­ing human rights falls on MINUSCA’s shoulders.27 It consists of over 2000 UNPOL officers and around 11 500 military personnel.28 The mission is still at the begin­ning of its life-cycle. The MINUSCA personnel interviewed portray a picture of a mission that is likely to stay in place for a decade or more, as from their perspective this period will be required to establish the basic functions of the state in CAR— notably the FACA, police, gendarmerie and judiciary—and to make them operational in a sustainable manner.29 However, MINUSCA personnel have also been involved in sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as human rights violations. In response, some contingents have distanced themselves from the population. This has led to a decrease in rapport with communities, which accuse troops of failing to guarantee public safety and siding with Séléka groups. Peacekeepers have become the targets of armed attacks and there have been 35 fatalities linked to hostile acts.30 At the same time, MINUSCA plays the role of mediator, providing good offices in support of the peace process, while it is also mandated to support the extension of state authority and the deployment of security forces.31 Today, the mission struggles to implement the Khartoum Agreement. On the one hand, armed group leaders have been given official state portfolios and thus fall under the UN’s mandate of support to the state. On the other hand, when armed groups violate the accord, MINUSCA is the only mili­ tary force capable of punishing breaches, raising demands from the government and popu­lation alike that it should forcefully engage the rebels. Next to MINUSCA, the EU Train­ing Mission (EUTM RCA) trains soldiers vetted by the UN in Bangui. Since mid- 2018, Russia has also been training soldiers on Russian weapon systems.32

26 Vircoulon, T., ‘La reconstitution de l’armée Centrafricaine: Un enjeu à hauts risques’ [The reconstitution of the Central African army: A high risk issue], IRSEM: Note de recherche no. 36, Apr. 2017. 27 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2448, 13 Dec. 2018. 28 See the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, . 29 Glawion, T., Van der Lijn, J. and De Zwaan, N., Securing Legitimate Stability in CAR: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2019). 30 United Nations, Peacekeeping, ‘Fatalities by mission and incident type: DRC’, Updated 30 June 2019. 31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2448, 13 Dec. 2018. 32 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). external assumptions and local perspectives 7

South Kivu province

It was in South Kivu province that the First Congo War (1996–67) had its origins. Since the end of the Second Congo War (1998–2003), the situation in the province has had less potential to destabilize the broader region. Nonetheless, fuelled by political opportunism and land and power struggles, local conflicts have multiplied. Consequently, the number of armed groups in the province has increased. Conflict in South Kivu province is often land-related, linked to farmer–herder conflicts over farming and grazing rights, as border delimitations are often unclear. Access to economic and natural resources is also a factor. With few income generation alter­ natives, people fight over access that they depend on for survival. Political and ethnic div­isions are not really seen as major dividing lines.33 South Kivu is a highly diverse prov­ince, and the frequently singled out Rwandophone Hutu and Tutsi Banyamulenge con­stitute just 0.4 per cent of the population.34 The many local conflicts in the province are further exacerbated by spillover effects from conflicts in the region, particularly from Burundi and Rwanda, as well as the political and economic ambitions of regional actors such as Rwanda and Uganda.35 Much of what happens politically in South Kivu province is linked to national politics. In spite of major doubts with regard to the results and outcome of the Decem­ ber 2018 elections, the 2019 transition from President Joseph Kabila to President Felix Tshisekedi was the first peaceful, democratic handover of power in the DRC. In March, both leaders formed a coalition in parliament; and in May Sylvestre Ilunga, a Kabila ally, was appointed prime minister. Both camps continued to argue over further appointments and only at the end of July was agreement reached on cabinet positions.36 In the DRC, political parties are not vehicles through which social groups can push a political agenda. Instead, the primary focus is on benefits for the leadership. The country has been decentralized but the subunits lack administrative and service deliv­ ery capacity. Local administrators are appointed by the president in a hybrid system involv­ing traditional chiefs and there is very little local control of power.37 Following the Second Congo War, different rebel armies were integrated into the government armed forces, forming the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC). A number of the rebel forces included in the FARDC remained homogeneous units and refused to be deployed outside of their own provinces. The FARDC remains largely unaccountable and underpaid.38 The Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC, national police of the DRC) was used by Kabila as a repressive force in the interests of the regime and police officers incentivized by patronage structures were required to extract resources from citizens rather than work for them.39 In South Kivu, outside Bukavu, the physical presence of the state is limited to the FARDC. Communities have little access to the PNC or to other forms of justice, as these are distant and often corrupt. They therefore make use of a variety of informal justice providers. In the

33 Irenge, L., ‘Conflict analysis in South Kivu and Tanganyika Provinces’, DRC Conflict Analysis, Tuendelee Pamoja II Project, Food for Hunger, Nov. 2017. 34 Calderon, A. B. and Englebert, P., ‘Tribulations tribales: estimations demographiques commentees des Ethnies Congolaises par Nouvelles provinces’ [Tribal tribulations: Annotated demographic estimates of Congolese ethnic groups in the new provinces], eds S. Geenen et al., Conjonctures de l’Afrique Centrale 2019 [Central African Conjuctions 2019] (Cahiers Africains, L’Harmattan: Paris, 2019). 35 Hoebeke, H. et al., Securing Legitimate Stability in the DRC: External Assumptions and Local Perspectives (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2019). 36 Bujakera, S., ‘Congo president and predecessor agree on division of cabinet posts’, Reuters, 26 July 2019. 37 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report: Congo, DR (Bertelsmann Stiftung: Gütersloh, 2018). 38 Muzeu, M., Democratic Republic of the Congo: Focus on the Security and Justice Sector Reform in Accordance with African Union Guidelines, Apr. 2018. 39 Thill, M., Njangala, R. and Musamba, J., ‘Putting everyday police life at the centre of reform in Bukavu’, Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, Mar. 2018. 8 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc absence of state authority, this means that communities sometimes take the law into their own hands through mob violence, physical aggression and killings.40 MONUSCO is the main external intervention in the DRC. Its current mandated priorities are the protection of civilians, support for the stabilization and strengthening of state institutions, and assisting in key governance and security reforms. In addition, the mission is mandated to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes.41 MONUSCO consists of over 1000 UNPOL officers and over 15 000 military personnel.42 Although President Tshisekedi has asked MONUSCO to stay, the mission is at the end of its life-cycle. The MONUSCO personnel interviewed portray a mission that, in part due to budget pressures, is likely to end within a couple of years. They describe their aims in terms of the priorities required to establish the minimum sustain­able justice and security provision within this compressed period.43 A 2017 strategic review led by the UN Secretariat describes MONUSCO’s strategic end-state as ‘security conditions in DRC no longer pose a tangible threat to international peace and security and remain that way even after the Mission’s departure’. MONUSCO has trans­lated this into conditions that include: ‘The reduction of intercommunal tensions and conflicts in the North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces to a level that can be managed by the Congolese authorities, with support from the UNCT [country team] and other partners’.44 Apart from the UN, a wide range of bilateral and multilateral donors have supported the re-establishment of state authority in the DRC, and South Kivu province more specific­ally. These efforts have included providing assistance to decentralization, SSR and justice reform programmes. In particular, donors have devoted their energies to the police system, but the armed forces and the justice system have also received some attention. A number of train and equip programmes, for example, have assisted the FARDC. 45 However, most activity has been put on hold since the most important donors, the United States and the European Union, imposed sanctions on high-level politi­cal and security officials after the political turmoil that followed the delayed 2016 elections. Moreover, international attention in the past has never been enough to include the entire province. The more rural areas in particular have been left behind.46

V. What is the role of the state?

Perspectives on the ground

Despite its poor record, the state remains central to popular aspirations in both CAR and South Kivu province. Although sometimes discussed in relation to eastern DRC, there is no general ambition for independence in South Kivu province. The discourse of armed groups tends to be protecting the country against foreign aggression, or the pro­tection of one community against another. Armed groups may be anti-regime but are generally not anti-state.47 In both CAR and South Kivu province, the ‘state’ was idealized, albeit in an ill- defined way, by many respondents. In both cases, the desired characteristics most often

40 Irenge (note 33); and Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 41 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2463, 29 Mar. 2019. 42 United Nations, Peacekeeping, ‘Summary of military and police personnel by mission and post: Police, UN mili­ tary experts on mission, staff officers and troops’, 30 June 2019. 43 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 44 Novosseloff, A. et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC/MONUC-MONUSCO, Effective­ness of Peace Operations Network, no. 3 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 2019). 45 Muzeu (note 38). 46 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 47 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). external assumptions and local perspectives 9 ascribed were strong, decentralized and accountable: strong in terms of controlling its frontiers and being able to suppress rebellion; and decentralized primarily through local elections and devolving significant budgetary powers to the local levels.48 In South Kivu province, decentralization is particularly framed within the concept of autochthony. Respondents argue that positions of authority should only be occupied by people who originate from their region.49 Accountability is used in the sense of serving the needs of the people by applying tax and resource revenues in a traceable manner to obtain security and justice and for service delivery in education, health care and infra­structure development. In South Kivu province, the ‘democratic’ character of an ideal state was often emphasized by respondents, including the regular organization of elections for local leaders.50 In CAR, respondents often referred to the state under former president and emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966–1979) as the mythical ideal of an ‘ideal state’.51 In both cases, non-state actors—including armed groups and INGOs—were not considered a long-term alternative to the state. Even in the short term, respondents in both CAR and South Kivu province see the return of the current less-inclusive state as the lesser of two evils.52 In CAR, general disappointment in the pre-2012 state contributed to the popular support for the Séléka rebellion. However, the new rulers did not bring the expected improvements so support for Séléka and ‘Anti- balaka’ groups has dwindled, even in the areas still under their control. The rebels are seen as illegitimate and many among the population want them prosecuted. Hatred towards the rebels is particularly high in state-controlled areas, such as Mbaïki and Bangassou, but even in Ndélé and Bambari people want the state to return. In these places, respondents do not refer to the return of the pre-2012 state but describe an inclusive state that includes their own representatives but excludes the rebels.53 It is note­worthy that in South Kivu province, churches were not mentioned much as an important service provider in the ‘ideal village’, as these are currently often engaged in the delivery of basic education and health services and as a justice provider.54 There is a largely shared understanding of what the state should deliver—security and services—but the focus depends very much on location. In both CAR and South Kivu province, in the more insecure areas respondents wanted the state to focus on the provision of security. The more stable an area is, the more attention is given to social service provision. Nonetheless, even in insecure areas respondents stressed that the provision of basic services is urgently required too.55 The main difference between CAR and South Kivu province is sequencing. In CAR, respondents start with security.56 In South Kivu, by contrast, respondents viewed socio-economic development—jobs, education and health care—as preconditions for stabilization. The latter argued that in absence of jobs, there is no alternative for youth than to join armed groups.57

Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities

Although in both cases external intervenors also describe their aims as a strong, decentralized and accountable state that provides security and social services, there

48 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 49 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 50 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 51 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 52 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 53 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 54 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 55 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 56 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 57 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 10 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc are three key discrepancies between the perspectives of external intervenors and those of respondents.58 The discrepancy with regard to the role of the rebels in the future of the state in CAR is particularly stark. International efforts seek to support the Khartoum Agreement, which co-opts the leaders of armed groups into the state and thereby legalizes their de facto power and status as representatives of the disenfranchised population. While external intervenors may be unhappy with the result of the Khartoum peace process, MINUSCA is mandated to support it, which many see as the outcome of a legitimate national and regional negotiation process. Respondents, however, do not see the armed groups as representative of the disenfranchised population. They want them to disarm and leave, and to be prosecuted. This is not just the case in government- held, predominantly non-Muslim, areas. The armed groups have lost legitimacy in rebel-held areas too. The Khartoum process has become a central part of MINUSCA’s mandate and the mission runs the risk of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the population. This risk is part of the classic dilemma of supporting elite pacts to ensure short-term stability, rather than ensuring long-term peace and an end to impunity. Already there have been frequent unsubstantiated accusations that MINUSCA is arming and providing support to rebels. On the ground, respondents see these accusations as very real, which creates fertile ground for anger against the mission and reasons for INGOs to distance themselves from MINUSCA.59 A second, less clear, discrepancy is at play in South Kivu province. External inter­ venors, both INGOs and peace operations, regularly try to make space for decentral­ ization and local alternatives, because central government structures are frequently ill-equipped to resolve local problems. Local solutions have often been idealized among INGOs and academics as part of the ‘local turn’ in peace building.60 Nonetheless, UN peace operations, as they implement peace agreements and follow constitutions, are generally ambivalent about decentralization. In South Kivu province, external actors often support decentralization as they follow the constitution and popular demand, which was backed up by the respondents. MONUSCO supports the Electoral Com­ mission’s preparations for local elections and trains local authorities. There is, however, a discussion about the way forward with decentralization in the DRC. On the one hand, further decentralization and local elections could provide greater legitim­ acy for and lead to enhanced accountability of local authorities. Confidence in local leaders—mostly traditional chiefs—is notably higher than it is in other state actors. On the other hand, their approval ratings are also still very low, and many of them have been involved in human rights violations and corruption, using ‘community work’ for personal gain. More importantly, further decentralization and local elections are a potential risk, since they could exacerbate local power struggles, border and land dis­ putes and inter-communal tensions, and thus risk opening a Pandora’s box. As the national government has not shown much interest in decentralization, thus far few results have been achieved. Nonetheless, the international community is likely to support local elections if and when they are organized, but it will not actively push for them.61 A third discrepancy, in South Kivu province, is on the sequencing of activities. Donors in South Kivu province have focused on stabilization and quick impacts through govern­ance reforms and a number of infrastructure projects, such as roads. External inter­venors have given less attention to what respondents perceived to be the key role

58 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 59 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 60 MacGinty, R. and Richmond, O., ‘The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 5 (2013), pp. 763–83. 61 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). external assumptions and local perspectives 11 of the state and of utmost importance: development and employment generation. As else­where, where priorities are not set and projects are not implemented in direct collabor­ation with the population (rather than their ‘representatives’), there is a risk that the local population will not perceive INGOs and peace operations as relevant, or that they may even be considered ‘useless’. They may come to be seen as unaccountable and, particularly when initial expectations are high, this can eventually lead to anger.62

VI. How should security and justice be provided?

Perspectives on the ground

In CAR and South Kivu province, respondents predominantly saw their national armed forces, the FACA and the FARDC respectively, as the preferred security providers. In CAR, the FACA is generally preferred by respondents as it is seen as the most effective insti­tution in the country, and the only one willing and able to protect the population against violence—and armed groups in particular. Popular support for the FACA is particu­larly strong in militarized, contested and recently contested areas, such as Bambari and Bangassou.63 Similarly, in South Kivu province faith in the FARDC as the preferred security provider was highest among respondents in Kipupu and Sange. In localities where the FARDC is absent, respondents asked that it be deployed to eradi­cate armed groups. In localities where it is present, respondents demanded that it improve and reform, for example, by paying FARDC personnel more so that they do not need to seek additional income by other means. Compared to CAR, however, respond­ents in South Kivu had significantly less faith in the FARDC. A number of respond­ents expressed substantial mistrust as, like MONUSCO, it is seen as being able but unwilling to act to resolve problems.64 In both CAR and South Kivu, support among respondents for non-state security providers is low. As discussed above, support in CAR for Séléka and ‘Anti-balaka’ groups is low, even in the areas currently under their control. Respondents see them as illegitimate and want them prosecuted.65 As in CAR, respondents in South Kivu prov­ince see the different armed groups, including the self-defence groups, as a source of insecurity. Respondents would prefer them to be neutralized, or integrated into the FARDC and sent to another province.66 Apart from the armed forces, respondents in both CAR and South Kivu province mentioned other state security forces, but the police and the Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) in South Kivu province, and the Gendarmerie in CAR are clearly less on respondents’ minds in such militarized contexts.67 It is also noteworthy that, in spite of the attention from MONUSCO and INGOs, respondents in the four localities under review in South Kivu province did not recognize security coordination structures such as the Comités locaux pour la sécurité de proximité (CLSP, local committees for neighborhood security) as platforms for dealing with security. While stakeholders perceive the CLSPs as useful for discussing security issues, these structures often lack owner­ship, as well as the resources and capacity to implement decisions.68 The differentiation between the roles of the civilian police and the military is stronger among respondents in South Kivu province than in CAR. In CAR, respondents made little differentiation between the tasks of the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the

62 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 63 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 64 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 65 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 66 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 67 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 68 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 12 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc police. Respondents divided responsibilities by the gravity of the incident, not by task. Small disagreements can be resolved by the police, while larger criminal issues require the FACA’s force. They wanted robust security provision to tackle the ‘impunity’ enjoyed by violent perpetrators. Human rights in these contexts were generally seen as a ‘luxury good’.69 In the areas of South Kivu province where insecurity is highest, respond­ents also wanted a robust security sector. Where the situation is calmer, how­ ever, respondents felt that a police presence was more appropriate. In the major towns in South Kivu province there is generally more awareness of the role of the PNC.70 Justice provision is perceived differently in CAR to how it is perceived in the DRC. In CAR, respondents expect the FACA to be involved in resolving communal and custom­ary disputes. Justice provision is seen from a militarized perspective. Only a few respond­ents talked about more sophisticated non-military forms of justice provision. The armed forces are perceived as providing quick fixes against armed groups, theft and road blocks.71 This is different in South Kivu province, where respondents clearly prefer a formal justice system organized by the state in which justice is provided by a formal judge in collaboration with the police. However, as formal justice is often physic­ally removed and expensive, respondents listed a wide variety of potential justice providers: formal justice providers, such as the PNC, the ANR and the FARDC; and informal justice providers, such as traditional chiefs, paralegals, churches and local prophets. This reflects the current variety in the system of justice. Particularly in Bukavu and major urban areas, people are familiar with the division of labour. Especially in the countryside, however, where present, the FARDC is seen as a second best option.72

Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities

The aims of external intervenors and the wishes of the local population in CAR and South Kivu province are by and large similar with regard to the security sector. External intervenors are also aiming for accountable and effective security forces, DDR or the military defeat of armed groups, as well as accessible justice for all. In both cases, MINUSCA and the EUTM in CAR and MONUSCO in the DRC, for example, support security provision by providing training and operational support to the military, the police and the intelligence services, and in the provision of justice.73 In South Kivu province, external intervenors have invested in the development of a mobile court system.74 Currently, one of the biggest similarities are the views on the need for a DDR process in South Kivu province. The international community has invested heavily in past DDR processes, with mixed results at best. The main obstacles were always the key stakeholders themselves, who were less interested. However, the appetite among combat­ants in several armed groups to join the DDR process has recently increased dramatically, among other reasons due to exhaustion, FARDC operations and the change of government. Respondents want the DDR process to start as soon as possible. This is a great opportunity that should be seized. However, given past experiences and the unexpected scale of the demand, external intervenors are not ready and await the

69 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 70 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 71 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 72 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 73 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 74 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). external assumptions and local perspectives 13 develop­ment of a policy framework by the Congolese Government. There is a risk that this slow response will lead to missed opportunities.75 Another similarity is that both external intervenors and the respondents in CAR and South Kivu seek the establishment of strong but reformed and accountable armed forces. This presents opportunities as well as risks. It is an opportunity in the sense that it provides space for SSR. However, even though local populations and external inter­venors may think alike, key stakeholders may have very different interests. In South Kivu, these frustrate reform processes and at times incite local communities to resist external efforts. Civil society may be involved in projects, but is often reactive and ends its involvement at the end of a project. Meetings often depend on participation fees. This demonstrates that local communities need to be involved in SSR in addition to key stakeholders in order to guarantee local ownership, but this is rarely the case. Given the common interest in SSR, channelling efforts through structures other than the existing ones, bypassing current stakeholders and cutting out the middle man could increase pressure on those stakeholders to make progress in reforming the security sector.76 At the same time, there is also risk attached to this similarity. Popular support for the armed forces combined with international interest in further strengthening them and the evident self-interest of the armed forces themselves could result in a further emphasis on international approaches that already too often prioritize short-term, mili­tarized security solutions. This consensus means that strengthening the armed forces is more likely to make progress than reforming them and making them more account­able, as that could face greater resistance. Such an emphasis on strengthening mili­tary security institutions has already led to the armed forces in CAR and South Kivu province often being seen as the most effective tool for dealing with what in essence are rule of law and policing challenges. This is particularly the case in CAR, where the EUTM, as well as France and Russia have focused much attention on supporting the FACA. Further strengthening the armed forces may promote a vicious circle of militarization of internal affairs in which popular support for the armed forces leads to more international support for them, resulting in increased capacity, which in turn increases popular support.77 An additional risk of strengthening the armed forces in CAR and the DRC is that by increasing their capability to bring security, their capacity to do harm and be used in abuses against the population also grows. This is particularly worrying in tense situ­ ations where the use of hate speech is already frequent in political discourses.78 A further discrepancy is that while to the respondents in CAR the ‘return of the state’ means a robust actor bringing security and justice, to external intervenors it means rule of law-based institutions. The former signifies robust and securitized action, while the latter requires adherence to rules and regulations, including on human rights and international humanitarian law. Unlike the respondents, external inter­venors generally recognize the classic separation of tasks: armed forces ensure external security and deal with rebellions if required, while police forces and the gendarm­erie ensure internal security and counter crime. Respondents demanded secur­ity and an end to ‘impunity’ through tough action. For them, witchcraft was also high on the agenda. These at times different priorities and popular demands can go against international calls for the rule of law. This puts the government in an awkward

75 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 76 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 77 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 78 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 14 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc position, as it faces contradictory international and national demands, and there is a risk that if it is not seen to be acting it may lose popular support.79 Informal justice provision is debated particularly among external intervenors. Respondents in CAR and South Kivu province indicated that, ideally, they would prefer a functioning, accessible and non-corrupt formal justice system to informal justice provision. However, informal justice providers currently appear to be better recognized by their communities, although they are at times corrupt and certain forms of ‘justice’ end in violent popular justice or human rights violations. Some external intervenors are convinced that informal or hybrid justice provision is a good alter­native. The risk is that this support for informal or hybrid justice provision might affect the establishment of formal justice structures that the respondents eventually desire.80

VII. Who should be part of the social contract?

Perspectives on the ground

In both CAR and South Kivu province, the population is only in favour of inclusiveness to a certain extent. In South Kivu province, ‘tribalism’, ethnic identity and autochthony lie at the centre of the citizen-state-society relationship. Although respondents often aspire to social cohesion and inclusivity, they frequently do not fully accept diversity. Particu­larly in Sange and Kipupu, the Banyamulenge, who have a cultural association with Rwanda, are excluded from the ideal social contract and often referred to as ‘foreign’ or ‘Rwandan’. Respondents sometimes accepted their presence but were less forth­coming about accepting their political rights. These tensions are exacerbated by com­petition between pastoralist and farming communities linked to dependency on land for livelihoods. Key stakeholders—particularly politicians, community leaders and the leadership of armed groups—often have an interest in perpetuating these tensions as they are an important source of power and resources.81 In CAR, respondents were often even more clear about their rejection of inclusivity. The non-Sango speaking part of the population, those with perceived ‘Arab’ roots, were not welcomed back even by the Muslim population. However, as in South Kivu, there is a wish to return to an idealized, unspecified past when Muslims and Christians were able to live together. This means that respondents encouraged the displaced Muslim ‘non-foreign’ population to return, in part because it is seen as important for trade. None­theless, respondents list conditions for the return of displaced persons and inter- com­munal peace. These include the need for them to ‘change their bad behaviour’, the finan­cial compensation that is expected from the international community, and for prosecution of the worst human rights violators.82

Similarities and discrepancies: risks and opportunities

Unlike many of the respondents, external intervenors, INGOs and UN peace operations generally stress the importance of inclusivity. In South Kivu province, INGOs and MONUSCO have invested in several rounds of community dialogue.83 In CAR, senior representatives of MINUSCA stressed that the Central African population and polit­ ical leadership have to accept that they cannot exclude a part of the population as

79 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 80 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 81 Hoebeke et al. (note 35); and Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 82 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 83 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). external assumptions and local perspectives 15 foreign, as many of them have lived in CAR for generations. While for many Central Africans this is a highly emotive topic, external intervenors tend to look at it more legalistic­ally and technically, and to emphasize the need for Central Africans to accept this. In fact, many external intervenors fear that ‘Central Africaness’ might easily be manipulated during upcoming elections, with highly negative consequences.84 This inclusion-exclusion discrepancy is omnipresent in both cases and harbours a real risk. In CAR, respondents expressed a perception that external intervenors are trying to force the Central African population to accept foreigners.85 In South Kivu, one interviewee noted the risk that external intervenors are quickly perceived as partisan when involved in dialogues.86 Eventually, such perceptions could delegitimize external interventions more generally. In fact, in the absence of extensive knowledge of complex local dynamics, involvement in inter-community dialogue initiatives risks intensifying conflict and strengthening spoilers.87 At the same time there are also opportunities. Respondents in both cases expressed the need for reconciliation and coexistence, although they questioned how and whether this would be possible. In CAR, while the debate about ‘foreigners’ is very heated, there also seems to be space in calmer settings to discuss the rights of ‘legal’ foreigners.88 In South Kivu, respondents saw a role for INGOs in particular in stimulating dialogue.89

VIII. Conclusions In policy and academic debates, local solutions and informal, non-state or hybrid security and justice provision often receive a lot of attention. Similarly, failures and mis­matches between external intervenors and local populations are frequently discussed. This research finds that in CAR and South Kivu province the gap between the aims of external intervenors and the wishes of local populations is not as large as is often assumed, particularly with regard to the role of the state and the provision of security and justice. Most respondents in CAR and South Kivu province would prefer a strong state and formal security and justice provision. Non-state solutions are not seen as good alter­natives. Weak, corrupt or non-inclusive state institutions, or even their complete absence, may drive populations temporarily to look for alternative solutions, but that does not mean that they prefer to do so. The efforts of peace operations, such as MINUSCA and MONUSCO, and of INGOs to strengthen state structures are therefore in line with the wishes of local populations. There is, however, also a clear tension with inclusivity. While respondents in CAR and South Kivu province often expressed hopes of returning to an idealized past of inclusivity and harmony, they find the related diversity much less acceptable. Efforts by external intervenors to support inclusivity are much less welcome to large parts of the population. They would often prefer to exclude ‘foreigners’ because of a history of conflict or because they perceive them as competitors for resources. In such non- inclusive contexts, if state building is not complemented by ‘horizontal’ peacebuilding and does not sufficiently incorporate the political economy of the conflict, strengthening state institutions and capacities risks strengthening the structures of inter-communal conflict.

84 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 85 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 86 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 87 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 88 Glawion, Van der Lijn and De Zwaan (note 29). 89 Hoebeke et al. (note 35). 16 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc

Local population

External Local/national intervenors stakeholders

Figure 1.1. Triangular intervention relationship

Source: Authors’ conception.

This is an example of how while they may talk about the same topics, external inter­ venors and local populations may mean slightly different things. Often, the devil is in the detail. Both may want the ‘state’ to take care of security, justice and development— but what kind of state are they referring to? Would it be more inclusive or exclusive? Is it more a robust security provider or would it prioritize the rule of law? Is it more centralized or decentralized? Unpacking these details is important in a people-centred approach. Moreover, although external intervenors aim to match the local population’s aspir­ ations on many topics, the way in which efforts are undertaken can lead to resistance. Often, frustrations are not so much about what is being done but how it is being done. The inclusion of local communities in planning, implementation and the evaluation of efforts is perceived as important for creating accountability and owner­ship, and ensur­ing that communities feel that they are not being treated as an object but instead being listened to. Part of the how of intervention is working directly with communities, not just their assumed leaders. The objectives of external intervenors and the desires of the local popu­lation may be the same, and they may mean the same thing, but the influence of structural challenges and the interests of key stakeholders—public authorities, polit­ icians, community leaders, civil society representatives and the leadership of armed groups—cannot be ignored. Key stakeholders—national and local, state and non-state— often require funding, capacity and an interest in implementing what the population wants and missions are aiming for. This intermediary layer can frustrate external inter­ventions to their own advantage and convince populations that the interventions are ill-intended. Thus, the key stakeholders also need to be included in the navigation of the discrepancies and similarities between what external intervenors aim for and local populations desire, and the risks and opportunities that result.

Navigating discrepancies, similarities, risks and opportunities

Navigating the discrepancies and similarities between the aims of external inter­ venors and the desires of populations, and the resulting risks and opportunities will external assumptions and local perspectives 17

Table 1.1. Typology of the five possible configurations of the triangular intervention relationship

Key (local/national Local population stakeholders) External intervenors Discrepancy Elite pact

International disconnect

Complete disconnect

Similarity Common understanding

Leadership blockage

= disagreement between parties; = agreement between parties. Source: Author’s conceptualization. require different approaches in different contexts. Understanding the triangular relation­ship between local populations, key stakeholders and external intervenors is an important aspect of this (see figure 1.1). To begin with, the relations between these groups are often inconsistent, as actors may agree on some issues but disagree on others. In addition, they are not three homogeneous unambiguous units as there are often different views within each. Each configuration of the triangular intervention relation­ship has different types of risks and opportunities for external intervenors, and therefore requires different kinds of actions to identify, account for and navigate it (see table 1.1. for summary of configurations). The discrepancies and similarities between what these groups want with regard to the future of the state, the provision of security and justice, and inclusion in the social contract are the subject of this research. In this typology, there are five types of configuration in the triangular intervention relationship: elite pact, international dis­ connect, complete disconnect, common understanding and leadership blockage:

Elite pact Elite pact is a situation in which external intervenors help to implement an elite agree­ ment that does not have wide popular support. The Khartoum peace process in CAR is an example of this. The main opportunities and risks of elite pact are that: (a) they may lead to short- term stability but risk the long-term sustainability of peace as grievances among the popu­lation persist; (b) external support for state or non-state structures that lack popular support risks creating illegitimate institutions that are subsequently hard to deconstruct; and (c) external support for what are perceived to be illegitimate or unpop­ular priorities risks delegitimizing the external intervention. Efforts to deal with limited popular support could include: (a) broadening the ‘pact’ through better inclusion of representatives of local communities in planning, imple­mentation and evaluation; (b) increased attention to communication and public information to explain the efforts and choices of the external intervenors; (c) persuading local/national stakeholders to publicly support, advocate for and take full responsibility for the agreements they have made, thereby ensuring that they cannot hide behind or blame external intervenors; or (d) surveying the desires and 18 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc wishes of local stakeholders and populations in order to increase the external inter­ venor’s understanding of and ability to navigate risks and opportunities.

International disconnect International disconnect is a situation where external intervenors strive to achieve some­thing that is not desired by local stakeholders and communities. International pressure for human rights in CAR is an example of this, as Central African stakeholders and communities generally prioritize stability and robust efforts to ‘end impunity’ over human rights compliance. The main opportunities and risks international disconnect are that: (a) external efforts with limited support from populations and key stakeholders risk non-cooper­ ation by national and local stakeholders or, if enforced or incentivized, half-hearted cooperation. Without local ownership, achievements may not be sustainable in the absence of external support; (b) external efforts that drive local stakeholders, such as govern­ments, to implement unpopular policies or undertake unpopular actions risk delegitim­izing them; and (c) external efforts that push for unpopular measures risk delegitim­izing external intervenors and diminishing their popularity. External interventions are usually supposed to be for ‘the people’ and therefore as a general rule it is unusual to push unpopular aims. However, external intervenors must also live up to their own standards and regulations. Inclusion, human rights and inter­national humanitarian law are essential principles that cannot be abandoned. In such cases, there is little else to be done other than: (a) pay increased attention to communications and public information; (b) counter narratives of exclusion; (c) undertake human rights education; and (d) deliver on popular issues, in the form of a ‘peace dividend’, in order to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local population.

Complete disconnect Complete disconnect is a situation in which populations and stakeholders want different things while external intervenors strive for yet another, third, option. Lacking any owner­ship, this situation is unlikely to lead to a sustainable situation either. This is a theoretical configuration that in practice was not encountered in this research. In the absence of any local anchor point or counterpart, external interventions are unlikely to take place at all. However, surveying the desires and wishes of local stakeholders and populations can help to find entry points for interventions.

Common understanding Common understanding is the ideal situation in which everyone involved agrees on the desired future outcome is not very common in conflict situations. If encountered, these con­ditions primarily require technical support and resources. Its main opportunities and risks are that external intervenors might not respond rapidly enough, as with DDR in South Kivu province, which risks dissipating momentum. In addition, external inter­venors, key stakeholders and populations might speak in similar terms, such as in CAR and South Kivu province where they all talk of the primacy of the ‘return of the state’, but can often mean very different things. This risks raising false expectations, disappoint­ment and, ultimately, violent tension. Thus, even under these most positive circumstances, it is important that efforts include: surveying the aims of local stakeholders and populations in order to unpack them and increase external intervenors’ understanding; and including local communities in planning, implementation and evaluation. external assumptions and local perspectives 19

Leadership blockage Leadership blockage is a situation in which external intervenors aim and local popu­ lations hope for similar outcomes, but key stakeholders have different interests. This is the case for example with regard to SSR in South Kivu province, where external intervenors and local populations have similar views on the future of the provision of security and justice but key stakeholders are blocking progress because they could lose their positions of power in the reform. Similarly, while the seeds for dialogue and decreased inter-communal tension in South Kivu are present, local stakeholders often block progress as they have an interest in perpetuating conflicts because they are a source of power and resources. The main opportunities and risks of leadership blockage are: (a) popular support for external intervenors’ efforts that are blocked by stakeholders provides an opportunity to involve communities. Bypassing current stakeholders and cutting out the middle man creates space to increase pressure on stakeholders to make progress; (b) external efforts to strengthen institutions, such as the armed forces, risk continuing a vicious circle of militarization in which militarized contexts increase popular support for strong institutions, further strengthening them, which again increases popular support; and (c) external efforts to strengthen institutions, such as the armed forces, while reform and greater inclusivity are blocked by key stakeholders, risk increasing the capabilities of such institutions to do harm and to be used in abuses against the population.

IX. Policy recommendations Every context is different. Each configuration of the above described triangular inter­vention relationship—elite pact, international disconnect, complete disconnect, common understanding or leadership blockage—has its own risks and opportunities. Each requires its own context-specific recommendations. This synthesis report focuses on the overarching conclusions and cross-case recommendations. These will have different general implications for every organization active in conflict-affected settings. More specific conclusions and recommendations for the UN peace oper­ations and INGOs dealing with security and justice in CAR and South Kivu province are presented in the two background papers that accompany this synthesis report. How­ ever, the following interlinked recommendations to external intervenors, UN peace operations and INGOs are also relevant to other conflict-affected locations.

Invest more in local knowledge. Interventions at the local level require extensive local knowledge to prevent doing harm by affecting conflict dynamics negatively. Even dialogue projects can empower spoilers as they are given a seat at the table. Hence, external intervenors should invest more in gathering local information and intelli­ gence by better involving local communities in these processes.

Survey and understand the aspirations of populations. Although surveys are costly to produce, knowing what communities want is important for gaining direction on what is required. This is not standard practice among external intervenors, UN peace oper­ ations and INGOs. The surveys conducted by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative are an important start to measure perceptions of and trends in security and justice pro­vision. Such surveys should become standard procedure in peace operations and they should be complemented with interviews on desired future outcomes. This would better contextualize the surveys and provide guidance at the strategic level on what external intervenors should aim to contribute. Moreover, it is important to incorporate an analysis of the configuration of the triangular intervention relationship between 20 towards legitimate stability in car and the drc local populations, key stakeholders—public authorities, politicians, community leaders, civil society representatives and the leadership of armed groups—and external inter­venors, to improve navigation of strategic risks and opportunities.

Strengthen two-way communication flows between local communities and external intervenors. The communication networks of all external intervenors, both INGOs and peace operations, are currently still too thinly spread. This risks actions being taken by external intervenors on the basis of too little local awareness. It also risks raising unrealistic expectations among the local population of what external intervenors can deliver, which in turn could generate new frustrations. External intervenors need to invest more in two-way interfaces for collecting information and intelligence on what com­munities desire, for improving accountability and for disseminating the motiv­ ations behind the decisions made.

Involve local communities more in planning, implementation and evaluation. Criticism of interventions by respondents was often not so much about what has been done, but how it was done. External intervenors need to engage communities early on in the planning and design of programmes, and throughout the process, as it can increase ownership and a sense of accountability, and consequently lead to more sustain­able outcomes.

Work more directly with communities: cut out the middle man as much as possible. The position of community representatives comes with power and interests that do not always favour the desires of the population or sustainable peace. Monopolization of the lines of communication needs to be prevented, as for example public communication through community leaders can prevent information from trickling down to com­ munities. Information and access to power are power. Although community and civil society representatives are important influencers, external intervenors need to invest more in more direct relationships with community members to avoid distortion.

Dare to emphasize international norms and frameworks over local dynamics and interests. To ensure a sustainable peace, it is essential to promote adherence to the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law. Such rules should therefore remain of primary importance. This means that at times external intervenors may have to object to the desires of populations and stakeholders and will have to balance their fulfilment within international norms and frameworks.

Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2019 SIPRI Policy Brief November 2019

SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN SUMMARY w This research explores the CAR AND THE DRC: underlying assumptions of interventions by international INTERNATIONAL AIMS, non-governmental organizations and United Nations peace operations in the LOCAL EXPECTATIONS provision of security and justice, and compared them jaïr van der lijn and nikki de zwaan* with the perceptions and experiences of local population in the Central African Republic and in South Kivu province, THE CHALLENGE the population can conflict with eastern Democratic Republic of international norms and standards. the Congo. Mismatches The dominant assumption in It is therefore imperative to better the international policymaking between the aims of external understand how local communities intervenors and local discourse is that strengthening the perceive the state and what the state’s capacity to provide security populations are frequently role of the state should be in discussed in policymaking and and justice for its population will ensuring that external stabilization academic debates. increase its popular legitimacy, efforts lead to security and justice Foremost, the gap between which will in turn contribute to arrangements that are inclusive, the aims of external a more stable society. This notion representative and sustainable in intervenors and the wishes of lies at the heart of Sustainable the long run. local populations is not as large Development Goal 16 and the as is often assumed. Most Sustaining Peace agenda. United THE RESEARCH PROJECT respondents would prefer a Nations member states are also strong state that takes supporting people-centred This research project explored responsibility for security approaches to peace operations. the underlying assumptions of provision and a functioning In the context of Action for interventions by international formal justice system. They Peacekeeping, they have committed non-governmental organizations perceive non-state and informal justice solutions only as themselves to advance political (INGOs) and UN peace operations temporary alternatives. Non- solutions and to strengthen in the provision of security and state armed groups are justice, and compared them with the impact of peacekeeping on perceived to be neither sustaining peace. However, the the perceptions and experiences of legitimate nor security state’s ability to provide security local populations, the authorities providers. Moreover, external and justice may not result in and other key stakeholders in the intervenors work with increased legitimacy in the eyes of Central African Republic (CAR) counterparts that local local populations, while informal and South Kivu province, eastern populations do not always provision of security and justice Democratic Republic of the Congo consider legitimate by non-state actors can sometimes (DRC). The research was based on representatives. increase theirs. Moreover, the form document analysis and interviews Last, although external of security and justice provision with representatives of the intervenors are generally aware that is perceived as ‘legitimate’ by United Nations Multidimensional that identity is an important driver of conflict and social tensions—and address this * This project was commissioned and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of through social cohesion The Netherlands through WOTRO Science for Global Development of the Netherlands activities—they often fail to Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO-WOTRO). It was developed in collaboration take full account of the way this with the Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law (KPSRL) as part of the Ministry’s affects state-building and the agenda to invest in knowledge and to contribute to more evidence-based policymaking. strengthening of state Views expressed and information contained in this document are the responsibility of authority. the author(s). 2 sipri policy brief

Integrated Stabilization Mission formal justice system. They in the Central African Republic perceive non-state and informal (MINUSCA) and the United Nations justice solutions only as temporary Organization Stabilization Mission alternatives. Non-state armed in the Democratic Republic of the groups are perceived to be neither Congo (MONUSCO), a number of legitimate nor security providers. INGOs and local actors, such as Weak, corrupt or non-inclusive community stakeholders and local state institutions, and especially authorities, and approximately 480 their total absence, can drive street interviews that sampled the populations temporarily to look perspectives of the local populations for alternative solutions. This does in CAR and South Kivu province. not mean, however, that this is The analysis: (a) compares what the preferred option. In academia, external intervenors are aiming the donor community and many to achieve with the end-state that civil society organizations, much local populations and actors would attention is given to strengthening ideally would like to see, in order informal justice and recognizing to assess whether assumptions the functions of some non-state match expectations; (b) assesses armed actors such as auto-defence how external interventions might groups. However, while these may better identify, account for and be short-term solutions, populations navigate the resulting risks and are supportive of the efforts of peace opportunities; (c) identifies what operations, such as MINUSCA could be done to make external and MONUSCO, and INGOs to interventions more effective and strengthen the state’s role and strategic; and (d) asks how the legitimacy in justice and security inevitable pitfalls might be avoided. provision. External intervenors work with THE MAJOR FINDINGS counterparts that local populations do not always consider legitimate The failures of and mismatches representatives. In CAR, the rebel between the aims of external groups that are now part of the intervenors and local populations Khartoum peace process have at are frequently discussed in times been treated by external policymaking and intervenors as the representatives In CAR and South Kivu province, the gap academic debates. of disenfranchised populations, This research finds between the aims of external intervenors but most of the respondents, even that in CAR and in rebel-held areas, perceived them and the wishes of local populations is not South Kivu province, to be illegitimate. In the DRC, as large as is often assumed the gap between many NGOs and local community the aims of external representatives were perceived as intervenors and the wishes of local accountable not to local populations, populations is not as large as is often but to international donors. assumed, specifically with regard Consequently, respondents often to the role of the state and the felt that external intervenors were provision of security and justice. not listening to local communities. Most respondents in CAR and South In addition, not enough attention Kivu province would prefer a strong is given to promoting democratic state that takes responsibility for representation at the subnational security provision and a functioning level. security and justice in car and the drc 3

Strengthening the state does community representatives is not automatically enhance the not enough as such positions can management of identity-based become associated with power, conflicts. Although external bias and personal interests. intervenors are generally aware External intervenors therefore that identity is an important driver need to be better aware of who their of conflict and social tensions, and counterparts are. address this through social cohesion In contexts where conflicts activities, they often fail to take unfold along identity lines, if state full account of the way this affects building is not complemented by statebuilding and the strengthening ‘horizontal peacebuilding’ and of state authority. Identity plays a does not sufficiently deal with the large role in how populations view underlying inter-communal causes who should be considered part of of the conflict, the social contract and who should strengthening The involvement of local community not. While respondents in CAR state institutions representatives is not enough as such and South Kivu province often and capacities positions can become associated with expressed hopes of returning to an risks consolidating idealized past where all are able to existing exclusive power, bias and personal interests live together in harmony, they found structures. efforts to include diverse population External intervenors need a better groups much less acceptable. They understanding of the context in would prefer to exclude ‘foreigners’ which they are operating to ensure from the social contract, either that they minimize the unintended because of the history of conflict or consequences of their actions. because they perceive them to be competitors for resources. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY Every context is different. AND PROGRAMMING There will be different general implications for every organization While informal and non-state active in conflict-affected settings. alternatives may be required in Nonetheless, the following the short term, it is important that interlinked recommendations for external intervenors embed these in external intervenors, UN peace a long-term focus on strengthening operations and INGOs are also the role and legitimacy of the state relevant to other conflict-affected in the provision of justice and locations. security. External intervenors need Invest more in local knowledge. to strengthen their direct Interventions at the local level communication with local require extensive local knowledge populations. These communication in order to prevent doing harm. flows need to be direct and two-way INGOs and peace operations interfaces for collecting information should invest more in gathering and intelligence on what information and intelligence by communities desire, improving better involving local communities accountability and disseminating in these processes. the motivations for the decisions made. The involvement of local 4 sipri policy brief

Survey and understand the among the population of the role of aspirations of populations. Even MONUSCO. The current approach though surveys of and interviews based on community leaders does on desired future outcomes can be not achieve ‘trickle down’. expensive to carry out, knowing what communities want is Continue the military presence. important in order to gain direction One of the key drivers of dialogue on what is required. They should will be the linkage between capacity become standard practice in peace building of the Congolese security operations and INGO programming. forces and the MONUSCO exit strategy. The MONUSCO presence Involve local communities more is not popular. People express little in planning, implementation confidence in it and do not want it and evaluation. INGOs and to remain in the country in the long peace operations need to engage term. However, future drawdown communities early should be at a pace that ensures that For local populations to see an impact on on in the planning the government takes responsibility and design of their daily lives, programmes need to be and has the capacity to deliver programmes, and security. implemented at the local and provincial throughout the levels, alongside strategic engagement at process as this can Focus during transition on the national level increase ownership reinforcing national security and and a sense of justice actors. The population accountability, and consequently recognizes the need for better lead to more sustainable outcomes. working conditions for security agencies, such as rotation of the Dare to emphasize international military, the effective payment norms and frameworks over local of wages and ensuring that the To ensure dynamics and interests. Congolese National Police (PNC) a sustainable peace, it is essential has sufficient resources. to promote adherence to the rule of law, human rights and international Promote local governance and humanitarian law. This means support local elections. A realistic that INGOs and peace operations framework and timeline are needed may at times have to object to the for local elections. As a first step wishes of local populations, and that towards the organization of local stakeholders will have to ensure elections, an assessment of the their fulfilment within international current state of local governance norms and frameworks. will have to be carried out. In preparation for the organization RECOMMENDATIONS FOR of local elections, institutions MONUSCO that investigate and adjudicate Reduce strategic risk by improving on conflicts related to customary information strategies. Despite authority must be expanded and the efforts of Radio Okapi and their decisions enforced. INGOs MONUSCO’s community liaison and MONUSCO should enhance assistants, among others, there is their inter-community dialogue still a severe lack of understanding initiatives. security and justice in car and the drc 5

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS MINUSCA OF THE DRC Ensure that the protection of Focus on strengthening state civilians is a top priority for troop capacity to provide security and contingents and communicate justice. For local populations mission priorities clearly to the to see an impact on their daily wider population. Contingents lives, programmes need to be that do not protect civilians or implemented at the local and fail to respond to the needs of the provincial levels, alongside strategic population fuel engagement at the national level. rumours that While the FARDC should focus on Support the establishment of more MINUSCA wants mobile court systems and enhance the conflict to neutralizing armed groups, the the military justice system to fill persist. This may government must relaunch its dialogue the justice gap. Examples from lead to increased with its major international partners on the past, such as Security Sector resistance to the Accountability and Police Reform mission and risk security sector reform (SSAPR), can also be built on. the security of staff. Additional training is required Commit to effective reform of for sub-standard contingents, the security services. While the including on CAR-specific linguistic Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and cultural competencies. should focus on neutralizing armed Contingents that continue to fail to groups, the government must establish a positive rapport with the relaunch its dialogue with its major population should be redeployed. international partners on security sector reform. This will require a Strengthen Civil-Military new disarmament, demobilization Coordination projects. and reintegration programme. The While acknowledging conflict military should be quickly replaced sensitivity and respecting the with the police in stabilized areas. domains of the state and NGOs, To this end, the police forces MINUSCA could establish a positive operating in rural areas should rapport by providing greater receive more resources and better assistance with meeting sanitary training. For this purpose, support or infrastructure needs. Increased for the planning and funding attention on these activities would of a comprehensive National also improve communication Programme for Disarmament, with the population, which would Demobilization and Reintegration dissipate rumours of alleged hidden (PNDDR4) will be required. agendas.

Redouble efforts on socio-economic Engage directly with the local development. There is an urgent population. Rather than working need for international partners mainly through the CAR state, a to support the Congolese state greater number of senior staff could at all levels to reconnect with interact more directly and regularly the population through a focus with local communities and their on economic reconstruction and leaders. development. 6 sipri policy brief

Continue to carry out joint Prioritize local elections. operations with the Central The population perceives the African Armed Forces (FACA), the closest levels of the state to be the Gendarmerie and the police while most relevant. Holding presidential reporting abuses to the hierarchy elections first risks local elections in Bangui. There should be greater being postponed indefinitely as a public discussion of the support new president might wish to reward currently provided to the security local supporters by nominating forces to encourage a transfer of them to positions as chiefs and responsibility to the government, mayors. and to reduce unrealistic popular expectations of the FACA. End the co-optation of the leaders of armed group. Even though they RECOMMENDATIONS FOR are regarded as illegitimate by the INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS local population, leaders of armed OF CAR groups are part of the Khartoum process. International pressure to The European Union Training co-opt non-state armed groups may Mission (EUTM) must continue to have led to a reduction in violence train the FACA. In the absence of in the short term but is likely to fuel a strong police force, such training tensions in the medium term. will need to include policing skills, such as on how to transfer cases quickly to the appropriate institutions. The EUTM could also help to set up a conduct and disciplinary International pressure to co-opt non-state regime to limit abuses against the armed groups may have led to a reduction population. Trained in violence in the short term but is likely to FACA personnel fuel tensions in the medium term returning from the field need to be mentored and monitored to ensure that the training is sustainable, while the training itself needs to be adjusted to the lived experience of the returnees.

Reinforce civilian control over the military. CAR has had experience of military coups. Strengthening the military might encourage army commanders to question and undermine democratic institutions. Stronger civilian control of the FACA could avoid future abuses against the population. security and justice in car and the drc 7

ABBREVIATIONS

CAR Central African Republic DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EUTM European Union Training Mission FACA Central African Armed Forces FARDC Armed Forces of the DRC INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo PNC Congolese National Police PNDDR4 National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration SSAPR Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform SIPRI is an independent RELATED SIPRI PUBLICATIONS international institute dedicated to research into Towards legitimate stability in CAR and the DRC: External assumptions and conflict, armaments, arms local perspectives control and disarmament. Dr Jaïr van der Lijn, Dr Tim Glawion and Nikki de Zwaan Established in 1966, SIPRI SIPRI Policy Report provides data, analysis and September 2019 recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, Securing legitimate stability in CAR: External assumptions and local researchers, media and the perspectives interested public. Dr Jaïr van der Lijn, Dr Tim Glawion and Nikki de Zwaan SIPRI Policy Study GOVERNING BOARD September 2019

Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Securing legitimate stability in the DRC: External assumptions and local Chair (Sweden) perspectives Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar Dr Jaïr van der Lijn, Hans Hoebeke, Dr Tim Glawion and Nikki de Zwaan (Indonesia) SIPRI Policy Study Dr Vladimir Baranovsky September 2019 (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) SIPRI publications are available to download at www.sipri.org/publications Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/ United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr Jaïr van der Lijn (The Netherlands) is a Senior Researcher and Director of the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme. Jair joined SIPRI in 2013. He is also affiliated with the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. His research focuses primarily on: current trends and future developments in multilateral peace operations (eg. AU, EU, NATO, UN); their handling of complex environments; their evaluation; and, their relationship with local actors in host nations.

Nikki de Zwaan (The Netherlands) is an expert on security and justice at the Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (CORDAID). Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2019