66
CHAPTER II
THE YOUNG HEGELIANS
The Young Hegelian Movement
Vie have seen how Hegel had tried to build a grand philosophical system that would explain and interpret all the phenomena in the universe. His was an attempt to build a system of universal reconciliation. Any system of such proportions was bound to break up and give rise to many different movements. This is precisely what happened in the case of the Hegelian system too. Soon after Hegel's death it started to disintegrate and create discordant results,,
To the orthodox# Hegelianism was a conservative system, which was the answer of German traditionalism to the new systems of philosophy that were making their presence felt in Germany, especially to the rationalism that was coming from France, Hegelian philosophy was essentially an explanation of the past but the younger generation of his followers wanted to detach it from its preoccupation with the past and make it a progressive force for the creation of a future. Both the old and the young Hegelians# the right and the left, based themselves on the master's famous dictum that the real is rational and the rational is the real.^ The schism arose from the different emphasis which the schools gave to the two crucial terms 'rational' and
' real' . 6?
The conservatives held that only the real is rational.
For them the measure of rationality was its actuality. That something was real and historically necessary meant that it was rational. For them mere existence was enough to prove the rationality of a historical reality. Thus the conser vative side found the justification for the status quo in
Hegel's philosophy. To revolt against the existing system was an act against rationality, an irrational act. The radicals (the Young Hegelians) stressed the opposite view.
They insisted that only what is rational is real. The actual was not f,or them the real# it often consisted of inconsistencies, anachronisms and opposing factors. So reality, or mere existence, could not be considered real in the philosophical or metaphysical sense. They pointed out that the mere occurrence of something in space and time was not equivalent to being real at all. Something was real only to the extent that it was rational. So anything that could not withstand the test of reason was not really real. The real should be able to form a rational whole; this might necessitate the radical transformation of the existing institutions in accordance v/ith the dictates of reason. Thus the Hegelian left was able to put forward a system, within the Hegelian framework, which could account for social change and even necessitate revolution. Because Hegel had stated in unmistakable terms that reality is a process, a universal effort to attain self-consciousness and that it grows more 68
perfect in the very growth of critical self-consciousness among men. There was no reason to suppose that such a process should be gradual and painless, the progress was necessarily the result of tension between the opposites which grew into a crisis and then burst into open revolution. Only at this juncture did the leap into the next stage occur. These were the basic laws of development found equally in nature and 2 in affairs of men and societies. Again to the radical
Hegelians it seemed evident that a ohilosophy which proclaimed the principle of universal negativism and which treated each successive phase of history as the basis of its own destruction, could not consistently tolerate the endorsement of a particular historical situation, or recognize as final and irrefutable
any kind of state, religion or philosophy,^ Consequently the
Young Hegelian Movement singled out the theme of permanent negation as the dominant theme of Hegel's philosophy, which
led to the radical criticism of all existing aspects of
society. In one of his early writings, when he himself was
a Young Hegelian, Engels observed that the Hegelian communists
such as Hess, Ruge and Herweg were a proof that trie Germans must adopt communism if they were to remain faithfully to 4 their philosophical tradition from Kant to Hegel,
Historically the Young Hegelian philosophy was the philosophy of the republican, bourgeois-democratic opposition which criticized the feudal order of the Prussian state. In
the literary field this opposition was led in the early 18 30's 69
by Heine# Bonme, etc. In the field of philosophy and theology the movement was led by Bauer, Strauss, Koppen, etc.
They demonstrated their opposition to the existing system by criticizing Christianity and its presuppositions from the
Hegelian point of view. That was the time when Marx came on the scene and into contact with this group of Young
Hegelians.
To gain an insight into Marx's thinking we must turn to the ideas and convictions of the radical Hegelians, because an insight into a man's thought could be furthered by an appreciation of the doctrines which contended against in his struggle for clarity, Marx's intellectual journey started with an acceptance of the left-wing Hegelian philosophy of religion. Then it proceeded to a penetrating socialogical criticism of the roots of all religious beliefs in general and of Christianity in particular and ended with the first sketchy formulations of historical materialism in his Holy
Family,^ This period of Marx's development coincided with the bourgeois movement to bring liberal political ideals into
German politics. This movement made certain consequences .6 appear in the weaver revolt and the spread of utopian religious socialism. But the opening shots in the fight against the feudal system, land-lords, absolute monarchy, bureaucratic officialdom and reactionary church were fired' 7 in the field of philosophy of religion. 70
As we have seen# the Young HegeJ.ians from the outset
considered themselves to be orthodox Hegelians. Their
stress on the continuous negation made them critics of all
existing social institutions. They adopted a historical
approach to all institutions and especially to religions,
because a criticism of these institutions from a merely philosophical point of view had been attempted by the French materialists without much success."8 The Young Hegelians u on
the other hand, by their historical approach tried to show
that the religions and their claims were once justified but had
now become outdated and irrational by their ov;n historical
developments. Neverthless their approach was not without its
defects. According to Sidney Hook their approach suffered
from a threefold defect. First, it was abstract and considered
the development of theological doctrine independently of the
instituional activities of the Church . The young Hegelians did not consider the bodies of doctrine-juridical^ philosophical/ social - which were pervaded with religious
notions. Secondly, the young Hegelian criticism was
idealistic. It did not search for the origins of religious
thought and practice in the material culture of the age; it
did not inquire into the linkage between the techniques of
religion and the material wants of the everyday economic life
of man. Thirdly, it was fatalistic: it regarded the historical
development and process as automatic, carried on by the pure g spirit or by certain individual leaders. 71
Thus the first field in which the struggle between the
Young Hegelians and other post Kantian philosophers took place/ was religion, separated from the socio-economic realities of the day. It v/as only with the advent of Marx and Feuerbach that this criticsm became a criticism of the whole socio-political-economic system that was prevalent at the time. They pointed out that the criticism of religion was incomplete if it was done in isolation from other social structures. Even such innocent guestions about the priority of the Gospels, not to speak of their historical validity, were soon found to have consequences that were detrimental to the existing order. That this implication was seen by the authorities, is manifest from the fact that Metternich met the first religious criticism with political persecution of the critics. He understood that the challenge to the authority of the Church involved challenge to the authority of the state.
The young Hegelians pointed out that religion had always professed a metaphysical dualism. Religion always held that its chief concern was with the other-worldly affairs, yet the threefold emphasis upon authority, tradition and renunciation that religion advocated in reality strengthened the political and social props of the existing order. How could religion function in this very v/orldly and concrete manner unless it had some connection with the past and present
social realities? The primary objective of the Young Hegelian philosophy of religion was to discover the character of this 72
continuity and relation by submitting specific texts,
doctrines and practices to a searching criticism. On the basis
of such investigation they concluded that religion was a
fantastic and compensatory expression of the nature of man. ^t
arose and endured in the course of the prolonged struggle of
human beings to adjust themselves to an irrational and inhuman
world. A critical analysis of religion, then, was at the
same time a radical criticism of the world out of which it had 10 arisen.
Individually not one of the young Hegelians (with the
possible eocception of Feuerbach) can claim to be a philosopher
of real depth or significance. But they have the credit of
dividing up Hegelianism and making it a historical force. It
was through them that Marx first came into contact with Hegel.
As Louis Althusser says:
The Hegel with who Marx argues ever since his doctoral dissertation is not the Hegel taken from the library shelf, the Hegel whom we now ponder in our studies. It is the Hegel of New Hegelian movement, who had already become an insistent need for the German intellegentia of the 184Gs, the Hegel by means of whom it seeks to comprehend its own history and its hopes. It is a Hegel already placed in contradiction with himself, appealing against himself, at cross-purpose with himself.
In the following pages we shall see some of the specific
contributions of some leading young Hegelians, particularly in
the field of religion.
According to Albert Schweitzer German theology of the 73
time had played an important role in the cultural and spiritual life of modern age. He says;
When at some future day# our period of civilization shall lie/ closed and completed, before the eyes of later generations, German theology will stand out as a great, a unique phenomenon in the mental and spiritual life of our time. For nowhere save in German temperament came there to be found in the same perfection the living complex of conditions and factors - of philosophic thought, critical acumen, historical insight, and religious feeling- without which no deep theology is possible.
Aiti. the greatest achievement of German theology is the critical investigation of the life of Jesus. What is accomplished here laid down the conditions and determined the course of the religious thinking of the f u t u r e . 1 2
The critical German studies were to have profound influence on the philosophy of religion and religious thinking in the years to come. One of the most important thinkers of this period was David Struass (lS08-1874), whose Life of Jesus was a turning point in the history of modern biblical scholarship.
The fundamental weakness of Hegel's interpretation of
Christianity lay in its failure to appreciate the significance of the historical personality of Jesus. His Christology was not based on the person of Jesus, whereas the life and religion of the people were based on it. His was an abstract system, in which the person of Christ provided a few significant contributions.^^ Strauss recognized this weakness of Hegel and set himself the task of rendering an accurate historical account of Jesus, He did not believe in any of the miraculous aspects of the life of Jesus and was not interested in producing a theologically accurate picture of Jesus within 7^
the hitherto acknowledged frame work. In fact his theology was more philosophy than theology itself. In a letter of
1833 he wrote that in his theology
philosophy occupies such predominant position that my theological views can only be worked out to comple^ess by means of a more thorough study of philosophy and this course of study I am going to nrosecute uninterruptedly and without concerning myself whether it leads me back to theology or n o t .
The result of his study was a negative theology# which was
Hegelian in form. He concluded that religion was not concerned with supra-mundane beings and a divinely glorious future, but with present spiritual realities which appear as "moments" in the eternal being and becoming of Absolute Spirit. He rejected personal immortality and opted for it in the sense of a quality of the spirit, its inner universality,^^ By his painstaking study of the Gospels he showed that the gospels were full of contradictions and so they could not be considered an authentic account of the life of Jesus. However the existence of the Bible was something that had to be explained.
His answer to the existence of these narratives was that they were the result of the myth-making consciousness of the early Christian community which had been brought up in the IG Jewish tradition. Strauss did not state that his conclusions were harmful to the essence of Christian religion. Like a good Hegelian, he held that Christianity was the most adequ,ate of religions and the symbol of the truths of philosophy. For him religious myths had the same value as poetry. 75
We have seen in the previous chapter that the concept of the divine plays an important part in the system of Hegel.
So as a Hegelian Strauss too had to deal with this concept,
.Strauss wanted to convert the concept of the divinity to something of a goal rather than religious concept. Religious consciousness had always felt the dualism of the divine and the human. Christianity, according to Strauss# is the first religion to overcome this distinction and this had been achieved, according to the traditional teaching of the Church, only in the person of Jesus, So in reality for man this duality of the divine and the human persisted. Strauss wanted to substitute hvimanity, the species, for the person of Christ.
So the apotheosis of God-man can become the apotheosis of humanity.
In many ways the Life of Jesus was a watershed in the development of critical biblical scholarship. The Straussian criticism once and for all undermined the belief in the historical validity of the Gospels. It was Strauss who set the context for the debate over "faith and history",
"authority", "absoluteness" and "relativism" that has forced much deeper reflection on the precise manner in which the certainty of faith has its ground in the relative events of history. His criticism demanded a re-assessment of historical Jesus free of dogmatic presuppositioiis and religious interests of the interpreter. 1 s 76
2. Cleszkowski
We have already seen the importance of negation as a
principle in the young Hegelian philosophy. By using this
principle they attacked the existing social systems and
institutions. In converting this philosophy of negation 19 into a philosophy of action/ the Polish writer Cieszkowski
played an important part. He attempted this transformation
in his work Prolegomena zur Historisophie (1838), This was
intended to a revision of the Hegelian philosophy of history,
in keeping with young Hegelian preoccupation. He wanted to
make Hegelian philosophy a tool for creating a future rather
than explaining the past. He says:
From the moment when I became familiar with the Hegelian philosophy of history I perceived both the importance and the insufficiencies it contains, not simply within the HegeI4-an system itself but outside it. That is# I found his philosophy of history not completely adequate to his philosophical standpoint in general either in form, method or content. Moreover, I found his philosophy itself inadequate to the absolute standpoint of world history ... As for us, we must state as a premise our conviction that without knowability of the future, i.e. without considering the future as an integral part of history, there can be no question of knowing the organic and ideal entirety or the apodictic process of history.
However he considered Hegelian philosophy to be the highest
philosophical achievement of contemporary world, and he
believed that philosophy, properly so called, has come to
an end with Hegel's philosophy. 2 1 That is to say, in the
future the spirit will no longer express itself in philosophy
but in creative activity. The developing spirit will
assimilate all the dualisms and a new era of unity will come 77
forth. In Cieszkowski we sae the seeds of future Marxian praxis. According to Cieszkowski, praxis is but the reproduction of the spirit from thought to being. 22 A study of Cieszkowski is an examination of the European consciousness and the assumptions of this period. First among these was the assumption that religious categories can be fruitfully translated into social terms. Perhaps the single-most conspicuous affinity among the Young
Hegelians, the French Utopians and the Polish Messiar(3-sts was their common conviction that the rationalism of the
Enlighteniuent provided an insufficient foundation for the good society. They saw consequently the central political 23 problem as one of transforming burghers into believers.
This was a tendency that Marx had to fight against.
Cieszkowski's rejection of Hegelian contemplativeness was to reappear more emphatically in Marx's criticism of German
Ideology.
Bruno Bauer (1809-1882)
Bauer, who started out as an orthodox Hegelian, was a leading member of the Berlin Doctors' Club and it was as a member of this group that Marx tried to formulate his ideas.
After reviewing Strauss's Life of Jesus, Bauer became a radical leftist and was soon saying about Strauss what 24 Strauss was saying about orthodox theologians. Since he could not agree with the conclusions of Strauss, he .started 78
all over again to inquire into the credibility and historicity of the Bible. According to Bauer Christianity grew out of the loss of individual freedom in the Roman empire. He played down the Judaic contribution to Christianity and its origin. In Christianity/ according to Bauer, religious alienation reached its climax. Man became divided in his innermost being. He entrusted his essence to mythical forces and thus become subservient to these forces. Bauer held that the task of the present phase of history was to restore to man his lost unity. He wanted a secularization of public life. The human spirit must be freed from Christianity and 25 the state from religion itself. This was his professed aiiHa
In 1841 he published The Trump of the Last Judgment upon
Hegel/ the Atheist and the Antichristian. An Ultimatum. Marx seems to have had a part in writing this book. 2 6 This was a clever attempt to show that Hegel himself was an atheist, though he did not publicly profess atheism. The work was written from the point of view of a pious religious who criticizes Hegel for his views which are 'professedly' atheistic. In spreading atheism# the young Hegelians were not doing anything but continuing the task started by Hegel 27 himself. As a result of his study of the Gospels he came to the conclusion that Jesus as a historical person did not exist. 2 8 And since he did not exist it was nonsense to
attribute divinity to him. "In the prophecy as well as in fulfilment, the Messiah was only an ideal product of religious 79
consciousness. As an actually given individual he never 29 existed." For him the evangelists X'lere people to be considered on par with Homer and Hesiod. He also rejected the idea of an unconscious mythical creation as superstitious.
Strauss never claimed to be an atheist. He believed that through his criticism he was fulfilling a task that religion itself in its true sense demanded; he was fulfilling the demands of Christianity. Bauer v;as a professed atheist.
He had shown that philosophically Hegel had done away v/ith religion and especially Christianity and now he himself had exploded jLts historical justification. The future unhindered growth of human nature ancl institutions, Bauer thought# would be the result of his atheism. The forces of orthodoxy and authority, he believed, had been done away with and therefore the proper development could take place in the pure light of reason. The future struggle would be within what is and what ought to be. Self-knowledge would be man's first and last virtue and since man is always developing this would be an ever widening aim that would never be fully achieved,
Marx believed that the fight between Bauer and Strauss to be a family guarrel. Marx v/as to a certain extent influenced by Bauer's religious criticism. Even the famous comparison of religion to opium by Marx could be seen in
Bauer.But Marx was against the philosophy of self-knowledge as formulated by Bauer and the former formulated many of his views in opposition to the latter. Ruge's final verdict 80
on Bauer, which v;as basically identical with that of Marx#
sums up Bauer; " Bauer is the "ultimate theologian", a total
heretic who pursues theology with theological fanaticism,
and for precisely this reason is not free of the faith which
he fights.
A, Arnold Ruge
The original aim of the Young Hegelians was to build
a system of politics and social organization based on the
principle of rationality. They had a sort of innate faith in
the historical self-consciousness of the Prussian system and
believed that Prussia could develop by peaceful means to a
sort of protestant constitutional monarchy. Their protestantism
did not mean the dominance of a particular denomination in
public life but adherence to the demands of reason. It was
with this aim in mind that they started criticizing the
existing system and called for the overhauling of it in the
light of reason. Soon, however, they found out that the
Prussian authorities were not interested in creating a system
based on their dreams and aspirations. So they had to change
their tactics and vrark for something more radical,
Sidney Hook is of the opinion that Ruge was the first to
see that once the Hegelian dialectics separated from the
Hegelian system, conclusions could be derived which undermined 32 the orthodox allegiance to the existing state and culture.
The first of these was to interpret the dialectical method as 81
an instrument of reflection. In reflection no object should
be considered final but as something to be transcended. Thus t . the dialectical method with regard to social instituions
became a method of criticism of what is and what might become
or what should be. " The true content of the Hegelian
Geistsphilosophie is humanism, its method is criticism.
They considered Hegel's philosophy of Spirit as a description
of the progressive development of individual and social
consciousness. Hegel's creedom, i.e., his metaphysical concept
of freedom, was identified with religious, political, legal
and intell_ectual freedom as occasions demanded. In this way
Hegel's idealism v/as transformed from Absolute Idealism into
practical idealism for the creation of a future according to the
demands of freedom. Consequently, philosophy is not only a
criticism of consciousness but also of history. It is the
philosopher's duty so to transform history as to make it humanly
significant. "Philosophical criticism contributes to the so movement of world-history....It is the philooher who knows when 34 the situation is ripe, who sits at the loom of time."
In his religious criticism Ruge starts with Hegel and
-follows Feuerbach in most cases. He believed that in
Christianity absolute spirit is knovm in human fashion but
they forget this basic truth and give philosophical existence
to God and other factors of religion. He wanted a humanistic
reliaion for " popery and Lutheran dogmatics destroy the idea
of Christianity. The religiosity of the Reformation, the 82
ethical enthusiasm of the Revolution/ the serious -mincicdness
of the Enlightenment/ philosophy and socialism, on the other
hand/ are real extensions of the Christian principle of
humanity,Ruge did not call himself an atheist and he did
not want to be called one because he believed that the Atheism
of Bauer itself was a religion with its own dogmas and rituals,
"Atheism, is just as religious as v;as Jacob wrestling with God:
the atheist is no freer than a Jew who ears pork or a m 3 5 Mohamedan who drinks v;ine," A
Max S t i m e r
By his own confession. Max Striner came to fulfil the
movement which was begun by Strauss deepened by Bauer and
transferred to a new plane by Feuerbach. Struass's concept
of absolute humanity had been declared religious by Bauer,
In turn Bauer's own ideal of critical self-consciousness had
been revealed as anachronistic theology by Marx and Feuerbach.
Now Stirner thinks that the worship of man propounded by
Feuerbach is mystical and superstitious. Thus Stirner seems
to be drawing conclusions opposed to the professed aims of the 37 young Hegelians,
Stirner points out that in the past man had oersonified
his fears in 'ghosts' etc and allowed himself to be dominated
by these creations of his imaginations. In the contemporary
world this tendency has re-appeared in a more subtle and
sophisticated from in categories such as 'humanity', 'state'/ 83
'society', etc. According to Stirner all these new categories were mere abstractions anc;, in a v;ay, religious.
For him the only reality that counted were 'ego', as opposed
■CO the abstract, ideals of man and society. The exaltation of man to a supreme status was nothing but disguised
3 8 Christianity, the belief in the human incranation of God.
"The 'I' is the nihilistic end of Cliristian humanity, whose last man is Unhuman'just as its first was 'superhuman'.
The 'I' enjoys life, unconcerned with the idee fixe of God 39 and mankind." Stirner believed that Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx and others, busying themselves with man in general and the human species, have forgotten the real individual, for the real man is the individual as he lives and breathes here and now. So Stirner v/anted to erase all traces of abstraction from thinking about man. God had been banished by the criticism of Strauss, Bauer and Feuerbach. But the ideal still remained as an oppressive force. Even the moral ideal
something that Stirner would like to get rid of because just like religion this too strives to enslave man.
'v/hat is a moral ideal? asks Stirner. It is something to which one should conform one's conduct. In this case v;hat is the difference betvreen a moral ideal and religious fetish?
In this way all the ideals which the Young Hegelians had 40 putforv;ard are meanigless abstractions. VJe can say that if Feuerbach pointed out that man created God in his image
a^^'d that he has thus done av;ay with theology in its traditional 8^
form, Stirner believed that the Ego has created man in his
image and has destroyed traditional ethics. V/e may sum up
in the words of Lowith, "By denying the substantiality of all
self-differentiation, Stirner eliminated not only the
theological distinction oetween what is human and what is
divine, but also the anthropological distinction between what
is I am "intrinsically" and what I am "accidentally". For his
own part, he presupposes as an ideal on] y the "absolute cliche 41
6 . Moses Hess
No account of Marx's intellectual development will be
complete without an account of the philosophy of Moses Hess who
was the chief theoretician of the group known as "true socialists"
Marx considered them quite dangerous and devoted considerable
amount of space in the Manifesto to refute them. This is all
the more puzzling because Hess was a friena of Marx and it was
he who converted Engels to communism. He co-operated with 42 Marx in the writing of German Ideology , part of the Manuscript
being in his handwriting. He had great admiration for Marx and
believed that Marx would usher in the new era for wliich ne had 43 Deen longing.
From his early days Hess was attracted to Spinoza and
Rousseau. From the former he learned to believe in the unity
of all men and from the latter he imbibed the conviction that
all men are equalo In his first book The Sacred History of
Mankind (1837) , "^^Hess predicted a new era of man's 85
reconciliation with God, an era of final reconciliation of the human race in a free and equal society based on mutual love and the community of goods. He suggested that a social revolution would come about as the result of the grov/ing inequalities between the rich and the poor with abundance on one side and increasing misery on the other. In the European
Triarchy(1841), Hess like other Young Hegelians tried to make
Hegelianism a forward-looking system and to base his communism on Hegel's system. He was also influenced by Cieszkov/ski' s 45 ideas on t'ne philosophy of action. He believed that the freedom of spirit which was brought by German Reformarion o in theretically German philosophy had now to be actualized in reality. This actualization had also been inaugurated in in the French Revolution. Once tnis is achieved he thought the real spirit of love and of Christianity would be achieved in
Europe and there v/ould no more be a need of a transcendental deity of the Church, This new society will be united from within without coercion. A precondition for the advent of communism is that the principle of love should triumph and the transformation of man should take place. "Moral and social slavery proceeds only firorni spiritual slavery; and contrariwise legal and moral emancipation is bound to result from spiritual 46 liberation."
Hess was convinced that the communist society would be nothinq but the flowering of human essence. Bringing into empirical existence the normative concepts contained in the 86
concept of man would do away once and for all with all the contradictions of society. Once tiiis v/as achieved there 47 would no more be any need for a church or social institutions.
Thus the philosophy of Hess was born of the desire to find principles that are ;'asic to human beings, which will be able to eradicate human misery in every asoect of life, and so would be the basis of a new order in which the interests of different individuals will not clash. That is, he v/anted a philosophy that would guarantee the autonomy of morality. For tnis he turned to Fichte, because he thought that by basing himself oq Fichte he v;ould be able to avoid the clash between religion and ethics. The basic standpoint of religion is one of acceptance, acceptance ot God, or a given world-view, of a world-order, etc. The standpoint of morality is that of assertion and imposition of what ought to be. The root of religion is feeling and that of morality is the necessities of life:
So long as human beings strive after ideals of perfection, there cannot be completely irreligious men; so long as they live in society/ they cannot be completely immoral. Irreligion is simply a word for other people's religion; iminorality, a term for behaviour different from our own. The essence of religion is worship; the essence of morality consciousness."48
The influences that shaped 'true socialists' were "^euerbach and the French Socialists, especially Proudhon. Hess tried to. link up the conclusions of French socialists to the Feuerbachian m.ethod: 87
The esstnce of ^od, says Feueroach, is the transcendent essence of man, and the real theory of the divine nature is the rheory of human nature. Theology is anthropology. That is the truth, but it is not the whole tru.th. The nature of man, it must be added, is social involving the co-onerative activity of all individuals for the same ends and interests. The true theory of man, the true humanism is the theory of human society. In other words, anthropology is socialism.'5^
The imr'Ortance of is that he was perhaps the first to attempt a reconciliation of Young Hegelian yohilosophy and conimunismi. Ke also expressed some of the iaeas that v/ere to be of basic J.mportance ro Marxist doctrines. Hov/ever, Hess could not agree to a merely materialist's interpretation of history and proletarian revolution. He was a visionary who wanted to liberate human race, not just the proletarist,
■:rom all forms of debasement and he wanted to achive it rhrough faith in the capacity of human beings to love rather than through violent revolution.
7. Ludv.dg Feuerbach (1804 - 1872)
All my writings have had strictly speaking, one purpose one intension, one theme. This is nothing less than ^ theology and religion and v/hatever is connected with them'.
The above words of reuerbach gives us some idea of the importance he placed on religion in his thinking. This oreoccu-Darion of Feuerbach is what made Karl Barth say that
"no one among the modern philosonhers has so intensively-, so e;:clusively and pr^^cisely occupi' d v/itri tiie croblem of theology as Feuerbach-although his love v/as an unhappy one," " Among the young Hegelians he v/as the most important philosopher to 88
undertake a systematic study of the phenomenon of religion and of Christianity in particular. His greatness and importance consists in the fact that he was able to take religious consciousness seriously and make religion an object of serious study in its own right. For him it was one of the most important aspects of human development. This is v;hat made
Engles say that Feuerbachc attempt was not to abolish religion but to 'perfect' it and he believed that even philosophy had to be absorbed in religion.Feuerbach expressed his religious preoccupation when he wrote in his Philosophical Fragments, "God was my first thought; Reason my second; Man my third and last thought.
It was at the conclusion of the Heidelburg lectures that
Feuerbach indicated his principal aim; to change "the friends of God into friends of man, believers into thinkers, worshippers into workers, candidates for the other world into students of this world, Christians, who on their own confession are half- 54 animal and halt:-angel, into men - whole men." To these proposed improvements he had early added that he wanted to transform theologians into anthropolgians and religious and political footmen of a celestial and terretrial monarchy and aristocracy into free, self-reliant citizens of earth.
Feuerbach wanted his philosophy to secure man his due here and now and such a philosophy had to start with man real, sensuous, material man in his totality. He hated all philosophical idealism that separated man from nature and P9
society. "Man thinks, not the Ego, not Reason. The human
IE the true and real; for the human alone is rational; man is the measure of reason,
To achieve his aim Feuerbach had to sutroit Hegel's philosophy to a throughgoing criticism. He criticised l) the irrationality of the Aosolute incarnate, ii) The superfluous and destructive nature of systematic philosophy and ivj The unwarranted break v;ith perception. 5 7
Feuerbach introduced his Foundations of the Philosophy of the Future with these v/ords:
The philosophy of the future has the task of leading philosophy out of the realm of departed spirits back to the realm of embodied living spirits; out of the godly felicity of a world of thought without neediness, back to the realities of human misery. For this purpose, the philosophy of the future requires no more than a human understanding, and human language. But the ability to think and speak and act in authentically human terms belong only to the human species of the future. The present task is not yet to represent this nev; h'umanity, but to draw mankind out of the morass in which it is sunk,..the task... is to establish the critique of human philosophy on the basis of the critique of divine philosophy.58
So it is as a man firmly based on the earth, taking his sensuous existence seriously and with a mission, that
Feuerr.ach tries to understand the emperical sources of human belief in God and the sources of religion. For his religion is the dream of the human mind, even this dream is based on earth, in the realm of reality. The aim of Feuerbach's 90
critique is to change the object as it is in imagination 59 into the object as it is in reality. It is with this aim
of explaining the phenomenon of religion in human, emperical
terms that he undertakes to write The Essence of Christianity.
According to him it is a faithful, correct translation of the
Christian religion out of the Oriental language and imagery
into plain speach. A more criticism of religion by speculative
philosophy cannot understand religion, nor is it able to bring
it to the level of human understanding.^*^ So the criticism had
to be of a religion that is part and parcel of the iife of
the people. The Essence of Christianity is the direct outsome
and culmination of the Critique of Hegelian philosopny.
B'euerbach nere, is trying to understand religious concept-
formation. Since the proper subject of religion is man, he
attempts to examine the process of concept-formation in man's
knov/ledge of himself the psychological and epistemological
process of many's self-conception. The conclusion he reaches is
that rej igion is esoteric Anthrojiology. The subject matter he wanted to analyse were, firstly, what is revealed in the
religious consciousness of man; secondly, how is it revealed
in the specific forms of religious thought, and in the 'false'
reflection of this thought (i.e^, theology).
Feuerbach believed that Religion is something specifically human. So he starts the The Essence of Christianity by asking the question, VJhat is the basis of roligion? He answers
that religion has ir,s basis in the essential difference between 91
man the brute. The difference between man and the brute is that the bruue has no consciousness in the strict sense.
Consciousness in the strict sense is present only in a being to v/hom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. 6 2 After establishing this difference oetween man and the brute, Feuerbach investigates the nature of x'eligion itself:
Religion being identical with the distinction characteristic of man, is then identical v;ith self-consciousness with the consciousness which man has of his nature. But religion, expressed generally, is consciousness of -the infinite; thus it is and can be nothing else than the consciousness which man has of nis own not finite and limited, but infinite nature. A really finite being has not ev'en the faintest adumbration, still less consciousness, of an inlinite being, for the limit of the nature is also the limit of the consciousness. The consciousness of the caterpillar, whose life is confined to a particular species of plant, does not extend itself beyond this narrov/ domain. It does, indeed, discriminate between this plant and other plants, but on account of that very limitation so infallible, we do not call it consciousness, but instinct. Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is identical vritli consciousness of the infinite; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness is essentially infinite in its nature. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of ■che infinity of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness or, in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the infinite of his own nature.
Feuerbach furthers his investigation to understand the real nature of man. According to him Reason, VJill and
Affections constitute the proper humanity of man. The power of thought is the light of the intellect, the pov/er of will is energy of character and the power of affection is love.
Reason, love and force of will are the perfections of man - 92
they are the absolute perfections of being itself. Man
exists to think, to love and to will. The divine trinity in
man, tibove the individual man, is the unity of reason, love
and will. These are t:he constituent elements of man's nature
This man is nothing without an object because it is through
the object that man becoines acgu^inted with himself,
consciousness of the object is the self-consciousness of man.
The absolute to mian is his own nature. Conseguently the power 64 of the object over man is therefore the power of his own nature.
Thus man, according to Feuerbach, is a being endowed v;ith
certain specific capacities and consciousness that enables him
to mak'"' his own nature his object of thought and contemplation;
All the conceptions and ideas of man are conditioned by his
own nature. Even his conception of infinity and otner
perfections are reflections based on his own nature. a. The Essence of Religion
Feuerbach says that in sense perception consciousness of
the object is distinguishable from the consciousness of selr;
but in religion, consciousness of the object and self-
consciousness coincide. The object of the senses is out of
man, the religious object is within man, this is much more
close and intimate to man than the mere object of the senses.
As we have seen, for Feuerbach the object of any subject is
nothing else than the subject's own nature taken objectively.
In religious consciousness this objectification finds 95
expression in the idea of God. Consciousness of God is self-consciousness# knowledge of God is self-knowledge.
Whatever is God to man is his heart and soul, God is the manifested inward nature, the expressed self of man.
Religion is "the solemn unveiling of man's hidden treasures, the revelation of his intimate thoughts, the open confession G6 of his love secrets." However the religious man is not aware of this identity. It is the ignorance of this fact that is fundamental to religion, what gives religion its peculiar nature. Religion is man's earliest and indirect form of self-knowledge. Hence, says Feuerbacii, religion everywhere preceeds philosophy, as in the history of race so also in that of the individual. Religion is the child like condition of humanity, a stage that man has to outgrow.
This is seen in the historrical progress of religion; what was considered to be objective reality by an earlier religion is considered subjective by the succeeding religion. What one generation considered to be objective and worshipped as divine is considered by the next as subjective and human<,
Religion is thus, in the last analysis, the relation of man to himself, to his own nature viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the human being, the humaA nature purified and freed from the limitations of the individual man. All the attributes of the divine nature, are therefore, attributes of the human natureo 94
The salient features of Feuerbach's conception of relioion aie : 1 ) r.an inak'jc religion and C-oa a”ter liis imcige;
2 ) wod is norriinu but the personirication oi; his own human aualitics; 3) this r^ersoni/'i c ation changes, it is modified
accordino to the rime and circumstances in v/h ich man rinds himself, and 4) as man develops he acquires more and more self-knowledue, hr' realizes that, v;hat he had been in the oast worshipping as God is nothing but his ov/n self. It is
“he duty of philosophy to reveal this fact to man so that he can live in the light of reason and not under an illusion as lie had been so .l ar living*
The Gonce:;tion of God or God's corresponds to the qualities rhat each one thinks to be important and sublime.
VJe cannot think of a God v/ithout aualities and so if we rake av;ay the craalities that are attributed to God^ then
there is no God left, A God who has abstract predicates has only an absrract existence. The influence that religion
and the existence of ^od have on man depends on the aualities
mat one attributes to Ciod. The God of religion is not the aj.'srraction or rne metar'iivsiclan.
God is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself; hence man can do nothing of himself. All goodness comes from God, The more subjective God is, the more completely does man divest himself of his subjectivity, because God is„ per se, his relinguished self, the possession of which he hov/ever again vindicates to himself.
Having thus comoleted the unveiling of religion and its essential basis, B'euerbach now proceeds to tackle the particular attributes and qualities of God to show that they 95
are nothing but human qualities. In religion man contemplates his own latent nature. The differencing of God and man is actually a differencing of man from his own nature.So an analysis of the qualities attributed to God will show that there is nothing supernatural about the qualities of
God but that they are merely the qualities of the human species. If God has to be an object of cult for man then
God has to possess these qualities. Without these qualities 70 God has no meaning for religion.
Religion should be able to satisfy the whole man. The predominent needs that religion satisfies are on the level of feeling. Yet man being a rational animal/ a thinking subject capable of abstraction, his God should also have qualities that can satisfy the needs of reason also. The 7 ^ dogma of Trinity is an attempt to satisfy not only feelings but also the other aspects. Feuerbach is able to see in God and in all his attributes the human source from which_ they originated. Prayer, one of the most important aspects of religion, is in reality a dialogue of man with himself. Men rush to prayer because they have wants and needs that cannot be satisfied here and now and demands before which he feels helpless. Since they cannot be realized in reality man looks for their realization in fantasy. What he wishes and wants is God to him and what he condem.ns is not divine. Thus religion in its fullest
sense is fantasy. It arises from man's sense of helplessness 96
and dependence. To get out of this fantasy man has to be helped out, by making him realize that the only reality is man and nature and nothing else. In his lectures on the Essence of Religion Feuerbach says:
My teaching or my view of life can be summed up in two words: nature and man. The being (Wesen) which I regard as preceding man, the being which is the cause or ground of man, to which is indebted for his origin and his existence, that being is in my view not God - a mystical, vague, ambiguous word, but nature - a clear, empirical, unambiguous word and being (Wesen). The being however, in which nature becomes^, a personal, conscious rational being - that is man.' ■
In the ultimate analysis then religion for Feuerbach is not a God-centered phenomenon but a man-centered one. It is the worship of man, "In every wish we find concealed a God; but in or^ behind every God there lies concealed nothing but '' > a wish." "Whatever the object of religion may be, be it even a shell or a pebble, it is an object of religion only 74 as an object of the emotions, of the imagination."
Christianity from the very beginning proclaimed that God has become man, but the real meaning of this is that man has become God, though the truth of this proposition still lies clouded in theology and speculation. It is not that
religion happens to be anthropology but it has to be
anthropology if it has to have a meaning and value for man.
Feuerbach has shown that religion has no content that is • not natural and human. It is the expression of the
alienated man. 97
For Feuerbach true religion is ethics in its transcendental and categorical form. This true religion, he hopes, will be liberated from the fantasy images and confusions through his critique'.^ Popular religion has no other aim or task than to make the world and nature comprehensible and practically compliant in the service of human needs. This is an aim it shares with culture and learning. Whereas culture tries to achieve it through means derived from nature, religion tries with means that 76 are supernatural such as prayer, belief, sacrament or magic.
This in short is Feuerbach's philosophy of religion and it was to have a lot of influence on Marxian critique of religion as we shall see shortly (Ch.III). Feuerbach's philosophy still exerts an influence on those who are searching for a universal humanistic philosophy that would help in bringing about a more humane universe. According to Kolakowski, Feuerbach's radical humanism could be summed up in the following points. Firstly, man is the only value; all others are instrumental and subordinate. Secondly, man is always alive, finite, concrete entity. Thirdly, there are permanent features of hiunan nature which make it possible for men to live in a harmonious comrr>unlty based on mutual love and respect for life. Fourthly, the abolition of hitherto known dogmatic, mythical and mystical religion will pave the way for a new authentic humanistic religion which will enable man to attain the real goal of religion. 98
namely# the satisfaction of their desire for happiness#
solidarity, equality and freedom.77
S. Conclusion
In this chapter what we have attempted is to show how
the conservative Hegelian philosophical system gave birth
to many divergent forms - many of them radical - which would
in the course of time form the groundwork of the most radical
ideology that would question the very foundation on which
conservative orthodox system was founded. The radicalization
of Young Hegelianism took three main forms. In philosophy
it broke with the Hegelian doctrine of the self-fulfilment
of history and accepted the opposition between the facts
of history and normative Reason. In the religious field,
the Young Hegelians rejected Christianity and all other
forms of religion and embraced atheism. Finally/ in the
political field they abandoned reformist hopes and accepted
the prospect of revolution as the only way to regenerate 7P humanity and Germany in particular.
It was as a member of this group that Marx started out.
Practically all of them were his contemporaries and co
workers at one time or another. The Young Hegelians we
have considered had mutual influence. So they cannot be
arranged in a neat pattern or chronology. It is extremely
difficult to find a particular point that had been consistently
developed by all of them. As we have seen all of them devoted 99
considerable amount of time and energy to the question of religion. Most of them like Hegel started out on their academic life as theologians. So we see a very strong current of religiosity in their works. We could even say that religion was their prime concern and they believed that a thorough criticism of religion would pave the way for a radical change in society, which at that time was based on the justification provided by religion. It was with the advent of Karl Marx that the Young Hegelian movement and critique acquired a social content. lUO
Notes and References
1 According to Karl Popper, Hegel arrives at this equation of reational to real by a series of equivocations. Plato# whose ideas or Form are entirely different from 'ideas in the mind', had said that the Ideas alone are real/ and that perishable things are unreal, Hegel adopts from this doctrine the equation Ideal=Real. Kant talked, in his dialectics, about the 'ideas of Pure Reason', using the term 'Idea' in the sense of 'ideas in the mind', Hegel adopts from this the doctrine that the ideas are something mental or spiritual or rationa, which can be expressed in the equation Idea=Reason. Combined, these two equations, or rather equivocations, yield Real = Reason; and this allows Hegel to maintain that everything that is reasonable must be real and everything that is real must be reasonable, and that the development of reality is the same as that of reason, j ^ ,
Cf, Popper, K., The Open Society and Its Enemies, VoL IX, The High Tide of Prophecy; Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p,41,
2 Cf. Berlin, L., Karl Marx, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p,49,
3 Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol.I, Oxford UP, 1981, pp. 82ff.
4 Cf. ibid., p.83. All the reference to Kolakowski in this chapter is to Vol.I.
5 The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co . is the first joint work of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels. This was meant to be a criticism of the Young Hegelian trend. Marx wrote most of the book and worked on it till the end of
Ih 7 t ' <' I 101
November/ 1944. "The Holy Family" is a sarcastic nickname for the Bauer brothers and their followers (see CW,IV, pp.683-685).
6 The Silesian weavers' uprising (June 4-6, 1844) was considered a futile revolt of the helpless poor people driven by dispair by Ruge. Marx saw in it the first big battle of the German proletariat against the bourgeoisie, as the manifestation of the growth of class-consciousness of the German workers. CW,III.594.
7 Cf. Hook, S., From Hegel to Marx, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1962, p.27.
8 About Enlightenment see the note 13 in Ch.l,
9 Cf. Hook, S., op.cit. 79.
10 Cf. ibid., p.80.
11 Oizermann, T., The Making of Marxist Philosophy, Moscow, 1981, pp.32.
12 Schweitzer, A., The Quest for Historical Jesus, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1948, p.l.
13 Cf. Reardon, B., Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1966, cf.ll3 ff.
14 Schweitzer, A., op.cit. pp.71-72.
15 Cf. ibid., pp.73 f£
16 Cf. Hook, S., pp. cit. p.82; see also Reardon, op.cit.p.113,
17 In his Life of Jesus, Strauss say; "If reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human nature, is this eguivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been. 102
and never more will ne in one individual. This is not the mode in which the Idea realized itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fullness on one exemplar^ and be niggardly towards all others - to express itself perfectly in that one individual and imperfectly in all the rest. It rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other - in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realization for the Idea? Is not the idea of unity of divine and human nature a real one in a far higher sense/ when I regard the whole race of mankind as in realization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternj-ty, a truer one than incarnation limited to a particular point of time?" Quoted in S. Hook., o.p.cit, pp.85-86.
18 Cf. Strauss, D., The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (ed.) Hodgson, Philadelphia, 1972, pp.xvii-xviii.
19 Kolokowski, op.cit. For this section see pp.85-88,
20 Liebich, A., Between Ideology and Utopia, D, Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1979, pp.32-33,
21 Cf. Kolokowski, op.cit. p,8 6 ,
22 Cf. Liebich, op.cit., p.336.
23 Cf. ibid., pp.295 ff. !.
24 Cf. Hook, S., op.cit., p,89,
25 Cf. Schweitzer, op.cit., pp.154.
25 Cf. Kolakowski, op.cit., pp.89 ff. According to Oizermann, (op.cit. pp.100-101), Marx did not take part in the writing of this pamphlet but appeared to have suggested to Bauer many interesting ideas. 103
27 Cf. Kolokowski# op.cit, pp.88-91,
28 Cf. Hook# S,, op.cit, pp.90 ff.
29 ibid./ p.91 quoted from Bauer's Kritik der Evenqellsche Geschichte der Synoptiker/ III/ p.14,
30 Cf, Kolakowski/ op,cit,/ p,92,
31 Lowith/ Karl, From Hegel to Nietzsche, London, 19 65, p,349<
32 Cf, Hook/ S,/ op.cit, pp.129 ff,
33 ibid,/ p,130.
34 ibid., p. 13.1,
3 5 Lowith, op,cit,, p . 3 4 2 o
36 Hook/ S., op.cit,/ p,154,
3 7 Cf. ibid./ p p , 1 6 5 ff,
38 Cf. Lowith K, op.cit./ pp.103-317,
3 9 ibid., pp.318/ 356-7o
40 Cf. Hook/ op,cit./ 167 ff,
41 Lowith, op.cit,/ p.368,
42 The German Ideolocry is the joint work of Marx and Engles which they wrote in Brussels in 1845 and 1846. It was meant to be an expression of their materialistic interpretation of history against the ideas spread by the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach.
43 Cf. Hook/ S./ op.cit./ p . 181, Also see Oizermann/ op.cit., p.101. 10^
44 Cf. Kolakowski, op.cit.# p,109.
45 Cf. ibid., p.109.
46 ibid., pollO.
47 Cf. ibid., pp.Ill ff.
48 Hook, S., op.cit., p.195,
49 ibid., p . 196 quoted from Religion and Sittlichkeit, pp.115-16.
50 Feuerbach L., The Essence of Christianity (trans. George Eliot) (E.C) , introd. Karl Barth, Harper & Brothers Publishers, N.Y. 1957, p.x.
51 ibid., p.x.
52 Reardon, op.cit., p.82.
53 Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, London, 1970, p.35.
54 Feuerbach, E.C., p.x, quoted from Das Wesen der Religion(WR ), Leipzig, p.3.
55 Cf. ibid., p.xi, quoted from WR, p.14.
55 ibid., pp.xi-xiii.
57 Cf. Dahlstrom, Daniel, "Marxist Ideology and Feuerbach's Critique of Hegel, "The Philosophical Forum", Vol.XI, No.3, New York, pp.234-248. See also Wartofsky, M., Feuerbach, Cambridge, 1977, pp.172-173.
58 Cf. Wartofsky, M., Feuerbach, pp.196.
59 Cf. Feuerbach says, "Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm 105
of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and caprice, instead of the simple daylight of reality and necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion - and to speculative philosophy and theology also - than to open its eyes# or rather to turn its gaze from the internal toward the external, i.e, I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality". (E.C. p.xxxix) See also pp.xxiii-xxxv.
60 Concerning his method about understanding religion Feuerbach says: "Speculation makes religion say only what it has itself thought, and expressed far better than religion; it assigns a meaning to religion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion; it does not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself speak; I constitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its prompter. Not to invent but to discover, "to unveil existence", has been my sole object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour...."(E.C,, p,xxxv-vi) See also p.xxxviii.
51 Cf. Wartofsky, M., op.cit., p,196,
62 Cf. E.C., p.l,
63 ibid., pp.2-3,
64 Cf. ibid., pp.3-5.
65 Cf. ibid., p.7.
6 6 ibid., p . 13. See also pp.12-14.
67 Cf. ibid., pp.17-20,
6 8 ibid., p.31.
69 Cf, ibid., p.33 106
70 Cf. ibid., p.44.
71 ibid., pp.65/ 73.
72 Kamenka./ The Philosophy of Ladriq Feuerbach, pp.42-43,
73 ibid./ p.43/ quoted from W.IX., p,43.
74 ibid./ p.43/ quoted from W/HI p.470.
75 Cf. Wartofsky/ M. , op.cit./ p,133/ quoted from Bolin- Jodal (ed.) Collected Works of Feuerbach, Stutgart/ 1903-1916, V/ pp.214-215.
76 Cf. ibid./ pp.392-395.
77 Cf. K61akowski/ op.cit., p.119.
78 Cf. ibid./ pp.93-94.