Mobinnet TELECOM TDD Development in Iran
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Persian Sites (English-97-08-07).Xlsx
Note: Consider that internet usage on the websites mentioned above will be calculated at half price, provided that the intended website is being visited using the IP mentioned in this list. Undoubtedly, the changes that webmasters make to the websites’ IP addresses without informing Shatel can result in the website being eliminated from the list of the websites the internet usage of which is calculated at half price, and Shatel will not be liable for these changes. Thank you Row URL IP 94.182.163.0/24 1 Varzesh3.com 94.182.132.0/24 94.182.99.128/27 185.188.104.0/24 2 Digikala.com 94.182.181.48 /28 185.147.176.0/22 3 Aparat.com 46.224.3.128/25 4 Shaparak.ir 185.167.74.20 5 Divar.ir 79.175.191.253 217.218.165.40 94.232.174.28 94.232.175.43 94.232.175.101 6 Tebyan.net 94.232.175.103 94.232.175.100 94.232.175.102 94.232.175.52 176.56.156.136 7 Bankmellat.ir 176.56.156.198 176.56.156.137 94.182.146.12 8 Yjc.ir 94.182.146.35 9 Blog.ir 91.99.101.242 94.182.146.186 10 Tabnak.ir 94.182.146.59 11 Mihanblog.com 5.144.133.146 12 Persianblog.ir 46.224.2.180 94.182.146.195 13 Asriran.com 79.175.164.155 94.182.146.24 14 Bmi.ir 89.235.64.0/22 164.138.23.8 79.175.175.20 79.175.175.21 15 Isna.ir 79.175.175.19 79.175.174.2 164.138.23.1 164.138.23.9 16 Khabaronline.ir 164.138.18.162 17 Rozblog.com 79.127.127.68 18 Mehrnews.com 77.238.121.220 19 Shahrekhabar.com 185.83.114.100 Row URL IP 20 Zoomit.ir 178.216.251.91 80.191.78.150 21 Tamin.ir 188.214.4.150 80.191.79.22 94.182.146.218 22 Mashreghnews.ir 185.49.84.70 185.49.84.72 23 Uast.ac.ir 46.32.1.26 185.13.228.77 -
8 a Special Report Iran Feedom House 01
Special Report Iran Status: Not Free Obstacles to Access: 19 (0–25) Limits on Content: 24 (0–35) Violations of User Rights: 31 (0–40) Total Score: 74 (0–100) Population: 72.2 million Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 18.2 million / 26 percent Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 23 million / 32 percent Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 15.4 million Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 30.2 million Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 85 / Not Free Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 105 out of 181 GNI Per Capita (PPP): $10,800 Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: Yes Political Content Systematically Filtered: Yes Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: Yes Introduction Although Iranians are active readers and producers of online content, the Iranian regime wields one of the world's most sophisticated apparatuses for controlling the internet and other digital technologies. Internet use in Iran began in 1995 at universities, then spread quickly via internet cafes to an otherwise isolated population with limited access to independent sources of news and entertainment. The government's censorship of the medium did not begin until 2001, but users today operate in an environment that features filtering of content—particularly domestically produced political news and analysis—together with intimidation, detention, and torture of bloggers, online journalists, and cyberactivists. As with restrictions on press freedom that date to the early days of the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic couches its restrictions on internet freedom in an opaque and arbitrary conception of Islamic morality outlined by the constitution, the press law, and the penal code. Obstacles to Access While the number of internet and mobile-phone users continues to grow, state-imposed and other infrastructural restrictions significantly constrain Iranians' ability to fully access these technologies and related applications. -
Data Collection Survey on Tourism and Cultural Heritage in the Islamic Republic of Iran Final Report
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IRANIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE, HANDICRAFTS AND TOURISM ORGANIZATION (ICHTO) DATA COLLECTION SURVEY ON TOURISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FINAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2018 JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA) HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY JTB CORPORATE SALES INC. INGÉROSEC CORPORATION RECS INTERNATIONAL INC. 7R JR 18-006 JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA) DATA COLLECTION SURVEY ON TOURISM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FINAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ v Maps ........................................................................................................................................ vi Photos (The 1st Field Survey) ................................................................................................. vii Photos (The 2nd Field Survey) ............................................................................................... viii Photos (The 3rd Field Survey) .................................................................................................. ix List of Figures and Tables ........................................................................................................ x 1. Outline of the Survey ....................................................................................................... 1 (1) Background and Objectives ..................................................................................... -
Download Being the Number of Sent Packets That Were Acknowledged As Received
Dimming the Internet Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran Collin Anderson? [email protected] Abstract. In the days immediately following the contested June 2009 Presidential election, Iranians attempting to reach news content and so- cial media platforms were subject to unprecedented levels of the degra- dation, blocking and jamming of communications channels. Rather than shut down networks, which would draw attention and controversy, the government was rumored to have slowed connection speeds to rates that would render the Internet nearly unusable, especially for the consump- tion and distribution of multimedia content. Since, political upheavals elsewhere have been associated with headlines such as \High usage slows down Internet in Bahrain" and \Syrian Internet slows during Friday protests once again," with further rumors linking poor connectivity with political instability in Myanmar and Tibet. For governments threatened by public expression, the throttling of Internet connectivity appears to be an increasingly preferred and less detectable method of stifling the free flow of information. In order to assess this perceived trend and begin to create systems of accountability and transparency on such practices, we attempt to outline an initial strategy for utilizing a ubiquitious set of network measurements as a monitoring service, then apply such method- ology to shed light on the recent history of censorship in Iran. Keywords: censorship, national Internet, Iran, throttling, M-Lab 1 Introduction "Prison is like, there's no bandwidth." - Eric Schmidt1 The primary purpose of this paper is to assess the validity of claims that the international connectivity of information networks used by the Iranian public has been subject to substantial throttling based on a historical and correlated set of open measurements of network performance. -
Wireless AC1200 ADSL2+ Dual Band Modem Router in This Case, You Should Go to Advanced Setup > WAN Service > Network Address Translation Settings to Disable
Wireless AC1200 ADSL2+ Dual Band Modem Router i Wireless AC1200 ADSL2+ Dual Band Modem Router Copyright Statement is the registered trademark of Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd. All the products and product names mentioned herein are the trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. Copyright of the whole product as integration, including its accessories and software, belongs to Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd. No part of this publication can be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into any language in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd. If you would like to know more about our product information, please visit our website at http://www.tendacn.com. Disclaimer Pictures, images and product specifications herein are for references only. To improve internal design, operational function, and/or reliability, Tenda reserves the right to make changes to the products without obligation to notify any person or organization of such revisions or changes. Tenda does not assume any liability that may occur due to the use or application of the product described herein. Every effort has been made in the preparation of this document to ensure accuracy of the contents, but all statements, information and recommendations in this document do not constitute the warranty of any kind, express or implied. Technical Support Website: http://www.tendacn.com Telephone: (86 755) 2765 7180 E-mail: [email protected] ii Wireless AC1200 ADSL2+ Dual Band Modem Router Contents Chapter 1 Get to Know Your Router ..................................................................................................................................... 1 1. What it does ............................................................................................................................................................. -
The Growing Cyberthreat from Iran the Initial Report of Project Pistachio Harvest
THE GROWING CYBERTHREAT FROM IRAN THE INITIAL REPORT OF PROJECT PISTACHIO HARVEST FREDERICK W. KAGAN AND TOMMY STIANSEN 1150 Seventeenth Street, NW 1825 South Grant Street, Ste. 635 April 2015 Washington, DC 20036 San Mateo, CA 94402 202.862.5800 650.513.2881 www.aei.org www.norse-corp.com THE GROWING CYBERTHREAT FROM IRAN THE INITIAL REPORT OF PROJECT PISTACHIO HARVEST Frederick W. Kagan and Tommy Stiansen April 2015 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT AND NORSE CORPORATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... v Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 Intelligence Collection and Analysis Methodology ...................................................................................... 4 Iran: The Perfect Cyberstorm? ...................................................................................................................... 8 What Are the Iranians Doing? .................................................................................................................... 14 Cyberattacks Directly from Iran ................................................................................................................. 24 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................... -
Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy
SMALL MEDIA IRANIAN INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY REPORT // February - March 2013 // www.smallmedia.org.uk This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 2 INTRODUCTION // When we began work on the Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report series late last year, our ambition was to document the rich technical and political complexities of Iran’s com- munications environment, which are often missed due to language, nuance and diffusion of sources. Although public reports often focus on the battles between the censors and Facebook, or the Cyber Army and reformist sites, these narratives often pass over the meaningful role of administrative entities, conservative factions and private individuals in the complex polity and security of the domestic network. We believed then that we can better predict the future when the motivations of these actors are better understood. There is no better affirmation of this than the timing of the February edition of this series, were we noted, “When Supreme Council of Cyberspace promotes new policies on the registration of VPNs, we can expect that unregistered VPN connection will be blocked and throttled.” Released on March 8, within hours Iranian Internet users began to report that outbound VPN connections and other anti-filter tools were no longer working. After several years of discour- aging public use of circumvention tools and direct threats of blocking, including brief periods of actual disruption, it appears that to the agencies administering Iran’s censorship policies the balance between control and development no longer favors the free flow of information over the Internet. -
Mashreq 2.0: Digital Transformation for Inclusive Growth and Jobs Washington, DC: World Bank License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO (CC by 3.0 IGO)
Mashreq 2.0: Public Disclosure Authorized Digital Transformation for Inclusive Growth and Jobs Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Mashreq Country Management Unit Digital Development Practice Middle East and North-Africa Region Infrastructure Vice Presidency The World Bank The World Bank © 2018 International Bank for Reconstitution and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some Rights Reserved This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, or of any participating organization to which such privileges and immunities may apply, all of which are specifically reserved. Rights and Permission This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following conditions: Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. -
Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report
JULY 2015 Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report A Small Media monthly report bringing you all the latest news on internet policy and online censorship direct from Iran. smallmedia.org.uk This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License Iranian Internet 2 Infrastructure and Policy Report Introduction Iran’s pervasive internet filtering system makes circumvention tools necessary for many run-of-the-mill online activities, such as posting a status update on Facebook or uploading a picture to Instagram. This requirement can make using the internet in Iran a persistent and frustrating challenge. Luckily for Iranian netizens, there are resources available to help them gain access to blocked sites. In what follows, we’ll examine one such resource. This month’s report looks at Filtershekanha, a mailing list which sends its subscribers biweekly updates on the latest circumvention tools and provides instructions about how to download the required software. Through a combination of an interview with the list’s founder Nariman Gharib and a presentation and discussion of circumvention tool download statistics, we’ll unpack what Filtershekanha is, how it functions, and what it might tell us about internet filtering in Iran more generally. Filtershekanha is almost certainly not the only source of information about circumvention tools in Iran, and the data we analyse is not intended to be representative of Iran’s internet-using population. Yet with nearly 100,000 subscribers, we think Filtershekanha can serve as a compelling case study that will allow us to probe questions about how Iranians access information about circumvention tools. -
Iran: Tightening the Net 2020 After Blood and Shutdowns
Iran: Tightening the Net 2020 After Blood and Shutdowns. First published by ARTICLE 19, September 2020 ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre 60 Farringdon Road London EC1R 3GA United Kingdom www.ARTICLE 19.org Text and analysis Copyright ARTICLE 19, September 2020 (Creative Commons License 3.0) Typesetting, Ana Z. ARTICLE 19 works for a world where all people everywhere can freely express themselves and actively engage in public life without fear of discrimination. We do this by working on two interlocking freedoms, which set the foundation for all our work. The Freedom to Speak concerns everyone’s right to express and disseminate opinions, ideas and information through any means, as well as to disagree from, and question power- holders. The Freedom to Know concerns the right to demand and receive information by power-holders for transparency good governance and sustainable development. When either of these freedoms comes under threat, by the failure of power-holders to adequately protect them, ARTICLE 19 speaks with one voice, through courts of law, through global and regional organisations, and through civil society wherever we are present. About Creative Commons License 3.0: This work is provided under the Creative Commons Attribution- Non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.5 license. You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative works, provided you: 1) give credit to ARTICLE 19; 2) do not use this work for commercial purposes; 3) distribute any works derived from this publication under a license identical to this one. To -
Iranian Internet Infrastructure and Policy Report
SMALL MEDIA IRANIAN INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY REPORT // January - February 2013 // www.smallmedia.org.uk This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 2 1 INTRODUCTION // As the June election approaches and the internal politics of the government becomes more continuous, Iran’s Internet connectivity, and the accessibility of uncensored information, con- tinues to deteriorate, reflecting offline crackdowns on the press. Prominent Persian-language websites and other online services have been filtered one by one, and communications with external platforms is becoming progressively more difficult. From a technical perspective, few things have been changed in recent months, and in this report we focus on the evolution of the infrastructure policies of the Telecommunication Company of Iran and Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, as well as the ramping up of the censorship of pro-government media. 2 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS content filtering and blocked sites · january - february: Persian-language music blogs, dating sites, digital securit information and movie download hubs are subject to increased filtering and content takedown orders. Sites hosted through Iranian-owned service providers, including those on foreign-based servers leased by companies such as Mihan Web Host, began to display notices that offending domain had been blocked by the Committee for Determining Examples of Criminal Web Content, advising the owner on how to appeal the takedown. Examples can be found on fullmusic4.ir, marshalsat.pro, num1vpn1.org, and myplus.ir. Contrary to initial reports, these domain names were not seized by the domain registrar or the country-level Internet registry, instead content was removed by the host company and a filtered page was posted in its place. -
Iran Telecom Market Review & Investment Opportunity Table of Contents
نشريه تخصصي كانون تفكر مخابرات ايران سال يازدهم، شماره 52 خرداد و تير 1395 Iran Telecom Market Review & Investment Opportunity Table of Contents Foreword ..............................................................................................................................2 IRAN AT A GLANCE ...........................................................................................................4 IRAN Economy ....................................................................................................................5 Iranian Telecom sector: History, Governance and Regulation .............................8 IRAN Mobile Market Review...........................................................................................11 Fixed Broadband Market in Iran ................................................................................... 15 IRAN FIXED MARKET DATA SHEET ........................................................................... 18 IRAN MOBILE MARKET DATA SHEET ........................................................................ 21 Revolution of Iranian Startups ....................................................................................22 MVNO Licensing in IRAN .............................................................................................. 24 Virtual Operators and Real Opportunities ............................................................. 24 Opportunities in Iranian Telecom Market ...............................................................26 How to do business in Iran successfully