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The Role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 0 Mucyo Report

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The Role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 0 Mucyo Report Mucyo report - The role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 0 Mucyo report- Report of an independent Commission to establish the role of France in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. This is the full report TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS i GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 1. Creation and historical background of the Commission 1 2. How the Commission understood its terms of reference 1 3. Methodology for the collection of information2 3.1. Sources of information in Rwanda 2 3.2. Collection of information abroad 2 3.3. Access to public documents 3 3.4. Information Processing 4 3.5. Research stages 4 INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT 5 1. Foreign involvement in Rwanda’s conflict and in the genocide 5 1.1 Historical background 5 1.2. Recent international interventions (1990-1994) 8 1.2.1. Belgium 8 1.2.2. United States 9 1.2.3. United Nations Organisation (UNO) 10 1.2.4. An attempt at international redress? 13 1.3 Process of the recognition of the genocide 14 1.3.1 Initiatives of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 14 1.3.2 Procrastination in the recognition of the genocide in the Security Council 15 PART I: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA BEFORE THE GENOCIDE 17 1. Historical background and legal framework of cooperation between France and Rwanda 17 1.1. Aspects of the civilian cooperation 17 1.2 Elements of military cooperation 18 1.2.1 Contents of the Special Military Assistance Agreement of 1975 18 1.2.2 Amendments of the 1975 Agreement 19 1.2.3 Increased military aid effective from 1989 20 1.3. Structure of the French military intervention (October 1990 – April 1994)22 1.3.1 Context of the October 1990 war 22 1.3.2 Description of the different elements of France’s intervention according to the official version 25 1.4 Official justification of the French intervention: building a legitimacy 30 1.4.1. Public statements during the events 31 1.4.2 Non confidential internal position 31 1.4.3 Posteriori statements 34 1.5. Criticisms of the French intervention within France and abroad 35 1.5.1. Criticisms at the time of the events 35 1.5.2 Posterior criticisms 39 ACTS FRANCE IS ACCUSED OF41 1. Contribution to the perpetration of the war 41 1.1. Support in military intelligence and telephone tapping 41 1.2. Strategic advice and tactical support 45 1.2.1. Attending the meetings of evaluation and strategic planning 45 1.2.2. Direct participation in fighting: 1990-1993 48 2. Involvement in the training of Interahamwe militia and village vigilantes (civilian self-defence) 54 2.1. The Interahamwe 54 2.2. Early stages of the village vigilantes « civilian self-defence » 55 2.2.1. Gabiro camp 57 2.2.2. Nyakinama University Campus 64 2.2.3. Gako camp 65 2.2.4. Mukamira camp 67 2.2.5 Bigogwe camp 69 2.3. Additional information 71 2.3.1 In 1992-1993, Interahamwe committed acts of genocide 73 2.3.2. Intensification of the training of the Interahamwe in preparation of the genocide of 199477 3. Criminal Investigation Department 79 3.1. The action of the French gendarmes in the centre for criminal investigation and documentation (CRCD) 79 3.1.1. Training in techniques and professional ethics of Criminal Investigation 80 3.1.2. Conduct of investigation 80 3.1.3. The computerisation of the central database 83 3.1.4. Was the computerisation of the central database used for making lists of the people to be killed? 83 4. Acts of violence on roadblocks 88 4.1. Ethnic segregation and arbitrary arrests 89 4.2. Disappearance of arrested people 92 4.3. Physical intimidations and violence 94 4.4. Sexual assault and rape 95 4.5. Participation and assistance in the killings 98 4.5.1 In military camps and other places in Kigali 98 4.5.2. In the other prefectures 101 5. Acts of violence away from the roadblocks 104 5.1. Ethnically based physical or verbal violence 104 5.2. Rape and sexual assault 107 5.3 Support and assistance in perpetration of violent acts 109 6. Violent interrogation of RPF prisoners of war 110 6.1 Threats and ill treatments110 6.2 Execution of prisoners of war 115 7. Support for a policy of mass murder 116 7.1. The Internal French Reports 122 7.2. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations 123 7.3 Reports by the Rwandan civil society 124 7.4. UN Reports 125 7.5 The repeated perpetrations of massacres and the reinforcement of French military support 125 8. Diplomatic support for the Rwandan regime 128 8.1. Actions alongside Belgium and African States 128 8.2. Partiality in the peace talks 131 8.3. Contribution to the ethnic radicalisation of the conflict 133 8.3.1. Justification of ethnic based speech133 8.3.2. Support to ethnic radicalism 136 8.4. Attempts to implicate western powers 138 8.5. Attempt at manipulating the UN 140 PART II: FRANCE’S INVOLVEMENT DURING THE GENOCIDE 142 I France’s involvement during the genocide, before Opération Turquoise 142 1. Official justifications of Opération Amaryllis 142 1.1. Protection of the French, European nationals, and other foreigners 142 1.2 The proclamation of the decision of non-intervention in the ongoing massacres 144 2. The facts blamed on France 145 2.1 Political support to the organizers of the genocide 145 2.1.1 Involvement in the training of the interim government 146 2.1.2 The targeted evacuations 150 3. Diplomatic support 160 3.1 Collaboration with the interim government 160 3.2 Contact with the President of the interim government 161 3.3 Protection of the interim government at the Security Council 162 3.4 Collusion with the UN Secretary General and his Representative in Rwanda 162 4. French military support during the genocide 164 4.1 Presence of French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide 164 4.2 High level contact between FAR officers and French officers 169 4.3 Delivery of arms and ammunitions during the genocide and their use 171 4.4 Distribution of arms delivered by France to Interahamwe during the genocide. 174 II. OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 177 1.1. The decision-making process 177 1.2 Disagreement at the level of the French executive on the objectives and modalities of the intervention 179 1.3 Orders of operation, composition and progress 182 1.4. Impressive human and material means 183 1. CYANGUGU 186 1) The Opération Turquoise, shield of the FAR in Cyangugu 188 2) Collaboration between the French soldiers and the Interahamwe in the continuation of the assassinations of Tutsis 189 3) Nyarushishi displaced persons camp 201 4) Rapes 206 5) Pillaging carried out by the French soldiers and their failure to intervene in the pillaging and destruction of infrastructure by Rwandans 210 6) Inciting the populace to flee the country 213 KIBUYE 215 BISESERO 216 1) Abandonment 216 2) Refusal by Captain Marin Gillier to end the Bisesero massacres 222 3) Colonel Rosier wanted to sacrifice the Bisesero survivors 231 RUBENGERA 240 III. KIBUYE TOWN 247 GIKONGORO 249 I. Distinctiveness of Murambi camp 251 II. Acts committed by the French soldiers at Gikongoro 252 1. Delivery of Tutsi to militiamen and inciting ethnic murders 252 2. Freedom granted to militiamen to continue murdering genocide survivors 255 3. Direct involvement of French soldiers in acts of murder 259 4. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 264 4.2 Throwing people off board at the edge and outside Nyungwe forest 268 4.2.2 Throwing people off board at Sheke 269 4.2.3 Throwing people off board at Shaba 271 4.2.4 Throwing people off board at Rusebeya 272 4.2.5 Throwing people off board at Nyakizu 274 5. Cases of rape and sexual slavery 276 6. Insufficient distribution of food and medical care to the survivors of the genocide 287 7. Inciting people to flee the country 289 8. Looting of public property 292 PART THREE: 303 INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AFTER THE GENOCIDE 303 1. Political support to the interim government and military support to former FAR and Interahamwe after July 1994 303 1.1 Official contacts with the interim government in exile 303 1.2 Supply of arms and covering their delivery by Turquoise 304 1.2 Restructuring, re-arming and re-training of FAR and Interahamwe 306 1.2.1 Supporting FAR and Interahamwe in Zaïre. 306 1.2.2 Training FAR and Interahamwe in Congo Brazzaville and in Central Africa 316 2. Constraints to the efforts of reconciliation in Rwanda from July 1994 319 2.1 Blocking aid funds for the improvement of the situation posterior to genocide 319 3. France as a turf for denial and revisionism of genocide 322 3.1 The revisionism and the denial of the French authorities and institutions 322 3.1.1 French Political leaders 322 3.1.2 Contamination in schools 323 3.1.3. Legal manipulation 324 3.3 Mobilization of ex-Soldiers of Turquoise 325 3.4 Support of French politicians in revisionist or denial propaganda 326 4. Obstacles to the judgment of the presumed perpetrators of the genocide 327 4.1.1 Reopening the case of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka 327 4.1.2 Other pending cases 329 5. Frustrating Judge Brigitte Raynaud’s investigation 332 6. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with the aim of favouring the interests of genocide suspects 334 SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY336 General Conclusion 341 RECOMMENDATIONS 349 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1.
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