Jeane Kirkpatrick and the End of the Cold War: Dictatorships, Democracy, and Human Rights Ilan Wurman Claremont Mckenna College
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Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2009 Jeane Kirkpatrick and the End of the Cold War: Dictatorships, Democracy, and Human Rights Ilan Wurman Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Wurman, Ilan, "Jeane Kirkpatrick and the End of the Cold War: Dictatorships, Democracy, and Human Rights" (2009). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 226. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/226 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE JEANE KIRKPATRICK AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: DICTATORSHIPS, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR JOHN J. PITNEY JR. AND DEAN GREGORY HESS BY ILAN WURMAN FOR SENIOR THESIS FALL 2008 - SPRING 2009 APRIL 27, 2009 ii ii iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...……iv Introduction………………………………………………………………………….……......1 Part I: An Intellectual and Political History Chapter One: Cold War Consensus Shattered………..……………………………………....8 Chapter Two: Dictatorships and Double Standards………………………………………....33 Chapter Three: The Carter Years: Was Kirkpatrick Right?....................................................45 Part II: Kirkpatrick and the Reagan Administration Chapter Four: The Kirkpatrick and Reagan Doctrines..…………………….……………….69 Chapter Five: Putting Policy to Practice: Chile and El Salvador………...………………….89 Bibliography………………………………………………………………..…………...….118 Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………122 iii iv Acknowledgments I could not have written this thesis without the help of many people, and first and foremost without the help of my adviser and professor, John J. Pitney Jr. He guided me to a doable and exciting topic from my initial mumblings about Reagan and democratization. Without his help, this year-long endeavor would never have come to fruition. I would also like to thank Professor Ken Miller and my fellow honors seminar students for their help and guidance along the way. Without stories to share, I’m sure many of us would have despaired long ago. My roommate, Kyle Kinneberg, also deserves some credit here: he has patiently listened as I have complained, and his company has made the project more bearable. While this project is the capstone of my undergraduate education, my parents, Hadassah and Ze’ev, were the foundations of that education. Without two wonderful parents to keep me yearning for knowledge, and sometimes to keep me humble, my undergraduate education would not have been as successful. For that I am forever grateful. I must also thank the people whom I interviewed for this thesis. They lived through the end of the Cold War, and were part of its story. I am honored that they took the time to talk to a college student. The ideas they gave me in our conversations helped give this thesis its final shape. iv Introduction In 2002, President Bush announced an ambitious goal: “to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.” The strategy to achieve this end was three-pronged: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”1 This strategy did not depend on war, but rather allowed for war to protect U.S. interests and, in the process, spread democracy—much as the Reagan Doctrine, as we shall see, did not depend on war but rather outlined when it could be used. The scope and methods of the current conflict are novel and based on newer, different threats to the United States. But in principle what has become known as the Bush Doctrine—the idea that America must use its power to spread democracy—was relatively consistent with America’s foreign policy traditions. Though there have been both isolationist and interventionist tendencies in past American foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt expressed the tradition of promoting democracy when he said that the United States must be an “arsenal of democracy,” as did Woodrow Wilson when he said the United States must make the world “safe for democracy.” Supporting democracy around the world has been a thread of American foreign policy since the First World War. 1 President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2002). 2 The various manifestations of this foreign policy tradition in American history were much more limited in scope than the current conflict. World War I had a well- defined goal for President Wilson, namely the creation of the League of Nations. In World War II, the well-defined goals were to defeat Hitler and establish democratic governments in Germany and Japan, and during the Cold War the goal was continued containment or defeat of the Soviet Union. All three conflicts had specific endpoints and organized enemies with identifiable headquarters. Critics of the War on Terror have rightly asked, when will the conflict end? When will we know that victory has been achieved? Were President Bush’s goals realistic? Such questions underlie this thesis, which explores the most recent episode in which the United States engaged in a relatively successful endeavor to spread democracy around the world. What lessons can policymakers glean, if any, from the American policies in the Cold War in its final decade? What can they learn about democratization in the Cold War era? This thesis is not intended as a comparative history of the Cold War and the War on Terror, but I shall attempt nevertheless to draw some connections and lessons for today, at least in the conclusion or where it might be illuminating. Because the scope of this thesis does not allow it to look at the history of the Cold War exhaustively, it focuses on one key player in the Cold War scene, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who served as President Reagan’s first Ambassador to the United Nations. More specifically, this thesis uses Kirkpatrick’s famous 1979 Commentary essay, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” as a springboard to explore the issues of democratization, human rights, the Reagan Doctrine, and the foreign policy debates of the 1970s. Such an analysis will shed light on a foreign policy that used different methods to promote democracy in different countries; 3 the difficulty and complexity of democratization in general; the distinctions, if any, between Kirkpatrick’s philosophy and that of the Carter administration; and criticisms of Reagan’s approach to the Cold War. Finally, such an analysis will illuminate important differences between the Bush administration policies and the Kirkpatrick-Reagan policies, which Kirkpatrick herself highlighted in her opposition to the 2003 Iraq War. Kirkpatrick’s essay might appear an odd choice of springboard, but I have found it helpful in thinking about many aspects of foreign policy. Her essay explores the interplay of realism and idealism. It raises such questions as: • Is it sensible to support anti-democratic regimes as a means to other objectives? • Should the United States hold its allies to the same standards of internal governance and human rights as it holds its enemies? • Might the national interest be compatible with larger goals defined by idealism? • What does democratization require politically, economically, and culturally? Such questions are relevant to democratization in the struggle against terrorism. Should the United States hold Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, which have provided significant support to the United States, to the same standards as Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Iran, or Libya? When do security concerns justify cooperating with undemocratic regimes in the Muslim world? Is it sensible to insist upon democratization in certain countries but not others? Is democratic government even feasible in modern- day Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, or Iraq? This thesis will explore those questions in the context of the Cold War. This thesis has two parts. The first relates some of the history leading up to Kirkpatrick’s writing of “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” followed by an 4 interpretation of that essay and the Carter administration foreign policy that inspired it. Though the essay was a direct outgrowth of Kirkpatrick’s disillusionment with President Carter’s foreign policy, it also grew out of the broader foreign policy debates in the post- Vietnam era. This period witnessed the rise of a new group of traditional liberal internationalists, who would derisively become called “neoconservatives” (a term they adopted), and of which Jeane Kirkpatrick was notably a member. The first chapter traces the history and its debates from the existence of a Cold War consensus in the 1950s and 1960s and how Vietnam shattered this consensus, to the emergence of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority and the Democratic Party split that occurred over Vietnam. This history not only provides the context and explores the events that shaped Kirkpatrick’s thought, but it also reveals competing beliefs about foreign policy on the American political scene. Examining those beliefs helps us understand Kirkpatrick’s and Reagan’s own thoughts and arguments: it provides alternatives within which we might compare policies. The second chapter analyzes her essay. Criticisms of Kirkpatrick have abounded over the years, particularly involving her support for “rightist” authoritarian regimes. What was the character of that support, and did she perhaps go too far in her enthusiasm for authoritarian regimes? Did the Reagan administration give these governments a “free pass” on human rights? Given Kirkpatrick’s criticism of President Carter’s double standard in foreign policy, were the Reagan administration and Kirkpatrick applying their own double standard? The final chapter in this part will look at Carter’s policies, which will sharpen our understanding of Kirkpatrick’s philosophy and Reagan’s policies by comparison, and 5 help to evaluate Kirkpatrick’s critique of the Carter administration.