NGO Power in Global Social and Environmental Standard-Setting

NGO Power in Global Social and Environmental Standard-Setting Magnus Boström and Kristina Tamm Hallström NGO Power in Global Social and Environmental Standard-Setting • Magnus Boström and Kristina Tamm Hallström*

In his book Power in the Global Age, Ulrich Beck argues that globalization has in- troduced a new space and framework for politics:

Politics is no longer subject to the same boundaries as before, and it is no longer tied solely to state actors and institutions, the result being that addi- tional players, new roles, new resources, unfamiliar rules and new contradic- tions and conºicts appear on the scene.1 According to Beck, we are witnessing one of the most signiªcant changes in the history of power. His analysis is based primarily on the changing relationship between global business and the state, arguing that there is increasing asymme- try between these two centers of power, to the advantage of global business. There is room for new forms of global counter-power in his analysis, however, and actions performed by NGOs are vital in this context. Beck, along with nu- merous scholars in the area of global governance and regulation,2 focuses on new roles, rules, strategies, and objectives. In this article we concentrate on rule- making within global multi-stakeholder organizations in which NGOs play crucial roles. We see a number of regulatory innovators in which environmental and social NGOs participate working for more responsible global business. Some of the best known of these standards setting organizations are the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), Social Accountability International (SAI), and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), and

* The research presented in this article has been made possible through funding by the Swedish Research Council for our joint project “Organizing Private Authority” as well as Boström’s project “The Missing Pillar,” funded by the Swedish Research Council Formas. The work with this article has proªted from collaboration with participants from the Missing Pillar research pro- gram, and we also wish to thank the anonymous referees that gave us constructive comments on earlier versions of the article. 1. Beck 2005, 3–4. 2. See, for example, Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Rosenau 2003; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Pattberg 2007; Fransen and Kolk 2007; and Boström and Garsten 2008.

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the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Many such standard- setting bodies are multi-stakeholder organizations. Their members and participants constitute various types of organizations and individuals: scientiªc experts, representatives from governmental organizations or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), representatives from transnational corporations (TNCs) and trade associations, and environmental and social NGOs from civil society. Standard-setting within these organizations relies on deliberations and negotiations among the participants and on ªnding durable compromises or consensus between stakeholders from various spheres of society. A number of scholars have drawn attention to the rise, inºuence, and role of NGOs in global politics—including international environmental negotiations,3 accountability struggles,4 world civic politics,5 and civil regulation.6 Others have focused on the mobilizing, networking, and organizing aspects of transnational social movement organizations.7 Still others focus on the accountability and legitimacy of NGOs.8 We argue, however, that there has been a lack of speciªc focus on their role, power, and participation within transnational multi-stakeholder standard-setting organizations—including the long- term challenges and dilemmas that such participation may create. Our ªrst purpose is to analyze the impact of NGOs on multi-stakeholder work by drawing on a power-based perspective. We then emphasize some of the institutional, structural, and discursive factors within multi-stakeholder organizations that create certain challenges to and dilemmas for NGO power and participation in the longer term. We focus on the role of social and environmental NGOs within three global standard-setting organizations: the FSC, the MSC, and ISO in its current work on social responsibility (ISO-SR). Our material is based on participant observations (e.g. standard-setting meetings, workshops, and public seminars), interviews, and conversations, as well as documents and secondary material.9 We conducted 120 semi-structured interviews between 2005 and 2008 with key actors who were directly involved in these standard-setting organizations or external actors who criticized or promoted the standard setters. Interviewees represented NGOs as well as other types of stakeholders, including producers, re- tailers, consultants, members of scientiªc communities, and state ofªcials. The concept of NGO is, to be sure, a broad and ambivalent one. Indeed, our investigation has included an examination of the way actors are constrained or empowered by being categorized as an NGO within a standard-setting organization. In this article, we refer to NGOs primarily as not-for-proªt organizations,

3. Betsill and Corell 2008. 4. Mason 2005. 5. Wapner 1995. 6. Bendell 2000. 7. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 2005; and Smith 2008. 8. Van Rooy 2004; and Jordan and Van Tuijl 2005. 9. Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010.

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usually with voluntary members or participants. NGOs are part of global or local civil societies. We have interviewed people working for both small and large NGOs, some of which are global (e.g. Consumers International, Building and Wood Workers’ International, Greenpeace, World Wildlife Find (WWF), Friends of the Earth), whereas others (including interviewees representing indigenous people’s groups from various continents) are local. The interviews followed a common interview guide. Our approach was ºexible, however, allowing for questions to be adjusted in accordance with the interviewee’s experience and expertise. Questions were also adjusted to accom- modate the type of actor-category represented by the interviewee. As for assess- ing the strengths or weaknesses of particular NGOs, we did not deªne any set of external criteria against which to assess the inºuence, impact, or effectiveness of NGO participation. Although possible,10 it is extremely complicated to trace a given outcome to the speciªc participation strategies, actions, and power resources employed by NGOs within a multi-stakeholder setting. Many variables intervene, including the counteractions of opponents, and a given power strategy may work in one situation but not in another, despite contextual sim- ilarities. Rather than investigating actual inºuence using a positivist/empiricist methodology,11 we were more interested in investigating potential inºuence, which corresponds more closely to a constructionist or critical realist methodology. An approach that focuses only on actual inºuence fails to acknowledge the potential power of nonparticipation (e.g. the exit strategy, discussed later in the article). To investigate potential inºuence we must pay close attention to the concept of power resources, while accounting for the institutional, structural, and discursive context in which power is exercised.12 Empirically, we have studied expressions of power, or potential inºuence, through a qualitative analysis of the experience and self-assessment of interviewees representing all types of stakeholders. We asked interviewees to talk about their participation experiences over time within or surrounding the standard-setting work (for instance, on the board, in the secretariat, on advisory committees, in working groups, or during consultations or campaigning). Some questions directly concerned the interviewees’ beliefs about the inºuence and impact of the organizations they represented, as well as the key mechanisms that were to achieve that impact (for example, formal structures, strategies, resources). We also asked about key obstacles and frustrations in the process, and some business people cited the power of some NGOs as one of their frustrations. Interviewees were also asked which other groups were most inºuential. Obviously, NGOs such as Green- peace and WWF tend to differ in their judgment of the usefulness of different participation strategies. In our analysis, we have focused on the most general

10. See Betsill and Corell 2008. 11. Betsill and Corell 2008. 12. Cf Barnett and Duvall 2005.

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and common characteristics and challenges. Our aim is not to assess the most powerful type of participation strategy; rather, our interest lies in the type of power resources that appears to be critical, and how these resources relate to the institutional, structural, and discursive context and process of multi-stakeholder standard-setting. The article comprises ªve sections. Following this introduction, we give a brief presentation of the three standard-setting organizations referred to in the article. In the third section, we brieºy present the NGOs that appear to be inºu- ential in each case, and introduce our power-based perspective. We then analyze four types of NGO power. In the fourth section, we examine speciªc institutional, structural, and discursive factors that condition NGO participation and power within a transnational, multi-stakeholder standard-setting context. The conclusions follow.

Three Standard-Setting Organizations

ISO The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1946, comprises close to 160 members—all national standards institutes. The great majority of ISO standards are technical, but since the late 1980s, ISO has been publishing management system standards in areas such as quality assurance (ISO 9000) and environmental management (ISO 14000). There are public, not-for-proªt, and commercial interests entangled in the so-called ISO system. The commercial group consists of corporations, business associations, and such service providers as consultants and certiªcation auditors. The board of ISO comprises a number of national standards bodies (NSBs), most of which are not-for-proªt and part of the government structure or mandated by the government. Entanglements are also clear between ISO and such IGOs as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and European Commission, all of which have formal cooperation with ISO. ISO also has a central secretariat, which employs some 150 people from 23 countries and supplies a range of ser- vices to ISO’s national members. After two years of broad discussion, ISO decided in 2004 to expand its activities in a new direction by entering the ªeld of corporate social responsibility, or social responsibility (SR) as ISO later called it. The ªrst move was to develop a guidance standard, the ISO 26000, to be released in 2010 with the aim of providing guidance on the concept of SR and on the ways in which an SR approach could be integrated into the everyday operations of all organizations. SR focuses on responsibilities for sustainable development and the welfare of society, encompassing such issues as human rights, labor practices, and the environment. As the ISO board was about to enter into SR standard-setting, several stakeholders articulated great expectations that ISO would make its

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structure and working procedures more democratic, thereby enhancing its democratic legitimacy.13 ISO therefore created a separate multi-stakeholder committee that assembled a number of expert groups representing “all relevant stakeholders” proportionately—including NGOs—in contrast to other ISO committees that gathered “voluntary” experts originating mainly from industry and consulting agencies. Consequently, for the ISO 26000 committee, ISO created six stakeholder categories: government, labor, NGOs, consumers, industry, and one residual category of “service, support, research and others” (“Others,” for short).

The FSC The high multi-stakeholder ambitions of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) are generally considered unique.14 FSC’s goal, which was established in 1993, is to promote environmentally appropriate, socially beneªcial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests, through a system of certiªcation and labeling. The basic FSC standards are known as the FSC “Principles and Criteria,” which are formulated at a general, abstract level, and must be worked out in more concrete regional or national processes of standard-setting and certiªcation. FSC was established as a membership organization, with both individuals and organizations as members. It is governed by a General Assembly of members divided into three chambers—environmental, economic, and social—each with one-third of the voting power. In addition, the voting power is divided equally between developed (referred to as “Northern”) and developing (“South- ern”) country members in each chamber. This organizational design was created to ensure that no one set of interests nor one country bloc could dominate policy-making. The General Assembly elects the nine-member Board of Direc- tors, comprising three members from each of the three chambers. The FSC Inter- national Secretariat in Bonn, Germany, with a staff of 25 employees, conducts the daily work of the FSC. Members from the environmental chamber are environmental NGOs or individual environmental scientists, whereas members from the social chamber may be trade unions, academics, or representatives of community-based forests or indigenous people. From the beginning, FSC membership has been steadily growing, as have its certiªed forest areas. By November 2009, FSC had 801 members, 362 of which were from Northern countries and 439 from Southern countries; 318 members belonged to the economic chamber, 335 to the environment chamber, and 148 to the social chamber.15 Almost 200 of these members are NGOs (approximately 140 environmental and 50 social).

13. Tamm Hallström 2006; and Tamm Hallström 2008. 14. E.g. Pattberg 2007; and Gulbrandsen 2008. 15. See Forest Stewardship Council News & Notes 7 (10), November 2009. Available at http:// www.fsc.org/ªleadmin/web-data/public/document_center/publications/newsletter/newsletter_ 2009/FSC-PUB-20-07-10-2009-11-01.pdf, accessed 21 November 2009.

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The MSC The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was established in London in 1997, four years after the establishment of the FSC. The FSC functioned as a positive model for the MSC, although its organizational form was not fully copied.16 The MSC is an independent, not-for-proªt, non-governmental body, formed as a business-NGO partnership initiative involving Unilever and WWF. Unilever, one of the world’s largest ªsh buyers, committed to buying from sustainable sources in 1996. It was established as a foundation rather than a membership- based organization like FSC or ISO. The MSC’s mission is to work for sustainable marine ªsheries through a system of certiªcation and labeling. In parallel to the establishment of the organization, the MSC’s basic standard, known as the “Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing,” was designed to be appli- cable to any sustainable ªsheries, regardless of size, complexity, geography, or technology. As with FSC labeling, the MSC’s requires chain-of-custody tracking to ensure that products carrying its logo originate from a certiªed ªshery. Although formally operating as a foundation, the MSC has developed into a multi-stakeholder organization including actors from the market sphere, civil society, and the public. The MSC has a Technical Advisory Board; a Stakeholder Council with about 30 members (fewer than 10 from NGOs); and a Board of Trustees with 15 members from the seafood and ªshing industry, a few environmental NGOs including WWF, and representatives from marine science. Whereas the Technical Advisory Board is a unit for the representation of scien- tiªc and standard-setting expertise, the Stakeholder Council was established to represent commercial, environmental, and other interests.17 The Stakeholder Council has an advisory rather than a decision-making function; it deliberates on current challenges and sends advice directly to the MSC Board of Trustees. Finally, the MSC has an international secretariat, staffed by fewer than 30 people. Although ISO, the MSC, and the FSC are often deªned as NGOs, we argue that they are better seen as multi-stakeholder organizations, including actors from the business world, civil society, and, to some extent, states. We are interested in how such hybrid organizing can affect the participation and power of NGOs.

NGO Power in Transnational, Multi-Stakeholder Standard-Setting In order to analyze NGO power in these global, multi-stakeholder standard- setting organizations, we must present a few initial observations. We consider the critical role of “rules for access” in studies of NGO inºuence in global governance and regulation, because it is not obvious that NGOs have such access in international environmental regimes or agreements.18 We could expect some

16. Fowler and Heap 2000; and Gulbrandsen 2008. 17. May et al. 2003. 18. Betsill and Corell 2008.

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NGO access or even impact in any multi-stakeholder work; it is, in fact, difªcult to use the term “multi-stakeholder,” if NGOs are not allowed to participate. In the cases of the FSC and the MSC, speciªc NGOs were among the key initiative takers and agenda setters. Thus, any standard setter that aims to legitimize its standard-setting by presenting it as a multi-stakeholder process will experience pressure to include and listen to at least some NGOs. This begs two critical questions, however. Which NGOs? Who or what do they represent? The answers help to analyze the extent of NGO power in various organizational contexts. In each standard-setting organization, interviewees representing different actor categories shared the view that a few of the participating NGOs had inºuential roles, whereas, at least in the cases of ISO and the FSC, a larger number of participating NGOs had less visible or even marginal roles. In the case of ISO, groups such as Consumers International and International Trade Union Con- federation were generally seen as inºuential, whereas, somewhat paradoxically, groups in the “NGO” category were generally seen as less inºuential. In the FSC case, interviewees from the FSC secretariat and all three chambers (social, environmental, economic) considered NGOs from the environmental chamber to be much stronger than NGOs from the social chamber. NGOs seen as relatively strong in the social category represented labor interests. Regarding environmental NGOs, interviewees mentioned the powerful roles of Greenpeace and WWF (and occasionally a few others). In the case of the MSC, the entire NGO group was generally seen as strong; but again, the highly inºuential role of the WWF was singled out. These initial observations give us some clues about NGO power or lack of power, and in the following theoretically informed analysis we expand on these and other observations. There is a huge body of literature on the concept of power, and it is generally acknowledged that several aspects, dimensions, or facets of power must be considered: visual and hidden expressions, direct and indirect effects, action- oriented aspects and structural factors.19 It is beyond the task at hand to elabo- rate on all the uses of power. For our purpose, it sufªces to distinguish broadly between an agency-oriented notion of power that directs attention to the capability of NGOs, and the structural, discursive, and institutional context in which NGO power is enabled or constrained.20 We return later to a few such condi- tioning factors that directly concern a transnational multi-stakeholder standard- setting context and process. By focusing on process, as well, we pay close attention to the dimension of time. The agency-oriented notion of power directs attention to actors and their resources and strategies. All organizations mobilize, accumulate, control, and make use of collective resources, which they can use to exercise power.21 Power is generally viewed as a relational concept; it is not a “thing” that can be pos-

19. Compare Lukes 2005; Barnett and Duvall 2005; and Clegg, Courpesson, and Phillips 2006. 20. The typology suggested by Barnett and Duvall (2005) has been useful for our purposes. They distinguish among compulsory (action-oriented), institutional, structural, and productive (which approximates discursive) power. 21. Ahrne 1994.

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sessed independent of social relations.22 Yet, being in possession of things may be a way to utilize power or to exercise “compulsory power” (the Weberian/ Dahl notion of the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do).23 Power in terms of socioeconomic resources or the ability to shape an agenda, debates, and discourses through issue framing are key aspects of participation in standard-setting.24 It is not necessary for an actor to use its resources for exercising power—it is often sufªcient to threaten to use one’s resources in a conºict for achieving a particular outcome.25 In what follows, we analyze four types of NGO power within or surrounding standard-setting: symbolic, cognitive, social, and monitoring power. We could also speak of economic (or material) power. To be sure, participants do not have equal opportunities to participate, simply because of their unequal access to ªnancial resources.26 Sending delegates to standard-setting activities requires a travel budget. Also important is the ability to engage NGO staff members to do the preparatory work. Whereas material resources are necessary for the capacity to participate, the other four types of power also directly concern the impact that NGOs can make in standard-setting. We later return to the topic of material power when discussing challenges of long-term NGO participation.

Symbolic Power Symbolic power resources refer to the name and logo associated with a particular organization. That name and logo may symbolize broad, legitimate values such as sustainability, responsibility, and quality. TNCs may have incredible power, but they are short of the symbolic power that relates to environmental and social responsibility. Beck argues that global business power is caught in a “legitimation trap” that provides considerable potential for politicization. Reputational damage and crises of legitimacy make world markets “highly un- stable.”27 The fragility of shareholder and consumer trust is the Achilles heel of global corporations—one of the basic motivations behind their engagement in “corporate social responsibility.” NGOs, on the other hand, are one of the most trusted forms of organization, ranked not only above corporations but also above governments, churches, and the media.28 The term NGO, despite all its ambiguities, is loaded with symbolic power. The term symbolizes a number of collectively shared values.29 ISO, for example, attempts to establish legitimacy as an “expert driven NGO”30—as part of civil society—despite its strong actual connection to both businesses and govern-

22. Clegg, Courpesson and Phillips 2006. 23. See Barnett and Duvall 2005 for a discussion. 24. Betsill and Corell 2008. 25. Ahrne 1994. 26. Tamm Hallström 2004. 27. See also Bendell 2000; Power 2007; and Boström and Garsten 2008. 28. Jordan and Van Tuijl 2006, 13; cf. Boli and Thomas 1999; and van Rooy 2004, 88ff. 29. Boli and Thomas 1999. 30. Higgins and Tamm Hallström 2007.

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ments. Nevertheless, as ISO entered the ªeld of social responsibility, it experi- enced pressure to include NGOs as a category in its new multi-stakeholder arrangement. NGOs were subsumed within the social and environmental chambers of the FSC and the Board and the Stakeholder Council of the MSC. The term NGO, however, is not seen as inherently positive in all contexts.31 Particularly within ISO, the view that NGOs have low levels of expert status and are charged with side interests is not uncommon. Interviewees from NGOs mentioned how people from other stakeholder groups tend to hold a negative view of NGO expertise:

NGOs are not seen as a real expert group. But industry sees itself as com- posed of experts contributing with their experiences . . . that “real” experts come from industry. The contributions of the NGO group are charged in a negative way. We are a heterogeneous group with low expert status.32

To be labeled as an NGO thus creates symbolic advantages and disadvan- tages. The symbolic value of NGOs, however, also works on a more concrete level. A number of high-proªle NGOs, including WWF, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the Red Cross, have managed to establish a well-known and recognized name and logo. People worldwide appreciate the activities of these organizations; even more signiªcantly, TNCs are aware of this fact. Generally appreciated NGOs, including environmental groups, animal-rights groups, labor unions, and other NGOs can bring the necessary legitimacy or “moral authority”33 to multi-stakeholder standard-setting. It would be extremely difªcult for projects such as those conducted by ISO-SR, the FSC, and the MSC to ignore such groups completely. Within ISO, the representation of human rights organizations has been particularly weak during the entire standard-setting process. Amnesty-UK is one of the few organizations that participates, and during interviews with representatives of lesser-known NGOs, the participation of Amnesty-UK was mentioned as being critical for their own participation; should Amnesty exit, others would probably follow, ruining the legitimacy of the process. A former member of the FSC Board, representing the economic chamber, indicates the symbolically strong role of well-known environmental NGOs, particularly the latent threat of negative Greenpeace campaigns:

The FSC is highly dependent on having access to the big environmental organizations and the proposals they address ...Ithink it would be counter- productive to vote down an interest group such as Greenpeace that sets the tone. If Greenpeace thought “we cannot have it in this way, we must look at it in that way,” it would not be very clever to defeat them, even if everybody else had a different opinion, because then we would only move the conºict

31. Compare Jordan and Van Tuijl 2006. 32. Author interview with NGO representative in the ISO 26000 process, Stockholm, April 2007. 33. Hall and Biersteker 2002; van Rooy 2004; and Mason 2005.

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out of the FSC’s Board to reality . . . and then all companies would have to face that conºict.34

It is obvious from several interviews that in the FSC and MSC contexts there is anxiety over the ability of Greenpeace to protest ofªcially, should its concerns not be taken sufªciently seriously. Greenpeace supports and participates in the FSC, but although it previously participated in the MSC board, it eventually left the MSC. Greenpeace questioned a number of ªsheries that ob- tained MSC certiªcation but which, according to Greenpeace, should not be labeled “sustainable.” Their exit and skeptical attitude toward the MSC caused concern within MSC circles. The Chief Executive of the MSC initiated a dialogue with Greenpeace and offered the organization “a standing invitation to sit on our stakeholder council, even to attend as observers.”35 Greenpeace has chosen inaction: “From the outset we are keeping an eye on what they [the MSC] are doing. We are not planning to do a big public push against them,” an interviewee from Greenpeace commented—yet the potential role of the organization is evident and powerful. The MSC cannot dissociate too much from the concerns generated by Greenpeace. Thus, power resources can have signiªcant effects without visible actions being taken. Inºuence does not necessarily require dialogue or participation.36 A few high-proªle NGOs can exercise power through nonparticipation, by using the exit option, by ignoring an invitation to participate, or by bringing to an end membership or participation in a standard-setting arrangement. They can also exercise power by threatening such actions, implicitly or explicitly. As Ahrne has noted, “Making threats credible without having to go into full action is the most rational way of using power.”37 Such symbolic power, however, is unevenly dis- tributed among organizations within global civil society; Greenpeace is an ex- treme case. Most NGOs are small and not well known, may beneªt only from the symbolic advantage of belonging to this abstract NGO category, and must form broader coalitions if they are to appear as a visual threat.

Cognitive Power Cognitive power refers to the ability of actors to provide unique knowledge and information. If NGOs are to affect the content of standards, symbolic power may be insufªcient; they may be required to use their cognitive power resources, and provide the standard-setting work with alternative information, expertise, and framings. Cognitive power resources may include, among other things, language skill, on-the-ground experience, sensitivity to cultural traditions, and the ability to provide theoretical or technical expertise in matters that are subject to stan-

34. Author interview with former FSC board member, economic stakeholder from the North, Stockholm, June 2007. 35. Lars H. Gulbrandsen conducted this interview with Rupert Howes in London, 23 May 2006. 36. Compare Betsill and Corell 2008. 37. Ahrne 1994, 120.

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dard-setting. Such NGOs as the Red Cross, Amnesty, Consumer International, WWF, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace help to clarify, concretize, and pop- ularize the meaning of commonly held ideas about social justice, triple bottom lines, fair trade, animal protection, precaution, sustainability, and biodiversity.38 Speciªc expert knowledge can be seen as a type of power resource that organizations can acquire and accumulate. Because of actors’ varied histories and locations in the social landscape, they have differing abilities to provide unique knowledge and information.39 WWF, for example, has a budget of US$ 332 mil- lion and ofªces in 90 countries, giving it exceptional research opportunities.40 The cognitive resources of such NGOs interact with their symbolic resources. Beck argues that NGOs have power in their capability to disseminate more reliable information than states and corporations can.41 They can make “truthful- ness” into a political issue, whereas states and corporations are seen as engaging in a strategic use of the truth. An NGO’s credibility in providing reliable information may be threatened, however, because of its simultaneous need and in- clination to dramatize information. It is a balancing act between the strategies of risk dramaturgy and the dissemination of “truth.” As noted previously, we found that the expert status of NGOs is questioned, particularly in the ISO case. At an international working meeting in 2006, participants accused representatives of the NGO and consumer groups of acting in an unnecessarily dramatic manner in criticizing the lack of transparency in the entire ISO process.42 For an NGO to claim that it represents the universal viewpoint is a valu- able cognitive power strategy in transnational standard-setting.43 One interviewee and board member representing the economic category in the FSC was impressed by organizations such as WWF and Greenpeace: “You can talk with Greenpeace or WWF, and they will give you global views.” He compared these organizations with local actors from the social and economic chambers, which tend to provide disparate, local perspectives from various countries. In her study of transnational social movement organizations, Jackie Smith found that it was more difªcult for Southern afªliates than for Northern afªliates to relate their local concerns to global campaigns.44 Beck relates power “in the global age” with the capability of moving from a national outlook toward a “cosmopolitan” view.45 The cosmopolitan outlook involves a transnational frame of reference and includes an understanding of global interdependencies and the interaction of national and global risks and crises. This outlook is not conªned to national boundaries. It simultaneously acknowledges equality and differences, and is committed to the planet as a whole.

38. Boström and Klintman 2008. 39. van Rooy 2004,81ff. 40. Mason 2005, 43. 41. Beck 2005. 42. Tamm Hallström 2008. 43. van Rooy 2004, 79. 44. Smith 2005. 45. Beck 2005.

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Social Power Social power resources include something that scholars generally associate with “social capital”: access to networks. Social power refers to the ability of actors to establish or link to formal or informal cooperation and alliances. Certain NGOs may be extraordinarily well trained and organizationally structured to establish links, networks or alliances among groups on a global scale.46 In the FSC case in particular, interviewees representing “economic” and “social” categories talk about the organizational and networking skills of global environmental NGOs. In the ISO-SR process, on the other hand, it is the consumer group, through Consumers International, and the labor group, through the International Trade Union Confederation, that are seen as having these qualities. Within multi-stakeholder standard-setting, the various categories of stakeholder groups must collaborate if the larger unit is to be effective. The MSC and the FSC were both created as multi-stakeholder organizations from the outset, and neither could work without cross-stakeholder agreements. And ISO will have to make consensus work among all six categories of stakeholders. Several of our interviewees talked about the importance of establishing and coordinating common viewpoints with stakeholders from other categories of actors. No powerful argument could be promoted from the viewpoint of a single category; yet a single category could add a necessary element within a given argument or framing. The trick is to ªnd collaborating partners both within and across categories. The capability to develop such coalitions derives from networking skills, leadership experience, and resources to arrange meetings, seminars, and workshops. It also requires cognitive power: the capability and skill to develop arguments using various framing-bridging techniques, including some degree of compromising attitude; preparedness for negotiation; awareness of others’ viewpoints, concerns, and ideologies; and, not least, willingness to offer or bracket some of one’s own viewpoints and concerns.

Monitoring Power NGOs demand improved accountability of TNCs, states, and IGOs, and they are constantly monitoring the performance of these actors.47 As soon as such organizations commit to principles of human rights, democracy, or a healthy environment—something social movements struggle for—NGOs immediately obtain an effective weapon: the ability to assess performance against promises and to expose the distance between rhetoric and practice.48 In standard-setting, some NGOs have developed a talent for combining “insider” and “outsider” participation strategies. The monitoring role of NGOs and other stakeholders in standard-setting is one variant. Stakeholders that participate in the standard-

46. Kekk and Sikkink 1998; Smith 2005; and Scholte 2005. 47. Scholte 2005. 48. Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Smith 2008.

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setting activities of ISO, the MSC, and the FSC (thus using an internal strategy) gain insight, experience, and knowledge about standards, policies, viewpoints, and strategies. They learn the nature of the compromises, what is behind standard criteria and principles, and what they should look for when evaluating practices that are certiªed according to the standards. They develop expectations. They expect compliance with rules and they hope for progress. Hence, as a side effect of their participation, they develop skills for the monitoring of future processes (both the standard-setting and the certiªcation processes). One interviewee from a global meta-organization for labor unions addressed this point:

What we are trying with FSC is to watch that workers’ rights are also pro- tected and that they are complied with. And we can contact FSC when we hear that there has been any breaking of rules—that they don’t follow the rule within a certiªed area—an area in which labor unions are persecuted . . . Then we can address this and try to do something about it.

In certiªcation schemes, observations of failure to comply with standard criteria should engage procedures that may lead to sanctions in the form of certiªcate withdrawal.49 NGOs can express concerns directly to standard-setting or certiªcation bodies or remind corporations to follow the standards properly. NGOs can mobilize coalitions around a standard-setting organization in case any problematic circumstances occur. A good example occurred in October, 2006, when a letter signed by a long list of environmental NGOs was addressed to the FSC Board and the FSC Secretariat: “We, the undersigned, are writing to you to express our serious concern about FSC increasingly losing credibility, both in the market place as well as among NGOs.”50 Among the signatories were FERN, the Sierra Club, the Rainforest Foundation, the Rainforest Action Network, representatives of the WWF International and several of its national sections, Greenpeace International and several of its national sections, and Friends of the Earth chapters in the UK, Australia, Austria, and Germany. Some of these organizations are members of the FSC; others are not. According to the authors of the letter, too many of the certiªcates have raised signiªcant opposition among FSC members. They argued that there was too much ºexibility for certiªcation bodies to interpret (or misinterpret) FSC standards and insufªcient monitoring of certiªcation bodies, and they raised concern over the direct economic link between certiªcation bodies and companies applying for FSC certiªcation. The Executive Director of FSC responded with a letter trying to explain, among other things, the measures that had already been taken and the plans to improve the situation, and gave some other interpretations of the topic. Such a response was necessary because the letter itself could signiªcantly undermine the credibility of the FSC, particularly if several of the FSC members that were included in the list were to withdraw their

49. Boström and Klintman 2008. 50. Letter addressed to the FSC Secretariat and the FSC Board of Directors, 30 October 2006, by 82 signatories from the environmental NGO community. On ªle with the author.

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membership. What this case shows is the ability among environmental NGOs to unite in coalitions (social power). The letter wielded particular force because the list included both members, which are advocates for FSC, and non- members, some of which are FSC critics. Moreover, the case demonstrates the monitoring power of NGOs. First, the NGOs monitor how FSC standards are used in certiªed forestry in various parts of the world. Second, they monitor the action of the monitors—the certiªcation bodies. And third, they monitor the standard-setting organization, its responsiveness, and its ability to monitor the certiªcation bodies and the certiªed practice. This case also shows collaboration between insiders (those who know about the standard-setting work and what outcome could be expected) and outsiders (those who watch and protest about inadequate performance in the practice).

NGO Power in the Organizational, Structural, and Discursive Context NGO power needs to be placed in broader circumstances. A number of condi- tioning factors enable or constrain NGO representatives in their efforts to make a difference, and we can broadly distinguish among three such factors— organizational/institutional, structural, and discursive—that inform the following three subsections. We cannot make a complete analysis of these factors, but we focus on a few of the key challenging circumstances of relevance in the multi-stakeholder organizational context. It is essential to add that we refer to a dynamic context by acknowledging a temporal dimension, and consequently a process.51

Institutional Power and Categorization—Is There any NGO-Think? The formal and informal institutional context of global governance, including rules and procedures, favors some actions and categories of actors while hinder- ing others.52 Although NGOs are given access to multi-stakeholder arrangements, we have noted that they face different opportunities in different standard-setting organizations. The concrete arrangement may asymmetrically affect stakeholders’ formal or informal opportunities to raise concerns, push their arguments, or participate in decision-making. Some actors may control structures of information and communication. Power relationships may become embed- ded or locked into organizational/institutional arrangements over time,53 and the arrangements may make it easier for some stakeholders to consolidate their power. The institutional arrangement can affect the conditions for NGOs in multiple ways, but we narrow our discussion by emphasizing categorization—a particularly intriguing aspect within a multi-stakeholder arrangement. A multi-

51. Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010. 52. Barnett and Duvall 2005; and Betsill and Corell 2008. 53. McAdam and Scott 2005.

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stakeholder arrangement, by deªnition, entails several types of actors and these, in one way or another, must be categorized.54 Categorization plays a critical role in the exercise of power, often invisibly, as categorizations tend to be taken for granted and become uncontested soon after their establishment.55 In the new ISO-SR process, NGOs were recognized as occupying a speciªc actor category, which was something novel in ISO standard-setting, and which demonstrated the willingness of ISO to move away from its reputation as a business-centered standard-setting organization. It is evident from our interview material, however, that groups categorized as NGOs within ISO had some problem identifying themselves in that way. When we asked an NGO representative about the main points in common within this group, however, she said that

There is no NGO-think. It’s difªcult to put all NGOs in one group. Their interests are very different. ...Dowehaveagood common language? No! I feel it is impossible for me as an NGO expert to be representative for all NGOs. These are artiªcial distinctions really.56

The NGO group attracted both large and small organizations with highly divergent interests. Consequently, it was perceived as heterogeneous and weak, and therefore encountered difªculties in exercising social power. In the ISO-SR process, NGOs could be seen in other categories as well. As noted earlier, both the labor and consumer stakeholder groups enjoyed the advantage of having a single organization coordinating the interests of national member organizations and representing their interests globally. Both these groups ªelded relatively few representatives at meetings, but each group managed to unite on the issues that loomed largest for it, and to present a consensual position. One reason for this strength was organizational (social power): both global organizations routinely convened stakeholder caucuses during and between international meetings. They thereby contrasted with other stakeholder groups, not least the NGO group. Another reason for the relative weakness of the NGO group concerned the way in which this category was deªned:57 as a type of organization that contrasted with the deªnitions of, for example, the labor and consumer groups, both of which corresponded to a crucial area of expertise of social responsibility (“labor issues” and “consumer issues”). Consequently, members of the labor and consumer groups were perceived as “real” experts, whereas the NGO groups were seen as having low expert status. Also within FSC, we observed some negative experiences that relate to the categorization. Environmental NGOs appear to adjust well to the environmental chamber, and they have managed to establish a relatively homogenous and uniªed chamber. Interviewees from the FSC case, however, talked in different

54. In Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010 we analyze how categorization of stakeholders is part of the organizing and legitimizing work of a standard-setting activity. 55. Bowker and Star 1999. 56. Author interview with NGO representative in Lisbon, May 2006. 57. Hacking 1999; and Bowker and Star 1999.

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ways about the fragmented character of the social chamber, which includes a di- verse cluster of groups and individuals representing indigenous people, local communities, labor interests, small landowners, and individual academics. These groups sometimes had antagonistic relationships with each other, which added to the difªculties in creating uniªed views (both social and cognitive power). “Environment” was perceived to be a more clearly deªned and institu- tionalized issue within the organizations representing it at the global level, whereas it is not as obvious what is meant by “social” or how to determine which issues are social issues at the global level.58

Asymmetries of Structural Power: Challenges to Balanced and Permanent NGO Representation In addition to being shaped by an organizational/institutional context of rules and procedures, concrete interactions are also inºuenced by such underlying structures59 as global capitalism, including the global distribution of power resources that follow these structures. Global capitalist relations necessarily provide large TNCs with a privileged position in various types of governance and regulation—not only because they are resource-rich, but also because they are indispensible.60 This is, of course, even more evident in such market-based regu- lations as those that ISO, the FSC, and the MSC employ. In this section, we narrow our focus on structural asymmetries of power resources that typically relate to NGOs—mainly, their lack of material resources compared with TNCs. Although such asymmetries vary greatly among NGOs, they generally exert a negative effect on the capacity of all NGOs to participate in a long-term multi- stakeholder process. Huge challenges to ensure balanced and permanent NGO representation accordingly follow. In all the three cases, the standard-setting organizations have identiªed the need to prevent the strongest actors from becoming dominant and, in various ways, to assist weaker actors to participate more effectively. ISO’s creation of six stakeholder categories to be represented in various task groups was developed to establish nuanced and balanced multi-stakeholder dialogue, but there were problems in making it work in practice. According to critical voices, there was a tendency within ISO to do business as usual, meaning that industry was by far the largest group and had the power to decide the outcome of this process. Such criticism came from the ILO and labor representatives, for example, some of which were present already during the agenda-setting phase. These stakeholders expressed their concern about ISO and threatened to either exit the process or deny support should ISO not change its organizational structure and working procedures into more democratic, multi-stakeholder ones.61 The

58. Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010. 59. Barnett and Duvall 2005. 60. Lindblom 1977. 61. See Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010, chapters 7 and 9.

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ISO Secretariat responsible for ISO-SR work responded to this early criticism by launching a series of activities aimed at securing a multi-stakeholder approach. These measures included the scheduling of time for work meetings for stakeholder debate within each stakeholder category and the setting of limits that would disallow the ªnancially stronger stakeholder groups from becoming too inºuential. The number of people at meetings was limited, for example, and the creation of an ISO-SR Trust Fund was instituted as a mechanism for raising money to provide for under-resourced stakeholders. The fund was also used for sponsoring experts to participate in meetings of the ISO 26000 working group and for supporting a limited number of awareness-raising and capacity-building events in the ISO-SR process.62 These and other measures to improve stakeholder balance and effective participation (and we note similar concerns and efforts in the cases of the FSC and the MSC) reveal how tricky it is to achieve balanced and effective representation during a long-term multi-stakeholder process.63 The power resources of stakeholders involved in the standard-setting processes play double, ambiguous roles.64 On the one hand, in its attempt to establish standard-setting authority for itself, the standard-setting organizations want to mobilize the power resources of each participant. The power and legitimacy of the multi-stakeholder organizational arrangement depends on combining these power resources. On the other hand, each individual stakeholder may use its own power resources to argue and push for its speciªc concerns, creating the potential for tension within the arrangement. If strong stakeholders merely use their power resources to advance their positions and defeat weaker stakeholders, the long- term stability, viability, and legitimacy of the standard-setting organization would be damaged. The difªculty in achieving a balanced representation of stakeholders relates to vastly differing capacities to participate—something that is obviously much easier for actors with strong ªnancial power resources than for their ªnancially weaker counterparts. As Jackie Smith found, “transnational organizing requires substantially greater resources than does more locally oriented action.”65 Several of our interviewees, particularly those from developing countries, have conªrmed that statement. Moreover, it is even more difªcult if the transnational standard-setting process appears to be unending (policy-making and standard-revision processes continue year after year in the FSC and the MSC). There are different opportunities for different categories of actors. Al- though many NGOs can afford to send paid employees to meetings, others are restricted to volunteers; yet organizations representing business interests are usually able to send well-paid employees. This problem can be partially rectiªed using the Internet. Electronic communication facilitates transnational organiz-

62. See Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010, for an extended analysis. 63. See Fransen and Kolk 2007. 64. Boström 2006. 65. Smith 2005, 235.

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ing among social movements, but, as Smith contends, “given the wide dispari- ties in access to Internet communications even within the highly industrialized countries, we should expect great inequity in the use of electronic communications by Northern and Southern TSMOs (transnational social movement organizations) and their afªliates.”66 For example, an interviewee from the FSC Sec- retariat reports about such inequity when he talks about obstacles for broader participation:

In many cases even the Internet is not a good solution because if you want to get down really to the people most affected by forest activities, they don’t have access to the Internet. It’s not only physical access, it’s a technological exclusion. Some places in the world they don’t have electricity.

Smith also argues that electronic communication alone will not produce the kind of “commitment and understanding that are essential for sustained collective action.”67 E-mailing cannot compensate for personal contacts and face-to-face interaction. Indeed, several interviewees maintain that a combination of electronic communication (between international meetings) and face-to-face communication (during international meetings) is needed for the effective development of common arguments (cognitive power) and alliances (social power) within stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the standard-setting work tends to be increasingly bureaucratic and complex, adding to the challenges of NGO participation. The governance and interaction structures and processes become highly complex, with fo- rums for decision-making, expert advice, ad hoc groups, special workshops, and stakeholder consultation for both members and non-members, as well as regional and national structures. The body of standards, policies, guidelines, methodologies, and strategy documents has increased signiªcantly over time in all three cases.68 The standard setters operate in a multi-sectoral area on highly controversial matters. They aspire to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of a plurality of stakeholders, all of which use different yardsticks to assess their performance. Increasing bureaucratic complexity is a response to such social/normative complexity. An ironic, unintended consequence of the bureaucratic complexity is the difªculty of effective participation. It is noteworthy that interviewees from a relatively strong NGO such as Greenpeace address this problem. During our interviews, they returned repeatedly to the topic of complex procedures and time- consuming efforts that must be made in order to create an impact on standard- setting work. Whereas it becomes difªcult for any stakeholder—including the strong ones—to obtain an overview, and to know where to focus attention, resources, and strategies, such difªculties are accentuated for actors with few material, cognitive, and social power resources.

66. Smith 2005, 241–242. 67. Smith 2005, 243. 68. Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010.

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Discursive Context, Long-Term Participation, and Critical Distance Discourse creates “productive power.”69 People (or NGOs) are empowered (seen in positive light) or disciplined (seen in negative light) through the spread of systems of knowledge and meaning. The increasingly pervasive discourses on Sustainable Development and Corporate Social Responsibility may, on the one hand, provide means for neoliberal elites, including TNCs, to legitimize further business operations and growth.70 On the other hand, such discourses may create space for counteraction by NGOs and social movements. They legitimize the very idea of multi-stakeholder processes,71 for instance, and the inclusion of global and local civil society and NGOs in governance and regulation. They legitimize the inclusion of environmental and social values and concerns in the standard-setting. Yet, standard-setting as a strategy and as a discourse may ªt some actors and NGOs better than others. Standard-setting and certiªcation may appear to be abstract and far-fetched to some types of actors. One labor union interviewee, who speaks favorably of certiªcation in general, made the following re- marks about the forest case:

Practically, in everyday working-life, certiªcation falls somewhat outside the ordinary frame for the labor union. That is not the core activity. The core activity is to organize members and to negotiate with employers, to sign collective agreements and so on. And it is not highest on the priority list, as they have so few resources to work with.

Within the ISO case, many labor representatives had a strong, negative attitude toward standards and certiªcation from the outset of the ISO 26000 process, as this was about voluntary compliance, whereas labor unions preferred regulatory solutions involving legislation or global agreements between a labor union and an individual corporation. It is not only easier for practical reasons, therefore, for economic actors to engage permanently in a standard-setting multi-stakeholder arrangement (see previous section). They also face fewer ideological obstacles. Several transnational corporations proudly announce that they have become part of such arrangements, whereas many NGOs place their symbolic power, credibility, and critical distance at risk when doing so. Long-term commitment to a multi-stakeholder organization may conºict with core activities, ideologies, or movement- identity of NGOs.72 If the stakeholder is an environmental NGO, for example, it usually seeks to develop a broad ideological and political orientation within a number of green issues, and allocate resources for a broad repertoire of strategies and activities—not merely standardization. The NGO may focus on a few

69. Barnett and Duvall 2005; and Clegg, Courpesson, and Phillips[0]. 2006. 70. Lipschutz 2005. 71. Often framed as partnership; Bäckstrand 2006. 72. Boström 2006.

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salient topics each year, but it is in the nature of such an organization to address new topics every year and to engage in public awareness-raising and campaigning. Being committed to a regular activity may therefore appear odd in the view of many social movement activists. Particularly if the NGO has elements of a radical, uncompromising or confrontational identity, its own individual members may expect that it preserves critical distance and does not spend too many resources on cooperative activities within multi-stakeholder standard-setting arrangements. In order to preserve symbolic, cognitive, social, and monitoring power over time, it is essential that NGOs can uphold some critical distance—that they prevent themselves from being co-opted or captured by the standard-setting organization or by other participating stakeholders. Critical distance entails that NGOs preserve reºective awareness of the discourses and compromises that un- derlie standard-setting, as well as reºective awareness of their own priorities. Critical distance relates to the power strategy of “exit.” If a stakeholder cannot realistically threaten to exit, its critical distance is seriously restricted. The Greenpeace strategy of rejecting participation in the MSC but joining the FSC is signiªcant in this regard. Greenpeace’s differing attitudes toward these organizations may, on the one hand, appear somewhat arbitrary; “Is FSC really better than MSC?” some interviewees wondered. On the other hand, Greenpeace sends a clear signal that its commitment is not without reservation, in case any stakeholder believed it to be. It is more difªcult for WWF to threaten to exit, because of its long-term commitment to both the FSC and the MSC and, consequently, its huge investment of resources and prestige. Leaving these organizations, if it wished to do so, might damage its name and reputation. As one Greenpeace interviewee commented about the WWF’s MSC commitment: “WWF would stand by them until the bitter end.” Certiªed companies that commit to the multi-stakeholder project may not expect cooperating NGOs to stage ofªcial protest campaigns against the standard-setting organizations and its certiªed companies. An interviewee from a Northern environmental NGO that provided early support for FSC found this balance between criticizing and not criticizing to be difªcult:

It is always dangerous to criticize something that you yourself have promoted. Then the industry quickly hit on us saying: “If not even FSC is good, it may be better to go for PEFC [an FSC-competing standard] or another system.”

Another interviewee from the same organization, commenting on the MSC, mentions other reasons to tone down critical viewpoints or to be cautious about using outsider strategies:

There can be reluctance to criticize too much, because you want to give a simple message. Reality is complex, but if you criticize one part of a label, then people may lose trust for the label as a whole.

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Unwavering commitments to something that is basically a compromise may be risky, however. If the standard fails to some extent to differentiate between responsible/irresponsible or sustainable/unsustainable corporate practices,73 NGOs that are tied to such a standard lose their political weapon and suppress their own discursive (or cognitive) and monitoring power. The NGOs then become tools for the expansion and legitimization of the standard and its related certiªed companies, which capture their symbolic power, rather than being empowered by using the standard as a tool for their continuing political protest, campaigning, and monitoring of corporate conduct.

Conclusion and Discussion We have demonstrated four types of NGO power in global multi-stakeholder standard-setting, as well as key challenges that relate to organizational/ institutional, structural, and discursive context. The term “NGO,” however, is general and vague; to be categorized as an NGO may constrain rather than empower some stakeholders. Moreover, it is clear from our cases that the capacity and capabilities of NGOs vary enormously. Some NGOs are well known and have strong symbolic, cognitive, social, and monitoring power. Such power resources clearly relate to material strength, as ªnancial resources are signiªcant for investing in the other types of power. Most NGOs, however, are small, un- known, and local. Many “affected publics”74 around the world are completely unorganized. Although some NGOs are comparatively strong and can play a signiªcant role within global multi-stakeholder standard-setting processes, there are key difªculties that concern all or most NGOs. These difªculties relate to time—all the practical difªculties to which long-term participation gives rise. The increasingly complex and bureaucratic structures that develop within the standard-setting organizations over time accentuate such difªculties. Long-term participation within and commitments to a multi-stakeholder arrangement ªt poorly with the operational logic of NGOs. Their core activities, ideologies, and identities, and their need to prioritize a number of topics and maintain critical distance, do not always go hand in hand with standard-setting work or with the durable compromises with big businesses that are part of these arrangements. Despite these difªculties, some NGOs have managed to maintain a durable and visible impact. They are sometimes blamed because they are seen as rich, moderate, Northern, unrepresentative, and unaccountable,75 or they are accused of talking the talk of corporate social responsibility and thereby helpi- ng to legitimize neoliberal expansion and globalization without challenging structural power asymmetries.76 Others would be concerned if not even these

73. Boström and Klintman 2008. 74. Mason 2005. 75. See discussion in van Rooy 2004; Mason 2005; and Jordan and van Tuijl 2006. 76. Lipschutz 2005.

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NGOs could participate, and thus help to facilitate more responsible corporate conduct. The standard setters alone can do little to alter global structural asymmetries. In her investigation of UN partnerships, Karin Bäckstrand concludes that “partnerships reºect rather than transform relations of power in global environmental governance.”77 Likewise, our research indicates that there are serious divides among NGOs within the standard-setting bodies, reºecting such dimensions as global versus local, Northern versus Southern, large-scale versus small- scale, and industrial versus community-based.78 Against this background, a policy-relevant issue is to direct the spotlight on the standard-setting bodies themselves, as well as their donors, institutional supporters, and vested interests. What can they do and what can they not do (or not want to do) to empower weaker NGOs? To remain multi-stakeholder standard setters, they will have to use and develop—with the help of strong stakeholders—empowerment strategies to counteract the tendency to reºect pre-existing structural asymmetries in the arrangement. We note that ISO, the FSC, and the MSC indeed develop policies, in- vest resources, and collaborate with strong stakeholders to assist weaker parties with the aim of preventing major power shifts in the arrangements. The bigger picture regarding these efforts remains unclear, and should be a key topic for further research.

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