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The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2004 The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation Spencer A. Overton George Washington University Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2004). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE DONOR CLASS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE, DEMOCRACY, AND PARTICIPATION † SPENCER OVERTON As a result of disparities in resources, a small, wealthy, and homogenous donor class makes large contributions that fund the bulk of American politics. Even in the aftermath of recent campaign reforms, the donor class effectively de- termines which candidates possess the resources to run viable campaigns. This reality undermines the democratic value of widespread participation. Instead of preventing “corruption” or equalizing funds between candidates, the primary goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the impact of wealth disparities and empower more citizens to participate in the funding of campaigns. On av- erage, candidates should receive a larger percentage of their funds from a greater number of people in smaller contribution amounts. Reforms such as es- tablishing matching funds and providing tax credits for smaller contributions, combined with emerging technology, would enable more Americans to make con- tributions and would enhance their voices in our democracy. INTRODUCTION Opponents of campaign finance reform embrace a relatively lais- sez-faire reliance on private markets to fund campaigns for public of- fice. Although they champion the individual rights of those who con- † Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. Mi- chael Abramowicz, Mark Alexander, Brandon Briscoe, Kim Christensen, Richard Ha- sen, Adam Lioz, Ira Lupu, Leslie Overton, Josiah Slotnick, Dan Solove, and Fane Wolfer read earlier drafts of this Article and provided helpful comments. Clyde Wilcox graciously shared demographic data about contributors to presidential primary candi- dates during the 2000 election cycle. In addition to participants in the University of Pennsylvania Law of Democracy symposium, participants in law faculty workshops at Fordham, Hofstra, and Washington & Lee, the Equal Justice in the West Conference at the University of Nevada Las Vegas Law School, and the lecture series of the American Constitution Society at the University of Chicago Law School provided valuable obser- vations and suggestions. This Article also benefited from exchanges with Edwin Baker, Rick Banks, John Bonifaz, Paul Butler, Anupam Chander, Elizabeth Garrett, Heather Gerken, Paul Herrnson, Jamahl Johnson, Orin Kerr, Sheila Krumholz, Kenneth Mack, Michael Malbin, Joe McLean, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Larry Noble, Nick Nyhart, Nathaniel Persily, Chellie Pingree, Joshua Rothstein, Glen Shor, Jonathan Siegel, Donald Simon, Joe Singer, Bradley Smith, Dalia Tsuk, and Cherrie-Ann Walters. Ian Bassin provided invaluable research assistance and feedback. This article is dedicated to the memory of Randall Merritt. (73) 74 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 73 trol resources, antireformers largely overlook the structural impact of vast disparities in wealth on the ability of most citizens to make finan- cial contributions.1 This Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in McConnell v. FEC2 to argue that the law should play a central role in reducing the impact of disparities in wealth on political participation. McConnell upheld large parts of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)3—a regulatory overhaul that banned unlimited soft money contributions and restricted corporate and union spending on politi- cal campaigns. In so doing, the Court in McConnell acknowledged the adverse impact that concentrated wealth has on widespread demo- cratic participation and self-government.4 In the aftermath of the re- forms upheld in McConnell, however, disparities in wealth continue to affect participation. A relatively small and wealthy group of individuals—the “donor class”—gives large hard money5 contributions that fund the bulk of 1 See, e.g., Lillian BeVier, Campaign Finance Regulation: Less, Please, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1115, 1118 (2002) (arguing that disparities in wealth do not make the case for regulat- ing independent expenditures for election-related speech because many other sources of unequal political influence will remain); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996) (indicating the author’s opposition to the belief “that modern campaigns have been corrupted by big money”); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating spending limits and reasoning that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”). 2 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 3 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.). 4 See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of the reasoning of McConnell. 5 Money that is subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s disclosure re- quirements and source and amount limitations is known as “hard” or “federal” money. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 648-49 (explaining that contributions made with funds sub- ject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s requirements and limitations are called “federal” or “hard” money, whereas contributions intended to influence elections and made with funds not subject to the Act are called “nonfederal” or “soft” money). While BCRA banned unlimited “soft” or “nonfederal” money contributions to federal parties (money previously not subject to regulation by the Federal Election Campaign Act), the law increased the amount of “hard money” an individual may contribute to a federal candidate from $1000 to $2000, and it increased the annual aggregate amount of hard money an individual may give to candidates, PACs, and parties from $25,000 to $95,000. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, secs. 101, 307, §§ 315, 323, 116 Stat. 81, 82, 102– 03 (2002). Even before BCRA restricted soft money and increased the hard money lim- its, hard money was the primary source of candidate and party funding. See PUB. CAMPAIGN, HARD FACTS ON HARD MONEY (2001), at http://www.publicampaign.org/ publications/studies/hardfacts/hardfactsfull.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (“Hard money remained the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 election cycle 2004] THE DONOR CLASS 75 American politics.6 Although approximately 51.3% of voting-age Americans cast a ballot in the 2000 general presidential election,7 less than 2% contributed $200 or more to a presidential or congressional candidate.8 In the 2003-2004 election cycle, contributions of between outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1.”). 6 See Bob Herbert, Editorial, The Donor Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 15 (“I doubt that many people are aware of just how elite and homogenous the donor class [to political campaigns] is. It’s a tiny group—just one-quarter of 1 percent of the population—and it is not representative of the rest of the nation.”). For the purposes of this Article, the donor class consists of natural persons who have made at least one contribution over $200 to a federal candidate, party, or PAC within the last two elec- tion cycles. 7 See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT 2000, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (reporting that official turnout for the 2000 presidential election was 105,586,274 vot- ers, or 51.3% of the voting-age population). 8 Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Eyes Campaign Finance Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 63458717. The precise percentage of voting-age Ameri- cans who contributed to a federal candidate, PAC, or party is not ascertainable because the FEC requires recipients to report only donations of more than $200 in an itemized report of any detail. See 28 U.S.C. § 434(b), (e) (2000) (requiring identification of each person who makes a contribution or contributions with an aggregate value ex- ceeding $200 per year, but allowing recipients to report lesser contributions at their discretion). The recipient combines all contributions of $200 or less and reports them as one total. Nevertheless, the numbers show that a small class of Americans gives most of the money collected by federal candidates, parties, and PACs. In the 2001-2002 election cycle, only 0.22% of the voting-age population in the United States gave a con- tribution over $200 to a federal congressional candidate, party, or PAC, and this group accounted for 76% of the funds given to federal candidates by individuals. ADAM LIOZ & ALISON CASSADY, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 4 (2003). Some might assert that the distribution of wealth does not have an adverse impact on democratic participation because union PACs are funded by deductions from the dues of millions of union members. Although this is an important point, unions do not facilitate the political participation of most Americans. Less than 6% (just under sixteen million) are members of a union, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 432 tbl.658 (123d ed. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/labor.pdf, and not all of these indi- viduals contribute to a union PAC, see 11 C.F.R.
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