The Police Bill [Bill 88 of 1996/97]: National Policing Structures
Research Paper 97/21
11 February 1997
The Police Bill [HL][Bill 88 of 1996-97] has completed its passage through the House of Lords and is due to be considered on Second Reading in the House of Commons on Wednesday, February 12th 1997.
This paper considers Parts I and II of the Bill, which make statutory provision for the UK-wide National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the National Crime Squad for England and Wales (NCS), and for the creation of service authorities to maintain these two services. Part IV of the Bill, which seeks to place the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) on a statutory basis as a non-departmental public body, is also considered. PITO's remit will initially cover Great Britain but will subsequently be extended to Northern Ireland. Part III of the Police Bill, which extends throughout the UK and seeks to make statutory provision for the use of intrusive surveillance techniques by the police and HM Customs and Excise by permitting entry on or interference with property or wireless telegraphy in certain circumstances, is considered in Library Research Paper 97/22. Part V of the Bill, which is intended to implement proposals for access to criminal records for employment and related purposes set out in the White Paper On the Record [CM 3308] is considered in Library Research Paper 97/23
Mary Baber Home Affairs Section
House of Commons Library Summary
This paper is concerned with the provisions in the Police Bill [H.L] [Bill 88 of 1996-97] relating to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO). It is not concerned with the provisions in the Police Bill relating to intrusive surveillance by the police or the proposed new arrangements for the disclosure of criminal records for employment and other related purposes, which are considered separately in Library Research Papers 97/22 and 97/23 respectively. The Police Bill has completed its passage through the House of Lords and is due to be considered on Second Reading on Wednesday, February 12th 1997.
The present organisation of police forces in Britain, including the tripartite system of control and accountability involving chief constables, police authorities and the Home Secretary, is described in the first part of this paper. Significant changes in the arrangements for England and Wales were introduced in 1995 when some of the principal policing provisions in the Police and Magistrates Courts Act (discussed in Library Research Paper 94/59) were implemented. The paper sets out the current arrangements for shared police services and the role of the regional crime squads and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) which was created in 1992 as a common police service financed by the Home Office.
The debate about whether or not the large number of existing police forces should be merged into a smaller number of regional forces or a single national police force is discussed in the second part of this paper, along with more recent suggestions that a national crime squad be created to deal with particular problems which tend to cross existing police force boundaries, such as the threat posed by national and international organised crime. The Government has accepted the argument that a new national crime squad is needed, and Part II of the Police Bill, which only extends to England and Wales, is designed to provide for the establishment of such a force. Part I of the Police Bill, which extends throughout the UK, seeks to provide a statutory basis for the NCIS.
The third part of this paper discusses the provisions in Parts I and II of the Bill concerning NCIS, the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the service authorities which are to maintain them. The extent of the Home Secretary's role in appointing members of the new service authorities and the Bill's provisions for funding the new bodies through a compulsory levy on police authorities in England and Wales, were the subject of criticism from some peers during the Bill's passage through the House of Lords. A Home Office paper setting out the Government's view of the accountability and funding arrangements for NCIS and NCS is set out in Appendix 1 to this paper.
The final section of this paper is concerned with proposals in Part IV of the Bill to establish the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), which was set up on an interim basis in April 1996, as an executive non-departmental public body (NDPB) The intended functions of PITO are to promote the delivery of national information technology services in support of the police, such as the Police National Computer, secure a co-ordinated approach to the development of local information technology systems in England and Wales through the implementation of the national strategy for police information systems and provide a procurement service for the police in areas where national supply arrangements are appropriate. A Home Office paper on accountability and funding arrangements for PITO is set out in Appendix 2 to this paper. Contents
Page
A. The current organisation of police forces in Britain 5
Shared police services 6
Regional Crime Squads 6
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 7
B. Proposals for organising policing structures on 9 a national basis
C. The Police Bill [H.L.] Parts I and II 16
The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the 19 National Crime Squad (NCS) and their service authorities
Powers and duties of the NCIS and NCS service authorities 26 and the Secretary of State, and the appointment of members of NCIS and NCS
Financing NCIS and NCS 30
D. The Police Bill. Part IV - The Police and 32 Information Technology Organisation (PITO)
Appendix 1 34
Accountability and Funding Arrangements for the national Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad - Home Office November 1996
Appendix 2 46
Accountability and Funding Arrangements for the Police Infomation Technology Organisation (PITO) - Home Office December 1996 Research Paper 97/21
A. The current organisation of police forces in Britain
At present there are 52 British police forces, most of which are organised on a local basis. There are 43 such forces in England and Wales (including the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police, which are responsible for policing London), 8 in Scotland and 1 - the Royal Ulster Constabulary - in Northern Ireland.
The provision of efficient and effective police services is the responsibility of the Home Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland, together with the police authorities and chief constables of the particular forces. Funding for the police is provided by both central and local government.
The provincial police forces are headed by chief constables, who are responsible for the direction and control of their forces and for the appointment, promotion and discipline of all ranks below assistant chief constable. On matters of efficiency they are generally answerable to their police authorities, to whom they are required to submit annual reports, with copies being sent to the Secretary of State. In the Metropolitan Police area the commissioner of police and his deputies are appointed on the recommendation of the Home Secretary.
In England and Wales police forces are maintained by local police authorities, which appoint chief constables and provide buildings and equipment.The Home Secretary is the police authority for the Metropolitan Police Service. The principal Act concerning the administration of the police service in England and Wales is the Police Act 1964, which established the tripartite structure under which responsibility for the police is shared between the central government in the form of the Home Secretary, local police authorities and chief constables. The 1964 Act was amended by the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, which implemented changes proposed in the 1993 White Paper Police Reform1. The 1994 Act introduced changes in the tripartite relationship and set up new free-standing police authorities in each of the 41 police areas outside London. (The background to the changes brought about by the 1994 Act is set out in Library Research Paper 94/59 on The Police and Magistrates Courts Bill). The various Acts concerning the organisation of the police have since been consolidated in the Police Act 1996.
As a result of changes proposed in and introduced by the 1994 Act, appointments to police authorities now include independent members as well as local councillors and magistrates. The standard size of a police authority is set at 17 members, comprising 9 local councillors, 3 magistrates and 5 independent members. The Home Secretary has the power to increase the size of a police authority beyond 17 if local circumstances make this desirable. Under the
1 Cm 2281
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arrangements set out in the 1994 Act police authorities set local policing objectives, in consultation with their chief constables and the local community, while the Home Secretary sets priority objectives for the police service as a whole. Key objectives and performance indicators for the police service in 1997-98 were announced by the Home Secretary on November 27 1996.2
The police authority for the Metropolitan Police Service is the Home Secretary. The Metropolitan Police Committee, a 12-member non-statutory body, was set up by the Home Secretary in 1995 to provide advice and assist him in setting the budget, approving and publishing costed policing plans, monitoring the force's performance and other related tasks. Like the changes in the arrangements governing the police forces, the creation of the Committee was first proposed in the White Paper Police Reform.3
In Scotland the new unitary councils act as police authorities. In Northern Ireland, where the Police Authority for Northern Ireland is appointed by the Secretary of State, the Government has issued a White Paper setting out proposed changes in policing structures.4In Scotland police authorities are to continue to be composed of elected councillors.
Shared police services
While police forces themselves tend to be locally-based, a number of police services are provided centrally by the Government or through co-operation between forces. In England and Wales these include criminal intelligence, telecommunications, including the Police National Computer and research and development. In Scotland the principal common services are centralised police training, the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Crime Squad.
Regional Crime Squads
There is a single Scottish Crime Squad in Scotland, while in England and Wales there are six regional crime squads. The regional crime squads, which were first set up in 1965, have the following terms of reference:5
1 To identify and arrest persons responsible for serious criminal offences within that region, nationally or internationally.
2 At the request of a chief officer, to assist in the investigation of a serious crime by undertaking,
2 Michael Howard sets key objectives - Home Office 27.11.1996 & HC Deb Vol 286 c.232-233, 27.11.1996 3 ibid. Chapter 11 4 Foundations for Policing: Proposals for Policing Structures in Northern Ireland Cm 3249 May 1 1996 5 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary report on South West Regional Crime Squad. 1995 Appendix B
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normally for a limited period, specific tasks agreed with the Regional Co-ordinator.
3 To co-operate with the National Criminal Intelligence Service, force intelligence bureaux and, where appropriate, HM Customs and Excise, in the gathering and development of intelligence on persons responsible for serious criminal offences and to provide an operational response in appropriate cases.
All the regional crime squads have regional co-ordinators, who are responsible for the efficient and effective management of the squad and answerable to Chief Constables Management Committees, made up of chief constables for their constituent forces, and to committees drawn from their constituent police authorities. The regional crime squads have a national co-ordinator, but he has no power to give directions to any of the individual crime squads.
National Criminal Intelligence Service
The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was set up in April 1992.6 It is funded as a central service by the Home Office, under the arrangements for the provision of common police services set out in what was section 41 of the Police Act 1964 and is now section 57 of the Police Act 1996. The role of NCIS is to support law enforcement agencies and its primary functions are to:
- process intelligence by gathering, analysing, storing and disseminating it;
- give direction by co-ordinating, setting standards and defining national systems, and
- provide services including strategic analysis of the threat from organised crime, act as a gateway to Europol and Interpol, training and advice.
In evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into Organised Crime during the 1994- 95 session the Home Office described the composition and role of NCIS in the following terms:7
37. NCIS brought together, under one umbrella, a number of existing organisations including the National Drugs intelligence Unit (NDIU). It is funded by the Home Office, under Common Police Service arrangements, as a central service. Its staff (currently 441 in total) are a mix of police officers, customs officers, Home Office, local authority and other civilian staff. It includes a unit of some 13 staff whose sole responsibility is the development and assessment of intelligence on organised crime (the Organised Crime Unit) and a unit of 74 staff responsible for intelligence on drug trafficking and financial crime (the Drugs Division
6 For detailed information on the current role of NCIS see Home Office circular 11/1995 7 HC 18-II Session 1994-95 Organised Crime Home Affairs Committee Minutes of Evidence and Memoranda p.83
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which includes the Financial Intelligence Unit). The Financial Intelligence Unit is the central point for receipt of all disclosures of suspicious financial transactions under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and the Criminal Justice Acts 1988 and 1993. It receives, researches and, where appropriate, develops these disclosures and then disseminates them to the relevant police and Customs operational units for investigation. Together the units that have been established within NCIS provide an important focus for the assessment and development of intelligence concerning organised crime. The principal users as well as suppliers of intelligence to NCIS are the seven Regional Crime Squads.
38. NCIS also liaises with a number of government departments and agencies including HM Customs and Excise, the Immigration Service, the Gaming Board and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as with foreign law enforcement agencies. A member of the Immigration Service is currently attached to the NCIS Organised Crime Unit and the Immigration Service is also giving assistance to the NCIS Drugs Division and to the Metropolitan Police in their efforts to combat Caribbean crime.
39. The Home Office believes that the recently formed NCIS, working closely with the Regional Crime Squads and overseas law enforcement agencies, is already playing a valuable role in combating organised crime and that its contribution will increase in line with its experience and knowledge. Examples of recent investigations include a fraud investigation in which two arrests were made and securities with a face value of 550 million were recovered and a current investigation concerning an outlaw biker group which, as a result of close liaison with the Netherlands and Sweden, has provided information about a number of murders. The Home Office is committed to supporting and developing the intelligence role of NCIS in relation to organised crime and its links with the police and customs operational units.
The National Criminal Intelligence Service's Scottish Office, which brought together officers and officials from the Scottish Crime Squad, HM Customs and Excise and the Scottish Criminal Intelligence Office, was formally opened in January 19978. NCIS headquarters and its South East regional office are in London, and there are other regional offices in Wakefield, Manchester, Brierley Hill, West Midlands and Bristol.9
The Security Service Act 1996, which came into force on October 14 1996, amended the function of the Security Service so as to allow it to act in support of the police and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. Arrangements for co- ordinating the Security Service's work in relation to this new function with the work of police forces and other law enforcement agencies were agreed between the Director General of the Security Service and the Director General of NCIS.10Under these arrangements, primacy of responsibility for combatting serious crime lies with the police service and other law enforcement agencies. In the Police Bill, the Government is seeking to provide for the Director-General of NCIS to be responsible for, and for NCIS have the lead role in, co-
8 National Criminal Intelligence Service goes north of the border - NCIS Press Notice 20.1.1997 9 ibid 10 See Scottish Office Police Circular No. 13/1996 Annex A
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ordinating Security Service activities in support of the law enforcement agencies investigating serious crime.11 It is thus intended that NCIS should have the lead role in such matters.
B. Proposals for organising policing structures on a national basis
Although some aspects of policing are organised regionally or nationally, the police service is still principally organised on a local basis. The possibility of creating a national police force has, however been considered on a number of occasions. The Royal Commission on the Police, appointed in 1960 under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, looked at the case for a unified or "national " police service in the course of its consideration of the overall structure and organisation of the police service.12 The majority view, set out in the Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police, was that:13
(8) There is a substantial case for creating a national police service. Its organisation would be more logical, and a number of us think that it would prove to be a more effective instrument for fighting crime and handling road traffic than the present large number of partially autonomous local forces (paragraph 128).
(9) We do not regard the creation of a national police service as constitutionally objectionable or politically dangerous (paragraphs 134-139).
(10) We think, however, that there is much value in a system of local police forces, and that the improvements which we regard as desirable can be achieved on the basis of the present police system. We therefore reject the case for creating a national police service, and we recommend the continuance of a system of separate local police forces (paragraphs 140-150).
One of the members of the Commission, Dr A.L Goodhart, issued a memorandum of dissent, in which he argued strongly for the creation of a national police force for England and Wales. He observed that a certain amount of joint activity was already taking place, as was inevitable under modern conditions, and took the view that a single police force would increase police efficiency.14 In his conclusion, Dr Goodhart said:15
11 Police Bill Clause 12 and see HL Deb Vol 575 c.790, 11.11.1996 12 Cmnd 1728. See p.40-50 for consideration of the arguments for and against the creation of a larger "national" pceoil service 13 ibid 14 ibid. p.166-167 paras. 35-37. Dr Goodhart's plan for a Royal English and Welsh Police, administered regionally, and for a Royal Scottish Police, is set out at p.177-179. 15 ibid. p.179
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I have not considered the question whether Parliament, or the people of this country, would at the present time be prepared to vote in favour of a national police force, administered on regional lines. That is a political matter on which it is not my duty to express an opinion, even if I were qualified by experience to do so.
British suspicion of plans for the creation of larger regional or national police forces has a long history. As with some of the arguments put forward against the introduction of national identity cards, fears are sometimes expressed that such moves would ease the path towards the creation of a centralised state which would pose a threat to individual liberty. In their book Constitutional and Administrative Law, de Smith and Brazier note that:16
the absence of a national police force is explained partly by apprehensions of central political control but mainly by the course of historical development.
The national basis on which some other European police forces are organised also reflects historical developments to some extent, in that in some cases, these forces developed as an offshoot of the armed forces or grew out of earlier military or paramilitary organisations.
In recent years discussion of police force organisation has often focused on issues such as accountability, rather than on the mechanics of police organisation. Interest in the latter subject has, however been growing, partly as a result of concern about measures to improve police management and efficiency and partly as a result of a wider debate on changes in policing. Concern has particularly been expressed about the appropriateness of current arrangements in dealing with national and international organised crime.
In a speech on April 25 1989 the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, rejected proposals for the creation of a national police force and stressed the importance of local links between the police and the communities they serve:
There will always be arguments brought forward by friends of the police as well as their critics in favour of a national police force or much bigger regional forces. But, as I have said, the roots of our police forces in their counties and cities are strong, and much has and will be done to keep them strong. It would be quixotic, just when it looks as if we may be turning a corner on crime, if we began to hack at the local connections of the police with some institutional upheaval. Rather we would wish to strengthen the links - for example by building up the special constabulary, and bv strengthening the local consultative committees which have now been formally established throughout England and Wales to maintain local understanding and co-operation.
16 7th edition 1994 p.419
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Mr Hurd added that he felt there was, however, a need for a "tougher knitting together of police effort". In a speech to the Police Superintendents' Association in September 1989 Mr Hurd again stressed the need to strengthen co-operation between police forces and proposed bringing criminal intelligence together in a national unit. As has already been mentioned, this particular proposal was implemented with the creation of NCIS in 1992.
In a speech to the Police Foundation in July 1989 the then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Peter Imbert, observed that
The foundation stone of policing in this country is embedded in the consent of the community and went on to express reservations about the creation of larger national or regional police forces and the impact which such a change might have on the relationship between the police and the community. Like Mr Hurd, Sir Peter felt that:
It would be ironic, just when the first glimpses of improvement in the crime situation are beginning to appear, if we were to change the whole structure of the service at this level and perhaps undermine that very relationship which is a crucial part of the contract of co-operation between the police and public.
Sir Peter did suggest that arrangements for dealing with criminal activities which extended beyond the boundaries of particular police forces could be organised and co-ordinated more effectively. In particular, he proposed that a national agency be created to deal with serious crime occurring across the country:
I believe it is now the time to propose and to examine the establishment of a new structure to deal with policing matters which have a national dimension. It is certainly not a new idea. Most of our European colleagues benefit to varying degrees from this system and similar structures have been established in our closest common law countries of the USA, Canada and Australia with different levels of success. Problems with internal state jurisdictions prompted this overlay in some cases, but in each, it has provided a better vehicle for dealing with international and organised crime. The more acceptable parts of these systems may have value to us, recognising our own particular needs. It would of course mean that we as chief officers may have to give up some of our sovereignty so that the national agency embracing amongst others the Regional Crime Squads - and I include here the No. 9, London Regional Crime Squad, which has traditionally and perhaps wrongly stood somewhere to the side of the Crime Squad system, - can provide a really effective operational detective unit across the whole country.
The proposal would enable the police service to retain the best of its policing system at the community level and, at the same time, develop a more accountable and therefore I believe a more effective response to that different tier of policing.
This overlay would have to encompass the following services; operations, intelligence, support and mutual assistance.
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The formation of this new National operational arm will not only require Government commitment and resources but also a significant change in attitude within the enforcement agencies, and that includes mine. The nucleus of a national investigative agency already exists in a number of separate and mainly uncoordinated parts. The amalgamation of these law enforcement bodies into the new national structure would have the responsibility for investigating the most serious of national and international crime including organised crime, terrorist-related crime, drug trafficking and serious food contamination and extortion cases.
In July 1989 the then chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, Sir John Wheeler, gave a speech at an Association of County Councils seminar in which he argued that the existing police forces in England and Wales should be merged to create between five and ten police forces in England and Wales. He envisaged the creation by statute of a national police policy committee of chief constables and the Home Office to ensure adequate policy direction and provide the national voice which he felt was urgently required. In a subsequent speech reported in the Scotsman in November 1991 Sir John was reported as saying that small and medium-sized provincial police forces could not be expected to have the necessary expertise to tackle all forms of serious crime, and proposing that a central police agency, incorporating the existing regional crime squads and including all Special Branch officers in Britain, be established to investigate serious and complex crime.17
Proposals for the creation of two national operational units, one a crime squad and the other an anti-terrorist unit incorporating elements of the security services, both acting outside the jurisdiction of local police authorities, were put forward in a speech in July 1992 by the then Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Sir Hugh Annesley. Accounts of his speech in the press reported Sir Hugh as having argued that most major crime was at a national and international level and that the existing regional crime squads were only an interim answer to the problem. They added that he noted the recognition by the USA of the benefits of a having a central squad (the Federal Bureau of Investigation or FBI) to investigate serious crime. Sir Hugh also reportedly argued that a nationally controlled police force operating on a regional basis would be a more effective means of dealing with crime than the current system of local police forces and police authorities, but accepted that there was no immediate prospect of such a radical re-structuring.18
In a speech given to the Association of Chief Police Officers' spring conference in 1994 the former national co-ordinator of the regional crime squads, Neil Dickens, called for the amalgamation of the regional crime squads, together with the Scottish Crime Squad, to form a National Crime Squad along the lines of the newly formed South East Regional Crime Squad. He said that while individual squads recognised their position within the national structure, they remained essentially parochial, with considerable variation in practice between different regions. He felt that an amalgamation was necessary to overcome a lack of overall strategy, particularly with regard to the fight against international crime. Mr Dickens stressed
17 'National police force called for in sweeping reform plan' - Scotsman 1.11.1994 18 'RUC leader urges central police force' - Guardian 22.7.1992
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that he was not proposing an FBI, in that his proposed organisation would continue to be staffed in police terms by experienced officers seconded from forces, who would gain additional knowledge and skills that could be used on their return to their forces. The organisation might also include HM Customs officers. He was strongly opposed to an organisation of direct lifetime employment which, he felt, would create an elitism and prevent good working relationships. Mr Dickens recognised that there would have to be careful consideration of the need for such major changes and in particular the constitutional issue of accountability.19
In the report of its inquiry into Organised Crime during the 1994-95 session the Home Affairs Committee examined the effectiveness of the regional crime squads and concluded that:20
102. The evidence showed the Regional Crime Squads to be a vital part of the policing system in the fight against organised crime. Liaising closely both with national agencies such as NCIS or Customs & Excise, and with each of the local police forces from which they are formed, they had the operational capacity to tackle criminal operations which cross force boundaries. Until recently, there were 9 Squads, covering England and Wales. Since 1989, three of the Squads have merged to form the South East Regional Crime Squad, comprising over 40 per cent of RCS resources; since then also two more squads, in the North and East, have merged, and there are further proposals - not agreed to by the relevant local authorities - for those covering Wales and the South West to merge. A National Coordinator of the Regional Crime Squads had offices alongside those of NCIS, but he had no power to give directions to any of the individual RCSS. Each RCS was responsible through its Chief Constables Management Committee to local authority committees.
103. Mr Dickens, the recently retired National Coordinator, strongly advocated that the RCSs should be merged into one National Crime Squad, under the control of a National Director. Consequential arrangements would have to be made in respect of funding and accountability. He argued that such a structure would provide a more coordinated and effective use of resources, reflecting the fact that criminals and criminal groups do not limit themselves to one region. At present, it was argued, individual police forces' local priorities could outweigh needs which were at a more national level; as a result, full advantage was not taken of NCIS intelligence packages. Inquiries which were more long-term in nature could also suffer. Additionally, there could be an imbalance between the various RCSs in their researching and effectiveness, since the funding of each was effectively set at the level of the force or local authority which wished to contribute least. Mr Dickens stressed that he was not advocating the end of the principle of local policing, only that the existing structure needed a different tier of policing to cope with crime which was organised or extended beyond the local level.
104. The proposal had the support of the Director General of NCIS. He stated that the time had come to give the National Coordinator executive authority over the RCSS, enabling him to determine amongst competing priorities, with the funding structure sorted out so that disparities in the level of development and equipment in the different parts of the country were
19 'We want a national crime squad' - Police Review 18.3.1994 20 Home Affairs Committee Third Report Session 1994-95 HC 18-I
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removed. Mr Pacey and Mr Dickens" both rejected the idea that a National Crime Squad might then be merged with NCIS, on the grounds that NCIS's role might be devalued if it was within an operational structure and also because it might come to be seen as a purely police organisation, to the detriment of its relationship with non-police users such as Customs and Excise, the immigration service or the Bank of England. But at the same time Mr Pacey felt that establishment of a National Crime Squad would enable the good relationship between NCIS and the National Coordinator to have a more direct effect in influencing the work undertaken by the RCSS.
105. Mr Dickens' proposal was currently being considered by ACPO. Noting that there was not at the moment agreement on the matter amongst Chief Officers, ACPO was unable to submit a considered opinion to the Committee, though they recognised the case for further amalgamations of the RCSs and for an executive role for the National Coordinator. The Home Office indicated that they were awaiting the views of ACPO on this matter, though they noted that the principal problems with the proposal concerned funding and accountability On funding, the move to a national crime squad would probably involve some form of top slicing from the resources given to local authorities in respect of policing. As for accountability, a similar problem to that referred to earlier for NCIS would be raised, with a form of accountability having to be developed which addressed concerns of political involvement in operational policing matters. Mr Dickens suggested that accountability would be through a Board of Management comprising executive directors - from Chief Constables, the Home Office, and local authorities - and non-executive directors (eg from the business community) We recognise the importance and value of local forces as the basis of policing in this country, but we do not feel that a nationally focused crime squad would undermine the structure of local forces. We consider that, if the response to serious and organised crime is to be sharpened and made more effective, the present structure of separate Regional Crime Squads, with no central executive direction, needs to be replaced by a more nationally co- ordinated structure. We have not made a detailed examination of the precise structures which should be set up in place of the present one, but we consider that the problems of accountability and funding structure are not insuperable and can he straightforwardly resolved by the Home Office, the police service and the local authorities; the model put forward by Mr Dickens, or the existing model of the Metropolitan Police, point to possible solutions.
In a speech in September 1995 the present Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, was reported as saying that local chief police officers should be prepared to give up part of their independence to create a "national strike force" to tackle organised crime. He added that the vested interests of chief constables should not take precedence over pressing national imperatives. He stressed, however, that the tradition of local policing could and should co-exist with an enhanced national structure and that a national agency did not mean a "national police force".21
An article in the Guardian on October 6th 1995 reported that the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) had met to discuss detailed proposals for a national crime squad.22 The
21 'Condon calls for national force to combat crime' - Daily Telegraph 6.9.1995 22 'Police win battle for British FBI: MI5 likely to miss out in new assault on organised crime' - Guardian 6.10.1995
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article suggested that most chief officers considered that a national squad was needed to co- ordinate operations with foreign police forces, but that a number of chief constables were opposed to a national squad on the grounds that it would further undermine the local basis of policing and lead to greater centralisation.
The 1993 White Paper Police Reform, which led to the changes in policing arrangements set out in the Police & Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, referred to the establishment of NCIS and to recent changes involving the restructuring and rationalisation of the regional crime squads, but did not contain proposals for the creation of a national crime squad. The Government's intention to establish a unified, national crime squad to take the lead in dealing with organised crime was announced by the Prime Minister in his speech to the Conservative Party conference on 13 October 1995. He added that the squad would carry out this role with the support of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), working with HM Customs & Excise, MI6 and GCHQ. Commenting on these proposals, Sir James Sharples, president of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), was reported as saying that what was proposed would not lead to a "national police force" or "British FBI".23
The Government's plans were elaborated on by the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in a speech to the ACPO summer conference on July 2 1996. Mr Howard said:
The Prime Minister announced last autumn our intention to establish a unified crime squad. He also made clear our wish to develop the National Criminal Intelligence Service - NCIS - and establish its identity separate from the Home Office.
Before I explain how we plan to achieve those objectives let me give some firm assurances.
First, we are not establishing a British equivalent of the FBI. There will be no "federal crimes" over which the new organisations will have exclusive jurisdiction. The public will continue to report all crimes to their local police forces. Second, there will be no direct recruitment to the crime squad; police officers will continue to be seconded from local forces. The new bodies will remain firmly rooted in the traditions of British policing and the tripartite accountability arrangements. NCIS and the crime squad will be distinct organisations, each headed by a chief constable - although clearly they will work closely together.
Finally, and most importantly, the national crime squad and NCIS will not detract from the existing roles and responsibilities of local police forces. We need a national response to threats on a national scale. We need to take some decisions on resources and on operational deployment at a national level, rather than through voluntary regional arrangements as hitherto. But the new Crime Squad and NCIS will continue to support local forces, in the same way as the Regional Crime Squads and NCIS do now. Local voices will be clearly heard in the arrangements for overseeing the new bodies and setting their strategic direction.
23 'No national police force, says police chief' - Press Association 13.10.1995
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Nor are we altering the position of the police service in the wider pattern of responsibilities for tackling organised crime. Many organisations have a part to play - Customs and Excise, the Immigration Service, the Serious Fraud Office, the intelligence agencies and so on. We will maintain this multi-agency response and strengthen the coordination between agencies. But no-one will be taking over existing police service responsibilities, nor will the police take over anyone else's existing role.
The relationship between police and Customs is particularly important. The respective responsibilities are set out clearly in the White Paper "Tackling Drugs Together". I welcome the work that is being done to develop common performance indicators and to present key enforcement statistics jointly. We cannot be complacent about the relationship and positive effort is needed to minimise any friction at the working level. The strong Customs contribution to NCIS is an important part of ensuring effective cooperation and we want to make sure that it is maintained.
So how will our new arrangement work? We envisage creating two service authorities, modelled so far as possible on police authorities. One would be charged with maintaining a National Criminal Intelligence Service and one with maintaining a crime squad. The service authorities would be independently chaired and would include police authority, police and independent members together with one representative from the Home Office. The NCIS service authority would additionally include representatives from Scotland and Northern Ireland and from Customs and Excise. Some representatives will sit on both service authorities. In addition, the two will share support staff.
The positioning of the service authorities and their composition is important. We need to involve central government representation to ensure that national needs and strategies are properly reflected. But they will certainly not dominate. The police authority and independent members will have a clear majority.
The Crime Squad will bring together the existing Regional Crime Squads. Just as the regional squads do now, it will conduct proactive, intelligence-led investigation into the activities of organised criminals at the inter-force, national and international level. At the same time, it will, at the request of chief officers, support forces in their investigation of serious crimes reported to them. The Crime Squad will work closely with the existing Scottish Crime Squad and with the RUC, but will have no specific remit in those separate jurisdictions.
NCIS, on the other hand, has a leading role throughout the United Kingdom in collecting, developing and disseminating criminal intelligence. It will continue to be headed by a chief constable and the police service will be its primary customers. But the contribution of Customs and Excise and other law enforcement agencies will continue to be crucial to its success. And NCIS will be an important gateway to international cooperation. It will channel enquiries to Interpol, Europol and the UK's bilateral liaison officer network and act as a contact point for overseas agencies. The primary source of funding for the service authorities will be a levy on police authorities in England and Wales. This will be coupled with contributions from the Scots, Northern Irish, Customs and other minor users. There is no necessity for the services to cost more under the new arrangements than the regional crime squads and NCIS do at present. We will need to look at future funding in the context of the overall allocation of policing resources.
I believe that these arrangements will improve the current situation significantly. They represent evolution rather than revolution. They will succeed because they work with the
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grain of British policing. Legislation will be needed in order to make these changes. I hope we will be able to bring it forward very soon.
C. The Police Bill [H.L.] Parts I and II
Part I of the Bill (Clauses 1-46), which extends throughout the United Kingdom, is concerned with the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) while Part II (Clauses 47-90), which extends to England and Wales only, is concerned with the new National Crime Squad (NCS).
The provisions of Parts I and II and their intended effects were summarised by the Home Office minister, Baroness Blatch, in her speech opening the second reading debate on the Bill in the House of Lords as follows:24
The Bill provides for the creation of two bodies corporate: one, with 19 members, called the Service Authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service; and the other, with 17 members, called the Service Authority for the National Crime Squad. These bodies will maintain the two services. The National Criminal Intelligence Service will provide criminal intelligence to police forces throughout the UK, to the National Crime Squad and to other law enforcement agencies, principally Customs, in this country and from overseas. In addition, in fulfilment of our undertaking during the passage of the Security Service Act 1996, the Bill provides for the Director General of the National Criminal Intelligence Service to be responsible for co-ordinating Security Service activities in support of the law enforcement agencies investigating serious crime.
The function of the National Crime Squad will be to prevent and detect serious crime which is of relevance to one or more police areas in England and Wales. It will also be able to target major criminals and, at the request of chief constables, to support local police forces in England and Wales and other law enforcement agencies here and from overseas in the prevention and detection of serious crime. In particular, it will preserve the close links which the regional crime squads already have with the Scottish crime squad and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
The membership of the service authorities seeks to reflect the tripartite structure on which our system of policing is based while recognising the national role of both services. Each service authority will be made up of independent, police authority and police service members, plus one Home Office representative. The service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service, because of its UK and multi-agency remit, will also include representatives of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland, police authorities and police forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland and a representative of Customs and Excise.
24 HL Deb Vol 575 c.790-792. 11.11.1996
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Although independent of each other, the two authorities would have a common core membership of 10 in order to ensure a shared strategic direction for the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. The core membership would include three independent members appointed by the Home Secretary, one of whom would be appointed to chair both service authorities. These are key appointments to positions with responsibility for important national services. In these circumstances, we believe that it is reasonable for the Home Secretary to choose the independent chairman. As with police authorities, the independent members would bring a wider perspective to the management of the two services than might be obtained otherwise. For example, one might usefully have an understanding of modern banking practice, given the significance of money laundering in organised crime.
In line with the arrangements for local forces, both service authorities will have to set objectives to secure the efficiency and effectiveness of the services they maintain. They will be required to publish service plans, similar to policing plans for individual forces, and to report performance in annual reports. The director general of each service will be required to report annually on the activities of the services they manage. Their reports will also be published.
The role of the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland in relation to the National Criminal Intelligence Service, will reflect his responsibilities for the police service generally. It will include the power to determine key objectives for each service, to call for reports, to hold an inquiry and require Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to carry out inspections.
Each service authority will appoint, from a short-list approved by the Secretary of State, a director general to run the service it maintains. Both appointees will have to be chief constables or eligible for promotion to chief constable.
The staff of the two services will comprise police and other members. Police members will be seconded police officers on relevant service or, in the case of Association of Chief Police Officers ranks, they will normally be appointed. Other members will be direct employees of the services or will be seconded or loaned from organisations such as Customs and Excise in the case of NCIS. All the staff in each organisation will be under the direction and control of the relevant director general.
The Bill includes power for regulations to be made governing the handling of complaints against the staff of both services. In relation to the National Criminal Intelligence Service, a member of the public may not know whether his or her complaint is against a police officer, Customs officer or some other member of the civil staff. It is essential that the arrangements are clear and that all complaints can be properly investigated. For that reason, we propose to ensure that all staff in both services will be subject to a consistent complaints system reflecting existing police procedures.
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Each service authority will levy police authorities in England and Wales for the costs of the service they maintain. These levies, which will be subject to approval and possible adjustment by the Home Secretary, will provide the majority of the income for the two services. Contributions to the costs of the National Criminal Intelligence Service will also be made by the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
We believe that decisions on the levy should be strongly influenced by locally elected members of the service authorities, as levies will affect local budgets. For this reason, proposals for the levies will be prepared by the police authority members from England and Wales and the independent members only. The police authority group voting on a levy will have at least one more member than the independent group.
Once the service authority has settled a budget and determined a levy, it will be considered by a tripartite group. This group will consider the levies in the context of overall spending on the police and proposed expenditure on centrally provided services such as police training. The tripartite group will advise the Home Secretary about the appropriateness of the proposed levy. He will then either approve the levy or instruct the service authority will not be able to exceed the levy.
The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS) and their service authorities
Clause 2, which requires the NCIS service authority to maintain NCIS, states that the functions of NCIS shall be:
a) to gather, store and analyse information in order to provide criminal intelligence, b) to provide criminal intelligence to police forces in Great Britain, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the National Crime Squad and other law enforcement agencies, and c) to act in support of such police forces, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the National Crime Squad and other law enforcement agencies carrying out their criminal intelligence activities.
Clause 48, which requires the NCS Service Authority to maintain NCS, states that the functions of the National Crime Squad will be: to prevent and detect serious crime which is of relevance to more than one police area in England and Wales.
Clause 48 (3) adds that the national Crime Squad may also:
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(a) at the request of a chief officer of police of a police force in England and Wales, act in support of the activities of his force in the prevention and detection of serious crime; (b) at the request of the Director General of NCIS, act in support of the activities of NCIS; (c) institute criminal proceedings; (d) co-operate with other police forces in the United Kingdom in the prevention and detection of serious crime; (e) act in support of other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime.
Clauses 1 and 47 are designed to provide for the creation of two statutory, corporate bodies to be known as "service authorities". One of these, with 19 members, will be for NCIS while the other, with 17 members, will be for NCS. The two service authorities will be independent of each other, but will have a common "core membership" of 10 members, including a common chairman appointed by the Secretary of State. The chairman will be one of three "independent" members (that is, members who are not members of British police forces, Crown servants, local authority members of English or Welsh police authorities, or members of police authorities in Scotland or the Police Authority for Northern Ireland) appointed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will be able to make orders increasing the number of service authority members to a specified odd number above that provided in the Bill, but will be required to carry out certain consultations before doing so. Arrangements for the appointment of members of the service authorities are set out in Schedule 1 of the Bill, while other provisions about members of service authorities are set out in Schedule 2. The proposed arrangements for appointing members of the service authorities are summarised below:25
25 Source: House of Lords Library Note 96/008
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Table 1: Core members of the service authorities
Type of Member Number Appointed by
Independent (chairman of both 1 Secretary of State authorities)
Independent 2 Secretary of State
Chief constable of police 1 Chief officers of police (England and Wales outside (England and Wales) London)
Commissioner or Assistant 1 Chief officers of police Commissioner of the MET or (England and Wales) Commissioner of Police for the City of London
Local authority police authority 3 Local authority members (England and Wales) of police authorities (England and Wales)
Representative of Secretary of 1 Secretary of State State in his capacity as police authority for the MET
Crown Servant 1 Secretary of State
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Table 2: Additional members of the service authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service
Type of Member Number Appointed by
Chief constable of police in 1 Chief constables of police Scotland forces in Scotland
Deputy chief constable or higher in 1 Chief constable of RUC RUC
Local authority police authority 2 Local authority members of (England and Wales) police authorities (England and Wales)
Police authority (Scotland) 1 Members of police authorities (Scotland)
Police authority (Northern Ireland) 1 Members of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland
Crown Servant (1) 2 Secretary of State
Customers officer 1 Commissioners of Customers and Excise
Notes:
1. The Notes on clauses state that the intention is that one crown servant will be appointed to represent the interests of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the other crown servant will be appointed to represent the interests of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
Table 3: Additional members of the service authority for the National Crime Squad
Type of member Number Appointed by
Chief constable of police (England 1 Chief officers of police and Wales) (England and Wales)
Local authority police authority 6 Local authorities (England and Wales) members of police authorities (England and Wales)
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The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) welcomed the proposals in Parts I and II of the Bill and believes that they will strengthen the capacity of the police to address organised crime26.
The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) also welcomed the proposals, but argued that the Government should be asked to set out clearly why it believed that the existing regional crime squads and their committees of police authority members should be dismantled. The AMA also raised concerns about the establishment of the new service authorities, their independence from the Home Secretary and their accountability to police authorities. The Association noted that similar concerns, during the passage of what became the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, about the appointment of the independent members of local police authorities and the chairmen of those authorities, had resulted in amendments being made which, amongst other things, enabled police authorities to elect their own chairmen.27( The discussion of this issue in connection with the Bill which became the 1994 Act is set out in House of Commons Library Research Paper 94/59 on The Police and Magistrates Courts Bill).
In its briefing on the Bill the Committee of Local Police Authorities (COLPA) said it was fully supportive of the plans to establish the NCIS and National Crime Squad service authorities, but added that:
The main concern of Police authorities is to ensure that the proposed arrangements for accountability at least match the quality of those currently in place. The constitutional strength of the present arrangements is that the regional committees [overseeing the work of the regional crime squads] entirely comprise representatives of police authorities who are directly accountable to those authorities. The main concern of police authorities is to ensure that these principles are reproduced in the new arrangements.
COLPA also noted that the arrangements for the appointments of members of service authorities differ from those for local police authorities. In particular, it noted that the Secretary of State would appoint the chairman and the other "independent members" of the service authorities and that there was no provision for magistrate members. The committee observed that the present composition of police authorities was reached after much debate in Parliament during the passage of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. It stated that it saw the proposed new service authorities as essentially no different from police authorities and considered that it would be more logical for the statutory arrangements covering the composition of police authorities to be applied to the service authorities themselves.28
26 Chief police officers welcome new plans for firearms and policing - ACPO news release 1.11.1989 27 Briefing paper on the Police Bill - AMA November 1996 28 The Police Bill - COLPA, undated
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In his speech during the second reading debate on the Police Bill in the House of Lords the Labour peer Lord McIntosh supported the proposed continuation of the tripartite system of control (that is, the division of responsibility for policing between local police authorities, police forces and the Home Secretary) in relation to NCIS and the National Crime Squad, but expressed concern about the Home Secretary's dominant role in appointing members of the service authorities for the two bodies. He said:29
The structure proposed for the two service here is not an FBI or, still worse, a CRS. What is authorities goes a good deal further in enhancing proposed is a body which will be acting in support the role of the Home Secretary than I would have of the operations of local police forces. Surely in thought, bearing in mind the debates that your those circumstances their role should be very much Lordships had on the Police and Magistrates' Courts greater than is proposed in the Bill. Act 1994. Noble Lords will recall that when we came to debate that legislation there was strong opposition from all parts of the House, not least from well-informed and senior members of the Conservative Party, to the proposals for the Home Secretary to have, for example, the power to nominate the chairman of police authorities; and, indeed, to the way in which independent members of the police authorities were to be selected. Your Lordships persuaded the Govemment - or at least the threat of Divisions on the matter frequently persuaded the Govemment - that the role of local authorities in police authorities should be greater than was originally proposed in the Bill. So it came about.
We seem to be going backwards. When you have a National Criminal Intelligence Service and a national crime squad, no one doubts the fact that the Home Secretary has particular responsibilities which ought to be reflected in the service authorities. Therefore, we are not saying that the Home Secretary should not be represented. But if we look at the core service authority for the two bodies, it will be seen that three members are to be appointed directly by the Home Secretary at will; one member is to be appointed by the Home Secretary in his role as the employer of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; and one member is to be appointed as a Crown servant, also by the Home Secretary. So five out of the 10 core members, as well as the chairman, are to be appointed by the Home Secretary. We think that that is going too far. We believe that the role of local authority members and of chief constables ought to be greater in this authority because, after all-as the Minister rightly said-what is proposed
29 HL Deb Vol 575 c. 796, 11.11.1997
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The Liberal Democrat peer Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank said he shared some of Lord McIntosh's anxieties about the appointment of the membership of the service authorities, including the independent members. He said it was important to recognise that the steps in Parts I and II of the Bill were major and might well lead to further developments. He expressed the view that the proposed arrangements would not last and would only provide a half-way house to a British equivalent of the American FBI and went on to say that:30
I believe that the two new bodies proposed in Parts I and II are like Siamese twins: they are joined together by a common chairman and a common core membership, not easily separated, but they may not have a long life together. We should bear that in mind whatever their merits may be.
In her speech at the close of the debate on the Bill's second reading the Home Office minister, Baroness Blatch, commented on Lord McIntosh's concerns about the provisions in the Bill designed to put the power to appoint the independent members of the service authorities, including the chairman, in the hands of the Home Secretary. She said:31
We fully accept the need to preserve our local basis of policing. The new service authorities are modelled on local police authorities so far as possible. Police authorities and independent members will be in a majority on both service authorities. But these are important national services and it is reasonable for the Home Secretary to appoint the three independent members including the chairman. Even so, we recognise that there is room for more than one point of view on these matters.I shall consider the views expressed today as we move towards the Committee stage of the Bill.
During the Bill's committee stage Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved amendments designed to reduce what he described as the Secretary of State's majority of the effective voting membership of the core authority, by reducing the number of independent core authority members appointed by the Secretary of State form three to two, and removing the Secretary of State's power to appoint the chairman of the service authorities. He felt that it was particularly important for local authority members to have the majority of places in the core authority because the funding of NCIS and NCS was to come from local government rather than the Home Office.32 In opposing the first of these amendments the Home Office minister Baroness Blatch expressed the Government's view that the introduction of independent members into local police authorities under the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 had proved to be an enormous success, saying that they had introduced new ideas and brought new skills and experience to the work of police authorities. She said she had no doubt that the role of independent members in the new service authorities would prove to be equally valuable. She also set out the Government's view that with only two independent members it would not be possible to achieve the wider spread of experience and skills which would be possible with three, and that it would be that much harder for the independent members to make an impact on the business of the service authorities.
30 ibid c.800-801 31 ibid c.832 32 HL Deb Vol 576 c.124-125 26.11.1996
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Both of these amendments moved by Lord McIntosh were negatived on division.33 In commenting on the second of them Baroness Blatch said that the Government's approach to the membership and chairmanship of the service authorities had been to strike a balance between the tripartite system of policing and the need to reflect national and multi-agency interests in the new arrangements.34
In a subsequent latter to Lord McIntosh of Haringey Baroness Blatch made the following remarks about the appointment of police authority members of the service authorities:35
In practice we envisage that the Clerk to the authorities will prompt the police authority associations (currently the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the Committee of Local Police Authorities) to arrange the selection of the English and Welsh police authority members of the service authorities. They will then arrange the selection of the police authority representatives ensuring, so far as it is practical., that their representatives reflect the political balance of the parties on police authorities. Subject to this proviso, the elected members of police authorities will have a free hand in selecting their representatives. As the Regional Crime Squad Committees include local councillors from police authorities there is no reason why elected councillors who are members of Regional Crime Squad Committees should not be selected to represent police authorities on either service authority. They will also be eligible to participate in the selection process. I would hope that the police authority members would ensure that some, if not the majority, of their representatives on the National Crime Squad service authority had previous experience of Regional Crime Squad.
A document prepared by the Home Office on Accountability and funding arrangements for the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad is set out in Appendix 1 to this paper.36
Powers and duties of the NCIS and NCS service authorities and the Secretary of State, and the appointment of members of NCIS and NCS
The Bill seeks to impose a duty on the two new service authorities to secure that NCIS and NCS are efficient and effective (Clauses 3 and 49) The service authorities will be required to determine annual objectives for NCIS and NCS and issue service plans and annual reports (Clauses 3-5, and Clauses 49-51). Each service authority will be required to appoint a person to be clerk to the authority (Clauses 14 and 59) The Bill also seeks to permit the service authorities to appoint officers and employees to assist them in discharging their functions, on such terms as the authorities consider appropriate (Clauses 13 and 58). Clauses 15 and 60 are intended to permit the service authorities to appoint people other than their own officers and employees to specified offices, or to designate such people as having specified duties or responsibilities.
33 ibid c.123-143 34 ibid c.138 35 HDEP 96/292 p.2 36 HDEP 96/264; DEP 4183 (3S)
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Under the Bill's provisions, it is intended that the National Criminal Intelligence Service should consist of:
a) the Director General, appointed under Clause 6 on such terms as the service authority considers appropriate, having been chosen by a panel of members of the service authority, from a list of eligible persons prepared by the panel and approved by the Secretary of State;
b) persons appointed under Clause 9 by the NCIS service authority as police members of NCIS;
c) other persons appointed by the service authority under Clause 9 to be members of NCIS as employees of the service authority.
Police members appointed to NCIS and persons appointed to NCIS as employees of the service authority are to be appointed on such terms as the authority considers appropriate, although the authority will be required to consult with the Director General before making an appointment or determining the terms and conditions.(Clause 9 (5)-(6))
The Bill seeks to provide that the Director General should hold the rank of chief constable. It is intended that both he and any police members of NCIS should, on appointment be attested as constables by making declarations in the form set out in Schedule 4 to the Police Act 1996 before a justice of the peace. It is also intended that they should have all the powers and privileges of constables throughout England and Wales and the adjacent UK waters. (Clause 9(4) and Clause 6 (5)-(8)).
Police members of NCIS will either be engaged with NCIS on a period of temporary service or appointed on a permanent basis to the rank of assistant chief constable with NCIS. Permanent members will be required to have held the rank of assistant chief constable or above in a police force in Great Britain or the RUC, or the rank of commander or above in the metropolitan police force or the City of London police force, or to have been eligible for appointment to one of these ranks. (Clause 9 (2)-(3))
The Bill provides for the National Crime Squad to be similarly constituted, with the service authority being responsible for appointing the Director General, police members and other members appointed as employees of the authority and the same rules concerning the rank of the Director General, and the appointment and attesting of police members (Clause 55 and Clause 52(5)-(8))
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During the Bill's committee stage the Home Office minister Baroness Blatch successfully moved amendments to Clause 9 and what was Clause 54 and is now Clause 55, which were designed to ensure that senior police officers who are permanently appointed to NCIS and the National Crime Squad retain a specific police rank. In moving the amendments, Baroness Blatch said:37
This large group of amendments seeks to achieve a very simple purpose. They ensure that senior police officers who are permanently appointed to the National Criminal Intelligence Service or National Crime Squad will retain a specific police rank. In this way they put beyond any doubt the original intention of the Bill that the directors general will hold the rank of chief constable and that only assistant chief constables, or those eligible to be appointed to that rank, will be permanently appointed to other senior police posts in the two services.
The vast majority of the police officers serving in the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad will be officers engaged on a period of temporary service away from their force. They retain all the powers and privileges of a constable as if they remained a member of their force and they have a right of return to their home force.
This arrangement will generally not be possible for senior police officers. It is impracticable for a chief constable to have a right of return to his previous force - the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Knights. His former post will have been filled. The same is generally true for other senior police officers where there are a limited number of assistant chief constable posts-perhaps only one-and it would be impracticable for officers to have a right of return. That is why the Bill makes provision for them to be permanently appointed to either service.
But because they break their ties with their previous force, it is essential to make clear in the Bill that they continue to hold a specific police rank. The directors general of each service and their senior colleagues are responsible for the overall direction and control of all the staff including the police officers on temporary service. It must be clear for good management of both officers have a specific rank. It will also be important for some operational purposes, such as authorisations under PACE, that the rank of senior police officers is beyond doubt.
The service authorities will have powers, under Clauses 7 and 53 respectively, to call upon their respective Directors General to retire in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness. In such cases they will need to obtain the Secretary of State's approval. They will also be required to give the Director General concerned an opportunity to make representations and to consider any representations that he makes. Local police authorities in England and Wales have similar powers in respect of chief constables under section 11 of the Police Act 1996.
Paragraph 13 of Schedule 2 of the Bill seeks to prevent police members of the service authorities from voting on decisions taken by the service authorities relating to the exercise of their powers under Clauses 7 or 53 to require the Directors General or any other members of NCIS or NCS to resign in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness. They will also be unable to vote on motions of censure of the Directors General of NCIS or NCS, including motions on disciplinary action to be taken against them. Some sections of the police service expressed concerns that, under the bill as originally drafted, the police members of service
37 HL Deb Vol 576 c.161-162, 26.11.1996
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authorities would have been able to sit in judgment on their senior colleagues running NCIS and NCS. During the Bill's report stage the Home Office minister Baroness Blatch moved an amendment designed to extend the prohibition in paragraph 13 by preventing police members of the service authorities voting on motions of censure, including motions on disciplinary action, against the Director General and any other member of NCIS or,as the case may be, the National Crime Squad.38Paragraph 14 of Schedule 2 seeks to prevent Crown servants appointed to the service authorities by the Secretary of State from voting at any meetings of the service authorities of which they are members.
The Bill seeks to impose on the Secretary of State a general duty to exercise his powers under Parts I and II "in such manner and to such extent as appears to him to be best calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness" of NCIS and NCS (Clauses 25 and 70) In respect of both NCIS and NCS it is also intended that the Secretary of State should:
- set broad objectives for the organisations (after consultations with representatives of various agencies) (Clauses 26 and 71);
- set performance targets (Clauses 27 and 72);
- issue codes of practice (Clauses 28 and 73);
- issue directions to the service authorities in the light of adverse reports (Clauses 30 and 75);
In respect of both NCIS and NCS the Secretary of State will have powers to:
- require the Service Authority to require the Director General and certain other members of NCIS or NCS to retire in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness (Clauses 29 and 74); - require the service authorities to report to him on specific matters connected with the discharge of the authority's functions (Clauses 31 and 76);
- require the Directors General to report to him on specific matters connected with the activities of their organisations (Clauses 32 and 77);
- require provision of information for statistical purposes (Clause 33 and 78);
- cause public or private inquiries to be held, by persons appointed by him, into matters connected with NCIS or NCS (Clauses 34 and 79);
- make regulations concerning the standards of equipment provided or used for the purposes of NCIS or NCS (Clauses 35 and 80);
38 HL Deb Vol 577 c.386-387 20.1.1997
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Where NCIS is concerned the Secretary of State will also have the power to make regulations requiring NCIS to use specified facilities or services if he considers that this would be in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness (Clause 36 ).
The Bill also seeks to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations concerning the conduct of members of NCIS and the National Crime Squad and the maintenance of discipline (Clauses 37 and 81) and procedures for handling complaints (Clauses 39 and 83). During the Bill's committee stage in the House of Lords the Home Office minister, Baroness Blatch, introduced amendments bringing in two new Clauses (Clause 38 and 82) which are intended to ensure that senior police officers who are appointed as permanent police members of NCIS and NCS have access to the same appeals tribunal machinery as their senior colleagues in police forces.39 Subsequent amendments to these Clauses, moved by Baroness Blatch during the Bill's report stage, extend this provision to the Directors General themselves, as they will be permanent police members holding the rank of chief constable.40
Financing the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad
Clauses 16-21 are concerned with the financing of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, while Clauses 61-68 are concerned with the financing of the National Crime Squad. Both the NCIS service authority and the NCS service authority will be required to maintain a "service fund" into which all receipts will be paid and from which the authorities will fund themselves and NCIS or NCS as the case may be. Under Clauses 17 and 62 and Schedules 3 and 5 of the Bill both the NCIS service authority and the NCS service authority will raise funds through a compulsory levy on police authorities in England and Wales and the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District for the costs of the service they maintain. Where NCIS is concerned, this represents a change, as the Service is currently funded by central government through the Home Office vote.
At present, police authorities in England and Wales partly fund local police services by issuing council tax precepts which are passed on to council tax payers by the local billing authority (the district, metropolitan or London borough or unitary council). Clause 17 is designed to enable police authorities to anticipate levies issued by NCIS and the National Crime Squad when setting their precepts.
Where Scotland and Northern Ireland are concerned, the Government intends that contributions to the cost of NCIS should be made by central government, in the form of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The service authorities will be able to make direct charges, under Clauses 19 and 64 respectively, to
39 HL Deb Vol 576 c.83-185 & c.194 26.11.1996 40 HL Deb Vol 577 c.389-390 20.1.1997
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recover the costs of providing services to HM Customs and Excise, Scottish police forces, the RUC, other users (such as the British Transport Police) and users from overseas where this is appropriate. The service authorities will also be able to accept gifts of money, and gifts or loans of other property, on such terms as appear to them to be appropriate. These terms may include the commercial sponsorship of any activity of the service authority concerned and of NCIS or NCS.
During the Second Reading debate on the Bill in the House of Lords the Labour peer, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, expressed concern about the funding of the new bodies41. The Home Office minister Baroness Blatch subsequently wrote a letter to Lord McIntosh replying to points raised during the debate, by him and by other peers, about the constitution, accountability and funding of the new service authorities. This letter, which was deposited in the Library42, included a note, reproduced as an appendix to this paper, describing the proposed accountability and funding arrangements for NCIS and NCS43.
During the Bill's committee stage in the House of Lords Lord McIntosh of Haringey moved an amendment which sought to require the Secretary of State to satisfy himself that the resources available to each police authority were sufficient to meet the amount of the levy for NCIS and NCS without adversely affecting the level at which police services were provided by that police authority. Baroness Blatch set out the Government's view that such a provision would be overly bureaucratic and would mean detailed examination of the policing plans for the 43 police authorities in England and Wales, resulting in direct intervention in local policing by the Home Secretary. She added that, in the Government's view, the Bill already safeguarded the interests of police authorities and made provision for an informed decision about the split between funding for local policing and the two new national services, in that paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 gave the police authority members of the two service authorities the dominant voice in determining the levies and paragraph 2 of that Schedule required the Secretary of State to consult representatives of the police authorities before deciding to approve the proposed levies. Baroness Blatch said that, in practice, the provision in paragraph 2 would be implemented by the creation of a tripartite body to advise the Home Secretary on the appropriate level of levy.44
In further discussion on this amendment and the general question of funding for the NCIS and NCS service authorities Baroness Blatch said that the sum of money that is currently made available by the Home Office for NCIS comes from the Police Vote money, which is taken into account in the share of money given to each local police authority. She added that funding for NCIS was therefore properly reflected in the allocation to each police authority45.
41 HL Deb Vol 575 c. 796-797 11.11.1996 42 DEP 4183 (3S) 19.11.1996 43 ibid. Annex A 44 HL Deb Vol 576 c.171-172, 26.11.1996 45 ibid c.174
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In a later letter to Lord McIntosh, which was deposited in the House of Lords Library, Baroness Blatch stated that, under the levying system proposed in the Bill, police authorities in England and Wales would meet the net costs of NCIS and the National Crime Squad after deduction of any other income, such as Scottish and Northern Irish contributions to NCIS. She added that, in order to offset the increased burden on police authorities, the Home Office expenditure on NCIS would be included in the funds available for distribution to police authorities as police grant.46
D. The Police Bill Part IV - The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO)
The Home Office has provided national information technology services for the police for over 20 years. The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) was set up on an interim, non-statutory basis on April 1st 1996. A Police Information Technology Organisation Management and Financial Statement was published by the Home Office in May 1996. The Organisation is currently a common police service maintained by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland under section 41 of the Police Act 1964 and section 36 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. On April 1st 1996 the Home Secretary announced the Government's intention to place PITO on an independent footing as soon as a suitable legislative opportunity could be found. Part IV of the Police Bill duly seeks to establish PITO as an executive non-departmental public body (NPDB). In a note on Accountability and Funding Arrangements for the Police Information Technology Organisation, published in December 1996 and47 set out in full in appendix 2 to this paper, the Home Office noted that:
Executive NPDBs, of which PITO will be one, carry out prescribed executive, administrative, regulatory or commercial functions. Other Home Office executive NPDBs include the Police Complaints Authority and the Gaming Board for Great Britain
The note goes on to say that:
The NPDB model for PITO has been adopted following discussions with the chief officer and police authority associations. The model allows these outside interests to be directly involved in the strategic management of national police information technology services. At the same time, NPDB status removes decisions about IT priorities for the Police Service away from the government framework and into the hands of the users, while at the same time continuing to recognise Ministers' own strategic interest in the provision of police IT.
46 HDEP 96/292 47 HDEP 96/292
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The service authority model is not appropriate to PITO's circumstances. This model has been designed to meet the particular needs of NCIS and the National Crime Squad in view of their operational policing responsibilities. PITO, in contrast, is a provider of non-operational support services to forces. The NPDB model allows the Organisation to benefit from a hands on executive board on which all the tripartite partners are represented.
PITO will be a body corporate, that is, it will be a separate legal entity able to enter into contracts and employ staff in its own name.
Clause 100 of the Bill duly seeks to establish the Police Information Technology Organisation as a body corporate. The functions of the Organisation are described in Clause 100(3) as being to carry out activities (including the commissioning of research) relating to information technology equipment and systems for the use of police authorities and police forces (including NCIS and the National Crime Squad), and such other bodies as the Secretary of State may determine by order made by statutory instrument. Clause 100(4) adds that the Organisation may also procure or assist in procuring other equipment, systems and services for any of these authorities, forces or bodies.
Clause 101 seeks to give the Secretary of State powers of central direction over PITO by requiring the Organisation to comply with any general or specific written directions given by the Secretary of State following consultations with it. PITO will also be required to provide such information about its activities as he may request.
The creation of PITO and its proposed establishment as a non-departmental public body do not appear to have generated controversy. More detailed provisions concerning the constitution, powers and proceedings of the Organisation are set out in Schedule 8 of the Bill. These provisions, and the government's intentions about how they will operate in practice are described in the Home Office note on the Accountability and Funding Arrangements for PITO48
Appendix 1
ACCOUNTABILITY AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THE NATIONAL CRIME SQUAD
48 ibid.
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Introduction
This paper describes the accountability and funding arrangements for the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the National Crime Squad which are contained in the Police Bill. Specifically, it sets out: a) the role and membership of the two service authorities which would maintain NCIS and the National Crime Squad, comparing and contrasting them with police authorities; b) the Home Secretary's powers in relation to the National Crime Squad and those of the Secretaries of State in relation to NCIS, comparing them with the Home Secretary's powers in relation to police authorities and police forces in England and Wales; c) other oversight arrangements and accountability including Parliamentary scrutiny, the eolr of the Audit Commission, and Commissioner for Local Administration; and d) the funding arrangements for NCIS and the National Crime Squad.
The service authorities
2. Two service authorities are proposed. One would be responsible for NCIS, the other would be responsible for the National Crime Squad. The service authorities would have overlapping membership with ten members (the three independent members, two police officers from England and Wales, three local councillors from police authorities in England and Wales and a Home Office civil servant) common to both authorities. This common core is not a separate authority or committee and has no separate powers or responsibilities. The provision for two separate service authorities with some members who are common to both authorities is considered to be a better alternative than two completely separate authorities or a single authority.
3. The proposed arrangement recognises that NCIS and the National Crime Squad perform different roles which require different structures and management whilst at the same time ensuring a shared strategic direction for two services that will work very closely together. Establishing two separate service authorities would emphasise the distinct identities, functions and Jurisdictions of NCIS and the National Crime Squad but it would not be as effective at providing a shared strategic direction and promoting close cooperation. A single authority might ensure a common strategic direction and close cooperation but would blur the distinct identities and functions of the two services. It would be difficult to reconcile such arrangements with the UK-wide remit of NCIS as opposed to the England and Wales remit of the National Crime Squad.
4. The membership of the service authorities ensures that those who have a role in the strategic direction of policing nationally (central Government) and locally (police authorities), those who fund policing (central Government, police authorities and local councils) and those who will use the services of NCIS and the National Crime Squad (police, Customs and central
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Government) are involved in the strategic direction of the services and their funding. The proposed membership of the service authorities also includes an independent element to bring a wider perspective to the management of the two services.
Role of the service authorities
5. The two service authorities would be responsible for maintaining NCIS and the National Crime Squad and for ensuring their efficiency and effectiveness. This is the same role that police authorities play in relation to the police forces they maintain. To do this the service authorities would perform the following duties, all of which are consistent with the duties of police authorities: a) set the strategic direction of the two services; b) publish service plans (analogous to policing plans) setting out:
i) what the services would do;
ii) how they would use their resources;
iii) any objectives or performance targets set for the services bv the service authority or the Secretary of State; c) report progress against the service plans in an annual report; d) act as employer for the civilian staff in the services.
6. In the same way that police authorities fund police forces, the service authorities for NCIS and the National Crime Squad would set their service's budgets, funding each service from its own service fund. The service authorities would raise their income from levies on police authorities in England and Wales and contributions from other users (such as Customs and the Scottish and Northern Ireland Offices on behalf of Scottish police forces and the RUC). In contrast, police authorities gain their income from police grant and precepts on local authorities. Like police authorities the proposed service authorities would be able to borrow, hold reserves and accept sponsorship. Funding is described in greater detail in paragraph 26 below.
7. Day-to-day management of NCIS and the National Crime Squad would be the responsibility of the Directors General of the two services. They would be operationally independent of the service authorities in the same way that chief constables of local police forces are operationally independent of their police authorities.
Membership of the service authorities
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8. The NCIS service authority consists of 19 members, two more than the National Crime Squad service authority. The two additional members and differences in the make-up of the NCIS service authority when compared with the National Crime Squad service authority are the result of NCIS being a UK wide multi-agency body: it involves police from England and Wales, Scotland and the RUC and a significant contingent of Customs officers. By contrast, the National Crime Squad is an England and Wales body performing essentially policing functions.
9. The NCIS service authority will consist of: a) three independent members appointed by the Secretary of State. The postholders will be expected to bring a national perspective to the management of NCIS (and the National Crime Squad). This would be difficult for independent members if they were selected solely from the independent members on police authorities in England and Wales. An appointment process based on Nolan principles is the best way to achieve the satisfactory selection of independent members and the Home Secretary is appropriately placed to administer this selection process. In practice, the Home Secretary will consult the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland over these appointments. The posts will be advertised and appointments will be made on merit. Ministers' roles in appointing the independent members will be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. The postholders will also sit on the National Crime Squad service authority. One of them will be appointed by the Home Secretary to chair both service authorities. These are key appointments to positions with responsibility for important national services. The Government believes that it is reasonable for the Secretary of State to appoint the three independent members given the responsibilities for policing of the Secretaries of State for the Home Departments; b) eight members drawn from police authorities in the UK:
i) five will be local councillors from police authorities in England and Wales. Involving local councillors reinforces local accountability. These members will be selected by local councillors serving on English and Welsh police authorities. In practice the police authority association (the Association of Metropolitan Police Authorities and the Committee of Local Police Authorities) will manage the selection process. Three of these police authority members from England and Wales will also be members of the National Crime Squad service authority;
ii) one will be a local councillor member of a Scottish police authority, selected by the members of Scottish police authorities (all of whom are councillors). In practice the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities will manage the selection process;
iii) one will be a member of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland and will be selected by the members of that authority;
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iv) one will represent the Home Secretary in his capacity as the police authority for the Metropolitan Police and will come from the Metropolitan Police Committee (a non- statutory body which advises the Home Secretary in his capacity as the police authority for the Metropolitan Police). The Home Secretary is the only person who can appoint someone to represent him in his role as police authority for the Metropolitan Police and it would not be right to exclude the police authority for the largest police force in the country; c) four members appointed by the chief officers _of police in the United Kingdom. Chief constables currently play a direct role in the management of Regional Crime Squads and the Government believes that users of the services should contribute directly to the strategic management of NCIS and the National Crime Squad. These services will directly support local police forces. Of the four chief officers:
i) two will be from England and Wales. They will also sit on the National Crime Squad service authority. One of these will be a chief constable from a police force outside London, the other will be a chief officer of police from the Metropolitan Police or the City of London Police;
ii) one will be a chief constable from a Scottish police force;
iii) one will be an officer of at least the rank of deputy chief constable from the RUC and will be appointed by the Chief Constable of the RUC; d) one member will be a senior civil servant from the Home Office representing the Home Secretary. This person will be a member of the National Crime Squad service authority as well. The Home Secretary has a legitimate interest in the strategic management of both services given his responsibilities for the efficiency and effectiveness of the police and the two services and his role in setting the strategy for policing in England and Wales; e) one will be a senior civil servant the Secretary of State for Scotland and one will be a senior civil servant representing the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Both Secretaries of State will contribute to the costs of NCIS and they have the same responsibilities for policing in their jurisdictions as the Home Secretary has in England and Wales. f) one will be a customs officer to represent the Commissioners for Customs and Excise. Customs and Excise will use the services of NCIS, provide it with staff and contribute to its costs.
10. The 17 member National Crime Squad service authority consists of: a) three independent members. These are the same three independent members who sit on the NCIS service authority;
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b) ten members drawn from police authorities.in England and Wales:
i) nine of whom are selected from local councillors on police authorities in the same way that the police authority members from England and Wales will be selected for the NCIS service authority. Three of these police authority members would sit on the NCIS service authority;
ii) one will represent the Home Secretary in his capacity as the police authority for the Metropolitan Police. This will be the person who performs the same role on the NCIS service authority ;
c) three members appointed by chief police officers in England and Wales. Of these at least one would have to be a chief constable from a police force outside London and at least one would have to be a chief officer from the Metropolitan Police or City of London Police. These two chief officers would be same chief officers who perform the same role on the NCIS service authority;
d) one member will be a senior civil servant from the Home Office representing the Home Secretary. This will be same person who performs the same role on the NCIS service authority.
Limitations on the role of service authorities' members
11. All members of the service authorities are full members but the Police Bill limits the roles which would be performed bv some members.
12. Decisions on the levy on police authorities in England and Wales will be restricted to the three independent members and the police authority members from England and Wales, including the representative of the police authority for the Metropolitan Police. This restricts the decision to representatives of those who will have to pay the levy and the independent element on the committee.
13. The Government believes that those who are going to use NCIS and the National Crime Squad should have a say in its strategic management. This is why there are police members on the two service authorities. The Police Bill excludes them from participating in the selection of the Directors General and from voting on any motion to censure them or require either of the two Directors General to retire in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness. This is in recognition of the fact that the Directors General are of the same status as the chief officers of police on the service authorities.
14. The Police Bill also bars from voting on any matter those civil servants who represent the Home Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland. They do not need to vote to fulfil their role representing Ministers' views on the strategic management of the two services. Their non-voting role is consistent with central Government exercising as light a touch as possible in the strategic management of the two services whilst their full
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member status (as opposed to being advisers or observers) ensures they are fully involved in the work of the service authorities.
The Secretary of State's Powers
15. The Secretary of State may only use his powers, to be exercised as necessary in consultation with the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Northern Ireland, in the interest of the efficiency and effectiveness of NCIS and the National Crime Squad. The Secretary of State's powers in relation to the service authorities, NCIS and the National Crime Squad are consistent with the Home Secretary's powers in relation to police authorities and police forces in England and Wales with two exceptions: a) appointment of certain members of the service authorities; and b) in respect of levying (see paragraph 27 below).
The powers
16. The Secretary of State's powers to direct the service authorities or services are set out below, cross-referenced to his existing powers in respect of the police in England and Wales. He can: a) by order determine objectives for both services. Any order must be laid before Parliament after being made (Section 37 of the Police Act 1996); b) set performance targets for both services to aim at in fulfilling any objectives the Secretary of State may set (Section 38 of the Police Act 1996); c) issue Codes of Practice relating to the way the both service authorities discharge their functions (Section 39 of the Police Act 1996); d) instruct a service authority to exercise its power to require the Director General of the service it maintains to retire in the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of the service. This places Directors General in the same position as chief constables in England and Wales (Section 42 of the Police Act 1996); e) instruct Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary to inspect either service and direct a service authority to take remedial action where the report states that a service is not efficient or effective, or will cease to be efficient or effective unless action is taken. (Section 40 of the Police Act 1996); f) instruct either service authority to report to him on anything to do with how they are discharging their role or how the service they maintain is functioning (Section 43 of the Police Act 1996),.
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g) instruct the Director General of a service to report to him on the functioning of the service he manages (Section 44 of the Police Act 1996); h) instruct either service to provide information to allow criminal statistics to be prepared (Section 45 of the Police Act 1996); i) appoint someone to hold an inquiry into any matter related to either service (Section 49 of the Police Act 1996); j) make regulations about the equipment used by either service (Section 53 of the Police Act 1996); k) make regulations requiring either service to use services shared with the other service and/or a police force or forces; ie common services (Section 57 of the Police Act 1996); l) make regulations about the discipline and complaints regimes applying to both services (Section 50 of the Police Act 1996); m) call for a report on the consultation arrangements put in place by either service authority or the Directors General of NCIS and the National Crime Squad and may require them to review consultation arrangements (Section 96 of the Police Act 1996);
17. In addition to these powers to direct the service authorities or services the Police Bill provides the Secretary of State with powers to: a) vary the size of the service authorities (Sections 4 and 5 of the Police Act 1996)-. b) approve any shortlist of candidates for the post of Director General (Section 11 of the Police Act 1996); c) settle disputes concerning charges in respect of collaboration agreements and aid by and for either service from or to the other service and/or a police force or forces. (Sections 23 and 24 of the Police Act 1996); d) arbitrate between a service authority and the Director General of the service it maintains where the service authority and the Director General dispute who should appoint a member of staff or the Director General does not wish to comply with a request from his service authority to provide a report on the management or activities of the service he manages (Section 22 of the Police Act 1996); e) hear representations from a Director General who is being instructed to retire in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness (Section 42 of the Police Act 1996),
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f) approve the designated deputy to a Director General discharging the functions of the Director General for a continuous period of more than three months (Section 12 of the Police Act 1996)-, g) make grants to the service authorities to cover expenditure they incur before the first financial year in which they receive income from levies. This will allow the service authorities to be set up in time for them to calculate the first levy, appoint Directors General and finalise arrangements for the creation of the National Crime Squad and transfer of NCIS from the Home Office to service authority management.
The Bill also gives the Secretary of State transitional powers to allow implementation of the Bill's provisions on NCIS and the National Crime Squad.
Accountability
18. The accountability arrangements for the two service authorities, NCIS and the National Crime Squad set out in the Bill are based on current accountability arrangements for the police. As such the primary route for accountability is through the service authorities. The Directors General of NCIS and the National Crime Squad report to their respective service authorities in the same way that chief constables report to their police authorities. The Directors General are, therefore, responsible for the day-to-day management of their services and are operationally independent.
Parliamentary accountability
19. Ministers would be accountable to Parliament for: a) the appointments they make to the service authorities-, b) their decisions on funding; c) the actions of the civil servants representing them on the service authorities; d) the exercise of any of the powers set out in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, including the powers to set objectives and performance targets.
20. Ministers would not be accountable for the actions of the service authorities and questions on operational matters, whether from Parliament or the public, would be for the Directors -General to answer. This is consistent with arrangements for the police. Both services could come within the remit of the Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons in the same way that a police force or a police authority in England and Wales currently does.
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Application of local government accountability mechanisms
21. Both service authorities and the services they will maintain will be within the Audit Commission's remit in the same way as police authorities and police forces in England and Wales. Members of the authorities will be liable for surcharge in the event of malpractice. The service authorities will come within the remit of the Commissioner for Local Administration as well.
Public accountability
22. Public accountability would be achieved through various means: a) the police authority members on the service authorities; b) the service plans and annual reports prepared by service authorities will be published. They will be sent to police authorities automatically; c) the Directors General of the two services will also publish annual reports; d) members of the public will be free to question the service authorities and the Directors General of the services they maintain directly, to ask local councillors to pursue the questions via the police authorities and to engage the support of their MP in pursuing questions they might have; e) the service authorities' meetings will be open to the public and papers and records will be available for inspection, other than in exceptional circumstances. Reasons will have to be given for closing any part of a service authority's meeting or denying access to papers or records; f) members of the public can raise queries about the service authorities' accounts with the District Auditor; g) the cost of the two services will be recorded in service plans and annual reports and the levy will be recorded on council tax bills in England and Wales.
Consultation
23. In addition to post facto accountability, the Bill places a general duty on the service authorities and the Directors General of NCIS and the National Crime Squad to establish consultative arrangements. The service authorities are required to consult about their own arrangements and the services they maintain with police authorities (throughout the United Kingdom for NCIS); each other; the Commissioners for Customs and Excise (NCIS only); and any other person or body they consider appropriate. Similarly the Directors General of NCIS and the National Crime Squad must put in place arrangements for consulting about their services with chief officers of police (throughout the United Kingdom for NCIS); each other;
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the Commissioner's for Customs and Excise (NCIS only); and any other person or body they consider appropriate.
24. The Bill places a specific duty on the service authorities to consult representatives of police authorities, the police, each other, their own Director General and Customs and Excise (as appropriate) before setting objectives for their services.
25. Provisions in the Police Bill require the Secretary of State to consult variously before: a) making an order to vary the size of the service authorities; b) setting objectives for the services; c) taking decisions on the levy; d) directing service authorities, their services, police authorities and police forces to enter into collaborative agreements and provide each other with aid; or before making regulations requiring them to use common services.
Funding
26. Each service authority will maintain a service fund. All income to the service authority will be paid into this fund and all the costs of running the service maintained by the service authority will be met from the service fund. The general financial regime will be the regime that applies to local government. The service authorities will appoint a finance officer who will be a qualified accountant,
27. Service authorities will obtain their income from: a) levies on police authorities in England and Wales. The levying process ensures that police authorities are directly involved in the decision about the funding of NCIS and the National Crime Squad. They can take informed decisions about funding the two services in the light of the local policing need for support from NCIS and the National Crime Squad. The levying process allows their views to be considered along with the wider need for these national services so that a balanced assessment of the funding requirement for NCIS and the National Crime Squad can be reached. As such, the levying process is a bottom-up process in which those who use and pay for the services are directly involved from an early stage. The Government believes that for these reasons levying is to be preferred to top-slicing; b) in the case of NCIS only, contributions from the Scottish and Northern Ireland Offices reflecting the UK wide remit of NCIS. This continues the present arrangements whereby the Secretary of State for Scotland meets a share of NCIS' costs and passes half of that share on to police authorities and joint boards under the Common Police Services (Scotland) Order 1996. Policing in Northern Ireland is funded entirely by central
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government and local authorities play no part in the process. That makes levying inappropriate; c) in the case of NCIS only, charges to Customs and Excise for the services provided to them. Levying is inappropriate for Customs and Excise because it is part of central Government; d) charges to minor users.' and e) borrowing. Service authorities will be able to maintain reserves and accept sponsorship as well.
Levying
28. The Table below sets out the sequence for setting the levy. The Police Bill contains reserve powers for the Home Secretary to set the levy in the event that a service authority refuses to do so.
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Table: The levying process
STAGE STAGE OF LEVYING PROCESS
1 Director General prepares draft service plan and budget.
2 Service authority considers draft service plan and budget and refines in consultation with Director General, police authorities, police and others it chooses to consult.
3 Police authority and independent members of the service authority agree a provisional levy.
4 The service authority submits its proposed levy to the Home Secretary who consults a tripartite group (established for this purpose and including persons who represent chief officers of police and police authorities in England and Wales) about the suitability of the proposed levy. The tripartite group comment on the levy in the context of proposed overall spending on the police, the other service and other centrally provided services such as police training.
5 1 - 2 days after the Budget the Draft Grant Report is issued to police authorities and service authorities. The service authority meets to consider any changes it might wish to make to the levy in the light of this and feedback from the tripartite group advising the Home Secretary on the levy.
6 Further tripartite group discussion of the levy. The group makes its recommendation to the Home Secretary.
7 The Home Secretary approves or adjusts the total amount of the levy. Once set, this levy cannot be exceeded by the service authority.
8 Service authority finalises its budget.
9 Police authorities notified of the levy and apportionment.
HOME OFFICE 18 November 1996
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Appendix 2
ACCOUNTABILITY AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE POLICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION
This paper describes the accountability and funding arrangements or the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), once it is established as an executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) by the provision of Part IV of the Police Bill. Specifically, its sets out;
(a) the status and membership of PITO and the role of its executive board;
(b) the Secretary of State's powers;
(c) accountability arrangements; and
(d) the funding arrangements for PITO.
PITO as an NDPB
The Status of PITO
2. The Bill would establish PITO as an executive NDPB. An NDPB is a body which has a role in the process of national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and accordingly operates at arm's length from Ministers, There are three main categories of NDPBs, namely executive, advisory and tribunals. Executive NDPBs, of which PITO will be one, carry out prescribed executive, administrative, regulatory or commercial functions. Other Home Office executive NDPBs include the Police Complaints Authority and the Gaming Board for Great Britain.
3. Details of all NDPBs are published annually by the Cabinet Office; the 1996 edition of "Public Bodies" will be published later this month. Guidance on the creation of, and the framework of control for, NDPBs is set out in the Treasury/Cabinet office publication "Non- Departmental Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments". The accountability and accounting arrangements for NDPBs are set out in chapter 8 of "Government Accounting".
4. The NDPB model for PITO has been adopted following discussions with the chief officer and police authority associations. The model allows these outside interests to be directly involved in the strategic management of national police information technology services. At the same time, NDPB status removes decisions about IT priorities for the Police Service away from the government framework and into the hands of the users, while at the same time continuing to recognise Ministers' own strategic interests in the provision of police IT.
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5. The service authority model is not appropriate to PITO's circumstances. This model has been designed to meet the particular needs of NCIS and the National Crime Squad in view their operational policing responsibilities. PITO, in contrast, is a provider of non-operational Support services to forces. The NDPB model allows the Organisation to benefit from a hands on executive board on which all the tripartite partners are represented.
6. PITO will be a body corporate, that is, it will be a separate legal entity able to enter into contracts and employ staff in its own name.
Functions of PITO and the role of its executive board
7. The Bill ascribes two broad functions to PITO.- The first of these is to carry out activities in relation to information technology equipment and systems for use by: (a) police authorities and police forces; and (b) such other bodies as may be determined by the Secretary of State. In practice, PITO will undertake the following activities:
(a) develop, procure and manage the delivery of national IT systems in support of the police;
(b) maintain a strategic approach to local IT systems, by co-ordinating their development and delivery where common standards and systems are needed in the interests of the efficiency or effectiveness of the police;
(c) keep under review the needs of police forces for information technology equipment and systems;
(d advise the Secretary of State on the exercise of his powers to regulate the use by police forces of information technology equipment or systems;
(e) undertake or commission research in relation to information technology equipment or systems for the use of police forces.
8. The second function of PITO is to procure or assist in procuring other (non-IT related) equipment, systems and services for police forces, police authorities and other bodies the Secretary of State has designated.
9. Responsibility for carrying out these functions will rest with an executive board. The board will set the strategic direction of PITO. It will do this through the publication of a strategic plan, which will set out the long-term strategy for the development of police information technology; a corporate plan, which will define how this strategy is to be realised over the next five years and the resources that will be needed; and a business plan, to cover the first year of the planning period. The board will also monitor the performance of the Organisation against these strategic, corporate and business plans and report on progress in an annual report.
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10. Day-to-day management of PITO would be the responsibility of the Chief Executive, who would be appointed by and directly answerable to the board for PITO's performance and operations. As PITO is a provider of support services to police forces, it is not appropriate to vest operational independence in the Chief Executive along similar lines to the operational Independence exercised by chief constables of forces or the Directors General of NCIS and the National Crime squad. The function of the Chief Executive is to give effect to the board's decisions and, in particular, to deliver PITO,s strategic, corporate and business plans on budget and on time,
Membership of PITO
11. The membership of PITO will reflect the tripartite arrangements for policing in the UK. The executive board will comprise.
(a) an independent chairman appointed by the Home Secretary after consultation with the chief officer and police authority associations;
(b) three members nominated by the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland;
(c) three members nominated by the police authority associations in England and Wales (namely the AMA and COLPA);
(d) one member nominated by the Association of Chief Police officers in Scotland;
(e) one member nominated by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities;
(f) two senior civil servants from the Home Office representing the Home Secretary's policing and wider criminal justice interests;
(g) one senior civil servant representing the Secretary of State for Scotland; and
(h) one additional member with relevant experience of the management of information technology in the private sector.
12. As with the chairman, the members of PITO will also be appointed by the Home Secretary or Secretary of State for Scotland, as appropriate. The appointment of members by Ministers is in keeping with the arrangements in place for the generality of NDPBs and was supported by the first report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Nolan Committee) which recommended that ultimate responsibility for appointments should remain with Ministers. The appointment procedures for the chairman and additional member will be in accordance with Nolan principles. While the chief officer and police authority members will be formally appointed by Ministers, as noted in paragraph 11 above, the individuals concerned will be nominated by their relevant associations.
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13. It is anticipated that PITO's remit will initially cover Great Britain. Once it extends to Northern Ireland, three additional members will be appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Once of these will be nominated by the chief constable of the RUC, a second will be nominated by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland, and the third will be a senior civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office.
The Secretary of State's Powers
14. The Secretary of State's powers in respect of PITO, set out in paragraph 15 below, broadly mirror those in the founding statutes of other NDPBs. The controls to be exercised by the Home Secretary reflect his responsibility for assuring Parliament of the efficiency and effectiveness in which PITO carries out its statutory functions and spends public funds.
15. The Secretary of State may:
(a) by order, determine such other bodies for whom PITO may carry out its statutory function (Clause 99(3) (b));
(b) instruct PITO to comply with any general or specific directions given in writing following consultation with the Organisation (Clause 100 (1) and (2));
(c) instruct PITO to provide such information about its activities as may be requested (Clause 100(3));
(d) determine the remuneration and allowances of members (Schedule 8, paragraph 3(1));
(e) determine the pension, if any, of board members (Schedule 8, paragraph 3(2));
(f) determine the level of compensation, if any, paid to a person who ceases to be a member or the chairman (Schedule 8, paragraph 3(3));
(g) approve the numbers and terms and conditions of service of employees (Schedule 8, paragraph 4(1));
(h) consent to the appointment of the chief executive (Schedule 8, paragraph 4 (2)); (i) consent to the remuneration and allowances paid to employees (Schedule 8, paragraph 5(1));
(j) consent to the arrangements in respect of the payment of pensions (Schedule 8, paragraph 5(2) and (4));
(k) consent to the appointment of persons who are not members of the Organisation to a committee or sub-committee (Schedule 8, paragraph 7(1));
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(l) determine the remuneration and allowances paid to members of committees or sub- committee who are not members of the Organisation (Schedule 8, paragraph 7(2));
(m) make payments to the Organisation out of money provided by Parliament (schedule 8, paragraph 12);
(n) direct, with the consent of the Treasury, that receipts from charges shall not be paid to him (Schedule 8, paragraph 13(3));
(o) direct, with the consent of the Treasury, the form and content of the organisation's statement of accounts (Schedule 8, paragraph 15(3));
Accountability
16. The accountability arrangements for PITO are based on the existing arrangements for other NDPBs, PITO would be responsible for carrying out its statutory functions but, as the responsible Minister, the Home Secretary would be accountable to Parliament for the overall efficiency and effectiveness with which the Organisation carries out these functions.
17. Ministers would also be accountable to Parliament for:
(a) the appointment of the chairman and members of PITO;
(b) their decisions on funding and the way in which the Organisation spends public funds;
(c) the actions of civil servants representing them on the PITO board; and
(d) the exercise of any of the powers set out in paragraph 15 above.
18. In addition to these arrangements for ministerial accountability, broader public and parliamentary accountability will be achieved through the following mechanisms;
(a) PITO will publish an annual report and accounts which will enable Parliament and the taxpayer to judge whether it is providing value for money;
(b) PITO's accounts will be subject to audit by the National Audit Office;
(c) PITO will be subject to scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee and the Chief Executive can be summoned to appear before the Committee to give evidence;
(d) PITO would be within the remit of the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
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Funding
19. PITO will initially be funded by means of grant-in-aid paid by the Home Office, with contributions being made by the Scottish and Northern Ireland Offices; the majority of executive NDPBs are funded in this way. This form of financing is appropriate where the Government has decided, subject to Parliamentary and essential departmental controls, that the recipient should operate at arms length. Over time, the Organisation will progressively be expected to cover most of its costs by charges on its customers. As with the arrangements for setting the levy on police authorities to meet the costs of NCIS and the National Crime Squad, before determining PITO's grant-in-aid it is intended that the Home Secretary would consult a tripartite group about the appropriate level of funding in the context of the proposed overall spending on the police.
HOME OFFICE December 1996
51 Recent Research Papers on related subjects include:
97/22 The Police Bill [Bill 88 of 1996-97]: 11.02.97 Intrusive Surveillance
97/23 The Police Bill [H.L] [Bill 88 of 1996-97]: 11.02.97 Access to Criminal Records
96/99 The Crime (Sentences) Bill [Bill 3 of 1996-97] 01.11.96
96/100 The Crime (Sentences) Bill and the Crime and 31.10.96 Punishment (Scotland) Bill: provisions for mentally disordered offenders
Criminal Justice