DOCSLIB.ORG

Analysis of the Restructuring Options of NJSC Naftogaz

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Analysis of the Restructuring Options of NJSC Naftogaz Analysis of the Restructuring Options of NJSC Naftogaz Part 1: Public Disclosure Authorized Unbundling options for gas transmission Part 2: Unbundling options for gas storage Final report, 9 February 2016 This work is being done as part of Task 1 of the joint EC-WB Facility to support the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine and NJSC Public Disclosure Authorized ‘Naftogaz of Ukraine’ on advisory services and technical assistance for the reform and modernization of the natural gas sector The views in this report constitute the consultant’s views and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank or the European Commission Public Disclosure Authorized This project is jointly funded by the European Union, This task is implemented the World Bank and the Energy Sector Management by Economic Consulting Assistance Program (ESMAP) Associates Ltd Public Disclosure Authorized Key recommendations Transitional and target structures for transmission and storage: two-step approach The overall unbundling process is suggested to be viewed as a two- step approach, with a transition to full unbundling being accomplished in two steps The first step, in the short term, would be a transitional structure that needs to achieve, as a minimum, the unbundling of the TSO. Given that the TSO is part of UTG, the proposed transitional structure is for the unbundling of both the TSO (transmission operation and assets) and SSO (storage operation and assets) The transitional structure is shown in the next page The longer term possible target structure indicates a fully unbundled system with the main functions of transmission, storage, production and supply/trading separated It could be achieved in say 3-5 years 2 Recommended transitional industry structure Current Ministry of Economic Development and Trade structure NAK Naftogaz UGV Ukrtransgaz Trading & (production) supply TSO SSO Recommended State owner 1 State owner 2 transitional structure NAK Naftogaz UGV Trading & UTG / NewCo (production) supply TSO SSO 3 Analysis of the Restructuring Options of NJSC Naftogaz Part 1: Unbundling options for gas transmission Introduction Description and theoretical assessment of unbundling options Stakeholder views and proposals EU experience Evaluation of options against agreed criteria Conclusions and recommendations Current arrangements for gas transmission and transit in Ukraine – how to unbundle? KEY MARKET & BUSINESS KEY LEGISLATIVE CHARACTERISTICS FEATURES Conformity with 3EP as transposed by Gas Market Law (GML) requires transmission unbundling – Naftogaz via its wholly owned question is which model should be adopted? subsidiary Ukrtransgaz operates: GML allows only OU and ISO models (not ITO) Extensive national gas transmission Naftogaz and its subsidiaries do not own the and transit pipelines transmission and storage assets The storage system They are owned by the State of Ukraine with some ambiguity as to whether they are vested in the State The transit and transmission Property Fund of Ukraine (SPFU) or other state entity infrastructure is not separated Ukrainian Law specifies that the State must remain Transit volumes fell to around 62 owner of gas transmission and storage assets bcm in 2014 while domestic Assets are currently managed by 100%-owned transmission (in 2012-2014) has Naftogaz subsidiary, Ukrtransgaz We understand that the state can grant usage been in the order of 40-50 bcm rights over the transmission system and storage However, transit tariffs represent the facilities (and that such assets would appear on the bulk (88%) of Ukrtransgaz revenue balance sheet of the operator) Transmission revenues are earned by 100% of shares of Naftogaz were transferred to the Ukrtransgaz directly but transit revenues Ministry of Economic Development and Trade ( are received via Naftogaz MEDT) on 18 December 2015 Naftogaz has a long term transit agreement with Gazprom, which expires in 2019 This agreement has not been assigned to Ukrtransgaz 5 The work is being undertaken under the auspices of the European Commission – World Bank Trust Fund 1 Initial assistance to MECI , in refining The Gas Sector Reform the restructuring concept of NAK2 Implementation Plan (forming Naftogaz (under EC-World Bank Trust Fund: Task 1), also contributed to part of IMF MoU) requires developing the Gas Sector Reform transmission unbundling to Implementation Plan (GSRIP) be implemented by June The GSRIP aims to support a stable 2016 framework for Naftogaz restructuring Decision by the Government and unbundling, covering production and price reform as well as transmission according to the GML should be and storage unbundling made by January 2016 The work undertaken by this task Working Group established initially focuses on restructuring and unbundling analysis for the with representatives of key transmission and storage business Ukrainian stakeholders and areas of Naftogaz donors pursuant to the order This report focuses on transmission of the MECI to coordinate this A separate, accompanying report addresses storage work and facilitate decision In a next step it will also include the on preferred unbundling and assessment of options for the restructuring options production business area of Naftogaz 1 2 6 MECI: Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry, NAK: Naftogaz of Ukraine This builds on prior work examining ownership unbundling options for transmission Naftogaz unbundling proposals have What we have previously proposed gone through changes but have Preferred model ownership unbundling, emphasised clear separation of TSO primarily to ensure TSO is incentivised to An evolution of proposals from 2014 invest in the upgrade of the transmission and 2015 on the basis of NAK’s system coordinated with system operation evolving business plan and associated needs implementation plan Advised on legal issues for implementation A number of different unbundling to ensure compliance with 3EP proposals formulated on which we provided comments Highlighted key issues requiring clarification and resolution: Discussion on the implications for the adoption of the ISO model compared to Analysis of whether gas transit agreement the OU model in relation to: with Gazprom can/needs to be assigned to The requirements for meeting the the TSO, or use of the assets can be 3EP/GML unbundling provisions facilitated by direct agreement between NAK/other state entity and independent TSO The tension between options for a minority private shareholding with Clarification that concessions or other European experience, and the legal similar form of usage rights over the requirement to keep fixed assets as state transmission system can be given to UTG property or other entity whether under public or Proposal has since firmed towards a private (full or partial) ownership variant of ownership unbundling How to ensure that public legal persons (discussed later) exercising ownership and control over Supported by McKinsey report (June different gas activities are separate and 2015) for Naftogaz demonstrating not under common influence (eg by the significant adoption of OU model in EU Cabinet of Ministers) 7 The aim is to support Government to make an informed decision on the restructuring of Naftogaz Assessment framework 3 1 EU experience 2 Taxonomy of 4 Review and pros and cons Qualitative assessment against assessment and agreed criteria: of stakeholder theoretical • 3EP compliance unbundling • Ease of implementation assessment • Efficient operation and proposals of unbundling investment ` options • Facilitation of gas market restructuring and private sector participation Conclusions and recommendations 8 Focus is on the structural options; good corporate governance needed irrespective of the chosen model The report builds on The present report examines previous analysis (by us transmission in isolation – and others), discussions storage is assessed separately during the November 2015 in an accompanying report Kiev ‘mission’, subsequent The report does not propose stakeholder proposals, and the specific public body that further meetings and a should exercise ownership control of the TSO (or of other presentation to the gas sector commercial Working Group of our draft activities), but this should be : report in Kiev in January a body consistent with the 2016 principle of separating ownership of system operation We attempt to distil the and transmission from supply main features and issues and production requiring to be addressed addressed immediately in the and resolved to arrive at a next phase of the work decision on the preferred consistent with principles of unbundling option for gas good corporate governance transmission/transit 9 Analysis of the Restructuring Options of NJSC Naftogaz Part 1: Unbundling options for gas transmission Introduction Description and theoretical assessment of unbundling options Stakeholder views and proposals EU experience Evaluation of options against agreed criteria Conclusions and recommendations The unbundling options EU Third Energy Package: three unbundling options (OU, ISO, ITO) Ukraine Gas Market Law*: prescribes one of only two options (OU, ISO) Increasing regulatory requirements control and regulatory Increasing Separate Transmission Vertically Transmission system OU integrated system operation undertaking Owners ownership Separate Separate Vertically Transmission Transmission ISO integrated system system operation undertaking Subsidiary ownership Owners Available options under the Ukraine Gas Market Law Separate Vertically
Load more

Recommended publications
  • OEF 107 November 2016.Indd
    NOVEMBER 2016: Issue 107 forum A QUARTERLY JOURNAL FOR DEBATING ENERGY ISSUES AND POLICIES It is well known that Russia is heavily not be practically possible, meaning CONTENTS dependent on its energy sector, from that oil and gas companies could face both an economic and a political a stealth increase in their overall tax Russian energy issues in a volatile perspective. As a result, the fall in the burden. environment oil price over the past two years and the Tatiana Mitrova then discusses one Russia’s macroeconomic problems and dramatic changes taking place in the of the key factors underpinning the the risks to the oil and gas sector global gas market are having signifi cant survival of Russia’s hydrocarbon Christopher Granville 4 consequences for both the Kremlin and industry in 2016, namely the devaluation Russia’s domestic energy companies. Cost dynamics in the Russian energy sector of the ruble and its impact on cost Tatiana Mitrova 7 However, instead of reviewing the competitiveness. The Russian increased risks for Russia from the The Rosneftization of the Russian oil sector government’s decision not to protect change in global energy markets, this Nina Poussenkova 9 the domestic currency as the oil price edition of the Oxford Energy Forum collapsed has signifi cantly enhanced Securing the future: the implications of discusses how Russia has started the position of exporting industries, India’s expanding role in the Russian oil to adapt its policies and commercial reducing their costs in US$ terms, sector strategies in a number of different areas. Vitaly Yermakov 12 but Mitrova argues that this benefi t Some of the new strategies appear very has limited further upside and could positive, while others carry inherent Ukraine’s dramatic gas import diversifi cation risks, but all show how the world’s indeed be reversed if the oil price Simon Pirani 15 largest producer of hydrocarbons is recovers.
    [Show full text]
  • A CITIZEN's GUIDE to NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES Part a Technical Report
    A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES Part A Technical Report October 2008 Copyright © 2008 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 and The Center for Energy Economics/Bureau of Economic Geology Jackson School of Geosciences, The University of Texas at Austin 1801 Allen Parkway Houston, TX 77019 All rights reserved. This paper is an informal document intended to provide input for the selection of a sample of representative national oil companies to be analyzed within the context of the Study on National Oil Companies and Value Creation launched in March 2008 by the Oil, Gas, and Mining Policy Division of The World Bank. The manuscript of this paper has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. Some sources cited in this paper may be informal documents that are not readily available. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. This report may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission. For free downloads of this paper or to make inquiries, please contact: Oil, Gas, and Mining Policy Division Center for Energy Economics The World Bank Bureau of Economic Geology 2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Jackson School of Geosciences Washington DC, 20433 The University of Texas at Austin Telephone: 202-473-6990 Telephone: +1 281-313-9753 Fax: 202-522 0395 Fax: +1 281-340-3482 Email: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.worldbank.org/noc.
    [Show full text]
  • Overview of the Ukrainian Oil and Gas and Shale Gas Market Opportunities
    1/25 Overview of the Ukrainian Oil & Gas and Shale Gas Market Opportunities by Lyubomyr Goncharuk Adviser to the Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine Canada - Ukraine Oil & Gas Opportunities Workshop, Kyiv, February 25-26, 2013 2/25 CONTENTS 1. Reserves & Resources 2. Production & Consumption 3. Opportunities Canada - Ukraine Oil & Gas Opportunities Workshop, Kyiv, February 25-26, 2013 3/25 1. Reserves & Resources Canada - Ukraine Oil & Gas Opportunities Workshop, Kyiv, February 25-26, 2013 4/25 Canada - Ukraine Four oil and gas provinces are recognized Oil & Gas Opportunities in the country, including 11 oil-gas Workshop, Kyiv basins and 35 prospective areas. February 25-26, 2013 Hydrocarbon deposits are being exploited for oil, gas, and condensate in the following regions: Oil & Gas 1/2 • A – the Eastern Region (Dniprovsko- Donetska Depression and northwestern Crystalline basement slopes portion of Donbas); Voronezhska Volyno- Podilska Dniprovsko-Donetska Depression A Plate • B – the Western Region (Volyno- B Kyiv Anticline Lvivskiy Podilska Plate, Fore-Carpathians, Trough Fore-Carpathian Trough Folded Carpathians Folded Carpathians, and Trans- Donbas Transcarpathians UKRAINIAN SHIELD Carpathians); • C – the Southern Region 200 km Fore-Crimean Depression (Prychornomorya, Crimea, and the Azov Sea Fore- exclusive marine economic zone of the Dobrugean C Scythian Trough Plate Black Sea and Azov Sea offshore). Black Sea Mountain Crimea 5/25 Canada - Ukraine In 2011, production amounted to 2.4 million Oil & Gas Opportunities tons of oil, 0.9 million tons of condensate, Workshop, Kyiv and 20.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas. February 25-26, 2013 The State Inventory includes 187 oil deposits Oil & Gas 2/2 (121 in production), 202 condensate deposits (142 in production), and 380 natural Crystalline basement slopes gas deposits (224 in production).
    [Show full text]
  • Advisory Services and Technical Assistance to NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine and the Government
    INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET CONCEPT STAGE Report No.: 89642 Date ISDS Prepared/Updated: July 15, 2014 Public Disclosure Authorized I. BASIC INFORMATION A. Basic Project Data Country: Ukraine Project ID: P151927 Project Name: Advisory Services and Technical Assistance to NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" and the Government of Ukraine on the Reform of the Natural Gas Sector Task Team Leader: Yadviga Semikolenova Estimated Appraisal Date: July, 25 2014 Estimated Board Date: Public Disclosure Authorized Managing Unit: GEEDR Lending Instrument: Sector(s): Oil and Gas Theme(s): Corporate Governance; State-Owned Enterprise Restructuring and Privatization; Regulation and Competition Policy Is this project processed under OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery) or OP 8.00 No (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)? Financing (in USD Million) Total Project Cost: EURO 2,035,000 Total Bank Financing: Total Cofinancing: Financing Gap: Public Disclosure Authorized Financing Source Amount BORROWER/RECIPIENT 0 Single Donor (EC) Trust Fund EURO 2,035,000 Total EURO 2,035,000 Environmental Category C Is this a Repeater project? No Is this a Transferred No project? B. Project Objectives Public Disclosure Authorized The objective of the project is to provide advisory services and technical assistance to NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" and the Government of Ukraine on the reform and restructuring of the natural gas sector through: providing support the Government of Ukraine to develop and implement the outstanding key 1 reforms in the gas sector that are necessary for Ukraine to fulfill the legal commitments undertaken in the framework of membership of the Energy Community; and providing advisory services, in the form of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), to NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" to prepare bankable projects and to oversee their implementation together with the IFIs (EBRD and EIB).
    [Show full text]
  • Cleaning up the Energy Sector
    10 Cleaning Up the Energy Sector Victory is when we won’t buy any Russian gas. —Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk1 Ukraine’s energy sector is well endowed but extremely mismanaged. Since Ukraine’s independence, it has been the main source of top-level corruption, and its prime beneficiaries have bought the state. This long-lasting policy has undermined national security, caused unsustainable public costs, jeopardized the country’s balance of payments, led to massive waste of energy, and capped domestic production of energy. It is difficult to imagine a worse policy. In- stead, conditions should be created so that Ukraine can develop its substantial energy potential and become self-sufficient in coal and natural gas.2 The solution to these problems is no mystery and it has been elaborated in a large literature for the last two decades. To check corruption energy prices need to be unified. That means raising key prices four to five times, which will eliminate the large energy subsidies and stimulate energy saving, while also stimulating domestic production of all kinds of energy. To make this politi- cally possible, social compensation should be offered to the poorest half of the population. The energy sector suffers from many shortcomings, and most of these need to be dealt with swiftly. Otherwise, new rent-seeking interests will evolve, and soon they will become entrenched and once again impossible to defeat. The new government has a brief window of opportunity to address the most important issues. 1. “Ukraina osvoboditsya ot ‘gazovoi zavisimosti’ ot RF cherez 5 let—Yatsenyuk” [“Yatsenyuk: Ukraine Will Free Itself from Gas Dependence on Russia in 5 Years”], Ekonomichna pravda, Sep- tember 8, 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • Poisoned by Gas: Institutional Failure, Energy Dependency, and Security
    POISONED BY GAS: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, ENERGY DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY EMILY J. HOLLAND SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 EMILY J. HOLLAND ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT POISONED BY GAS: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, ENERGY DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY EMILY J. HOLLAND Many states lack domestic access to crucial energy supplies and must deal with the challenge of formulating an energy security policy that informs their relations with energy producing states. While secure and uninterrupted access to energy is crucial to state security and welfare, some states fail to implement energy security policies and remain dangerously dependent on a foreign supplier. In the post-Soviet region many states even actively resist attempts by the European Union and others to diversify their supplies. Why and under what conditions do states pursue energy security? Conversely, why do some highly dependent states fail to maximize their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier? I argue that that to understand the complex nature of energy dependence and security it is necessary to look beyond energy markets to domestic political capture and institutional design. More specifically, I argue that initial reform choices guiding transition had long-lasting affects on the ability to make coherent policy choices. States that did not move away from Soviet era property rights empowered actors with an interest in maintaining the status quo of dependence. Others that instituted de facto democratic property rights to guide their energy transitions were able to block energy veto players and move towards a security maximizing diversification policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Climate and Energy Benchmark in Oil and Gas
    Climate and Energy Benchmark in Oil and Gas Total score ACT rating Ranking out of 100 performance, narrative and trend 1 Neste 57.4 / 100 8.1 / 20 B 2 Engie 56.9 / 100 7.9 / 20 B 3 Naturgy Energy 44.8 / 100 6.8 / 20 C 4 Eni 43.6 / 100 7.3 / 20 C 5 bp 42.9 / 100 6.0 / 20 C 6 Total 40.7 / 100 6.1 / 20 C 7 Repsol 38.1 / 100 5.0 / 20 C 8 Equinor 37.9 / 100 4.9 / 20 C 9 Galp Energia 36.4 / 100 4.3 / 20 C 10 Royal Dutch Shell 34.3 / 100 3.4 / 20 C 11 ENEOS Holdings 32.4 / 100 2.6 / 20 C 12 Origin Energy 29.3 / 100 7.3 / 20 D 13 Marathon Petroleum Corporation 24.8 / 100 4.4 / 20 D 14 BHP Group 22.1 / 100 4.3 / 20 D 15 Hellenic Petroleum 20.7 / 100 3.7 / 20 D 15 OMV 20.7 / 100 3.7 / 20 D Total score ACT rating Ranking out of 100 performance, narrative and trend 17 MOL Magyar Olajes Gazipari Nyrt 20.2 / 100 2.5 / 20 D 18 Ampol Limited 18.8 / 100 0.9 / 20 D 19 SK Innovation 18.6 / 100 2.8 / 20 D 19 YPF 18.6 / 100 2.8 / 20 D 21 Compania Espanola de Petroleos SAU (CEPSA) 17.9 / 100 2.5 / 20 D 22 CPC Corporation, Taiwan 17.6 / 100 2.4 / 20 D 23 Ecopetrol 17.4 / 100 2.3 / 20 D 24 Formosa Petrochemical Corp 17.1 / 100 2.2 / 20 D 24 Cosmo Energy Holdings 17.1 / 100 2.2 / 20 D 26 California Resources Corporation 16.9 / 100 2.1 / 20 D 26 Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen (PKN Orlen) 16.9 / 100 2.1 / 20 D 28 Reliance Industries 16.7 / 100 1.0 / 20 D 29 Bharat Petroleum Corporation 16.0 / 100 1.7 / 20 D 30 Santos 15.7 / 100 1.6 / 20 D 30 Inpex 15.7 / 100 1.6 / 20 D 32 Saras 15.2 / 100 1.4 / 20 D 33 Qatar Petroleum 14.5 / 100 1.1 / 20 D 34 Varo Energy 12.4 / 100
    [Show full text]
  • Changes in Articles of Associations
    IGU Council meeting in Beijing, China, on 24 October 2013, Agenda item 7 IGU Annual Report 2012 1 IGU Council meeting in Beijing, China, on 24 October 2013, Agenda item 7 IGU Annual Report 2012 1. Introduction to IGU International Gas Union, established in 1931, has the vision to be the most effective and independent non-profit organisation serving as the spokesperson for the gas industry worldwide. As of 31 December 2012, the organisation had 122 members from all over the world. The members are the most representative gas entities in a country, or companies with physical or commercial assets related to the exploration and production, storage, transmission, distribution or trading/marketing of natural gas. Until 2003, the IGU membership typically consisted of national gas associations or national gas companies with only one member from each country. New members were initially approved as observer members and could later become Charter members. Following the changes in the IGU Articles of Association (AoA) approved in September 2002, all current members automatically became Charter members as of 1 January 2003. From then on, companies related to the gas industry from any Charter member country could join IGU as Associate members. Significant interest in becoming an Associate member has prevailed and, with this additional membership model, IGU has broadened its knowledge base and network considerably. IGU’s vision is to advocate for natural gas as an integral part of a sustainable global energy system. IGU promotes the political, technical and economic progress of the global gas industry, directly or through its members and in collaboration with other multilateral organisations.
    [Show full text]
  • Massive and Misunderstood Data-Driven Insights Into National Oil Companies
    Massive and Misunderstood Data-Driven Insights into National Oil Companies Patrick R. P. Heller and David Mihalyi APRIL 2019 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 1 I. UNDER-ANALYZED BEHEMOTHS ......................................................................................................... 6 II. THE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY DATABASE .....................................................................................10 III. SIZE AND IMPACT OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES .....................................................................15 IV. BENCHMARKING NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES BY VALUE ADDITION .....................................29 V. TRANSPARENCY AND NATIONAL OIL COMPANY REPORTING .................................................54 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND STEPS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................61 APPENDIX 1. NOCs IN NRGI’S NATIONAL OIL COMPANY DATABASE ..........................................62 APPENDIX 2. CHANGES IN NOC ECONOMIC DATA AS REVENUES CHANGED..........................66 Key messages • National oil companies (NOCs) produce the majority of the world’s oil and gas. They dominate the production landscape in some of the world’s most oil-rich countries, including Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela and Iran, and play a central role in the oil and gas sector in many emerging producers. In 2017, NOCs that published data on their assets reported combined assets of $3.1 trillion.
    [Show full text]
  • 2005 Annual Report on Form 20-F
    United States Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 20-F Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 Commission file number 1-32575 Royal Dutch Shell plc (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) England and Wales (Jurisdiction of incorporation or organisation) Carel van Bylandtlaan 30, 2596 HR, The Hague, The Netherlands tel. no: (011 31 70) 377 9111 (Address of principal executive offices) Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act Title of Each Class Name of Each Exchange on Which Registered American Depositary Receipts representing Class A ordinary shares of the New York Stock Exchange issuer of an aggregate nominal value €0.07 each American Depositary Receipts representing Class B ordinary shares of the New York Stock Exchange issuer of an aggregate nominal value of €0.07 each Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act None Securities For Which There is a Reporting Obligation Pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act None Indicate the number of outstanding shares of each of the issuer’s classes of capital or common stock as of the close of the period covered by the annual report. Outstanding as of December 31, 2005: 3,817,240,213 Class A ordinary shares of the nominal value of €0.07 each. 2,707,858,347 Class B ordinary shares of the nominal value of €0.07 each. Indicate by check mark if the registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Follow-Up Press Conference to Annual General Shareholders Meeting of Gazprom June 26, 2015 Participants: — Viktor Zubkov
    Follow-up Press Conference to annual General Shareholders Meeting of Gazprom June 26, 2015 Participants: — Viktor Zubkov, Chairman of the Gazprom Board of Directors; — Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee. MODERATOR: Good afternoon, dear colleagues. The first meeting of the newly elected Board of Directors has taken place. The Board of Directors elected Viktor Zubkov as its Chairman and Alexey Miller as Deputy Chairman. QUESTION: Maria Tatevosova, TASS agency. Mr. Zubkov, I’d like to congratulate you on your appointment and clarify something: there were rumors that Alexander Novak, Russian Energy Minister, would be elected Chairman of the Board of Directors. Could you possibly comment on those rumors? VIKTOR ZUBKOV: Firstly, thank you. All I can say is that everything’s fine at Gazprom; everything is going smoothly. It is borne out by today’s speech made by Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee, and by the General Shareholders Meeting as well. The shareholders, particularly the Government, which is our main shareholder, support the Company’s strategy of sustainable growth and believe that we are on the right track. That’s why the Government decided that no changes were needed in the Board of Directors, including its membership structure. As for Alexander Novak, he’s a highly qualified professional; I’ve known him for a long time since my service in the Russian Government. Today he joined the Gazprom Board of Directors as a Member. That’s all I can say. MODERATOR: Esteemed colleagues, Mr. Novak is actually here right now, so, if you don’t mind, we’ll let him and Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Attorney General
    U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 30, 2018 Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 30, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1-1 AFGHANISTAN......................................................1 ALBANIA..........................................................2 ALGERIA..........................................................3 ANGOLA...........................................................4 ANTIGUA & BARBUDA................................................5 ARMENIA..........................................................6 ARUBA............................................................7 AUSTRALIA........................................................8 AUSTRIA..........................................................11 AZERBAIJAN.......................................................12 BAHAMAS..........................................................14 BAHRAIN..........................................................16 BANGLADESH.......................................................18 BARBADOS.........................................................19 BELGIUM..........................................................20 BERMUDA..........................................................21
    [Show full text]