APPENDICES a Participants
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APPENDICES A Participants Mack Alford Bernard Carre Ascent Logic Corporation (Southampton University) 180 Rose Orchard Way, Suite 200 Program Validation Ltd. San Jose, CA 95134, USA 26 Queen's Terrace ( 408) 943-0630 Southampton SOl lBQ UK J. Dave Andrews 011-44 703-330001 Andyne Computing Limited 544 Princess Street, Suite 202 Greg Chisholm Kingston, Ontario K7L 1C7 Argonne National Laboratory Canada EBR-11 Project (613) 548-4355 9700 S. Cass A venue Argonne, IL 60439, USA Kurt Asmis (708) 972-6815 Atomic Energy Control Board [email protected] 270 Albert Street Ottawa, Ontario KIP 5S9 Dan Craigen Canada Odyssey Research Associates 265 Carling Avenue, Suite 506 Graham Birtwistle Ottawa, Ontario IGS 2El 2500 University Drive Canada Computer Science Department (613) 238-7900 University of Calgary [email protected] Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada John Gannon ( 403) 220-6055 National Science Foundation graham@cpsc. ucalgary.ca Room 401 1800 G Street, NW Robin Bloomfield Washington, DC 20550, USA Adelard 28 Rhondda Grove Susan Gerhart London E35AP, UK MCC, Software Technology Program (44) 1 318 7579 3500 West Balcones Center Drive [email protected]. uk (internet) Austin, TX 78759, USA gerhart%[email protected] Ricky W. Butler Mail Stop 130 Norm Glick NASA, Langley Research Center National Security Agency Hampton, VA 23665 9800 Savage Road USA Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 USA Martine Calve (310) 688-8448 Communications Security norm@cs. umd.edu Establishment P.O. Box 9703, Terminal Ottawa, Ontario KlG 3Z4 Canada 102 Joseph Goguen Keith Hanna Programming Research Group University of Kent University of Oxford Electronic Engineering Department 8-11 Keble Road Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NT, UK Oxford, OXl 3QD, UK 0227-764000 (865) 54328 [email protected] (internet) [email protected]. prg (janet) [email protected]. uk (internet) Will Harwood Imperial Software Technology Tim Gollins 3 Glisson Road CESG, Princess Elizabeth Way Cambridge CBl 2HA, UK Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 5AJ +44-223-462400 UK [email protected]. uk (internet) (0242) 221491 x4107 Larry Hatch Donald Good National Security Agency Computational Logic, Inc. 9800 Savage Road 1717 W. Sixth Street, Suite 290 Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 Austin, TX 78703, USA USA (512) 322-9951 (301) 859-4050 [email protected] Douglas Howe Mike Gordon Computer Science Dept. SRI International Cornell University Suite 23, Millers Yard Ithaca, NY 12853, USA Mill Lane (607) 255-5831 Cambridge CB2 IRQ, UK +44 23 324 146 C. Terrence Ireland [email protected] NCSC 9800 Savage Road Brian Graham Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 2500 University Drive USA Computer Science Department (310) 859-4485 University of Calgary [email protected] Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada PaulJoannou grahamb@cpsc. ucalgary.ca Ontario Hydro, Mail Stop H13 F22 700 University Avenue Steven Hall Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X6 Prior Data Sciences Canada 2000 Barrington Street, Suite 604 ( 416) 592-5910 Halifax, NS B3J 3Kl Canada Richard Kemmerer University of California Department of Computer Science Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA (805) 961-4232 kemm@moccasin. ucs b.edu 103 Ian King Carroll Morgan CESG, Princess Elizabeth Way Oxford University Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 5AJ Programming Research Group UK 8-11 Keble Road Oxford OX1 30D, UK Milan Kuchta +44 865 2725 70 Communications Security [email protected]. uk (internet) Establishment P.O. Box 9703, Terminal Bob Morris Ottawa, Ontario K1G 3Z4 NCSC Canada 9800 Savage Road (613) 991-7331 Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 USA Carl Landwehr (301) 859-4373 Code 5542, Naval Research Laboratory [email protected] Washington, DC 20375-5000, USA (202) 767-3381 Dave Musser RPI, Computer Science Department Bill Legato Amos Eaton Hall Dept. of Defense Troy, NY 12180, USA 9800 Savage Road (518) 276-8660 Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 USA Peter Neumann SRI International Nancy Leveson Computer Science Laboratory ICS Department 333 Ravenswood A venue University of California at Irvine Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA Irvine, CA 92717, USA ( 415) 859-2375 (714) 856-5517 nancy@ics. uci.edu Dave Parnas Department of Computer Science David Luckham Goodwin Hall, Queen's University Stanford AI Lab. Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 Computer Systems Laboratory Canada (613) Dept. of Electrical Engineering ERL Building, Rm. 456 Richard Platek Stanford, CA 94305-4055, USA Odyssey Research Associates (415) 723-1242 301A Harris Dates Drive [email protected] u Ithaca, NY 14850-1313, USA (607) 277-2020 John McHugh [email protected] Computational Logic Inc. 3500 Westgate Drive, Suite 204 Jesse Poore Durham, NC 27705, USA Computer Science Department (919) 493-4932 University of Tennessee [email protected] Knoxville, TN, USA [email protected]. utk.edu 104 John Rushby K. Speierman Computer Science Laboratory National Security Agency SRI International 9800 Savage Road 333 Ravenswood A venue Fort George Meade, MD 20755-6000 Menlo Park, CA 94025 USA USA (301) 688-6434 ( 415) 859-5456 [email protected] [email protected] Roger Stokes Peter Ryan ICL Defence Systems CESG, Princess Elizabeth Way Eskdale Road, Winnersh Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 5AJ Wokingham, Berkshire RG 11 ISL UK UK (0242) 221491 x4295 ( 44) 734 693131 Mark Saaltink Vincent Taylor Odyssey Research Associates DND/CRAD DRDCS, 11 CBN 265 Carling A venue, Suite 506 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario lOS 2El Ottawa, Ontario KIA OK2 Canada Canada (613) 238-7900 (613) 995-8008 [email protected] Damian M. Saccocio National Research Council Martyn Thomas National Academy of Sciences Praxis 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW 20 Manvers St Washington, DC 20418, USA Bath BA1 1PX, UK (202) 334-2605 +44 225 444700 mct%praxis. [email protected]. uk (internet) Steve Sadler Rolls Royce & Assoc. Jeannette Wing P.O. Box 31 Carnegie-Mellon University Derby DE2 8BJ, UK School of Computer Science 0332-661461 Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA ( 412) 268-3068 William Scherlis [email protected] DARPA/ISTO 1400 Wilson Blvd. Jim Woodcock Arlington, VA 22209-2300 Oxford University USA Programming Research Group (301) 694-5800 8-11 Keble Road [email protected] Oxford, OX1 3QD, UK +44 865 272576 Chris Sennett [email protected] RSRE, St Andrews Road Malvern, Worcs WR14 3DS, UK +44 614 895184 [email protected] (internet) B Potential Applications for Formal Methods The following potential applications for formal methods were proposed by Working Group 3. Time limitations and a desire not to orient problem statements toward a particular formal method led the group to agree on an informal framework for describing the posed examples. The framework used is as follows: Title 1. Type of example: (tutorial, exploratory, benchmark, demonstration) 2. Description: (state the problem, including relevant system properties desired in a successful solution) 3. Motivation: (what makes this an example interesting?) 4. Criteria: (what would be a success? a failure?) 5. Lasting value: (for successful completion) 6. Aspects of formal methods stressed by this example:( e.g., ability to handle real-time requirements, ability to handle large systems, ability to verify par ticular system properties, etc.) 7. Formal techniques/tools that would be interesting to see applied to this prob lem: 8. Potential impact: (who would be interested in the results?) 9. Estimated resources required: 10. Approach (funding/management/technical) 106 Nuclear Reactor Protection System (HW/SW, spec. & mech. proof, safety, med., open) Type of example: Demonstration (benchmark) Description: Specify, develop and prove an example of a nuclear reactor protection system. A redundant voting architecture could be chosen that allows sequential and concur rent aspects of the problem to be separated. The problem could include signal processing, level comparison, and trip logic. The example should not be a post hoc application of formal methods to existing software but a full formal development. Full documentation of the example should be in the public domain. Motivation: A socially important safety critical example of current public interest and con cern. Application of formal methods should lead to increased assurance in the system. The work is feasible with low technical risk and will provide a good example to the nuclear industry to encourage technology transfer. Application of formal methods in this area should reduce the costs of licencing such a system (e.g., gaining approval of regulatory authorities). Criteria for success: Complete example system that is acceptable to nuclear regulatory authorities and peer review. Lasting value: Technology transfer with an input to safety critical standards. Aspects of formal methods emphasized: Application to slow real-time systems with weak concurrency; sequential systems; system synthesis from proven components; and hard ware interfaces; use of layered design and specification with an engineering perspective. Techniques to be used: Specification and proof at appropriate levels of abstraction. Potential impact of example: Mainly technology transfer (see Motivation). Estimate of resources required: 3-6 person years. Proposed approach: Multidisciplinary, using existing experiments, e.g., DARTS over the short term. 107 Transformation Tools (Verified) (SW, spec. and proof, reliability, small, open) Type of example: Demonstration Description: Hardware designs captured in different forms should be reliably translatable to and from the form used by a verification system. For example, designs in the HOL language should be transformable to and from VHDL, ELLA, the form used by layout design tools (e.g., Electric), or a net list description language. Work is under way at Cambridge to make this transformation possible for HOL to ELLA. Motivation: Currently, the parallel or independent definition of designs, or transformation between independent representations, is error prone. The example would seek to demonstrate how this problem could be overcome. To extend the formal coverage of the range of hardware design representations. Criteria for success: The success of the example depends on the size of the transformable subsets of the languages concerned, and the utility of those subsets as perceived by designers and verifiers.