CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE SIEGE OF CARTHAGE

Carthage had been under blockade ever since the revolt started, so it is worth asking how far a siege differed from this. The blockading forces, based on Tunes, had already cut the city off from its hinterland: Hamilcar’s original march to the Bagradas had been practicable only by night and by using the tidal effect of a strong wind at the river’s mouth. The rebels no doubt took extra care after that to prevent any more breakouts, but the tightness of the blockade must have varied in the year or so that followed. After Hamilcar’s victories and his operations through parts of Libya, supplies and support for the rebels around Carthage, Utica and Hippacra slackened, as we have seen. But with the new lease of life won by the rebellion, the situation changed outside Carthage too. Mathos’ and Spendius’ decision to lay Carthage under actual siege was a propaganda coup as well as a bold military move, reinforcing the impact made by the Carthaginians’ recent catastrophes. Besides encouraging the Libyans to keep supplying munitions and no doubt money, these developments seem to have prompted more recruits to join up. Polybius a while later reports Spendius, Autaritus and the Libyan Zarzas at the head of bigger forces than ever. It was quite likely now that Zarzas brought in—or went out and recruited—a fresh Libyan division under his own command. The movement may have attracted fresh mercenary recruits from abroad too. Punic naval patrols could hardly hope to prevent all from getting through. Strikingly, envoys from Utica had been able to sail to Rome with an appeal for help—a mission the Carthaginians would dearly have wanted to thwart, but failed to.1 Besieging the city, instead of blockading it, rst of all meant moving forces closer to its walls. This called for trenches and protective equip- ment like mantlets. Attacks on the city forti cations, especially at any points that looked vulnerable, might be launched from time to time. The rebels did have some siege-engines, those captured from Hanno

1 Bigger forces than ever, and Zarzas’ division: Pol. 1.84.3. Uticans’ appeal to Rome: 1.82.11. the siege of carthage 189 outside Utica early on. Perhaps they were able to fashion more, for some of the veterans of Sicily may have had the technical skills, and craftsmen among the army’s camp-followers might try making replicas of Hanno’s engines. But if any direct assaults were tried, they failed against the powerful forti cations and the city’s resourceful defenders. Another way of capturing a city, one often tried when force failed, was treachery within. Both Hannibal and his Roman adversaries were to exploit this successfully three decades later. Mathos and Spendius may have had the money, but found no takers. Solidarity within the gates of Carthage was clearly high. Even slaves, who must have been many, gave the authorities no known trouble. This left only the third, the slowest and least reliable method, trying to starve the city into surrender. Before the siege opened, the impasse between the Carthaginian gener- als was resolved. The army, or at least its citizen element, decided that Hanno must retire from command. News of Utica’s and Hippacra’s defections may have in uenced the men, for arguably it had been Hanno’s withdrawal from the coast that pushed the towns over the edge of rebellion. If so, he had a right to complain, since he had withdrawn at Hamilcar’s summons. More important, though, was surely that Hanno had few active achievements to his credit since his early, limited victory at Utica. Hamilcar had won two victories on a bigger scale, and then had been scouring the countryside of rebels—until Hanno joined him. The army preferred the bold risk-taker to the cautious calculator. Polybius shows that, as the siege of Carthage opened, the eld army already had a replacement for Hanno. This was a general named Hannibal. His appointment raises more questions. If the solution to the deadlock was to remove one of the two generals, why give the army two again? Hamilcar and Naravas had worked together well before, without any second Punic commander beside them. Nor was it a standing requirement that Punic operations must have two gener- als. Would Hanno have been sent another colleague if the troops had retired Hamilcar? In his campaigns in Libya around 247, he was (it seems) sole commander, just as he was at the start of this war. Again, what was the new man’s status relative to Hamilcar: general with equal powers, meaning the risk of another clash, or Hamilcar’s lieutenant? As so often on details, we have no help from Polybius. But we may draw reasonable inferences from events earlier and later.2

2 Hannibal replacing Hanno: Pol. 1.82.12—even by Polybian standards a sentence of notable clumsiness. The vote against Hanno and the appointment of Hannibal are