Blockades

Blockades: Their Status under International law, Effectiveness

and Impact

Pierce Young

Senior Thesis

CSU Maritime

Young 1

Blockades

Abstract

Since the beginning of naval warfare, navies have used the military action of a blockade

to deny the enemy the shipment of vital supplies needed to fight. The consequences of such

blockades have almost always resulted in the suffering of the civilian population the blockade is

over due to the nature of the blockade itself to deny any ship access to a port or territory even if

they are simply transporting food or medical supplies. Today blockades are used sparsely in most

conflicts yet are still used and are seen as a viable military strategy even with the humanitarian

impact that almost always corresponds with the operation. The law of blockades which has

evolved over the last 400 years focused more on the economic impact of blockades on states

rather than the suffering of the civilian population effected. The law of blockade today has

therefore been influenced by this thinking with the many rules which must be followed having to

do with the convenience of states with humanitarian responsibilities taking precedent after World

War 2. International humanitarian law on the other hand condemns blockades completely. In the

case studies presented, the blockades in operation today and in the not so distant past have been

due to security concerns of a state with these concerns being all too real with another entity

attempting to transport weapons to a group that could cause potential harm on a blockading

state’s citizens. They have also been initiated when no other serious power in the region can

challenge the blockade militarily. A blockade, compared to other potential options, does always

accomplish the goal of stopping the armament of an enemy group and therefore has an impact on

the reduction of a conflict. This reality, however, does not give a belligerent state the right to

evade the humanitarian responsibilities that correspond with implementing a blockade.

Young 2

Blockades

Introduction

I am working on the topic of the use of maritime blockades in the world today because I

want to find out their status under international law, their effectiveness as a military action, and

how civilian populations are affected by such blockades; as policy experts need to understand if

and how a blockade is justified especially if a significantly large amount of civilians suffer as a

result. I am particularly interested: understanding which cases are blockades justified under

international law, if a blockade always leads to a humanitarian crisis (through not enough food or

medical supplies getting through); and the potential places in the world where a blockade could

take place in the current international environment and the impact the blockade would have

especially since threats of blockades from certain countries, such as Iran, are extremely common

(ICG, 2018). I will answer these questions by analyzing on-going blockades today and in the last

century such as the Israeli blockade of Gaza and Lebanon, the U.S. blockade of Cuba, the Saudi

Arabian blockade of Yemen and Qatar, and the potential blockade of China by the U.S. if

hostilities were to take place. I will also analyze these blockades under the multiple lenses of

international law whether it be traditional or humanitarian and judge in which cases these on-

going and relatively recent blockades are in anyway justified especially if a humanitarian crisis is

taking place. The military action of a blockade defined as "a belligerent operation to prevent

vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified

ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy

nation” has become an action states take in this century and the second half of the last century

when there is a threat to them either existentially or a threat to their sphere of influence

(Heinegg, 1997). This reality is interesting due to the fact that a blockade has traditionally been

Young 3

Blockades

used in times of war between two states and not just a state that threatens the security of another.

Therefore, the international community must decide whether or not a blockade, although being

an effective military strategy at ensuring that no weapons which can do major harm are

smuggled through to combatants, becomes unjustified when a large civilian population suffers as

a result. The lines also become blurry when a blockade is established due to a direct threat

existing which could lead to a loss of life in the civilian population of the belligerent state. What

also must be decided, therefore, is how the international community balances a state’s right to

defend themselves and their civilian population from harm, no matter how extensive, and when

the actions of defense constitute a war crime due to the extreme suffering of another civilian

population.

Blockades under International Law and Resurgence

Brief History and Terms

Although blockades have been used as an instrument of war to deny an enemy state supplies

since the times of ancient Greece, historians give the recognition of the first formal blockade to

the Dutch blockade of Flemish ports in 1584 (Heinegg, 1997). During this time no formal

international law existed on the legality of blockades and their effects on neutral states although

the blockade itself began the question of how belligerent states handle neutral states and their

rights such as due notice of a blockaded port by the belligerent state and that a blockade must be

impartial to all vessels (Fraunces, 1992). After a time, the recognition of certain rules, although

informal, began to form among the powers of Europe concerning the establishment of a blockade

on a state. These rules included adequate notice to neutral states by the belligerent state that a

blockade has been initiated, proper establishment of a blockade, effective enforcement, impartial

application, and respect for the rights of neutral states (Fraunces, 1992). Some of these general

Young 4

Blockades

principles were informally established due to the number of blockades the British Empire

established during the 18th century. One of the main complaints neutral states had during this

time was the fact that Great Britain would tend to capture ships that weren’t breaching an

established blockade around a port but rather capturing the vessel if they deemed that the ships

ultimate destination was the blockaded port itself. Also, states did not want to adhere to a

blockade and thereby hindering their trade if a blockade was ineffective and could possibly be

ran. This policy of “paper blockades” taken by Great Britain severely affected neutral merchant

shipping and led some affected countries to create the first armed neutrality where they declared

that in order for a blockade to be legal, the blockade must be effective. Great Britain, however,

did not consider this principle a part of international law until the treaty of Paris was signed in

1856 (Heinegg, 1997). The principles listed that were informally part of international law

concerning the establishment of blockades was finally ratified in 1909 via the Declaration of

London. The major maritime powers met and agreed upon the only collective recognition of the

traditional law of blockade (Fraunces, 1992).

Embargo and Blockade

Many get confused with the differences between a blockade and an embargo due to the

fact that they are sometimes used interchangeably in the media and popular culture. To be

specific: an embargo is the policy of not trading with another nation and not allowing the

belligerent country’s ports or territories to be used for commerce with that nation while a

blockade is the physical closing of all international commerce through military force on certain

ports or territories of another entity (Bannerman, 2010). While both eventually cause economic

distress on the territory effected, a blockade is in of itself a military action and therefore a much

more extreme action. The phrase “economic blockade” is used interchangeably between an

Young 5

Blockades

embargo and an actual blockade which causes most of the confusion. Both acts are also in many

cases widely condemned for the suffering they can cause on a civilian population. An embargo

comes under international condemnation when humanitarian relief is not exempt from the

embargo. Relief can come in the form of food, medicine, or other medical material. In the end,

however, and embargo is used much more often in order to quell a state to stop certain acts.

Sanctions and embargos in this sense have the same meanings with the difference between the

two actions are simply the scope in which they are applied. An embargo, such as the one the

United States has against Cuba, is a complete prohibition on all trade with no goods or services

allowed to be imported tor exported from the island nation. Sanctions could be considered as

“partial blockades” and ultimately have the same effect as an embargo depending on the scope

(DEC, 2017). Sanctions are an extremely useful diplomatic tool that countries such as the United

States and international organizations such as the UN use in order to make the government of a

country cooperate when they are threatening international peace and security (Gov.UK, 2016).

Ultimately, embargos along with sanctions are meant to punish the government or in some cases

a specific individual of a country with the people usually suffering as a result while blockades,

while having the same basic intent, punish the people of a country much more quickly and with

greater consequences.

Traditional Law of Blockade

The traditional law of blockade goes off what was established in the 19th and early 20th

centuries concerning what the major maritime powers agreed upon at the London Conference of

1909. The traditional law of blockade does not consider how a blockade may be affecting a

civilian population such as whether or not the blockade is directly leading to a humanitarian

crisis (Fink, 2011). The traditional law of blockade also does not take into account how naval

Young 6

Blockades

technology has evolved since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Among these technologies are

the submarine, underwater mines, airplanes, and missiles all of which make the blockading of a

relatively small area of land more difficult (Fraunces, 1992). These laws created out of the last

three centuries of naval warfare quickly fell in relevance at the outbreak of world war one. The

traditional law of blockade, although still having practical usage when dealing with the

international law of blockade, is not used as the foremost way of dealing with blockades today

unless cited by the belligerent state. The reason for this typical stance is due to the nature of the

traditional law itself. The law of blockades in this mind set came about more to keep commerce

and trade in neutral states flowing freely between themselves. A system of understanding

between the major maritime powers of Europe at the time created these laws with the importance

of commerce put above any idea of state maritime supremacy. These states did not consider that

someday the world would consider humanitarian law in their condemnation of blockades. The

idea of some sort of maritime law to control the actions of major maritime powers was of course

established in earlier cases such as the seizure of the Santa Caterina. The traditional law of

blockades could then be considered part of the new enlightenment era ideals concerning the

conception of states and the interactions between them. The laws created out of this era also

begin to note the difference in laws during times of war and in times of peace. In every account

of traditional law of blockade being used before the twentieth century, a perpetual state of war

existed with no so-called “pacific blockade” taking place.

Modern view of Blockades under International Law

The modern view of blockades under international law and the laws of naval warfare take

into account how a blockade can be affecting the civilian population of the blockading country

itself. The UN began to realize the effects a blockade can have on a civilian population and

Young 7

Blockades

specifically outlawed denial of aid and food as a means of war during the fourth Geneva

Convention (ICRC, 2014). By the time of the first protocol to the Geneva Conventions in 1977;

blockades took into account the civilian impact a blockade can potentially have on a country.

Specifically, “The principles found in articles 54 and 70 represented a new view of blockade in

terms of its non-military effect, as well as a codification of customary principles acknowledged

by all nations” (Skiaire, 2011, pg.620). They realized by the time of the first gulf war how much

of an effect a blockade can have on the civilian population of a country and sought to find the

best way to give aid to the Iraqi population when the blockade there was established during the

conflict (Skiaire, 2011). The coalition blockade against Iraq brought a number of questions about

the obligations of belligerent states to adhere to the Geneva Convention while attempting a

blockade and the power of the UN Security Council when they operate in such a way that can

supersede customary international law. The first protocol to the Geneva Convention was of

course cited in the case of the blockade and required the blockade to automatically allow

humanitarian assistance into the country. Blockades today are therefore observed almost

exclusively for their humanitarian impact thanks to the international humanitarian laws such as

the Geneva Conventions which have been developed since the Second World War.

The San Remo Manual

Probably the most in depth, modern, and authoritative publication concerning the laws of

modern-day naval warfare, which include blockades, is the San Remo Manual. The manual was

prepared by, “a group of legal and naval experts participating in their personal capacity in a

series of round tables convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law” (ICRC,

1995). The manual describes in length what makes a blockade, the actions states must take in

order to make a blockade legal, and when a blockade becomes illegal and can potentially amount

Young 8

Blockades

to a war crime. According to the Manual, a blockading state becomes illegal when one or more

of the following takes place: a.) a blockade is not declared and notified to all belligerents and

neutral states, b.) the declaration does not specify the commencement, duration, location, and

extent of the blockade and the period within which vessels of neutral states may leave the

blockaded coast, c.) the blockade is deemed non-effective, d.) the blockade bars coasts and ports

of neutral states, e.) the blockade is not impartial to the vessels of all states (Cambridge

University Press, 1994). The rules just listed were previously agreed upon by the major maritime

powers more than two centuries beforehand. The manual goes on and lists the extended

provisions a belligerent state must take concerning the humanitarian impact a blockade almost

always has on the civilian population of a country. The manual states that the declaration or

establishment of a blockade is prohibited if: (a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian

population or denying it other objects essential for its survival; or (b) the damage to the civilian

population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military

advantage anticipated from the blockade. 103. If the civilian population of the blockaded

territory is inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the

blockading party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies,

subject to: (a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which

such passage is permitted; and (b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be

made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization which

offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. 104. The

blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or

for the wounded and sick members of armed forces, subject to the right to prescribe technical

arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted (Cambridge University

Young 9

Blockades

Press, 1994). The Blockades taking place in the world today are usually condemned due to the

fact that they are seen as excessive in terms of military gain to impact on civilian lives. The

belligerent country, however, never sees their actions as excessive especially if they believe their

own civilian would face violence if the blockade were not in place. Also, the intention of a

blockade to specifically starve a civilian population seems to be hard to prove especially if

blockades have been used when there is a specific security threat to the belligerent state. All

blockades today also exist in a state where a war is not officially declared between the belligerent

and blockaded state.

Resurgence in Use

The use of a blockade as a viable action when a traditional conflict between two states is

not taking place has had a surge in the post-world war 2 world. In the major naval blockades

which have taken place in the world today, there have only been two, one recent and one in the

last century, which have actually been directed towards a state itself. The rest have been enforced

against a militant group not operating under the authority of a state, although they have the

support both in ideology and materials from one or multiple states (Ben-david, 2015) (Rai,

2018). These groups, in every case, pose an extremely serious threat to the lives of the civilians

belonging to the belligerent, blockading state. The navies of such countries have decided that the

action of an effective and enforced blockade on a portion of territory controlled by these militant

groups is the most viable option for the halting of attacks for reasons which seem clear in the

context of the situation the belligerent states are in. Blockades are basically an artificially created

border. They stop any materials from getting through without a thorough inspection first and

limit what and who can seek access within the country. They are also much easier to carry out

compared to other viable options which stop armed attacks from a militant group. One option is

Young 10

Blockades

an occupation that can put the lives of a greater amount of people, both civilians and armed

personnel, in danger (Edelstein, 2004). Besides their effectiveness at actually stopping arms and

other weapons from being transported to a port or stretch of territory, blockades can show who is

a power in that particular region where the operation is taking place. Blockades in their recent

use have happened where there was no serious threat to them ending from armed resistance.

Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States all have strong militaries which can project their

power in their regions if need be. Israel by far has the best military in the region with their

effectiveness as a fighting force and technological capabilities, much of which is financed by the

United States, making up for their limitations of manpower and size (Heritage, 2018). The

blockade of Gaza displays this reality to other states surrounding the country and even ones

farther away: particularly Iran. Saudi Arabia, who is the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation

Council, also has a great amount of military power projection thanks in a large part to the huge

amount they spend on their military and U.S. arms sales to the country (Heritage, 2018). The

current blockade of Yemen is a recognition to Saudi military power within the region.

Case Studies on Modern Blockades

Israeli blockade of Gaza and Lebanon

One of the most controversial and widely condemned blockades taking place today is the

Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Since June of 2007 the state of Israel has put in place a naval

blockade of the entire Gaza Strip. The blockade is in place due to the claim of the Israeli

government that the terrorist organization Hamas has been attempting to smuggle weapons into

the Gaza Strip with the intent to attack both civilian and military infrastructure in Israel. Israel’s

claim is credible in this case due to the number of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians since

Hamas took over the Gaza Strip and due to the evidence provided that Iran actively tries to

Young 11

Blockades

supply Hamas with weapons (Ben-David, 2015) (Levin, 2018). Information provided by Israel

and their agents across the Mediterranean show how weapons would more than likely continue to

be smuggled into the Gaza Strip if a blockade was not in place. Hamas in their 2014 conflict with

Israel received rockets from Iran and Syria via Iranian naval ships dropping them off in Sudanese

or Syrian ports where they were subsequently smuggled to the Egyptian-Gaza border and then

transported underground through tunnels into Gaza (Ben-David, 2015). The Islamic Republic of

Iran has not been shy in their remarks supporting the cause of the Palestinians and giving support

to Hamas while simultaneously calling for the destruction of Israel who they refer to as “Little

Satan” while the United States is “Great Satan” (Levin, 2018). Knowing this information may

give one the idea that blockading Gaza could be a simple and justified act taken by the Israeli

Navy.

Condemnation of Israel and Legality of the Blockade

Since the implementation of the blockade, however, Gaza is facing one of the worst

humanitarian crises in the world today. According to the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, of the 1.9 million Palestinians living in Gaza around 1.3

million of them are in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, 2016). The UN has blamed

the crisis almost completely on the coordinated land and sea blockade Israel and Egypt have

implemented on the Gaza Strip. The legality of the naval blockade itself is in question due to the

crisis and incidents where people have tried to breach the blockade such as the Mavi Marmara

incident in May of 2010. An outcry has also taken place among the international community

about the rights of fisherman in Gaza to be able to fish in the waters they have used for

generations. In response to the attempts by Palestinians to set fire to Israeli land via incendiary

kites and balloons, Israel has set increased measures on the blockade including limiting the

Young 12

Blockades

extent of fishing in the Mediterranean from 6 nautical miles to 9. On July 9th of this year, the

Israeli government also restricted all exports coming out of Gaza and all imports except

humanitarian equipment such as food and medicine (ICG, 2018) Israel, for the most part and

despite the new restrictions in place, is completely following the traditional law concerning

blockades. They have followed every guideline needed such as announcing the blockade to

neutral states, being impartial with their seizure of ships attempting to run the blockade, and not

extending the blockade to ports of neutral states (Fink, 2011). The conflict through the lens of

international humanitarian law, however, is a far cry from the traditional. The first argument one

can make that the Israeli blockade is not following current international law is whether the

blockade, which by technicality has to be part of a larger international conflict, can be

implemented on a territory containing a hostile armed group not considered a state. Russell

Buchan makes the argument that because Palestine clearly isn’t a state under international law,

that Hamas does not follow the rules of war, that the Gaza Strip isn’t Israeli territory, and there is

no third-party actor: the blockade isn’t in place due to an international conflict and therefore not

following customary international law in that sense (Buchan, 2011). Another argument, and by

far the one with the most research and international attention, is that the blockade is in place

because Israel is trying to collectively punish the population of Gaza. Although Israel claims that

the blockade is in place due to the current security situation, the Hudson-Philips report on the

current situation in Gaza rejects that statement and instead make the claim that the blockade

itself is in place to collectively punish the population of Gaza for voting on Hamas in their

elections (Fink, 2011). Israel, in their defense, has attempted to give aid to Palestinians in the

Gaza strip on multiple occasions and allows humanitarian supplies and building materials to be

transported into the Gaza Strip (IMFA, 2012) (JVL, 2018). The Turkel-Commission, written

Young 13

Blockades

after the Hudson-Phillips report, refutes this condemnation: stating that, “There is nothing in the

Red Cross’ Customary International Law Study that in any way connects the idea of ‘collective

punishment’ with a naval blockade or siege warfare On the contrary, the Study states that ‘the

prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare does not prohibit the imposition of a naval

blockade as long as the purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to starve a civilian

population” (Fink, 2011).

Developments for the Blockade to End

In order for the blockade to end and therefore ease the humanitarian crisis, a number of

developments must take place concerning the on-going conflict. These developments must

happen due to the fact that the Israeli navy cannot be materially challenged in the region in the

current atmosphere. The Israeli Navy has a number of capable ships available in their arsenal

including fast intercept craft and patrol boats, Saar-5 class Corvettes, and Dolphin class

submarines all of which are perfect for Israeli defensive needs at the moment (Cropsey, 2016).

Israel has also developed a Sonar based AquaShield Defense System near the Gaza and Lebanese

borders. This underwater sensor of this system detects hostile movement underwater up to 1000

meters if there were any open-circuit divers attempting to infiltrate Israeli territory (Weiss,

2016). Recent attempts by Hamas to end the blockade of Gaza have all ended in failure for the

militant group. The group attempted to bring recognition of the blockade by starting

demonstrations along the border with Israel along with other factions and the Gaza civil society

and then began to support groups and individuals to launch kites and balloons to set fire to fields

just adjacent with Israel. Israel, throughout this time, has been bombing Hamas targets in Gaza to

deter the group from supporting the protests and launching these incendiary kites into Israel. The

group at first didn’t respond to these strikes in the hope that the protests would bring enough

Young 14

Blockades

international pressure on Israel to end the blockade itself. As the strikes increased, however,

Hamas along with the Islamic Jihad began shooting rockets indiscriminately into Israel as to not

seem like they would simply absorb the strikes without a response (ICG, 2018). The Israeli-

Palestinian conflict being, many would argue, the most complicated and most difficult to end

international dispute in the world today must show some compromise for Israel to stop any kind

of military action against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Since Israel has a greater military force, and

generally does not easily change their policies on security concerning the West Bank and Gaza

even after widespread international condemnation, Hamas will need to agree to at least some

concessions for Israel to ease the blockade (USDS, 2017). Hamas, Israel argues, must end their

missile attacks against Israel and their divine mandate to destroy the state of Israel. Hamas may

yet go in that direction after the last decade of movement from a militant group to more of

political group which still has terrorist tendencies. The group is, however, split between the

extremist viewpoints and the more pragmatic members (Long, 2009). Their rivalry with the PA

and their complete control of Gaza makes sure that Israel will need to deal with the group in

order for the blockade to end. Others argue that only the complete end of the blockade itself

would be a huge step at bringing bring peace to the territory, although extremely unlikely when

one looks at the traditional security policies of the Israeli government (Bannerman, 2010). A

cease-fire between Israel and Hamas would do much to ease the blockade and the amount of

suffering the people of Gaza are going through. The likelihood of such a cease-fire is not likely

due to a number of factors. These include the reality that neither side is willing to sacrifice too

much in any agreement with the other. What Israel would want is the disarmament of Hamas; the

release of Israelis and some of their remains without an exchange; and a commitment to a cease-

fire not just in the Gaza Strip but in the West Bank as well (ICG, 2018). Hamas would not agree

Young 15

Blockades

to any of these conditions. Hamas will continue to establish themselves in the West Bank as long

as Israel is continuing to build settlements in the territory. There is a possible deal that could

make the PA the head governmental body within the Gaza Strip. This plan would make a more

acceptable partner to work with in Gaza for Israel and would more than likely create some easing

of the blockade. The major problems with this plan is that Hamas would not attempt to disarm

themselves even after a deal is reached and would still try to undermine PA leadership in Gaza

and the West Bank. Plus Israel would not fully lift the blockade even under the best of these

circumstances with only a partial lifting being viable at best (ICG, 2018).

Israeli Blockade of Lebanon

The blockade of Lebanon by the Israeli naval forces during the Israeli-Lebanese war is

entirely distinct from the on-going blockade of Gaza today. The major difference is the fact that

Hezbollah launched a significant and threatening offence against Israeli forces before prompting

the blockade to be established (Schmitt, 2008). Israel cited their right of self -defense as soon as

the Israeli military began their invasion into southern Lebanon during operation “Change

Direction”. Israel then immediately sent their ambassador of the UN to Security Council and

Secretary-General to set forth the legal basis for the operation (Schmitt, 2008). The conflict was

not international in character even though the Lebanese government of the time was technically

in control of the country and Israel blamed the conflict both on the Lebanese government, Iran,

and Syria. Hezbollah was the group responsible for the attacks against Israeli installations,

making the blockade questionable in legality under the San Remo Manual (Buchan, 2011). Even

with this argument, the blockade is justified since there was an on-going armed conflict taking

place with more than one state contributing to the attacks. Israel also filled every other obligation

needed to make the blockade legal under the San Remo Manual. They let states who were

Young 16

Blockades

trading with Lebanon know that there was an established blockade, although the fact that one

was established was known to all states when it took place. They were also impartial to all

vessels due to the all too real threat of weapons being smuggled in from both Iran and Syria. The

blockades effectiveness can also be cited. The extremely short amount of time the blockade was

in place, about two months, also makes the chance that food and humanitarian supplies for the

civilian population of Lebanon did not have such a shortage which could lead to a crisis.

Saudi Arabia’s Blockade of Qatar and Yemen

Beginning with the blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia; the blockade was put in place to,

according to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, to punish Qatar due to the accusation that the

country was both supporting Iran and providing funds towards Islamic militants (Murphy, 2017).

Disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the blockading Gulf States including the UAE,

Bahrain, and their ally, Egypt; are more likely reason for the blockade taking place. The

blockade is something of an anomaly. Neither side considers the action as an act of war with

neither side also wanting any hostilities to escalate more than they already are. Saudi Arabia and

other members of the coalition seem to be on the losing side of the situation. Qatar does not pose

an existential threat to Saudi Arabia or any other of the countries part of the coalition. From a

political standpoint, the blockade has seemed to do the exact opposite effect from what the

blockading states intended. Although Qatar has taken severe financial costs as a result of the

blockade, they have also begun a closer relationship to Saudi Arabia’s rival: Iran. Trade between

Qatar and Iran increased to 2 billion dollars the past two years (Kabalan, 2018). Of all the

blockades mentioned, the one taken by Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar is the most

unjustified. The coalition thought they can simply bully Qatar into submission and would have

more support if they could simply paint the situation as a part of global war on terror. Qatar

Young 17

Blockades

posed no security threat to other gulf states: which in the end is the deciding factor that the

blockade was unjustified.

Saudi Blockade of Yemen

Yemen is home to one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world today. Although the

Saudi blockade of Yemen is not the only reason why the humanitarian disaster exists, the

blockade has without a doubt increased the scope of the crisis and the suffering of civilians

within the state of Yemen (HRW, 2012). Since the war and subsequent blockade began, at least

2.3 million Yemenis have been displaced with more than 22 million requiring humanitarian

assistance (Cambanis and Hanna, 2018). The question that must be asked is whether this crisis

outweighs the military gains the Saudis get from implementing the blockade and if the blockade

itself is in violation of the international law of blockades. The San Remo manual, as mentioned

earlier, is the most modern document written about the international law of naval blockades.

When one goes through the manual, Saudi forces appear to follow most of the guidelines of

international law such as the blockade being impartial to the vessels of all states, and the

knowledge that a blockade is in place communicated to all states. (Cambridge University Press,

1994). One of the main arguments which could be made is that the blockade is in place due to the

sole intention of the Saudis wanting to starve the population in Houthi controlled areas. Another

argument that could question the legality of the blockade is whether or not the humanitarian

crisis taking place outweighs the military gains Saudi Arabia receives from carrying out the

blockade. Taking into account the political situation in the Middle East at the moment, this claim

loses its validness. Iran, a longtime rival of Saudi Arabia, has been supplying the Houthis with

weapons and other military support due to the benefits Iran would see by having a strategic ally

bordering the state of Saudi Arabia (Rai, 2018) (ICG, 2018). Another factor that must be

Young 18

Blockades

brought to attention is the fact that the Houthis commonly send rockets into Saudi territory where

they are indiscriminately fired at civilians. Airports which are used specifically for civilian travel

are commonly targeted by the rebel group (Blaine, 2018). This reality is obviously a threat to

Saudi Arabia and their civilian population and dispels any claim one can have that Saudi Arabia

has the blockade in place only to specifically starve the civilian population in Yemen, although a

valid argument can be made that the Saudi government is intentionally blockading the country in

order to quell the population as a whole whether they be an armed group or not (Mundy, 2018)

The other more important reason the Saudi navy is blockading the ports of Yemen is to of course

win the war for the legitimate government of Yemen who are majority Sunni. The broader

geopolitical strategy of Saudi Arabia is to make sure such an ally of Iran does not gain power on

the border with the kingdom (Guzansky and Heisteain, 2018). The Saudi military must make

into account, however, that the civilian population of Yemen depends on outside imports for

around 80% to 90% of their food, medicine, and fuel (HRW, 2017). The country is also in direct

violation of the Geneva Convention to which they are a member of. They are specifically in

violation of articles 48 and 52 which require member states to distinguish between civilian and

military objective and to prevent unnecessary suffering by civilians during a conflict (Kefi,

2018). Their indiscriminate airstrikes against civilian infrastructure must also end. The blockade

will more than likely stay in place until the end of the conflict which is nowhere in sight. Until

then Saudi Arabia must allow for a greater flow of humanitarian aid to the region through

Yemeni ports. This easing of restrictions is apparent since the Saudi-led coalition blocked the

port of Hodeidah in 2015 through which over 80% of the country’s food, fuel, and medicine is

imported from. Since then the blockading forces only let the port be used at varying degrees of

restrictions (CLSHRC, 2018). The Saudi navy must ease more of these restrictions if they really

Young 19

Blockades

want to be seen as a state simply defending themselves and their interests rather than a

belligerent state attempting to starve a suffering population. The San Remo Manual would make

the blockade illegal in this since although not many have cited this position. The U.S will also

still support Saudi Arabia with weapons and other military equipment unless of course recent

actions taken by Saudi Arabia change the U.S. policy of weapons sales toward the kingdom. If

the U.S. does not take this course of action, the conflict will more than likely prolong for years to

come. President Trump has already made a statement demanding that the Saudi government ease

the blockade enough for more humanitarian assistance to enter the country. Further statements

similar to the one mentioned from the current administration will do much to ensure the public

that the U.S. does not support a campaign that internationally starves a civilian population into

submission (Cambanis and Hanna, 2018). Saudi Arabia, for the conflict to end, must either help

the government of Yemen fully defeat the Houthis or make an agreement with them in order to

end all hostilities. The population of Yemen would then need to have a legitimate government

put in place or else the fighting would start again: much like the attempt at creating changes in

the government before the civil war which most people in the country still saw as illegitimate

(Salisbury, 2018). The international players who would help in a transition to a legitimate

government would need to accept the extreme complexities of governance in Yemen as they

stand today and the fact that they would need to embrace the local governance of many areas in

Yemen in order to make the transition more realistic. The major players involved in Yemen

would need to accept to some kind of cease-fire to make such a transition work in the first place

(Salisbury, 2018). This goal looks to be far into the future especially with the actions all sides

have taken. The Houthis have also banned a number of aid agencies who wish to help the

starving Yemen population (The New Arab, 2018). The rebel group particularly stopped food

Young 20

Blockades

and aid from entering the city of Ta’izz where a majority of civilian deaths took place due to

their indiscriminate shelling (UN, 2018). The Saudi government therefore does not take all of the

blame for the shortage of food and other humanitarian supplies when it comes to the suffering of

the population of Yemen. Saudi Arabia, the government of Yemen, and the Houthis will, until

peace comes, continue to mount up war-crimes against the suffering civilian population of

Yemen.

U.S. Blockade of Cuba

Although the U.S. government uses the term embargo as the policy for their actions against

the economy of Cuba, the definition of a blockade clearly shows that the actions the U.S. took

was both a blockade and an embargo, the latter which is ongoing to this day (Shneyer, 1981).

One of the most interesting aspects of this blockade compared to others in more modern times is

that not only did the blockade start when there was no official or unofficial war between the U.S.

and Cuba, but the blockade started when there were absolutely no armed hostilities between the

U.S. and Cuba unlike the blockades of Israel and Saudi Arabia. The blockade began in 1961 and

lasted with the greatest amount of enforcement in the 20 years after. The reason for such a

blockade was the fact that the communist government led by Fidel Castro took over the Island

and began setting up their communist regime (Shneyer, 1981). The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

also helped to increase the aggression of a United States blockade of Cuba due to the obvious

threat the country had to the security of the U.S. During that time, many states made the claim

that the fact that the U.S. began a blockade of Cuba meant an act of war was therefore

established between the U.S. and Cuba on the grounds that a blockade was a wartime action. The

U.S. argued, however, that making such a declaration wasn’t in either of the countries’ best

interests even though there was a buildup of military potential in Cuba at the time the blockade

Young 21

Blockades

began (Meeker and Katzenbach, 1962). The blockade worked of course with no more weapons

of mass destruction reaching Cuba and the Soviet Union willing to reach an agreement with the

United States. Kennedy and Krushchev agreed that the missiles would leave Cuba if the U.S.

removed their weapons from Turkey and that the U.S. would not attempt an invasion of Cuba

(Getchell, 2015). The U.S. blockade, however, faced trouble in justification thanks to the UN

Charter that has certain qualifications for a state to use force. If the San Remo manual was

written before or during the U.S. blockade of Cuba, the blockade would be illegal under the

international law of blockades. The blockade follows every rule that makes a blockade legal

except the fact that the blockade seemed to intentionally harm the civilian population (Partyka,

2014). The United States took this stance, according to Nicholas Partyka of the Hampton

Institute, in order, “to bring enough hardship and suffering to everyday Cubans so as to foment

discontent, and ideally to bring about through suffering a revolution ousting the Castro

government. The idea was to create conditions of deprivation - ie. starvation, lack of medicine,

etc. - in order to motivate the masses of the Cuban people to turn against the new government

and back towards leaders seen as friendlier to US interests” (Partyka, 2014, para. 7). Another

condemnation is the embargo which by far hurts the world economy who experienced a 130

billion dollar hit in 2016 thanks to the embargo (Alvarez, 2017). The United States government

should therefore admit that the blockade of Cuba was a wrong in the eyes of international law.

The Castro government showed no signs of weakening while the blockade was taking place and

only furthered their stance that the U.S. was directly threatening the regime and the people of

Cuba. An opening of relations between the U.S. and Cuba by the Obama administration is a great

step towards ending the embargo, although the Trump Administration has set in place many

restrictions lifted by the former administration (Felter and Renwick, 2018). Another blockade of

Young 22

Blockades

the island doesn’t look likely due to the warming of relations the Cuban and U.S. governments

have had this century. A conflict between the United States and Cuba that would escalate to a

blockade of the island nation by the U.S. Navy would not take place even with the country being

one of the least free nations in the world according to Freedom House (Freedom House, 2017).

This lack of freedoms being in political rights and civil liberties. This display of The Cuban

people are also, according to a poll carried out by PEW, have a 97% approval rate of the easing

of relations between their government and U.S. (Felter and Renwick, 2018). The UN general

assembly has also condemned the U.S. embargo of Cuba for the twenty-fifth consecutive year.

Potential Blockades

U.S. Blockading China

The U.S. military has a plan of action for every potential conflict in the world today. The

U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia is expected to bring more military assets to the region with around 60% of

the U.S. navy and air force projected to be in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020 (Krepinevich,

2015). Although a linked defense along the first island chain would be best the best bet to deny

Chinese aggression, a blockade is definitely an action the U.S. navy would take if aggression

turned into open conflict. A conflict, although questionable in probability due to one of the most

productive economic institutions in the world today taking place between the U.S. and China, is

not infeasible and with both sides having their own strategies to defeat the other. Part of the U.S.

strategy to defeating China in an armed conflict would be to create instability within China to

weaken the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Chinese people. The military

advantage of making sure that the Chinese armed forces won't be supplied with oil is a smaller

gain compared to the political turmoil that would take place within the state of China (Farley,

2018). The blockade of China by the U.S. navy would be devastating for the Chinese people. In

Young 23

Blockades

2013 China imported approximately 64.5% of their crude oil consumption (Zang, 2014). China

also does not have any real reactionary force to combat the U.S. navy, although they have been

trying to build one in recent years. The impact such a blockade would have on China thanks to

the blockade alone is something China also takes into account. According to Xunchao Zhang of

ANU, “…a preliminary estimate that an energy blockade cutting off all 87% of oil imports that

came by sea (that is, rather than overland or by river) would cause a direct reduction of 6.6% to

the Chinese GDP (as measured by purchasing power parities), a figure equivalent to the size of

the Australian economy” (Zhang, 2014). These projections should be a major deterrent for China

if they are thinking about starting a conflict in the region. That is, of course, if the United States

Navy is capable at completely quelling the Chinese navy to such a point. The Chinese Navy

currently consists of over 330 surface ships and 66 submarines with the United States Navy

consisting of 211 surface ships and 72 submarines (Fanell, 2018). By, 2030, however, the

Chinese Navy is estimated to be expanded to 450 surface ships and 99 submarines: posing a

much more serious threat to the U.S. Navy stationed in the region. This rise in Chinese Naval

forces will continue far into this century thanks to the ongoing “Belt and Road Initiative” of the

Chinese government. The plan, which of course involves the global expansion and national

rejuvenation of China, also involves the Chinese Navy in order to expand China’s interior lines

out into the maritime domain (Fanell, 2018).

Legality of a Blockade of China and Likelihood of Success

The question is that if a conflict would take place, how justified would a blockade be

under international law. An armed conflict would seem to justify a blockade both in traditional

and humanitarian law. The United States certainly has the power to make the blockade effective,

impartial, and knowledgeable to all nations once the armed opposition to the operation could be

Young 24

Blockades

quelled. One of the main criticisms against a blockade would be if the action creates a

humanitarian crisis in an extreme scope: particularly if major starvation could take place. The

Chinese government has historically sought to make food production as domestic as possible. A

plan established in 1996 was made by the government in order to try and make the country

produce 95% of their needs for grains including wheat, rice, and corn (China Power Team,

2017). The only problem the Chinese would face in terms of food security is their lack of meat

and other types of crops that are vital to feed the massive amounts of livestock China has due to

an increase in consumption among the people in China of both meat and dairy products (China

Power Team, 2017). Although an outcry would take place among some in the international

community due to this hypothetical blockade contributing to the decrease of food security among

a civilian population; China would be able to feed most of their population thanks to their

domestic production of major grains. The U.S. would have all of their legal rights, therefore, of a

blockade if one were to take place against China. For the blockade to end, the hypothetical

conflict with China would have to end. The conflict in this case would end either with a U.S. or

Chinese victory over each other. For the United States; the best-case scenario for a victory would

be to undermine the grip the CCP has on the governance of the Chinese people. The actions the

U.S. could take in this respect would be to humiliate the Chinese military in war, destroy a

significant amount if the PLAN and the PLAAF, and to cause significant economic stress in the

country itself (Farley, 2018). For China, a victory would be to a removal of the alliance

framework the U.S. has in the region. The U.S. would not be able to realistically keep on fighting

if allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines no longer want anything to do

with the ongoing conflict. Even of the conflict ends, the main reasons the conflict started would

remain in place. China is still a rising country and would replace their forces lost in the conflict

Young 25

Blockades

within the decade (Farley, 2018). The U.S. would also find it hard to replace their forces lost

during the conflict due to their use of a much more advanced and therefore expensive technology

used in warfare. Depending on the outcome too, public support would be negative with many

crying for the removal of forces in the region (Farley, 2018).

Potential blockade of Greece by Turkey if conflicts were to arise

Another potential region where a blockade would take place is another area where a large-

scale conflict international conflict can potentially happen. Even though both Greece and Turkey

are members of NATO, animosity between the two countries is still ever present. Greece after all

won their independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821 and have had multiple conflicts take

place between them such as the Greco-Turkey war in the early 1920s (Vassalotti, 2011). The

main reasons there is such a chance for conflict today, besides cultural distrust and claims of

discrimination taking place in both countries where a significant minority of each ethnicity is

present, is the dispute between the two countries concerning resources in the Aegean Sea and the

dispute over the Turkish presence in Cyprus. The dispute between Greece and Turkey

concerning resources in the Aegean Sea stems from the question of where the EEZ of Greece and

Cyprus meet and who has claim to the vast oil deposits found in the Aegean. The dispute began

when Turkey created a map which illustrated where Turkey planned to explore for oil and other

research. Greece made the claim that the median line separating the Greek and Turkish zones did

not take into account Greece’s eastern islands (Vassalotti, 2011). Greece claims that every island

is entitled to its own continental shelf and that the delimitation line done by Turkey is contrary to

international law. Turkey, who is not a member of UNCLOS specifically for this reason, claims

that if Greece was to have rights to the continental shelves of their islands, an estimated 97% of

the Aegean Sea bed would belong to Greece (Vassalotti, 2011). The dispute could be solved

Young 26

Blockades

through bi-lateral negotiations between the two nations and the potential for a conflict to arise

would be extremely unlikely if Turkey would be able to successfully join the EU in the coming

years. A larger and arguably more difficult dispute which could lead to an armed conflict and

subsequent blockade of Greece by Turkey is the dispute over the island and country of Cyprus.

The dispute of course started when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 due to the existence of a

significant Turkish population on the island. Today the cries for Greek Cypriot union with

Greece has somewhat halted but remains large in the minds of the citizens of both sides of

Cyprus even though Greek Cyprus is an independent state (Kaloudis, 1999). If clashes were to

take place between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Turkey and Greece would certainly come to the

aid of their ethnic sides: thereby exacerbating the conflict. In order for the conflict to not take

place at all and therefore no armed hostilities or need of a blockade, both the Aegean Sea dispute

and the problem of Cyprus must be solved.

Armed escalation and subsequent operations

A conflict between the two countries would be difficult for both sides due to the military

defenses both already have in case such an event was to take place. Turkey by far has the ability

to blockade major sections of the main Greek coastline if an armed conflict were to take place

between the two nations. Turkey at the moment has the upper hand in naval capacity for several

reasons which would therefore make a blockade feasible. The Turkish Navy currently has an

advanced navy and plans of expansion for further power projection in the Mediterranean. The

country, by the year 2020, is expected to have 20 frigates/destroyers, 11 submarines, 7 corvettes,

and 19 fast attack missile crafts with the number of all naval crafts expected to rise (Kaymal,

2017). With the large number of cuts in military spending by Greece due to the economic

depression which has plagued the country for years, Greece has a problem challenging the

Young 27

Blockades

Turkish navy in this respect. Greece can, however, put up a powerful defense against such a

blockade if one were to take place. In this hypothetical conflict, both sides would take massive

losses with the conflict hopefully ending quickly thanks to the intervention of both the U.S. and

NATO. The bulk of the fighting would be between the air assets of each of the respective

countries (CIA, 1983). After this escalation of aerial combat; Greece would attempt to reinforce

their islands and keep open their supply lines to these bases where a Turkish attack would be

imminent. In the meantime, Turkey would have to create an effective blockade of Greece with

the challenge of making sure no ships get passed the Turkish fleet. In all likelihood, the Turkish

navy would only be able to ensure a blockade and stop Greek supply lines for a short and

sporadic amount of times before Greece could break the operation (CIA, 1983). Turkey could

therefore not be able to have a justifiable blockade of Greece under international law for this

very reason. If ships could easily slip past a Turkish blockade, then the blockade is without a

doubt illegal under the international law of blockades. The best-case scenario would be for

Greece and Turkey to come to an agreement of both the dispute over the Aegean Sea and the

Cyprus question and avoid the main reasons for an armed conflict to start in the first place.

Turkey joining UNCLOS would certainly lead to settlement of the Aegean dispute. The Cyprus

problem, however, will be much more difficult to solve and will be a major thorn in the progress

of Turkey and Greece to ease the historically bitter relationship with one another.

Potential blockade of North Korea by the U.S.

Once again, the United States military has a plan when it comes to the chances of a

conflict with another high-risk country. In this case one of the highest risk countries of all: North

Korea. A naval blockade of North Korea by the U.S. is feasible due to, once again, the fact that

the U.S. has and is continuing to put more and more of their naval assets towards East Asia.

Young 28

Blockades

Before a full-scale conflict would even start, the U.S. would plausibly be blockading several

North Korean ports in order to ensure that the sanctions in place are upheld. A full-scale war

with the chance of a nuclear attack against the United States is obviously not the best nor

extremely likely event to take place at the moment; a blockade on the other hand can be a tool

used to ensure North Korean cooperation. The blockade which would take place before a conflict

would start would be more complicated than one could expect yet would still be legal under the

international law of blockades. The U.S., and naval vessels of other navies, would certainly be

able to stop a large amount of vessels coming into the northern part of the Korean peninsula

especially if there are only a limited amount of ports to block. The blockade would be impartial

due to potential fears of smuggling and the fact that the point of the blockade would be to stop

any ship from entering or leaving the ports. A blockade of this kind would certainly get the

attention of the world; not needing the U.S. to tell all countries that the blockade is taking place,

although the U.S. would more than likely take this course of action out of courtesy. The

foreseeable problem with this blockade, is the North Korean response to such a military action

and cooperation of the regime’s neighbors. A blockade is still traditionally seen by many as an

act of war done by the belligerent state. North Korea could then us the action as an excuse to

attack the vessels in the blockade and other ships in the region (O’hanlon, 2018). If they were to

take these actions, there would most certainly be a response from U.S. forces stationed in the

region. The Navy of North Korea, however, is ill equipped to offer any sort of resistance to the

U.S. Navy in the region. The North Korean navy is most behind on modernization compared to

the rest of the North Korean military. North Korean submarines, however, may pose a problem

to this hypothetical blockade as evidenced by the successful attack on the ROK warship the

CHEONEN (DOD, 2012). The rest of the conventional forces of North Korea can put up a

Young 29

Blockades

serious defense if the country chose to take up arms against the blockade established by the

United States. This threat would come from missiles launched from land and the aircraft the

North Koreans can potentially send if the United States ever takes this action. If North Korea

decides to take massive retaliatory actions against the blockade, then the opening of further

conflict would certainly start. A complete blockade of North Korea, however, would need the

support of both Russia and China in order to for the naval blockade to be complete in the

operation’s success. This support would more than likely not be given by either country. In the

Korean war of 1950-1953; the U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, and Royal Australian Navy all attempted

a blockade of the peninsula which was thwarted thanks to Russia and China sending assistance to

North Korea through their land borders (Stangarone, 2018). Ships would also simply pass

through the waters of Russian and China where they would then head towards North Korean

ports. The likelihood that Russian and China would accept the blockade to be expanded into their

territorial waters and that they would also blockade the North Korean state is absurd considering

the geopolitical strategies of both countries. This reality is especially true considering that a

major shipping route passes through the yellow sea which is extremely close to the Korean coast

line. Any complications to this route, especially a conflict initiated by North Korea, would put

this route in jeopardy which would have dire economic consequences for both China and the

United States (Stangarone, 2018).

Legality of North Korean Blockade

Since the chances that the United States and North Korea would start a regional conflict

if a blockade would be established off of the coast of North Korea; the blockade would be seen

through the lens of an active armed conflict rather than the blockades of Gaza and Cuba. The

blockade would remain legal throughout whatever conflict starts and would actually be more

Young 30

Blockades

justified under the international law of blockades due to the actual use of violence by the

blockaded state against the belligerent state or the U.S. and allies in this case. Beforehand the

blockade would find justification in almost every part of the San Remo Manual, including the

fact that the blockade is on a state who is a large threat to regional stability, except possibly the

factor of humanitarian aid shipment being halted by the blockade (Cambridge University Press,

1994). The fact that the population of North Korea is severely malnourished thanks to

generational starvation is no secret to the world. Life is extremely challenging for the vast

majority of North Koreans with the sanctions already in place against the nation having

unintended consequences against them (UN New, 2018). A serious blockade has the possibility

of furthering this massive starvation taking place in North Korea.

Potential Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran

Although the likelihood of a successful blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian

Navy is extremely unlikely considering the U.S. naval presence in the region; the Iranian regime

has made countless threats to close the strait in retaliation over the number of sanctions the

United States has put on the country. The threat of a crisis in the strait is also, according to the

International Crisis Group that provides independent analysis and advice on how to prevent,

resolve, or better manage crises; has a severe threat level for a conflict starting in the strait (ICG,

2018). The extreme importance the strait is to the world economy and the dire consequences of a

closure of the waterway, even for a profoundly limited amount of time, merits an observation if

threatened with a blockade.

Background and Likely Events

The Iranian threats to blockading the strait are in direct response to U.S. sanctions

threatening to reduce Iran’s oil export earnings (Ratner, 2018). The number of threats that Iran

Young 31

Blockades

has made are numerous. On November 3rd of this year, a senior IRGC official opined that the,

“U.S. economy is not capable of handling another war”, and that, “U.S. aircraft carriers are

within the range of the ballistic missiles with pin-point accuracy that are capable of hitting

mobile targets” (ICG, 2018). Threats such as the one mentioned are stated almost daily from

Iranian officials. The chances that Iran will attempt to close the strait increases if a broad

embargo on purchases of Iran’s oil is upheld. Iran also sees the presence if the U.S. Navy in the

region as a threat to the country itself; especially since the U.S. left the JCPOA. Iranian imports,

if they would attempt to do such a closure, could be re-routed to other ports outside of the strait

or become more established along overland trade routes to provide cushioning for the impact the

country would have due to their use of the strait itself for their economic needs. The attempt to

close the strait would spell disaster for the world economy with the price of oil skyrocketing

thanks to the global integration of the oil market and around 30% of the world’s seaborne traded

crude oil passing through the strait every day (ICG, 2018). The Iranian Navy would not be a

match for the U.S. navy in any realistic way despite their plethora of threats against U.S. military

presence in the region. The Navy of Iran is made up of mostly small surface vessels and

submarines meant to mostly harass civilian and military shipping and enforce a strategy of anti-

access through the strait (Goure and Grant, 2009). Although they do have a number of larger

vessels including frigates that could put up a heavier resistance to the U.S. Navy. A way the

Iranian Navy could challenge the U.S. Navy and employ an effective blockade would be if the

country could find a way to be able to sink a U.S. aircraft carrier; an ability they do not have at

the moment despite the claim made by Admiral Ali Fadavi of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary

Core Navy that they have the ability in the event of a war with the U.S. (Mizokami, 2018). This

ability would come in the form of a highly advanced ASBMs which could do enough serious

Young 32

Blockades

damage to a U.S. aircraft carrier to sink the vessel. Although they do not have the technology at

the moment, testing done by the regime has shown that their Hormuz 1 and 2 antiship ballistic

missiles are capable of hitting targets at ranges of up to 155 miles which is on the right track

besides still not being far enough to outrange an aircraft carrier. Iranian Kilo-class diesel-electric

attack submarines which, properly equipped and crewed, can also do serious damage to an

aircraft carrier (Mizokami, 2018). Even if they has the capability for such an attack, intelligence

gathered about Iran and their capabilities would ensure that the U.S. Navy would not risk the loss

of an aircraft carrier and instead would rely on alternatives to the firepower of an aircraft carrier

such as long-range strategic bombers or cruise missiles launched from warships. Iran does have a

number of resources they can put to use and a breakthrough of missile technology from the

regime is plausible. A potential challenge to U.S. naval supremacy in the Strait of Hormuz is

therefore all too possible in the future (Mizokami, 2018). At the moment, however, the Iranian

regime will do all they can to challenge U.S. presence in the strait. This challenge will likely be

through continued threats and military exercises that could affect oil prices if oil market

participants take such threats and exercise seriously, or they can potentially harass tanker ships

traversing the strait along with the damaging of infrastructure which would affect world oil

supply and shipping costs (Ratner, 2018). Although this runs the risk of a military response by

the U.S.

Final Analysis

Justification of Blockades as a Whole

The question of whether or not the use of a blockade is justified in of itself is another area

the international community may have to answer in the future. Blockades have led to

humanitarian suffering in almost every case where they have been used whether due to a lack of

Young 33

Blockades

food which causes massive starvation, or a lack of medical supplies which greatly increases the

casualties among the civilian population whether due to a lack of medicine and equipment for

those already hospitalized or those who will succumb to disease due to a lack of products for

sanitation. This fact is due to the nature of blockades themselves with the entire objective of the

action itself to be to stop any and all supplies from getting into the port of entry. Even with the

offer of other points of entry for humanitarian supplies, the process slows down the time when

the civilians most in need can receive their aid. The international law of blockades, as mentioned

earlier, have only recently come up with the fact that blockades inherently cause such a

humanitarian crisis and only a limited number of countries have agreed to this fact (Skiaire,

2011). In September of this year UN special rapporteur Idriss Jazairy stated how blockades,

“expose people to the ravages of economic war in peacetime”, and how civilians affected by

blockades do not benefit from the protection of the Geneva Convention (UN, 2018). Many argue,

then, that blockades themselves, no matter what the situation, are in violation of the Geneva

Convention due to the fact that the military action is followed by an extreme suffering of a

civilian population. Adherence to the Geneva Convention of course depends on whether or not

the country is a member to a certain protocol or not. The international law of blockade does not

completely make a blockade itself illegal under humanitarian law but rather puts the

responsibility on the belligerent state to act if a humanitarian crisis is taking place due to the

implementation of the blockade (Fink, 2011).

Belligerent State

Although such a claim is justified in this sense, rights of the belligerent state for self-

protection against any threat aimed at their civilian population must be taken into account. In

chapter 7 article 42 of the UN Charter, the text states that, “Should the Security Council consider

Young 34

Blockades

that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore

international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other

operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” (UN, 1945). Blockades

in the charter therefore seem to be a justifiable military action the Security Council can take

under the United Nations. Under the charter, the action is also considered a fairly passive way to

deal with acts of aggression from other states. A threat to regional stability is therefore another

factor which is taken into the justification of the use of blockades. As mentioned earlier, both

Saudi Arabia and Israel have real threats of instability in their regions and security threats against

their citizens, therefore giving both countries a degree of justification for their established

blockades against the Gaza Strip and portion of the Yemen coast respectively. Another factor is

how far article 51 of the UN Charter extends concerning using blockades as a use of self-

defense. The article states that, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United

Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace

and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be

immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and

responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as

it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN, 2016).

An argument that the blockades of Yemen and Gaza are in response to attacks against the states

of Saudi Arabia and Israel respectively and therefore a just use of article 51 seems valid until one

observes how proportionality is taken into account concerning the self-defense of a state.

Proportionality deals with the degree of force permissible in self-defense of a state and requires

Young 35

Blockades

that a state takes no more action acquired to deter an anticipated attack or defeat one that is

underway (Schmitt, 2008). Blockades undertaken by states according to the UN Charter are by

their nature over the proportions of an acceptable degree to deter an anticipated attack or defeat

one that is underway. Turkey and Israel are not at war with the civilian population of Gaza or

Yemen: yet both must be aware of the situations both states are creating even with the obvious

threats. A blockade being considered an act of war is not compatible with the how the military

action is used today and can actually be used to avoid an escalation of a conflict in certain

circumstances. The U.S. blockade of Cuba was at first in response to the shipment of missiles

into the country which threatened both the security of the U.S. people and the stability within the

region. The implementation of the blockade after a deal was met between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union which took the missiles off the island nation was neither due to a threat to the U.S. people

or stability within the region. The act can therefore be seen as unjustified in such a case.

Other Potential Options

A state decides to implement a blockade only when all other options are not feasible and

a blockade is the only option available that achieves the desired objective. The objective of

blockades, in their usage by states, has been to eliminate a certain security risk by ensuring that

the threat and probability of such a risk are lowered by limiting the number of arms and other

weapons shipped into a territory or port where they would most likely be smuggled and put to

use. Blockades seem like the most likely approach to achieve this goal due to the other possible

options presented to the belligerent state.

Occupation

One such approach is the military occupation of a territory. As mentioned earlier; a

military occupation without question puts the lives of both civilians and military personnel at a

Young 36

Blockades

greater risk. An occupation would need to weaken the group receiving the arms enough to cease

the chance of any more weapons to be smuggled in and put to use. The occupation would

therefore need to be successful unlike many other military occupations in history. The blockades

taking place today would not be effectively replaced with an occupation for a number of reasons

having to do with both how an occupation can be successful and the political situations each

belligerent is in. The factors which control whether or not a military occupation can be

successful or not include recognition by the occupied population for the need of an occupation;

the perception by the occupying power and the occupied population of a common threat to the

occupied territory; and that the occupying power makes a credible guarantee that they will

withdraw and return the indigenous government to power in a timely manner (Edelstein, 2004).

Observing the situation in Gaza and taking these factors into account; one can clearly see why an

occupation to stop arms shipment to Hamas in Gaza would be a catastrophe. Not only would

Israel once again receive international condemnation and another full-scale war with Hamas, but

the terrorist organization would receive a rise in popularity among the people of Gaza (ICG,

2018). The IDF would therefore fail at the objective of ensuring that Hamas is too weak to

receive weapons from the outside. In Yemen too, the chances that a successful occupation by

Saudi Arabia would take place is implausible. The Sunni-Shia divide which already splits up the

region would be a major hurdle for such an operation plus the fact that the Saudis are already

hated by large portions of the Yemeni population already. Also in the case of the U.S. blockade

of Cuba; an invasion and occupation of the island would have certainly been a catastrophic

decision with the likelihood of the missiles on the island being put to use increasing dramatically.

A blockade therefore is a much more pragmatic option these belligerent states can take compared

to a full-scale military occupation.

Young 37

Blockades

Specifically targeting Ships

Another option countries can take besides a blockade is gathering enough intelligence to

board specific ships who are carrying arms to a port or territory. This option would ensure that

only ships carrying arms would be boarded by the military commandos of a belligerent country

and not every neutral ship including ones simply trying to give humanitarian aid. The option

would require a large amount of intelligence capabilities with agents operating in ports and

territories where the transfer of weapons onto an innocent-looking shipping vessel would

transpire. Certain intelligence services of countries would be able to have success in this area

such as the Israeli intelligence service Mossad who already have agents operating across the

Middle East (Noonan, 2010). Such boarding of ships even with arms aboard, however, cannot be

boarded legally under the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNLOC, 1982). Israel has not

completely signed onto UNCLOS specifically to maintain their freedom to visit any ship deemed

a threat to the state. Saudi Arabia may be able to stop a number of ships although their

intelligence service, Al-Mukhabarat al-Amaah, is not as capable as the Israeli Mossad (Fink,

2015). Saudi Arabia is, however, a party to UNCLOS and would face breaking the treaty and

handling the backlash from other member states if they were to begin such operations. Other

activities taken by nations could ensure arms are not transported to these areas. A number of

programs have already been adopted by a significant number of countries who see the obvious

threat a large, illegal arms market has on global security. Illegal arms sales raise the likelihood of

civilian deaths and the exacerbation of a conflict (Boutwell, 1998). The progress towards a

united and effective arms control was stalled through much of the first decade of the 21st century

but came into culmination with the Arms Trade Treaty which entered into force in 2014. Before

this treaty was signed, the UN took a number of steps to create such a treaty but found many

Young 38

Blockades

members unwilling or unable to show progress in the program of action treaty (Mishra, 2015).

The ATT is “a multilateral treaty designed to regulate international trade in conventional arms”

(ACA, 2013, p.1). The treaty includes a number of measures which requires members to not

authorize arms which would break any international treaties or arms embargos or be used in

crimes or attacks against civilians. This treaty goes far into ending the illicit market for arms to

conflict areas yet isn’t enough to stop the current blockades today. The fact that Iran or Syria are

not signatories to the treaty is enough to keep both Israel and Saudi Arabia from ceasing their

blockades (UNODA, 2018).

Conclusion

The use of blockades as a viable military strategy will not end as long as navies and

conflicts between states exist. Countries will also continue to use blockades and the threats of a

blockade in cases where they believe the territory or port they are blockading has proven to be

receiving weapons intended to be used against a country’s military or civilian population or if

they are threatened regionally. This reality will be true whether or not an official war is declared.

The legality of such blockades will of course be observed under the current international law of

blockade which includes both the traditional law that was established centuries ago and the

newer international humanitarian laws, such as the first protocol to the Geneva Convention that

actually takes the suffering of the civilian population under a blockade into account. Blockades,

besides being a viable and effective action that stops arms from flowing into a nation, are also a

show of power where they would be used against an entity only if they do not have much

military resistance and if the condemnation of the action won’t turn into a coalition of nations to

stop the blockade. The blockade used will also be protecting stability within the region; much

like sanctions are used today by states and international organizations such as the United States

Young 39

Blockades

and United Nations. The humanitarian impact from blockades escalate much quicker compared

to a sanction or more aggressive embargo. This fact is due to the nature of blockades themselves.

A blockade is meant to stop any supplies from entering a port or territory; even if they are meant

to send in humanitarian supplies. The blockades in operation today off the coasts of the Gaza

Strip and Yemen are not justified according to international humanitarian law. They, clearly,

increase the suffering of the civilian populations the operations are under and add another scope

of instability to a conflict. However, under the law of blockades laid out in the San Remo

Manual; Israel is acting accordance to the manual while Saudi Arabia is in clear violation of the

manual. Specifically; Saudi Arabia is in Violation of Section 2; Articles 102, 103, and 104 which

deals with using the blockade as a weapon to starve a population into submission. Potential

blockades in the world today are where a dispute between two rival powers escalates into armed

conflict where one of the belligerents decides that a blockade is the best strategy to defeat the

other. A blockade in this sense can actually be considered as an option where a belligerent state

can actually keep the stability in a region and ensure that the conflict doesn’t escalate any further

by keeping weapons and other materials vital to a military, such as fuel, out of the hands of

enemy combatants. A blockade in many scenarios can be seen as an act of self-defense if an

extremely real threat against a state and their citizens exists with the likelihood of an attack

increasing if a blockade is not in place. Even if this reality exists: the responsibility of the

suffering of the people under a blockade rests solely on the belligerent state with the security

threat against such state not corresponding to the evasion of this responsibility. With this reality

in mind; the alternatives to a blockade are not feasible in their effectiveness. An occupation of a

territory to ensure the weakening of an entity threatening the state enough to guarantee the

ceasing of the supply of arms to such entity is not likely where a blockade is in effect instead

Young 40

Blockades

such as in Yemen and Gaza. A long military occupation rarely achieves all of the goals needed in

the first place, therefore making a blockade a much more feasible option when compared.

Neither targeting individual ships nor any arms treaty stops these arms from being transported to

their intended destinations. Therefore making a blockade the most effective operation a country

can take in these situations. Blockades are extremely useful in an armed conflict when one takes

these facts into consideration. Their long term impact on a civilian population, however, makes

them ultimately unjustifiable unless sufficient humanitarian aid is given.

Young 41

Blockades

References

Arms Control Association. (2013). Arms Trade Treaty. Retrieved November 22, 2018, from

https://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/arms-trade-treaty

Alvarez, O. R. (2015, November 8). US Blockade on Cuba, Mistake or Wise Move? Retrieved

October 06, 2018, from https://havanatimes.org/?p=128243

Bannerman, G. (2010, July 7). 'Blockade' and 'Embargo Have Different Meanings. Retrieved

from file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/IYUUPYGW/blockade-and-embargo-have-

different-meanings.html

Ben-David, L. (2015). Hamas’ Order of Battle: Weapons, Training, and Targets. Retrieved 2018,

from file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/NFPRVUXQ/hamas-weapons-training-

targets.html

Blaine, S. (2018, July 19). Houthis Attack ARAMCO Facility in Riyadh. Retrieved November

02, 2018, from https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2018/07/19/houthis-attack-aramco-

facility-in-riyadh/

Boutwell, J. (1998, August 1). Arms Control Today. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from

https://www.armscontrol.org/print/391

Buchan, R. (2011). The International Law of Naval Blockade and Israel's Interception of the

Mavi Marmara. Retrieved from https://search-proquest-

com.ezproxy.csum.edu/docview/899300925?accountid=10353&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3A

primo

Young 42

Blockades

Cambanis, T., & Hanna, M. W. (2018, October 24). The War in Yemen Is a Tragedy-and

America Can End Its Complicity. Retrieved November 22, 2018, from

https://tcf.org/content/commentary/war-yemen-tragedy-america-can-end-complicity/?session=1

Cambridge University Press (1994). San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to

Armed Conflicts at Sea. Retrieved 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/42E8IYZN/San%20Remo%20Manual%20on%20I

nternational%20Law%20Applicable%20to.pdf

CIA. (1983). A Contingency Study on a Greek-Turkish Military Confrontation. Retrieved 2018,

from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T01058R000202330002-5.pdf

China Power Team. (2017, October 27). How is China feeding its population of 1.4 billion?

Retrieved November 22, 2018, from https://chinapower.csis.org/china-food-security/

CLS., & MHR. (2018, March 29). Universal Periodic Review of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved

October 01, 2018, from https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-

rights-

institute/files/submission_to_the_un_universal_periodic_review_of_saudi_arabia_2018.pdf

Cropsey, S. (2016, November). Israel Goes to Sea. Retrieved 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/49RZTNA2/12982-israel-goes-to-sea.html

Department of Defense. (2012). Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic

People's Republic of North Korea. Retrieved from

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_Securi

ty_Developments_Involving_the_DPRK.pdf

District Export Council. (2017). What are Embargoes and Sanctions? Retrieved November 25,

2018, from https://www.newyorkdec.org/what-are-embargoes-and-sanctions.html

Young 43

Blockades

Edelstein, D. M. (2004). Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or

Fail. International Security, 29(1), 49-91. doi:10.1162/0162288041762913

Fanell, J. (2018). China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to

Hegemony. Retrieved 2018, from

https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/james_e._fanell_hpsci_testimony_-_final_-

_17may18.pdf

Farley, R. (2018, April 02). Why A War Between America and China Is Very Possible: Here Is

How It Would Go Down. Retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-

between-america-china-very-possible-here-how-it-25180?page=0%2C4

Felter, C., & Renwick, D. (2018, January 19). U.S.-Cuba Relations. Retrieved November 01,

2018, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations

Fraunces, M. G. (1994). The International Law of Blockade: New Guiding Principles in

Contemporary State Practice. doi:https://www-jstor-

org.ezproxy.csum.edu/stable/pdf/796877.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Adb810e1df8c5250665a5e72

507dacc46

Freedom House. (2017, April 07). Cuba. Retrieved November 29, 2018, from

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/cuba

Fink, M. D. (2011). Contemporary views on the lawfulness of naval blockades. Aegean Review

of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law, 1(2), 191. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12180-011-

0021-y

Getchell, M. (2015). The Cuban Missile Crisis. Retrieved from

https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/postwarera/1960s-america/a/the-cuban-

missile-crisis

Young 44

Blockades

Goure, D., & Grant, R. (2009, April). U.S. Naval Options for Influencing Iran. Retrieved 2018,

from https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/us-naval-options.pdf

Gov. UK. (2016). Sanctions, embargoes and restrictions. Retrieved November 22, 2018, from

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions

Guzansky, Y., & Heistein, A. (2018, March 26). Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen Has Been a

Disaster. Retrieved November 21, 2018, from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-

arabias-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064

Heinegg, W. H. (1997). Naval Blockade. Retrieved from https://digital-

commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&articl

e=1429&context=ils

Heritage.org. (2018, October). Middle East. Retrieved November 22, 2018, from

https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/middle-

east

Human Rights Watch. (2017, December 7). Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians.

Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/43EPNJBF/yemen-coalition-

blockade-imperils-civilians.html

International Crisis Group (2018, July 24). Averting War in Gaza. Retrieved November 24,

2018, from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-

mediterranean/israelpalestine/b60-averting-war-gaza

International Crisis Group. (2018). Strait of Hormuz. Retrieved 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/8ZGK45EY/hormuz.html

International Committee of the Red Cross. (1994). San Remo Manual on International Law

Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994. Retrieved from https://ihl-

Young 45

Blockades

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=5B310CC9

7F166BE3C12563F6005E3E09

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2014, January). The Geneva Conventions of 1949

and their Additional Protocols. Retrieved November 29, 2018, from

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012, August 16). Negative Palestinian Actions vs. Positive

Israeli Measures. Retrieved from

http://www.israel.org/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Negative_Palestinian_positi

ve_Israeli_measures_Aug_2012.aspx

Jewish Virtual Library. (2018). Fact Sheets: Israel's "Blockade" of Gaza. Retrieved from

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-s-quot-blockade-quot-of-gaza

Kabalan, M. (2018). How the blockade on Qatar failed. Retrieved 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/T6KIXXC9/how-the-blockade-on-qatar-

failed.html

Kaloudis, G. (1999, March). CYPRUS: THE ENDURING CONFLICT. Retrieved 2018, from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20753188?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Kaymal, T. (2018, August 31). Turkish Navy's Guided Missile Ships with Projections to 2030 –

Bahriye Enstitüsü. Retrieved November 03, 2018, from

https://bahriyeenstitusu.org/2018/08/31/turkish-navys-guided-missile-ships-with-projections-to-

2030/

Young 46

Blockades

Kefi, D. (2018, April 02). The Yemen Civil War and Saudi Arabia's Unlawful Blockade.

Retrieved November 22, 2018, from http://hrbrief.org/2018/04/yemen-civil-war-saudi-arabias-

unlawful-blockade/

Krepinevich, A. (2015, April). How to Deter China: The Case for an Archipelagic Defense.

Retrieved October 01, 2018, from https://search-proquest-

com.ezproxy.csum.edu/docview/1658669009/fulltext/BBCF033B29B54179PQ/1?accountid=103

53

Levin, D. (2018, July 09). Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Retrieved November 23,

2018, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad

Long, B. (2010). The Hamas Agenda: How Has It Changed? Retrieved from

https://www.mepc.org/hamas-agenda-how-has-it-changed

Meeker, L., & Katzenbach, N. (1962). Legal and Practical Consequences of a Blockade of Cuba.

Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/file/20906/download

Mishra, A. (2017, July 17). Guns, Weapons, and Illegal Trade. Retrieved November 24, 2018,

from https://intpolicydigest.org/2015/01/05/guns-weapons-illegal-trade/

Mizokami, K. (2018, April 18). How Iran Could Sink a Navy Aircraft Carrier in Battle.

Retrieved November 26, 2018, from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-iran-could-

sink-navy-aircraft-carrier-battle-25435

Murphy, R. W. (2017). The Blockade of Qatar. Retrieved November 02, 2018, from

https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/fall-2017/the-blockade-

of-qatar

Young 47

Blockades

Noonan, S. (2010). Special Report: Israeli Intelligence Services. Retrieved November 22, 2018,

from https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/17/1795164_for-edit-special-report-israeli-

intelligence-8-003-words-2.html

O'Hanlon, M. (2018). America Has Military Options For North Korea (but They're all Bad).

Retrieved November 01, 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/RYHZHGVA/america-has-military-options-north-

korea-theyre-all-bad-23940.html

Partyka, N. (2014, May 2). The US Blockade of Cuba: Its Effects and Global Consequences.

Retrieved November 01, 2018, from http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/cuba-project-part-

two.html#.W93dWdVKgqM

Rai, M. (2018, April 13). Iran Developing Houthis as its Long-Term Asset. Retrieved from

https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/13/iran-developing-houthis-as-its-long-term-asset/

Ratner, M. (2018). Iran’s Threats, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets: In Brief. Retrieved

November 23, 2018, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45281.pdf

Schmitt, M. (2008). "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the

International Law of Self-Defense. Retrieved 2018, from

https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=mjil

Salisbury, P. (2018, August). A Multidimensional Approach to Restoring State Legitimacy in

Yemen. Retrieved November 20, 2018, from https://www.theigc.org/wp-

content/uploads/2018/08/Legitimacy-in-Yemen-2018.pdf

Schneyer, P. A. (1981). The Legality of the U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba under

International Law.

Young 48

Blockades

Skiaire, M. R. (2011). The Security Council Blockade of Iraq: Conflicting Obligations Under the

United Nations Charter and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Retrieved from

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.

com/&httpsredir=1&article=1569&context=auilr

Stangarone, T. (2018). Why a Hard Embargo of North Korea is Impractical. Retrieved

November 25, 2018, from http://keia.org/why-hard-embargo-north-korea-impractical

The New Arab. (2018, January 24). Houthis 'ban over 35 aid agencies' as more civilians killed in

Saudi strikes. Retrieved November 12, 2018, from

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/1/24/yemen-rebels-ban-aid-agencies-as-

airstrikes-kill-civilians

UN. (2018). INTERVIEW: UN's top official in North Korea foresees 'surge' in humanitarian aid |

UN News (2018). Retrieved November 02, 2018, from

https://news.un.org/en/interview/2018/06/1013432

UN. (1945). UN Charter (full text). Retrieved November 20, 2018, from

http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/

UNCLOS. (1994). United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. Retrieved 2018, from

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

UNODA. (2018). Disarmament Treaties Database: Arms Trade Treaty. Retrieved November 22,

2018, from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att

UN. (2018, September 13). Blockades 'expose' the innocent, to the 'ravages of economic war' -

UN sanctions expert warns | UN News. Retrieved November 19, 2018, from

https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019192

Young 49

Blockades

UN (2016). Charter of the UN: Article 51. Retrieved November 29, 2018, from

http://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml

UNOCHA. (2016, November 14). The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade |

November 2016. Retrieved from https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-

impact-blockade-november-2016

USDOS. (2017, March 03). Israel and The Occupied Territories - The Occupied Territories.

Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/nea/265502.htm

Vassalotti, J. (2011). Rough Seas: The Greek-Turkish Aegean Sea Dispute and Ideas for

Resolution. Retrieved 2018, from

file:///C:/Users/Young%20PC/Zotero/storage/VPKHUICB/Vassalotti%20-

%20Rough%20Seas%20The%20Greek-Turkish%20Aegean%20Sea%20Dispute%20a.pdf

Weiss, G. (2016, September 08). The Israeli Navy in Context. Retrieved November 25, 2018,

from http://cimsec.org/israeli-navy-context/27852

Zhang, Xunchao. “A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade?” The National

Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 25 Nov. 2014, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-

buzz/us-china-war-asia-could-america-win-by-blockade-11733.

Young 50