Continuity Within Chaos
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Continuity Within Chaos The role of political discourse in the rebuilding of Communist Party legitimation in Poland, 1988-90 Jo Harper Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of the University of London London School of Economics February 1999 UMI Number: U123103 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U123103 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 2 A bstract This thesis deals with the ways in which the Polish United Workers’ Party's (PZPR) political discourse and its modes of political legitimation changed during the period of the transformation of the political system in Poland between 1988 and 1990. The central hypothesis is that the PZPR retained a strong series of discursive continuities during this period, although partially reconstructed its discourses along three main axes: Civil -Public/Private, Geopolitical - West/ East and Historical - Past[Present. Each element emerged out of the PZPR's existing discourses and simultaneously transformed both them and the PZPR’s position within them. Thus one saw the emergence of an autonomous, semi de-institutionalised Communist Party, which became tied by its discursive commitments to an evolving political agreement following the 1989 round table talks that it was unable to reverse or oppose. The thesis adopts a historical case study approach in which changes in PZPR discourses are analysed over four periods. 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 6 Foreword 7-10 Chapter 1 Terms and Focus 1. Introduction 11-15 2. Hypotheses 16 2.1. Continuity 16 2.11 Civil discourses 17 2.1. ii. Historical discourses 18 2.1. iii. Geopolitical discourses 19 3. Locating the research: literature review 20-21 3.1. Gaps in the field of 'discontinuities’ 22-26 3.2. Gaps in the field of 'continuities' 27-28 3.3. Problems of 'PZPR' literature 29-32 3.4. What the thesis is not about 33-37 Chapter 2 Theory and Methods 1. Introduction 38 2. Legitimation 39-46 2.1. Discourse and Legitimation 47-49 2.2.1. Grades of Discourse 49-50 2.3. Types of Legitimational Discourse 51 2.3.i. Traditional Legitimation 51 2.3.ii. Legal-Rational Legitimation 52 2.4. Discursive Signifiers 53-54 2.4.1. 'Private'V s 'Public' 55-56 2.4.i.a. 'The Party/'parties' 56 2.41b. The State and constitution 56 2.4.i.c. 'Opposition' 57 2.4.ii. 'West' Vs 'East' 58 2.4.ii.a. The 'East' 59 2.4.ii.b. The 'West' 59 2.4.iii. 'Past'Vs 'Present' 60-63 2.4.iii.a. National Independence (1918) 64 2.4.iii.b. WWII/Katyn 64-65 2.4.iii.c. PPS 65-66 2.4.iii.d. 1968 and 1970 66 2.4.iii.e. 1981-83 66-67 3. The PZPR in historical perspective 3.1. 1948-80 68-75 3.2. 1981-88 76-84 3.3. Discursive contenders with the PZPR (1982-89) 3.3.i. Inner community 'pragmatic(‘ centre) 85-86 3.3.ii. Reformers versus hard-liners 86 3.3.111. Reformism within the PZPR 86-87 3.3.111.a. 'Globalism' 88 3.3.111.b. ''Populism' 89 3.3.111.c. Auxiliary community 89 4. Methodology 90-91 5. Sources and non-sources 92-93 Chapter 3 The Re-emergence of History May-December 1988 1. Introduction 94-95 2. Public Vs Private 96-121 3. East Vs West 122-123 4. Past Vs Present 124-129 5. Conclusions 130-131 Chapter 4 Changing Course December 1988-January 1989 1. Introduction 132-133 2. Public Vs Private 134-157 3. Past Vs Present 158-161 4. East Vs West 162-163 5. Conclusions 164-165 Chapter 5 The End of History February-August 1989 1. Introduction 166-168 2. Public Vs Private 169-196 3. Past Vs Present 197-206 4. Conclusions 207-209 Chapter 6 Becoming Post-Communist August 1989-January 1990 1. Introduction 210-211 2. Public Vs Private 212-227 3. East Vs West 228-233 4. Past Vs Present 234-237 5. Conclusions 238-239 Chapter 7 Conclusions 1. Introduction 240 2. Continuity/Discontinuity 241 2.1. Establishing ’continuity' 242 l.l.i Public' discourses 242-243 1.1.ii 'Western' and 'historical' discourses 244 1.2. Continuity in traditional discourses 245-246 1.3. Longer and shorter-term explanations 247 1.3.i. The moderate Solidarity opposition 248 1.3.ii. The round table talks 248-249 1.3.iii. The role of the USSR 250 2. The relevance of discourse 251-252 3. The SdRP’s political legitimation, 1990-97 253-254 3.1. Past/ Present 255 3.2. Public/ Private 256-257 3.3 East/ West 257 4. Thesis contributions and relevance 258-259 Bibliography 260-272 Acronyms used in main text 272-273 Appendix i) Key actors 274-275 Appendix ii) Chronology of events, 1988-90 276-283 List of figures: 1. Schematic representation of PZPR discourses 54 2. June 1989 Election results 190 6 Acknowledgements Thanks to Joanna for her love, patience and commitment. Thanks to the entire Witkowski household for its long-suffering patience. Thanks to Rodney Barker for his support, encouragement and guidance. 7 Foreword The Solidarity logo, with its wobbly written' Solidamoscl and the figure of Lech Walesa remain, even after the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the two most evocative and widely held images of Poland, particularly in Western Europe and North America. Solidarity represented all that was 'noble, good and honest,’ fighting for ' Western’ values against the tyranny of the ''Bast 'x The Polish anti-Communist opposition movement evoked much uncritical sympathy and support. It was, in many eyes often over-romantically, seen as the main beneficiary of the collapse of Communist structures, particularly from outside Poland, both in Western Polish emigre circles and more generally within the Western press and popular consciousness. It would (and should), as many argued during 1989,2 provide the basis for a transitional democratic regime, located within a broad coalition of Church, secular, centre-left and centre-right and trade union groups. In many respects, before its acrimonious split in 1990, it did. As the political and institutional structures of Communism collapsed during 1989, the main focus of explanation assumed or implied’return a to history' or a 'return to Europe.'3 "The phrase people use to sum up what is happening /' Garton-Ash noted in 1990, "is a return to Europe.’’* The ’revolutions’ of 1989 represented, from this perspective, a return to normality and the traditions of the pre-war era, a return to 1939.’1939,’ *Radio Free Europe and the Paris-based periodical, Kultura, amongst others, tended to overplay this aspect of the changes. 2Lipiec, J., (1990) 3Glenny, M., (1990); Ash, T.G., (1990a); Jedlicki, J., (1990) 4Ash, T.G., (1990a) Ibid. p.21 8 from this perspective, represents not only the last period of Polish national sovereignty, but also the last period of democracy. It represents the civil, democratic and 'free' society craved by many under Communism.5 Communism was seen as merely an aberration, a product, in Poland, as elsewhere, of Russian imperialism and the peculiar division of Europe after the Second World War. This notion of 1returning to traditions' suppressed during the Communist period is without doubt valid and vital. However, two problems arise within the various 'romantic'6 or explicitly anti-Communist interpretations7 that see Solidarity as the benefactor of the end of Communism. One, the traditions, if indeed they are being or can be returned to, are themselves confused and fraught. Two, the Communist left, as well as the anti-Communist opposition can claim a stake in them. Polish politics during the 1930's must be located within the context of an externally dependent and semi-colonially penetrated national economy, weakly legitimated democratic, and at times authoritarian, structures of power, a strong socialist orientation among large sections of society and the political classes and a multi ethnic and diverse society. The notion of returning to normality, in the sense of stable and predictable politics, therefore, is returning to a situation in which normality was anything but prevalent. Furthermore, varied and complex sets of political, ideological and constitutional relations and matrices have emerged since 1989. The new democratic State, for example, remained, until 1997, without a fully codified or consensually accepted constitution and curious new alliances ^Alexander, J.C. (1991) and Michnik , A., (1976). Habermas, J., (Holmes, L., 1993, p.45) refers to the 1989 period as a "rectifying revolution," for example. 6Glenny, M., (1990), Ibid. 9 and political ideologies have emerged. The post-Communist political map in Poland is not easily amenable to the traditionally dichotomised notion of political ideology along a left/right continuum. Much of the post-Communist left - comprised of the PZPR's successor, the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic (SdRP), the largest party in the electoral umbrella organisation, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD),8 and the post-Solidarity left, Labour Union (UP) and Socialist Party (PPS) - is committed to more market deregulation of the national economy than one would associate with traditional or Western European social- democratic parties.9 It also has significant support from the emerging ownership classes.