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Australia Falcon Heavy Upper Stage Burn Observations

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Australia Falcon Heavy Upper Stage Burn Observations WAS NOT NEW RUSSIAN ICBM WARHEAD SEEN [SUN ANTI-ABM TEST [“KYSS-T-16”] -- X NOT THE SURPRISE RESUMPTION SET] OF ‘SPIRAL UFO’ SPECTACLES WAS JULY 26, 2019 SEEN This report assumes reader familiarity with earlier Kapustin-Yar-to-Sary-Shagan-Topol [KYSS-T] summary WAS http://satobs.org/seesat_ref/misc/171226_kyss.pdf SEEN James Oberg // Aug 6, 2019 REVIEW DRAFT 1 WAS www.jameseoberg.com SEEN [email protected] ORGANIZATION OF THIS NARRATIVE • OVERVIEW & IMAGERY • METHODOLOGY • DETERMINATION OF LAUNCH TIME • ACTIVITY REGION MAP AND CLOUD COVER • KYSS-T PAST EVENTS • KYSS-T STANDARD FLIGHT PROFILE • PHASE 1 [LAUNCH] REPORTS • PHASE 2A [DESCENT BURN] REPORTS • PHASE 2B [BUS SPINUP SPIRAL] REPORTS • SUMMARY • CONCLUSIONS • EXPECTATIONS • SUGGESTIONS • APPENDIXES 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 2 appendixes • APPENDIX 1 – Previous reports on ground observations of missile/space plume/venting events • APPENDIX 2 – Official Russian announcements • APPENDIX 3 – Miscellaneous press reports • APPENDIX 4 – foreign language postings • APPENDIX 5 – UFO media reactions • APPENDIX 6 – Phase 1B additional raw reports • APPENDIX 7 – Phase 2A/2B additional raw reports • APPENDIX 8 – Strange shape of Phase2 plume – explained? • APPENDIX 9 -- ISS COORDINATION? ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT. • APPENDIX 10 – UNSORTED RAW NOTES/LINKS 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 3 OVERVIEW OF KYSS-16 LAUNCH • Unique test program began in 2005 [with highly visible twilight launches since 2009] aimed at developing defense-avoiding highly-maneuverable ICBM warheads. • A year and a half after the last such launch, and a year after official announcement indicating no further launches, suddenly there is a NEW ‘classic’ KYSS launch with NO mention of maneuvering warhead development. • Previous [and only] 2019 Topol launch in February was from Plesetsk to Kamchatka for troop training and lifetime extension validation – unrelated to KYSS-T • This NEW twilight launch from Kapustin Yar to Sary Shagan led to mass views/images of ‘old’ [> an hour] ascent contrails [from lower Volga region] BUT NO ACTUAL ASCENT -- and also of classic entry burn and spiral [from central Asia plus Iran and Afghanistan] • Some of the finest videos EVER of the final spiral flare were obtained this time • Unlike the earlier launches, until recently, no launch time was announced • Determining launch time took some research to reconcile vague estimates across several time zones, but a ‘consensus’ approximation has emerged. • Although the International Space Station made three passes over the region during that evening, and KYSS-T missions have been observed from ISS in the past, latest results indicate it is UNLIKELY that the ISS was in proper position for observation this time. 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 4 VISUAL HIGHLIGHTS: BEST NEW KYSST VIDEOS • Link to ascent plume, GOOD VIDEO OF DOUBLE - W • https://www.stav.kp.ru/online/news/3552796/ • KwauLu’s rock-steady zoomed spiral event [Tashkent] https://youtu.be/B-VDKigPF6Y • Good spiraling view https://youtu.be/GHrfJwdYlcs • GREAT CRISP VIEW OF SPIRAL EVOLUTION • https://youtu.be/bveL0PQ5XAA • FOUR VIDEOS INCLUDING BEST-EVER SPIRAL • https://youtu.be/lLtVYj3VddE 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 5 THIS SPECTACULAR IMAGE IS FROM AN EARLIER KYSS-T LAUNCH, THAT TOOK PLACE WELL AFTER SUNSET 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 6 POST-SUNSET CONTRAILS LOOKED ABOUT AN HOUR OLD, ACTUAL ASCENT WAS NOT SEEN TWILIGHT LAUNCH CONTRAILS HIGH OVER THE LOWER VOLGA RIVER 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 7 BRIEF SPIRAL SEEN IN UZBEKISTAN & OTHER NEARBY LOCATIONS UZBEKISTAN STREET SCENE 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 8 METHODOLOGY FOR ROCKET-SPOTTING SLEUTHING • Locating eyewitness accounts and imagery is more of an art than a science, with no cookbook checklist approach – just following hints and hunches across the internet jungle. • Most documented accounts omit crucial information such as observer location, time-of-day of launch [and GMT offset], viewing direction, and object motion direction. • When followed up [quickly!], extremely valuable details can be obtained on occasion from cooperative witnesses. • Non-English text exchanges require judicious use of Google-translate plus investigator familiarity with at least several foreign languages. • The range of witness misinterpretation and misperception is amazing and dismaying, but even such garbled accounts often include clues. • This subject is discussed in much more detail at my ‘Rocket Spotting’ blog https://rocketspotting.blogspot.com/2019/01/introduction.html 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 9 Clustering of eyewitness estimated event time [plume/spiral event was ~ 5 minutes after launch] • EARLIEST POSSIBLE – MUST BE BEFORE LAUNCH SITE SUNSET SO ASCENT PLUME WAS NOT OBSERVABLE. AFTER SUNSET ONLY SUBSTANTIALLY CROSSWIND-KINKED CONTRAIL WAS IMAGED, A SHAPE CHARACTERISTIC OF A VERY LONG TIME AFTER LAUNCH • Kuban [Oryol, Black Sea NE coast] Sunset: 20:29 [gmt + 3] = 17:29 gmt • Astrakhan [lower Volga] sunset was 17:56 gmt • Turkmenistan, Ilshat Oraz , about 19:30 [GMT+5] = 1430 gmt [under review] • ‘FOBOS’ website launch estimate: 14:52 gmt [reference uncertain] • Based on Iran report [personal contact]: 15:25 GMT launch • AniI on Iran reports: “exactly at 8:00 PM” [gmt + 4.5] = 15:30 gmt • Kyrghyzstan [ Myrzabek Kurbanaliyev] exact time 15:44 gmt • ‘Tajikstan Info’ website = 15:43 GMT • Timur Eshmurzayev [Shymkent, Kazakhstan] = 15:43 GMT • Shymkent, Kazakhstan [Сергей Абрамов] ‘about 16:00’ gmt • LATEST POSSIBLE: Russian Defense Ministry website time hack “21:05” [gmt+3] = 18:05 [official release is usually several hours after launch] • ISS overflights at 14:42,16:19, 17:56 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 10 X Kapustin Yar launch site Sary Shagan impact site X Iran Afghanistan 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 11 Map drawn by FOBOS site commentator Stasik Kotory-Smog https://pp.userapi.com/c852132/v852132094/17fbb4/xi3Jv35IHGo.jpg 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 12 http://www.sat.dundee.ac.uk/geobrowse/geobrowse.php?sat=15&year=2019&month=7&day=26&slot=1500&ch=4&grid=1&size=1 Cloud cover at estimated launch time X Kapustin Yar launch site Sary Shagan impact site X Iran Afghanistan 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 13 “CLASSIC” KYSST visual phenomena Flight profile apparently unchanged, three distinct flight phases: 1A-ASCENT - nominal first and second stage [two minutes], 1B- leaving narrow ascent plume that quickly kinks from winds, [and can last for half an hour or more suspended in the air] three minute coast [crosses half the sky while invisible], 2A- DESCENT - third stage fires 65 seconds canted downwards to impact test range [acceleration during burn creates significant taper in plume] 2B- WARHEAD BUS SPINUP – Several-seconds firing creates brief spiral [as sharp-boundary plume forward edge falls behind plane of spiral] followed by rapid plume enlargement and dispersal into invisibility Descent plume spray created sharp-edged triangular fan that reached >200 km in length Cloud is translucent so determining whether it’s coming-or-going is difficult Upper portions of plume spray were ejected with substantial vertical component that allowed significant altitude gain before falling back into atmosphere [several minutes] 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] KYSS14 -15/16 VARYING RANGES Topol ICBM max range officially given as 11,000 km Commercial satellite launch version can reach orbit Standard test range Plesetsk-Kamchatka is 6000 km KYSS-T test program involves range of only 2nd BOOST 2200 km requiring PHASE modified launch profile FIRST 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 15 1. 2005 Nov 01 1710 gmt +3 [sunset + 4h33m] KYSS-16 2. 2007 Dec 08 14:43 gmt +3 [sunset + 1h41m] [-024°] 3. 2009 Dec 10 1235 gmt +3 [sunset + 34m] SEEN [-005°] 4. 2010 Dec 05 1911 gmt +3 [sunset + 7h09m] KY-SS 5. 2012 Jun 07 1739 gmt +4 [sunset + 43m] SEEN [-004°] 6. 2013 Oct 10 1339 gmt +4 [sunset - 39m] SEEN +ISS 7. 2013 Dec 27 1730 gmt +4 [sunset + 4h33m] Topol PARENTHETICAL NUMBER IS SUN 8. 2014 Mar 04 1810 gmt +4 [sunset + 3h25m] ELEVATION ANGLE [NEGATIVE tests 9. 2014 May 20 1708 gmt +4 [sunset + 31m] SEEN [-003°] MEANS BELOW HORIZON] 10. 2014 Nov 11 ??? +3 [rumored failure] sunset = 1323 SHOWING WHY SOME WERE family 11. 2015 Aug 22 1513 gmt +3 [sunset - 45m] SEEN SUNLIT AFTER SUNSET. 5° = 15 12. 2015 Nov 17 1212 gmt +3 [sunset – 1h04m] SEEN km, 10° = 80 km, 25° = 600 km 13. 2016 Dec 24 1755 gmt +3 [sunset + 4h49m] 14. 2017 Sep 26 15:28 gmt ?? [sunset + 42m] SEEN [-006°] 15. 2017 Dec 26 03:30 gmt ?? [SUNRISE – 1h18m] SEEN [-012°] 16. 2019 Jul 26 15:39 gmt ? [Sunset - 64m] SEEN 17. TBD ?????????????? 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 16 Half of the first fourteen KYSST flights VISIBILITY vs. EVENING/MORNING TWILIGHT were launched in evening dusk, allowing observers to the east [with dark skies] to BEST REGION see the pluming backlit by the sun just SUNSET FOR VIEWING below the western horizon [other half were launched in deep night; NONE in full daylight]. In such evening conditions any observers closer to sunset had skies too bright to show the plume. SKY TOO BRIGHT KYSS-16 [JULY 2019] RESUMED THE MAIN FOR OBSERVING PATTERN OF EVENING TWILIGHT LAUNCH Flight #15 [2017 Dec 26] was SKY TOO BRIGHT launched in dawn twilight so FOR OBSERVING the ground observing context was a mirror-image of earlier launches. Traditional viewer FOR VIEWING FOR locations had bright skies and REGION BEST SUNRISE saw nothing; new areas much farther to the west saw the 7/30/2019 KYSS-T-16 mission observations [July 26, 2019] 17 KYSS-16 plume for the first time ever.
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