Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions

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Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713636813 The Legacy of the Authoritarian Past in Portugal's Democratisation, 1974-6 António Costa Pinto a a University of Lisbon,

Online Publication Date: 01 June 2008 To cite this Article: Pinto, António Costa (2008) 'The Legacy of the Authoritarian Past in Portugal's Democratisation, 1974-6', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 9:2, 265 — 291 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/14690760802094891 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690760802094891

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Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 DOI: 10.1080/14690760802094891 ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647Online/08/020265-27 © 2008Taylor&Francis 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal.Email:[email protected] Correspondence Address more orlessradicalinrelation totheeliminationofauthoritarianlegacies,and, in the past,anddemocratictransitions havebeenfertilegroundforattitudesthatare A Taylor andFrancisFTMP_A_309655.sgm10.1080/14690760802094891 Totalitarian MovementsandPoliticalReligions1469-0764(print)/1743-9647(online)OriginalArticle2008Taylor92000000June2008AntonioPintoacpinto@ics.ul.pt &Francis University ofLisbon ANTÓNIO COSTAPINTO Democratisation, 1974–6 The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’s Vol. 9,No.2–3,265–291,June–September2008 Totalitarian MovementsandPoliticalReligions, other words, regime; theinstitutionalinnovationofthatand themodeoftransition.In that thethreekeyvariablesare:durabilityof thepreviousauthoritarian ‘quality’ ofconsolidateddemocracy,KatherineHiteand LeonardoMorlinoargue pioneering efforttounderstandthelinksbetweenauthoritarian legaciesandthe determine theextentofeliminationorretentionauthoritarianlegacies.Ina change haspaidlittleattentiontothequestionofhowtypetransitionmay face uptothelegacyofdictatorialregimes;however,literatureonregime Democratic transitionschallengeboththesocialeliteandsocietyasawholeto ful dynamicinitselfservedtoconstitutealegacyfortheconsolidationofdemocracy. Portugal thanintheotherSouthernEuropeantransitions.Infact,transition’spower- created a‘windowofopportunity’inwhichthe‘reactiontopast’wasmuchstronger the Dictatorship.ThenatureofPortuguesetransitionandconsequentstatecrises authoritarian legacyduringthetransition:eliteandinstitutionsassociatedwith analyses howPortugal’spoliticaleliteandsocietystruggledwithtwoaspectsofthe democracy andde-colonisationofwhatwasthelastEuropeancolonialempire.Thisarticle severe crisisofthestatethatwasaggravatedbysimultaneousprocessestransitionto pro-democratising forcesandoccurringinthemidstofColdWar,coupledtoa ‘third wave’ofdemocratictransitionsinSouthernEurope.Unshackledbyinternational BSTRACT Changes ofregimeoblige new authoritiestocometermswiththelegacyof legacies. authoritarian rule,thegreaterpotentialinfluence ofauthoritarian privileged theauthoritarianincumbentsinmode oftransitionfrom the greaterpotentialinfluenceofauthoritarian legacies.Themore the moredurableandinstitutionallyinnovativeauthoritarian regime, The Portuguesemilitarycoupof25April1974wasthebeginning 1 : InstituteofSocial Science,UniversityofLisbon, Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt9, Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 little pressure forretribution.However, theexamplesofSouthern Europe,Latin during their final years(forexample, Portugal, Hungary,Poland), wouldface the most‘limitedpluralism’, andwhichhaveamorediscreterecordofrepression emotions afteritsfall.Some authorssuggestthatthosedictatorialregimeswith conduct oftheoldregime doesnotexplaintheextentanddegreeofthese the degreeofrepressiveviolence andthepersistenceof‘retributiveemotions’; assumptions. resulted inconsolidateddemocracies,apparentcounter-examplestohis and reparationscontinued,eveninthenegotiatedtransitionsthathadalready ern Europewereonlyjustbeginningandinmanycasesthecallsforpunishment limited. Huntingtonwaswritingin1990,whenthetransitionscentralandeast- transitional process,thescopeforintroductionofretributivemeasuresis transitions byreform,inwhichtheauthoritarianeliteisapowerfulpartner transitions. pressures forcriminalisationwerepresentfromthe very earliestmomentsofthe relating tothe‘distributionofpowerduringandaftertransition’. or non-emergence,of‘transitionaljustice’islessamoralquestion,andmoreone successful democraticandelectoralre-conversionofformercommunistparties. case insomecentralEuropeancountrieswhichthereareexamplesofthe set offactorsbeing,forexample,onemoreweaponpartyconflict,aswasthe tive justiceprocessesafterthetransitionsmayalreadyhaveanothermuchlarger phase ofdemocratisation.Ontheotherhand,factorsthatcanunleashretroac- particularly whentherehasalreadybeenadegreeofretributionduringtheinitial even althoughthetimedimensiontendstoattenuateretributivepressures, racy andnewprocessescanbeunleashedinanypost-authoritariandemocracy, democratic transition.Accountabilityiscentraltotheverydefinitionofdemoc- dimension ofregimechange:theprocessesretributionasadynamicelement with whichtheyareassociated. particular, thepoliticalpunishmentofelitesanddissolutioninstitutions 266 tive emotions’thatareindependentofthetypetransition. tive justice end ofthetwentiethcentury,ifwedifferentiatebetweentransitionalandretroac- ring towhatElstercalls‘immediatetransitionaljustice’. shortly afterthetransitionandcometoendwithin,say,fiveyears’,wearerefer- with theformer,andnotlatter.Thatistosay:when‘proceedingsbegin demands werepresent.In‘post-totalitarian’regimes (touseLinz’sterm is aparadigmaticexampleof‘consensualdecision toignorethepast’,these programme oftheclandestineoppositionparties.Even intheSpanishcase,which dissolution oftherepressiveinstitutions,constitutes partofthepolitical wing authoritarianregimes,thecriminalisationofasectionelite,and dation. success ofregimechange,andforthelegaciesasuccessful democraticconsoli- on thetypeoftransition. replaced byanoppositiondidthepossibilityofprosecutionpresentitself’. terms, ‘onlyinthosestateswherepoliticalauthorityradicallycollapsedandwas elites were‘meetingasocietaldemand’. elite-driven processes,wherepublicopiniondataexists, ittendstoshowthatthe During theirinitialphase,almostalldemocratisationprocessescreate‘retribu- However, whenwetakeanoverallviewofthedemocratictransitions The typeofdictatorialregimeisvitallyimportantfor determiningtheextentof A. C.Pinto 12

However, evenoverthelong termthereisapositivecorrelationbetween 10 tout court

5 On theotherhand,evenwhendealingwithmajority ofcases , weseethatHuntingtonwascorrect,sincearedealing 2

Samuel Huntingtonarguesthattheemergence, 11

Its successfulimplementationdepends 6

We aredealingwitha 8

In thecaseofright- 3

In simple 9 ), the 4 In 7 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 democratisation. but itispreciselythisthatrepresentsthechallengeforanyanalysisofPortuguese democratisation. tute elementsthataredifficulttointegrateintothecomparativeanalysisof military, thecrisisofstateanddynamicssocialmovements,consti- Portuguese case.However,someofitscharacteristics,particularlytherole phase ofthetransition. of thedictatorship,openingaswiftandimportantstatecrisisduringinitial that, accordingtosomeauthors,‘wasnotaconscioustransitiondemocracy’. [Portugal] intheframeworksetbylatertransitionsprocesses’, regime, despiteitssinglepartybeingweaker,and ‘limited pluralism’greater. too dissimilarinnaturefromthefinalphaseofneighbouring Spain’sFranco mas causedbythewarprovokedoutbreakofa war inAngola.TheinabilityofSalazar’ssuccessorto resolvesomeofthedilem- timid regime‘liberalisation’thatwasswiftlyhalted bytheworseningcolonial In 1968,SalazarwasreplacedbyMarceloCaetano, who initiatedalimitedand authoritarian regime: country’s transitiontodemocracy.SalazarismwascloseLinz’sideal-typeof involved in‘assimilating collective actioninPortugalduringthe1970snotesmethodologicaldifficulties transition. Theauthorofonethebeststudiespoliticalmobilisationand underestimates boththestatecrisesand‘revolutionarycriticaljuncture’of assumption offinality,basedonthesubsequentconsolidation.This In fact,oneofthelimitationssomeanalysesPortugal’stransitionistheir racy afterwar’, influence it.Portugalwas,asNancyBermeohasclaimed,anexampleof‘democ- transitions, therewerefewmodelsavailabletoinspireit,andnonedirectly over, becausePortugalwasthefirstofso-called‘third-wave’democratic of itsregimechange,withthecollapseNewStateon25April1974.More- because oftheauthoritarianregime’slongevityand tional justice. extent ofitsrecord‘administrativemassacres’intheappearanceatransi- transition issuperimposedonthenatureofauthoritarianregime,and pressures werepresenteveninthesecases. America andCentralEuropedonotconfirmthishypothesis,becausesuch and theMovimento dasForçasArmadas (MFA,ArmedForces’ Movement), immediate wake oftheregime’scollapse betweensomeconservative generals the crisis,whilelatterwas themainreasonforconflictthatbrokeoutin character ofthedemocratisation anddecolonisationprocesseswasonefactor in greater degreeofuncertaintyandthe‘extremeconflictpath’ promoted democratisationanddecolonisation. was a‘non-hierarchical’militarycoup,whichhad a politicalprogrammethat cause comparablecrisesof thestate. and thesubsequentprocess ofradicalisation:othertransitionsbyrupturedidnot forces. However,thereisno directcausallinkbetweenthismarkeddiscontinuity sition withoutnegotiationsorpactsbetweenthedictatorial eliteandopposition The comparativeliteratureontransitionshasalwaysincorporatedthe The natureofthePortuguesedictatorshiptellsuslittleabout In thisrespect,thePortuguesetransitionisaparticularlyinterestingcase Unlike Spain’s 14 The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 15 20 16

ruptura pactada in whichthemilitaryplayedadeterminingroledownfall

As LinzandStepanhavenoted:‘wealltoooftentendtosee 21 itwasaregimethatsurvivedthe‘fascistera’,and not a priori [negotiatedrupture],Portugalunderwentatran-

the Statecrisiswithtransitiontodemocracy’, 23

As wewillshowbelow,the simultaneous 13

We alsoarguethatthenatureof coup d’etat ruptura 18

of aregimechange in April1974.This

17 [rupture] nature

forgetting the 267 22 19 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 the country’spoliticaltransformation. Mozambique andGuinea-Bissaufrom1961onwards madethemprotagonistsin transition insouthernEurope. The Portuguesemilitarycoupof25April1974wasthebeginningdemocratic The NatureOfPortugal’sTransitionToDemocracy democracy. legacy ofauthoritarianism,supersedingandtransmutingitsimpactonPortugal’s other words,wewillobservehowthenatureofPortugal’stransitionaffected kind ofregime istobeestablished. in whichdemocratic structuresareemerging’, butinwhichitisstill unclearwhat of thetransitionifoneconsiders thetransitionasthe,‘fluidanduncertainperiod political roleinthedemocratisation process. with varioussectorsofcivil society,andwhowerereadytoplayaleading ing actionofthemilitary,there werealternativeeliteswhohadcloseconnections repression, prevented‘there-compositionoftheStateapparatus’. substituted, dispersedandparalysedtheclassicmechanismsoflegitimateState structures’ anditsemergenceasanauthorityforregulatingconflicts,which behind theprovisionalgovernments.The‘interweavingofMFAinState’s explained bythiscrisis,althoughitwasnotthesethatprovokedtheStatecrisis. overthrow. Therapidemergenceoftransgressivecollectiveactioncanbe military’s generalisedinterventioninpoliticallifefollowingthedictatorship’s which hadplannedandexecutedthecoup.Thisconflictwasatrootof 268 1970 furtherconsolidatedthisdissident‘liberalwing’. Económico eSocial(SEDES–SocietyforEconomic and SocialDevelopment)in the dictatorship.ThecreationofSociedade paraoDesenvolvimento short, itallowedfortheconsolidationofa‘liberalwing’ ofdissidentsopposedto reasons gaverisetoatwo-yearliberalisationprocess, andalthoughitwascut dictatorship. ThereplacementofSalazarbyMarcello Caetanoin1968forhealth importance. Itconstitutedapoliticaloptionlegitimated bythestruggleagainst although disconnectedfromthemilitaryofficersthat ledthecoup,wasofcrucial tions. past’ wasmuchstrongerinPortugalthantheotherSouthernEuropeantransi- quent statecrises,createda‘windowofopportunity’inwhichthe‘reactionto served toconstitutealegacyfortheconsolidationofdemocracy,initself. century. tary interventionbythecaptains,arareifnotuniquecaseintwentieth democracy anddecolonisationofwhatwasthelastEuropeancolonialempire. of thestatethatwasaggravatedbysimultaneousprocessestransitionto forces andoccurringinthemidstofColdWar,coupledtoaseverecrisis movements. rupture and,inmanycases,cametobeacomponentofthetransgressingsocial lution ofinstitutionsandpurgesexceededthoseclassicintransitionsby main factorexplainingwhy,inthePortuguesecase,movementfordisso- The ‘revolutionaryperiod’ between1974and1975wasthemostcomplexphase The institutionalisationoftheMFAtransformeditintodominantforce The priorexistenceofasemi-legalandclandestine opposition toSalazarism, Below wewillarguethatthenatureofPortuguesetransition,andconse- The singularityofthecollapsedictatorshipresidesinnaturemili- 26 A. C.Pinto

The transition’spowerfuldynamic(statecrisesandsocialmovements) 29

The waronthreefrontsthatwasbeingwagedbytheregimeinAngola, 25 28

Unshackled byinternationalpro-democratising 32

30 During these twoyearspowerfultensions 31 Thus,despitethesurpris- 24

This wasthe 27 In Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 repressive bodiestobebroughtjustice. There wereimmediatecallsfortheagentsofpoliticalpoliceandother radical, affectingthelowerranksofregimebureaucracy,albeitunevenly. began toaffectthecivilserviceandprivatesector.Itbecameincreasingly rial politicaleliteandsomeconservativemilitaryofficers,thepurgemovement Following aquickdecisiontoremovethemorevisiblemembersofdictato- 1974, culminatingintherapidandmulti-directional indeed, itisdifficulttoimaginethismobilisationdevelopingotherwise. isation developedinparallelwithandthepresenceofthisprotectivecover: the positionof themoderatepoliticalparties. cratic regime, andtherealisationofthese electionsasscheduledgreatly enhanced toral calendarwasasignificant factorinthefoundinglegitimisationofdemo- sustaining powerfulsocial movements.TheMFA’sdecisiontorespecttheelec- groups weresymbolsand motorsofaneverworseningstatecrisisthatwas the implementationofagrarian reformsandnationalisationoflargeeconomic the ConstituentAssemblyon25April1975. values, wasonthevergeofbeingdeclaredillegalup untilthefirstelectionsfor integrated sectorsofPortuguesesocietythatespoused conservativeauthoritarian New Stateandfindleaderswithdemocraticcredentials. Indeed,theCDS,which effort wasmadetoexcludefromthesepartiesany persons associatedwiththe centre-Right andRight,thePPDCDS,pointed inthisdirection.Agreat The formationandlegalisationofpoliticalpartiestorepresent theelectorateof Partido PopularDemocrático(PPD–Democratic Party),wereformed. Right, theCentroDemocráticoSocial(CDS– Democratic Centre)andthe year. of thelistdemandsmadebyworkersandstrikersthroughoutfollowing the thirddemandofagroup149labourdisputes,anditremainedontop of anytheneo-democracies’. gal experiencedoneofthemostintenseandwidespreadmobilisationexperiences factor leadingtotheprocessofradicalisation.AsPhilippeSchmitternotes:‘Portu- transition rightlyemphasisethepowerful‘revitalisationofcivilsociety’asa above’, therapidinsitutionalisationofdemocracy.Manyanalyses perhaps explainwhythemoderateeliteswereincapableofdirecting,‘from political mobilisationthatexacerbatedthecrisisofstate,andwhichcan of theMFAasapoliticalforce.Thissubsequentlyopenedspaceforsocialand coup andGeneralSpínolaotherconservativegenerals,ledtotheemergence initial drivingforcebehindtheconflictbetweencaptainswhohadled cratic regimeimmediatelyfollowingtheconvocationofelections. provisional governmentsoughttherapidestablishmentofapresidentialdemo- of themilitaryelite,leaderssomeinterestgroupsandapartfirst occupation ofvariousunions,corporatistorganisationsandmunicipalities.Some dissolution ofthemostnotoriousinstitutionsNewState,aswellin days afterthecoupof1974.Itwasespeciallyimportantinimmediate held. Themobilisationofdiverseanti-dictatorialforceswascrucialinthefirst constitution wasapprovedandthefirstlegislativepresidentialelectionswere emerged withinPortuguesesociety,whichbegantosubsidein1976,whenanew Initiatives ofasymbolicrupturewiththepastbegantoevolvesoonafterApril The overthrowofGeneral SpínolaalongwiththeMFA’sshifttoLeftand It wasatthistimethatthepartiesweretorepresent theRightandcentre- The disagreementsconcerningthenatureofdecolonisation,whichwas 35 The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 33 Itisimportanttonote,however,thatthismobil- 34

Already inMay1974,thepurgewas saneamentos [purges]. 269 36 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 Liberation Army). of Portugal),andtheExércitoparaaLiberaçãodePortugal(ELP–Portuguese para aLiberaçãodePortugal(MDLP–DemocraticMovementfortheLiberation there emergedright-wingterroristorganisations,theMovimentoDemocrático were madeontheofficesofPCP,extremeLeftandassociatedunions, civilians alikebegantomobilise,theanti-Leftoffensivebecameviolent.Attacks the activities.AselementsofextremeRightandRight,militaryofficers local militaryauthoritiesremainingneutraland/orwiththembeingcomplicitin Catholic Churchandlocalnotablessupportedparish-levelmobilisations,withthe Oporto. IntheprovincestonorthofRiverTagus,hierarchy Democratic Party)backedthemoderates,leadingmobilisationsinLisbonand Socialista (PS–SocialistParty)andthePartidoSocialDemocrática(PSD officers organisedasuccessfulcountercoupthattoppledtheradicals.ThePartido context ofincreasingmobilisation,on25November1975,thatmoderateMFA ary (andanti-communist)movementinthenorthofcountry. explained aspartofa‘programmedconspiracy’. the armedforcesindrivingtheseeventsforwardmeansthattheycannotbe cadres. – theseoftenmediatingthe U.S.role–alsosupportedthetrainingofparty together withtheinternational organisationsoftheEuropean‘politicalfamilies’ moderate politicalparties werefinancedbytheU.S.administration,which war methodsdeployedtodealwithItalywereused inthePortuguesecase.The were occupiedthroughoutLisbon. had beenthemouthpieceofmoderateLeft,andhouses,shopsfactories Rádio Renascençaandthenewspaper same timeextremeleft-wingjournalists‘occupied’theCatholicradiostation, the extremeLeftduringcrisis,anditsinfluencewithinmilitary.At organisations suchastheworkers’commissions,growingchallengeposedby complex: conflictwasfedbythedevelopmentofstronggrassrootspolitical but thisdoesnotprovideafullexplanationofevents.Thesituationwasmore democratic politicalelitemademuchofthisargumentinitsfoundingdiscourse, impose anewdictatorshipwiththesupportofSovietUnion.Naturally, the PartidoComunistaPortuguês(PCP–PortugueseCommunistParty)to 270 in therapidprocessofde-colonisation,particularly in Angola. forces ofthecentre-Leftandcentre-Rightincapital, aswellonintervening United Statesinparticular–concentratedonsupporting democraticpolitical that in1974–5Portugalwasanissueof‘international relevance’. Socialist BloccountriesledbytheSovietUnion.All theevidencemakesitclear Community (EEC),affectingrelationsbetweenthese twoorganisationsandthe North AtlanticTreatyOrganisation(NATO)and theEuropeanEconomic Portuguese casewasadivisiveissueininternational organisations,withinthe as shapingtheanti-Leftstrategythatevolvedover ‘hotsummer’of1975.The enced theformationofpoliticalparties,unionsandinterestorganisations,aswell actual flight of memberstheeconomic elitefromthecountry. Although strongly marked byalargenationalised sector,aswellcapital flightandthe the powerfulpoliticaland socialmobilisationledbytheLeft,aneconomy Portuguese societybegantopolarise,withtheemergenceofananti-revolution- It istoosimplistictoconsiderthe‘hotsummer’of1975simplyasanattemptby Caught bysurprisethecoup,international community–andthe During 1974–5,Portugalexperiencedsignificantforeigninterventionthatinflu- A. C.Pinto 41

However, theimpactofforeign aidwaslimited:itdrownedoutby 39 37

The importanceofinternaldivisionswithin República

[Republic], whichupuntilthen 40

38 The samepost-

It wasinthis Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 the countrywithin daysofthecoup. eventually abolished. Manyformeragents remainedprisoners,whilst othersfled oration betweenthemand thearmedforces.Nevertheless,organisationwas were toensurethesurvival ofthepoliticalpoliceincolonies,givencollab- many oftheagentswhohad soughtrefugeinthebuilding.Someattemptsmade police’s headquartersinLisbon, whichresultedinthesurrenderandarrest of quence ofthemilitarycoup’s owndynamicsandthesurroundingofpolitical of certainmembersthepoliticalpolice.Thesedemands weremadeasaconse- overthrow, shouldbeplacedonthereserve. whom hadpubliclydeclaredtheirsupportforMarcello Caetanoontheeveofhis regime’s institutions,closeddown.TheMFAproposed that60generals,mostof The singlepartyandtheofficialyouthorganisationwere, alongwithmanyofthe were immediatelydisarmed,withsomeoftheirleaders beingplacedincustody. police andtheanti-communistLP,whichhadattempted toresisttheAprilcoup, demands thattheformerleadersfacecriminaltrialsin Portugal.Boththepolitical Brazil. Inthisway,thenewgovernmentavoidedhaving torespondpopular diately deportedtoMadeira,fromwheretheymostly continuedontoexilein Members oftheformerregimewhowishedtojoinMarcelloCaetanowereimme- Programme, providedforaminimalandswiftpurgeofthearmedforces. nal (JSN–NationalSalvationJunta),whichwasinfullaccordancewiththeMFA elements drivingthepoliticalmovementfortheircriminalisation. the imprisonmentofmanyformerorganisation’smembersweresignificant the anti-communistmilitia(theLegiãoPortuguesa[LP–PortugueseLegion]),and most associatedwiththedictatorship’srepression,suchaspoliticalpoliceand and thesymbolicbreakwithpast.Thebriefresistanceofferedbythoseforces tion ofthedemocraticeliteandpopularmobilisation,accentuatedbothreal in whichthejudiciaryplayedalmostnorole. attitudes concerningthepunishmentofthoseassociatedwitholdregime,and the state,powerfulsocialmovementsandmilitaryinterventionthatshaped new legitimateddemocraticinstitutions.Thiswasaperiodmarkedbythecrisisof collaborators tookplacebetween1974and1975,beforetheestablishmentof and symbolicpunitivemeasuresagainstthemostvisiblebetterknown score settlingreachedtheeconomicandentrepreneurialelites.Mostofactual agents of,andcollaboratorsin,thedictatorship’srepression.Thesecondwaveof contradictory facesofanattempttopunishboththeauthoritarianelitesand Only afewmonthsafterthecoup,Portuguesetransitionaljusticedisplayedall Settling AccountswiththeDictatorship:Portuguese‘TransitionalJustice’ Both flowedtogetherintoadoublelegacyfortheconsolidationofdemocracy. the attitudeswithrespecttocountry’sauthoritarianpastduringthisperiod. essential forexplainingsomeofitsmoreradicalcharacteristics,aswell the transitionsuggests. cal arena,internationalsupportwasmoreimportantthantheearlyliteratureon moderate civilianforcesandthefinalwithdrawalofmilitaryfrompoliti- domestic politicalfactorsplayedacriticalroleinenablingboththetriumphof The maindemand,whichwasnearlyunanimous, toensurecriminaltrials The firstmeasuresimplementedbyGeneralSpínola’sJuntadaSalvaçãoNacio- The non-hierarchicalnatureofthecoup,withalmostimmediateinterven- The natureofthetransition,andespeciallystatecrisisthatthisunleashed,is The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 271 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 dictatorship. ‘fascist’, andthreatenedtopurgethecivilservicefor actscommittedduringthe Decree Law123of11March1975alreadyreferred totheformerregimeas several timesinordertokeepupwiththeradicalisation ofthepoliticalsituation. remained activeuntil1976,andthelegislationgoverning themwasrevised cracy, often escaped partypoliticalcontrol. Theestablishmentof involved. Purge movementsintheprivate sector,andeveninthe statebureau- and thesmallbutinfluential partiesoftheextremeLeftweremainactors measures adoptedbytheJSN andtheMFAimmediatelyaftercoup,PCP Table 1). number ofremovalsand suspensionsmusthaveincreasedsignificantly(see statute oflimitationswasestablishedforcriminalproceedings. referred tointhepreamble.Thelawalsoprovidedsentencesof2–12years,andno directly responsibleforrepressiononthebasisofa‘revolutionarylegitimacy’ tribunal ofmembersthepoliticalpolice,aswellthosegovernmentofficials citizens. InJuly1975,ConstitutionalLaw8/75providedforthetrialbymilitary tions, givenitsmonopolisticaccesstotheabout3millionfileskeptonindividual ings ofthetrialformerpoliceagentsandtocooperatewithotherpurgeinstitu- groups andthePCP.Theroleofcommissionwastopreparecriminalproceed- were frequentdenunciationsofpoliticalmanipulationbyextremeleft-wing previous regime’spoliticalpolice.Thelifeofthiscommissionwasagitated:there officers. Thisbodybeganarrestingpeoplewhohadactedasinformantsforthe Police, PortugueseLegionandYouth),whichwasledbymilitary da PIDE-DGS,MPeLP(CEPML–CommissionfortheAbolitionofPolitical 272 suspended. 12,000 peoplehad,legallyorillegally,beeneitherremoved fromtheirpostsor In February1975,officialreportsonthepurgeprocess statedthatapproximately spread anti-capitalistsentimentemerged,resultingin arenewedwaveofpurges. that ‘contradictedthepost-25April1974established order’. Decree Law277,dated25June1974,chargeditwith thescrutinyofbehaviour existing purgecommissionsorwithcreatingnewonestocoveralltheministries. answered directlytotheCouncilofMinistersandwaschargedwithcoordinating Reclassificação (CIMSR–PurgeandReclassificationCommission)wascreated.It old regime,theInter-ministerialComissãoInter-MinisterialdeSaneamentoe first regulationsonpublicadministrationpurges.Twomonthsafterthefallof faculties bystudentassociations. rated withtheformerregime,werealmostimmediatelydeniedaccesstotheir sors andbureaucratsintheuniversitiesofLisbonCoimbra,whohadcollabo- the removalofregimesupporterswithinbusinesscommunity.Someprofes- moderate statements.Thefirstpurgeswerespontaneous,withstrikerscallingfor cautious regardingtheissueofpurges,withPSandPCPbothissuing removed theformerleadersfromtheirpositions. authoritarian regime’sunionorganisationsweretakenoverbytheworkers,who council levelandremovedformerregimeleadersfromtheirposts.Severalofthe ment), afrontorganisationwithlinkstothePCP,tookoverlocalpostsatcity the MovimentoDemocráticoPortuguês(MDP–PortugueseDemocraticMove- Various organisationswere involvedinthepurgeprocess.Asidefrom It didnottakelongforthenewauthoritiestocreateComissãodeExtinção In responsetothesemovements,theprovisionalgovernmentpromulgated The firstpublicstatementsbyleft-wingpoliticalpartiesweregenerallyquite A. C.Pinto 45 44

It isestimatedthat,betweenMarchandNovember 1975,the That samemonth,whenGeneralSpínolafledthecountry, awide- 43

These commissions 42

At locallevel, comissões de Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 rised police force. TheCouncilofthe Revolution,theMFA’s supreme body, Nacional Republicana (GNR–National RepublicanGuard),Portugal’s milita- ing withhimwereremoved fromtheirposts.ThepurgesalsoaffectedtheGuarda 1975, thepurgemovement wasreinforced,andthemajorityofofficerswork- (PIDE-DGS) Police (repressive) administrative Political, military, Elite of thedismissalsthatweretakingplaceasaresultpurges. PS andPSD.Thesecommissionssoughttoestablishalegalframeworkformany by thefirstprovisionalgovernments,whichincludedrepresentativesofPCP, New Stateduringthecolonial war. regime’, giventhatthewhole defenceestablishmenthadcollaboratedwiththe became impossibletosustainpoliticalcriteriasuchas ‘collaborationwiththeold from activeduty.Incompetencebecametheofficial criteriaforremoval,asit of theyear,300officersallranks,andfromthree services,hadbeenremoved ers hadbeenremovedfromactiveserviceandplaced inthereserves. administered thepurgesdemandedbyMFA.ByOctober 1974,103navaloffic- against thethenclandestineMFAandgeneralsSpínola andCostaGomes. Marcello CaetanoinapoliticalceremonyMarch 1974,andwhohadstood first listcomprisedpersonswhoweredeemedtohave givenpoliticalsupportto General Spínola,theprocesswidenedtoaffectagreater numberofofficers.The forces waspartoftheMFA’spoliticalprogramme and,againstthewishesof who weresubsequentlyplacedonthereservebyJSN.Thepurgeofarmed the 60generalswhohadpledgedtheirallegiancetoauthoritarianregime,and tary. Immediatelyafterthecoup,MFAhandedGeneralSpínolanamesof For obviousreasons,thefirstinstitutiontoundergoapurgeprocesswasmili- The ArmedForces considered tobeassociatedwiththeformerregime. authoritarian attitudesamongtheindustrialandentrepreneurialelitewere purges werelimitedbyastrictdefinitionofcollaborator.By1975varioustypes ‘collaborator’ alsoshiftedduringthepre-constitutionalperiod.In1974,first revealed nocoherentpattern,varyinggreatlyfromsectortosector.Theconceptof control. implemented thegreatmajorityof‘wild’purges,whichPCPoftendidnot PCP sharedtheircontrolwiththepartiesofextremeLeft.Thecommissions These wereestablishedindependentlyoftheunionswithinbusinesses,and saneamento entrepreneurial Economic and When GeneralSpínolawent intoexilefollowingtheattemptedcoupofMarch The In themonthsthatfollowed1974coup,special militarycommissions Generally speaking,thepurgeprocesswasnotgovernedbyaclearstrategyand comissões detrabalhadores

[purge commissions]withinthepublicadministrationwasapproved The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation Table 1. Punishment ra n diitaiepre Militarytribunalandofficial Trial andadministrativepurges Administrative purges state intervention,nationalisation Purges, workplaceoccupations, Elites andformsofpunishment

[workers’ commissions]oftencalledforpurges. 47 Governmental andofficial Formal agent commissions commissions government commissions Workers’ commissionsand 46 Bytheend 273 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 transferral toanotherpost,whilstthemaximumwasdismissal. to thenewdemocraticregime;andincompetence.Theminimumpunishmentwas non-democratic behaviourinthecourseofdutyaftercoup;inabilitytoadapt The firstlegislationstatedthatcivilservantscouldbepurgedforthreereasons: Purging theCivilService tary officers,anditwasherethattheimpactoftransitionmostsharplyfelt. democracy inPortugalthereforeentailedanimportantchangethelivesofmili- associated withtheNewStatehadbeenforcedtoretire.Theinstitutionalisationof new generationquicklyrosetothetopranksofarmedforcesasoldelite defending communist activists.Atthe same time,theSalazarist elite includeda participated in theNewState’spolitical trials,eitherastheaccused oraslawyers the moderateLefteliteassociated withthePSwasmadeupoflawyerswhohad and thepoliticalcourtsof the dictatorship(the‘plenarycourts’).Alargepart of union pressure. party towhichtheminister belongedandthedegreeofpublicopiniontrade the variousministerialcommissionswasveryuneven, anddependeduponthe global analysismadebythecommissioncoordinating theprocess,actionof of theextremelydrawn-outjudicialprocessesthatcontinuedinto1990s. reintegrated –onlytobeimmediatelyrelegatedthereservesasaconsequence MFA leaderswerealsoforcedtoleavethearmedforces,althoughmany socialist regimes.AfterthedissolutionofCouncilRevolution,some into exileinAngolaandMozambique,whichwerebythattimegoverned parties withinthearmedforceswereremovedfromtheirposts,whileotherswent ments, orwiththeCommunistParty,weredismissed.Sympathisersofthese MFA, thoseofficerswhohadbeenassociatedwithrevolutionaryleft-wingmove- and forcedthemintoexile.Followingthevictoryofmoderateswithin the activelistorsubjectedtoprocessesthatremovedthemfromarmedforces tary movementsduringthetransitionalperiod,moreofficerswereremovedfrom not ‘obeytheprinciplesespousedbyMFA’wouldbeplacedinreserve. issued DecreeLaw147Cof21March1975,whichstatedthatanyofficerswhodid 274 heads ofthedictatorship’scensorshipboard. collaborators; leadingmembersofeithertheMP,LPorsingleparty;and government: membersofthedictatorship’sgovernmentalelite;politicalpolice penalties wereappliedaccordingtoprioritiesthatlaterdefinedbythe 4300 publicservantshadbeensubjectedtoapurge process. imposed bythelegislation.Byendof1974,eight months afterthecoup,about depended ontheamountofpressureexertedby tradeunionsandthelimits quantitative level.Theprocessevolveddifferentlyfrom ministrytoministry,and on individualpoliticalbehaviourpriortothefallof authoritarianregime. was introducedinMarch1975.Thenewlawprovided forpurgesthatwerebased indecision, theslowpaceandbureaucraticnatureof thepurges,newlegislation result oftheprotestsfromtradeunionsandcommission membersaboutthe to beapplied,ineachcaseimplementedbytheheadofrelevantministry.Asa the variouscommissionsandpresentedtoCIMSR,whichratifiedpenalty One oftheleastaffectedwas theMinistryofJustice,particularlymagistrates The militarywastheinstitutionwherebreakwithpastclearest. With theconsolidationofdemocracy,andasaresultprofusionmili- It isdifficulttodeterminehowthepurgesaffected statebureaucracyona A. C.Pinto 51

The purgeprocesswasdirectedby 52

According tothe 50 Maximum 49 48 A Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 Supreme CourtofJustice. judges whohadgonethroughthisprocessweresubsequentlyappointedtothe Reclassifications). DespiteprotestsfromthemoderateparliamentaryLeft,two Reclassificação (CARSR–CommissionfortheAssessmentofPurgeAppealsand were reinstatedbytheComissãodeAnáliseRecursosSaneamentose later, someofthebetterknownjudgeswhohadbeendismissedorforcedtoretire ers ofconservative parties. remove some professorswhowerealso members oftheCouncil Stateandlead- dominated byasmallMaoist partydecided–againstthewillofPCPstudents to purges tookplaceintheUniversity ofLisbon’slawfaculty,whereanassembly having collaboratedwith the politicalpolice.Themostradicalof‘wildcat’ purge commission.Thesame appliedtoschoolteacherswhoweresuspected of ‘condemned’ wereeversubmitted tolegalpurgeproceedingsbytheministry’s sors accesstotheuniversity,althoughonlyasmall minorityofthoseso taken intheabsenceofanylegalproceedings. commissions resignedinprotestatthe‘wildcat’purges whichwereoftenunder- legal andthe‘wildcat’purgesweremostthorough. Somemembersofthe sure exertedbythestudentmovement,itwasin universitiesthatboththe military tointerveneprotecttheaccused.However, giventheverystrongpres- secondary schools,themoreradicalactionsbystudent movementforcedthe and varioushigh-rankingmembersoftheministry weretransferred.Inthe The JSNremovedalluniversitydeansanddirectors of facultiesfromtheirposts, sors, schoolteachersandwritersformedpartofthis sector’spurgecommission. whole, werealsohigh:particularlyintheuniversities.Famousuniversityprofes- capitalism ofthesocialmovements. removals tookplaceinthissector,whichwasalsothemostmarkedbyanti- intervention invariousprivateenterprisesmeantthatthemajorityofforced collaborated withthepoliticalpolice.Additionally,nationalisationandstate relationship withthePIDE-DGSandthosewhohad,inonewayoranother, inclusion inthepurgelawofthoseindividualswhohadmaintainedaformal ist apparatus.Alargenumberofthe‘wildcat’purgeswere‘legalised’by Corporations andWelfare,whichhadoverseentheregime’sextensivecorporat- reaching andradical.Thisnewministryreplacedtheregime’sMinistryof ment postsorforbeingmembersoftheregime’scensorshipbodies. in 1974–5,mostofthemforparticipatingpoliticalcourtsorholdinggovern- undertake morethoroughpurges’. commission recognisedthatitwasneither‘necessarynorviableatthispointto response topubliccriticism,thesecretaryofMinistryJustice’spurge first ministersdidnotpromotepurges,limitedtheremovalofmagistrates.In the MinistryofJustice. were importantfactorscounteractingthedesiretopurgelegalprofessionand was notthecase.Institutionalfactors,andmoderationofsocialistleaders, lead onetobelievethatpressureprosecutethelegalelitecouldbehigh,butthis attempted tolegitimateitsactsinjuridicalterms. large numberoflawprofessors,andtheregimehadalwaysobsessively Students would,followingvotesinthestudentassemblies, simplydenyprofes- Purges intheMinistryofEducation,andthroughouteducationsystemasa The purgesundertakenwithintheMinistryofLabourweremorecomplex,far- Out ofabody500magistrates,42judgesweresubmittedtopurgeprocess Additional obstacles,suchastheautonomyofjudiciaryandfactthat The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 56 54 53

Both theseelementswould 55

Two years 275 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 democratic opposition. although italso hadthesupportof independents andnotables ofthelocal linked tothePSand republicans.TheMDPwasdominatedbythePCP, (CEUD –ElectoralCoalition forDemocraticUnity),theelectoralfrontthatwas majority inoppositionto theColigaçãoEleitoraldeUnidadeDemocrática Democratic ElectoralCommission), whichin1969hadobtainedasignificant level. Thispartyhadsucceeded theComissãoDemocráticaEleitoral(CED – democratic oppositionparties.TheMDPwasthemain purgeagentatthelocal tions werelegalisedassumingtheauthorityoflocal membersofthemain the Interiordesignatedprovisionaladministrative commissions. Thenomina- councils. Duringthefirstmonthsfollowingcoup, theJSNandMinistryof were thousandsofpeoplerunning304municipalities andover4000parish It ismuchhardertoassessthebreakatlocallevel. On24April1974there Rupture attheLocalLevel majority neverregainedthestrategicpoststheyhad previously held. administration: whilemanywerereintegratedbetween 1976and1980,thegreat years later.Nonetheless,importantchangesdidoccuratthetoplevelsofstate process, andmadeitpossibletoreintegratemanyofthepurgedindividualsafew However, longdelaysinpurgeproceedingsreducedtheoverallscopeof were alsoaffected,particularlyforcollaborationwiththepoliticalpolice. higher levelsoftheadministration,inthesecaseslowerrankingcivilservants frequent. Indeed,whilereportsindicatethatmostofthosepurgedbelongedtothe case intheMinistriesofLabourandEducation,forcedremovalsweremore strong pressurewasexertedbytradeunionsandworkercommissions,asthe of politicalexiles. consular officialshadbeeninvolvedincontrollingandmonitoringtheactivities with largePortugueseimmigrantcommunitiessuchasBrazilandFrance,where oration withthepoliticalpolicehadbeenmoreobvious,particularlyincountries sion, althoughfullyestablished,onlyworkedinthoseconsulateswhichcollab- leader, MárioSoares,merelytransferredsomeambassadors.Thepurgecommis- When hewasnominatedtothepositionofforeignminister,SocialistParty of thediplomaticcorpswhohadheldgovernmentpostsunderdictatorship. grated intothestatesystem. in thecreationofprivateuniversities,althoughlargemajoritywaslaterreinte- the professorswhohadbeenremovedfromtheirpostsin1974becameinvolved clausus while othersemigratedtoBrazil.Whenthegovernmentintroduced lower-ranking individualswhowereaccusedofbeingpoliceinformants. of Labour,thelattercategorywasmostsoughtafter,andpurgesalsoaffected repression bydenouncingstudentsandoppositionprofessors.AsintheMinistry level postsunderthedictatorship;orcollaboratingwithpoliticalpolice’s other educationworkersweremoresolidlybasedontwocriteria:holdinghigh- explain someofthe‘wildcat’purges.Legalproceedingsagainstprofessorsand the dictatorship,aswellauthoritarianbehaviourofmanyprofessors,can 276 In total,purgeswithinthestateapparatuswereunevenandlimited.Where Within theForeignMinistry,purgeprocesswaslimitedtoafewmembers Some professorsaffectedbythepurgestookupnewprofessionalactivities, The repressionofthepro-democraticstudentmovementinfinalyears A. C.Pinto

[closed number]restrictingaccesstothestateuniversitysystem,someof numerus Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 limited impact. dictatorship fromstandingascandidatesforthefirstelections,itmusthavehada legislation barredallleadinglocalpoliticianswhohadbeenassociatedwiththe and rupturewithinthelocaladministration.Moreover,whilstconstitutional positions atthelocallevel. and itwasonlylater–duringthepre-electoralperiodthattheybegantocallfor direct nationalisation, thestateindirectly controlledvariousbusinesses forafixed give thestate controloverthemainsectors ofPortugal’seconomy. Apartfrom weak, therewerefewer‘wildcat’ purges. the country,whereunions andtheworkerscommissionswererelatively movements thatrailedagainst thebusinessandland-owningelite.Innorth of and itbecameanintegral partofawaveincreasinglyanti-capitalistsocial collaboration witheitherthepoliticalrepressionor with NewStateinstitutions, business community,thedynamicovertookdesire topunishanyindividual’s the industrialareaaroundLisbonandinbanking andinsurancesectors.Inthe taken overbythestate.The‘wildcat’purgesconcentrated onlargeenterprisesin occurrence in1975,asdidthenominationofnewmanagers forthebusinesses basic principlesofdueprocess. grate thosewhohadbeensubjectedto‘wildcat’purges, withoutrespectforthe ing purgesinthepublicsectorasawhole.Itsmainrole atthispointwastoreinte- nationalised. Thesecommissionsweresubordinated tothecommissiongovern- authority todealwiththebankingandinsurancesectors whichhadbythenbeen 21 January,thattwopurgecommissionsweregivenlegalstatusandformal workplace occupationandworkerself-management. disputes associatedwiththepurgesassumedaradicalform,ofteninvolving assumed radicaltraits.Itisinterestingtonotethat73percentofthe102industrial were rapidlytransformedintoacomponentofcollectiveactionthatincreasingly important, evenifpurgesofbothpublicandprivatecompanies’administrations ship’s politicaleliteaswellwiththecriminalisationofpolice,were The ‘symbolsofrupture’,signalledwiththedismissalmostdictator- causes ofindustrialdisputesduringtheweeksimmediatelyfollowingcoup. also initiatedagainstmembersoftheeconomicelite,visiblyfrighteningthem. first waveofself-exiles.Somethemostimportantillegalpurgeprocesseswere groups, strikemovementsandstrongpressureforstateinterventionledtothe understanding betweenGeneralSpínolaandtheleadersofmaineconomic industrialists andentrepreneursfromthecountry.Despiteattemptstoreachan by theprocessofnationalisationandstateintervention,aswellflight During thefirsttwoyearsoftransition,economicelitehadbeenhithard The EconomicElite PS itselfwerepoorlyorganisedin1974: central andnorthernpartsofthecountry.Thepartiescentre-Right several administrativecommissions,whichbecameincreasinglyisolatedinthe Given thecurrentlackofdata,itisdifficulttomeasurelevelscontinuity The nationalisationstrategy aimedtodismantlethelargeeconomicgroupsand The exodusofimportantmemberstheeconomic elitebecamearegular It wasonlyatthebeginningof1976,withpublicationDecreeLaw52 As hasbeennotedabove,demandsforpurgeswereamongthemostsignificant During the‘hotsummer’of1975,anti-communistactivityledtocollapse The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 58 60 61 57

they lackedaproperpartystructure, 59 277 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 profound transformationduringthetransitionperiod. The relationshipbetweenthestate,economiceliteandmediaunderwenta The PrintandBroadcastMedia democracy. changes tothePortugueseeconomicsystem:akeylegacyoftransition reintegrated between1976and1980,butnationalisationcausedlong-lasting period profoundlyaffectedtheentrepreneurialsector.Mostofitsmemberswere nationalisations, purgesandtheforcedresignationsofpre-constitutional called onmembersoftheeconomicelitewhohadfledtoreturn.Thus,wave as primeministerofthefirstconstitutionalgovernment,visitedBrazilin1976,he although manyreturnedtoPortugalbetween1976and1980.WhenMárioSoares, ing thenortherntextilesector. essentially affectedtheindustrialareaaroundLisbonandSetúbal,hardlyaffect- industrialists abandonedtheirposts(2percentwerepurged),andthatthepurges the levelofintervention.Onestudyallowsustoconcludethat19percent period. The1976Constitutionconfirmedthenationalisationprocess,butreduced 278 campaigns, inwhichthey were successfulinassociatingthe‘ made the‘ responsible foranyofthese events,themoderateLeftassociatedwith PS Left untilitsolddirectors were restoredin1976.Whilethecommunistsnot directors resignedin1975,whenitbecameamouthpiece fortherevolutionary New Stateperiod. daily publications,itwastheonlyonetocontinue publishingthroughoutthe military, andthestationreturnedtoChurch. 1975, untilitspowerfultransmittersweredestroyed ontheinstructionsof public opinion.Thisradiostationbecameaninstrument oftheextremeLeftin journalists, andtheself-managementsysteminstituted thereafter,polarised occupation oftheCatholicChurchradiostation,Radio Renascença,byitsown process: thepoliticalbattleforcontrolovermedia hadagreatimpact.The left-wing partiescontrolledthepurges. against non-officialnewspapers,wherejournalistsandtypographerslinkedto occupation ofitsheadquarters.Themostimportantproceedingstookplace by anofficialsubscriptioncampaign,disappearedimmediatelyfollowingthe state bureaucracy;thesingleparty’snewspaper,whichwasartificiallysustained press hadalimitedcirculationthatwasessentiallyrestrictedtomembersofthe to retaintheirdominantpositionsuntil25November1975. were linkedtothePCPandotherextreme-Leftorganisations,whoable tary, themainpurgeagentsinthissectorwerejournalistsandtypographerswho were abletoretaintheirpositions.Whilethefirstpurgesdrivenbymili- pers, whichwerealreadyinthehandsofoppositionunderoldregime, were removedfromtheirposts.Onlyafewdirectorsofprivatelyownednewspa- trative andmanagementbodiesoftheprintbroadcastmediaorganisations substantial part oftheprintmedia,most ofthepresscameunder statecontrol. the threatofaPCPtake-over ofpower. The pro-democraticnewspaper, The mediaasawholeexperiencedprofoundchange duringthetransition The censorshipserviceswerepurgedanddissolved.officialdictatorial After thenationalisation ofthevarious economic groupsthathad controlleda A. C.Pinto República República

Case’ oneoftheirmost successful‘anti-totalitarian’

supported thePS,andbecameself-managedafterits 62

Brazil wasthepreferreddestinationforexiles, República , metwithasimilarfate.Ofallthe 63 Membersoftheadminis- Republica

Case’ with Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 the SCEshortly thereafter. The CDCswere closeddownin1975,with theministryofeducation abolishing classes fearedtheconsequences ofstudentsescapingthecontroltheirfamilies. were highlysuspiciousof left-winginitiatives,andwheretheurbanmiddle- particularly inthenorthof thecountrywhereconservativenotablesandpriests guese society.Suchwasthenatureof denounce theauthoritarianlegacy,andto‘democratise’certainsectionsofPortu- In 1974–5,severalcivicandstatemobilisationinitiativeswerepromotedto Voluntarism andMemory pers relied,atleastinitially,onfinancialsupportfromthewesterndemocracies. employed someofthepreviouslypurgedjournalists.Manythesenewnewspa- that weresupportedbythemoderateLeftandpartiesofRight, which re- Later, attheheightofpoliticalradicalisationprocess,newnewspapersemerged Portugal’s ‘peasantsandthe labourers’. ing oralandmaterialmemoriesofthepopularresistance totheNewStateby memory. Thismaterialwasintendedtoserveasthe basis foramuseumcontain- that theywereinvolvedinwasthecollectionofethnographic materialonpopular literacy andothersimilarprojectsinthelocalcommunities. Oneoftheprojects academic yearpriortoenteringuniversity,students were encouragedtoworkon cal climatethatpromotedcontactbetweenstudents and‘thepeople’.Forone consequence oftherapidlyexpandingsecondaryschool system),andanideologi- inability toacceptallcandidatesforhighereducation (whichwasitselfadirect Division. of theevents25November1975anddissolution ofthePCPdominatedFifth the centralandnortherndistrictsbeforefinallybeingabolishedinaftermath the moderatepoliticalparties.Consequently,campaignswereinterruptedin were immediatelyresistedbythenorthernconservativeelitesandcriticised attempt bythemilitarytocreateitsownpropagandadepartment,movements promoting civicparticipation.Believingthesecampaignstobelittlemorethanan who designedculturalinitiativesdenouncingtherepressionofpast,while the MFA,campaignsweredrivenbyleft-wingintellectualsandcommunists Delgado and popularorganisations,includedthecreationof period, butwhichwereassociatedwiththepoliticalpartiesaswellcivilsociety has yettoberealised.Otherinitiativesthatweremoreemblematicofthe1974–5 it wassupposedtoleadthecreationofamuseumresistance,projectthat between economicgroupsandthepoliticalpolice.Whenitwasdissolvedin1991 repression, thetreatmentofpoliticalprisoners,censorshipandcollaboration primary documentation,which–amongotherissuesdenouncedtheregime’s dictatorship’s archives,thisCommissionpublisheddozensofbookscontaining socialist andleft-republicanintellectualspoliticians.Withaccesstoallofthe responsible tothepresidencyofCouncilMinisters,andwhichconsisted The governmentalsocreatedtheBlackBookCommissiononFascism,whichwas civilians andpartsoftheServiçoCívicoEstudantil(SCE–StudentCivicService). cultural actioncampaigns)developedbytheMFAincollaborationwithleft-wing Both theSCEandCDCs metwithresistance(albeitfordifferentreasons)– The SCEwasaproductoftwointerrelatedfactors: theuniversitysystem’s The CDCswereintendedto‘democratise’theruralworld.Whileestablishedby [HumbertoDelgadoPopularCourt]. The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 64 campanhas dedinamizaçãocultural Tribunal PopularHumberto

(CDC – 279 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 − ‘Wild’purges + Legalpurges April 1974toMarch1975 for theassassinationweretriedandconvicted former PIDEagentswhohadcommittedthiscrime.Intheend,thoseresponsible mobilise publicopiniontodemandtheapprehensionandconvictionof regime’s leadingopponents.Establishedafterthetransition,courtsoughtto general’s murder,whilethefamily’sfirstlawyerwasMárioSoares,oneof fleeing intoexile.Thedictatorshipconsistentlydeniedanyinvolvementinthe had stoodagainstSalazar’scandidateinthe1958presidentialelectionsbefore Humberto Delgado,neartheSpanishbordertownofBadajozin1965.Delgado most notoriouscrime:thePIDE’sassassinationofdissidentgeneral, 280 Fall ofdictatorship symbols ofrecessionandresultedinadrasticreduction inrealsalaries.Inthe gal’s firstagreementwiththeInternationalMonetary Fund(IMF),became ism, combinedwiththeintroductionofausteritymeasures followingthePortu- economic sphere,theheavilynationalisedsectorand extensivestateintervention- remained underthetutelageofCouncilRevolution until1982.Inthe beginning oftheprocessdemocraticinstitutionalisation, albeitonethat situation in1976.Themilitaryinterventionof25November 1975markedthe The moderateelitethatdominatedtheconsolidation periodinheritedacomplex The DualLegacyandtheConsolidationofDemocracy 30 years. of thecolonialwarandsubsequentdecolonisationwastodragonfornext Only thecompensationof‘anti-fascists’willbediscussedbelow,aslegacy democratic consolidationmarkedthebeginningofrehabilitationprocess. that tookplaceveryrapidlyduringthetwotransitionalphases.Theperiodof punish themfortheircollaborationwiththepreviousregime(seeTable3). introduced duringthefirsttwoyearsoftransitionandwhichweredesignedto were alldeeplyaffected(albeittodifferentextents)bythemeasuresthat by parliament,butitwasevenusedagainstanextreme-Rightgroup. in the1990s,despitecriticismsaboutitscontinuedutility,notonlywasitratified ideology’. Thisclausewasretainedaftersubsequentconstitutionalrevisions,and clause inthe1976Constitutionprohibitingpoliticalpartiesthatexpresseda‘fascist in termsofpunitivemeasuresagainsttheoldregime–wasintroductiona to ensuretheprosecutionofPIDEagents,onlylegallegacytransition– of repression.Withtheexceptiontemporarymeasuresthatwereintroduced to thecriminalisationofbothauthoritarianeliteanddictatorship’sagents The HumbertoDelgadoPopularCourtwasestablishedtoexaminetheregime’s As Table2shows,thisprocesswasatypeofimmediatetransitionaljustice, As wehaveseenabove,themilitary,political,administrativeandeconomicelite The ConstituentAssemblydiscussedalargerangeofproposalsthatweretolead Table 2. A. C.Pinto Phases oftransitionanddemocraticconsolidation thepurge March 1975toApril1976 Crises + ‘Wild’purges + Legalpurges processes in absentia . April 1976toOctober1982 Reintegration Reduction ofpenalties Democratic consolidation 65 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 been victims of thepurges. Between 1976 andtheearly-1980s,steps weretakentoreintegrate thosewhohad Reintegration it clearthattheyfavoured continuing withinstitutionaldemobilisation. diminution of1974’srevolutionary ‘emotions’,andtherulingpoliticalelitemade lent years,1974–5.Thetwoyearsthathadpassedsince thenhadseenasignificant and theruleoflawhadbeenre-establishedfollowing the‘excesses’ofturbu- criticism ofthesentencesmetedout,theydidserveas noticethatjudiciallegality benevolent treatment.Althoughtherewaspublic demonstrations againstand military activeservicereportsfromthecolonialwar periodreceivingespecially (normally theyweresentencedtotimealreadyserved), withthosewhohadgood flee thecountryreceivedonlylightsentencesfrom themilitarytribunals political ethos,andasaresult,thosewhohadnottaken advantageoftheirbailto release. Theirtrialswereconductedaccordingto the newpost-revolutionary awaited trialandpunishment–eitherinprotective custodyoronconditional tracked down,therefollowedatwoyearperiodduring whichPIDE-DGSagents the so-called‘PIDEhunt’,inwhichthosewhohadnotfledcountrywere respect ofthetrialmembersformerregime’spoliticalpolice.Following ment wastodealwiththedictatorship’slegacy.Thisparticularlytrue during thelastyearsof1970s,determiningmannerinwhichgovern- more complexaffairthatdraggedonrightupuntiltheturnofcentury. 1974 revolutionandleaderoftherevolutionaryLeft,wasinvolved,amuch 25 April),withwhichOteloSaraivadoCarvalho,theoperationalleaderof wing terroristgroup,theForçasPopulares–25deAbril(FP-25–PopularForcesof time thattheircrimeswouldnotbe‘forgotten’.Therepressionoftheextreme-Left ate elementsduring1975’s‘hotsummer’,andthepromisesmadetothematthat leading tovendettasthatwereaconsequenceoftheirextensivelinkswithmoder- some oftheirmemberswerejailed,themajoritycasesdraggedonforyears, later astheyfadedawayfollowingGeneralSpínola’sreturnfromexile.While by servingandretiredmilitaryofficers.Theiractivitiescametoanendafewyears dismissed fromservice. the leaderofMFA’smilitantfaction,OteloSaraivadoCarvalho,were ated withtheformerpro-communistPrimeMinister,VascoGonçalves,and and state-ownedcompanies.Membersofthearmedforceswhohadbeenassoci- parties andthePCPweredismissedfromtheirpositionswithincivilservice and militaryfigureswereremovedfromoffice:manymembersofextreme-Left tional period.Atthesametime,anumberofcommunistsandleft-wingcivilians role re-evaluatedinlightoftheclaimthattheywereanexcessearlytransi- on theRightandcentre-Right,purgesweresoonbroughttoanend,their Eanes, calledfor‘reconciliation’and‘pacification’.Underpressurefromparties socialist, MárioSoares,andthefirstdemocraticallyelectedpresident,Ramalho soon tobejoinedbyextremeleft-wingterroristactivities. ist activitiesbrieflycontinuedasalegacyofthe‘hotsummer’1975.Theywere of thedecolonisationprocessbroughtproblems.Someextremeright-wingterror- social arena,thereturnofhundredsthousandscolonialrefugeesasaresult Despite thisoutburstofviolence,aclimatepoliticalreconciliationdominated The extremeright-wingterrorismoftheMDLPandELPwascarriedoutlargely The officialdiscourseofthefirsttwoconstitutionalgovernmentsledby The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 66

New legislation waspassedandmeasures were 281 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 period whenmanyofthepurgeswere‘merelyarbitrary’. view that,‘itisnecessarytorepairthedamagethatwasdone’during1974–5 torship. Accordingtoareportintoitsactivities,thecommissionexpressed of legallyqualifiedmilitaryofficialsandcivilianswhohadnolinkswiththedicta- vast majorityofappellantswhocamebeforeit.Thiscommissionwascomposed Revolution, andcontinuedinoperationuntilthemid-1980s,rehabilitating process. TheCARSRwasthencreatedundertheauspicesofCouncil Revolution, CaptainSousaeCastro,wasgivenresponsibilityfortheentire process ofrehabilitationtookplace.AmoderatemembertheCouncil the leadershipofCEPML,reinforcedlegalmechanismstoensurethata Council oftheRevolution,whichtookonrolethesecommissionsaswell service, werelargelyunsuccessful. which mainlyaffectedtherecentlynationalisedstateenterprisesandcivil purged byholdingstrikesandevensomesporadicsit-ins.Buttheseactions, trade unionmovementprotestedagainstthereintegrationofthosewhohadbeen barracks. assigned tothepurgecommissionsinprivateenterprises’returntheir Council oftheRevolutionordered‘allofficialsarmedforceswhohadbeen purges hadbeenmostsevere.Soonaftertheintroductionofthesenewlaws, quickly adoptedtonormalisethesituationineconomicarenawhere‘wildcat’ 282 which couldcountonthenewprivatenewspaperstofighttheircorner. Causa (MPDJC–MovementfortheReintegrationofUnfairlyDismissed), themselves intotheMovimentoPró-reintegraçãodosDespedidossemJusta void. ‘which hadnotobserved’thelawsthatweretheninforce,legallynulland realised byworkersintheprivateandpublicsectorsbetween19741976, Decree-law 471of14June1976declaredthattheideologicallymotivatedpurges designed toallowthereturnofexileswhohadbeenforcedoutbypurges. them, butonly iftheyhadnot‘takenpart inillegalactivities’. of the politicalpolice’. Thisprincipalrestored theirrightsaspublicemployees to the PIDE-DGSisirrelevant becauseitwasnotillegalinthepasttobeamember agents, andhaddecidedthat ‘thefactthatthosebeingtriedwereformeragents of the militarytribunals:these tribunalshadheardthecasesagainstpoliticalpolice the caseofPIDE-DGSagents, theCARSRfollowedprecedentestablished by which concernedofficialsof thepreviousregime’spoliticalpolice(seeTable3). In within thevariousgovernmentministriesandnationalised industries,mostof CARSR. Revolution itself;however,thegreatmajoritywereleft toSousaeCastroandhis Simão, Caetano’sMinisterofEducation,wasdecided bytheCouncilof had beenpurgeddidnotbeginuntiltheearly-1980s. Onecase,thatofVeiga before returningtotheirposts.Insomeuniversities reintegrationofthosewho ferred tootherinstitutionsorremainedathomeuntil emotionscalmeddown particularly vociferous,thosewhoweretobereintegrated weresimplytrans- In somecasesinwhichtradeunionorstudentresistance tothereintegrationwas restoration oftheirseniorityforthepurposecalculating pensionentitlements. retirement; theremainderoftenreceivedapaymentinlieuoflostearningsand been dismissedduringthepurgeshadtheirpunishmentalteredtocompulsory The purgecommissionsintheministriesceasedtooperate1976,and Taking advantageofthenewsituation,victimspurgesorganised Between 1976and1978thesecommissionreassessed around3000processes 68 A. C.Pinto 67

The governmentfollowedthisupwithaseriesofmeasuresthatwere 70

Most ofthosewhohad 71 69 The Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation

Table 3. Purge processes: measures applied by the purge commissions and CARSR action

Purge commissions (1974–6)

Dismissed and Compulsorily Dismissed compulsorily retired retired Suspended Transferred Unknown

289 2 107 13 56 1564 Total

CARSR (1976–8) Dismissed 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 Compulsorily retired 65 0 24 1 0 19 109 Suspended 147 2 18 2 1 5 175 Transferred 3 0 10 0 12 4 29 Reintegrated 34 0 23 7 7 1282 1353 Punishment annulled 33 0 31 3 33 30 130 Archived 0 0 0 0 3 193 196 Total receiving the same sentence as before 6 — 24 2 12 9 2031

Note: of the previous 1564 cases unknown, only nine remain unknown. 283 Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 figures toreturn toPortugal.Thelast presidentoftheNew State, Admiral process ofdemocratic consolidation,encouraged someoftheoldregime’s leading absorption. reduced thenumberofreturning colonistsand,consequently,theshockofsocial tarian threatoftheextreme-Left1974–5. legacy’: theauthoritarianismofRightunderNewState,andauthori- parties ofthecentre-Right,Portugal’sdemocracywasshapedbya‘double According totheofficialdiscourseofMárioSoares’sPSandthatdemocratic been verydifficultforanofficialexhibitiontodealwiththistransitionalperiod. Salazar regime. political changethathadtakenplaceduringthe25yearssincefallof sented symbolicallybythematicpanelsportrayingtheprocessofsocialand sition wereomitted,andtheexhibitionendedwheredemocracybegan,repre- the dictatorship.Significantly,turbulentperiodoffirstyearstran- colonial war,whichculminatedinabrightlylitareathatcelebratedthefallof cratic presswerecelebrated.Therewasaforebiddingcorridordedicatedtothe photographs ofpoliticalprisoners,whileoppositionfiguresandthepro-demo- chambers ofthepoliticalpolice,andalongcorridorsthatwerelinedwith guese travelledthroughthedarkpassagesofSalazarism,torture Directed towardsbothstudentsandthepublicatlarge,thousandsofPortu- 1999 tocoincidewiththecelebrationof25yearsPortuguesedemocracy. the officeofpresidencyandgovernment,wasinauguratedinNovember An officialexhibitionofthetwentieth-centuryhistoryPortugal,sponsoredby The PoliticsofMemoryinDemocraticPortugal parties. release tothepublicwasacontroversialvictoryforhistoriansandleft-wing tion. Theirincorporationintothenationalarchiveandconsequentlimited passionate, withsomeparties–particularlytheCDScallingfortheirdestruc- mentary debatesconcerningthefutureofarchiveswereoftenheatedand became littlemorethanadocumentarchiveresponsibletoparliament.Parlia- appeals weretransferredtotheadministrativecourts,whileCEPML 284 family tiesinPortugal. relatively recentsettlement inthecoloniesandconcomitantmaintenance of support: itwasaproductofthenaturewhitecommunity inAfrica,withits merely aconsequenceofthe‘quiethabits’ascribedto thePortuguese,norofstate Portugal. lise the The processofde-colonisation,whichwasaggravated bytheirinabilitytomobi- cal capitaloutoftheirinvolvementinanti-communist activitiesduring1975. torship’s ‘barons’,orofthepopulistmilitaryfigures whohopedtomakepoliti- 1970s, thesituationnolongerfavouredpolitical re-conversionofthedicta- some anti-communist‘militaryheroes’washardlynoticeable. Bytheendof in favourofthosewhohadbeenexpropriated 1974–5, andthesearchfor The abolitionofpunitive legislationaffectingthedictatorialelite,and Given thecomplexlegacyoffirsttwoyearsrevolution,itwouldhave With theabolitionofCouncilRevolution,manyoutstanding The relativelypeacefulprocessofreintegratingthe The impactofthereturnright-wingexilestoPortugal,presscampaigns A. C.Pinto retornados

[returnees], markedtheendofaneraforradical Rightin 73

Emigration toothercountries, suchasSouthAfrica,also 72 retornados

was neither Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 from civilsociety, thepoliticalparties(including thePSandPCP), andalack first twoyears ofthetransitionwereabandoned onaccountofa lackofinterest repression. Allsuchproposals forsuchprojectsthatwereputforwardduringthe the establishmentofnew democraticregime. the 1926militarycoup)was replacedwithanewholidayon25April,celebrating assumed greatersignificance, whilethe28Mayholiday(whichcommemorated tion, 5October1910(therepublichadneverbeenabolished bythedictatorship), past wasthealterationofnationalholidays.Thedate oftheRepublicanrevolu- retirement pensionentitlementsfortheyearsthey were inhidingorexile. lation enablingthemtoseekcompensationforthe social securitybenefitsand torship hadtowaituntil1997,andtheintroductionof thePSgovernment’slegis- receive parliamentaryapproval. were madefromthe1970sonwards,althoughsome oftheproposalsdidnot de Abril bridge overtheRiverTagus,whichwasalmostimmediatelyrenamed name hasbeenremovedfromallpublicmonuments,squaresandalsothe opposition figures–republicans,communistsandSocialistalikewhileSalazar’s mously restored.Streetsandotherpublicplaceshavebeenrenamedafterfamous to GeneralHumbertoDelgado,whoseentiremilitaryhonourswereposthu- as theOrderofFreedom.Themostemblematicthesedecorationswasgranted victims, anddecoratedmembersoftheanti-Salazaroppositionwithawardssuch sive presidentshaveposthumouslyrehabilitatedmanyofthedictatorship’s image ofthedemocraticregime.Duringfirst30yearsdemocracy,succes- Sampaio), havebeensymbolicallyimportantinreinforcingtheanti-dictatorial who hadbeenactiveintheanti-Salazarstruggle(MárioSoaresandJorge system andthefactthat,firstGeneralRamalhoEanes,followedbytwopresidents ical oppositiontothedictatorship.Thesemi-presidentialnatureofpolitical disappeared followingsuccessivereformsoftheconstitution. ism. Similarly,thelegacyofstatesocialismandmilitaryguardianshiphadalso which couldactasarepositoryoftheauthoritarianvaluesinheritedfromSalazar- Right withparliamentaryorelectoralsignificancerepresentingtheoldelite, heritage ofthedoublelegacywaspracticallyextinct.Therenoparty António Guterres’ssocialistgovernment. regime’s collapse,isanotherwhoreactivatedhispoliticalcareerasaministerin who wasresponsibleforthemodernisationofschoolsystemoneve tary oftheCDS.AnotherformerministerinCaetano’sgovernment,VeigaSimão, democracy: hewaselectedtoparliamentandforabrieftimeGeneralSecre- Caetano’s MinisterfortheColonies,developedapoliticalcareerundernew even joineddemocraticparties.Someexceptionsprovetherule:AdrianoMoreira, associate themselveswithapossiblerebirthoftheradicalRight,andfewthem refused anddiedinBrazil1980.Noneofthosewhocamebacksoughtto former ministerseventuallycamebacktoPortugal.MarcelloCaetano,though, Américo Tomás(whomaintaineda‘politicalsilence’untilhisdeath)andsome prove thattheywerepersecuted,andisnotalways easy. order toqualify,claimantsmust,throughdocuments heldinthePIDEarchive, There are,inPortugal,no museumsdocumentingthedictatorshipandits Another aspectoftheattempttosymbolicallydelegitimise theauthoritarian Attempts tocompensateactivistswhohadstruggled againstthedictatorship The newdemocraticinstitutionsassociatedthemselveswiththelegacyofpolit- On theeveofPortugal’saccessiontoEuropeanCommunityin1985, [25AprilBridge]. The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 74

Members oforganisationsopposedtothedicta- 76 Ponte 25 75 285 In Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 archive. majority ofhistoriansensuredthatthesedocumentsremainedwiththenational course ofactionduringtheensuingparliamentary,negativereaction cal policetotheiroriginalownersorheirs.Althoughsomedefendedthis duty toreturnletters,photographsandothermaterialconfiscatedbythepoliti- former socialistministerwhohadbeenavictimofthePIDE-DGS,concerned they werefirstopenedtothepublic.One1996controversy,provokedbya inspection. archive, where,likeallotherNewStatedocuments,theyareopentopublic the PIDE-DGSandSalazararchivehavebeendepositedinnational his death in1970,containanaccountof40yearsPortuguesepoliticallife.Both been keptinthePresidencyofCouncilMinisters’officesfollowing survived. Thesedocuments,meticulouslymaintainedbySalazarhimself,had almost entirelyintact.Moreimportantlyperhaps,Salazar’sownpersonalarchive military tookpossessionofthePIDE-DGSarchives,whichconsequentlysurvived regime’s archiveswasatopicofheateddebate.Giventhenaturefall, overthrew theauthoritarianregime. tion, andhaskeptalivethememoryofthoseinvolvedin1974coupthat former membersoftheMFA–hasgraduallydevelopedanannualcommemora- office. Withthepassageoftime,25AprilAssociation–whichisorganisedby dation, whichwasestablishedfollowingtheformerpresident’sretirementfrom Salazarism andthetransitiontodemocracy.ThisistrueofMárioSoaresFoun- established withtheexplicitaimofconsolidatingmemoryresistanceto point. Itwasonlytowardtheendof1990sthatprivatefoundationswere Lisbon, inthe1990s,MuseumofRepublicandResistancebeingacase modest initiativeswereundertakenbyPS–PCPruncitycouncils,including failed togarnerthesupportofCavacoSilva’scentre-Rightgovernment.Some sion ontheBlackBooksFascistRegimeintoamuseumofresistance of enthusiasmonthepartstate.A1991suggestiontoconvertCommis- 286 punish some membersoftheprevious elite,andtodissolvethe authoritarian new authorities feltthatitwas‘morally and politicallydesirable’to replaceandto provisional governments that provokedthesymbolicbreakwithpast.The downfall andthecharacter ofthe‘anti-authoritarian’coalitionduringfirst sure duringthetransition process. Itwasthenatureofauthoritarianregime’s between thenatureofauthoritarian regime,andtheextentofretributivepres- The Portuguesecaseisa goodillustrationoftheabsenceanycorrelation Conclusion the statuteoflimitationsapplied,andthathewastherefore free. extradite him,forcingthecourtthathadoriginally sentenced himtoadmitthat name; however,theSpanishcourtrefusedtoallow Portugueseauthoritiesto absentia elled toPortugal,althoughhehadbeensentenced eightyearsimprisonment an interviewtoaPortuguesejournalistinwhichhestated thatheregularlytrav- leader ofthePIDEunitresponsibleforHumbertoDelgado’s assassinationgave cases orfromnewrevelationsbymembersofthe former regime.In1998,the Important publicdebateconcerningthearchivesbeganin1990s,when As isthecasewithotherdemocratictransitions,fateofdefeated There arealsooccasional‘eruptionsofmemory’thatarisefromunresolved A. C.Pinto . HewassoonlocatedinSpain,wherehehadbeen livingunderafalse 77 in Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 doers’. desire forretributiononceithadbeensatisfiedbyhe punishmentofsomewrong- ments afterthefirstphaseoftransitionwas natural‘abatementofthe juncture’. collective action’,thusmarking‘thepassingofacriticalandintegrated the endofstatecrisisand,withit,finalopportunityformanykinds institutions cameintobeing.AsPalaciosCerezalesstates,‘25Novembersignalled almost immediateend.Thishappenedafewmonthsbeforethenewdemocratic the partiesofRightandcentre-Left,bothlegalillegalpurgescametoan 25 November 1975coupthatgavevictorytothemoderatemilitary,supportedby the ‘opportunitystructure’thatthisaffordedistemporallyvisible:with economic elite. greatest ‘fear’ofthetwentiethcenturyamongstcountry’ssocialand exceeded thepoliticalpunishmentofauthoritarianelite,provoking ments. Infact,thestatecrisisanddynamicsofsocialmovementsin1975 the purgesweretransformedintoafacetofradicalisationsocialmove- system. InthePortuguesecase,particularlyinpublicandprivateenterprises, justice: simultaneouslyradical,diffuseandwithlittlerecoursetothejudicial important ‘windowofopportunity’forthePortuguesetypetransitional police andadministrativejustice.However,thestatecrisesalsoconstitutedan dissolution ofauthoritarianinstitutions,thecriminalisationpolitical criminalising them. a fact,andsomeofthemweresubjectedtoprocessesthatinvolvedpurging more repressiveorganisations(suchasthePIDE,andPortugueseLegion)was or subjectedtocomplexprocessesthatparalysedthem.Thedissolutionofthe many ofthetransitionalprocesses1970sand1980swereeithereliminated political institutionsdissolved,butthe‘authoritarianenclaves’thathadsurvived ship couldhavelefttodemocracy.Notonlyweretheregime’smostimportant tutional legaciesandthemoreimportantmembersofelitethatdictator- Notes who hadbeencondemned. the endofretroactivejustice,andreintegration alargeproportionofthose agreement’ todenouncebothauthoritarianismandthe ‘excesses’of1975marked made someattemptstocriminalisetheradicalelites of1975,butan‘informal political opportunity. institutions –particularlybecausethetypeoftransitionprovidedthemwith .Thereisa verylargebibliographydealingwith‘transitionaljustice’processes, themostrecentof 2. 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Portuguese JournalofSocialScience (Paris: InstitutD’ÉtudesPolitiquesdeParis, (Lisbon:IED,1984). A Luta

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Os Militares 9 February 3/2 (2004), (Oeiras: Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:40 8 July 2008 0 Elster(note2),p.228. 80. PalaciosCerezales(note20),p.176. 79. Huntington(note3),p.231. 78. Ifthepersonidentifiedincaseisstillalive,orhasbeendeadforlessthan50years,theirfile 77. dents. Themajorityofdocuments,expungednames,areopenforconsultation. may onlybeconsultedwiththepermissionfromindividualconcerned,ortheirdescen- The LegacyoftheAuthoritarianPastinPortugal’sDemocratisation 291