On the Crimes of Rebellion and Sedition. ENRIQUE GIMBERNAT
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On the crimes of rebellion and sedition. ENRIQUE GIMBERNAT https://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2018/11/29/5bfe9f09fdddff95068b4579.html 29 Nov. 2018 | 02:07 If my numbers are right, from January 2013 to October 2017, the Catalan Parliament approved four laws and six resolutions, and the Parliamentary Bureau admitted 10 bills and draft resolutions for approval by the regional legislature, that were overtly unconstitutional, and contrary to previous Constitutional Court rulings; the purpose of all of this legislation was to facilitate and carry out the independence referendums of 9 November 2014 (that of the “cardboard ballot boxes”) and 1 October 2017. Meanwhile, for the same reasons and in the same period, the cabinet of the regional government approved four equally unconstitutional decrees. Each and every one of these legislative and executive provisions and resolutions issued by the Autonomous Community of Catalonia were first suspended—assuming that my numbers are indeed right—by nine Constitutional Court decisions, several of which were served personally to the members of the Parliamentary Bureau, to the General Secretary of the Parliament, and to the regional president and cabinet members, advising them that they could be found criminally liable if they did not obey the suspensions. The very same laws and resolutions were subsequently found to be unconstitutional and null by numerous Constitutional Court rulings and proceedings. One must admit that the Catalan Parliament and Cabinet did not burden the Constitutional Court with problems of interpretation to find these regional laws and resolutions to be unconstitutional; each of these instruments—with unparalleled audacity—unilaterally establish provisions such as the “process of democratic separation [of Catalonia not being subject to] the decisions of institutions of the Spanish State, and particularly of the Constitutional Court” (Resolution 1/XI, of 2 November 2015, of the Catalan Parliament), not to mention repealing the Spanish Constitution (Articles 3 and 13 of Act 20/2017, on legal transition and the founding of the Republic). One need not have the legal acumen of Ulpian to understand that all of these preposterous and arrogant provisions approved by the regional parliament and cabinet are unconstitutional. In fact, knowing how to read and write is enough. Similarly, as regards the equally preposterous appeal to Catalonia's non‐existent right to decide, not one secessionist jurist has yet identified a provision of national or international objective law that recognizes this supposed right. Naturally, it cannot be found in domestic provisions, because not only does national law not recognize this right, it actually emphatically denies its existence in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which states that “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. Nor, of course, can such a right be found in international law, since Resolution 1514 of the United Nations General Assembly (the Magna Carta for Decolonization) recognizes the right to self‐determination only for former colonies, and expressly rules out regions such as Catalonia availing themselves of said right: “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (Principle 6 of Resolution 1514). Furthermore, in this same regard, when referring to the right to self‐ determination, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 also expressly precludes this right from being “[…] construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States” and stipulates that such States are “thus possessed of a government 1 representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.” Since, consequently, there is no court in the world, be it national or international, that has the power to recognize the region's right to decide—a right that not only does not exist but is expressly prohibited by national and international law—Catalonia's independence can only be achieved in one of two ways: either by reaching an agreement with the central government, or with tanks. The first of these means was employed by Scotland to hold—in agreement with the government of the United Kingdom—a binding referendum on independence, which ultimately delivered a negative result for the secessionists. However, a pact between a region and the executive—which is permitted by British law—is impossible in Spain. Unlike UK law, Spanish law does not give the national government the power to agree on such a referendum, since prior to doing so the aforementioned Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution would have to be repealed. Although such an action is theoretically possible, in practice it is not, as the requirements for the constitutional reform that would enable the separation of Catalonia would include (pursuant to Article 168 of the Constitution) approval by two‐thirds majorities in the Congress and Senate, followed by a national referendum on the amendment; because, at the very least, the “constitutionalist” parties would oppose such a reform, the required two‐ thirds majorities would never be obtained. Even in the unimaginable hypothetical case of such majorities existing, it seems similarly inconceivable that the people of Spain, in the subsequent referendum, would vote in favour of a constitutional reform that would allow Catalonia's independence. Having ruled out Catalonia's possibility of achieving independence through agreement with the Government, the second, and only remaining possibility would be to use tanks. There is a recent example of this method in Europe: Crimea, whose parliament approved a unilateral declaration of independence from Ukraine on 11 May 2014, and which subsequently joined the Russian Federation after a referendum held on 16 May. This was possible because throughout the process of secession and the subsequent incorporation of Crimea into Russia, the Russian armed forces supported the separatist movement through considerable military land, sea and air operations. Because Catalonia does not have armed forces or a friendly country that would lend it troops, this means of achieving independence is also ruled out for the Autonomous Community. Since no court in the world can recognize an inexistent and explicitly prohibited right to decide for Catalonia, since no agreement to enable independence can be reached between the central government and the Catalan government without the prior—almost impossible— repeal of Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, and since Catalonia has no tanks and no nation in the world would be prepared to lend them, independence can only be considered unattainable, unless one has lost a grip on reality. The fact that the secessionist politicians have mobilized millions of Catalans to pursue an impossible independence is unforgivably irresponsible, and one day—be it sooner or later—they will answer to the true people of Catalonia, who have been terribly deceived. As mentioned on several occasions, in Europe, secessionist movements are characterized by a consistent pursuit of separation of regions that are richer than the rest of the State. This is the case for the secessionist parties of Flanders (Vlaams Belang, Nieuw‐Vlaamse Alliantie [N‐VA]), which enjoys a per capita income that far exceeds the rest of Belgium (Wallonia), or for the Northern League (LN), which is pursuing secession from the other, less privileged regions of Italy. In other words, what characterizes these secessionist movements, apart from 2 nationalism, right‐wing extremism and xenophobia, is a lack of solidarity, as also reflected by the fact that no secessionist movement has been seen in the poorest regions of Europe. As is well known, it is these far‐right parties of Europe (Vlaams Belang, N‐VA and LN) who offer the strongest support and comradeship to the Catalan secessionists. However, to confirm whether the Catalan secessionist movement is also characterized by xenophobia, there is no need to look at their friends in Europe ("birds of a feather…"), one need only repeat some of the xenophobic utterances of the person who has been raised to the highest echelon of power in Catalonia by the secessionist parties PDeCAT, ERC and CUP, namely Quim Torra: “Now you look at your country and once again talk to the beasts. But they are different. Carrion‐eaters, serpents, vultures. Beasts in human form, but which exude hate… There is something Freudian in these animals. A small fault in their DNA ¡Poor wretches!”; Or: “Spain is fundamentally an exporter of misery, in material and spiritual terms”. And the progressive sectors of Spanish politics, which approve of Catalan secessionism, will someday have to explain why they supported a movement that rejects two of the hallmarks of left‐wing identity: internationalism and solidarity. As I explained in detail in two articles previously published in El Mundo (on 12 December 2017 and 31 July 2018), as I reiterate here, and as can be deducted from numerous Supreme Court and National High Court rulings, as well as from reports issued by the State Prosecution Service—although in fact there is no need to refer to any of these, if one has followed the Catalan crisis in the news: the events in Catalonia