No. 231 Strategic Forum April 2008 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy by Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders
the balance of influence. A concerted effort to regional security behavior was mixed, to say the Key Points refocus and enhance U.S. engagement with least. China maintained assertive positions on Asia is sorely needed. This should include its territorial and sovereignty claims and some- The balance of power in East Asia is stable active and high-level participation in regional times used military means to reinforce its posi- and favors the United States, but the balance diplomacy, enhanced cooperation on nontra- tions. In February 1995, China seized Mischief ditional security issues, welcoming a con- of influence is tipping toward Beijing. China’s Reef in the South China Sea, and its military growing weight stems from its size and market structive Chinese regional role, and develop- ment of a comprehensive, government-wide forces conducted military exercises and mis- dynamism, reinforced by newfound military sile tests near Taiwan in July-August 1995 and restraint and skillful diplomacy that have strategy to pursue the full range of American enhanced its ability to translate power into objectives in Asia. March 1996—both provoking critical reactions influence. The shift in the balance of influence, from the region and the United States. if unaddressed, could undermine U.S. interests. China’s Resurgence Beijing’s concerns about the unfold- China’s regional goals include expanding ing “China threat” debate prompted a signifi- Chinese influence, isolating Taiwan politically, Asia’s strategic landscape is shifting. With cant adjustment in its approach to the region.1 marginalizing Japan, maximizing energy secu- colonialism and the Cold War now distant memo- Chinese leaders decided that economic modern- rity, and limiting vulnerability to U.S. pressure ries, regional political alignments are more flex- ization and the maintenance of domestic sta- without stimulating balancing behavior. Beijing ible, open-ended, and constructive than they have bility required constructive relations with the has sought to avoid confrontation with Wash- th ington and to reassure its neighbors of China’s been since the mid-20 century. Region-wide United States and a peaceful environment in benign intentions. Most East Asians now view stability and the adoption of market-oriented eco- Asia. These goals in turn demanded restraint China as a key trading partner and an economic nomic policies have unleashed growth and sparked in the use of military threats and active efforts opportunity rather than a threat. record levels of trade and investment. The peace- to reassure neighboring countries of China’s China’s influence in Asia does face limits. ful management of disputes has become the rule benign intentions. Its booming export industries depend on imports rather than the exception. This policy reorientation included, or was from other Asian countries, and its military Of the various structural changes mark- at least consistent with, more diplomatic engage- power lags far behind that of the United States ing this new landscape, none stands out more ment with other Asian countries, skillful use of and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Severe social and environmental prob- than China’s resurgence as the leading power in commercial diplomacy (including trade agree- lems tarnish China’s image. East Asia. China’s combination of a large and ments, foreign aid, and investment), and a more Asian elites regard China’s military buildup growing economy, newfound military restraint, welcoming approach to participation in regional as primarily aimed at Taiwan but harbor a and skillful diplomacy is a recipe for expanded institutions. Beijing now plays a constructive residual wariness about China’s long-term influence. Its growing regional role reflects role in the Asian integration movement and has intentions. East Asian governments are hedging both an increase in underlying power resources embraced interactions with regional organiza- by engaging China bilaterally and multilaterally (fueled primarily by rapid economic growth) tions such as the Association of Southeast Asian while maintaining security ties with the United and improvements in Beijing’s ability to trans- Nations (ASEAN).2 Most East Asian officials and States and encouraging a larger Japanese and late power into influence via effective diplomacy. defense intellectuals now see China as a status- Indian regional role. A perceived U.S. neglect of the region, Until the mid-1990s, China was wary of quo power, at least for the foreseeable future. coupled with American preoccupation with regional organizations, preferring to deal with China’s strengths in the region should the war on terror, is accelerating the shift in other Asian governments on a bilateral basis. Its not be exaggerated, however. Its soft and hard
No. 231, April 2008 Strategic Forum 1 power alike lag far behind the United States. has grown tenfold. In 2004, China overtook up the fastest growing product category of traded Much has been made of China’s alleged soft Japan to become the world’s third largest trad- goods, accounting for roughly a quarter of both power, but its behavior and stated intentions ing economy, and in the following year, trade Asian exports and imports as opposed to 16 to 18 reflect adjustment to Southeast Asian norms, reached a ratio of 69 percent of China’s nominal percent 10 years earlier.7 not vice versa.3 Moreover, China’s domestic gross domestic product (GDP). (The equivalent In the 1970s and early 1980s, when China’s political stability remains vulnerable to poten- ratios for Japan and the United States are about economy was relatively autarkic, Japanese com- tial moves by external actors that lie largely 25 percent.) In some coastal provinces, this ratio panies pioneered production networks in Asia by outside of Beijing’s control. These include deci- exceeds 100 percent. In 2007, China’s foreign investing heavily in South Korea and Southeast sions affecting the future of Taiwan, the fate of exchange reserves exceeded $1.5 trillion, and its Asia. China has now moved from the periph- the North Korean regime, the legacy of Japan’s current account surplus surpassed $262 billion.4 ery to the center of these arrangements. Many wartime record, and the outcome of territo- Although the world sees China as a giant Asian exports formerly destined for the United rial disputes in the East and South China Seas. export machine, imports have also soared. Until States or Japan now go to China for further pro- Also relevant to China’s domestic future are 2004, when the Chinese government began cessing before being reexported to global mar- possible U.S. moves to restrict Chinese imports, to take steps to restrain domestic investment kets, especially North America and Europe. Just American and European pressure to revalue growth, rising imports kept pace with rising as individual Asian countries have become more the yuan, and the possibility of a global reces- exports, and China avoided large trade deficits dependent on China, China likewise has become sion. Any combination of such events could stall or surpluses. The Chinese economy is now more dependent on global markets. China’s economic modernization, thwart rising open than the Japanese and Korean econo- High-technology products illustrate the new expectations, and threaten domestic stability. mies were at comparable stages of development. pattern. In 2005, China was not only the third larg- East Asian elites are well aware of Between 2000 and 2005, imports into China est exporter of electronics products and components China’s severe social and environmental prob- nearly tripled, from $225 billion to $660 billion. (up from tenth in 2000) but also the second largest lems, authoritarian political system, and ugly Imports as a ratio of GDP skyrocketed from 4 importer (up from seventh in 2000). Technology- human rights record. They have no intention percent in 1978 to 30 percent in 2005—two and of becoming dominated by China or anyone three times larger than the ratio in the United China’s surging else. They respect American power, even if they States and Japan, respectively.5 Imported parts economy—not its culture, think it is misused. Virtually all of them want and components account for over 50 percent of educational system, or the United States to engage with the region China’s exports and in some manufacturing on a more sustained and high-level basis. It sectors perhaps as much as 75 percent. government—commands is China’s surging economy—not its popular Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China the most respect culture, educational system, or form of gov- has grown even more rapidly than trade, ernment—that commands the most attention playing a crucial role in transferring the cap- intensive exports assembled in China typically and respect. ital, technology, contacts, and management consist of high-tech components imported into skills that have supported China’s economic China from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the China’s Market Power takeoff. Initial foreign investments came pri- Philippines combined with lower-tech components marily from ethnic Chinese living outside of and raw materials imported from the rest of Asia. China’s size and market power convey lever- China. Sources of investment diversified in Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers are moving up age. From the 1960s on, Japan and the so-called the mid-1990s, and by 2007 annual FDI had the value-added chain: China’s top exports to the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, grown to $67 billion, compared to $15 bil- rest of East Asia include parts for office equipment and Singapore) experienced explosive growth. lion in India and about $29 billion in Japan.6 and telecommunications equipment, along with But no single nation has ever opened its econ- China has attracted more than $750 billion toys and footwear.8 omy and expanded its international economic in investment, more than all other develop- Production networks are forcing com- role as quickly as China, and none of the others ing countries combined. An estimated 55 to panies in other parts of Asia to specialize in had a noteworthy military force at the time of its 70 percent of “Chinese” exports are manu- niche products. Companies located in coun- growth. Expectations that China’s rapid growth factured by foreign firms operating in China tries with reasonably competitive econo- will continue and support the development of or by partnerships between foreign firms and mies and attractive investment climates, other forms of power in the future reinforce and Chinese entities. such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, amplify Beijing’s current political influence. A related structural change stems from glo- and (increasingly) Vietnam, have been able Since economic reforms began to take effect balization, namely the rise of region-wide pro- to increase their manufacturing exports to in the early 1980s, China’s share of global trade duction networks. Parts and components make China, while others, including Indonesia, are lagging behind.9 Dr. Ellen L. Frost is an Adjunct Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the Balance of Dependence National Defense University and a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Dr. James J. Przystup and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders are Senior Research Fellows in INSS. Comments may be China’s size and growth have forged new directed to [email protected] and [email protected]. patterns of dependence. On the one hand,
2 Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008 individual Asian countries have become more Table 1. Percent of Imports from China (China’s Rank as Import Source) dependent on China than China is on them. The volume of Chinese trade with East Asia has Japan South Korea Taiwan ASEAN 6 India increased dramatically over the last decade, 1986 4.7 (4th) 0 0.28 (33d) 4 (6th) 0.55 (27th) but the share of Chinese exports going to East 1996 11.6 (2d) 5.7 (3d) 3 (7th) 3 (5th) 1.9 (18th) Asia (excluding Hong Kong) has declined from 2006 20.4 (1st) 15.7 (2d) 12.2 (2d) 11 (3d) 9.4 (1st) 34 percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 2006.10 On the other hand, China has become heavily Table 2. Percent of Exports to China (China’s Rank as Export Market) dependent on imports from Asian suppliers and on Western markets. Japan South Korea Taiwan ASEAN 6 India Asian economies are globalized, but since 1986 4.7 (4th) 0 0 2.3 (12th) 0.74 (28th) the turn of the millennium, China has become 1996 5.3 (5th) 8.8 (3d) 0.54 (23d) 2.9 (12th) 1.8 (14th) the first or second largest trading partner of 2006 14.3 (2d) 21.3 (1st) 22.7 (1st) 8.8 (3d) 6.6 (3d) most countries in the region (see tables 1 and Sources: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), available at
No. 231, April 2008 Strategic Forum 3 China’s New Diplomacy of trade-related relief measures, such as a free expand PLA ability to project power within Asia. trade agreement with crisis-strapped Thailand, These include development of more accurate Whereas former president Jiang Zemin trade offers to other ASEAN countries, and mea- short-range and medium-range conventional emphasized great-power diplomacy and rela- sures to stimulate visits of cash-rich Chinese ballistic missiles, acquisition of Kilo-class sub- tions with the United States, the Hu Jintao– tourists to ASEAN countries. After a Japanese marines and Sovremenny destroyers, deploy- Wen Jiabao regime has focused more attention proposal to establish an “Asian Monetary Fund” ment of tankers and air-refueling technology to on cultivating countries on China’s periphery. collapsed under U.S. and other Western pressure, extend the range of Chinese fighters, and efforts Chinese officials assign their best diplomats Beijing joined a Japanese-led effort to establish a to improve airlift and sealift capability. Chinese to Asia. Backed by active commercial engage- network of currency swap agreements. military officials are now openly discussing ment and benefitting from the more restrained The most visible symbol of Beijing’s foray building an aircraft carrier.15 posture of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), into commercial diplomacy was Beijing’s pro- China’s accelerated military modernization Chinese diplomats have been able to adopt a posal of a China-ASEAN FTA in 2000, which program has been accompanied by efforts to reas- nuanced, flexible, and responsive stance on would encompass almost 2 billion people and a sure its neighbors that a more powerful PLA will most issues and employ a range of tools to combined GDP of over $3 trillion. It is an open not threaten their security. China has not repeated expand influence. secret that Chinese leaders directed their chief the military activities that alarmed its neighbors China’s commercial diplomacy has ben- trade negotiator to propose the plan for essen- in the mid-1990s and has behaved with relative efitted from the region’s widespread interest tially political reasons. Two years later, Chinese restraint to various provocations from Taiwanese in free trade agreements (FTAs), which began and ASEAN leaders formally announced a deci- president Chen Shui-bian. China has sought to to mushroom in Asia in the late 1990s. Most sion to start negotiations aimed at establish- demonstrate that its military and paramilitary Asian FTAs are bilateral, but a few involve ing such an FTA within 10 years. The initial forces can make useful contributions to regional ASEAN as a whole. FTAs involving Singapore, phase of this agreement is now in effect, but and global security, including via increased par- Australia, New Zealand, and the United States many details—governing exceptions for “sen- are genuinely trade-liberalizing, but many if sitive” sectors, phase-in periods, dispute resolu- Chinese diplomats are not most of the others protect politically sen- tion mechanisms, and other significant provi- nuanced, flexible, and sitive industries, set up long phase-in peri- sions—are still being worked out. ods, and contain no enforcement provisions. Another instrument of China’s commer- responsive on most Japan’s offerings, known as economic partner- cial diplomacy is large-scale financial and issues, employing a ship agreements, cover investment, services, technical assistance for infrastructure proj- range of tools to expand and intellectual property, but exclude agricul- ects, particularly in poorer countries and/or ture and are not enforceable. countries with energy resources. Such proj- Beijing’s influence Given their limited scope but high visibil- ects include ports, highways, bridges, and ity, it is clear that FTAs and economic partner- popular sites such as sports stadiums, built ticipation in UN peacekeeping missions. China ships stem as much from political and secu- almost entirely by Chinese companies using has also offered to increase regional cooperation rity priorities as from economic considerations. imported Chinese workers. These projects are on nontraditional security issues such as disas- For China, FTAs offer a means of using access popular with recipient governments because ter relief, counterterrorism, and counterpiracy. to the China market to cultivate influence and they typically come without the strings char- Although the resources committed to these mis- compete with Japan and the United States. For acteristic of loans from the World Bank and sions have been modest, they are intended to other Asians, FTAs with China are geopoliti- other aid agencies. But they create few local showcase a constructive role for Chinese military cal expressions of peace and security as well as jobs, and some have been marred by serious power. In addition, China has made modest efforts doors to economic opportunity. safety problems. to increase its transparency on military issues as a Along with Beijing’s policy reappraisal, the China’s military power has increased sig- confidence-building measure. China began pub- Asian financial crisis served as a catalyst that nificantly over the last decade, creating both lishing biannual white papers on national defense prompted China to launch a far-reaching set of respect and heightened concerns in other Asian in 1998 and has recently begun to participate in commercial diplomacy initiatives. The collapse countries. The PLA has enjoyed double-digit real military exercises with neighboring countries. of the Thai baht in July 1997 triggered finan- budget increases every year since 1997. The offi- China has improved the quality of its cial devastation that spread throughout much cial 2007 budget was approximately $45 billion, participation in multilateral security dia- of the region. To the dismay of East Asian gov- but estimates including military-related and off- logues at both the official and unofficial ernments, the United States did nothing. East budget spending suggest that total 2007 spend- levels and has established bilateral secu- Asian leaders contrasted this passive response ing may range from $97 billion to $139 billion.14 rity dialogues with most major countries in with U.S. assistance to Mexico during a similar This money has underwritten higher salaries, Asia. China now formally subscribes to the crisis a mere 3 ½ years earlier. American failure expanded training and facilities, and the acqui- Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the to respond opened the door for China’s diplo- sition of advanced Chinese and Russian arms. South China Sea, a pledge of good behavior macy. Shielded from the worst of the crisis by Many of these weapons appear to be focused drafted and ratified by ASEAN to preclude war rigid capital controls, China took credit for not primarily on deterring possible U.S. interven- over the Spratly Islands and other disputed devaluing its currency and announced a series tion in a Taiwan crisis, but some significantly maritime boundaries. Beijing was also the
4 Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008 first non-ASEAN government to sign ASEAN’s they believe that contributing to China’s eco- have also unsettled a broad cross section of the signature treaty, the Treaty of Amity and nomic growth through regional engagement Korean public. Strategic planners in Seoul are Cooperation, a nonenforceable set of prin- promotes openness and raises the likelihood aware that a more assertive China could pose a ciples enshrining the principles of national that one-party rule will gradually soften into a threat to South Korean security and sovereignty. sovereignty, noninterference, equality, terri- less repressive form of governance. In Southeast Asia, governments have torial integrity, renunciation of the threat or Second, many East Asian governments cal- reacted to the rise of China in different ways. use of force, and peaceful settlement of dis- culate that closer ties with China enhance their Roughly speaking, China’s influence is inversely putes. Russia, India, Australia, and all other leverage with the United States, as well as with proportional to distance. Mainland Southeast regional powers have signed the treaty, but Japan, Australia, and India. They expect that Asian countries share cultural ties with China, the United States has not. these powers will pay more attention to their but express varying degrees of concern about region and that competition will induce offers being drawn increasingly into China’s orbit. East Asian Reactions of assistance on favorable terms. Some express a sense of fatalism about China’s Finally, cooperation with China has rela- emergence as a dominant regional power. Laos, Although concerns persist about how a tively low costs. Beijing insists that Asian coun- Cambodia, and Burma are not equipped to stronger China may behave in the future, the tries accept its position that Taiwan is part of view of China as a near-term threat is now China, but this condition appears reasonable for Asian countries, a distant memory. Asian governments are to many Asian governments facing separat- regional integration determined to preserve security ties with the ist issues of their own. Aside from a brief epi- United States, but they see the rise of China sode in 1998, Beijing has not asked Asian coun- enhances security as an opportunity that should not be missed. tries to give up their security relationships with by embedding (Even Taiwan leaders welcome China’s eco- the United States. Beijing has not complained nomic growth and supported China’s mem- much about import restrictions on products or China in a web of bership in the World Trade Organization.) presented its Asian partners with a list of harsh multilateral structures Most East Asian security experts do not see trade demands.16 China’s military buildup as a direct threat to At the same time, East Asian governments deal with China except as recipients of techni- the rest of the region. They are well aware of differ considerably in their perceptions of China. cal and educational assistance. China’s plans to improving Chinese military capabilities and Japanese leaders are among the most wary. They build more dams on the Mekong River threaten concerned about China’s lack of transpar- know that they are engaged in a subtle com- the livelihoods of people downstream, but none ency, but they tend to believe that Beijing’s petition for influence with China and do not of the affected governments is in a position to buildup is aimed primarily at Taiwan. want Beijing to monopolize regional leadership. challenge these decisions. Today, most Asian governments are still Unlike most other countries in the region, they By contrast, Indonesians have a greater struggling to consolidate nation-building view China as a potential long-term security sense of freedom of maneuver. They are proud efforts, manage ethnic and religious tensions, threat. While watching China’s military mod- of their fragile democracy and view China’s and cope with crime, pollution, disease, and ernization, Tokyo is engaging China as much as activities in Burma as unhelpful. They also har- other cross-border threats. In many countries, possible even as it strengthens its bedrock alli- bor bad memories of China’s efforts to destabi- democratic governance has replaced dictator- ance with the United States. Both former Prime lize their government in the 1960s. Nevertheless, ship, but corruption, weak institutions, and Minister Shinzo Abe and his successor, Yasuo the Indonesian government maintains cordial absence of the rule of law undermine public Fukuda, have made improving relations with and cooperative relations with China, as does confidence and erode stability. The financial China a policy priority. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Of crisis of 1997–1998 demonstrated vividly that In the Republic of Korea (ROK), attitudes that group, Malaysia tends to side with China on Asian destinies are linked and stimulated a toward China are mixed. China is now the larg- regional issues more than the others and is only move toward closer regional integration to est ROK trading partner, but South Koreans now overcoming its Mahathir-era resentment foster economic growth and minimize shared have grown concerned with the competitive and suspicion of the United States. vulnerabilities. However, residual mistrust challenge that China poses to Korean firms in Despite their differences, all Southeast and domestic political constraints frequently key industries. South Koreans share Chinese Asians are opposed to domination by a single out- limit cooperation. concerns about the destabilizing impact of a side power. They are concerned that a shift in the China’s economic and diplomatic trans- North Korean collapse or a military conflict on balance of influence would take the form of sub- formation has encouraged other Asian govern- the peninsula and appreciate the key role that tle but grinding political and diplomatic pressure ments to seek closer cooperation with China for China is playing in the Six-Party process and rather than military occupation. Domination by at least three strategic reasons. First, Asian gov- denuclearization of North Korea. At the same an outside power could stifle their foreign policy ernments still harbor a certain degree of wari- time, South Koreans are concerned about the independence and subordinate local economic ness about China’s political evolution and long- long-term implications of China’s growing eco- goals to the priorities of the hegemon. ASEAN term intentions. They calculate that embedding nomic presence in North Korea for unification spokesmen are careful not to single out China as China in a web of agreements encourages of the peninsula. Beijing’s recently reasserted the object of their concerns, but China obviously peaceful and cooperative behavior. Similarly, claims to the historic kingdom of Koguryo comes to mind.
No. 231, April 2008 Strategic Forum 5 The ASEAN-driven pan-Asian integration Table 3. Membership in Asia-Pacific Organizations movement should be seen in this context. The effort to create an Asia-wide “community” has ASEAN ASEAN + 3 East Asian Summit APEC acquired a certain momentum even though it has produced more “visions” and declarations than Brunei Darussalam ASEAN members ASEAN + 3 members Southeast Asia: Brunei tangible results. For China, participation in the Cambodia China Australia Darussalam, Indonesia, integration movement opens up new opportuni- Indonesia Japan India Malaysia, Philippines, ties for influencing political and security develop- Lao PDR Republic of Korea New Zealand Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam ments in its most important neighborhood. For Malaysia East Asia: China, Japan, other Asian countries, creating a framework for Myanmar Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, regional integration enhances their security by Philippines Chinese Taipei embedding a rising China in a web of dialogues Singapore Oceania/South Asia: and agreements even if these efforts exclude the Thailand Australia, New Zealand, Papua United States. Japan and South Korea are trying Vietnam New Guinea to exploit this new diplomatic space to advance Pacific Rim: Canada, Chile, their diplomatic goals without Americans looking over their shoulders. Mexico, Peru, Russia, United Of all of the Asia-wide regional orga- States nizations, the group known as ASEAN + 3—ASEAN, China, South Korea, and Japan—is the most important from a strate- large part from the widespread perception that The ongoing processes of military trans- gic perspective (see table 3). ASEAN + 3 has Washington is distracted and preoccupied by formation and the realignment of U.S. force become quasi-institutionalized, spawning some events outside the region, particularly in the deployments in Asia have strengthened four dozen committees and working groups. On Middle East. As long as the United States main- American power projection capabilities in the financial issues, Japan has the lead; on most tains large numbers of combat troops in Iraq region. Recent and planned efforts include other issues, China tends to overshadow Japan and is narrowly focused on antiterrorism as the shifting an additional aircraft carrier to the (but takes care to avoid the appearance of overt top foreign policy priority, this perception will Pacific fleet, moving attack submarines to leadership). linger in Asia. At the same time, Washington’s bases in Guam, and upgrading Anderson Air In the wake of the financial crisis, ASEAN refusal to talk directly with North Korea until Force Base in Guam to support B–1 and B–2 + 3 finance officials established a web of cur- quite recently and the tendency of senior U.S. bomber operations. More broadly, transfor- rency swap arrangements and continue to meet leaders to skip regional meetings has reinforced mation is intended to improve the U.S. abil- regularly. They share best practices and dis- a perception of U.S. disengagement. ity to flow forces from one theater to another cuss such topics as improving the efficiency of Nevertheless, the United States retains in response to unexpected contingencies. The cross-border financial transactions, enhancing enormous advantages in Asia. Only the United United States has also used exercises, such as financial transparency, defining a reference States can provide region-wide security. In Valiant Shield in June 2006, to demonstrate its currency unit derived from a basket of Asian recent years, the United States has undertaken ability to rapidly deploy combat assets. currencies, and establishing a regional bond ambitious efforts to transform its alliances The United States has the ability to make market. This is one area in which Chinese and with Japan and South Korea and to improve important contributions to regional security. Japanese officials get along well and in which its power projection capabilities in Asia. The U.S. Pacific Command, and in particular the discussions have produced tangible results. U.S.-Japan alliance has broadened its focus Seventh Fleet, offers training and joint exercises China’s implicit power to sway decisions in to include global and regional security chal- to Asian militaries eager to upgrade their skills. the other “+ 3” functional groups has prompted lenges beyond the defense of Japan, joint devel- Pacific Command also proposes and partici- Tokyo to strengthen ties with Canberra and New opment of ballistic missile defenses, and efforts pates in joint efforts to address nontraditional Delhi and to favor the East Asian Summit group- to improve military cooperation for future con- security threats, such as piracy, illegal traffick- ing (the ASEAN + 3 countries plus India, Australia, tingencies. Disagreements about how to deal ing, and terrorism. (Pacific Command offi- and New Zealand, also known as ASEAN + 6), in with North Korea have created tensions in the cials emphasize that they are sensitive to Asian which China’s influence is diluted. Singapore and U.S.–ROK alliance, but efforts to create a more fears of U.S. domination and prefer letting oth- Indonesia also welcome the inclusion of these oth- equal military relationship and to relocate U.S. ers take the initiative, at least publicly.) Relief ers. Where Americans see overlap and duplication troops out of downtown Seoul have created a operations after the tsunami in December 2004 of effort, Asians see safety valves. more sustainable political foundation for the and Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 also alliance. The United States has also upgraded demonstrated unparalleled U.S. capabilities to The U.S. Role its alliances with Australia, Thailand, and the employ military logistics capabilities to conduct Philippines and expanded security cooperation humanitarian relief operations halfway around The erosion of American influence in the with key Asian countries such as Indonesia, the world. U.S. Government agencies have exper- diplomacy of the Asia-Pacific region stems in Singapore, and India. tise, technology, and experience that can help
6 Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008 address critical nontraditional security chal- China, impose sanctions, or otherwise hinder this positive direction, the United States should lenges such as infectious disease, piracy, envi- China’s growth would meet stiff resistance in Asia. commit appropriately high-level officials, includ- ronmental degradation, and terrorism. U.S. non- The United States should welcome China’s ing the President, to the region every year to governmental organizations and private sector growing ability and willingness to make contribu- attend key regional meetings. The Department of actors can complement U.S. Government efforts. tions to security and stability in Asia. But it should State’s appointment of an Ambassador to ASEAN Along with Europe, the United States is also work more actively to ensure that China’s grow- is a step in the right direction, and the nomi- the final market for a high proportion of Asian ing regional influence does not begin to erode the nee should be expeditiously confirmed by the exports to China. America’s higher education foundations of the U.S. security presence. Such a Senate. But the appointment of an Ambassador system, job opportunities, management skills, tipping point would occur if U.S. political relation- is not enough. The next President should express entrepreneurship, services, technology, and pop- ships in the region deteriorated to the point where willingness to go to Asia to attend a U.S.–ASEAN ular culture are prize assets that could con- the United States could no longer rely on bases and summit, which the Bush administration can- vey greater influence if wielded more adroitly. other military assets to counter aggression. celled in 2007. Current skeptical views of the U.S. global role Toward this end, the United States needs In strategic terms, the Asia Pacific are balanced by a more positive appreciation of to engage more actively in regional diplomacy. Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) is a American capabilities to solve problems in Asia. Current risks are limited, but over time the trans-Pacific counterweight to ASEAN + 3. The A 2006 poll indicates that the United States is drift toward China, if unchecked, could reduce United States should energize its participation still viewed as the most influential country in American influence, call the rationale for U.S. in APEC and ensure that budgetary resources Asia and that majorities in China, India, and alliances into question, weaken Japan’s position, correspond to a renewed political commit- South Korea all see the United States as playing further isolate Taiwan, and constrain the inde- ment. Washington should coordinate closely a “very positive” or “somewhat positive” role in pendence of Southeast Asian countries. with Japan (which now views APEC more favor- resolving key problems in Asia.17 Over the last 2 years, American attention to ably than it did 5 years ago), South Korea, and Southeast Asia has revived and some construc- Australia. Washington should also support Recommendations tive initiatives have been proposed. But available APEC observer status for India. funds do not match ambition, and most of these Building on the Pacific Command’s Based on this analysis of China’s rising proposals are unknown outside of narrow bureau- record as a provider of security, the United influence and the U.S. position in the region, cratic circles. A combination of a few simple ini- States should propose enhanced multilateral we recommend a concerted effort to refocus tiatives and better public diplomacy “packaging” regional cooperation on nontraditional secu- and enhance American engagement with Asia. would help, but there is no substitute for high-level rity issues. Washington should pick issues The balance of power in East Asia is stable, but engagement and commitment. The United States that pose problems for both the United States the balance of influence is shifting in China’s must do a better job of translating its underlying and Asian governments where U.S. exper- direction. The latter balance is not zero-sum. power into influence. tise and resources can make real contribu- U.S. influence is declining relative to China, Although antiterrorism is a priority of tions, such as countering piracy, infectious but not in absolute terms. The United States Asian governments, Asian leaders face many disease, pollution, and even financial insta- will remain the strongest power in Asia for the other pressing problems. It is unrealistic to bility. These initiatives should be open to any indefinite future. China’s rising influence in expect the United States to turn away from Asian government that shares a sense that Asia does not threaten near- and medium-term the Middle East and the threat posed by inter- the particular issue is a problem and is will- U.S. interests. On the contrary: China’s eco- national terrorism. Nevertheless, Washington ing to work toward solutions. China should nomic openness, diplomatic flexibility, military should broaden its regional agenda, increase be invited to join. These initiatives should be restraint, and willingness to help deal with ter- its nonmilitary presence, make better use of pursued quietly and with consideration for rorism and other nontraditional threats con- its soft power resources, and become a more Asian sovereignty concerns to avoid putting tribute to peace and prosperity in the region. responsive and understanding listener. China (and others) on the spot. But over time, Uncertainty about China’s future political As a first step, the United States should sig- greater emphasis on nontraditional security evolution—and about whether the current pat- nal its renewed interest in and commitment to cooperation could make tangible contribu- tern of Chinese restraint will persist as it grows Southeast Asia by signing the Treaty of Amity tions to Asian (and American) security and stronger—complicates U.S. policy choices. Given add positive content to U.S. public diplomacy the uncertainties, a U.S. policy that encourages the United States in the region. China’s reform and constructive engagement in must do a better job of The United States needs to take more regional and world affairs while hedging against advantage of soft power resources as well as uncertainty is prudent and preferable to actions translating its underlying its economic and technological strengths. that stoke Chinese fears. Active U.S. engagement in power into influence Less burdensome visa requirements and the region—including continuation of U.S. alli- expanded opportunities to study in the United ances and the U.S. security presence—can help and Cooperation. Although the Asian integra- States would go a long way in reviving and encourage continued Chinese restraint and coop- tion movement has produced few tangible results projecting U.S. influence. More technical and erative behavior while discouraging aggression to date, the fact that the region remains at peace grassroots assistance in health and educa- and hostility. Conversely, U.S. efforts to “contain” and is stable cannot be discounted. To reinforce tion would be popular in Asia. Lower tariffs
No. 231, April 2008 Strategic Forum 7 on selected commodities and products from launched by the two sides will not always be University and the University of California, Berkeley, July developing Asia would help counter images of compatible, and other Asian governments will 21–22, 2006, table 5. 9 For a more complete discussion, see John growing U.S. protectionism. The aim should have their own ideas. But narrowing differ- Ravenhill, “China’s ‘Peaceful Development’ and Southeast be to translate the full range of U.S. capabil- ences, identifying common interests, and liv- Asia: A Positive Sum Game?” in China’s Rise and the ities into enduring influence that promotes ing with disagreement are what foreign policy Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh peace and prosperity in Asia and thereby is all about. Provided that Washington main- Press, 2007). advances U.S. long-term interests. tains a hedging strategy, remains prepared 10 Percentages are calculated from Chinese export statis- In order to provide an ongoing policy to counter military aggression, uses both its tics as reported in the UN Comtrade database. framework for these (and other) initiatives, reas- nonmilitary and military assets, and actively 11 Interview with economists at the Taiwan Institute of sure U.S. friends and allies in Asia, and keep the engages in regional diplomacy, the United Economic Research, Taipei, December 2005. 12 Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats, Major Trade support of Congress and the public, Washington States has everything to gain from a coopera- Trends in East Asia, Policy Research Working Paper 3084 needs to draw up a comprehensive, government- tive, comprehensive, and forward-looking stra- (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), tables 6.1 and 6.2. wide strategy toward Asia that integrates mili- tegic response to China’s new role in Asia. 13 Figures for 2007 are preliminary estimates from UNCTAD press release. Also see Thomas Fuller, “Southeast Asia tary and nonmilitary components of U.S. policy. Group Seeks to Accelerate a Trade Zone,” The New York Times, The last American East Asian regional security Notes August 23, 2006, C5. strategy was issued in 1998. Asia has changed 1 See David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the greatly since then. The time is ripe for a new Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2008), 3 (Winter 2004–2005), 64–99; and Yong Deng, “Reputation 32. The figures are a U.S. DOD estimate of total China defense- regional strategy that assesses Asia’s new strate- and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat related spending. gic landscape and derives appropriate U.S. goals. Theory,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign 15 Ibid. Such a strategy should identify the full Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: 16 Beijing complained in 2007 when several Southeast Asian spectrum of U.S. objectives in Asia—political, Stanford University Press, 2006), 186–214. countries tried to tighten inspections on Chinese goods due to food 2 economic, security, environmental, energy, For an overview of the Asian integration movement, see and product safety concerns, which may presage a less solicitous Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Chinese approach to the trade concerns of ASEAN countries. health, and humanitarian. It should attempt Rienner, 2008), chapters 6–9. 17 Chicago Council on Global Affairs, The United to weigh the tradeoffs between them, recon- 3 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China States and the Rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 cile them with other regional policies and and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport, CT: Multination Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago: Chicago Praeger Security International, 2007), 112. priorities, seek a better balance between U.S. Council on Global Affairs, 2006), 50–53. Percentages of those 4 Figures available at
8 Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008