COMMENTARY THE CLASH OF ‘NATIONS’ IN : REFLECTIONS ON THE GEZİ PARK INCIDENT

The Clash of ‘Nations’ in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park Incident

TAYFUN ATAY*

ABSTRACT This article argues that the devastating mass demonstra- tions triggered by a humble environmentalist in the Gezi Park of cannot be understood without taking into ac- count the notion of ‘culture’. The driving force behind the demon- strations, which turned into an extensive social outburst, is cul- tural and rooted in the worries of the secular people of the country about the shrinking ground of their lifestyle as a result of govern- ment pressures. What happened during the weeks of Gezi Park demonstrations was actually a reaction of these people to the ‘offi- cial’ trend of intensification toward religious morality in daily life and the public space.

“One cannot flatly deny the probabil- A group of sensitive environmental ity that there will arise two nations in activists took a stand against a recon- Turkey, one secular, the other Islamic. struction plan in Gezi Park, , The possibility of a violent confronta- sincerely for the sake of the trees. tion between these two clusters seems However, an overly aggressive and vi- distant but might become realistic in olent response to their peaceful the future.”1 resistance sparked an outrage, partic- ularly within the secular segments of Professor Şerif made the Turkish society against the religiously above spine-tingling prediction inspired authoritarian policies of the about the future of Turkey nearly 25 ruling Justice and Development Par- years ago, and he very well might feel ty (AK Party). These policies, clearly 2 that time has confirmed his warning. visible since 2011 when the AK Party * Professor Indeed, the recent social outburst in had its third subsequent electoral vic- of Social Anthropology Turkey, which stemmed from a small tory by taking nearly half of the votes, and Columnist park in İstanbul and spread to all ma- had long caused resentments among in jor cities of the country, has many these people, as they felt their non-re- Insight Turkey indications that it can be taken as a ligious (but not ‘irreligious’) lifestyle Vol. 15 / No. 3 / proof for Mardin’s ‘far-sightedness.’ was threatened. 2013, pp. 39-44

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People stand on the flashpoint in Istanbul In fact, the AK Party had come to this to be filled by the AK Party cadres during a wave of new point by following a very different – essentially, the Party replaced the alternative . path – one far from the recent au- Army! The AK Party moved away EPA thoritarian line. Its striking success in from being the leading force for civ- Turkey can be explained by its abili- il-plural democracy to being the ar- ty to convince many liberal-minded chitect in the construction of a new (surely, secular) people of its loyalty identity and culture in Turkey. Noth- to the principles of liberal democra- ing illustrates this change of orienta- cy. On this basis, it recruited consid- tion more perfectly than the words of erable support from the non-conser- Aziz Babuşçu, the provincial chair- vative segments of the society, among man of the AK Party for İstanbul, which were the liberal, leftist and who emphasized in a speech that the socialist circles, in its fight to defy second decade of the AK Party power the military-bureaucratic tutelage, would be a period of “construction.”3 particularly after the unsuccessful Small wonder then that some new attempt of military intervention on codes related to education, or at- April 27, 2007 (popularly called the tempts to bring new regulations over ‘e-coup’). very private matters such as abor- tion, alcohol consumption, and even The prosecutions, detainments, and public displays of affection, are all charges of a large number of military linked with this ‘will of construction.’ officials and civilians who were ac- No doubt, these new regulations all cused of planning a coup against the caused frustrations in the secular cir- AK Party government signaled the cles of the society. end of military-bureaucratic author- itarianism and a decisive turn toward These frustrations were deepened a genuine democratic setting. Alas, by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Er- the vacuum of left doğan’s personal views over these is- by the military bureaucracy seemed sues, which were manifested through

40 Insight Turkey THE CLASH OF ‘NATIONS’ IN TURKEY: REFLECTIONS ON THE GEZİ PARK INCIDENT

The main thrust of the demonstra- AK Party moved tions led by the ‘laicist elite’ in 2007 was political and ideological, aimed away from being the at ousting the AK Party government leading force for while favoring the establishment, then civil-plural democracy based on military tutelage. Howev- er, the driving force behind the re- to being the architect cent demonstrations is, as mentioned in the construction above, cultural and rooted in the wor- ries of the ‘secular masses’ about the of a new identity and shrinking ground of their lifestyle as a culture in Turkey result of government pressures. In fact, it would seem that the 2007 demon- strations have less in common with the ones started by the Gezi protests, his hardly popular exclamations: “We and are more comparable to the ones do not want a drunk youth,” and “Go, organized by the AK Party as a coun- drink at your home, not outside!” Or, terattack. Notwithstanding differences regarding the abundance of young in their connections with the opposite couples kissing and hugging in pub- poles of the sociopolitical spectrum, lic areas, “I don’t imagine any mother both sets of demonstrations share the who wants to see her daughter on the same context – that is, the context lap of a man.” of power. As in the case of the 2007 demonstrations called Cumhuriyet The devastating mass demonstrations Mitingleri (Rallies for the sake of the triggered by the Gezi Park incident Republic), the demonstrations orga- need to be evaluated with this back- nized by the AK Party and called Millî ground in mind. It otherwise will not İrade Mitingleri (Rallies for the sake of be easy to understand the rise of an the National Will) had the character- extensive social outburst from such a istics of ‘power mobilization.’ The fact humble environmentalist protest. Is that the former appealed to a minority isn’t useful to explain what happened while the latter to a majority, does not in terms of dirty games of outside make a difference in qualitative terms. forces (or, the so-called ‘interest-rate Further, as far as the AK Party is con- lobby’ of foreign investors); provoca- cerned, its principal figures that were tions by opposition parties; attempts once subject to coercive power in 2007 by illegal extremist groups; efforts by now appear as the practitioners of the remnants of ‘coup-seekers’ with power and coercion. And this brings their expectation of return to the an- them in line with the conduct of once cient regime of military tutelage; and, effective, but now overthrown, guard- finally, a last cry of ‘laicist’ national- ians of the regime of military tutelage. ists who were extremely active on the streets in the period preceding the By now, I have attempted to clarify e-coup of 2007. that the Gezi Park outburst was a re-

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sult of the desperation and helpless- middle and upper class urbanites ness the secular people of Turkey felt of secular orientation; the Alevis of under the increasingly authoritarian Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic origins; rule of the AK Party . These feelings and a considerable part of the nomi- were elevated by a perception that the nally Sunni Kurds leaning toward the government, particularly Prime Min- secular Peace and Democracy Party, ister Erdoğan, did not consider the whose political agenda is based on secular people a “decent” component defending the Kurdish identity and of society vis-à-vis the religious-con- the cultural rights of the Kurds. servative majority – whom he re- Be that as it may, the most significant and impressive portion of the partici- Only 10 percent of the pants in the demonstrations were the youth born in the 1990s. They can protesters said they were in be called “children of popular cul- Gezi Park for the trees. Ninety ture”, particularly to emphasize their percent of them expressed distance to politics. Popular culture most notably flourished in Turkey at that they were disturbed the turn of the 1990s with the intro- by and unhappy with the duction of private television channels authoritarian discourse and into society. Loosely speaking, being part of the culture of everyday life in attitude of Prime Minister an urban, capitalist, industrial set- Erdoğan, and were therefore ting, it is also organically connected with a secular space. in the streets and public squares Throughout this text, I prefer using the term ‘secular’ (seküler) instead of the more common Turkish term, laik- ferred to throughout the demonstra- lik (laicity, from laïcité in French). The tions as “the 50 percent,” the reins of reason for this is to draw a distinction whom, he added, were “hardly” held between a ‘culture’ and a ‘state (also by himself (implying that they would elitist) ideology’. In the Turkish sense, attack and harass the protesters). As the term laiklik has more resonance a matter of fact, all press conferences as an ideological stance relating to of- held by Erdoğan subsequently in ficial control over a religious culture. this process of unrest seemed to help Therefore, I refrain from using it and nothing, except to clarify the message turn to the term secular; etymolog- that he ceased to be the prime minis- ically derived from the Latin word ter of the whole country, but of those saecularis as an opposite to the term who “faithfully” supported him. ‘sacred’, it refers to ‘this-worldliness’ and offers a design, regulation, and In my opinion, the “unfaithful” in rule of human life without applying this context consist mainly of the a sacred procedure of any sort. What

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is at work here is not the termination lic squares. Eighty-five percent also or even limitation of religiosity, but agreed that there was an increasing rather, independence from it in daily interference of the government in life. people’s lives. The most pronounced motives of the participants in the What happened in Turkey during the surveys are freedom, democracy, and weeks of Gezi Park demonstrations pluralism, while the least common was a reaction of the secular-mind- include ideology, secret organiza- ed people – a significant portion of tions, or party affiliations. And, the whom were of the ‘90s generation – most dynamic element of the demon- to the ‘official’ trend of intensification strations was revealed to be young toward religious morality in daily life adults of the ‘90s generation.4 and the (secular) public space. One needs to emphasize, however, that Finally, one should also not overlook this was not a reaction against reli- the visibility of some members of the gion, nor does it mean that the youth secular bourgeoisie as another eco- of the ‘90s are nothing but irreligious nomically significant (albeit demo- delinquents plunged in immorali- graphically minor) part of the com- ty. Quite the contrary; these young plex composition of the protestors. adults seem to know very well how to The existence of such a component be sensitive with respect to religion. also explains, I think, the priority of Nothing demonstrates this more im- culture over ideological or economic pressively than their effort to create dynamics in the nature of the upris- a physical safety zone for the pious ing. Trade unions and leftist-social- participants in the Gezi Park protests ist movements rallied together with (the so-called ‘anti-capitalist Mus- these ‘capitalists’ throughout the lims’) in order to prevent them from demonstrations. The reason for this is any sudden attack of the police forces solely cultural – in other words, com- while they were praying. This is not ing together through a willingness to a generation that disregards religion, maintain the secular mode of life. rather a generation that is quite re- spectful of religion. The secular bourgeoisie of Turkey, connected with TÜSİAD (Associ- Some surveys conducted during the ation of Turkish Industrialists and protests to reveal the background of Businessmen), has long been disil- demonstrations confirm the points lusioned with the AK Party . This is put forward here. Only 10 percent of because the government deliberately the protesters said they were in Gezi promoted the newly emerged “Mus- Park for the trees. Ninety percent of lim bourgeoisie” of Turkey, who had them expressed that they were dis- been initiated by the Prime Minister turbed by and unhappy with the au- Turgut Özal in the 1980s but flour- thoritarian discourse and attitude of ished and turned much more influen- Prime Minister Erdoğan, and were tial under the AK Party. Represented therefore in the streets and pub- by the Islamist business association,

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MÜSİAD (Association of Indepen- them, without conflict, to follow both dent Industrialists and Businessmen)5 their fathers’ path to freedom and as a counterbalance to TÜSİAD, this progress and their grandfathers’ path religiously energized bourgeoisie to God.”7 cannot come to terms with its (sec- ular) ‘classmates’ in class interests.6 Considering the political perfor- Such is the ‘knot’: cultural conflict mance of the AK Party before 2011, does not give way to class alliance. one might have had full hope for the And these two bourgeois classes ap- creation of such a ‘workable compro- pear to support different national mise’ in Turkey. Yet, the experience ideals – one secular, the other - of the post-2011 period with the AK ic. Thus, Prof. Mardin’s remarks men- Party , particularly with the unfor- tioned in the beginning of this article, tunate course of events surrounding in which he envisioned Turkey split- Gezi Park, tempt one to conclude that ting into two nations about 25 years this hope was just in vain. ago, also makes sense in this context. If we bring to mind that at the core of a nation lies the bourgeois dynamic, Endnotes the culturally divided capitalist class 1. Şerif Mardin, “Culture and Religion: Towards the in Turkey might indeed fuel tenden- Year 2000,” in Turkish Political Science Associa- cies of separation into two distinct tion, Turkey in the Year 2000 (, 1989), p. 185. national entities. 2. The actual focus of Mardin’s projection was the growth of religiosity in Turkey in the 1980s, a phe- nomenon not unconnected with the worldwide I conclude this paper with another effect of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. quote from a much earlier, yet also 3. Cited by Özgür Mumcu, “Alternatif Erdoğan seminal, work of Prof. Bernard Lewis. gerçekliği”, Radikal, June 17, 2013. In his book, The Emergence of Mod- ern Turkey, Lewis also brought to 4. I use the survey results quoted in Radikal (“Dire- nişçilerin portresi: Gencim, özgürlükçüyüm, Baş- our attention the possibility of a cul- bakan’a kızgınım!”), June 5, 2013. See also Eyüp tural confrontation in Turkey, which Can, “Kim bu Geziciler?”, Radikal, June 15, 2013. appears as a similar version of the 5. It is quite popular in Turkey to argue that the ‘M’ one introduced by Mardin nearly 30 in the acronym, although representing müstakil, years later. The prediction made by which means independent in Turkish, does actu- Lewis, however, includes a sense of ally imply ‘Muslim.’ optimism: 6. As an extensive, but also clear-cut account of this new, ‘Islamic’ capitalist class in Turkey, see Gül Berna Özcan and Hasan Turunç, “Economic Lib- “The Turkish people, by the exercise eralization and Class Dynamics in Turkey”: New of their practical common sense and Business Groups and Islamic Mobilization,” Insight powers of improvisation, may yet find Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2011), p. 63-86. a workable compromise between Is- 7. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey lam and modernism that will enable (: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 424.

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