The Broiler Industry
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A publication of the Agricultural & Applied The magazine of food, farm, and resource issues Economics Association 2nd Quarter 2015 • 30(2) The Broiler Industry: Competition and Policy Challenges Tomislav Vukina and Xiaoyong Zheng JEL Classification: L11, L66 Keywords: Merger and Acquisition, Competition, Production Contracts The U.S. broiler industry is considered the role model of facilities, whereas the contract payments are determined in industrialized agriculture. Vertically integrated companies an oligopsony setting—with relatively few buyers—where control all stages from breeding flocks and hatcheries to the processing plants compete on the regional markets for grow out, processing, and marketing. They typically run contract growers. Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006) has their operations through smaller divisions found through- established a relationship between oligopsony power and out the country, but mainly in the South and Southeast. hold-up in the poultry industry. Hold-up is central to the The finishing stage (final stage of production where one- theory of incomplete contracts. It arises when part of the day-old chicks are brought to the farm and grown to return on a grower’s relationship-specific investment can market weight) as well as the production of hatching eggs be ex-post appropriated by the integrator. They empirically (broiler breeder operations) rely almost entirely on con- showed that the severity of the contract growers’ under- tracts with independent growers. In 2012, almost 97% investment problem, as a defense against hold-up by an op- of broiler chickens were raised under contracts. The main portunistic integrator, is a function of the number of inte- reason why the processors became the coordinators of the grators in the area. The stronger the competition for grower industry is because a large proportion of the value added services—that is, the larger the number of companies of- is in the processing. In addition, significant economies of fering contracts—the smaller the hold-up problem. Con- scale are likely to cause ever-increasing industry concen- sequently, with less hold-up, the number of chicken houses tration. This concentration coupled with restructuring oc- the grower is willing to invest in is closer to the efficient curred either via replacing of existing plants with fewer, number. The efficient number is the number that would larger and more efficient ones, or via reorganization and result if the integrator and the grower were to vertically consolidation of assets of existing firms into more efficient integrate. MacDonald and Key (2012) has documented configurations, or both. that in highly concentrated local markets, poultry integra- Although the consequences of mergers and acquisition tors can exercise some monopsony power. Specifically, they in the poultry industry—such as on productivity, employ- showed that, in markets with a single integrator, growers ment and wages, input and output prices and margins— received about 8% lower fees and growers in markets with have been considered in the literature (Weng, Vukina, and two or three integrators received 4% lower fees compared Zheng, 2014), comparatively little has been written on to growers in markets with 4 or more integrators. the direct impact of industry concentration on contract growers’ welfare, including the number of growers and Industry Dynamics and Structure their earnings. The number of contract growers is deter- In the last couple of decades, the increase in the broiler in- mined by the firms’ strategic decisions about varying the dustry output in the United States came from the increased aggregate production volume and the scale of processing number of chickens grown and especially from the increase ©1999–2015 CHOICES. All rights reserved. Articles may be reproduced or electronically distributed as long as attribution to Choices and the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association is maintained. Choices subscriptions are free and can be obtained through http://www.choicesmagazine.org. 1 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2015 • 30(2) AAEA-0415-585 has been rather uneven. As a matter Table 1: Top-15 Firm Rank and Total Number of Processing Plants Owned by of fact, in post-2008, the production Top 15, 1997 to 2013 stagnated and even decreased in some years such that the industry growth in Company Name 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 1997 2008-2013 period amounted to only about 0.4% per year on average. Tyson Foods 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 Pilgrim’s Pride 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 During the same period, the broil- er industry has become more con- Sanderson Farms 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 5 6 7 11 centrated. Industry concentration is Perdue Farms 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 3 typically measured by considering the Koch Foods 5 5 7 5 5 9 9 9 15 15 13 14 market share of the top-4 and top-8 Wayne Farms 6 7 5 6 6 5 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 firms in the industry as well as a more complex Herfindahl-Hirschman Mountaire Farms 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 Index (HHI) (Table 3). The indus- Peco Foods 8 8 8 10 11 11 13 12 9 10 15 try’s top-4-firms concentration ratio House of Raeford Farms 9 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 10 11 10 11 increased from 40.9% in 1997 to Foster Farms 10 10 10 9 10 10 11 10 8 8 8 10 9 57.9% in 2013, with a peak of 60.1% in 2012. During the same time pe- George’s 11 12 12 15 15 14 12 13 12 13 12 12 riod, the top-8-firms concentration Keystone Foods 12 11 11 11 9 8 8 8 ratio increased from 53.1% in 1997 Case Foods 13 14 to 79.3% in 2013, with a peak of Amick Farms 14 13 14 80.7% in 2012. For comparison pur- O.K. Foods 15 15 13 12 12 10 11 11 9 11 15 15 poses, the rest of the meat complex in the U.S. is even more concentrated Fieldale Farms 13 14 13 13 14 14 14 12 14 13 13 with beef and pork industries’ con- Simmons Foods 15 12 14 15 centration ratios exceeding that of the Allen Family Foods 15 broiler industry. In 2007, the 4-firm Townsends 15 12 concentration ratio of beef packers was 83.5% and of pork packers 66%, Gold Kist 3 3 3 2 2 compared to only 59.5% for broilers Cagle’s 13 14 9 9 8 (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2007). ConAgra Poultry 4 5 The entire studied period, and Wampler Foods 14 especially the post-2008 period, was Seaboard Farms 10 characterized by a significant number Choctaw Maid Farms of bankruptcies and intense merger and acquisition activity. The melt- Hudson Foods 6 down of the financial services sector Total # of Plants by Top-15 and high corn prices were mostly to Firms blame. For example, in 1998, Tyson “Note: Number of plants specific to companies is available from the authors upon request. Foods, Inc. and Hudson Foods Com- Source: Watt Poultry USA, various issues. pany merged. The same year Peterson Farms, Inc. was acquired by Sim- mons Foods, Inc. In 2000, Seaboard in their slaughter weights. At the 1997 (Table 2). However, during the Farms, Inc. was acquired by ConAgra same time, the increase in the number 1997-2013 time period, the produc- Poultry Company and in 2002 BC of slaughter and processing plants was tion grew from 27.3 billion pounds Rogers Poultry, Inc. was acquired only modest. Table 1 lists the rank of of ready to cook (RTC) chicken meat by Koch Foods, Inc. Most acquiring the top-15 firms in the industry from to 37.8 billion pounds—a 38.5% in- firms were larger while most acquired 1997 to 2013. The total number of crease. The average RTC processed firms were smaller. The exception to plants owned by these firms increased weight increased by 26%. This phe- this is Gold Kist who was No. 3 when only slightly, from 124 in 1997 to 127 nomenon is largely demand driven it was acquired by Pilgrim’s Pride in 2013. The total number of chick- and occurred in response to con- Corporation who was then No. 2. ens slaughtered in 2013 was 8.5 bil- sumer preferences for white (breast) Pilgrim’s sent an unsolicited proposal lion, an increase of only 10.4% from meat. During this period, the growth 2 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2015 • 30(2) to Gold Kist offering to purchase all Table 2: Number of Chicken Slaughtered and Ready-to-cook (RTC) Chicken of the outstanding shares for $20.00 Meat Produced from 1997 to 2003 per share in cash on August 18, 2006. Average RTC Chicken Meat RTC Chicken Meat Produced # of Chicken Slaughtered The agreement was reached on De- Year Produced per Slaughtered (Million Pounds) (Million Heads) cember 4, 2006 at the price of $1 Head (Pound) higher than Pilgrims’ initial offer. The 2013 37830.2 8530.75 4.45 Pilgrim’s Pride’s case is compelling: 2012 37309.4 8429 4.39 after a series of aggressive acquisi- 2011 37202.5 8537.64 4.36 tions (Wampler Foods Inc. in 2001, 2010 36909.8 8649.34 4.27 ConAgra Poultry Co. in 2003, and 2009 35510.3 8519.97 4.17 Gold Kist in 2006), Pilgrim’s filed for 2008 36906.3 8921.07 4.14 Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 2007 36159.1 8903.07 4.06 on December 1, 2008, because of the 2006 35499.6 8837.54 4.02 deterioration of poultry pricing com- 2005 35364.8 8853.81 3.99 bined with an increase in input costs 2004 33745.8 8663.38 3.9 and the company’s lack of liquidity 2003 32749 8536.87 3.84 to withstand the downturn.