OCTOBER 2009 VOL. 81 | NO. 8 JournalNEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
The Modernized, Streamlined Contract
Electronic Contracts Also in this Issue and Signatures – Redux E-Discovery Why Arbitrate? by Bran Noonan Navigating in PowerPoint 866-FUNDS- NOW
Pre-Settlement Finance BESTSELLERS FROM THE NYSBA BOOKSTORE
October 2009
Construction Site Personal Injury New York Lawyer’s Deskbook, NEW! Litigation — New York Labor Law Second Edition (2008–2009) The Practice of Criminal Law under §§ 200, 240(1), 241(6) (2008 Revision) WINNER OF THE ABA’S CONSTABAR AWARD the CPLR and Related Civil Procedure Perhaps no single scheme of statutory causes of action The Second Edition consists of 27 chapters, each Statutes, Fifth Edition has initiated more debate. This text provides a road covering a different area of practice that provides A book that pulls together the rules and provi- map through this at-times confusing area of law. advice within that particular area of law. PN: 4150 / Member $250 / List $325 / 2,490 pages sions of law not covered in NY’s CPL or Penal Law. Includes a summary of key case developments. PN: 40698 / Member $45 / List $55 / 206 pages PN: 4047 / Member $80 / List $110 / 480 pages New York Lawyer’s Formbook, Second Edition (2008–2009) Debt Collection and the Enforcement Medical Malpractice in New York, The Formbook is a companion volume to the Third Edition of Money Judgments, Second Edition New York Lawyer’s Deskbook and includes 21 This book provides advanced insight into many sections, each covering a different area of practice. (2008) aspects of the trial of a medical malpractice case. PN: 4155 / Member $250 / List $325 / 3,256 pages Monetary awards determined in court cases involve PN: 41309 / Member $95 / List $125 / 654 pages an array of procedures that attorneys must know. The new second edition, under the editorship of Paul A. New York State Physician’s New York Residential Landlord-Tenant Peters, not only updates case and statutory law but also HIPAA Privacy Manual FFormsorms oonn CDCD Law and Procedure (2008–2009) addresses new issues within this field, providing in-depth A hands-on tool for health care providers New York residential landlord-tenant law is topical analyses. and their legal counsel, this publication daunting to newcomers and the experienced alike. PN: 40308 / Member $125 / List $170 / 548 pages provides guidance for a physician’s office This monograph introduces the fundamentals of to respond to routine, everyday inquiries residential landlord-tenant law and offers a guide Foundation Evidence, Questions and about protected health information. to the procedural mechanics practitioners face in PN: 4167 / Member $75 / List $95 / 288 pages Courtroom Protocols, Second Edition landlord-tenant disputes. (2009) PN: 4169 / Member $72 / List $80 / 108 pages The second edition, along with its collection of Practitioner’s Handbook for forms and protocols, has four new chapters: Pro Se Appeals to the Court of Appeals, Public Sector Labor and Employment Defendants, Courtroom Closure, Burdens of Proof Third Edition Law, Third Edition (2009 Supplement) and Summations. This new edition updates topics on taking and PN: 41078 / Member $50 / List $60 / 172 pages This landmark text has been revised to include perfecting criminal and civil appeals, alternative recent developments in case and statutory law that procedures for selected appeals, and how to write Impasse Resolution (2008) are useful to practitioners representing public sector and present the appeal. employees, unions or management. This publication provides both an overview and PN: 4017 / Member $48 / List $57 / 234 pages PN: 42057 / Member $150 / List $185 / 1,550 pages in-depth discussion of the impasse resolution proce- dures under the Public Employees Fair Employment Real Estate Titles, Third Edition Act, commonly known as the Taylor Law. The Plaintiff’s Personal Injury Action An all-time bestseller, this edition is edited by James M. in New York State PN: 4122 / Member $30 / List $40 / 124 pages Pedowitz, Esq., a nationally renowned expert in real This treatise answers the tough questions faced by estate law and title insurance, and authored by some the plaintiff’s personal injury attorney every day – Legal Careers in New York State of the most distinguished practitioners in the field. It’s liens, special needs trusts, structures, Medicare and Government, Ninth Edition (2008) an essential guide to the many complex subjects sur- Medicaid, conflicts of interest, workers’ compensa- For law students and lawyers considering careers rounding real estate law. tion, no-fault, bankruptcy, representing a party in and/or work experiences in public service with the PN: 521007 / Member $150 / List $180 / 1,632 pages infancy, incompetency and wrongful death. State of New York, this expanded edition includes PN: 4181 / Member $175 / List $225 / 1,734 pages comprehensive information on employment NYSBA Practice Forms on FFormsorms opportunities with the various levels of state CD-ROM—2008–2009 oonn CCDD government. Access nearly 800 forms for use in PN: 41298 / Member $30 / List $50 / 264 pages daily practice. PN: 61509 / Member $280 / List $315 Model Partnership Agreements (2009) Here is a guide for solo and small-firm practitioners who wish to establish a partnership or other business form, or to formalize relationships in a law practice that has no formal structure. PN: 41358 / Member $50 / List $60 / 142 pages
Expand your professional knowledge 1.800.582.2452 www.nysba.org/pubs Mention Code: PUB0568 Free shipping and handling within the continental U.S. The cost for shipping and handling outside the continental U.S. will be added to your order. Prices do not include applicable sales tax. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION JournalNEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
BOARD OF EDITORS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF David C. Wilkes Tarrytown e-mail: [email protected] Mary Grace Conneely Monticello Philip H. Dixon Albany Elissa D. Hecker Irvington Jonathan Lippman New York City Eileen D. Millett New York City Gary A. Munneke White Plains Thomas E. Myers Syracuse John B. Nesbitt Lyons Gary D. Spivey Colorado Springs, Colorado Sharon L. Wick Buffalo MANAGING EDITOR Daniel J. McMahon Albany e-mail: [email protected] ASSOCIATE EDITOR Philip C. Weis Oceanside
My membership with the New York State Bar Association has brought me PUBLISHER many useful benefits like networking—including interacting with judges, Patricia K. Bucklin Executive Director participating in CLE, and making life-long friends. I highly recommend membership in the NYSBA to all attorneys. NYSBA PRODUCTION STAFF ASSISTANT EDITOR Joan Fucillo DESIGN Stephen P. Younger Lori Herzing NYSBA member since 1983 Erin Corcoran EDITORIAL OFFICES One Elk Street Albany, NY 12207 (518) 463-3200 FAX (518) 463-8844 www.nysba.org
ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVE Network Media Partners Renew today for 2010. Bruce Tackett Executive Plaza 1, Suite 900 www.nysba.org/renew2010 11350 McCormick Road Hunt Valley, MD 21031 (410) 584-1960 Thank you for your membership support. e-mail: [email protected]
EUGENE C. GERHART (1912 – 2007) Editor-in-Chief, 1961–1998 CONTENTS OCTOBER 2009
20 Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings BY EDNA SUSSMAN
DEPARTMENTS 5 President’s Message 8 CLE Seminar Schedule 18 Burden of Proof BY DAVID PAUL HOROWITZ 26 Planning Ahead BY ILENE S. COOPER AND ROBERT M. HARPER 30 Point of View BY BRADLEY D. KAY 36 Arbitration BY PAUL BENNETT MARROW THE MODERNIZED, 40 Presentation Skills for Lawyers BY ROBERT LANE AND BRUCE A. OLSON STREAMLINED 44 E-Discovery CONTRACT BY STEVEN C. BENNETT 48 Attorney Professionalism Forum Electronic Contracts and 53 Language Tips BY GERTRUDE BLOCK Signatures – Redux 54 New Members Welcomed BY BRAN NOONAN 60 Classified Notices 60 Index to Advertisers 10 63 2009–2010 Officers 64 The Legal Writer BY GERALD LEBOVITS
CARTOONS © CARTOONRESOURCE.COM
The Journal welcomes articles from members of the legal profession on subjects of interest to New York State lawyers. Views expressed in articles or letters published are the authors’ only and are not to be attributed to the Journal, its editors or the Association unless expressly so stated. Authors are responsible for the correctness of all citations and quotations. Contact the editor-in-chief or managing editor for submission guidelines. Material accepted by the Association may be published or made available through print, film, electronically and/or other media. Copyright © 2009 by the New York State Bar Association. The Journal ((ISSN 1529-3769 (print), ISSN 1934-2020 (online)), official publication of the New York State Bar Association, One Elk Street, Albany, NY 12207, is issued nine times each year, as follows: January, February, March/April, May, June, July/ August, September, October, November/December. Single copies $20. Periodical postage paid at Albany, NY and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes per USPS edict to: One Elk Street, Albany, NY 12207.
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 3
PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE MICHAEL E. GETNICK
Social Media: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
or law firms promoting their speak. When in doubt, don’t say any- practices and attorneys selling thing. Remember that anything you Ftheir skills, social media sites like post should be considered permanent LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter can be and searchable; it can be copied, pasted essential tools. In fact, our Lawyers in and e-mailed to a wide audience. Transition Committee recently spon- Attorneys using social media sored a free Webinar on the benefits of also can run afoul of the Rules of social networking in the down econo- Professional Conduct. Anecdotally, I my.1 The “good”: In a time where we have heard of instances where attor- are all concerned about the bottom neys were communicating with their line, social media can be an attractive clients through Facebook, and these requirement of posting a disclaimer. I marketing tool due to its relatively posts were ultimately read by oppos- am certain that the use of social media low cost. Social media can open many ing counsel. Rule 1.6 provides that implicates other Rules, but I do not doors for your practice, but there can “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly reveal have the space to note them all in this also be the opposite result. confidential information” without the column. A judge shared with me a story of client’s informed consent. There is no It’s worth noting that a client’s use one attorney in a case before her who expectation of privacy on Facebook, of social media can also pose problems. claimed her inability to appear in court and attorney-client communications I recommend counseling clients against was due to a death in the family. The on networking sites such as Facebook discussing their cases with friends and attorney’s Facebook page told another certainly are at risk for revealing privi- relatives through social media. If your story. Rather than meeting her profes- leged or confidential information. clients are active on social media, it sional obligations, the attorney had Other Rules come to mind. Per Rule may be a good idea to read what spent the week drinking and party- 3.3, a lawyer appearing before a tri- they are posting. Electronic postings ing, and then shared her escapades bunal cannot “engage in undignified are increasingly becoming evidence in online. This extreme example of social or discourteous conduct” or conduct divorce and child custody matters.2 In media exposing misconduct certainly “intended to disrupt the tribunal.” one case, a mother’s posting that she falls into the “bad” category. But there So, avoid tweeting in court, and be was single and had no children was are other, more subtle, ways to get in careful that your communications do used against her to indicate her lack trouble online. not disparage the judge or opposing of honesty.3 Lawyers also are using Although the law in this area is counsel. Rule 3.6 covers trial public- social networking sites as evidence new, it is rapidly growing. I have heard ity and provides that lawyers shall in personal injury actions. In one sce- that persons posting allegedly defama- not make an extrajudicial statement nario, a client litigating a personal tory statements on Twitter about topics that will be disseminated by means of injury action, wherein he claimed that ranging from apartments to clothing public communication – which argu- injuries prevented him from having an are finding themselves named defen- ably includes blogs, Twitter, Facebook active social life, posted information dants in libel suits. Status updates on and the like – that could materially on Facebook indicating that he hosted Facebook and Twitter are supposedly prejudice an adjudicative proceeding parties and attended weekend outings intended to be real-time reports on in the matter. In addition, the rules at summer cabins.4 At the very least what you are thinking, feeling and related to advertising and testimonials that’s “ugly.” doing. However, publishing a negative also come into play. While LinkedIn is Finally, those in law school and not statement without first contemplating a credible, professional networking site yet admitted to the bar should be espe- the consequences could get you into and a great way to increase your client serious trouble. Even with something base, to be safe, I suggest testimonials as modern as social media, the old posted on your profile by your clients MICHAEL E. GETNICK can be reached at adage remains true: Think before you should follow Rule 7.1 – including the [email protected].
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 5 PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE cially careful about what items they Bar has more than 20 blogs written by a pitfalls, especially for lawyers. The post – and also what their friends post diverse group – from solo practitioners wise practitioner will learn to balance about them. Pictures, video and even to a struggling law school graduate privacy and confidentiality if seeking words can all come back to haunt to experts in various fields of law. A to maintain a robust professional pres- you during your character and fitness wealth of information is available to ence online. ■ evaluation. And, the content remains you at www.nysba.org/blogs. You can out there, waiting for would-be follow us on Twitter at www.twitter. 1. This and the other valuable Lawyers in Transition programs are free to download at www. employers to discover. Recent gradu- com/nysba, where we often post our nysba.org/lawyersintransition. ates are having enough difficulty in press releases and other news items. 2. See http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family the current job market. Be careful that We also have a growing following on _law/2009/06/facebook-divorce.html (last visited your social media activity does not LinkedIn. Join our group of nearly Aug. 31, 2009). create a black cloud over your record 1,000 individuals at www.nysba.org/ 3. See Belinda Luscombe, Facebook and Divorce: Airing the Dirty Laundry, Time, June 22, 2009 avail- of achievements. LinkedIn, where you will find discus- able at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ Cautions aside, it is no surprise sions, news and job postings. article/0,9171,1904147,00.html (last visited Aug. 31, that more and more attorneys and law Social media can be a wonderful 2009). firms are using social media, which marketing tool for attorneys who take 4. See http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland- labrador/story/2009/05/11/facebook-lawsuit- provide an easy and efficient way for the time to learn how to use it effec- cp-511.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). us to stay connected to each other and tively. Like any other form of com- to cutting-edge information. The State munication, social media can have
LPM Online CLE Programs Now Available!
Get a Jump on Your MCLE Credits for the rest of 2009 and beyond with the following online programs. Online programs are downloadable to your MP3 player—saving you time, money and travel expenses. Practice Management and the New Rules of Professional Conduct Internet Marketing for Law Firms Boosting the Bottom Line When the Economy Tanks Twittering, Linking, Posting & Friending: Legal Implications of Social Networking Help Clients Find You: Simple Tools to Improve Your Web Presence
For more information or to purchase these programs please visit www.nysba.org/2009lpmonlineprograms. Or call toll free 1-800-582-2452
6 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal
NYSBACLE Tentative Schedule of Fall Programs (Subject to Change)
The New York State Bar Association Has Been Certified by the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board as an Accredited Provider of Continuing Legal Education in the State of New York.
No Fault – What You Need to Know in New York Handling Tough Issues in a Plaintiff’s Personal October 14 Long Island Injury Case November 5 Rochester Public Utility Law November 13 Buffalo; New York City October 16 Albany November 20 Albany; Long Island Medical Malpractice New York Appellate Practice October 16 Syracuse November 5 Long Island November 4 Long Island November 13 Westchester November 6 Buffalo December 3 New York City November 18 Rochester November 19 Albany; New York City Henry Miller – The Trial November 6 Albany Practical Skills: Intro to Estate Planning October 19 New York City Protecting Your Practice – Risk Management for October 20 Albany; Buffalo; Long Island; the Solo and Small Firm Rochester; Syracuse; Westchester (1:00 pm – 5:00 pm) November 9 Albany Update – 2009 (live program) November 16 Long Island October 23 Syracuse November 18 Buffalo; New York City October 30 New York City Practical Skills: Purchases and Sales of Homes Practicing Matrimonial and Family Law November 10 Albany; Buffalo; Long Island; in Chaotic Economic Times New York City; Rochester; (9:00 am – 12:45 pm) Syracuse; Westchester October 23 Buffalo November 6 Long Island Securities Arbitration November 20 Syracuse November 12 New York City December 4 Albany December 11 New York City Ethics and Professionalism (9:00 am – 12:35 pm) Limited Liability Companies November 12 New York City (9:00 am – 1:00 pm) November 13 Albany; Syracuse October 27 Westchester November 17 Long Island December 1 New York City November 20 Westchester December 2 Albany December 1 Buffalo December 4 Buffalo December 8 Rochester Using PowerPoint at Trial †Update – 2009 (video replays) November 4 New York City November 13 Albany; Rochester November 18 Binghamton Representing Licensed Professionals November 19 Ithaca; Long Island; Saratoga (9:00 am – 1:00 pm) November 20 Canton; Utica; Watertown November 5 New York City December 2 Buffalo; Suffern November 12 Albany December 3 Plattsburgh November 19 Syracuse December 4 Jamestown; Poughkeepsie December 3 Long Island December 10 Corning; Westchester December 11 Loch Sheldrake Foreclosure and Other Receiverships (half-day program) November 13 New York City (1:00 pm – 3:45 pm) November 20 Rochester (9:00 am – 11:45 am)
† Does not qualify as a basic level course and, therefore, cannot be used by newly admitted attorneys for New York MCLE credit. NYSBA’s CLE Online ONLINE | iPod | MP3 PLAYER
The Contested Accounting Proceeding in Bringing CLE to you... Surrogate’s Court: The Law and Techniques You Should Know anywhere, anytime. November 17 Buffalo November 20 Westchester December 1 Syracuse All online programs available in December 3 Albany December 8 Long Island MP3 format to download to your December 10 New York City iPod or other MP3 player December 11 Rochester Practical Skills: Civil Practice – The Trial NYSBA is proud to present the most flexible, November 18 Albany; Buffalo; Long Island; “on demand” CLE solutions you could ask for. New York City; Syracuse; Westchester With CLE Online, you can now get the valuable †Corporate Counsel Institute professional learning you’re after (two-day program) ...at your convenience. November 19–20 New York City > Get the best NY-specific content from the †Seventh Annual Sophisticated state’s #1 CLE provider. Trusts and Estates Institute (two-day program) > Take “Cyber Portable” courses from your November 19–20 New York City laptop, at home or at work, via the Internet. Construction Site Accidents > Download CLE Online programs to your iPod November 20 Buffalo or MP3 player. December 4 Albany; Long Island December 11 New York City; Syracuse > Everything you need to obtain full MCLE credit is included online! Finding the Bottom Line – Rights of People With Disabilities in New York State December 1 Rochester December 4 New York City December 9 Albany Hot Topics in Elder Law December 2 Albany; New York City December 4 Rochester December 9 Westchester December 10 Long Island Advanced Real Estate Practice Come click for CLE credit at: December 14 New York City www.nysbaCLEonline.com †Estate Planning (video replay) January 22 Jamestown Features Electronic Notetaking allows you to take notes while listen- ing to your course, cut-and-paste from the texts and access To register notes later – (on any computer with Internet access). or for more information call toll free Audio Seminars complement the onscreen course texts. 1-800-582-2452 You control the pace, and you can “bookmark” the audio at any point. In Albany and surrounding areas dial (518) 463-3724 Bookmarking lets you stop your course at any point, then Or fax your request to (518) 487-5618 pick up right where you left off – days, even weeks later. www.nysba.org/CLE MCLE Credit can be obtained easily once you’ve completed (Note: As a NYSBA member, you’ll receive the course – the form is part of the program! Just fill a substantial discount) it out and mail it in for your MCLE certificate. The Modernized, Streamlined Contract
Electronic Contracts and Signatures – Redux
By Bran Noonan BRAN NOONAN ([email protected]) is a senior associate at Martin Clearwater & Bell LLP. He earned his law degree from New York Law School and his undergraduate degree from the University of Arizona.
s with everything else in the digital age, the in Law: New Frontiers in Property and Contract.”2 The hallowed handwritten and signed document is author warned that the rapidly expanding digital world Abeing reduced to relic status. Today, transact- would present new legal challenges as electronic trans- ing electronically has become the norm rather than the actions began to replace those executed on paper. As a exception. Nearly any type of contract can be drafted and result, the author urged legislatures and courts to reex- executed electronically. Scores of legal documents, such amine and adapt the law to the broadening electronic as tax forms and trademark applications, are completed, form. Consumers and businesses would need laws to signed, and submitted electronically. Checks are gradu- instill confidence in the integrity and validity of the ally becoming a thing of the past as more and more insti- electronic medium. Four years later, in 2000, the Journal tutions accept automatic account withdrawal programs. published “Wide Use of Electronic Signatures Awaits Even parking tickets, once known for their illegibility, are Market Decisions About Their Risks and Benefits,” which no longer handwritten. explored the potential effects of the then newly passed The electronic medium, at a minimum, expedites federal electronic signatures legislation on transactions.3 and modernizes commercial and business transac- This article addresses how the law has responded and tions, allowing parties to enter into them instantly progressed since those articles, focusing specifically on and effortlessly. Consider a magazine publishing com- the validity and construction of e-contracts. pany that, for example, must enter into work-for-hire For all intents and purposes, electronic contracts agreements with freelance writers on a monthly basis. are equal to their handwritten paper brethren. Current The electronic medium allows each party to negotiate federal and New York State statutes and common law terms and execute the agreement from the comfort of purportedly permit parties to execute a wide range of their own offices. Neither side has to expend time or contracts and transactions electronically and to utilize money meeting in person or waiting for documents to electronic signatures to indicate mutual and valid con- arrive by mail. And by simplifying and streamlining sent. At the end of the day, courts primarily concentrate the editing and review process, the electronic medium on whether or not an e-contract is properly constructed, improves the quality of a document and by extension rather than on the validity of the medium itself. The the transaction itself. design of an e-contract raises unique issues, such as the Since the emergence of the Internet, the New York effect of hyperlinks in contracts, which are absent from State Bar Association Journal has published two note- paper contracts. Interestingly, courts look to traditional worthy articles on the subject of electronic transactions.1 contract law principles, such as sufficient notice of In June 1996, the Journal published “Information Age terms, to resolve design and construction concerns.
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 11 substantial economic effect on interstate commerce even when viewed in the aggregate. In Morrison, the Court invalidated the Violence Against Women Act for similar reasons. Declining to resolve the constitutional question, the McFarlan court, instead, merely contemplated how far Congress could actually step beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause in an effort to provide a better, uniform nationwide rule. At any rate, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich10 may have rendered this issue moot. There, appearing to distance itself from Lopez and Morrison, the Court upheld the validity of the Controlled Substance Act under the Commerce Clause insofar as it prohibited the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana. The trial court in McFarlan also suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Printz v. United States11 raised a second constitutional problem with E-Sign. In The Federal E-Sign Law Printz, the Court held unconstitutional provisions in the Congress adopted the Electronic Signatures in Global Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required and National Commerce Act, commonly referred to as states to conduct background checks before allowing gun “E-Sign,” on June 30, 2000. Section 7001, title 15 of the purchases. According to the Court, the federal govern- U.S. Code states in pertinent part that ment is prohibited from commandeering state processes with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or bodies to achieve federal purposes. In McFarlan, the or foreign commerce: 1) a signature, contract, or other state court considered E-Sign’s applicability to a second record relating to such transaction may not be denied police printout of computer-generated photos of the legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it defendant. According to the court, E-Sign “expressly is in electronic form; and 2) a contract relating to such preempts state law” with respect to all records kept by transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or state or local agencies.12 While E-Sign presumably would enforceability solely because an electronic signature or not cover the police record, however, because it did not 4 electronic record was used in its formation. arise out of a commercial transaction,13 the court argued, A transaction under E-Sign consists of “an action or set somewhat cryptically, that a rule imposed upon a state of actions relating to the conduct of business, consumer, that regulates only those records used in commerce “is in or commercial affairs between two or more persons.”5 the real world a rule imposing the [statute] on such state’s Section 7003 does, however, exclude certain transactions records for all purposes.”14 The court dismissed the idea from its coverage, namely, those traditionally governed that a state statute regulating non-transactional govern- by state law, such as insurance polices, rental agreements, ment records might coexist with E-Sign, concluding that and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) transactions. a federal rule that regulates all state records “may well Federal courts have never addressed the constitu- constitute a violation of the rule against commandeering tionality of E-Sign. While the act covers “any transaction the activities of a state to achieve a federal purpose.”15 in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,”6 it does Putting aside whether the analysis flows logically, this not explicitly indicate which types of intrastate transac- conclusion is a rather expansive interpretation of Printz. tions are “in” or will “affect” interstate commerce and Accepting the validity of an e-record is unlikely the type come under the purview of the act. Since its adoption, of hijacked processes the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned one state court has raised doubts about the legitimacy in Printz. Nevertheless, no published case has ever cited of the act. In People v. McFarlan,7 a New York state trial McFarlan or questioned the constitutionality of E-Sign. court questioned whether or not Congress, in its attempt The implication is, at the very least, that the act has been to give E-Sign the broadest scope constitutionally pos- widely accepted. A constitutional challenge would in fact sible, would find the statute under judicial scrutiny in be surprising because the functional benefit of the statute light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in United presumably outweighs any constitutional violation. States v. Lopez8 and United States v. Morrision,9 where the Despite McFarlan’s red flags, federal courts have Court sought to limit, if not roll back, Congress’s power utilized E-Sign on a handful of occasions, limiting their under the Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Court held discussion to stating that E-Sign had settled the question that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the scope of whether or not electronic agreements and signatures of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause were valid and enforceable. For example, in the 2003 because the subject matter of the act did not have a action Medical Self Care, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
12 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal the Southern District of New York addressed whether an e-mail should be considered a writing for the purpose of enforcing a “written consent” clause in a contract.16 The court invoked E-Sign, holding that “the decision not to consider an e-mail a writing is arguably foreclosed by 15 U.S.C. section 7001.”17 The next year in On Line Power Technologies, Inc. v. Square D Co.,18 the Southern District of New York examined whether e-mails created a valid purchase agreement. The plaintiff allegedly entered into agreements with the defendant over multiple e-mails, which stated only the price, order number, and name of the sender. The court held that since “federal statutes governing electronic signatures recognize the validity and enforceability of electronic signatures,” the parties “did enter into valid new agreements.”19 Finally, a year later, Campbell v. General Dynamics20 concerned an employer that sent its employees a mass e-mail requiring them to pursue arbitration of an American with Disabilities Act grievance. In determining the validity of the arbitration e-mail agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act, the First Circuit held that E-Sign “prohibits any interpretation of the FAA’s ‘written provision’ requirement that would preclude giving legal effect to an agreement solely on the basis that it was in electronic form.”21 Notwithstanding the lack of commentary, the case law, including that from other circuits, summarily confirms that E-Sign furnishes electronic agreements with the same authority as their paper counterparts.22 Interestingly, a narrow area of contention focuses on whether or not one party is obligated to accept electronic agreements under E-Sign, especially where the other party insists on it. The issue arises out of two provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 7001. On the one hand, § 7001(a) mandates that an electronic record may not be denied legal effect. Yet, on the other hand, § 7001(b)(2) states that persons are not statutorily required “to agree to use or accept elec- tronic records or electronic signatures,” presumably over- riding the foregoing section. The sections lead to contrary interpretations: an electronic record will be automatically either denied legal effect if one party refuses to accept it or given legal effect if one party decides to use it. Only two courts have actually addressed this issue, both favoring subsection (b)(2) over the preceding subsec- tion. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Prusky,23 a 2005 action arising out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the defendant cross-claimed, alleging that the plaintiff violat- ed E-Sign for refusing to accept his electronic requests to transfer monies to other investment funds. Shortly after, a New York state trial court addressed the issue in DWP Pain Free Medical PC v. Progressive Northeastern Insurance.24 In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s no- fault action was premature because the medical provider submitted claim forms electronically without permission. The plaintiff replied that E-Sign required the defendant to accept the forms because E-Sign gave them the same
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 13 validity and effect as the handwritten form. Without statutes exist, and the state statute is technology neutral. explanation, both courts held that subsection (b)(2) per- Actually, ESRA preceded E-Sign, and, therefore, does mitted the parties to reject the electronic transmissions. not refer back to the federal law. Regardless, in the end, Under that approach, subsection (a) apparently would the trial court evaded the issue altogether and actually govern when parties explicitly agree to use electronic rendered it moot, concluding that under either ESRA or means but, absent an agreement, neither party would be E-Sign the result would be the same. While no other court obligated to transact electronically. The result potentially has ever addressed this issue, the chance that a court burdens parties who intend to use electronic means by will invalidate ESRA on preemption grounds appears requiring them to obtain the other party’s consent. This remote. could lead to inequitable outcomes for individuals unso- With respect to the substance of the statute, ESRA has phisticated in the law. For instance, a consumer accus- received even less attention than E-Sign. While the stat- tomed to transacting electronically might not expect this ute authorizes the use of electronic signatures, records, statutory limitation and might be left empty-handed for and contracts,30 New York state courts have limited their failing to confirm whether a business accepts electronic review to the validity of electronic records, as opposed to transactions, which is what happened to the individual contracts. In April 2002, McFarlan became the first pub- investor in Prusky.25 lished case to raise ESRA, accepting the validity of com- puter-generated photos of the defendant under the state The New York State ESRA Law and federal technology statutes. Just weeks afterward, In 1999, the New York State Legislature passed the in D’Arrigo v. Alitalia,31 a New York civil court decided Electronic Signatures and Records Act (ESRA).26 Section whether or not an airline passenger’s electronically filed 304 states in pertinent part: “An electronic signature lost luggage complaint constituted a “writing” under the may be used by a person in lieu of a signature affixed Warsaw Convention, which required complaints to be in by hand,” and it shall have “the same validity and effect writing. The civil court cited a variety of legal and non- as the use of a signature affixed by hand.” Section 305 legal sources, including ESRA, to hold that the computer- adds that an “electronic record shall have the same force generated complaint constituted a “writing.” and effect as those records not produced by electronic The only other cases to utilize ESRA have done so means.” The Legislature enacted ESRA to ensure that in connection with electronic traffic tickets. Decided in “persons who voluntarily elect to use electronic signa- 2005, People v. Rose involved a defendant who moved to tures or electronic records can do so with confidence that dismiss her DWI charge on the ground that the computer- they carry the same force and effect as nonelectronic sig- generated ticket was invalid.32 The Rochester city court natures and records.”27 Similar to E-Sign, the statute does acknowledged that ESRA was designed primarily for not, however, explicitly obligate “any entity or person to “commercial and public record applications rather than use an electronic record or an electronic signature.”28 law enforcement use,” but that “the decision to substitute As with the constitutionality of E-Sign, People v. e-tickets for the often illegible multiple copy Uniform McFarlan is again the lone court to create a potential Traffic Tickets was an appropriate and logical extension controversy – this time, the issue of preemption. E-Sign within the purview of ESRA.”33 expressly preempts contrary state law except for a nar- The city court, however, objected to the e-ticket sys- row field. Specifically, a state electronic record and sig- tem insofar as it functioned in a manner that violated the nature statute survives if (1) the state enacts the Uniform verification requirement under the Criminal Procedure Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) as approved and Law. Officers would input information into the computer adopted for enactment by the National Conference of system and then print the e-ticket. Yet the software was Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; or (2) if the state designed so that the officer “signed” the e-ticket before enacts a law that is (a) consistent with §§ 7001 and 7002 of actually entering any information on the ticket. That E-Sign, (b) technologically neutral, and (c) if enacted after would be akin to parties signing a blank paper before E-Sign, makes specific reference to E-Sign. filling in the terms of agreement. Verification, as with In deciding the defendant’s motion to exclude the consent, needed to follow the input of information. The prosecution’s second printout of computer-generated court, nevertheless, found that the officer’s signed depo- photos of the defendant, the McFarlan court affirmed that sition revived his ill-timed electronic verification. “ESRA is not the same as, a clone of, or even similar to A few years later, a Rensselaer County justice court UETA,”29 failing the first preemption exception under faced with the same verification issue took an alterna- E-Sign. Then, presumably with respect to E-Sign’s second tive approach. In People v. Patanian, the justice court preemption exception, the court resolved that the scope agreed with the defendant that the state could not cure of E-Sign “purports to preempt ESRA in accordance a defective e-ticket with deposition testimony.34 The with [its] own terms.” The basis for this conclusion is left court, instead, held that the officer’s actions verified the unexplained. No glaring inconsistencies between the two electronic document. Since the officer himself printed
14 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal and served the ticket bearing his electronic signature, the terms and sufficiently consented. Similarly, in Barnett v. “the need for a prompt or additional button formally Network Solutions,42 the plaintiff entered into an electronic affirming the uniform traffic ticket seems redundant in contract with the defendant to register domain names. nature.”35 The court pointed out that “[n]o language The Texas state appellate court focused on whether the under [ESRA] exists specific to any timing of the signa- plaintiff had notice of the forum selection clause, uphold- ture.”36 The central caveat, therefore, became the design ing the contract because it clearly presented the clause and rather than the validity of the electronic form. required the plaintiff to scroll past it prior to consenting. A controversial e-contract design issue has been the New York State and Federal Common Law effect of hyperlinks in Web site license agreements. In In the event that E-Sign or ESRA are declared unconstitu- Pollstar v. Gigmania,43 an Internet browser could down- tional, repealed, ignored, or inapplicable for any reason, load concert information from the plaintiff’s Web site New York state and federal courts will likely continue to pursuant to the conditions of a license agreement that the permit the use of electronic contracts and signatures, as user accessed by clicking a hyperlink. The catch was that The catch was that users could consent and proceed without ever linking to view the agreement, which is commonly referred to as a Browse-wrap agreement. long as the contracts are properly constructed. Since the users could consent and proceed without ever linking to case law on electronic contracts is sparse, jurisdictions view the agreement, which is commonly referred to as have yet to develop their own comprehensive precedent a Browse-wrap agreement. In deciding the defendant’s on the subject. Federal and state courts look, instead, to motion to dismiss, the Eastern District of California held the small group of cases that have emerged in jurisdic- that while the license agreement was buried in the Web tions nationwide for guidance.37 site, potentially impairing the parties’ mutual consent, Most of the litigation has focused on Web site agree- the agreement was not invalid as a matter of law. Two ments, where a few federal and state courts have express- years after Pollstar, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected ly held that such agreements constitute a valid writing the browse-wrap design altogether in Specht v. Netscape which parties may execute and accept electronically. See, Communications Corp. because it failed to provide ade- for example, Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.38 Before quate notice.44 In all these actions, from Moore to Specht, joining the Microsoft Network, a prospective member the construction of the e-agreement was under attack, was prompted to enter a subscriber agreement with not the electronic medium itself, which is to say that the click-boxes providing the options: “I Agree” and “I Don’t courts all tacitly approved of it. Agree.” Registration could only proceed after the sub- Courts have not indicated any special reasons, such scriber had an opportunity to view the screen and click as the rise of e-commerce, to give Web site agree- the “I Agree” box. The New Jersey state appellate court ments an exclusive right to the electronic form, finding held that between an electronic and printed contract other electronic transactions governed by the statute “there is no significant distinction.”39 Another example is of frauds equally valid. A 2004 New York state case of In re RealNetworks, Inc.,40 where the Northern District of first impression was Rosenfeld v. Zerneck, where the trial Illinois examined whether the arbitration clause in a Web court addressed whether parties may enter a real estate site license agreement constituted a writing as required contract by e-mail. In deciding if the typed signature at under the federal and state arbitration acts. The district the bottom of defendant’s e-mail satisfied the writing court applied a literal interpretation of the term “writ- requirement under New York State’s statute of frauds, the ing,” concluding that the definition of “writing” did not court held that the defendant’s “act of typing his name exclude electronic agreements. at the bottom of the e-mail manifested his intention to Other courts have, however, bypassed the question authenticate [the] transmission.”45 In 2008, the New York of the medium’s validity altogether, focusing instead on Appellate Division, First Department applied Rosenfeld to the construction of the Web site agreement. For instance, an e-mailed employment agreement. In Stevens v. Publics, in Moore v. Microsoft Corp.,41 the plaintiff had to scroll the appellate court held that the “e-mails from plaintiff through the terms of the license and then click the “I constituted a signed writing within the meaning of the Agree” icon before he could download the software. statute of frauds.”46 In the federal forum, the Seventh Paying no attention to the validity of the electronic Circuit considered whether the defendant’s e-mailed pur- medium, the New York state appellate court focused on chase orders, which contained only the sender’s name in whether or not the plaintiff received adequate notice of the e-mails, satisfied the UCC statute of fraud’s signature
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 15 requirement. Judge Posner, writing for the court, claimed offeree materially modifies and returns the contract, it that “neither the common law nor the UCC requires a would likely fail for lack of mutuality. hand-written signature,” concluding that the sender’s name on the e-mails met the signature requirement.47 Conclusion With these actions, the issue was not so much whether the While the electronic medium is seemingly equal to the electronic medium is a valid means for executing employ- handwritten paper form, new transactional legal chal- ment or real estate agreements, but whether a statute lenges will certainly arise as the digital age progresses. restricts the use of the medium. Already increasingly common methods of e-communi- cation will likely pose significant legal tests. Before long, Construction of an E-Contract the law will have to assess the validity of transactions While E-Sign and ESRA allow electronic contracts to serve executed via text messaging, instant messaging, Twitter, as legitimate substitutes for many paper contracts, they and Facebook. Do these electronic avenues differ signifi- provide limited guidance for practitioners attempting to cantly from e-mail correspondence? Will their informal properly construct an electronic contract. Practitioners nature preclude them from being a valid and enforceable should, therefore, consult the small body of electronic alternative? Will courts begin to individually examine the common law to determine the safest way to design and types of electronic communication thruways employed? build an e-contract. The answers are all arguably no. Courts have never The case law highlights a number of general architec- scrutinized handwritten paper contracts over the type of tural guideposts. At the very least, properly constructed paper used, whether it was a napkin or personal check, e-contracts should contain sufficient notice of all terms, but rather over whether the parties satisfied the formal adequate methods of consent, the ability to save and formation requirements, such as providing fair notice print the agreement, and a readable format.48 For of terms and evidencing mutual consent. As long as the instance, in Feldman v. Google, the federal district court electronic alternatives allow for valid formation, courts held that an e-contract seven paragraphs in length was should uphold them too. ■ “not so long as to render scrolling down to view all the terms inconvenient or impossible.” With that in mind, 1. A third article, Of Keystrokes and Ballpoints, 80 N.Y. St. B.J. 46 (Jul./Aug. 2008), by William Maker, Jr., touched on the narrow issue of whether an elec- parties should likely refrain from using hyperlinks tronic writing satisfies the statute of frauds writing requirement. since they potentially obstruct a party’s notice of the 2. Raymond T. Nimmer, N.Y. St. B.J. (May/June 1996), p. 28. terms. Next, electronic consent may be accomplished by 3. Bill Zoellick, N.Y. St. B.J. (Nov./Dec. 2000), p. 10. requiring a user to click an “I agree” icon, for example, 4. Under § 7006(4), an electronic record “means a contract or other record before allowing software to be installed.49 The print and created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic save requirement does not necessarily mean an elec- means.” tronic agreement must provide a “print” or “save” icon; 5. 15 U.S.C. § 7006(13). the ability to cut and paste the agreement into a word 6. 15 U.S.C. § 7001. processing program will suffice.50 Finally, with respect 7. 191 Misc. 2d 531, 744 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). to readability, while no single standard exists, com- 8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). mon sense should guide design decisions. In Feldman, 9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). for example, the court approved contractual terms in 10. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 12-point font and not all capitalized.51 11. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The case law has identified two key methods to deliver 12. McFarlan, 191 Misc. 2d at 538. The court’s source for this proposition is an e-contract: (1) by e-mail or (2) by accessing a contract unclear since it incorrectly cites to a federal criminal statute. No provision in E-Sign appears to preempt state law with respect to agency records. on a Web site, as in a Web site license agreement.52 Today, 13. 15 U.S.C. § 7006. other methods certainly exist. A number of software 14. McFarlan, 191 Misc. 2d at 539. programs, such as Adobe Acrobat and Omniforms, allow 15. Id. individuals to convert word-processed and hard-copy 16. No. 01CIV4191, 2003 WL 1622181 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). documents to digital forms that parties can digitally fill 17. Id. at *3. in, save, and e-mail as attachments. Finally, while not addressed in any of the e-con- 18. No. 03 CIV 4860 (CM), 2004 WL 1171405 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). tract cases, an offeror should also construct a non-UCC 19. Id. e-contract that adheres to the mirror-image rule.53 In 20. 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). New York, the mirror-image rule states that an offeree’s 21. Id. at 556. The court added that, pursuant to E-Sign, an e-mail agreement to arbitrate is also likely enforceable under the Americans with Disabilities Act. response operates as an acceptance only if it is to the exact 22. See also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (E-Sign 54 terms of the offer. An offeror should, therefore, create settled the issue that the arbitration provision of the online agreement was a an electronic contract where the prospective offeree can- writing); Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002) (had E-Sign not delete or insert material language. Otherwise, if the taken effect before the contract had been completed, it would uphold the legal
16 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal effect of the e-mails under the UCC statute of frauds); MacDermid v. Discover 41. 293 A.D.2d 587, 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep’t 2002). Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2007) (online credit card application deemed 42. 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001). valid under E-Sign). 43. 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 23. 413 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 44. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (the court 24. 14 Misc. 3d 800, 831 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Dist. Ct., Suffolk Co. 2006). found that a browse-wrap license agreement was invalid for failure to provide 25. 413 F. Supp. 2d 489. sufficient notice of the terms). 26. See N.Y. State Technology Law § 301 (“State Tech. Law”). 45. 4 Misc. 3d 193, 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). But see Vista Developers 27. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 540.1(a). Corp. v. VFP Realty LLC, 17 Misc. 3d 914, 847 N.Y.S2d 416 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 2007) (holding that signed e-mail does not satisfy statute of frauds in a real 28. State Tech. Law § 309. estate transaction). 29. McFarlan, 191 Misc. 2d at 538. 46. 50 A.D.3d 253, 854 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep’t 2008). See also Al-Bawaba.Com, 30. State Tech. Law § 302: An electronic record “shall mean information, Inc. v. Nstein Technologies Corp., 19 Misc. 3d 1125(A), 862 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct., evidencing any act, transaction, occurrence, event, or other activity, produced Kings Co. 2008) (applying Rosenfeld to e-mail license agreement). or stored by electronic means and capable of being accurately reproduced in 47. Hasbro, 314 F.3d 289. forms perceptible by human capabilities.” 31. 192 Misc. 2d 188, 745 N.Y.S.2d 816 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002). 48. See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Barnett v. Network Solutions, 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 32. 11 Misc. 3d 200, 805 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. City Ct. 2005). 2001); In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 *1 (N.D. Ill. May 33. Id. 8, 2000). 34. 20 Misc. 3d 298, 857 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2008). 49. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587, 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep’t 2002). 35. Id. 50. In re RealNetworks, Inc., 2000 WL 631341 *1. 36. Id. 51. Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.D.C. 2002); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa 2007). 37. While the cases discussed in this section were decided between the late 1990s and early 2000s, courts continue to cite them today as guiding precedent. 52. See Barnett, 38 S.W.3d 200; Specht, 306 F.3d 17; Caspi, 732 A.2d 528; Moore, See, e.g., Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., 2004 WL 23331918 (D. Kan. 2004); 293 A.D.2d 587; Rosenfeld v. Zerneck, 4 Misc. 3d 193, 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa 2007); Jesmer v. Retail Magic, Ct. 2004); Cloud Corp., 314 F.3d 289. Inc., 55 A.D.3d 171 (2d Dep’t 2008). 53. The UCC abandoned the mirror-image rule for the rule of good faith which 38. 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). does not invalidate an offer if the offeree modifies the terms in good faith. 39. Id. at 119. 54. See Sinram-Marnis Oil Co., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 139 A.D.2d 360, 532 N.Y.S.2d 40. No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 *1 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000). 94 (1st Dep’t 1988).
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 17 BURDEN OF PROOF BY DAVID PAUL HOROWITZ
DAVID PAUL HOROWITZ ([email protected] or [email protected]) practices as a plaintiff’s personal injury lawyer in New York and is the author of New York Civil Disclosure (LexisNexis), the 2008 Supplement to Fisch on New York Evidence (Lond Publications), and the Syracuse Law Review annual surveys on Disclosure and Evidence. Mr. Horowitz teaches New York Practice, Evidence, and Electronic Evidence & Discovery at Brooklyn, New York and St. John’s Law Schools. A member of the Office of Court Administration’s CPLR Advisory Committee, he is a frequent lecturer and writer on these subjects.
“Buried, But Not Dead”
s the leaves fall this October, what? Not one person got it. Not notice, the case is called by the clerk, and a sudden cold snap my classmates; not my teacher, Mrs. and if the action has, in fact, been Areminds us that winter is just Wildman; not the principal. Following abandoned, and no one answers the around the corner, one’s thoughts my grand entrance, as the assemblage’s call of the calendar, the case is dis- invariably turn to that uniquely stunned silence quickly turned to rau- missed pursuant to CPLR 3404, and American holiday, Halloween. For me, cous jeering, feeling a bit like Carrie the one-year period to restore the case the iconic, Norman Rockwell-inspired at the prom, I burst into tears and fled to the trial calendar begins to run. If childhood memories of dunking for the gymnasium. On the way out, Mrs. the calendar call is answered, CPLR apples and binging for weeks on the Wildman stopped me: “David, what 3404 does not come into play, and the fruits of trick-or-treating plotted and were you thinking?” court generally sets the case down carried out with the precision of the This is what I stammered in reply. for either a pre-trial conference or a landings at Normandy, are overshad- trial date. owed by the memory of my life’s CPLR 3404 Whether “marked off,” struck from greatest humiliation. CPLR 3404 provides for the automatic the calendar, or unanswered at a clerk’s As a child, while my friends were dismissal, for failure to prosecute, of calendar call, the case is taken off the reading comic books or the Hardy a case that has been “marked off,” or court’s trial calendar and placed in a Boys, I was thumbing through the struck from the trial calendar, or has state of suspended animation, from CPLR. As my friends decorated their gone unanswered at a clerk’s calendar which it is either revived by restoring rooms as firehouses or forts from the call, and has not been restored to the the case to the trial calendar within one western frontier, my room was set up trial calendar within one year. year of being taken off the calendar or as a miniature courtroom. And while In New York a case is “marked off” dismissed. my friends wanted to grow up to be or struck from the calendar when one The restoration of an action within John Glenn or Roger Maris, I wanted or more of the parties is unable to pro- one year of its being taken off the trial to grow up and be, well, David Siegel. ceed to trial on the date set by the court calendar in one of the ways set forth Alas, that was not to be. for trial and the court will not allow the above, is a simple task. In some coun- My childhood dreams were shat- trial date to be adjourned. When this ties, the plaintiff simply notifies the tered on Halloween, 1965. Determined happens, CPLR 3404 is triggered, and clerk of the trial court, either in writing to win the prize for best costume, and the one-year period to restore the case or by advising the clerk of the part that thereby earn the everlasting respect to the trial calendar begins to run. If the the case is being restored. Other coun- and admiration of my classmates, court elects to adjourn the trial date, ties require a stipulation, and, where a I designed a costume so clever, so the action remains on the trial calendar, stipulation is not agreed to, a motion sophisticated, and so terrifying that to be called to trial at a later date, and may be required. In any event, all that winning the prize was a foregone con- CPLR 3404 has no application. is required is notification by the plain- clusion. That too was not to be. Instead A clerk’s calendar call is a device tiff that the case is ready to be restored. of achieving what I now realize would utilized in some counties whereby A motion to restore an action within have been fleeting fame, I thereafter notice is given that certain actions, the one-year period may be opposed, endured daily taunts until my fam- when there has been no activity noted and the motion denied, where the par- ily finally moved out of the neighbor- for a case for a set period of time and ties stipulated, or the order striking the hood. which the court suspects may have action specified actions to be taken by The source of my humiliation? I been abandoned, are placed on a cal- the plaintiff prior to restoration that went to my school Halloween party endar to be called at a specified date were not done at the time the motion dressed as CPLR 3404. And you know and time. At the time set forth in the is made.
18 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal A dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3404, CPLR 3404 is one of several calen- and only in cases in which a note of in contrast with a dismissal for lack of dar control devices contained in the issue has been filed.3 prosecution pursuant to CPLR 3216, CPLR and in the Uniform Rules for requires no motion or other action by Trial Courts permitting the dismissal of Conclusion a party, and requires no order from actions. Other calendar control devices Once my sobbing subsided to the occa- a judge. All that is required is a min- include CPLR 3216, which provides sional shuddering sigh, Mrs. Wildman isterial act by the clerk to make the for the dismissal of actions for lack of said: “What on earth does any of that appropriate entry dismissing the case prosecution prior to the time a note have to do with Halloween?” I looked after the one-year time period has run. of issue is filed, and § 202.27 of the at her incredulously. “Don’t you get CPLR 3404 specifies that a dismissal Uniform Rules of Trial Courts,1 which it? Your case is no longer alive, but it’s pursuant to the rule is without costs. authorizes a trial court to dismiss a not dead either, you can still bring it Some courts have made the point that case or take other action if a party fails back to life! It’s perfect for Halloween.” a CPLR 3404 dismissal is never minis- to appear at a scheduled calendar call Shooting me the same look she had terial since it creates a presumption of or conference.2 Alternatively, the court when I asked why I couldn’t sing with abandonment that may be negated by may elect to grant an adjournment, the others after being designated a “lis- proof of litigation in progress, yet this although many judges feel constrained tener” at auditions for the chorus, Mrs. seems to be a distinction without a dif- by the deadlines imposed by the court Wildman told me to go on home, get ference. Thus, an action dismissed after system for the trial of actions (referred a good night’s sleep, and not to worry one year pursuant to CPLR 3404 is, in to as “standards and goals”) or the court about the other kids. fact, dismissed, even if it may be pos- may vacate the note of issue and restore Well, perhaps this Halloween you sible to overcome the presumption of the case to pre-note status, pursuant to will remember my childhood night- abandonment that led to the dismissal. § 202.21(e) of the Uniform Rules. mare and toss trick-or-treaters a cou- Once an action is dismissed pursu- The practice of trial courts “mark- ple of extra pieces of candy. Whether ant to CPLR 3404, a motion to vacate ing off” or striking cases from the or not you do, if your action is marked the dismissal, pursuant to CPLR 5015, calendar has expanded beyond the off, or struck from the trial calendar, or and restore the action must be made. limited purpose for which the statute goes unanswered at a clerk’s calendar In seeking vacatur of the dismissal and was originally intended, and is now call, remember Scout on the way home restoration to the calendar, the mov- frequently utilized, to make a court’s from her school pageant in her squash ing papers must demonstrate a meri- calendar compliant with “standards costume, feeling lost and scared in torious cause of action, a reasonable and goals.” This expansion of the use the woods, and that, like Boo Radley, excuse for the delay, a lack of prejudice, of the statute, implemented in vary- CPLR 3404 is there to save you. ■ and the lack of intent to abandon the ing ways and with divergent means action. Because the dismissal is one for of restoration, has sown confusion as 1. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.27. neglect to prosecute, an order denying this and other aspects of calendar prac- 2. See Basetti v. Nour, 287 A.D.2d 126, 128, 731 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (2d Dep’t 2001). See also Uddaraju a motion to restore an action deemed tice vary, often significantly, from one v. City of N.Y., 1 A.D.3d 140, 766 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1st abandoned should comply with the county to another. Recent Appellate Dep’t 2003); Lopez v. Imperial Delivery Serv., Inc., 282 recently enacted amendment to CPLR Division cases take the position that A.D.2d 190, 725 N.Y.S.2d 57 (2d Dep’t 2001). 205(a), which requires a recitation of CPLR 3404 has been overused and, in 3. See Basetti, 287 A.D.2d at 128; Lopez, 282 A.D.2d 190. the specific conduct constituting the accordance with the original intent of neglect. the section, it should be used sparingly,
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION Annual Meeting location has been moved— Hilton New York 1335 Avenue of the Americas New York City January 25-30, 2010
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 19 EDNA SUSSMAN (esussman@ sussmanADR.com) is a principal of SussmanADR LLC and is the Distinguished ADR Practitioner in Residence at Fordham University School of Law. She is the Chair- Elect of the Dispute Resolution Section of the New York State Bar Association. Formerly a partner at a leading international law firm, she serves on the arbitration and mediation panels of many of the principal dispute resolution institu- tions, including the AAA, ICDR, CPR, WIPO and FINRA and the mediation panels of the federal, state and bankruptcy courts in New York.
Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings By Edna Sussman
hoice – the opportunity to tailor procedures to business nificantly reduce costs and provide for a much speedier goals and priorities – is the fundamental advantage of resolution than can be found in court. Carbitration over litigation.1 Flexible Process – As arbitration is a creature of contract, Much has been written in recent years about whether the parties can design the process to accommodate their arbitration has become so much like litigation that arbi- respective needs. Hearings may be set at the parties’ con- tration’s most commonly cited benefits – saving time and venience and the less formal and less adversarial setting money – no longer pertain. One author, writing in a recent minimizes the stress on what are often continuing busi- issue of the New York State Bar Association Journal, sug- ness relationships. gested that the cost of the arbitrators’ fees makes litigation Subject Matter Expertise – Arbitration permits the par- the less expensive alternative for resolving commercial ties to choose adjudicators with the expertise necessary to disputes.2 Response to this and other criticisms requires decide complex issues that often require such industry- a review of the many benefits of arbitration, a look at the specific expertise. empirical data on the speed and cost of arbitration, and a Finality – Judicial review of awards is restricted to summary of the mechanisms available to the parties and very limited issues. The finality of awards is particularly their counsel to control costs and increase efficiency.3 important in business transactions. In many instances, with the cost of capital and the paralysis that indecision Why Arbitrate? can bring to businesses, the most important consideration Benefits in a commercial dispute is that it be quickly and defini- The many benefits of arbitration have led to the extensive tively decided. use of arbitration as the process of choice for dispute reso- Confidentiality – Arbitral hearings, as opposed to court lution in commercial disputes. These include: trials, are generally private, and confidentiality can be Faster and Cheaper – As is discussed at greater length agreed to by the parties. Most arbitral institutions have below, arbitration is the parties’ process. The parties can specific rules regarding the confidentiality of proceedings craft and implement a streamlined procedure that can sig- and awards. This is an important feature for many cor-
20 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal porations, particularly when dealing with disputes over By contrast, as reported for 2008, the median length intellectual property and trade secrets. of time for civil cases resolved through trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York was International Arena 30.7 months for jury cases and 27.0 months for non-jury Certain additional features of arbitration in the interna- cases, a number in line with most other federal district tional context are of particular importance: courts.7 The median length of time from filing in lower Cross-Border Expertise – Arbitration permits the parties court to disposition in the Second Circuit for cases that to choose adjudicators with the necessary expertise to were appealed was 43.1 months.8 The Bureau of Justice decide the dispute. Such special expertise can include an Statistics reports that for state court contract cases in the understanding of more than one legal tradition – such as 75 largest U.S. counties, the average length of time from common law, civil law or sharia law – an understanding case filing to trial in jury cases was 25.3 months and for and ability to harmonize cross-border cultural differences bench trials 18.4 months.9 and fluency in more than one language. Thus as compared with both U.S. federal and state Neutrality – In the international context, arbitration court systems, arbitration affords a significant time sav- provides a neutral forum for dispute resolution and ing for the vast majority of cases. Indeed the average case enables the parties to select decision makers of neutral appears to reach resolution three to five times faster in nationalities who are detached from the parties or their arbitration. And it must be noted that many international respective home state governments and courts, in a court systems are considerably slower than those in the setting in which bias is avoided and the rule of law is United States. observed. Counsel expenses and fees are the most significant Enforceability – In the international context, a critical cost of litigation. Inevitably, a longer process requires the feature is the existence and effective operation of the New expenditure of additional lawyer time as it creates oppor- York Convention to which over 140 nations are parties. tunities for additional discovery and motion practice. The The Convention enables the enforceability of interna- abbreviated schedule in most arbitrations usually results tional arbitration agreements and awards across borders. in significant cost savings. It significantly limits the grounds for refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement or award, making it possible to Is Arbitration Really Cheaper? enforce an award even in a jurisdiction that might oth- The reduced cost available in arbitration has historically erwise find ways to favor its domestic party. In contrast, been viewed as a principal reason to favor arbitration judgments of national courts are much more difficult and over litigation. It is true that access to the courts is essen- often impossible to enforce abroad. tially free while arbitration has some costs associated Thus, even apart from the lower cost and greater with it – i.e., the cost of the administering institution if speed, many parties choose arbitration for dispute resolu- one is selected and the cost of the arbitrator(s) – but these tion for one or more of these other benefits. must be viewed in light of the total cost of the proceeding, including counsel fees and the other costs of preparing Is Arbitration Really Faster? a case. While there appear to be no definitive statistical The availability of a process that is quicker than a court studies comparing the costs of arbitration with litigation proceeding has long been a principal reason for the in commercial cases, through informal comparisons and selection of arbitration for dispute resolution in business anecdotal evidence arbitration appears to be generally transactions. The statistics support the long-held belief cheaper.10 Certainly it is a process that can be streamlined that arbitration is a mechanism for achieving speedier by the parties. dispute resolution. The American Arbitration Association Only a small part of the total cost of arbitration goes (AAA) reports that for its business-to-business cases in for the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and the tribu- which awards were rendered in 2008, the median length nal, the “additional” cost of arbitration. The International of time from the filing of the demand to the award was Chamber of Commerce reported that 82% of the costs 238 days or 7.9 months.4 The AAA’s international arm, incurred were what the parties spent to present their case, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), including lawyer fees and expenses, expenses related to reports that for its cases in which awards were rendered witnesses and expert evidence, and other case prepara- in 2008, the median length of time from the filing of the tion costs.11 Thus, arbitrator and institutional charges demand to the award was exactly 365 days or 12 months.5 were only 18% of the cost of the arbitration. And it should The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and be noted that the costs for case preparation and presenta- Resolution (CPR) reports that for its domestic and inter- tion are much more easily controlled in arbitration than national cases combined in which an award was rendered in litigation. in 2008, the median length of time from the filing of the In litigation one is subject to the Federal Rules of demand to the award was 347 days or 11.5 months.6 Civil Procedure or parallel state court rules that allow for
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 21 broad discovery, including both document discovery and arbitration process, counsel can consider contractually depositions. Typically, discovery is a very costly part of limiting document discovery, barring or limiting deposi- trial preparation, and it can be burdensome to the par- tions, providing for fast-track procedures (such as limit- ties as well. Document discovery is generally more lim- ing the length of time from appointment of the arbitrators ited in arbitration; depositions are either dispensed with to hearing and from the hearing to award), providing for altogether or are severely limited in number. Extensive “baseball arbitration,” limiting the matter to one arbitra- motion practice is commonplace in court but is much less tor at least for smaller disputes, excluding judicial review common and, in fact, usually discouraged in arbitration. where that is permissible, and taking care to draft an arbi-
If the parties jointly seek to extend or complicate the arbitration, they may obstruct the arbitrator’s ability to achieve effi ciency goals.
Court cases require more counsel time for preparation tration clause that will not provide grounds for a court and trial than is the case with arbitration. For example, challenge as to its application. The selection of appropri- trial-related matters not pertinent to arbitration include ate governing rules can make all the difference and can evidentiary issues, voir dire and jury charges instruc- set up the time limits and other procedures desired. In tions, and proposed findings of fact and law. Appeals selecting the arbitral institutional rules that will govern, from trial court decisions are commonly filed, a process they should be reviewed to make an informed choice. generally unavailable and, in any case, very unusual in Unless the parties want a lengthy proceeding, counsel arbitration.12 All of these additional costs must be fac- should not provide for the application of the Federal tored into any consideration of the costs of arbitration. Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. This suggests that arbitration can be, and generally is, Of course it takes two to tango, and this contractual much less expensive even with a paid adjudicator. approach to limiting dispute resolution timing and costs only works if agreed to by all parties.13 What Can Parties Do to Make Arbitration Choice of Institution – Examine the rules of the provider Faster and Cheaper? institution selected, if the matter will not be ad hoc, in While a good arbitrator will manage the arbitration to deciding which is most suitable. The rules of the institu- expedite the proceeding and minimize costs, the parties tions vary. Some have rules that promote more expedi- and their counsel can have a determinative role and in all tious and less costly resolution. cases they play a significant part in establishing the tim- Choice of Counsel – Retain counsel who understand ing and costs for the matter. Arbitrators can “jaw-bone,” the interest in efficiency and cost savings and who are set schedules, emphasize efficiency and cost saving, and experienced in arbitration. Selecting counsel who are work with the parties to streamline the process, but they accustomed to litigation and see all cases as best tried are required to follow the terms of the arbitration agree- with a “leave no stone unturned” attitude can lead to the ment. If, for example, the arbitration agreement estab- conversion of the arbitration into a litigation-like process, lishes extensive litigation-like protocols, the arbitrator especially if all parties subscribe to that view. must follow them. If the parties jointly seek to extend or Choice of Arbitrator(s) – Select an arbitrator who (1) is complicate the arbitration, they may obstruct the arbitra- experienced in case management and has the ability to tor’s ability to achieve efficiency goals. conduct the pre-hearing procedures efficiently; (2) is There are many steps counsel and parties can take available to deal promptly with pre-hearing issues, hear to assure time and cost savings; much is in their hands. the case in the near term, and deliver awards without Efficiency and cost are not always the parties’ principal undue delay after the hearing; and (3) has the ability to goals in arbitration, however. But if speed and cost saving move hearings along. are objectives sought by the parties, attention should be Choices on Discovery – Do not seek extensive docu- devoted to carefully addressing the many choices avail- ment discovery; eliminate depositions altogether or limit able, including the following: them to one or two per party. If one party opposes broad Contract Provisions – Counsel are increasingly com- discovery, it is much easier for the arbitrator to set tight ing to recognize the importance of tailoring the dispute limitations, as he or she is not faced with “the parties’ resolution clause to the specific needs of the situation process” and right to choose. Provide that a single arbi- and are no longer simply inserting the “standard clause” trator be authorized to rule on discovery issues. at midnight. In order to assure a speedy and less costly CONTINUED ON PAGE 24
22 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 23 CONTINUED FROM PAGE 22 Conclusion Any system of dispute resolution, whether arbitration or Choices on Pre-Hearing Issues – Don’t make motions litigation, will have its outliers, the cases that run amok, other than those as to such threshold issues as the juris- and it is easy to point to those to support a negative view. diction of the tribunal or the statute of limitations. Work However, any realistic analysis must look to the function- cooperatively with opposing counsel to minimize the ing of the overall system and the unique ability the parties matters that must be brought to the arbitrator for resolu- have to craft a process that meets their needs. If cost and tion. time savings are important to the parties, arbitration pro- Choices on Scheduling – Pick as early a date for the hear- vides a mechanism for achieving those goals. Litigation ing as is realistic and consistent with the level of prepara- may have many other virtues but it simply does not offer tion the case merits based on client goals – and stick to it. the parties the opportunity to tailor the process to meet Rescheduling a hearing can often cause a lengthy delay as those objectives. ■ it can be difficult to find dates on which all participants are available. 1. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 De Paul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 3 (forthcoming 2009), available at Choices for the Hearing – The conduct of the hearing can http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372291. be expedited by (1) presenting direct testimony by affi- 2. Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Arbitrating Commercial Issues: Do You Really Know the davit; (2) limiting the time available for the hearing and, Out-of Pocket Costs? N.Y. St. B.J. (Jul./Aug. 2009), p. 30. if appropriate, using the “chess clock method” to assure 3. This article focuses on commercial disputes. Consumer and employment equal time; (3) using telephone and video conferencing arbitration which has been controversial in recent years and has been the sub- ject of numerous studies and articles is beyond its scope. technology; (4) choosing a hearing location that minimizes 4. E-mail from American Arbitration Association on file with author. expenses to the parties; (5) conferencing or “hot tubbing” 5. E-mail from the International Centre for Dispute Resolution on file with the experts; (6) using a single expert to advise the arbitra- author. tors rather than having the parties offer competing experts; 6. E-mail from the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and and (7) limiting post-hearing submissions. Resolution on file with author. 7. Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2008 Table C-10, available at What Else Is Being Done to Make Arbitration Faster http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/contents.cfm. and Cheaper? 8. Id. at Table B-4A. Current criticisms of arbitration – that it is neither speedy 9. Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005, available at nor cost-effective – largely stem from two issues: the http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. submission to arbitration of sophisticated business cases 10. Susan Zuckerman, Comparing Cost in Arbitration and Litigation, 62 Disp. Res. J. 42 (2007). An anecdotal study in which three construction litigators and of significant monetary value and the advent of globaliza- arbitrators concluded that litigation was 27% more expensive than arbitra- tion with the resulting increase in complex cross-border tion even assuming that several depositions were taken in the arbitration and disputes. Counsel and parties have in recent years chosen excluding the costs of appeals in a court proceeding. to handle some of these matters in a manner that has led 11. International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Arbitration, to their falling within time frames and cost structures Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs for Arbitration, available at http://www. iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/TimeCost_E.pdf. more akin to litigation than arbitration. These cases have 12. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). Some institu- led some to question the efficacy of arbitration. tions provide for an appellate process with a panel of arbitrators but parties The arbitral institutions have been responsive to the have not commonly availed themselves of this option. For example, CPR criticism and are devoting significant attention to foster- established rules for an appellate process with a panel of three arbitrators in 1999, but the process has never been used by any party. ing speedier and cheaper arbitration proceedings by pro- 13. For a discussion of the many issues a careful drafter should consider in 14 mulgating rules, guidelines and protocols intended to drafting the dispute resolution clause, see Stipanowich, supra note 1; John help parties select a more efficient process, and to provide Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 58 Disp. a concrete, rule-based protocol for the arbitrator to resist Resol. J. 28 (2003). burdensome party requests. Educational programs for 14. See, e.g., AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. Expedited Procedures; ICDR Guidelines for Information Exchanges in International Arbitration; JAMS Streamlined arbitrators now often emphasize the ways in which the Arbitration Rules and Procedures; CPR Protocol on Disclosure of Documents arbitrator can facilitate an efficient hearing. To meet the and Presentation of Witnesses in Commercial Arbitration; ICC Commission on criticism head on, the College of Commercial Arbitrators Arbitration, supra note 11; IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration. is holding a national summit in October 2009 for all constituencies to come together to discuss and vote on a series of concrete, practical protocols. In short, the institutions and the arbitrators are step- ping up to the challenge of preserving the time- and cost-saving advantages of arbitration. However, it takes parallel motivation and action by parties and counsel to achieve the goal.
24 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 25 PLANNING AHEAD BY ILENE S. COOPER AND ROBERT M. HARPER
ILENE S. COOPER ([email protected]) is a partner at the Uniondale-based law firm of Farrell Fritz, P.C. She concentrates her practice in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation. Ms. Cooper is President of the Suffolk County Bar Association, an Adjunct Professor at Touro Law Center, and a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
ROBERT M. HARPER ([email protected]) is an associate at Farrell Fritz, P.C., concentrating in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation.
Exoneration Clauses – Not All They’re Cracked Up to Be
ntent is a paramount concern in Principles of Construction and Examples of testamentary provi- construing the provisions of a will the Role of Public Policy sions that violate the law or public Ior trust, but public policy consid- New York law authorizes an individu- policy abound.10 In In re Walker, the erations often play an important role. al having testamentary capacity to dis- petitioners commenced a construc- While these concerns generally coin- pose of property “in any manner and tion proceeding, seeking to obtain two cide, when matters of public policy for any . . . purpose,” provided that adoption decrees they claimed the conflict with a dispositive plan, public the disposition does not offend pub- decedent, their adoptive father, specifi- policy considerations will be decisive lic policy.1 Consistent with that prin- cally bequeathed to them in his will.11 of the outcome. ciple, intent generally trumps all other The petitioners sought the decrees Public policy concerns most often concerns in construing testamentary because the documents purportedly come into play when issues of fiduciary instruments.2 Courts are charged with identified their biological mothers.12 duty and liability are before the court. effectuating that purpose by imple- The Surrogate’s Court, New York Testamentary clauses that purport to menting each testator’s testamentary County, denied the petitioners’ appli- exonerate a fiduciary from responsibil- scheme, determining the decedent’s cation and dismissed the petition, rea- ity for failing to exercise prudence and intentions from the plain language soning that public policy required the reasonable care have been found inval- of the entire will, and construing the confidentiality of adoption records.13 In id as contrary to public policy. While, words memorialized therein in accor- affirming the surrogate’s decision, the historically, exoneration clauses have dance with their ordinary meanings.3 Appellate Division, First Department been a matter requiring judicial inter- Once ascertained, the testator’s and the Court of Appeals relied upon vention, with the passage of § 11-1.7 of intent typically controls.4 Although the same policy-based rationale.14 As the N.Y. Estates, Powers & Trusts Law the testator’s voice has been silenced the Court of Appeals explained, the (EPTL) in 1966 testamentary attempts by death, courts are duty-bound to decedent’s bequest was “contrary to to immunize a fiduciary from liability effectuate his or her expressed tes- public policy because consummation have been eliminated by legislative tamentary wishes, regardless of any of the transfer [was] sought for the fiat. Nevertheless, because EPTL 11-1.7 conflicts among clamoring litigants.5 purpose of discovering information is limited by its terms to testamentary Neither the courts nor the beneficiaries which [was] against the public policy documents, judicial oversight in this of an estate have the power to substi- . . . to disclose without good cause.”15 area continues, and has become most tute their own wants and desires for The confidentiality was necessary to apparent in recent years, in the context those of the decedent6 – that is, unless ensure the assimilation of the adopted of inter vivos instruments. the testator’s intent violates public child into the adoptive family and This article examines the competing policy.7 the privacy of the biological parents, interests involved in the construction A legacy is violative of public policy among other concerns.16 of a will or trust, provides a general when it contravenes a constitutional Another case often cited for this background on exoneration clauses, provision, statutory prohibition, or proposition is In re Haight,17 in which and advocates for the amendment “the social judgment . . . implemented the decedent’s will conditioned his of EPTL 11-1.7 to limit the enforce- by the statute.”8 When a testator’s son’s right to enjoy the income of a ability of exoneration clauses in inter intent offends public policy, a court testamentary trust on the son’s divorce vivos trust instruments and powers of will circumvent it and substitute its or separation from his wife. Although attorney. discretion for that of the decedent.9 the Surrogate’s Court, Orange County,
26 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal issued a decree effectuating that provi- out when the results would be absurd, not generally be divested by agree- sion, the Appellate Division, Second abhorrent or a waste of the assets of an ment or otherwise.29 Department, found it to be void as estate.”24 Accordingly, the court refused Notwithstanding that duty, how- against public policy.18 The Appellate to enforce the disputed provision.25 ever, testators and grantors have Division reasoned that “conditions In sum, while a testator’s expressed attempted to insulate their fiduciaries annexed to a gift, the tendency of which intent generally guides the construction from liability for breaching their obli- is to induce the husband and wife of a will, adherence to that intent is not gations.30 These attempts come in the to live separate, or to be divorced, are, universal. Courts can look beyond tes- form of exoneration clauses, which upon grounds of public policy and tamentary intent and substitute their purport to exculpate fiduciaries for public morals, void.”19 discretion for that of a testator when breaching the duty of undivided loy- In re Pace20 is of equal import. In the testator’s intent violates the law or alty and failing to account.31 Yet, these Pace, the decedent’s will directed the public policy of the state. clauses are not universally enforce- trustees of a testamentary trust to raze able, despite the intentions of testators, the buildings located on real property Exoneration Clauses: grantors and principals.32 held in trust.21 Noting that the build- Meaning and Early Application More than a century ago, in Crabb ings were in “good physical condition,” Estate and trust fiduciaries owe a duty v. Young, the Court of Appeals first the trustee commenced a construction of undivided, absolute loyalty to the addressed the issue of whether exon- proceeding and the Surrogate’s Court, beneficiaries whose interests they pro- eration clauses are enforceable.33 In Cayuga County, found that the subject tect.26 This “inflexible” duty of fidel- Crabb, the decedent’s will exempted the provision was void as against public ity is akin to the highest standards trustees of a testamentary trust estab- policy.22 The court explained that the of honor, not just honesty alone.27 It lished pursuant thereto from liability decedent’s intent should not be effec- obligates fiduciaries to administer the for “any loss or damage . . . except [that tuated because razing the buildings estate or trust for the benefit of the which occurred due to] their own will- would be “waste[ful].”23 As the court beneficiaries, without regard to self- ful default, misconduct or neglect.”34 further opined, “the intention of the interests.28 The legal responsibilities When the trust suffered investment maker of a will should not be carried arising from that fiduciary status can- losses, the beneficiaries sought to be
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 27 reimbursed by the trustee.35 Although the fiduciary [of an estate or testamen- Initially, the Appellate Divisions both the trial court and intermediate tary trust] for any loss, unless occa- for the First and Second Departments appellate court ruled that the trust- sioned by “willful neglect or miscon- enforced exoneration clauses in inter ee had an obligation to replace the duct” is a nugatory provision amount- vivos trust instruments,56 relying upon amount lost, the Court of Appeals ing to nothing more than a waste of the strong preference for respecting a reversed, relying on the exoneration good white paper.’”46 grantor’s expressed intent, rather than clause contained in the will.36 In doing Countless cases bear this point imposing judicial discretion on the so, the Court explained that the dece- out.47 Surrogate Holzman’s decision trust.57 The courts also emphasized dent “had an absolute right to select in In re Lubin48 provides a helpful that the exoneration clauses were lim- the agencies by which his bounty analysis of the statute as it relates to ited – they did not completely absolve should be distributed and to impose executors and testamentary trustees. the fiduciaries from accountability to the terms and conditions under which In Lubin, the decedent’s will provided the trust beneficiaries.58 it should be done.”37 Since there was that the executor of his estate would be More recently, courts have come to no evidence of willful default, miscon- relieved from liability “for any loss or contrary conclusions, holding that exon- duct or negligence on the trustee’s part, injury to the property . . . except . . . as eration clauses in inter vivos trust instru- the exoneration clause governed and may result from fraud, misconduct or ments are not enforceable, despite the required that the fiduciary be excused gross negligence.”49 Describing it as a statutory silence in EPTL 11-1.7.59 For from liability for the losses.38 “toothless tiger,” the surrogate refused example, in In re Shore, the Surrogate’s Subject to the requirement that fidu- to enforce the exoneration clause Court, New York County, invalidated ciaries act honestly and in good faith, because it violated public policy.50 an exoneration clause that purported the rule in Crabb prevailed for more Another noteworthy case is In re to insulate the attorney-trustee from than five decades, until the Legislature Allister, in which the decedent’s will the duty to account.60 Accountability enacted N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 125 authorized her testamentary trustee to is the cornerstone of all fiduciary rela- (DEL) in 1936.39 Section 125 of the DEL invest the trust principal “irrespective tions, said the court; the exoneration proscribed the enforcement of exonera- of whether the same may be autho- clause in question violated public poli- tion clauses that purported to excuse rized by the laws of [this] State . . . as cy since it left the trust beneficiary with estate and testamentary trust fiducia- investments for fiduciaries and with- no one to protect his interests.61 The ries from liability for failing to exercise out the duty to diversify and without court explained that the “public policy reasonable care.40 This was necessi- any restrictions placed upon fiducia- against exonerating testamentary fidu- tated by the “increasing practice of ries by any present or future applicable ciaries from any and all accountabil- testamentary draftsmen and corporate law.”51 Notwithstanding the testator’s ity is equally applicable [to] inter vivos fiduciaries in vesting in . . . fiduciaries intent, however, the Surrogate’s Court, trusts.”62 Accordingly, the court rejected almost unlimited powers, with a mini- Nassau County, found that the exon- the attorney-trustee’s defense that the mum of obligations.”41 As the legisla- eration provision contravened EPTL exoneration clause excused her from tive history reflects, this practice was 11-1.7,52 reasoning that the provision the duty to account.63 “a serious potential menace not only to “would elevate the fiduciary above the Similarly, in In re Francis, the only the rights of a surviving spouse but of law” if effectuated.53 reported decision to address the . . . all persons interested in estates.”42 Although EPTL 11-1.7 undeniably enforceability of such clauses in pow- The same policy-based reasons gov- applies to testamentary instruments, ers of attorney, the Surrogate’s Court, erned when the Legislature passed the the statute is silent with respect to inter Westchester County, rejected the successor to DEL § 125, EPTL 11-1.7, 30 vivos trust instruments and powers of agent’s reliance on an exculpatory pro- years later.43 attorney.54 That silence has left courts to vision that authorized him to engage reach their own, sometimes divergent, in self-dealing and absolved him of Whittling Away the Power to views on the issue and necessitates the the duty to account.64 As Surrogate Exonerate Fiduciaries amendments discussed below. Anthony A. Scarpino, Jr. explained, the Under EPTL 11-1.7, a testator is pro- agent’s conduct was governed by the hibited from exculpating the executor The Statutory Silence “standard of ‘utmost good faith and or testamentary trustee nominated in As noted above, EPTL 11-1.7 is devoid undivided loyalty toward the princi- a will from liability for failing to “exer- of any mention of inter vivos trust instru- pal, [as well as] the highest principles cise reasonable care, diligence and pru- ments and powers of attorney.55 In the of morality, fidelity, loyalty and fair dence.”44 Will provisions that purport absence of statutory guidance, courts dealing.”65 Insofar as the exoneration to do so are void as against public have exercised their discretion – and clause purported to excuse the agent policy and have no effect.45 Indeed, as reached conflicting conclusions – as to from that standard, it ran “afoul of Surrogate Radigan explained in In re the enforceability of exoneration claus- New York’s public policy” and could Stralem, “‘the attempted exoneration of es in such instruments. not be enforced.66
28 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal Since executors, trustees, and agents 3. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d at 358–60. 34. Id. acting pursuant to powers of attor- 4. Id. at 358. 35. Id. ney are held to the same standard 5. 11 Warren’s Heaton on Surrogate’s Court Prac. 36. Id. § 187.01(4)(a) (7th ed. 2007). of absolute, undivided loyalty to the 37. Id. 6. Id. beneficiaries whom they serve, public 38. Id. policy necessitates that they be treated 7. In re Godrey’s Will, 36 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (Sur. Ct., 39. In re Clark’s Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 138, 177 N.E. Richmond Co. 1941). 397 (1931); In re Balfe’s Will, 245 A.D. 22, 24–25, similarly, especially in the context of 280 N.Y.S. 128 (2d Dep’t 1935); Margaret Valentine 8. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d at 358–60. exoneration clauses. Therefore, EPTL Turano, Commentaries: EPTL § 11-1.7 (2008). 9. Warren’s Heaton, supra note 5, at §187.01(4)(e). 11-1.7 should be amended to effectuate 40. In re Stralem, 181 Misc. 2d 715, 719–20, 695 10. In re Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 464–66, 18 N.E.2d N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Co. 1999). that purpose by filling the statutory 658 (1939) (holding a condition in restraint of mar- 41. Id. void with respect to inter vivos trust riage to be void as against public policy); Kalish 42. Id. instruments and powers of attorney, v. Kalish, 166 N.Y. 368, 372–73, 59 N.E. 917 (1901) (opining that the testamentary provisions, which 43. Id. regardless of the grantor’s or principal’s violated the rule against perpetuities, contravened 44. EPTL 11-1.7(a)(1). expressed intentions. Indeed, doing so the public policy of this state); Levenson v. Levenson, will ensure that the state’s public policy 229 A.D. 402, 403–406, 242 N.Y.S. 165 (2d Dep’t 45. EPTL 11-1.7(a)–(b). 1930) (stating that the decedent’s attempt to convey 46. In re Stralem, 181 Misc. 2d at 720 (citations omit- concerns regarding reasonable fiduciary an interest in a joint tenancy was invalid); In re ted). McHugh, 226 A.D. 153, 154, 234 N.Y.S. 541 (4th Dep’t conduct are served and that the courts 47. See, e.g., In re Allister, 144 Misc. 2d 994, 998, 545 1929) (invalidating a bequest of wrongful death address this issue uniformly. N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Co. 1989); In re Lang, action proceedings, which did not provide for the 60 Misc. 2d 232, 234–35, 302 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sur. Ct., statutory beneficiaries); Hacker v. Hacker, 153 A.D. Erie Co. 1969). Conclusion 270, 271–77, 138 N.Y.S. 194 (2d Dep’t 1912) (finding 48. 143 Misc. 2d 121, 539 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sur. Ct., The language of testamentary and a testamentary provision containing an unlawful restraint on the power of alienation to be invalid). Bronx Co. 1989). non-testamentary instruments, while Id. 11. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d at 358–60. 49. at 122. generally accorded great deference by 50. Id. 12. Id. the courts, has historically yielded to 51. Allister, 144 Misc. 2d at 997–98. public policy concerns – ensuring that 13. In re Walker, 99 A.D.2d 448, 448–49, 471 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1st Dep’t 1984), aff’d, 64 N.Y.2d 354, 358–60, 486 52. Id. a fiduciary acts in accordance with the N.Y.S.2d 899 (1985). 53. Id. highest principles of morality, fidel- 14. Id. 54. In re Shore, 19 Misc. 3d 663, 665–67, 854 N.Y.S.2d ity, loyalty and fair dealing. Though 15. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d at 360. 293 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Co. 2008); In re Francis, 19 Misc. 3d traditionally invoked in the area of 536, 541–43, 853 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sur. Ct., Westchester 16. Id. at 360–61. Co. 2008). estates, these principles should apply 17. 51 A.D. 310, 311–12, 64 N.Y.S. 1029 (2d Dep’t 55. Coincidentally, the Legislature recently amend- equally in the context of every instru- 1900). ed the N.Y. General Obligations Law (GOL) to ment from which a fiduciary relation- 18. Id. at 313–16. ensure greater accountability among agents acting ship arises. Hence, there is no logical pursuant to powers of attorney. GOL §§ 5-1505, 19. Id. 5-1509, 5-1510. Among other things, the amended basis for excluding inter vivos trusts 20. 93 Misc. 2d 969, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sur. Ct., GOL sections specify that agents owe fiduciary and powers of attorney from the scope Cayuga Co. 1977). duties to their principals, provide for the appoint- ment of monitors with respect to the agents, and 21. Id. at 970–75. of exceptions that have been applied authorize the commencement of special proceed- to exoneration clauses. Indeed, giv- 22. Id. ings to remove agents. Id. The new provisions are ing inter vivos trustees and attorneys- 23. Id. consistent with the amendments to EPTL 11-1.7 proposed herein in that they provide for greater in-fact unfettered discretion to act 24. Id. accountability among agents. unreasonably, without accountability, 25. Id. 56. Carey v. Cunningham, 191 A.D.2d 336, 336, 595 contravenes the very nature of their 26. 41 N.Y. Jur. 2d Decedents’ Estates § 1450 (2009); N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep’t 1993); Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, fiduciary status. Section 11-1.7 should, Ian W. MacLean, Exculpatory Clauses in Inter Vivos 187 A.D.2d 477, 478–79, 589 N.Y.S.2d 582 (2d Dep’t Trusts: What Remains of a Trustee’s Duty of Undivided 1992); see also Kolentus v. AVCO Corp., 798 F.2d 949, therefore, be amended to ensure the Loyalty?, 37 NYSBA Trusts & Estates L. Section 966 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying New York law). interests of inter vivos trust beneficia- Newsl. 5, 5 (Fall 2004). 57. Bauer, 187 A.D.2d at 478–79. ries and principals are protected by 27. In re Wallens, 9 N.Y.3d 117, 122–23, 847 N.Y.S.2d 58. Carey, 191 A.D.2d at 336. 156 (2007) (discussing the duty of trustees). proscribing the enforcement of broad 59. In re Amaducci, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1998, p. 32, col. exoneration clauses, which purport 28. Id. 3 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Co.). Id. to relieve fiduciaries from the duty to 29. 60. Shore, 19 Misc. 3d at 665–67. 30. MacLean, supra note 26, at 5. exercise reasonable care, diligence and 61. Id. 31. Robert Whitman, Exoneration Clauses in Wills ■ 62. Id. prudence. and Trust Instruments, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 123, 124–25 (1992). 63. Id. 1. In re Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354, 357–60, 486 N.Y.S.2d 32. Cf. In re Stralem, 181 Misc. 2d 715, 720, 695 64. In re Francis, 19 Misc. 3d 536, 541–42, 853 899 (1985). N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Co. 1999) (discussing N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Co. 2008). 2. Sankel v. Spector, 8 Misc. 3d 670, 679–80, 799 the enforcement of exoneration clauses in testamen- 65. Id. N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 2005); see In re Fabbri, tary instruments). 66. Id. 2 N.Y.2d 236, 239–40, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1957). 33. 92 N.Y. 56, 65–67 (1883).
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 29 POINT OF VIEW BY BRADLEY D. KAY
BRADLEY D. KAY ([email protected]) is a second-year student at the University of Georgia School of Law and a graduate of the University of Georgia.
Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease? The Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Exception
ort reform can take many forms sumers but rather will harm consum- turer can escape liability if it can show and affect many parts of com- ers in numerous ways. that the prescriber knew of the risk, Tmon law. These reforms are gen- considered the risk, and decided the erally considered by, and passed by, Duty to Warn benefits of the drug outweighed the state legislatures. Recently, some state Product manufacturers have a duty risk of the disease that the medication legislatures have considered chang- to warn consumers about all reason- was used to treat.10 ing the duties a prescription drug ably foreseeable risks associated with manufacturer owes to the ultimate their products. To establish a prima Who Must Warn Whom? consumer. The prescription drug man- facie case, a plaintiff must prove that Courts have recognized that warn- ufacturer has two duties: (1) to make a knowledge of the warning would ings can be provided on the container safe product that is free from defects have changed the plaintiff’s behavior4; in which the products are supplied and (2) to warn the ultimate consumer and, in most cases, courts apply the or by a label or other device if fea- of any foreseeable risks.1 This warning presumption that the warning would sible.11 Many courts have recognized can come from many sources, includ- have changed the plaintiff’s conduct.5 that manufacturers and distributors of ing the drug label, brochures, and Many courts have held, however, that certain products may have no effective advertisements. this presumption should not apply in way to convey warnings to the ulti- This article will examine one pro- unavoidably dangerous products like mate consumer.12 In Persons, the court posed change to the duty of manu- prescription drugs.6 held that the manufacturer of skis did facturers of prescription drugs to ade- A manufacturer has a duty to warn not violate a duty to warn against the quately warn the ultimate consumer. of all risks that a reasonable person use of a particular type of ski boot. The Under the proposed change, a man- would want to know about, and court felt the warning the defendant ufacturer of prescription drugs who the warning must convey the scope gave to the sporting goods store was engages in direct-to-consumer adver- and seriousness of the danger.7 The enough to satisfy its duty to warn tising of those drugs, can no longer Restatement (Third) of Torts provides because the store acted as a reliable satisfy its duty to warn by warning that the manufacturer of a prescrip- third party that should have conveyed a learned intermediary – e.g., by pro- tion drug or medical device violates the information to the ultimate user. viding the prescribing physician with this duty to warn if the manufacturer The Persons court held that a warning adequate warnings, which the doctor does not provide reasonable warnings would have no benefit for consum- then conveys to patients. of foreseeable risks to the health-care ers if the consumers do not have the This reform has been considered provider – or the patient if the man- technical expertise or knowledge to in a few states,2 and it is likely that ufacturer should know that health- understand the warning.13 Warning more states will consider it as well. care providers are not in a position to the ski shop was enough to satisfy the Proponents claim this reform will ben- reduce the risks of harm in accordance defendant’s duty to warn the consum- efit consumers in two ways.3 First, they with the instructions or warnings.8 er because the consumer necessarily say, it will lower drug prices because Some courts have held that a plain- relies on the knowledge and technical the manufacturer will spend less on tiff must establish that (1) the pre- expertise of the ski shop.14 advertising. Second, it will provide scribing physician would not have A manufacturer does not always patients with better warnings since prescribed the drug if there was an have an effective or feasible way to manufacturers will have to warn con- adequate warning and (2) the injury convey a product’s warning to the ulti- sumers directly. I will argue, however, would not have occurred had the drug mate consumer. In general, courts have that this reform will not benefit con- not been administered.9 The manufac- held that a manufacturer in this situa-
30 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal POINT OF VIEW tion does not have a duty to warn the Federal courts first held, in Sterling In 1997, the F.D.A. relaxed its restric- ultimate consumer; rather, the warning Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, that if the doctor tions on direct-to-consumer advertis- must be conveyed to an intermediary is properly warned of the possibil- ing of prescription drugs. Since then, who will relay this warning to the ity of a side effect in some patients, the amount of money the pharmaceu- ultimate consumer. Take, for exam- and is advised of the symptoms nor- tical industry spends on advertising ple, a manufacturer and supplier of mally accompanying the side effect, has risen to billions of dollars annu- bulk products. In Hoffman v. Houghton there is an excellent chance that injury ally. This has prompted some states to Chemical Corp., the court adopted what to the patient can be avoided.18 An recognize an exception to the learned is known as the “bulk supplier doc- overwhelming number of jurisdictions intermediary doctrine for direct-to- trine,” which can be an affirmative have adopted this learned intermedi- consumer advertising situations. defense in products liability/duty to ary doctrine.19 While drug manufacturers formerly warn cases.15 Bulk suppliers and man- The learned intermediary doctrine is advertised to patients only through ufacturers should be able to rely on the an exception to the rule that the manu- their prescribing physician, they now intermediary’s own obligation to pro- facturer must take all reasonable steps to directly advertise products to consum- vide safety measures and warnings for provide warnings directly to a product’s ers on the radio, television, the Internet, the ultimate users. The bulk supplier ultimate user.20 Learned intermediaries, billboards, on public transportation, must supply adequate warnings to the such as doctors and nurse practitioners, and in magazines.30 Some courts have intermediary and ensure that reliance stand between the manufacturers and held that mass marketers of prescrip- on the intermediary is reasonable. The the product user and make the deci- tion drugs should not be insulated supplier is permitted to discharge its sions as to what medicines the user from their duty to warn consumers duty to warn in a practical and respon- should take. Thus, the manufacturer’s directly when they seek to influence a sible way that equitably balances the duty to inform consumers runs through patient’s choice of drugs through mar- realities of its business with the need the physicians, not directly to the con- keting.31 In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, for consumer safety.16 sumer.21 The intermediary makes an for example, the court held that the The bulk supplier doctrine should individualized decision, weighing the learned intermediary doctrine does not be extended to prescription drug man- potential harms and benefits, based apply to direct-to-consumer situations ufacturers. Prescription drug manu- on the intermediary’s knowledge and because consumers are active partici- facturers sell large amounts of their experience of both the patient and the pants in their health care decisions, product and the product is the same product.22 Prescription drugs are likely invalidating the concept that it is the regardless of the buyer. While the to be complex and their effects on users doctor, not the patient, who decides manufacturer is not absolved of its can be varied.23 Because only a medical whether a drug or device should be duty to convey adequate warnings, it professional can take into account the used.32 is allowed to rely on an intermediary propensities of the drug, as well as the Due to these changes in prescrip- to make a risk/benefit analysis and individual characteristics of the user, tion drug marketing (as noted in recommend to the ultimate consumer the manufacturer is required to warn Perez33), the Supreme Court of West which drug should be taken. It is likely only the prescribing physician.24 The Virginia became the first state court to that an ordinary consumer would not prescribing physician is then obligated reject the learned intermediary doc- have the expertise or knowledge to be to inform the patient of the benefits trine wholesale in State ex rel. Johnson able to comprehend the drug manu- and risks of the drug, and how those & Johnson Corp. v. Karl.34 The court in facturer’s warning. Since the typical benefits and risks compare to different Karl held that manufacturers of pre- user has insufficient knowledge and treatment or no treatment.25 scription drugs are subject to the same expertise to benefit from the warning, duty to warn consumers about the the manufacturer should be able to rely Exceptions in Prescription Drugs risks of their products as other man- on warning a learned intermediary to The learned intermediary doctrine ufacturers.35 The changing environ- satisfy its duty to warn. is an affirmative defense, which the ment has also affected the way courts defendant has the burden to prove; define a manufacturer’s duty to warn. The Learned Intermediary however, if an exception is applied, the For example, in Holley v. Burroughs Doctrine burden shifts to the plaintiff.26 Courts Wellcome Co.,36 the court extended the Many people argue that the most effec- have held there are a few exceptions scope of what constitutes an interme- tive way a manufacturer can warn the to the doctrine where the manufac- diary to include other medical person- consumer is through the consumer’s turer must warn the ultimate consum- nel that may be in a position to reduce doctor. The idea of limiting a drug er. Some of these exceptions include: or avoid risk of harm. This has been manufacturer’s duty to warn to the mass immunization programs,27 birth adopted by the Restatement (Third) doctor, rather than the general pub- control pills,28 and direct-to-consumer of Torts: Products Liability.37 There is lic, began with Stottlemire v. Cawood.17 advertising.29 no general rule for deciding whether
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 31 POINT OF VIEW a manufacturer has a duty to warn an argue that since manufacturers are the direct-to-consumer exception to intermediary or the ultimate user, but able to communicate with consumers the learned intermediary doctrine.45 certain factors should be considered through the advertisement, the manu- Courts deciding whether to apply the in making the determination of whom facturer will be able to communicate direct-to-consumer exception have all the manufacturer has a duty to warn.38 the warning to the patient. The mere elected to apply the learned intermedi- These include the gravity of the risks fact that the warning can be communi- ary doctrine, with no exception.46 posed by the product, the likelihood cated to the consumer, however, does the intermediary will convey the warn- not mean the typical consumer will Which States Apply the Learned ing to the ultimate user, and the feasi- understand the warning.41 Risks con- Intermediary Doctrine? bility and effectiveness of warning the nected to prescription drugs are likely Defendants in cases regarding pre- ultimate user directly.39 to be very complex, most often too scription drugs or medical devices can complex for the ordinary consumer to apply the learned intermediary doc- Rejecting the Doctrine in understand. If the ordinary consumer trine. In the prescription drug context, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising does not have the technical knowledge every state other than West Virginia, The justifications for the learned inter- or expertise to understand the warning, Rhode Island, and Vermont applies mediary doctrine were best summed then the warning is not of benefit to the some form of the doctrine (courts and up by the New Jersey Supreme Court: ultimate user.42 It is difficult to imagine the legislatures of Rhode Island and “(1) reluctance to undermine the doc- that including a warning of all reason- Vermont have not yet considered the tor-patient relationship; (2) absence ably foreseeable risks in a commercial learned intermediary doctrine).47 In in the era of ‘doctor knows best’ of or in a pamphlet will be an effective the medical devices context, 39 states need for the patient’s informed consent; way to warn the ultimate consumer. apply the learned intermediary doc- (3) inability of drug manufacturer The typical language in a warning is trine; 10 states have not had the oppor- to communicate with patients; and too scientific for an ordinary consumer tunity to decide whether to extend (4) complexity of the subject.”40 to understand. The manufacturer also the learned intermediary doctrine
A doctor or other learned intermediary would be able to choose what warnings are necessary and what warnings are frivolous concerning a particular patient.
Advertising prescription drugs direct- runs the risk of desensitizing the user. to devices.48 Only West Virginia has ly to the consumer undermines only As manufacturers add line after line rejected applying the doctrine.49 two of the four justifications; however, to warnings, it is easy to lose sight manufacturers engaging in direct-to- of the label’s communicative value Tort Reform Abolishing the consumer advertisement generally can as a whole.43 Attempts to warn of Learned Intermediary Doctrine escape liability by warning an inter- every possible risk can lead to volumi- New York has, however, begun consid- mediary. nous and yet impenetrable labels – too ering replacing the learned intermedi- Advertising directly to the consum- long-winded to read and too techni- ary doctrine with a duty to warn the er does undermine the doctor-patient cal to understand.44 A doctor or other ultimate user when direct-to-consumer relationship and create a need for the learned intermediary would be able to advertising is used.50 Other states have patient’s informed consent; the patient choose what warnings are necessary considered a similar reform51 and more becomes a more active participant in and what warnings are frivolous con- will likely consider it as well. the relationship by initiating the con- cerning a particular patient. The drafters of the New York bill versation with the doctor about the Because there is not an effective or recognize that direct-to-consumer course of treatment. The doctor may feasible way for prescription drugs advertising can have adverse effects on be more willing to prescribe the drug to convey adequate warnings to the the public due to misinformation. In a that the consumer has chosen, because ultimate user in a beneficial way, most poll cited by the bill drafters, 43% of he or she knows the patient wants states have not adopted an exception individuals polled believed only com- that treatment. Therefore, the patient to the learned intermediary doctrine pletely safe drugs could be advertised should have all of the information in for direct-to-consumer advertising. and 21% thought only extremely effec- order to make an informed decision. The exception was formerly wide- tive drugs could be advertised.52 Proponents of the exception to the spread, but since Perez was decided no Advertising makes the patient a learned intermediary doctrine can court (besides New Jersey) has applied more active part of the doctor-patient
32 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal POINT OF VIEW calculation, and the bill’s drafters advertising will not take the doctor out claim that it is the cost of advertising claim the patient who demands an of the equation.54 Doctors have a duty that drives up the cost of medicine.57 advertised drug receives that drug 73% to warn their patients of the risks of the However, costs included in civil liti- of the time (although the drafters do medicine they prescribe, independent gation are likely to be much higher not cite where they got this statistic). of the duty they have under the learned than a company’s advertising costs. They also say that allowing a prescrip- intermediary doctrine, notes Professor Eliminating the learned intermediary
Drug manufacturers would likely be forced to raise drug costs more with a direct-to-consumer exception in place. tion drug manufacturer the benefit Bernabe. Manufacturers would not stop doctrine will eliminate a defense for of the learned intermediary doctrine providing warnings to doctors, and doc- the manufacturer. Manufacturers could would allow the manufacturer to hide tors would not stop conveying warnings expect not only more lawsuits but also behind the physician whose role it has to patients.55 But not every patient will more adverse judgments. usurped.53 They are worried that drug need to be warned about every risk, The cost of providing a full and manufacturers will increase drug costs and a consumer reading a warning comprehensible warning to the patient to pay for increased advertising costs, containing every foreseeable risk may and the cost of increased lawsuits and although one could argue that drug be unreasonably deterred from using adverse judgments must be added to manufacturers will have to increase the drug. Bernabe’s argument ignores the cost of manufacturing the drug to drug costs to pay for increased civil the possibility that patients will place understand the increased costs caused liability costs. too much emphasis on the risks enu- by the reform. Thus, drug manufactur- The most common criticism of merated in the manufacturer’s warn- ers would likely be forced to raise drug creating an exception to the learned ings and too little on the benefits the costs more with a direct-to-consumer intermediary doctrine is that it takes doctor conveys to the patient. exception in place. Proponents of the the most knowledgeable person out Proponents of reform claim that exception are attempting to fix a prob- of the equation. The consumer would manufacturers should be able to clear- lem, but in reality they are increasing receive all of the information about ly communicate a more comprehen- the problem exponentially. a product and make the decision sive warning. They reason that if the Another issue is that an exception to whether to use it in the absence of the manufacturer can convey an adver- the learned intermediary doctrine will doctor. Proponents of reform claim tisement to the consumer it should be encourage forum shopping. Plaintiffs that the doctor will continue to warn able to convey a warning to the same will always try to bring suit in a juris- patients but that consumers will be consumer. The flaw is that advertise- diction that has an exception for direct- able to supplement the doctor’s warn- ments are much easier to understand to-consumer advertising. Many pre- ing with the one from the manufac- than scientific warnings. A warning is scription drug products liability suits turer. Assuming an adequate warning not effective simply because it is com- turn into class-action suits, and juris- reaches and is read by a patient (let municated. If the consumer does not dictions having the exception will be alone understood by him or her), one understand a warning, then he or she more attractive to these litigants. One likely result would be confusion, fear, has not benefited from the warning.56 example is the Vioxx litigation in 2004, and the unreasonable rejection of an Therefore it is likely that requiring where a law firm sent out letters to appropriate medical treatment. The manufacturers to convey their warn- get all potential clients to bring their consumer may focus on the risks of ings directly to the consumer will lawsuits against Vioxx in New Jersey the product and discount the very nar- result in the consumer having less because of the state’s lenient products row probability that harm will actually understanding of the risks of a pre- liability laws.58 occur. Thus, the warning should be scription drug than when the warning Finally, patients should get infor- provided to the learned intermediary; is conveyed by the doctor, who has mation about prescription drugs from only he or she has the knowledge and received it from the manufacturer. their doctors, because they may be expertise to make the correct risk/ more likely to follow warnings that benefit analysis for each individual The Exception Should Be Rejected their physicians provide rather than patient. Increased liability would drive up the warnings a company provides. Professor Alberto Bernabe of John cost of health care and deter the devel- Marshall Law School argues, however, opment and production of helpful Conclusion that eliminating the learned interme- medicines. Proponents of the exception The learned intermediary doctrine diary doctrine in direct-to-consumer to the learned intermediary doctrine is an important concept in products
NYSBA Journal | October 2009 | 33 POINT OF VIEW
liability law, especially when prescrip- diary doctrine to create a direct-to- 38. Id. tion drugs are being considered. Ever consumer exception. ■ 39. Id. since the FDA eased its regulations on 40. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255, 161 N.J. 1 (1999). prescription drug advertising in 1997, 1. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388. 2. For example, New Jersey in 1999, West Virginia 41. Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. there has been an evolution in the in 2007, California in 2008, New York in 2009. 773, 777, 217 Cal. App. 3d 168 (1990). way drug manufacturers do business 3. See, e.g., N.Y. State Assembly, Bill No. 42. Id. – specifically concerning advertising. A05201, available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/ 43. Hood v. Ryobi, 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999). This increase in drug advertisements leg/?bn=A05201. 44. Id. 4. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 677 has created many new issues, one of 45. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d N.Y.S.2d 764 (1998). 514, 547 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 2006), judgment vacated, 129 S. which is whether the drug manufac- 5. Tingey v. Radionics, 193 Fed. Appx. 747 (10th Cir. Ct. 1578 (2009); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. turer should still be able to satisfy its 2006); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmts. Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d, 447 j, k. duty to warn the consumer by provid- F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. 6. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2007). ing the physician with an adequate F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1992); Restatement (Third) 46. Beale, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. warning. Products Liability § 6(d). 47. See Drug and Device Law, Headcount II: The Some argue that advertising direct- 7. Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d Learned Intermediary Rule and Medical Devices, 1025, 1035 (E.D. Mo. 2007). available at http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot. ly to the consumer undermines many 8. Restatement (Third) Products Liability § 6(d). com/2008/07/headcount-ii-learned-intermediary- of the justifications for the learned 9. Thomas, 949 F.2d at 814; Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 rule.html. intermediary doctrine and that it is F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004). 48. See id. not fair for the manufacturers to spend 10. Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1021 49. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 220 W. Va. 463 (2007). money on advertisements and pass the (10th Cir. 2001). 11. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 388, cmt. n. 50. N.Y. State Assembly, Bill No. A05201, available costs onto the consumer in the form 12. Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05201. of higher prices. However, the most 773, 777, 217 Cal. App. 3d 168 (1990). 51. For example, New Jersey in 1999, West Virginia important justification for keeping the 13. Id. at 778. in 2007, California in 2008. 14. Id. at 779. 52. N.Y. State Assembly, Bill No. A05201, available learned intermediary doctrine in place at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05201. 15. 751 N.E.2d 848, 434 Mass. 624 (2001). is that it is not feasible that manufac- 53. Id. 16. Id. at 857. turers can provide effective warnings 54. Torts, Comment on a Bill That Would Eliminate 17. 213 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.D.C. 1963). that are comprehensible to the average the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, available at http:// 18. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th bernabetorts.blogspot.com/2009/05/comment-on- user. If the user does not understand Cir. 1966). bill-that-would-eliminate.html. the complex warnings, then the warn- 19. Pumphrey v. Bard, 906 F. Supp. 334, 338 (N.D. 55. Id. W.V. 1995). ing is not beneficial and serves no 56. Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 20. Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 836, 257 773, 777, 217 Cal. App. 3d 168 (1990). purpose. An exception to the learned Conn. 365 (2001). 57. N.Y. State Assembly, Bill No. A05201, available intermediary doctrine for situations 21. David G. Owen, Products Liability Law 630 at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05201. (West, Thomson Reuters 3d ed. 2008). in which the manufacturer advertises 58. Letter, Re: Vioxx Litigation, available at http:// directly to the consumer would take 22. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. druganddevicelaw.net/Vioxx%20forumshopping 1974). the most knowledgeable person out of %20letter.pdf. 23. Id. the equation. The multitude of warn- 24. Id. ings, which are not applicable to every- 25. Owen, Supra note 21, at 631. body, will likely confuse and scare the 26. Ebel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 767, 782 Find us on the Web! average user, perhaps deterring that (S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 321 Fed. Appx. 350 (5th Cir. 2009). person from taking a potentially use- 27. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 Just a click away: ful medicine. And, the price of drugs (9th Cir. 1968). The NYSBA Journal is available to you anytime at all. will likely rise to cover the costs of 28. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 Log in as a member: increased litigation. N.E.2d 65, 394 Mass. 131 (1985). Membership gives you access to current issues and the 29. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 161 N.J. 1 Journal archive on HeinOnline. The archive offers the Advertising prescription drugs (1999). Journal in a word-searchable format, beginning with the first issue in 1928. directly to the consumer does change 30. Id at 1247. many parts of the relationship between 31. Id. Find an article: Our word-searchable index lists all Journal articles from the manufacturer, doctor and patient. 32. Id. at 1260 (quoting Susan A. Casey, Comment, 2000 through present. However, the changes do not justify Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 Wm. Mitchell Let us know: an exception to the learned interme- L. Rev. 931, 956 (1993)). Comment on any article you’ve read, topics you’d like diary doctrine. The exception to the 33. Id. at 1247 addressed or the issues facing today’s practitioners through the editor’s blog. learned intermediary doctrine does 34. 647 S.E.2d 899, 220 W. Va. 463 (2007). The Journal at www.nysba.org/barjournal. little more than hurt the patients it 35. Id. at 914. purports to protect. Therefore state 36. 330 S.E.2d 228, 74 N.C. App. 736 (1985), aff’d, The Editor’s blog at 348 S.E.2d 772, 318 N.C. 352 (1986). http://nysbar.com/blogs/barjournal/. legislatures should reject any mea- 37. Restatement (Third) Products Liability § 2(c), Click on “comments.” sures to reform the learned interme- cmt. i.
34 | October 2009 | NYSBA Journal Make the most of…