THC NEW LEFT HISTORIANS

AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY

OF THE COLD WAR

James Viggo Jensen B.A., University of British Columbia, 1969

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF I .: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

History

@ JAMES VIGGO JENSEN 1975

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

April 1975

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. APPROVAL

Name : James Viggo Jensen

Degree: Master of Arts

Title of Thesis: The New Left Historians and the Historiography of the Cold War

Examining Comit tee :

Chairman : J.M. Bumsted

Ian Mwidge Senior Supervisor

C.G. Reed, External Examiner Department of Economics & Commerce Simon Fraser University

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Title of Thes is /~issertation :

The New Left Historians and the Hi~toriographyof the Cold !Jar.

Author :

James Viggo Jensen

(name) April 28, 1975

(date) l? T)Ct"" CT . nud I binc. I

Chapter I of this thesis attempts to place the

New Left historians in the perspective of twentieth-century American historiography. In doing this, one finds that in precise historiographical terms a straight line extends from the Progressive school of historians, particularly

Charles Austin Beard, his analysis of foreign policy and his view of the historian as a student of history, to today's radical historians, This relationship between

Beard and the New Left historlians' interpretations of the origins of the Cold War is essential to a full understand- ing of New Left scholarship, Hitherto, this relationship nas been giossed over with glib cornrrier1i.s or iyii~red7iZtij- qether, Though the New Left historians' radical scholar- ship constitutes to a considerable degree a reaction against the sterility and complacency that they find so pervasive in their predecessors' work, the New Left's interpretation of the Cold War is not something put together in protest against Vietnam. It is actually the latest expression of dissent within American historiography.

Chapter I1 trios to answer the question whether the

New Left historians as students of history have made any substantial contribution to the historiography of the origins

iii of the Cold War. The New Left writers have made two major contributions to Cold War historiography. First, the New Left historians have questioned the adequacy of the ortho- dox view which interprets American policy as primarily a defensive response to an aggressive Soviet Union bent on world domination. In view of the available evidence, this conclusion is no longer tenable. Second, the revisionists have emphasized the decisive effect of the atomic bomb played in the origins of the Cold War.

In addition, the New Left historians have emphasized that it was Washington, not Moscow, which had the choice of alternatives in the immediate post-world War 11 period. In their judgement, the United States was determined to use its predominant economic and atomic power-in a vain effort to compel Russia to accept America's Open Door view of the world. Very simply stated, the Open Door vieu~holds that

American policy makers, at least since the latter part of the nineteenth century, have dogmatically believed that

American prosperity and democracy are dependent upon con- tinuous andeever increasing economic expansion. The Open Door theory has formed the very basis of the New Left's radical interpretation of the whole American diplomacy. Althouqh it is too early to give a definitive answer concerning the veracity of the Ne~u Left's Opcn

nmm7. + &-,- -...., UUUL LIIGLJJ. y t it is .;tiidcnt thzt zn i-tttrarctatisn clcs2~

to the realities of that period will evolve from a synthesis of the N~VJLeft historians' and their pre- decessors* analyses of the origins of the Cold war. Several persons have assisted me in the prepara- tion of this thesis. Special thanks are due to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Ian Muqridge, who maintained considerable patience throu~hthe years this paper was under develop- ment. He contributed to its progress through construc- tive criticism and invaluable suggestions. Also of assistance was Dr. Richard K. D~bowho took time from his busy schedulc to read this paper and offer helpful suggestions. I am also indebted to my wife, 8abert-a, and my daughter, Sarah, for their continued support and enccurageaent. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPROVAL PAGE ...... ii

ABSTRACT . s . iii-v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... vi CHAPTER

I NEW LEFT COLD WAR HISTORIOGRAPHY IN PERSPECTIVE * w . . s . 1 II THE NEW LEFT HISTORIANS AND THE COLD WAR...*...... *..rw.. 54 111 CONCLUSION ...... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . 102

vii CHAPTER I

NEW LEFT COLD WkR HISTORIOGRAPHY IN PERSPECTIVE

In the field of American historiography there have been two major groups of historians during the last fifty years. Charles Austin Beard exemplified the

Progressive historians who dominated the profession in the 1930s and early 1940s.l Shortly after the Second

World War, however, some historians rejected the progres- sive interpretation OF American history, which stressed class division and conflict, and replaced it with an 2 interpretatior emphasizing homogeneity and consensus.

Though the post-Beardian consensus historians are still well entrenched in the discipline, it is evident that dur- ing the 1950s G n3c.i radical school of American historians, commonly labelled the NEW Left, emerged to challenge the consensus account of the American past. Barton J. Bernstein

or an excellent analysis of tho three major Progressive historians, Frederick Jackson Turner, Vernon L. Parrington, and Charles Austin Beard, refer to Richard Hofstadter's The Progressive Historians (NEW York, 1968). For the best brief description OF the ~roaressivehistorians, see John Higham --et al., ~istary(~n~leiood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), pt. 111, Chap. 111. 2~ortwo valuable views of the consensus historians, see -ibid., Skotheim, ed., The Historian and the Climate of Opinion (Reading, Mass., 19691, pt. 11. has rendered a useful definition of this group.

Though derying precise definition and lumping together those who believe in objective history with those who do not, the term does denote a group of various 'loft' views - whether they be Earxist, neo-Beardian, radical, or loft- liberal.3

As an introduction to the major concern of this thesis, which uill be the New Left historians' contribu-

tion to the historiography of the origins of the Cold War,

this chapter will restrict itself to a brief examination

of the historiographical roots of these historians, This

is undertaken in the belief that such an analysis will contribute to a more thorough understanding of the New

Left historians which in turn will fecilitate a better

the origins of the Cold Uar. As Walter LaFcber has noted; "they (the New Left historians) are perhaps better studied

through their vie^ of history rather than their call to

politics".4 He contends that this is the case because of

their "widely-varying relationship" to the term, New Left. If one accepts LaFeber's contention, one finds

3t3arton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards A New Pastt Dissentinq Essays in American History (New York, 196i'J.

4~hornasG. Paterson, nd., The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, ~assachusetts~?~),p, 118, 3 that, in historiographical terms, the New Left historians' view of history is rcnarkably similar to that of people like Charles Austin Beard. Porhaps the new radicals' conception of the rola of the historian and his purposes in society similarly explains in large part the changes they have wrought in interpretation. The following writers, despite their difFerences in interpretation, might be considered the major New Left Cold Was historians;

Barton J, Bernstein, David Horawitz, Thomas G. Paterson,

Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter CaFeber, Gar

Alperovitz and William fipplcnari Williams. 5

Before examining the 'historiographical roots of the New Left historirns, it 5s helpful to descrihe the initial reaction of the dominant consensus historians to the new revisionist reading of the American past. To a remrkable extent, the CGnsensijs lziden Am~ricai~Historicdl

Association has been slow to recognize the achievements of this new school oF radical writers especially in such

S~hau~hthere are many historians who might be con- sidered New Left, this paper is concerned solely with those radical historians, who may now^ be considered tho First generation of Neu LeFt Cold War historians, Those radical historians considered here are specialists in American foreign policy and specifically the origins of the Cold War. This distinction is made because other New Left historians have somewhat diFFcrent historiographical roots than the foreign policy writers. In this regard see llNe~Radical His- torians in the Sixties: A Survey1', Radical. America, IV, No. 8-9 (NOV., l.970), 81-106. Also helpful is Irwin controversial areas as the origins of the Cold War, u:hich

elusive international conflict OF modern times". Until quite recently, the consensus historians seemed content either to ignore NEW Left historical scholarship or to dismiss it wit.h derogatory remarks. Thay appeared to be follov~ingthe advice given by Louis Hartz, a respected consensus historian, regarding Charles Board.

Historians have openly assailed Beard . . . . But after all is said and done Beard sol how stays alive, and the reason for this is Lhat, as in the case of Rarx, you merely demonstrate your subservience to a thinker when yau spend your time attvnpting to disprove hin.7

Oscar Handlin did not ignore New Left writing. On

The Contours of Amorican Histcry beczrne almost representa- tive of the consensus historians1 attitude toward the New

Left's reexamination of ~mericanhistory. Handlin wrote that

Unqer's, "The 'Neu~ Left' and American Historvr Some Recent rends in United States Historicgraphy," ~mericanHistorical Review, LXXII (JU~Y,1967), 1237-1263; Dan Pope,' "A Radical micGuide It American Historv." Liberation. Vol. 15 (Autumn, 1970)' 49-54; Walter ~a~uodr,"~crnritin~ Hiatcry," Commentzry, Vol. 55, No. 3 (march, 1973), 53-63.

'~orrnan A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Can- tinuiny Debater A Review of Recent Literature," Journal of Conflict Resol.ution, XI11 arch, l969), 123. ?~ouisHartz, The Liberal Tradition in America- (~ew York, 1955), p. 3. in evaluating this book, one cannat exclude the possibility that it was intended as an elaborate hoax, that its author has heen enjoying hir-sclf by in eniously pulling the leg of his colleagues. 1

David Donald even objected to "publishing a manuscript by Irwin Unger on historians of the Neu Left". He objected

"on the ground that the historians whose work he discussed were no?; @f suffici~tntconscqtience to merit extended con- sideration in the pages of our major professional jour- r~al".~Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., went so far as to "blow the whistle" on historical revisionism concerning the origins of the Cold Wa; .lo Evidently the consensus his- torians were satisFied to dismiss the N~LULeft historians as unworthy OF engaging in scholarly debate.

80scar Handlin, review of William Applemen William;, The Contours of American Histor , The Mississippi Valle Historical Review, l961~I~rch,md43 . avid Donald and Aileen S. Kraditor, review of Bernstein, ed., Towards A New Past, American Historical Hevietu, LXXIV (kc., i9r531.

'O~rthur M. Schlasinger, Jr., The Nen York Reviem of Books, Oct. 20, 1966, p. 37. It should be noted that- Schlesinger withdrew his attack on revisionism a yezr later in his article, "Origins of the Cold War," Fareiqn ,,ffairs, XLVI (~ct., 1967), 22-52. 6

Donald's and Schlesinger's attitude to ravisianist his- toriography is diractly related to their vi3a of historv and the historians' role in society, Thus, their negative reaction to New Left historiography is not surprising uhen one perceives the pessimism inherent in the consonsus view OF history. L!arren Susman, in his excellent article on American historical writing, cogently analyzcd the relationship between the consensus historians' view of history and its effect on their historical writing. He noted that in 1940, the approxirnatc year tho consensus historians begzn to energc as a distinct school, "a singu- larly antihistorical spirit" app~ared"crnong the leading 11 figures of our intcllectual life". Susnan further com- mented that "the study of history as a discipline has again become major literature, Frequently superbly written and

Allan Nevins, and Samuel Eliot Morison. He specifically quoted Schlesinger's viev~of history, written in 1949.

ll.bJarren I. Susman. 'Historv and the American Intellectualt Uses of a ~iable ask." American Quarterly, XU1 (Surnrnsr, 1964), 243-263. History is not a redeemer, promising to solve all human problems in tine; nor is man capable ZF trannczndin- t-2 lizita-icns cf his being, Y Man generally is entangled in insoluble prob- lems; history is consequently a tragedy in which we are all involved, VJ~OS~keynote is anxiety and frustration, not progress and ful- fillment,l3

It was Susman's opinion that, in the works of the historians noted above and most historical writing since

World War 11,

we look in vain For a vision of the past which will enable us to remake the present and the future. Here ideology is specifically rejected. Here we find a history which offers a reinforce- ment of current moral values and no effective chall~nqeto the ri~ri.?jnnrn?kers iuFthin the social order u~hode most frequently opecate in terms of some view of history, som, iderslogy,l4

elucidated by Schlesinger in 1949 has changed very little. For example, as recently as the American Historical Associa- tion's 1970 convention, Oscar 'Handlin reiterated =hat in

13brthur Schlcsingcr. Jr., "The Causes of the American Civil Wart A Note on Historical Sentimental- ism," in E. C. Rozuenc, ed,, The Causes of the American- Civil War (~oston,1361), pp. 189-190,

14~usrnan, "History and the American Intellectual," 261-262. 8 effect was still the consensus v:ew of history when he

decric$ th~ncdzrn "d~!---;:~ r-.--.~u*tg ,

"decay from ~t~ithin"U~as clearly directed at the New Left historians. Handlin had explicitly decreed that any

involvement in present day issues was out of bounds for the legitimate historian.

Despite the addition of a shiny scientific veneer in the 1950s. consensus history was buffet~dby serious criticism in the late 1950s and 1960s. l6 much of this criticism, which cpme f F~Vsc>re!~*tv t uncxr2~ctcdI zrezs, L:JZ~ directed zt the rigidity and4sterility that had bacome the main features of consensus scholarship,

In an article written in 1359, "The Cul-t of the

'American Consensus'r Hornog~nizingCur History", John

Higham warned of the dangers of "The conservative frame of reference" and how it "creates a paralyzing incapacity to deal with the elements of spontaneity, effervescence, and

lsOscar Handlin, Newsweok, Januery 11, 1971, p. 58.

16~orrestNcDonald has referred to his felloa his- torians' improved methods of gathering .data that took pLac~, during the 1950s as a "Factual explosion." 9 violcnco in Air~cricanhistory". l7 While he criticized certai.n asr>nct.s nf t.hv histcri n??-.-.phy r?F +hn P~22rcccivc historians Vcrnon Parrington and Charles Austin Bsard, hs concluded that "we pay a cruel price in dispensing with their deeper values; an appreciation of tho cruszding spirit, a responsiveness to indignation, a sense of in- justicew.18

C. Vann Woodward also was critical sf the consensus historians uhen in 1960, he commented on the effect of can- temporary events on historical interpretation. He went so far as to predict that the "avalanche of events" which has so complet~lyrevolut.ionized our tvosld since 1965 tllor.rlrf inspire, even necessitate, ex'tensive revisions in the writ- ing of American history. 'The prcocnt gcnerntion of his- torians", he argued, "has a special obligation and a unique

L opportunity" 1.0 ohal.lc~l[;u accepted versions OF hlstory from their unique perspective. 20

- 17~ohnHigham, "The Cult of the 'American Conson- sus8--Homogenizing Our History,' --Commentary. January 27, 1959, p. LOO.

I9c. Yann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," American I-listorica?..-- Hcview, LXVI (October, 1950), 13. As this thesis will attempt to substaptiate, it

is readily appzrcnt that kJoodwardfs plea for a rointar- pretation of Arnsrican history in view of the cataclysmic

events since 1945 went largely unheeded by any others than

the new radical historians of the 1960's. The consensus

historians have indeed assumed the role assigned to them

by Woodward. "If historians assume an intransigent atti-

tude toward reinterpretation, they will deserve to be regarded as antiquarians and their history as irrelevant. ,,?I

The serious criticism consensus history encountered

from Woodmard continued when Migham renou~edhis earlier criticism in a 19G2 article &titled "Beyond Conzansus:

The Historian as Moral Critit". In this stinging attzck,

he stated that

now that stability rather than changs has t~come the national objective, whsk values can pass the pragmatic test? Only what is snugly enmeshed in the texture of American experience has clearly proved its practical worth, Deprived of an active commitment to progrzss, the pragmatic approach tends to endorse sheer succsss and sur- vival. Having lost its critical edgo, pra9- matism has tended to deteriorate into retro- spective piety.22

22~ohnHigham, "Beyond Consensusi The Historian as Moral Critic," American HistoriczZ Revicu, LXVII (~pril, 1962). 620. tory that stressed homogeneity and consensus, acknoujledged the limitations OF consensus history in his book, -The Progressive Historians.-- He accepted that consensus histozy had met ruith serious and s-!nd criticism ~!~henhe conceded that among the chapters o? the past of which the consensus thesis had failed to make sense were the Revolution and the Civil War. 23 In addition, HoFstadtar might have cited tha Cold War and, indeed, the entire conssnsus account of tu~entieth-century United States foreign policy.

To all intents and purposes, thc mnjnstssam his- torians remained deaf to the criticism hurled at then by

Higham, Woodu~ard and Hofstadter, Their failure to heed tl-iis criticism compelled Noodwisd, in his 1970 Preskdentia3.

Address to the American Historical. Assoc;iotion, to repeat his warning, first made in 1960, for historians to listen to "criticism OF the guild, whether it cnE:cs from artists, scientists, or philosophers, or from our own students". 24

To do other~uisc,he argued, "~ouldappear to be singularly

23~ofstadtcr, The Proqressive Historians, p. 460.

24~.Vann Moodward, "The Future of the Past ," Arneric~~nHistcrical Revire,- LXXV (~ebrtiary,l970), 724. perilous at this time". *' In his most biting barb, Woodmard criticized the consensus histarians for their

"eFfarts to please popular taste and court popular esteemw.

This "tended to encourage the qualities of blandness and

banality complained of by the critics of history". 26 He also acknowlcdqed that

ours is ~ssentiallyan age of disjuncture, not of community. Indifference to these conditions and inscnsitivity to any light that the world of art or science or philosophy may throw upon them would be a dissesvico to the craFt.27

Yet the consensus historians, for tho most part,

persisted in interprctkng the American cxperiencc in a

tionate. Since Samucl Eliot Morison's Prcuidential

Address of 1950, little had chan~zdin @he consensus

of that year inaccurate. Me noted with satisfaction

a decided change of attitude toward our past, a friendly, almost affectionate attitude, as con- trasted with the cynical, almost hatcful one of young intellectuals in earlier yaars.28

205amuel Eliot Plorison, 'Faith o? a Historian," American Historical t7aviatii,- LVI (~anu~ry,1951)e 272. As noted, Wood~vard questioned the adequi3cy of such

which "regards history as an instrument of political or social action", Moodward clearly advocated a reexamination of the first principles of the craft of history. 29 The consensus historians' conplaeoncy became so apparent that it uJas even discussed by journalists who were largely unfamiliar with American historiography,

Clifford Solway observed thxt their historiography exudcd

perfect certainty abocit how things tmre, arc, and should bnp nut to nrontion a gallinq com- placency abof~Cthc objectivity of their om account of recent evonts.30

Nowhere was this nore urinistakabic than in tho liberal-consensus explanation of the Cold Mar, specifi- cally their reaction to the containment policy which Farmed 31 the cornerstone of llkshingtun's post-1945 foreign policy.

291doodwerd, "Future of the Pest," 724.

30~li~fordSolway, "Turning History Upside Do~n,' Saturday Hevirit~,- June 20, 1970, p, 14.

31~eorge Kennan delineated the foreign policy which came to be known as containment, The list of Cold War literature by such scholars as Dexter Pcrkins, Harbert Feis, John Lukacs and John In their interpretation of this area of American dipla- matic history, tiiohnm's comments uhout the tend~ncvof consensus historians "to endorse sheer succ~ssand sur- vival" have special relcvancc. 32

During the 1950s, their intarpretation cama to be accepted as the orthodox interpretation. Very briefly, the historians of that period "accepted the nation oF

Soviet aggressiven~ssas valid and of Lester,] Firmness as necessary". 33 With this frame of reference, it naturslly followed that they considered Washington's containment policy as net only necessary but the nation's most succcss- ful postwar decision. tierburt Feis, For oxample, justified the Amcricnn adoptiorr of the cantsinsent policy with the

against both Soviet expznsi~aisrr~and Conmunist social. 34

Spanier Focusses on the containment policy as the backbone of pcst 1945 foreign policy, The memoirs and papers of statesmen such as President Harry Trumzn, Secretaries of State James Byrnas and John Foster Dulles also attest to this.

32~igha~n,"Beyond Censensus, " 620.

33~raebner, 'Cold War Origins," 126.

34~erbertFeis. Betmen L!ar and Psacer Thc ---Potsdam Conf rrencr? (~rinFctor3,N. J. , lTim-r%T. It should be emphasized here, as Graebner has

Cold War orthodoxy laid dom by United States and British officials in spaeches, writings, memoirs, communications, and recorded cofiversations between 1945 and 1950". 35 1n effect, thesc historians were able to, and did, "draw heavily on the research undcrt.nken by those politicians who felt obligad to defend their vie~s".I6 This casts con- siderable doubt on the objectivity and independence OF the orthodox account of this era of American history.

The certainty inharent in orthud~xCold !Ajar his-

of such recant orthodox scholars as Charles 8. marshall,

Dexter Pcrkins, and David Zccs are brj.ef ly considered. 37

35 Graebnzr, "Cold War Origins ," 175. Graebner has generally followed the orthodox position on the Cold War. See also Brian Thomas, "Cold $Jar Origins," 11,

Journal of Conterilpc ~ -9History, SII (April, I~SG), 183-1.98s

36~hornas. 'Cold War Origins ,' 183. 37~eeparticularly Dexter Perkins. The Diolornacs- of a KPL.J Aqe (~loornington; Ind., 1967); ~harlesBurton

&arshzi>%ii~ Cold !'jar: A Conziso_-___I_ tiisto2 (N~MYork, 1965); and David Hees, ---The Aqe of Co~t3inmcr-t: The -.-Cold Irlar, 1945-1955 (London, l~?67?. 16

Thcy have, despite the chanqed perspective OF the 196Cs

;)nd fhn 2~:j12bk-Li*.- .,/ \,.-C n,LLUeA . IT-'-'CI,.C &ILU<~ 1L K-LL~LI --.ibl, ' pe~'bi~t~f3

in viewing "the Saviet Unlcn ns an expansive FO~CE?and . . . Stalin as the exponent, not. of Russian security, hut of the Cotzrnunist proqrsn". 38 In fairness, Graebner has

qualified his statemant by notinq that thesc scholars did

not "laud every American decision or accept the ratinna!~ 39 of every official utterance".

However, the consensus historizns' almost whole-

hearted acceptanc~,throughauk t~odecades, or !!Jashingtonls account of the Cold 1Car hnd st2rious repercussions for their

history. "Havinq lost jts rrit it-71 pdn-7 (it~liczzinc)", 40 --LA--- --LA--- consensus Cold 'la? sch~larshipalmost bcc~ncindistinzuish- able from official Ljnktod Stater; Cold P!ar foreiqn policy,

Neither this occurr~nzcnor 'ctre loss o? their "critical . edge" was accidsntal, Several historians during the 1950s, among them a president of the American Historical Associstion, were forthright in callir-lg on scholars to abandon tho stancc

of critical reflection, Thcy advocated instuad a kind sf

38 Grzcbnor, "CoLd Uar Origins," 127.

40~ighnrn,"Rcyocd Consensus, " 620. 17 history that wquld serve the 4msric~nnational intarost

in the st.y.11nn7P trli t.h H hnc: t ?l~,Sn~i~t !Irlinn- n1 !t ot!l- tc- mainstream hi: toria~s' accc*ptanct~of this recommenrlat icn that severely undormincd orthodox Cold War historiography.

Having associated themselves so cLoscly mith \;Jashingtcn1s position, sny criticisiz oP official American foroi2n policy was nccessaril:f translated intcl irlwarranter? criticism of their writings.

Dexter Perkins' 1354 article, "American Foreign

Policy and its Critics", is illuminating in this r~gard because it revc;*ls the drfcnsiv~pesture underlying the orthodox anzlysis of Amcriccn for~>icnpa! icv stse tchjny from 1698 to 1954. Far example, wkile th? author ri.,jcct,cd what hc labcllcd pzrtison critici~n,he lar~dedcriticism

"which Flows From spt.cia1 kriou~lerfqn,and reflection and

~hizhstiisiilatcs a dcePek u,rd~rsianding:'. RS exanpies of such lofty critici:~tn,hz mcntionsd the u~orkof Hans

Morgentkau in his book, In Defense- of ths P!atizn:l-.".------Inkcrest.,

41~nnycrs Read, "The Social Responsibilities of the Historian," American Historical Review, LV (January, 1950), 283.

"2extte Perkins, "American Foreign Policy and Its Critics," in Alfred Ii. Kelly, ed., Anericsn Forci~nPnlicv ---C- ----and Amr1rican Dcnocracy (~aynoStoto Uiliv. , 1!m77$~d63zg6. affairs.

I SF:? thcl ms'c serious fzult oT our past policy formulation to lie in sont~thingth3t I night call thz lc9alistj.c-nor;list,ic a~pro~chto inicrnnticnal problc3ms. This approach runs like 3 rcC sk '-12 thrariqh crir foreign policy of the last fif ly ycars.44

Despite Perkins' own umrm ti:el.come to the right kind of criticism, apparently even Kcnnan's remarks, not aith- standing his credentials, wre toa much For Porkins. 45

He decided that his hszrers viould conclude that "thcy

43 Georgq Kennao and Hans Forgcnthzu arc nenbrrs nf the so-czllcd rznlist school, For a survzy of the realists sce Christophsr Lcsch, "T~PCo!d War, Rzuisited and Revisioned," --N, Y. Tirnos L'laqazinc, Jant~rry14, 1968, pp. 26-35.

45~ecChristoph~r Laa~h's excellent artitle on George Kennan, "The Historian as Diplmzt," --Th? Nation, November 24, 1962, pp. 348-353,

d6~er!

American policy for bcing too legalistic and unrealistic.

Thauqh Perkins alone wrote thesa words, the atti- tude they revealed came to reprasent tho stand OF an entire school of historians on America's conduct of the

Cold War, His Lack of critical insight, as ruflcctcd in this article, is charactoristic of consensus historiography.

Racocj'nitinn of this is essential if one is to acquire a meaningful perspective on New Left Cold War hi%.tory.47 Tho

New Left's interpretation must be undcrstaod in rclation

Nel;! Lcft radical scholarship, par%ictrlarEy th-;r inte~p~~- tation of thc origins of the Cold bjzr, cunstitgt~sto a considerable dcgrc~a reaction ag:iir~stthc st9rifity and complacency thc;t they found so pcrvasivg in tboir predec{=c-

In addition to the outrageous confidence oxhibitcd by the historians of ths 1950s in relation to their inter- pretation of the Cold War, evidently they are equally convinced of the cnrrectness of their conception of the historian's function, The follotuing exchsnge between the

47~arryHo~li: Hansom's revie. nF David Horov~itz,--Thc Free Yorld C~~csst~:~:A Critique of rPi~-if?rirzn Poreion Policy - --ly------.------. ----~i---u- in tlic [:old W:>r, 5zict~rd~ytiavir!!, Noitr,mLc!r Gti, 1965, p. 34, - ....-U_-Fa--- a= revezls this cumplaccncp. radical Arthur Waskow and hJoodurardvery succinct;ly illus- trates this point and capturcs the differsnc~in thuir conception of the historian.48 This is sufFicinnt at this tim2, In his condemnation of the radical historians' concern with "re?evance", Woodward stated that

history is not an id~olcgy, . , it is an intef- lnctual process, a discipline th~itis still going. Its future and its true Furtctiuris are to cleanse the story of mankind from the dec2iving visions of the purposeful past.49

Waskou~ r~spondedthat

every comwittcd historian ou~hkto bc a radical , . . . The radical hiptoriktn h;s the drjty to examine the seeds of2 ch:>nga so tt~ctthey do nut becomc defeated nlternat.ives.50

Schlesinqe?'~view of history. alrezdy nuatsd, separztcs the tu~oviec.,s cven narc stark1y. His outloek identifies a passive, static role for thb histori2.n.

48~hisexchange occurred at the 1970 meetin? oT the American Historical Association in Lldashington, D, C. Sec Cornrnantwal, XCI, January 16, 1970, 469. This is someil~hatunfair to VJaad~ardbecausc h~ is more a pregrossive than a consensus historian, Howvcr, his remarks areusefulat this stage because they neatly crystal- lize the difference in the Neu Left's conception of the his- torian.

49~orisGrurnbzch, "Out of ths Groovcs of Acadnrni?," Commonra.a?,- XCI , January 16, 1970, 4.69. his funstion in sucizty. Their ideal wks tl,at of a neut~

Samuel Eliot Marison, Frederick Merk, Arthur Meier

Schlesing~r,Jr,, arid Paul Herman Buck have pointed out in tho tfaruard Guide to flncr5can-- History,

This cuncuptian of history prccludsd zny inval-vt~:cntby

A~icipdiion wat~2.d cicsrly undermine thc much adnircd his--

5 :! tori-cal objectivity.

Ons can readily understand why the estsbfishmcnt historians, canvinced in both their interpr~tationof the

American past and their conception of the historian, b!ere reluctant to came tu grips with Nem LeFt scholarship. But notwithstanding their dst~rmincdeffort, the dominant schoo? of American historians can nc Longer disroqard the work of

"0sc3r Handlin, -ct --ale. -Harvnrd 6uidi2 lo Anorican- History (N~L~JYork, 1967). p, 20.

52~laarly,historians ecro nut to makc t.hcrnsclvcs dircctly usoful in the solutior~of sc)ciztyts prnhlcms, thr3sn nnw rcvisionist,~, Both events and ttie New L~:ft's

v~ithinthe profnr;! i.crt uf the radical left's crit.ique of

Unitcd Statcs fareign policy in particulc7s.53 However, although th~pro?ession is increasingly engaging tho New

Lr.7t in schnlarly debatc, it has yet to offer anything more than a cursory cxplznation of iuky the New Left his- torians emerged in the 1960s.

In so doing, they have r~liedupan one of two explznations to account for the appearance of tho N~SJLeft.

eith~rarc childishly ~chcSlingagainst th::ir ~Ldsrsor are

53~reparticularly David S. Patterson, 'Recent Literature 017 Cold Mar Criqins: Ail Essay Revicw," was a poriotj of uxtrr:mu social and politic^! unrest.

Tradition:,l socis? and political values wErc questioned and rnjcctcd by such tzililznt left groups as Students for a Democratic Soci~ty, the I33 ack Panthers, St~ldnctP!on-

54 Committee, Durinq this "tine OF ram~ontsocial criti-

Jerold Auerbrch, "the past no less than the present falls 55 under scrutiny". He continues Lhzt

54 In thnir efi?pkz;is upcn the tur!~i!l~ntIYGOs, the profession has ortrn confused the rdcw L5r"t historians ii~ith the Yaif~Left mr,$~enentthat rcckcd the lzsL ducada. For a good survey 07 thc Ncw Left mcvencnt, se~Paul Jacobs znd

The New Left in History," Radical Arnorjca,--- IU, No. 4 (~ul~- August, 19'721, 11-4R.

55~houghJeruld 5. Auerbachvs "NI! Deal, Old Deal, or Rza 3231 8 Some Th~~~C2htson New Left Historioqraphy," The Jo~lrnalof ~si!b,hcrfi-~.istc~ry(Fc.bru:?r.y, l9~3),pp.. ------. ------d- , is cof~ce?ncd!ilith thc ivew Lcft's th~uai-~tson the N~GJDeal it is helpful. becausa it revsal-s the consencrtr; ateitud~to~ijard radical scholarship. eApfisit in his analysis oy the nzLsi radical historions is his bclieF that thcy have suci \irnbcd to the perils OF present-nindedness, in that they have allogJpd issues sucl~

the first major ~ssayc;n the young c3issi.d: .-~thistorians GF' the 1960s. In relating their emergence to "a younger generation's protest ag3inst the status quo", Unger criti- cized tkcir "exploitati3n cf the past For purprs~csof present 50 reFormW. He o5viously hulievcs that the P!or; Left historians'

58~ru~inUnasr. "Comsentnrv or, the Re. Lnft His. deep concern with the issues that convulsed the United

necessary for good historical schclarship. Lacking the alleged political nedtrality of the consensus historians, Unger vigorously condemns the New Left's excessive present- mindedness because "it suggosts a contempt for pure his-

tory, that has not enlisted in the good fight". 59 very simply then, the netu radicals' interpretation of the

origins of the Cold War can be dismissed as a distortion of the historical record. Conveniently, the orthodox account of the Cold War remains intact,

Auerbach's and Unger's point of V~RNIis of SOM-

importance. The radical historians hava indeed been

greatly influenced by the tumultuous events of the last

decade. The Vietnam War in particular has dseply affecLed

their historical writing,

Barton J. Bornstein has addressed himself to this

very point. "During the early sixties," hs notes, "the conservative consensus began to break down", For hirnselF

bid.,- p, 155. The myth that the consensus his- torians were objective in their judgernt?nts isstill alive. For a useful corrective, see the still relevant article by William L. Neurnan, "Historians In An Age of Acquiescence," Dissent, IV (winter, 1957). 64-69. Also invaluable is David Eakins, "Objectivity and Commitment," Studies on the -Left, I a all, 1959), 44-53. and other young radicals, "the rediscovery of poverty and

Vietnam" had far-reaching results, It "shattered many of the assumptions of the fifties and compelled intellectuals to re-examine the American past". From these events, and mainly from the writings of younger historians, "there began to emerge a vigorous criticism of the historical 60 consensus".

Gabriel Kolko has also addressed himself to this question.

FOR A GROWING NUMYER OF AMERICANS the war in Vietnam has become thc tu'rnincj point in their perception of the nature of American foreign policy, the trat~malisirr~;~event that requires them to look aqain at the very raats, assump- tions, and structura of a policy that 6s profoundly dastrltzt i vo and $8nqpfcus: 61

It is also evident that the N~UJLeFi historians arc very dissatisfied with both "the historical judgement of their elders and with the current state of American civili- zation". 62 William Applasan Williams has serious doubts

60~ernstein,New Past, p. ix.

bL~abrielKolko, The Roots of American Fareisn Policy (~oston,1969), p, xi.

"~ohn A. Garraty, "A Then For Now," review of Bernstein, ed., New past, Tho New York Times Rook Review, May 12, 19C.9, p. 44, concerning the validity of the consensus approach to his- tory. He asserts that, during the late 194Gs and 1?53s, fearful Americans turned "to history for an explanation of their predicament and a program (if not a panacea) far the future". 63 In his considered judgement, the historians of that period only too willingly obliged. Thus, "Clio became involved in another of her many affairs with a society in search of reassurance and security". 64

It does not follow, however, that, because the Neu Left scholars are disenchanted with the historical findings of their elders, they are engaged merely in infantile rebellion. On the contrary, their radical ana1y:is of

American history, particularly their writings on the origins of the Cold War, is of real significance in American historiography, Hopefully it will be established in another part of this paper that this now radical inter- pretation is in part the result of newly availeble archival material and a new perspective.

However, equally important is the New Left's con- ception of the role of the historian and his purposes in 28 society. Their conception of the historian's role is similar to that of Chzrlcs nustin !card, He saz himself as a student of history and not as a historian, The former is interested in using history zs a means to an end while the latter is interested in history as an end 65 in itself.

For the most part the establishment historians have overlooked this factor in their appraisals of New Left scholarship. If this is not remedied, it is impos- sible to place the New LsFt historians accurately in his- torical perspective, because all of their writing has b~en influenced by their view of the historian. Because of their shortcomings in this area, the consensus historians have missed the challenge that the New Left historians have made to the traditional role of the historjan. Rather than examining whether or not the New LcFt's idea of the historian is of any v~~rthtthe more conservative historians have mcrely concluded that the radicals are guilty of being too present-minded. 66 In so doing thsy have conveniently disregarded the exciting possibilities inherent in the New

65~eeWillinms' , 'Charles Austin Beardl The Intellectual as Tary-Radical" in Harvsy Goldberq, ed., Arncrican Radicals -- Sane Problems and bersonalities (Nel:~ ------" - York, fY58), pp. 29i~-307.

66~eeUnger's "Commentary on the New Left" for this point of vieu~. 29

Left idea of the historian as a student of hist~ry. They

Thzt the post-1945 historians should diuell upon tbz events of the 1953s 2nd its ch~ngedclimate of opinicn, in their ~xplznationof ths emergence of the Neu Left his- torians, is not surprising, Rost rsdern historians accest that there is an intimete relationship bettceen a histori'n's work and the climate of opinion in u~hichhe does his work,

As Bencdetto Crnce observed, "every true history is con- te~poraryhis toryt'. 67 This statement has special rele- v~nceto the zriting of Amk. ican hist;c!ry, for every ccnc-2- ti~nof American scholazs hks reexamined and reinterpretsd the past in terns of its own tine.

Ho~ever,dospite its strenqths, this e~phasison the !tz::; Left zs a prod~ctomtheir aye fails to expiain how the events of the 1960s could possibly have influence? the xriting done by William Appleman Williams in the 1953s.

This is most significant because Williams, who might aptly ke celled ths dsan of the New Left historians, wrote bocks and articles in the 1959s which later came to form the theoretical frame~orkof the radical scholarship of the

573enedetto Crece, "History and Chronicle,' in Hans Teyerhoff, ed., The Philosoohy of History in Our -Ti~e (;.ea York, 1959). Tha inFiuence of Williams on his students and others is easily discernible. The reasons for this are obvious. In Williams' intorprctation, they found a coherent explanation of how the United States found itself in the tragic sftuation of the 1960s.

68~eeespecially the following sorks by William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781.- 194'1 (Neu~York, 195'27-;I-The Traqzdy of American Diplomacr l=York, 1959); The U. S., Cuba and Castro.- (--? NEW York 1962)t "The Irony of Containment," The Nation, Nay 5, 1956, pp. 376-379; and "The American Century: -m-1957," -The Nation, November 2, 1957, pp, 297-301.

69Llnyd C. Gardner, Gar A*qorovitz, and Walter LaFeber wera students of Will.iams. Alperovitz was an undergraduate in Williams' course at the University of Wisconsin; LaFcbor, uha wrote his thesis there under Fred Harvey Warrington, did not takc a formal course with Williams but assisted in his course and ackflo~~l- edges his influence, Cited in Barton J. Elernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Tru~.3nAdministration ?chicago, 1970), p, 5. David Horowitz has recognized the pioneering work of Professor Williams on p. 16 of Corporations and the Cold -War (~ewYork, 1969). In this respect see also tasch's "The Cold War, Revisited and RE-visioned," and Ronald Radosh "Making the World Safe for America," review of Gabriel Kolko's -The Politics of War 1943-1945 (N~LUYerk, 1968), and The Hoots of Arn:?rican fareiqn Policy, The Nation, October 6, 1969, pp, 35~-351. In these revieu~stiadosh criticized Kolko because he did not acknoaledge his con- siderable debt to William Applernan Williams, Their acceptance of ktilliams' scholarship had

that decade cane to reject the liberal consensus inter- pretation of American history, not merely because it was the schol.arship of a more conservative older generation which rsprcsented the status quo, but because bJilliarns* two books, -American-Russian Relations, 17s1-1947 (1952) and The Traqedy of American Diplomacy (1959), offered a more realistic, plausible account of how the United States became involved so extensively around the world, The

lattcr study in particular was a lucid book which accounted

for American qlobalism and the Hmerican empire. A young

Nem Left writer has written that Williams' analysis, principally his revelation of the central rols of expari- sionism in American history

has made it possible for radicals to argue persuasively that American involvement in Vietnam was not an aberration, but rather a logical culmination of America's hist~r~.~O

Contrast this view with that exprossed by the ortho-

dox Ernest R. May in Imperial Dcmocracyt The Ernerqence OF

-America -as --- a Great Power. 71 Though it is a study of - 70~itedin "New Radical Historians in the Sixties," 92 *

71~~cWilliams* illuminating "The Acquittinq Judge," reuie~uof Ernest R, May, Derocracyr the frnerqenre -of America as a Great York, 19611, ~tu3ieson the Left, III (Winter, 1963), 94-99. American foreiqn policy during the lR90s, it advancad a view that the I\vi+.nc! 5t-??s h35 ~~ZZ~GLSSthr~st 3por1 it, which is remarkably similer to that put forrr~ardby the orthodox school. in their explanation of the Cold War.

American leaders "werc at most only incidentally concerned about real or imagined interests abroad". 72 Cornpsrcd to this, Williams' interpretation of this period and United

States twentieth-century foreign policy was more satis- factory to the emerging radicals in explaining haw the

United States acquired the empire thzt was all too visible

emphasized that !;!illia~rs' rejlisv wzis infinitely supprior to thc orthodox account of hot%?th~ Unit~d States accidentally came to preside avor a vast Perhaps this is oven more true of the p! rind after 1945. According to thr? orthodox scenario, a reluctant Washington, innocent of the intricacies of international. power politics, had world

73~avidHorotuitz has accepted Williams' innlysis of the Yalta accords because it is more fipmly based on the actual course OF events. This is one small example of the influence of Williams. See Horowitz, "Revision- ist Tales of Negotiations with the Communists," Namparts, June 29, 1958, pp, 49-54. leadership thrust upon it un~~!il.l.inglyafter World War

IT. 74 Gcorqo Kennan. ths celebrated realist, has dj~rert-nd himself to the qucstion of America's alleged innocence in the diplomatic arena. He found that the answer lay in

Washington's legalistic-moralistic approach to inter- national problems. Konnan has slaborated that

to tho American mind, it is inplzu5ible that people should have positive aspirations, and ones that they regard as legitimate, more important to them than the peacefulness and orderliness of international life.75

The belief that the United Statcs was an innocent, essentially isolationist natiln has long Tomind the basis oP Cold War orthodoxy. ,

In contrast to this axplnnation, \ijilliams has advanced the view that Wnshingtnn cageriy sought to assume vmrld leadership in this period. He is worth quoting at soms length. He contends

that the United Statcs had From 1944 to at least 1966 a vast preponderance of actual as well as potential power vis-3-vis the Soviet ~nion.76

An appreciation of the

74~hiscontention is central to Cold lCar urthodnxy. As already noted, it is Found in the works of such writers as John Spanier, Johr, Lukacs, Dexter Perkins and Herbert Feis. 75~cnnan. American Diplomacy,- p. 83. 76~illiarns,Traqsdy , p. 200. relative weakness of the Russians . . . does confront all students of the cold Imr, be they academicians or politicians or hn!~.;et:!

Williams continuos that

a nation with the great relative supremacy enjoyed by the United States between 1944 and 1962 cannot with any real warrant or meaning claim that it has been FORCED to foLlou~a certain approach or policy. Yet that is the Amepican clairn.78

The consensus vie,*[of United States darnesiic history lcnt Fu; L11t.r impei;us to the nritings OF 'Jfillians. The con- I sensus image of Rrnerica pirturcd a unl'quo denocra'ic nation, devoid of class conFlict, ~ndfree frsz inpzrial- ism, united in a broad domest'c and fcreicjn policy consen- sus. The nation, as celebrated by such consensus his- torians as Louis Hartz and Daniel Boorstin, someho~v seenod at odds with the America the young radicals conFronted in the late 1950s and 1960s. 757

or an excellent rovietu of their literature see Skotheim, ed., Climate of Opinion. and its ec~ncmicdeprndcnce on such expansion exerted great influence on his stud~nts. That it did can be seen in the reception accorded his seminal study, The Traqedy of Amnrican DipLo~azy.--- - That study provided the framework on which the young radical historians of the 1969- built thair controversial analysis of Amarican diplomacy.

In this regard a young revisionist has written that "his (~illinrns')books, rnest notably -The Tragedy of American DipJ-o~:acy, have offcred a wozlth of insights and 80 suaqestions for furthc?~ror2aarch". Thvs, his C~U~~CR~S, and others as well, hava suiGed upon Williams' interprn- tation as a basis of enquiry and expanded upon it in their own studies, One nccd only examine the histaz-icsl scholnr- ship of Gardner, Alperuvitz, aerr.~st;cin, Kalico, Faterson, and Hnrowitz to confirm this.

In view of LbJilliams' considerable influence on his students, any explanation OF the New Left historians as mcrely a reFlection of their climate of opinion is inade- quate because it ignores the fact that he wrote important studies during the 1950s that eventually formed the core of revisionist Cold War historicgraphy.

"~adical America, "A Survey," 92. To do so is also to ignore the Fact that in precis historiographical terms a straight line oxtends From t.h~ so-called Progressive school of historians, particularly

Charles Austin Board and his analysis of foreign policy and his view of th9 historian, to today's radical historians,

This relationship bot~uzenBeard and the New Left's critique of t~tientieth-century American for'nign policy is essantial to a full understanding of Ncu Left scholarship.

Hitherto this relationship has been glossed over with glib comments or ignored altogether. The New Loft historians' intarprotation of the Cold War is not, therofarc, something put together in protest agzinSt Victnsn. It is actuaLly the latestexprressEon of dissent within American historiagraphy,

Though the naw dissenters hava gonc beynnd B~ard,their work

'l~ccerdincj to Irzin Ungcr, thc Ncw Le't histori;n;, in particular William Applenzn Willizrns, ome wry little to Beard. Unger does qualify this by noting that they are obligated to Beard in the area af "recent Arnericzn foreign policy." In Unger's opinion Williams has only ackno~lcdged the following debt to Beard because it befits his belli- cose style. Unger "Commentary on the Naw Left," p. 132. "It . . . seems appropriate in view of a31 the bigotad and career building attacks* acts of purification in the form of misrepresentation, and evcn smart alec criticism by sup- pased aristocrats, to acknowledge formelly my respect for and indebtedness to Charles Austin Beard." Williams, Contours of Anerlcan his tor^, p. 490. Walter LaFeb~rhas also praised the tradition of Charles Beard in American diplomatic history. In so doing he has assaulted thosa historians who "since 1945 . . . have been preoccupied with knifing Beard with onc hand and using the other hand to pen caricatures of a unique unblemished Republic which became a world empire with little conscious human inter- vention." LaFeber, "The Conscious Creation of a 'World is greatly infused t~rithboth his view of the historian's

Tho key contcrnporary figure in this historio-

graphical chain is indisput~5lyWilliam Rpplcrnan Williams,

He is the link connecting the New Left historians and

Charles Austin Beard. Fin appreciation of their relation-

ship larqely explains the New Left scholars' conception

of the hist.orian and their general approach to foreic=,n policy. Professor Williams fulfilled much the sems role of great teacher for the radical left as Beard, to a l~sser

extent, did for him. --

peets, b.!illisms is writing ~kom3 Bea~tfiznporspoctive, especially in the area oF foreign policy. He has recog-

nized this debt in a personal article entitled "Charlas

Austin Beard: The Intelbeetual as Tory-Radical". In his judycment, "There are fow short analyses , . . which match the quality of Beard's treatment of foraign affairs in

The Rise of American Civilization" and "It is even more

Wide' Empire," re vie^ of Richard Van Alstyne, ---The Risjnq. American E~plro,(Oxford, 1960) in Studies on ti!e Leftp 11, m27 103. Solway in his article, "Turning History Upside Down," recognized the link betweon Beard and the New Left histarians.

he Now Lsft historians have "gone beyond" Reard in that they are more heavily indebted to Karl Mzrx. When the new revisionists have msde much cf Marx, it is more often the early "soft" Marx, who speaks of "alienaticn," rather than the "hard" Marx OF Das Kapital,- with its class struggle and proqressive "imrniserization nT the proletariat." difficult to name a volumo that is more rewarding in in-

According to the dean of the New LeFt historians, ths Progressive Goard stressed the following three points in his analysis of Foreign policy.

(1) it is iritilnateJ-y connected with doinestic affairs, (2) empires are not built in Fits of absent- ndr:dn.;ss, and (3) expansion does not in anc ~f itself solve problems, and often complicates and deepens them.84

Tho New Left di!)lomatic historians' obligation to Beard in this respect is cunsidorzble. Thzy too havc ~mphasizsd, in varying dcgrces, these samh three factors in their radical counter-intcrpretaticn of United Statcs forelqn policy, Though they have stressed much more than Beard the demands of capitali:>rn in the making of American roroi~n AS policy, they arc still writing ~uithinhis shado~u.

In this rrgard see Eugene D. Genovcse, "William Appleman Williams on ftlarx and America, " rcvieth~of Nillian A, Williams, The Great Evasion. An Essay on -- the Contem- porary Relevanca-- of Ka5.l---- Ihsx and on the Nisdon- of Admitting ths Heretic intoC-----'--t-.--d-----.----- the Dialooun about America's Futurn, Studies on the Left, VI (January-February, 1966) 70-86.

83~illiarns,"Intellectual As Tory-Radical ,lo p. 305.

his is analyzed in Horowit,~,ed., Corporations and the Cold IJar and Kolko, The Limits of Pa~~cr. It was Beard ~hofirst fully exposed the degree

ing :'eature of American history. a6 In so doing he eas perceptive enough not to limit his study of Amc!rican expansion to territorial s~~ansion.~~In The Idea of National Interast,- Beard astablishsd thzt a national interest, as int~rpretedby most American statesmen, is a material interest. Unfortunately far the Republic, in

Beard's judgement, the Hamiltonian conception of national interest triumphed too often. Beard defined this as mean- ing the

consolidz tion of com~icrci~l,nanufacturinq, f inancia?. and agriculturtl interests at honc, the promotion of trade in all psrts of thc world by the engin~suf diplonzcy, the deSensc I- I - of tha",e,rr:d:. by zi ~~L:,;??fij: nauy, bite suprerildcy of the Unitei States in the Western Hezti~pher~?, and @he use of military and naval strnngth in the rivalry of nations to sccurc economic advantages for citizcns of the United ~tates.08

86~eardfocussed on expansionism in his The Idea-.--. cf Natinrtal Interest (N~UJYork, 1934). His fear of expansion- ism inspired his The Open Dazs at Home (~ewYork, 1934).

87~enryWallace, 'Beard: The Planner," The New Republic, Januzry 2, 1935, p. 225. This article succixctly shov~sthat Eeard was conscious of rriore than just terri- torial expansion. As !dallace has noted, Beard tins aware of imperialism. He defined it as "an effort on the part of the dcminant industrial and financial forcss of a nation to send its surplus capital and commodities zbroad in prc- Ference to raising the stanc!3rd of living of its peop1.e at home."

"~eard, Notinnal Interest, pp. 48-69. In Charlcs 8c:?rd's judg~rnent, as lonq as the

Washington's foreign policy makers, the 3epublic would be committed to a

diplomacy whic'. ostensibly seeks the txelfarc of the United Stztes by pushinq and holding doors open in all parts of the world with all engines of government, ranninq from polite co~rcionto thc use of arms.Bg-'

The New Left historians have come to a similar, though more rsdical conclusion. The new revisionists have

tory. Starting From this perspective, thc !?cc: Left has necessarily arrived at an interpretation ~f krn~riczrlfureiyn policy that differs rcr,;arkzbly frcjLi th~irpredecessors,

The New LeFt, like Heard, have also dsmonstrated, in a more sophisticated manner, the considsrable extent to u~hich

Washington's foreign policy has delibarately long flolued from domestic requiremants,

Sophisticated or not, it was Beard aha observed that "domestic affairs and foreign relations are intimately associated u~itkeach othar. Often both are but dif'fercnt aspects of the same thing. This view signiricantly

Open Door,- vii. ''bard, -National Interest, affectod Beard's analysis of American diplomacy. it enabled him to grasp the dsncstic pressures underlying the formulation of American foreign 7olicy. It played an equally important role in the New Left diplomatic writings. They have focussed upon the intimate relation- ship between American diploraatic and domestic policies.

Thus tdillians hzs concludzd that

a re-examination of the history of twentieth- century American foreign rclatiorls (and the relationship between foreiqn policy and the domestic economy) offers the most prornisinq approach to such a reconsideration of our assumptions, 91

? his appronch has proved tri~itPuifor Niilis-;s an3

I tho antire scho31 of Nsx~ LeFt diplomatic historians,

Their examination of thc rc?ciprosal rc3atinnshirj betixeen foreign and domestic policy has led ta their contraversial

Open Door theory of Hmsrican diplomacy, This theory, as promulgatsd by Willirms, holds that since

the Crisis of the 1.C9O1s, v~henAmericans THOUGHT that the continental frontier was gone, they advansed and accepted the argcrnent that continued expansion in the forn of overseas economic (and even territorial) empire provided tho best, if not the on1 way to sustain their freedom and prosperity. 52

91~illiams, Traqedy, p. 9. The Noiu LeFt writers, aq a group, are cor, firiced that

American diplomscvc if it is to b~ renlict;--?lly trnd-r- stood, must be viet~~cdEn the context of their Opcn Door tbeory, In this regard, Williams has argued persuasively that the history of Americsn diplomacy thrcughout the twentieth-century has been the history of the Open Door pc licy, "To stabilize tho world in a pro-Amsrican equi- librium" has been the minimum objective OF United States policy; "to institutionalize American expansiaiiisnw its 93 optimum goal. The Cold !!Jar, in Willians' vieu~,nust be interpreted as tho latest phasc of a continuing aFFort to mako the w,rld szre Tor ~nzricancapitalisn. 9 4 This policy was consciotisly and dclibi:rair;ly cnhsrked upr ,i bcczusc?

American statcsrner~ts, lievcd thrit Ansrican cnpitalisrn ncedcd ever-expsnding foreign marksts in ordcs tr) survive,

A similar expl~!f~aiionwss prcviousiy cxpol~ndedby

Beard. He ices so convinced of the varzcity oF the Opan

Door thesis that he wrots The Open Dnn~at Hone in an attempt to end just such American depondenco upon ever- expanding xarkets. For this reason Bzard asked the follcw- ing question t

"see Lasch, 'Cold War, Rcvisitcd and Re-visioned, " pp. 29-32 for an excellent analysis of LIJilfiams' Open Door interpratation. Was it rcally pn;sible, by any policy and action, to find cvcr-exp,,ndinq fcraign outlets for tho ever-increasiny "surplusesw of agricultural produce, manuf3ctures, and capital, especially in view of the increasing competition of other groat powrs fnr the same maykets?95

Board's definitive answer uJas "no". Consequently, in The Open Daar ot Ho~c- he rnzintaincd the view that

the only wcy to assure? peace and prosperity was to develop tschnological and consumer fruntiers at home and Forgat about the world frontiar.96

Beard's nritings on the misdom of creating an open door at home are eloquent testimony to his bc-lie' that the

UniLcd St2tes and its leaders were erroneously and danger- ously convinced thzt the nsii~n'csconcmy denanded expznd- ing foreign mzrkats,

Beard's observziion that e:,:pires are not built in fits of absent-mindcdncss also occupies a central place

the writings of tho New L~ftdiplomatic historians.

Though Williams wrote the following, he is echoing a belief held by his New Left colleaguss as well as Beard:

neither contingency nor madness is absent from history, but the vast majority or siqnifieant figures on the stage of history act consciously and purposefully (if usually routinely) within

95~eard,Interest, - p. 552.

96~loydGardner, "From MEX Deal to New Frontiers: 1937-1941," Studies on --t.h~ - Left, T (Fall, 1959), 30. their conceptions of the world, 97

The Keut Left writzrs' entire body of scholarship irrefutably supports this outlook. Walter LaFeber has stated that

it is odd that historians who worry most about keeping the Anericen story clean for Cold War purposes and free from the Beardian interpre- tation are reluctant to givo their ancestors credit for the brilliant debates, detailed blueprint:;, and the sound structuring which created one of the largest, and most successful empires in world history.98

In crediting their ancestors with consciously cresting a

thc sano path as Char1.c~Bcard.

The dissenting Itistorians 04 the 1959s and 1370s are even more firmly in the Beardian traditian uhen it

and his rol-e in society.

First, consider Beard's view of history and thc historian through the eyes sf Professor Williams, in whose estimetion, as earlier indicated, Beard pictured himself a stud~ntof history and not a historian. This is not only

~illiarns'opinion but that of the American historical

971~~illiams,Contours, p. 21.

"~a~sbor."Conscious Creation of o ' World-Mi 'e Empire"', 104. profession as wellc The dinstinction between them is of

the stu- dent's emphasis is "on his study ts a means", unlike the 99 historian, u~hoconsiders "his work as an end itself".

Accordingly Beard, the words of Williams,

studied history to equip himself to comprehend and change his ow society8 to understand the direction and tenpa of its movement, and to pin- point the places at which to apply his energy and influence in an effort to modify both aspects of its development. 100

Now consider 1jJilliams' own view of history and ti,:.! historian zs enunciated in the chapter on "History as a

Tha purpose of hist~~yis not to explain our ~itz~ti~~sc th~tGC CZE ~~kil~~G~JI, ui3~xi C. Wriqht Mills has called Chearful Rcbots in This Bee'. Possible of All b!orlds.lOl

In Williams' considered opinion,

history's great tradition is to help us under- stand ourselves and our world so that each of us, individually, and in conjunction with our fellcmmcn, can formulate relevant and reasoned alternatives and became meaningful actors in making history. 102

99~illiarns,"Tory-Radical,' p. 303.

101~illiarns, Contours, p. 19. Contrast the above viow of the historian with th~texFresced by Qcczr Handlip, in 15?1 ~h~nhc czutionzd historians against "making ourselves useful in the solu- tion of society's evcrchanging problems". lo3 Obviously the true historian @as not to participate in the making of history, Such involvement would undermine his objectivity.

The NEW Left historians could not accept this image of the histori~lnand hisrole in society any mure than Beard. The significanca of this is considerable. For exanple, in Williams' vieu~,history thus freed could becorne 104 a way of learning, of breaking the chains of the past.

"Written History as en Act af Faith" providcd what was, in effect, a defense for the usa of historical scholarship in the cause of reform. 105 i - lhis vjew of the historian in conjuncticn with their foreign policy assumptions created severiil related problems for the radicals, as it hzd For Beard. Williams'

"Charles Beard; the Intellectual as Tory-Radical" is

IUJHandlin, Neust!!eek, p. 58, 104 See the preface and conclusion in Williams', Contours.

lo5see Skothsim's Climate of Opinion and Beard's ----^I-y bwn article "Mritten History as an Hct of Faith." Ar~cricsn -Historical Review, XXXIX (.linuary. 1934). 219-229. extremely valuable in this respect. !/Jilliams* thoughts

problems. The Nevi Left's and Beard's view of tha historian and foreign policy forced them to develop a concept of kleltanschauung. Lltillinrns hzs defined it as a "definition of the world combined u~ithan explanation of how it works", lo' Williams* assertion that this was necessary for Beard again acts as a mirror-image of why it was also necessary for himself and the New Left. Williams suggests

that

both as a studont of history and as an acting citizen it mas vital for him (~eard)to rom- prehcnd the systbn of ideas chich first ratinnalize, and in tern further motivate, impcr ial expansion, 107

It naturzlly folLor;s t.hat the nevi revisionists

were eornpcllea to develop a canccption of the world.

Williams' explanation of why this was vital for Beard

revsals ~hyit was also necessary for the Neu Left.

This study was of key importance to Beard, for if he could cnme to grips u~iththe general view of the world that was held by the expansionists, then he could att:?ck it more directly and effectively.108

106tqiI.liarns, Contours,

107~4~illians,"Tory-Radical," p. 305. The New Left historicns' notion of Weltanschauung

American history. Very simply stated, the Open Door vieu holds that American policy makers, at least sinco the latter part of the nineteenth century, have dogmati- cally believed that American prosperity and democracy are dependznt upon continuous and ever-increasing economic expansion.lU9 The Open Door theory has formed the vcry basis of the New Left's radical interpretation of the whole of American diplomacy.

In addition, the NEW ieft is convinced that this

Open Donr view of the wortd has launch(*d th~United S+.2f=q on its imperialistic cuurse. The objective of New Left scl~cllership, in the words of Car Alperovitz, is

to got to th~rcot of tho intcrventicr~isttradi- tion so tliat, the idea or^ expansion, OF inter- vention - and tlre idea that "Freedor;t'bequires both - no longcr weaves confortably into thc basic fabric of our society - so that ordinary people arc free to sce that their inter~stsare not the same as tt)ose of the business and govern- ment institutions ti~hichnow sustajn the old ideology. lliJ

Beard also aktemptcd to get to the root of American interventionism and expansionism in his much maliqneri Open

109~eolilliams, -T;aqr?%,-- pp. 57-83 and pp. 229-243 for a detailed oxami~stionof the Open Door thenry,

llO~lperuvitz, --Cold !!Jar Essays (New York, 1970), p, 120. Door at Honlc. In this bonk, Heard offered an zlterna- tive program for the United States, It providcd for

most efficient usa of the natural resources and industrial arts of the nation at horn9 in a quest for security and a high standard of living.lll

Beard's alternative society was tb be a collec- tivist democracy. He uas convinced that this wzs the directian in which history was moving. It was to this end that he directed such schclarship. In this regard,

Beard tuould no doubt have agrtlcd ir~ithAl.perovittls deterrnir~atinnthzt the "only 'pcint of invee :..iqating tht? 1. I. 7 past is to lca=.n hov: 'ia cIz:~lluith .the future".

In the view of Al.perovitz and the h!cv: Left, the future can best be doalt ~ithif an alternative is providzd that will free America fro? its rnlisncz on the OpEn Dour.

If this is to be done,

ways must be found to slleak intelligently to thc great majority of Americans, and, with patience and committrnent to the long haul, to offer a creative alternative to ideas which so many have held For so lonq.113

'"~eard, Open Door, p. vii.

ll'blperovitz, 501-d War Essays. p. 113. ll31bid ., pp. 120-121, New Left Cold War historiography is writton nith this

,,b3:-"'4-:" is -L1 al+..rn-,tivc i~ -ind. E~visi~nist ,,,$ ULJIsIp L1i5 first step in crezting an alternative to what th y con- strue as American imparialism.

This rationale aninatss the work of Gabriel Kolko.

He states that

by understanding the meaning of that poriod (1343- 1909) we comprehend our own decade in microcnsrn and th.3 challenges we Face in breokinq the par~lyz- ing grip of a thirty-y~ar-old crisis in inter- national relations ovcr the future of all man- kind. 114

Kolko is of the opinion that "in vieicing the genc:.is of the challenge oS our time wa hold a mirror to curselves, 115 the problems LUZ cunfront, znd t+tc saurcc CF uur m3laisc".

in the future. "Every war generates myths that serve to ' justify and perpetuate it, and the cold war has baen no exception, "11' The distortion of reality by these myths has created a pu5lic consensus that imposes serious restraints on future flexibility, The myth of American

innocence in the Cold War must be sct straight. Unless

The Politics of Mar,

116~orowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam -- (middlosox, 1967), p. 11. Also p'&lished as The Frse World Colossus. thn myths of two d~cadssof cold \liar can be replaced with premisc:s more firnly rootpd in r~ality. the pros; ycts for pcaco will grow dirn.il5

This x~ovld severely inhibit the New Left's creation of an alt~rnativeAmcrican sociaty.

A similar motivation h2s subtly undcrlincd the writinqs of Walter LaFektor. In --Arn~rir-n, Rrcr:si?, and thp Cold War, 1945-1966, LaFebcr has deplored the United

States' post-19a5 foreign policy because of its preaccupa- tion with anti-communisn. He has alsc warned of the

powsr could most profitably be t~scd",118 ~t almost goes without saying that such an analysis ~ot.,iLd contributs immeasurably to the crcation of a nevj Americz. LaFeber has noted that this "would be a Promethean - or Sisyphezn 119 effort".

Though the New Left dipl.omztic historians are vitzlly int-erestod in creating a nev; society in America, they are quite vague about its shape, UnFortunately, even

Williams, uho is the most helpful in this regard, has

ll'~a~eber,Cold Wac, p. 259. the majority of Americans must be prescrlted with something nnu ta 13ok at so their choices will no longcr be circumscribed ~~itha hundred ys~rs of imperial consciousness. 121

If the Americans are presentee! with a neu conccp.t;inn of freedom, "they have the chance to create the first truly democratic socialism in the umrldw. This is the tzsk at which the New Left Cold P13r hbstorizns, as a group, have directed thzir ef'fnrts.

foreign affairs 113s lcd them in this direction. Tn so doing it has raised severzl quastians. For oxarplc, is the Open

Door Weltanschauung that they attrihutc to fimcrican policy makers since at least the latter part of the nineteenth- century accurate? IF not, what is one to makc of their

120~ee Milliarns, The Great Ev3sion (~hicprjo,lgf~d), *----- pp. 167-176, and the last two page:, of his The Roots- of tho Mndern Ameriran Empire-- (NEW York, 1969).

12'~lichacl meeropol, OW. A. Williams' Historio- graphy," Radical Aaerica,--- IU, KO. 6 (Aug., 1~70),29-53. 1221dilliarns, --Contours, p. 480. 1s it possible that their it~F?itanschau!~nqhas resuitf~d from their radical desire to changz Amzrica in the direc- tion of soci-alism? 3ill.ii2rnu has stated that

if we can understand . . . history as a prelude to accepting it, and accept it as a prelud~to chsrigirrg those ic. as and Fjol.icies, thcn . . . America can give the other , . . peoples of the world a chance to make their nvm history by acting on our ovJn responsibility to make our own history. 123

An attempt will be made to deal with thesc questions

123!~illiams, VuLinrn Anpriciin --C~ira, F. xxiv. THE NEW LEFT HISTOHIAMS AND THE COLD WkH

This chapter will try to answer the question, whether the New Loft historians, as students of histcry have made any substantial cantrihution to the histarin- graphy of the origins af the Cold War? It is important to recognize that the Neu~Left writers are writing as students of histc~ry. This awarEness than allu:.ils one to facus on their analysis rather than on the question of wh~theror

more serious violations af histurical schol~r-ship,1

However, it is first necesszry to outline briefly their immediate prec~ecessars' interprstntinn as still accepted in such widely used textbooks as John Spnnler's

American Foreiqn Policy Since LtJorld lllar I1 (1967) and John Lukacs' --A History of tho Cold War- (1961). This interpse- tation has be~nsuccinctly and somewhat crudely presented

he assessmsnt of Nea Left Cold War historio- graphy undertaken in this chapter is of a limited nature. It is concerned with what may be considerrtd the New Left historians' most important contributions to Cold lhr literature. by Henry Pachtcr as follnr.i:.;t

After k'orld Lhr 11 the Soviet Union tried to expan? its power through military conqucst and Cnnr~unjstuprisings in as many countrias as possible. But it was restrainnd by vigorous counteraction of the L.'t?:tern po~crswhich "contained" the Soviet advznce by neasurcs of mutual assistance short of v:ar. Fortunately, United Stztes* opinion had abandoned isolationism and America now !.as ready to assume its responsikililias as a great world power dedicated to the principlg of cuilcctive sccurity.2

Formulated during the late 1940s and early 1950s, an era of rapidly deteriorating SnvieL-American relations, the nrthodnx intorpr~t~kir~cr~tlrl~rz Pm~rfri-n pn?Fi*;t rnnrp? dofensiut? and Cilm~stpsssjvd in thc face of scr\nrssless 3 Scviet expansion, Conssquantly, they acccpCed as proper the Americzn rejectior-, nf any agr~crcnton ~phzrcsof influence and ths dcvciopr~cntof a counter strategy, con- 4 tainment. In general, it is against this point of view that the Ncw Left historians hav~struggled, Perhaps svcn

'~nnr~Pachtcr, 'Rcvisionist Hlsturians and ths Cold War," Dissent (NOV.-Dec., 1968), p. 505.

3~emhersof the orthodox school now oftkn contcnd that the Cold Nar resulted from the fzilure of both sides. Louis J. Halle, ------The Cold Mar as History (London, 1967) emphasizes historical determinants.

'~orrnan A. Graebner. "Cold War Ori~ins... and tho Con- tin~~inqDebater A Review of Rccent Literaiure," Journa- I of Conflict Resnlution, XI11 arch, 1969), 125-7. more important, the radiczl historians have also strug- gled aqainst their predecessors' dstach~dconception oF the historian. In the former's opinion, the latter's view of the historian has not served thcm nor the pro- fession particularly well. According to the neLv revision- ists, it allowed the orthodox historizns to uncritically accept tho containrnunt doc~rina.~This is significant because the Now Left's vieiu of the historian (as critic) is similarly intertwined ~~iththeir analysis of the Cold

War.

Any meaningful assessment 07 the New Left his-

of the Cold Kar ncst First cansidcz th~z0r4 of the early

6 Carr, Ik~LtcsLippc~nn, and Henry Wsl. lace. This assassr-ent is neccssa.;y to d,,ti.,rninc the extent. or" the idew Lzft his- torians' contribution, whether the nem revisionists have

'~hristo~hsrCasch, "The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed.* To~e~ards----- A N~LYPnst: DisscnL'------..-"JI Essavs in American ~istory7idcwYork, 1~6'/'J-2:!-35~. --A This excellent $ticla analyzes the social. corfditions under which historians OF the 1950s worked. merely recast old views in a new way.

aspects of Co1.d !f!ar orthodoxy. Yet they are not in cnm- plete agraencnt. Carr, then an assistant editor of -The Times, turotg an editorial on iiovernber 5, 1944, v~hich produced the first indication of support for cjhat later bccame the NEB Left's interpretation in the 1960s. This editorial is of considerable value to the Neuj Left his- torians because it defended Russian predoninznce in

Eastern Europe before thc Churchill-Stalin spheres of inFlucncc agreement wzs made public. Tho new revisionists

prcviotrs west.clrn zct, the Gerna~iinvasion of l9hl.

Russia, like Great Oritain, has no aqqrcssive or expunsive dosiqns in Eurepe. ;ghat she wants on her Western fr~ntieris security. What she asks fsnn her tllestern neighbors is a guarantee, the extent and form of which u~illbe det-.rrnined mainly by the experience af the past t~enty-five years, that her security shall not be exposed to any threat from or across their territories. Admittedly she is unlikely to regard with favour intervoiition by other Grc2at Powers in these countries.

But Great Dritain has traditionally rssistod such intervention in thr Coru Countries or in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, snd the United States in Central America - reaions which these two pottjers have properly adjudged vital to thsjr security. It vjould be inconqruous to ask Russia to renounc-r? similar right of reassurrncs; and it would be foolish as uoll as somewhi Carr's acceptance and dsf~nseof the idea that a postw?,r Sovict sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was

wa.2 fully cjevclupt:cj by Malter Lipprnann in The Cold Mar

(1947). Lipprnann perceived the exi.stencs of a Russian problem but he rejected the official Arerican plan for solving it.

Perceptive a, C~rr'sa,nd Lippn3nn's aiialysis of

ad\~af1~5!r!the nlo!;.k p2;c;l:isive si;.tcn:t..::t of the revizionis'c

questions to which the Nea Left historians have rsturned.

Haw do 4morican actiefis since V-J Cay appeEr to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete thing like $13 hillion for the Liar & Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atovtic bomb and continued prodgction of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our wezip+-r~s,production of 0-29's and plznncd production of B-36's and the effort to secure air bascs spre:ld over half th? globe from which the cthcr haif CC the q?cbe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to thg rest of the world as if we Luerc only payinq lip service to

7~ditorial,---Tho Times- (Londcn), Nu". 6. 1944, 7. 8. peace at the conference table.

Thcsc fncts rather sskc it appczr cit!-i~~(1) bi IU CI we arc preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitabln or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mmkind. How would it look to us if Hussia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers .nd air bases within 1,Of10 miles of our coasC- ines, and iw d ld not?e

Long before the new revisionists emerycd, !Cal;cce asserted, in his letter Lo Truman, that United States - Russian rslations brcke dnan For tv~oreasons r first, because the DeFence Department acquired air bases close ta the Soviet Union, and, second, because of t,h~United

States monopoly of thc atom bn~h, Kallacn's cnntentiocs

\]:ere lztcr to occupy a esntrnl p33cc in the vorks of

The asscrtians made by Waflaca also found a cen-

tral place in 8lacl:~tt'sFear, Nar and the Banb,- written

in 1948. Written before tkc publication of later docu-

ments, some of which vindicate its conc1,usions to a

remarkable degree, Blackntt cogently developed Four major

contentions upon ~hichthe Now Left aould later extensively

rely in its analysis of thz origins of the Cold War.

'cited in Denna Frank Flaming, -Ths------Cold Car and Its Orinins, Vol. I (London, 1961), pp. 420-21. GO

First, since the casualty fiqurcs S~OVJ~~that most of tho

figbkir?c; i~ t,+c szr ~4~sdone by gsd ?,r;;,y ~1-LIIC

eastern front., Eussia's snnsitivity about her viestern land

frontiers must be appreciated. Second, as Japan was already

thinking in terms of surreridor by July 1945, and the

Americans did not intond to invade before November, the

haste to drop the first atom bomb on August 6 becomes com- prehensible only in vicw of Stalin's determination to bring the Soviet Union into the war on August 6 - with, presumably, the intentien of making the same gains in

Russia noLu in progross. " Third, the American (Baruch) Plan for controlling atomic wapons ensured the wcakcning of Russia's military and economic positic!~. Finally, the obvious Soviet solution both to America's atomic bomb monopoly and to the doctrine oP "instnnt and condign punish- ment" contained in the Raruck Plan must be to advance her 61 fi p - * 4. -- , . .- ?* c. *.. .- L. .. .. - - IF! kt I rzbt..i~~..t LLJI~L.,GL:.> ?&c -7r~ififiussia as pussible.

Implicit in Olbckott's analysis were two arguments which have proved invaluable to the New Left's interpre- tation. First, if Rul;sia1s position in Europe in 1945 could be understood in the li~htOF her experience of repeated invasions from the ~!~est,hcr consolidztion of that position after 1945 shou1.d bc equally understood '1 the light of Hiroshima, of America's new and apparLntly perniancnt air bases, and of thr? Baruch Plan. Second, the

Truman adiiinistration's decision zfter Rocs~v~L~;*sdsath

, Eastern Europe %as the r~sulinot of arty ncc: Soviet zcts during the crucial perir?d I+.:il. 1945-Jznb~ry 2945 br;t of an American i.evc.:.sol of policy. In cffoct, !uhnt; hctd ci-ranqe4.! was not Soviet policy but tho v~ostornview of it, due pes- sibly to pressure excrtnd by the State Department and the new menbcrs OF the Trumen c~binet,who werG militant anti- ce. :~unistsand had rejected Roas~v@lt'swartirm attempts to 11 conciliate Rue-Paa~a. . - 10 Blackstt developed thosc points in his book, Atomic -Neanons-- and---- F?~t-!~'?stRelations (Cambridge, 1956). Cited in Grian Thomas, "Cold War Origins," 11, Journal of -Contcmp~rary History, I11 (~~ri.1,1968), 107-188. ll~svidHoroxit.7 in his bock, Frnn Yalts-- to Vietnern (~iddlcsex,19~7) has emphasized the effect of I ~man's changes in his cabinet on Amnrican foreign policy. See pp. 51-62. Walter LaFeP nr, for example, has demonstrated

anxieties and of Arncrica's responses urnpa dus not to Russian actions but to America's interpretation of them. l2 New

Left ariters like !iJilliarns, Alpsrovitz, Horowitz and LaFeber also concur with Blackett's contention that United Statos policy toward the Soviet Union dramatically shifted after

Truman became President. This change in policy began u~ith

Trumen's "get tough" speech to Molotov concerning Russia's attempt to lower an iron fence around Poland. A surprised Molotov, Pcnplc's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied,

"1 have never been talked to like that in ~y life." "Car?y out your agscer::cnt.s, " the Pr%~idi.iitssid, "arld yc:~~tv~cn' t ,, 13 get talked to likz that. It is cviricnt from this brit:f account thht the ncu revLsiunists have relied to a gr~at

major flru. If Blackett was correct, and if it was the

United States and nut the men in the Kremlin ~horcfused to cooperate, the reasons FOP this decision are not mad2 immediately apparent by Blackett, 1tJhat v~oul-dcause the

American government to reCxch svch a fateful decision?

12%lter LaFeber. America. Russia. and the Cold

13~arryS. Truncn, Plecoirs, Pol. I, Yeor of Decisjons (Garden City, N. Fear and dislike of dictatorial govarnmsnts might be one reasonl but as the New Left histurians have emphasi7ede these existed outside the communist czrnp, and their number was likely to incrcase in places like Spain and

Greece, A secnnd possibil.jty, Fear of a Russian invasion of Western Europe, ivhich UJ~Sprominent in orthodox inter- pretations of the origins of Cold War, was not taken seriously by the Truman administrnlion. George Kennan, srchitecL OF the containment theory, has substantiated this vieupoint. In May 1965, 2.t a lecture delivered at the Graduate Institute of International Studics at Genev~,

Kennan stated that

Such a procedure, he pointed gut,

fitted neither with the requircrncnts of thc Marxist doctrine, nor with Russia's om urgent need for recovery Fronr thc dev~stz~tinr~af a long and exhausting war, nor with what was knomn abcut the temperarnzr.tt of the Soviet dictatcr himself. l4

14~oorg2F, Kennan. "Philosopl~yand Strategy in An~orica's Postwar Policy," a locturc delivsred at Lha Graduate Institute of Internati~nalStudies, G€?nel~a, flay 11, 1965, Yet, orthodox historians havs maintained that only resolute

Ancrican actinn by means of the containment doctrine savcd 15 Western furoi~crrom Soviet aggression. Anothsr reasan for Mashington's refusal to cooperate

with Russia in the imediat's postwar period might have been

American fear of conmunisn~. However, as Isaac Deutschcr,

a tcachzr of the Naw Left generation, has shown in his

biagrzphy, --Stalinr A Political Biocjrsphy (1549), the SOV~E~leader prover' himsclf to be one of thc most consar-

vativs leaders in the world, Stalirt's record of non-eo-

operation with the cam~unistleaders of China and Yugoslavia,

Mao and Tito, supports Doukschc,r? ccontsnti.c.;.i. Tho idea

thnt tke Soviet statesmen v~as3 promoter of coiiinunist

expansion outside Russia, nt thzt time, is not sugpartad 16 by the available evidence.

151n the orthodox interpretation, tllc Nzrshsll Plan and the Truman Doctrine forn the ba;.::Dana of the If( untainrnent dcctrine".

16~01kohas written nxtensicnly about Stalin's con- servatism. In regard to Eastern Europe, For example, Kolko contends that tht? comnt~nizaticnof that region constituted Russia's reaction to hostile Western policies rather than the unfolding of Stalin's design. "In fact L~JGno$! know," Kolko writes in his The Polliics of War (N~LuYor!~, ------7 1960) that the Russians . . , had no intention of Bolsheviz- ing Eastern Europe if--but only if--they CCtiJld find alter- natives" (p, 619). In a braader ccntrxt, Kolko notes that "The Americans and British salt] the cmerqrnce a? the Left zs rrlatod jn sonp vital way to Russia rathzr than to the col- lzpse of capitalism znd calunialisrr! throughout the world." According to Galko, it is ironic that "the two gent~inr>ly popular Communist parties to take po~l~er--inYugoslavi.:~ and China--did so avcr Soviet obJect.ions and advice, and were The Neu: Loft historians have emphasized that the

Rumania, a country whose troops had actually invaded

Russia in support of Hitler, the Soviets first attempted to govern u~iththe Communists in a minority. Two weeks after Yaltn, ho~?ver,Stalin brutally demanded that the

Cornnr~nistparty obtain powar within two hours to restore order or Russia would "not be responsible For the con- tinuance of Rumania as an independent state". On the other hsnd, tho Soviets supervised elections which allot d a non-

Communist qovernment to gain paivnr in Hungary, suffered an overtvhclmina dcfeat in election; in the R!tcqi:>n-cnn- trolLcd zones or Austria, held clcctians in Rulc%ria, it:hich satisfi~d British if not American sffic:k.~ls, an[; acquicsccd

qovernment in Finland, a nation against which the Russians had Fought a bloody war in 1939-1940, if that government iuould follotu a foreign policy friendly to Russia. Historical events, particularly the two German invasions, led Stalin 17 to plsce Poland in the sane category as Ruc.!ania, not Finland.

the first ta brcal.: the hegemony af the world movement" ------Pol.itic3 of War, p. 36. In From --YaLta --.---.-----. to Vietnam Ilornv~itzdevelops De~~tvchcr's thesis that the 5talinization of Eastern Europe was estzh- lishsd cnly after the Truman Doctrine in 1947' (pp. 96-90). Tha orthodox interpretation has aktri.bt.!tc?r: to

,,,,sisRr.: 3 l;Llicpof iii"xorebla p~~,ti~l~~~,-,1ii 5 i! u LI -i i.: LI , they havc too ofton ot.~er?cinkerithe significance of the irnm~diatapost,nar period which is essential 'co z meaningful analysis of the Go1 r In addition, nnn-rnvisionist historians havo simnly cliumi.ss~dthis crijcial 1945-1.945 period as the prc?lttda, a shre~i~dSoviet plan to a11sy

Amarican suspicions until the American Army evacuated

Eu~ope,to ttle later consolidation and expansion of Hussian poucr in east-central Europz, Bcrnstein has commented thzit, "from this perspnctive, ho::;ever, mu h of Stalin's

an area of "friendly govcri~riients," u;I-iy, 9eukschcr asks, did hc "so stubbornly rc~fuseto make any concessions to thz 19 Poles over thcir castern frontiers?" Similarly, it is difficult to und~rstandStalin's demsnd Par reparations from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumznia if he eventually planned to seize control of thzse n~ticns, It logically fo?.log:s that, if Stalin had decided to turn Eastarn Europa into a

"iiartun J. Rernstsin, cd., kfittcs------..-and Policies - -of th? Truman- Adminjstration (~hicaqo,f3'lO1, p. 38, 67 satellite of the Soviet Union, he nould not have to con- cern hi;riseli" r;;ith eithci; rzp:2lati2ns or the Pzlir-h issir?,

!dith t/hese nations as satellites of fCosco~~,Stalin v~ould have a free hand,

If A?uric~infear of communism in 1945, dislike oF police state;:, nDr fear ec a SGV~;?~zttack an w;?stern

Europ-3 dctermin~!dA~crican policy tu~~ardMoscow, what did?

Thus the question remains, why did the Truman adninistra- tion, in 1965 or 1945, decide not to negotiate with Russia but rather seek to co~pslthe Soviet Uninn to abandan

Eastern Europe os the Neu Left historians have charged? , . To make their chzE2en~~ata the or'it~cdox intr:ri:rei;:~~.c:i~: crc?df bla , thc F.'cv: Lcft !-i:i.r;i;ori.:ins necrl a noiivc? Far s~jch nv.apiniknf:ey..uu4,.. firn~ric2n~rt?an. That motive is t\~cid22 of the o?~nDour as d~vf:Ic?~dhy th8 lil~jcrNc?~ Left U.!"~.iter~~.

It is here that tho New Left histo~i~i-ishave made thair major contribution to the historiography OF the origins of the Cold War,

The influ~ntialNew Lcft historian ~~hohas dane most to develop and promote the idea of the Open Dao:- and a revisionist interpretation of the bcginninqs of thc Cold

War is Oilliam Appleman \~Jillizims, He has argued persuasively that the history OF American diplomacy throughout the tv~entieth-century has becn the history oP the Open Coor policy. "lo stzbilize the world in a pro-Ameiican oq~ii-

libriurn" has becn the nininum abjectrive of United States po1.icy; and "to institutianalizn American expansionw

,< .- ;= ? its cp t i:.;~;::&,-. .L 2e T!-+c cz;-j bjz2, ii-i~~!-?~z...r...-.*L.,~J.AAUIJIJ .-:VIC~, must bc interpreted as thc latest phase oF a coi~tinuing effort tn maka the wnrld safe for Am~ricandemocracy and

American capitalism, a phase in which the United States fc ~d itself increasingly cast as the leader of a world- 21 wide counter-reucjlution. This policy was consciously and deliberstely embarked upon, uJilliarns argued, because

American statesmen bslievsd that Amcrican capitalism needed ev ;:-expanding fareign markets in order to survive.

Eastern Europe =as obvicusly a prime asca For Awerican

'lsee Chriotophor Lasch, "The Cold $Jar, Revisitad and 3cvisioned," N. Y. Tinoc Mzaazin~,-zLr.p Jan., 14, 1968, pp. 26-35 For an excr?llent analysis nf ll!il.lirms' Opcn Dqs: interpretation,

22~nthe opinion o the New Left historians, thj central. dynamic of Amarican diplomacy sincs thc 1.090s has been an ever increasing domestic economy "Lha ddei?isndcd 3 continua?. search For f'orciqn markets en:fibin:?d w:;i th a 1-omr- ing of foreign tariff's (the Op~nDoor). The Cold $Jar was thn apathe0si.s oC this inevitable devclcpment. Though thc NEW Lcft school of historians are in agroencnt on the above, they can be divided into at least trun qroups. The dct.rsrrni17ir.t n~mberssiich as Gabriel Kolko and David Horawitz zra cnnvinccd that the internal strcc- tural rcquir~rr!entsof a rnstura cc~~.i.talj.st;icArn~rica, more than the deFccts of pr?rsonelity, arc resporisibln for 9:ashington1s expansionist foreign policy. Holuevcr , others, such 2s !4ill.i.arn Applontan B?ilLi'ams, 69 determined to expand the Open Door principle of trade and 73 investment intn areas under Souin+, rnntrol . Williams maintzir-,ed that, during the early years of the Cold 'I!ar, the United Statcs hzd "a vast proportion of actual as well as potential power vis-5-vis the Soviet

Union". The United States "cznnst ~ithany real warrant or meaning c:a.fn that it has been FO3CCD to Follow a certain approach or policy". 24

Lloyd C. Gardncr and :kltsr LcFeber, havc givcn mora emphasis to the importance that simplistic and rnisquidcd ideas or ideals rnzy b~ unrelated to the nature of Ancrica's ocanornic system, lf.!h?;tei,-~r t.heir p:*rt.icular crnphasis, tho ?Jnl*! !.?TC. h.icf,t?ri??:- lrc i:: ::i;r:z:::r;t t!-,l;_b_A,:.;-ric;n i-'a;rr;l.ui; policy has d?fc:cdcd the cnpi:alist olrj order 2nd apposc3 leftist f~ovemcntsarourld the mnrld.

24~illinrns,--LTraqodv * p. 208. 8s Lasch has pointed out, it is helpful to conpara this with a statemrnt by Schlcsinqer, a defendcr of Cold :'Jar orthodoxy: "The Cold War could have been avoided only if the Soviet Union had not been possessrd by convictions both of the infaf- fi ility of the Co~munistu~@rd arid of the inevitability of a Conrnunist r:urld." Arthur Schlesin3~r,Jr., "Origins of the Cold !#Jar," -----.4Foreian Affairs,- XLVI (~ctober,1967), 52. In questioning the orthodnx vies that Unitcd

Sthies postti:a: palicy icss orirnarily a r~spon~-Pt~ rrmnrzr- less Soviet expansjcn, the blew Left historians, l~dby

Williams, have nnde z majnr contribution to the history of thn Cold \Car. This questianin~has given the revision- ists nem pcrspcctiv~s. It has enabled then, in part, to return the controversy surrour?ding the oricjins OF the Cold tijar to the dipfon?ai;ic arena. It has remained For the Neiv

Left historians to emphzzizc that, in 1945 and aftor, tho

United States and not tho Soviet Uninn had the luxury of alternatives, Far ex-ample, the Unitad St '.c:s held vast

mad^ in I1!ashingtun to prescrvs and expand the @en Door in the critical period after the war, not Masco~v, were largely 26 responsible for the breakdown of tha wartime cealition, - 25~naddition to tl~~seRn~rican powcr advilntilges, Russia tiad been dcvzstatod by lilo~ld'!far II. See Isazc Deutselicr, "iJyths of the Cold Mar," in David Horou~itz, ed,, Containncnt and Ec~o~ution(London, l96i'), pp. 13-14.

26~osce the Cold War according to Gardner simply as part "of an ackicn--reaction syndrome in which one side or the otbc?r was totally justified, or for which neither side was responsit~lo,oversimpLifies matters," Gardner rather suqgests, given our ignorance of much of Soviet policy, that Nashinqton was more responsible "for th~way Pcrh~psa ~~ordProm Do3n I chcson, a major architect of

America's Cold LCzr policys is il l\lrninsi:inq in this rgs-

pest. "As long as thcre is a great disparity of pomr

whjch makes negotiations seem to be unnecessary to one

side, that causzs them to believe that they can accom-

plish their purposes it~ith0~tit". 27 Granted diplomacy is

interaction amenq pc::crs, but in cortain situntions such

as thc irninudiat~lljorld Mar I1 period as Acheson has pointed

out un~ittingly,the pre:domin%nt pouJer,in this cas6 tho

United States, is apt Lo fore~ogenuine negotiation because

it is convinced that it can accomplish its objectives with-

out it. Such cjsre the circurnstanczs it) the irncdiata post-

war period.

P~ssiblythis is v~hy Llppzann" test to dc.crnlne

Soviet ccinduct and purpose. This action uiould drzst,ically

alter the balance of puwr, the Kremlin wculd appreciate

this, and the United States thereFore

in which the Cold Kar doveloped , . . fiecause7- it h. d much greater opportunity and far more options to influence the course of events than the Soviet Union, ichcsc situz- tion in victory ms Rorse in some ways than that of tho defcatod countriesw Archi tncts of Illusinn: Men and Idc:as ------I ---_.-- - in Amo~icanForcion Policy, 1911.-3 Y49 vilicarjo, 19707, p. - -*-- - 317. Unfortunztely, as the Nerd Left historians, aidcd by

Lippmannts pcrccptive criticism oF contains :nt, have established, the Unitr?d States, dealing from a pnsi-tion of unassailable superiority, tms in no mod to co~prornise~

Instead of the course advocated by Lippnann, Amcrican offici.als lzunckt?d a diplc~atic.offensive to prevent Russiz from cansclidating or expanding her spkar-(2 nf inffucnce in

ta crploy its vzst ecannmic suprtmacy ta f'orca 9u~siato accede to America!, cfernznd~ for an open world, 30 Acccrdinq

L U Lippmann,

29~~eLipornannls Cald Uar*-- f~ra brilliant criticur of the contai.nnont doctrine tind how that pol.iey ums doom~d fram its inception. ""~olko, in hfs ------Th? Limits of Fou.ar, is io agrau- merit with LaFet~nr. In Kclko's jt~rlr;mani tilt: Unitcu Stat~~ "excrqed Frnm the car self-conscious of its nciu strsngth and confident of its ability tu direct world rccons!ruc- tion along lines compztibla with its goa?s." The objec- tives cf !l!auhington's po! icymzkcrs vdcre "to restructure 73 to LaFeScr's brilliant artdlysis, the Unitcrl States buiSt its initial post-Ncrlri ?ar 11 forci2n policy unon four major assumptions. W2shinqton offici~lsfirst asscvnd that foreign policy qrcm directly fram domcstjc policy and not primzrily fran cutsj.de pressures, The s~ectre of anot' :r depr~ssionh

Statos would not sit cn thc sidelines for it cc~uldnot 31 arford to do so.

A week after Japan was dsfeatcd, Secretary of State

James F. Eyrnes aFfirmn3 that initial Americ~npostwar policy wns bassd upon thcs~four 3ssunptions. Noting khst

the omrld so that I\r;.aric::n buslncss could trado, apcrnte, and profit i~~ithoutreseriction~ cvary~~here" Limits cf-- POLL!~~,p. 2. #Iour intern~itionalpolicies and our dornest.ic poli-cles

7.-- - ' " ' LA A ,., . , it; ~t~;iir;t~;iii d th~t"OLIJ? roreic~nrcia-

tions inevitably affcct enploymerit in the Unitcd States,

Prosperity ~nddnprassion in the United States just as

inrfvjtably zffuct our relztions wjth the other nations of

ths world." The Secrztary stated his "firm cnnvictinn

thzt a durahl~pea-e cannot be built on an economic faun- dation of exclusive blocs . , . and economic u~arfare, (A libsral trading system) imposes special responsibilities upon those ~~hooccupy a dominant position in world trade.

Such is thc position of the United States," U!ith his

our palitizal and ccnriclrnic crecd is in conflict ~ithidoo-

loqies which reject. both OF these pri-nciples. To the extent that vJe ars ahl~. tn mansgo nilr domestic affairs successfully, uJe shall %in canvcrts to our crer in every land, "32 The United Stat~simplemented this goal with resolve.

American officials hoped that they coul achieve the

32~ayrnond Dennett an%!Robert K. Turncr. ed..- - - Documents on Arn~ricnnForeiqn Rclnti.nns, Val. ~III,' ----I'--.------L--- -19/15-1045 (Princeton), 1940, 6Lll-6132, 3 f:?on~tary Fund, Thesc agcncies would, if successful, guarantee the integrity of tht: Op n Door. American officials uorc crjnfider-lt-, thst Jchsac? agr:nciss "u~ouldmini- mize cxclusiv? and explosive nationalism and maximize econonric ~ndpol j tical interchanqe. ,, 34 It wzis not without significznce for Soviet security in Eastern Europe that

American econoinic power automatiicaiXy assured the United

States control of these sr,pposedly international agencies.

It ~ouldappeer that the New Lcft historians'

tariff walls at hon!a and abroad, However, one major doubt disturhzd Amarican officials: would a11 the forncr Allies, primarily Britain, France and Russia, plzy ths game accord- ing to Amcriczn rulcs? By 1946, Great Britain and France had for the most part given the appropriate answers, Tho

- --- dcvoFCi~~sepoints in detail.

34~a~eber,Cold ?Jar, 1945-3456, p. 17. refused tn play thz game according to American rules. It was largely for this ruzson that the United States could not devclnp its n;tjltil.ateral appreach for the world through

policy XIS its dsternination to retain zn exclusive American sphcrc of infltlensc in the Mestern Hc~isphcrc, A State

Department mern~sandum of late Juna 1945 inFasned Truman that although sphsrcs of interest d?d in fact exist in

35!~!ashi~ngton's Open Door vision of thc world had other Far rcachinn ramifications for L!nitrr3 States forcig? policy. As Kolkn hzs noted, the necessary conclusion of this vision "was the belief tl~atsocialism, state omer- ri~ip,and Third ?nrld ecanomic d~velapmentwsre funda- munt2lly inimicnl to American g1ob?I objectives" --L;mits ----of POL~JF~,p* 13.

U. S., Depsrtflent of stat^, Panors------.. Relatinn - to the Foreinn RL-lntia:.is nf thc 1;niti.d qt-te:.: fhe I:crni~renr.c -----. - -..-----_-*- _- -HerlFr7--- - (fJatsdS3--- (Wast.ingi~~~,l9~0), 1, 262-2brt. 77

This policy statement reveal.ad the contrzdictory nature

r:f Amerf can dipl~rnncy, The rt?vtsinnirts havn nraL3erly stross~dthis dilonns. Though the United States ~vas opposed to sphzros of interest in Europe, it acted to secure its awn sphcre of interest in the Mestern hemis- phore. bJo. hin~tonachieved this ob jectivu through Article

51 of the Unitcd Nations Charter, formulated by Senator

Vandenberg and Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller. Article 51 provided for collective self- defense throt:r,lh special reqjonal organizations to be farmrd out?i.de the !Jnitcd Vatin! 5, br~ttjnden: the princi- a1.e~of ths Charter. Seriztor Vc?..ndenb~::c ty;jii'ied i;ne

exclusive Amcriczn poxor in the Net$~and the right to 38 exert Arscricsn pntcqr in tha Old,

Russia refused to accopt Ari?oric;t's concnpt of the world.

Soviet accept~nce07 thc Open Boor would probably have rneznt American econanic domination sf Eastern Europe,

Therefore, as some of the early critic af the ccmtainn3rt policy, in particular tjallacz, tippmann end Blackctt., haw2 pointed nut, th~Russians refused to play the gs~raccording --- 78 to Amoricrsrl ri~ler;, and, instc:iri of b~incncorrt,a.inrd, they

the Open Door to Soviet sccurity in Eastern Europe, have ccinsiderab!y ex ~ndudthis expla, ;tion. They have shown that the Amcrican cancc:t of open-uarld diplomacy crashed against Stalin's maj~rarr?a of concern, Eastern Europe.

As early as 1941 and 1942, u~henthe Nazi army apyroached

Moscotii, Stzlin insisted to Oiest~rnofficials that postwsr

the Gcrmzn army at Staiingrarj.

dsm!r1. .; For an o;;cn tvorld for hc cclu.ld not affced to do sn.

Aztfior he corlst-uctt Soviet postuar policy on the &ssump- tinn that it was necessaTy to mnintain Russian freedom OF action in Eastern Europe, an arca Sialin dcnned csssntiol tn Soviet security. He relied less on the Fomalitics of

39~ntt~onyEden has cnnijrmcd that Stolin asked for recognition OF hi. .June 1941 Frontiers zs early as the fol lowing Decenbzr. Cited in Thovas, "Cold LJzr Criqins, " II, 191-192. the LJnitpd Natio;ls Charter tt?an had th2 Unitcd Strr-7tcr;

(Article 51). He accc.jxglishcd Soviet security in a mnre ruthless mznnzr, thrw~ghthe Red Amy's occupation and ccnsequent com!qunizntinn cf East.c:rn Europe, Extreme personal a~bktioncnd fearxist Doctrin~,partlyaeccuntcd for Stalin's poliel~sin this area. Eut the great Russian demand for security and econonic rehabilit:qtinn madc this policy in$arati\rc. Stalin wcs in a pradicarnent. In order to recrtvor quickly ocono* icnlly, he would require American capital, since the United States possesc~dthc only abun- dant capii. .l rrsotlrces in the cor3.d. l'Jaltc.,r LaTcber has

b L Washington ivzs awarc of, and attempted to capstali~c on, Stalin's problem, It was pzrtly for this reason that

Averell Harririar?, a principal United States policy maker

policy with Russia. Ha adviszd that such tactics would ccmpel the Soviet Union to follou~the American !-nt~rcretation of the issues in dispute lika Pularr ', th~Uniierf Pjations

40 LaFebnr, -..-Cold ':Jar, p, 10. Ril veto, and rpparations. Cecause the Russjzn novern~~nt

*lr..,,dtr, a.cT. I~L~C>)~:,~!~AC .-.--..--.!;i:-;~~str-tn~~) . . . irt iheir :.econ-

. , struction," arid because Stalin did not wish to break it:. zh

Washington, Harriman ms sanvinced Truman "could stand

Firm on imps;-tank issues without running serious risks,"

As early as Jarluary 1944, liarriman had emphasized that

"thn Sotlint Govf?rn3nnt vl8ce? the utmnst inport nrn cn our coaperation" in providing econonic assi!:,tance; and he hed concluded that "it is a factor which should be inte- grated into the fabric OF our ovcrall relations. "41 Rftcr an early policy dispute in xhich Genaral Georqc Xarshatl,

ChinF CC "-?----$IC.15.. th:. Rrwy OF StyfF, 2nd S:-r;r..t?.;rt. I - 5t.i msan recoia~enrfed ~:a~:tii?n,I rurr:r.;n opbd for r'zrrrtni?n'c; po I. icy.

Having rs~detlis d~ci~sion,th~ Presid?:nt d~cidadto bring the Pal.lsh issue tp-, a s~lctCinnfzvot~i 3lc to the

United State:;. Truran resolved to enforce his interpre- tation of the Yaita cgreement, regarding reprcsr?ntztion in the restructured Polish government, even if it wrecked the United Nations. He later explained that this uJas the test of Soviet coo~cration. IF 5tal.in ~~oi~ldncL adhere tn his agrcernsnts, Tru~anreasonad that khc United b!ations was

"~itsd in Rcrnstoin, Politics and Policies,--.. pp. 25-36. doornad. "Our anrer:me;>ts u:ith tho Soviet Union so far

tinue, Trumen informcd his advisers that "if the Russians did not wish to join us, they could go tn hell. ,' 42

The President's militant mood u!as evident in hi- 43 April 23, 1945 talk aith Molntav, Truman warned that economic aid would deu2nd mholly uucn Russian behzviotir in executing the Yalta agreement. The new President acted in such a manner evFn though sonn American officials believed the Yalta aqrc:cfi~ent w35 open to two interpretations.

Admiral Leaky had remarked to Prerid2nL Roasevalk that thc

herence to tha Rmerican interpretation when thc agreement was so vague.945 The h!cw Laft historians havs chergsd that

Truman adopted his uncompromising attitirde because the extonsion of the Open Door into Eastern Europe was inv~lved,

42~hid.,- pp. 26-27.

43~orTrumn's lecture ta Molotov on thzt accnsion, see footnote 1.3 in Chdptor I1 of this paper.

45~~~Herz's bco4, ----acoinninrs -- ---.-- oC ths---- Cnld -- \t!ar, for an €!>:cf?llefIt andlysi s that clearly ravr!a ls the vsr;ucr:ezc: uf the Yalta aorez;n~nts. We conclud 7 that they were definitely open ta t?i!o interi~rctntions.

Politics of W2r, -11_-----_.___ stratcqy siirl lar to th,zt. f i.~lln.~~din thrs lend-lease tila ttcr ,

Stalin's applicaticjn for a six billioq dal!ar lca~in

January 1345 war mct v~Stha Fzrniliar An~ricanresponse.

48~orTrurin~'~ latcr cxplnnaticn of the ntoppagc of sen Prunan, lend-lwcc, --...b?emc.irs, - -- - VoE. I, 225, See. or.!"--. nstsin, ------Politics TI?.! Policies,- pp. 27-20 for thc T?ew Left, histcrian:: ' contcrition tha-l Trui~~n?. I.: ",~r recolleotion ~vasinaccurate. Alperovitz makes thc point that "a lirnit~tinnon Lend-Lease Foll.o~~edIri!-;i.cnlly From the vie:.:; khht Amcric~r~ diplorracy could gain iF thz Soviat Union wcro rEnrc dnperl- dent upon economic assistance?, Al~erovitzconcludzs that "This would incrc:sse ~!:PIsT~c~~'sCCCI~UM~C leverago'." Hs thsn quotes 9czns tn th~effcct that such Ancrican actlo5 would "meke t1.i.. soviet authorities come to us" ---Atemi(-: Dis~1um~c\t~ /_ ( pa 36. In this rngzrd, see also Kolko, --.------The Politics-..-..- OF --War, p, 39'/, Sovict point of vietxr, rncmbership in thvr;r! agencies, con-

5 1 LaFcber, --Cold "zr, pp. 22-23.

0 h

Secretary of State Byrrtt?s skat~di.n 19.47, "T belir?vr!cl thr ztcmiEt7ci,;> :! i;.- .-.z- :-.=. ..?.'P..' L;J"UIT;"- -- - ": -J G JUbLG3L21 UL I u~~eLII~ ,, 5:3 Japanesc to accept surrsnder on our terns. But the fact that. the Ur;itot! States tins determined to end the Lvar against Jzpzn b~faroFiussian entry cn Aucust 8, rather than the I\fover;rSef L ir~vasinndzts, has bc!.:n affirmed and reaPfi.rrnod in a much mcpE rjccj-sive ri-?nrrer. "Thoarjh t??rt~tr mas an understanding thzit the Soviets would enter the wzr three months after Germany surrendered", Byrnes has testi- fied, "the President and I hoped that Japan would surrender

bonb at the Potsdam Conference for a spccific and far-

Japan. At the szme tine, Byrnes had decided not to co-

operate with the Sovints in the early stagss sf nuci~ar

53 Jancs F. Byrnes, Sp~zltinn..-- Frrrnk1.y - (NQN Yorl:, l96?), p. 203, Alpc!rovitz has irrterprnt~dTruman's qot tough lecture to

P?olotov as evidence of a dramatic shift from Rooscvelt's

avn?lable to Bl~ckett,that fro;^ any rational military pcint of vieti:, Japan i.:as already daf~ated",~~and activu!.y pursufng surrender terms. General Eiscnhouer has stated

'I told him (Trtl tn) I vms against it (the dropping OF the nton bomb) on tmo acctsunts. First, the Japnncsc wzrc ready tc surrend~rand it w?sn't necessary to hit them u~iththat zwful thlnq, Second, I hated to sca our count,rbl :-a tho first

56~itedin Thocns, "Cold Mar Origins," 11, 194.

"~l~erovitz.--Atcnir -- 1. --y - p. 1116. to use such a weapon. 50

Evidently the borilb xas not drappclrl For military consid~ra-

tions, to deCe3t Japan, and thus to save thoussnds of

Arncriczn and Japanosr lives, as orthodnx historians like

Feis have argued. F-urtblzr dcsutt is cast upzn the orthcdrrx

interprctaf ion by the fact that IJrcsident Truran did nut

even consider it necessary to ask th~opinion of tilo

military zdvisur most directly concerned. This laas ncnc

other than General. PkcArthur, Supreme Coi2mander of f?llicd

Forces in the Pacific. He uas simply iriform~dof the

weapon shnrtly bsforc it LQes bscd zt Hircst-tina. M2c9rthur

siztcd on numeroa: occcsions bcfo~ohis deathChpt, iiLe

Ei~i3i:h3~3~~he b~lic\:~d kh~ altr;,4c t;orlt, I:;(: curt; ?.ot~3.y sr) unnzcEssary fi-n,: z ailitdry poir~ior vie,!.

Why then did Trumcln, th~?i\lleiu Left hist01 ians

have stressed, nat Lry one or more of tho fvl1owir.g ;Itr:rnt;-

tives? The three most likely were guarantecinq thc posi-

tion af th~Japanese Emperor (arid hence rnzking surrcntier

conditional), seeking a Russian declaration of vlar (or

announcercent of intent), or L~aitingfor Russian ~>nisyinto

the mar. As no invasion of the Japanese mainland 3s plannad - 50 PJF?Ios~JJ;~cI:,-- "I~Bon !kew, Nov. 11, 1S63 p. 107.

"cited in Alperovitz, --Rt,crmic Diplc-.- ::3cy, p. 23g. tnugh speech, the ff~olctovinterviec:, or a conciliatory approach, tha KapkZns mission, or even thrcugh cconnmic pressure in the ending of Lend-Lcase, Truman decided ta rely 011 Lrner.ica's master card, the atomic bomb, In ord~:=. to do this, the Prcsid2nt had to iuait until thn atomiz

I'll certainly have a hammer o,n thus^ boys! ,, h 9 Eurupe ta the fcrcign rr!inintars' rncetlnq in 5eptember ar"ter tho hoebs hsti been dropper!,

Thcre is lit ti^ dauot that tlte h~nbhad a docisivo ,- the Soviets morn manaqezhlc in L.nstr:rn Europc, and thus airj thu ,4rfici.j.cal1 qovor.t.~rn~n.tin iLr; e:'iit~l*t to ksc~th? Cnen Door intzct . 65 the electiurls hcre and in tlun~arywere poskpcned. It is

affairs, narknd Lhe beqinning of "the trzqic inpassc? in

Sovict-Afi13ricnn relations. ,I 6 fi ttic United Stat~s r~iththe option OF using t!-,z norib t3 ccprco or even bizck- mail tho Sovict !~nian.~~Tho Joint Chiefs of Starf clearly perceivnd thc advantage of n~clearmor!o;oly to the United

States.

Kc should e::plc~it (the nuclear rnono:loly) to assist in thc early estatlistlrncnt crf a satisfy- inn peace , , . . It will be desir3blc for interna tjonal aqr~.ement.s conznrning the atonic bomb to follow the Eurapoans peace troatics and definitely to precede the time when oth~?zcoun- tries could have atoi5i.c banhs.70

69~eet:oromitz, -.------Ynl tc to Yi~t~arn,pp. 265-279.

70~itndin Ocrnstujn, Politic? 2nd F~licies,p. 48. --* --* 94

Under tt:e terms of the Baruch Plan, the Seviet

Union was being asked to accept completely a Wcst,ern arranqernent that entailed opening its borecrs , i.ts tar~et arezs and its ~ilitarysecrcts, and tg trust Pjashington, with its absolute mpapon, net ta take political or military advzntage of thu difficulties that would '~ndoubtedlyensup,

Clearly, the Saruch Plan did cndnnqer Russian security, at least in its early stag~s. In his letter tc~Trumn of

July 1945, Vallace objected to the Bzruch approach,

as he predicted in his containment thorry, this would preclude the Soviet Union from ever receiving at.onic information. This cor!sideration, that the Ccrncunist Pa;.ty would ba undermj ned if i;lcscort~accepted the fimerieai-r Baruch

Plan, was very much in the minds of the men u~hodrafted belief that he considcrctf "thc problcn! of au: satisfactory

The Trumzn administration ignored Stinson's advice, Russia

rnjccted the Baruch Plpn and Soviut-Anariczn relations were

77~itrdin ti~rc.~~'L%.lt~,-..------Yaltrj kc, Vic.tr:~in, p diplomacy failed in its nrir;ciozl obioctive "to sa4p

Russia mctr nsnaqcnblu in Eu~G~?"and thus tn preserve and expand tho Open Door. And, VJ~Z~EV~Lhc tritth in the

east Eurapean govr?ri-rr?lc?ntnar;d the gsnrzral tightening up of

Stz.linist control which culn-!inatod in the expulsion of Tito frox the C~miiiPnrr.:: .in 194I?, all follovod the era of aka:nic dipla~scyichich thc I!cxi LcPk his Li-jr Fiir!s, Alpcravitz and 74 Horo:!~itz in por. ti.cuJ.:~r, hli~;~!evp!-.asizod, Tile o::thoc:c>: interpretatinn ctf i;hz nriqiilr; of tl-IE Cold !'l>r, hc:-:ei;zr, tlas continu:,tf LO d~;:i-,pl>y 01%sirirply to il ,<:E 1::;~ impacL vkich

Ar,.,ew:"c,rp .-.,-.I rt ,.,-,r.<,.-,.%<...,-~ -(: 4.L- ..2 .,.- 2- . . ui bl:t3 uL~t:t*t_. S~,;titj hai: Uii b~Lf.1

2ussia and 93 \j!.'z~l~in!ji,~r;~~p[?Ij.&g:; i,~cj~?;.dth~ S~:!i::t. Lli,rj.~n in the crucial 9945-19.:5 p:-riod, NELJ Left historians hav~

~iventhis aspecl:. of thu Cold War rni!ui.i needed eniphasis.

doctr:ne, economic c?:' *~~~ini.smand historical prescnt- mindndness, hava to a grnater extent than the arttlodox historians critically examined the root cac:scs of the Cold

hzs largely bs~r~forgotten or misrepresented tnzt the

United States hzd the choice of alternai.ives in the immediate p~st-:~!orld?Jar I1 period, As already noted, the

American gavernrnont possessed predcminant power, both ecj2nornic an3 atomic, It folloes, as 11Jill.ians has stated, that "pau:cr and rcspui-~sibilitjrgo togetl-ler. in a dircct ar:d

intimate relationship". Therefore, Washington, more so than IS"loscota, had it in its po!i!er whsthcr or not to cooperat?.

2~illiAppl .- n kiiil ?inns, --The ---ATrnoedy- or Americar:-- --- Diplonacv (?icu~York, 1959), p. 2nU. __-.--- __L This is esssntial to a @enuSnn undarstnndinq of the oriqins of the Cold !~Jr;tr. UnTt3rtun-;l.tc.ly, 3s the Nc~u LeFt historinns hclvc? zxautlrf, it appezrs that tha Uni-Lcd States chose to use its povter in a Vain cffort tc compel Russia to accept the Open Door,

Certainly, as studznts OF history, the neLv revisicn- ists have rsired a fe!v disco~certingq!~~.stions for those who are committed eitbsr tc the orthodox view of the Cold

Nap or to the ortil~dr~xview of the historian, blast prominent among these is the qu2slion: hov: did the United States

arrivcd at strch an erronc~r~~exylanatian qivcn thzir ob.jcc- tivc conceytinn af ths historian's Function?

ortcn charqcd, mere rilztoric ?ired hy thair militsfit opposi- tion to Aneric3n forelln policy. On thz cnntrary, the ncm revisionists inuch malinned dissent from Accrica's foreign and domestic polj-cics, co:nbj.ncd lxith tf~zirBeardian view of tho historian, has perhaps eriabiec! thgn to perceive the origins of the Co?-d !t:itr in a manner c1osr.r to thc ac.ti~ol rcalftics of th period. onr! r:iijst sr2pnrate ns vell as interrelate th~ pronlcms of Russi?, En53 3nd. 1:lestern capital- ism, 2nd tl~crcvc?l;tion in r,!uch of the u~crld in thc ovf:rrfdinq cnnt~xtOF the United Stat~s' expacs ' ~n and advancament of its nati n~al intcrcst .5

The c~ntinuingefForts of the Nev~Left u~ritersin this area mko it evidznt that thcy ha:.e accopted the ctial-

lenqe handed to 'i'w historical plnfession by Frcderic!c

Jackson Turner, in his Pr~siden%i:jlAdd~ess, to ths Am~?riczn

Possibly, this has bp:,n tho liesf Lark historian:;' great.cst contribtltion to date, Thr Ncv~Left; historians havc un- questionably rei!:orked American history frc-)m the perspezt ick- of thc 1953s and 1970s as thsir prcdccessars did from that

OF the 1943s 2nd 1950s. Perhaps an interprctstinn that is clascr' to thr? truth thzn any that exists nw!v will eiser2c Byrnrts, James Fa --AL!, in Gnc tifetirnr.- Ner~York, 195C. - . --.Spcakinri -.------Frankly. New York, 1947.

Kcnnan, Georqp F. Me~o:rs, 1925-1950. Sustnn, 1967. -- "---.------

Stimson, Hcr!ry I.., and Sunrly, lilcGc;?rqc:, -*-..-On Act.j.v~------Se~v!T.cn --.----in Pnccr! :>.nd-. ----- 'i!~;., P!c?L~J Yark, 1947, B~rnstein,Bilrtoi~ J,, cd. -Pciikics _. _____ ~crfPolicies o? thc -Truman Admirli----- 1:t~a+-". i' -- 1.1 Chic3qo, LY'lb. -- . , ed. ----iow3rds ---A Nro~ Pa::t. Dissentin?-- Essays ------in A~c~rican --- Pictcrv. -- hew Yoric, ~.%I'T.

Slackett, P. I 5 Atcmlc !,le:?pons and East-!t'cst Relat 'ofis. ------I---->.- _^ Canbridqe, 1955. Garc!.-,er, Lloyd C. --,.--Arci:it:ccts---.--- -...-.---- of XLlvsir~!~:- --. Pic:?....+ ----.-and Idcas.. jn iimizri..rr.n- -- Forcan i!oli.c:y, lY4l-l949.--- Chicago, 1~'fd.

Go!.r-berq, Fia:rvoy, Same eti. ------.--hmorlcan I

Grae\;ner, h!nsLlsn A, Co?--j I:,!;).;. I?~JJ~.?:;-;;~::v kri.~:.^l~!-~~n!' .?!?:ir)~, -r.,-_-_-.,-.-i---x*..x-r...r-.-.---.- I-^.^--..---.---L- p . p-r* -, f-.r lL.?:.kL;ri g 12" J, , .i9L;?* - ,.-,-.-... . " ." . - -- . . . -

Hiqhaz, John, et ale -Hist,ory, Er?glclvood C?.iffs, N. J., 1965. . * I! iiolltn, Gzhrrc; !. 8nc.i jcyt;u. I IIC L~IYi..k$; ~27 P"I;,ZX ; Tkte L20rIs .-. -- -- .- -.------A,-. .------.-.-"- and iinfted Stat-:: For'.cai:~n Policy, b945-19tiL. New Yori;, _ _.__.___^__-'_----.-.-I.--." .--- ...--- 1972.

I(oli.r), CaIjrieI _T __-___2riL, !a: Thr! !:!orld and I! !: tcd St:?tes Forr>inn Pi3lic~+iYL3-1P~5. 13cw York, 1968, ------Thr\ itnots of /?mt?rican Foreion policy: ------~ II -_ _-.. -A+-- An fin'. 1_l*r47 of L'!IIJ~P~ ;:PU kt!i'~)~!jC?. BCS~UI~,1955'. ----- ..------*--.--

F *, LaFebc2 I- I"..i fil;.>s .i-*it;~~titj~;~j.a, 312d L!IC~Cold tijar, . -..- -.--- 1945-1966,-. New Yozk, 1967.

lilay, Crncs'i H. Ii ,:e~.!.al Der:or,rar,v : t!r~Er?~rr?onc~ of __* - - -__ --A_. -.-I------Ar;irric;i 2s a Great;--- C.or~:.r, ?ev! Ycrk, 1961;

Jack. New York, S\

Thg iJ, S , Cuba cinb Cac?.~c;. Ne~uYork, --- --I---.. ------1962, -----&--..--....--..,.---- "LCrj,tien History :?s :tn Act oC Faith." -..------r!nrc!rir.~:.~ ni*3t::ricrl- ---- C;BY.~.?CJ~ ---.- - XXXlV an,, 1934), 219-229,

Garraty, John A, "A Then For NO:^, 11 revlev! oF b~7riori.I.

.- Cilbcrt, James, "A Hassle of biisto i=n:.* ----.-~hc. >lac 'rt,-- January 20, 1963, pp. 77-79, Grumbach, Doris' "0:1t of the Graqvec OF At:adcn~." -Comnonmeal, XCX, [do. 15, Jan. 16, 1970, 460-470.

Jr., Crlorao C. 0 to tkc Hcrrina,> - - Lend-ieasn Russia ~nd Origins af

"Revisionist Tales of Neqokirtinns with the Cotnmu~~ists," --....-Ran~?rts, - June 29, 1968,pp, 45-58.

------. , 2nd Lynd, 5tnur;tltart. "Cold-"'ar Origj-rrs and the 9of inition of Rcvoluticr, Mn E~chanoc."

~tlqhes,11, Stu:?rt. "'(he 3cccr;rtd Y~erof th? Cold ''!:ix.. r\ . "Thc Conscicus Crc 'ban o

Lasch, Chri st^;. ~PT, @*Th!;Hjr4t~;f{~;7 a?, Di;-Lr7;.!:tlw --T,..? -- IGatiprj,- ?d~?*..~, 74, 3 957, pp. 3LR-353.

------. "Lnttor te the Plcvcwrnt , Ch:?llsnq!-nn th? Histurian:,.'"Lic~rotion,pea-,- - - Vul. 14, Xo, PO (Fe5, , 19'(3), 40-43.

Paddox, Robert Ja~cc?s. "ri Cn3.d !}Jar Ra.tt.le." ----Nou; York Heview of....--,- Uno!:;-, Vo?. XX, No. 1.5 (ilct, 18, 19'1% GC-59. --.--" , "The Lerjzcy of Seordian History." --...----itad.ical !i-crira,-.- ---- Vo1, 4, No. 8-9 (i'~ov,, 1970), 67-GO.

"Oriyins of rl 2 ~st.-!*::~~Crisis, A Di:ictlssian." Jaur.rt;zI

of Cootc~r.,_I _ _I_c;rzrv 1': __-._c.tcryt _ IIT (~pril,196G), 2~-?~2-~~,-

Pach ter, HEFT y. "f?c\risionfst Historj aris arid the Cold !?ar. " ---Djs:r:ni (?!ow..-Dec. lqfic), pp, 505-51(?.

------.. , "The I~?tellcctc!alnf; Diplci:at, A Critic::! Uiucussion of Georqe F, Ksnvan," --Diss~nt, --- VoL. 15 (ifizrch-April, 196C), l5l.-l70. Pol-, J. R, "Tlio Amorjc~nPasi: Is it Still Usnhlc?" .lo!!:*na.!l i>f 'tacric:?n Stt.rdf~s,Val. Ip No. 1 (April, --. I --.- - -.------.--- l:J:-! ,) h:<.**:r:c

------.---- . "Oriqins or" th - Cnld !':a~." For.eiqn-- ---Rff'sir~, XLVI (~ct., 1~67)~22-57. "The Contin::in:2 Cnlri : A Synp~3~iua," -Reirjcv.;s ...- -.-- in.-

A m :? j. r -A 71 \-{ ' ,%,! I? NO. Q (3~~., lacl:,r 4r;5-470. ------... -...... -.-.--G-. .* . 9

Russia, -9.---.-.-3t:.!iil'.l?s on------'ti7~ t-ef'i,,'IIT- (5!~nmzz, 1?~2), 24-46. . "A Note on Charles Austin Beard's Search for a General Theory of Causation." American Historical Review, LXIII (October, 1956). 59-80. . "Brooks Adams and American Expansion." The New tngland Quarterly, XXV (~une, 1952), 217-232. . "The Acpuittinq Judqe," review of Ernest R.-erial ~ernocrac~,Ehe ~mer~enceof America )outer, Studies on the Left, I11 (Winter, 1963). 94-99. . "The American Century: 1941-1957." The Nation, Nov. 2, 1957, pp. 297-301.

, "The Irony of Containment." The Nation, May 5, 1956, pp. 376-379. . "The Nature of Peace," Monthly Review, Val. 9, No. 3 and 4 (~uly-~ugust1957). 112-11.t.

Wopdward.,. C. Vann, "The Age of Reinterpretation." American Historical Review, LXVT (Oct., 1960), 1-19. . "The Future of the Past." American Historical Review, LXXV (Feb., l970), 711-726.