Representative Democracy, Conflict, and Consensus in J. S. Mill An
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Representative Democracy, Conflict, and Consensus in J. S. Mill An abridged and translated version of a dissertation presented by Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua to The Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Philosophy University of São Paulo Advisor: Prof. Alberto Ribeiro Gonçalves de Barros Co-advisor: Prof. Maria Isabel Limongi Examiners: Prof. Cicero Romão de Araujo, Prof. Silvana Ramos, Prof. Nadia Urbinati São Paulo 2019 Autorizo a reprodução e divulgação total ou parcial deste trabalho, por qualquer meio convencional ou eletrônico, para fins de estudo e pesquisa, desde que citada a fonte. Catalogação na Publicação Serviço de Biblioteca e Documentação Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo Dalaqua, Gustavo Hessmann D136r Representative Democracy, Conflict, and Consensus in J. S. Mill / Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua ; orientador Alberto Ribeiro Gonçalves de Barros. - São Paulo, 2019. 245 f. Tese (Doutorado)- Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo. Departamento de Filosofia. Área de concentração: Filosofia. 1. Mill, John Stuart 1806-1873. 2. Democracy. 3. Political Representation. 4. Consensus. 5. Conflict. I. Barros, Alberto Ribeiro Gonçalves de, orient. II. Título. TABLE OF CONTENTS Overview of the Portuguese version of the dissertation………………….………p. 11 1. Democracy and truth: A contingent defense of epistemic democracy ...…………p. 31 1.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...……p. 31 1.2 The critique against the epistemic conception of democracy…………………....p. 33 1.3 Deliberation and truth: Mill’s epistemic democracy…………………………….p. 37 1.3.1 “With the eyes of a working man”: representation, knowledge, and social perspective…………………………………………………………………….……..p. 43 1.4 Pragmatism and the democratic conception of truth………………………...…..p. 50 1.5 Conclusion: on the possibility of an epistemic conception of democracy……....p. 53 2. What makes representative constructivism democratic?.........................................p. 58 2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………...……p. 58 2.2 Descriptive representation…………………………………………………….…p. 61 2.3 Representative constructivism……………………………………………….…..p. 63 2.4 Representative constructivism in Mill…………………………………………...p. 66 2.5 Mill’s advocacy for female suffrage as an example of the mobilization power of political representation………………………………………………………………p. 71 2.6 Democratic constructivism and the agora model of political representation…....p. 77 2.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….p. 79 3. Democracy as compromise: An alternative to the agonistic vs. epistemic divide..p. 81 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…..p. 81 3.2 The agonistic vs. epistemic divide in Miguel, Mouffe, and Urbinati………..…..p. 82 3.3 Democracy and compromise in Mill………………………………………….…p. 86 3 3.4 Democracy and compromise in Morley……………………………………...….p. 95 3.5 Democracy and compromise in Kelsen……………………………………...…..p. 99 3.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...p. 103 4. John Stuart Mill’s republican feminism……………………………………..…..p. 104 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….p. 104 4.2 The Subjection of Women and the political relevance of gender equality…...…p. 105 4.3 Mill’s feminist republicanism………………………………………………..…p. 111 4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...……p. 123 5. Liberty as resistance against oppression and epistemic injustice in J. S. Mill..…p. 127 5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…p. 128 5.2 Oppression and epistemic injustice………………………………………….....p. 129 5.3 Liberty as non-subjection…………………………………………………..…..p. 131 5.4 Representative democracy and resistance……………………………………....p.134 6. Conflict, socialism, and democracy in Mill…………………………………...…p. 137 6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…p. 138 6.2 Mill’s praise for conflict: Its arguments and intellectual sources………………p. 140 6.2.1 The influence of the Bildungstradition and the ancient Greeks……………...p. 141 6.2.2 The influence of François Guizot………………………………………….....p. 144 6.3 Does Mill’s socialism seek to institute a society without conflict? A reply to Duncan……………………………………………………………………………...p. 147 6.4 Does Mill’s democratic theory seek to institute a society without conflict? A reply to Stephen……………………………………………………………………………..p. 151 6.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...…p. 160 4 7. Representation, epistemic democracy, and political parties in John Stuart Mill and José de Alencar……………………………………………………………………..p. 162 7.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….p. 163 7.2 Representative democracy in John Stuart Mill…………………………………p. 166 7.3 Representative democracy in José de Alencar………………………………....p. 172 7.4 Representative constructivism in Alencar and Mill…………………………....p. 177 7.5 The connection between epistemic and agonistic democracy and the role of political parties…………………………………………………………………………….....p. 181 7.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...p. 187 8. Conflict, consensus, and liberty in J. S. Mill’s representative democracy…..…..p. 190 8.1 Conflict and consensus in Mill’s representative democracy…………………...p. 190 8.2 Representation as advocacy and ‘the spirit of compromise’…………………...p. 196 8.3 Conflict and the origin of representative institutions…………………………..p. 200 8.4 Conflict as a resource for democratic deliberation……………………………..p. 202 8.5 Representative democracy and liberty………………………………………….p. 208 8.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...p. 213 References……………………………………………………………………….....p. 217 5 Abstract DALAQUA, Gustavo Hessmann. Representative Democracy, Conflict, and Consensus in J. S. Mill. 2019. 245 pp. Doctoral dissertation – Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2019. This dissertation examines the relationship between representative democracy, conflict, and consensus in John Stuart Mill’s philosophy in order to appease a hermeneutical quandary that has divided Mill scholars for decades. While some scholars claim to find in Mill a radical agonistic democrat – a political thinker who understood democracy to be the regime of conflict, not consensus – other scholars accuse Mill’s democratic theory of privileging consensus over conflict. Contra the idea that there are two contradictory “Mills” – one that values conflict and denies any role whatsoever to consensus, and another that preaches a consensualist politics whose main goal would be to eliminate conflict – this dissertation shows how Mill’s emphases on consensus and on conflict reconcile within his political theory. Taking a different stance than the one offered by Mill scholars thus far, the interpretation I put forward is that representative democracy for Mill requires both conflict and consensus. By juxtaposing the textual passages of the “consensualist Mill” to those of the “agonistic Mill,” I argue that a complete understanding of Mill’s philosophy rules out the conflict vs. consensus dichotomy that lurks behind the controversy revolving around the “two Mills.” It is precisely because he deems conflict to be an inevitable byproduct of democratic freedom that Mill values consensus – a consensus that establishes how citizens’ conflicts can unfold ad infinitum without maiming the body politic. A 6 democracy that dispensed with such consensus would be acting suicidally, for it would undermine the very structure by which political conflicts can manifest themselves without bloodshed or civil war. An analysis of the passages of the “consensualist Mill” allows one to affirm that liberty and equality are the two principles Mill identifies as the boundaries for democratic agonism. “Boundaries” here means these principles constitute a common grammar that every citizen participating in the agonistic debate must respect when she formulates her political proposals. According to Mill, democracy cannot survive without sustaining a consensus around the two principles that, since democracy’s inception, are considered constitutive of any democratic order. The basic principles of liberty and equality are inherent in the democratic procedure, to the extent that in their absence democracy falls apart. Together, they form a juridical and constitutional consensus that grounds democracy. The construction of a demos requires the public recognition of a minimum juridical consensus that regulates the multifarious conflicts which will emerge among citizens. Without such consensus, the body politic will either disintegrate into different demoi or generate a set of dispersed individuals incapable of seeing themselves as fellow members of a single political community. The first chapter addresses Mill’s theory of representative democracy. The second, his understanding of consensus, and the third, his conception of conflict. Keywords: Representative democracy. Conflict. Consensus. John Stuart Mill. Democratic Theory 7 Acknowledgments I am very grateful to my dissertation advisor who helped me a lot over these last several years. Through his classes and conversations, Prof. Alberto Ribeiro G. de Barros taught me how to practice the history of political thought. His scholarship and mentorship set the highest example for me. I was also fortunate to have as my co-advisor Prof. Maria Isabel Limongi, who has been an attentive reader of my work on Mill’s political philosophy for over a decade. Her thought-provoking work on modern British political thought has also set an example for me on how to practice the history of ideas. I am also thankful to the three professors who participated in my dissertation