DUBLIN II REGULATION Lives on hold
European Comparative Report Project HOME/2010/ERFX/CA/1721 DUBLIN II REGULATION Lives on hold
European Comparative Report
February 2013 Contents
Acknowledgements...... 4 Abbreviations...... 4 Executive Summary...... 5 I. Introduction ...... 12 1.1. Legal Framework...... 13 1.1.1. From Schengen and beyond...... 13 1.1.2. The Dublin Regulation...... 14 1.1.2.1. European Jurisprudence: Cracks in the Dublin system...... 16 1.1.3. Recasting the Dublin Regulation...... 17
II. Methodology...... 18 III. Statistics and the cost of the Dublin system...... 20 3.1. Dublin Regulation statistics...... 21 3.2. Operational cost of the Dublin system...... 23
IV. Report Findings...... 26 IV. The application of the Dublin Regulation criteria...... 27 4.1. The hierarchy of criteria...... 27 4.2. Unaccompanied children (Art. 6) ...... 28 4.2.1. Interpretation of Art. 6...... 28 4.2.2. The application of the best interests of the child principle...... 29 4.2.3. Family tracing...... 30 4.2.4. Appointment of a guardian during the Dublin procedure...... 31 4.2.5. Age assessment...... 32 4.3. The Family unity provisions (Art. 7, 8 & 14)...... 34 4.3.1. Family definition (Art. 2(i))...... 34 4.3.2. Family unity and the application of the Dublin Regulation (Art. 7, 8 &14)...... 35 4.3.3. Simultaneous applications from family members (Art. 14)...... 40 4.4. Visas and residence documents (Art. 9)...... 40 4.5. Irregular border crossing and Eurodac (Art. 10)...... 42 V. The use of Discretionary Provisions...... 46 5.1. Sovereignty clause (Art. 3(2))...... 46 5.1.1. Procedural aspects of the sovereignty clause...... 46 5.1.2. Application of the sovereignty clause for vulnerable persons...... 48 5.1.3. Application of the sovereignty clause for reasons of general conditions in another Member State...... 49 5.2. Humanitarian clause (Art. 15)...... 50
VI. Procedural Safeguards...... 55 6.1. Access to information...... 55 6.1.1. Information leaflets...... 55 6.1.2. Information on the potential application of the Dublin Regulation in an individual case...... 56 6.2. A personal interview...... 58 6.3. Access to Dublin case files...... 59 6.4. Notification of the transfer decision...... 60 6.5. Appeals...... 62 6.5.1. Suspensive effect of appeals...... 63 6.5.2. The competence of the Court...... 64 6.5.3. Access to a Higher Court of Appeal...... 64 6.5.4. Practical obstacles to accessing an effective remedy...... 65 6.5.5. Other review mechanisms...... 65 6.5.6. Legal Aid...... 66 6.6. Access to the asylum procedure ...... 67 6.6.1. Access to the asylum procedure in a take back situation...... 68 6.6.2. Access to the asylum procedure in a take charge situation...... 70 6.6.3. Access to the asylum procedure in a Member State which took over responsibility for an asylum application and repeat Dublin Regulation cases...... 71 VII. Vulnerable Persons subject to the Dublin Procedure...... 75 7.1. Medical examinations within the Dublin procedure...... 75 7.2. Impact of vulnerability on Dublin transfers...... 76 7.3. Continuity of care within the Dublin procedure...... 77 VIII. Reception Conditions and Detention...... 81 8.1. Reception conditions...... 81 8.1.1. Reception conditions pending transfer in the requesting Member State...... 81 8.1.2. Reception conditions in the responsible Member State...... 83 8.2. Detention...... 84 IX. Practical Aspects of the Dublin Regulation...... 90 9.1. Transfer procedures...... 90 9.1.1. Responsible authorities...... 90 9.1.2. Transfer methods and modalities...... 90 9.1.3. Voluntary return to the country of origin...... 92 9.2. Time Limits...... 93 9.2.1. Respect for time limits...... 93 9.2.2. Extension of the time limit for transfer on the basis that the asylum seeker has absconded.....96 9.3. Circumstantial evidence...... 98 9.3.1. Evidentiary requirements for proving family links...... 98 9.3.2. Evidence concerning stay outside the territory of Member States (Art.16(3))...... 99 X. Member State Cooperation...... 103 10.1. Administrative cooperation...... 103 10.1.1. Communication between Member States (Art. 21)...... 103 10.1.2. Bilateral administrative arrangements (Art. 23)...... 105 10.1.3. Dublin liaison officers...... 107 10.2. Heterogeneity in the application of the Dublin Regulation within Member States...... 109 XI. The Implementation of European Jurisprudence...... 111 11.1. The ECHR MSS v Belgium and Greece judgment and the joined CJEU cases NS & Others C-411/10 and C-493/10...... 111 11.1.1. Transfers to Greece...... 112 11.1.2. Transfers to other Member States...... 115 11.2. The CJEU case of Migrationsverket v Petrosian C-19/08...... 116 11.3. The CJEU case of Migrationsverket v Kastrati C-620/10...... 117 XII. Conclusion...... 119
ANNEXES ...... 121 ANNEX 1: Definitions...... 122 ANNEX 2: Recommendations...... 123 ANNEX 3: Report on the implementation of the project...... 125 ANNEX 4: Bibliography...... 128 Acknowledgements This report was written by Matiada Ngalikpima and Maria Hennessy. The coordinating partners of the project were Forum Réfugiés – Cosi, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). ECRE coordinated the national research with project partners and took the lead in drafting this comparative report. This synthesis report brings together the main findings of national reports produced by:
Austria: Judith Ruderstaller (Asyl in Not) Bulgaria: Valeria Ilavera (Legal Clinic for Refugees and Immigrants) France: Matiada Ngalikpima (Forum Réfugiés – Cosi), Christophe Harrison & Véronique Lay (France Terre d’Asile) Germany: Maria Bethke, Rebecca Kalt & Dominik Bender (Hessischer Flüchtlingsrat & Pro Asyl) Greece: Spyros Rizakos (AITIMA) Hungary: Grusa Matevzic (Hungarian Helsinki Committee) Italy: Anna Galosi, Cristina Laura Cecchini & Maria de Donato (Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati) Slovakia: Katarina Fajnorova & Mirka Mittelmannova (The Human Rights League Slovakia) Spain: Hana Cheikh Ali & Virginia Lopez (Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado) Switzerland: Seraina Nufer (Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe SFH) The Netherlands: Danielle Zevulun & Geert Lamers (Vluchtenlingenwerk Nederland)
Cover Photo: Manu Brabo/AP/Sipa. Design & Layout: Patricia Graizely - Création Calico
Enriched by the first Dublin transnational project “Transnational advisory and assistance network for asylum seekers under a Dublin procedure” in 2011 Forum Réfugiés – Cosi launched a new project with partners entitled “European network for the technical cooperation on the application of the Dublin II Regulation”. This comparative report forms part of the main activities of the project aimed at strengthening knowledge on the application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe. This project was financed by the European Commission through the European Refugee Fund (July 2011 – February 2013).
The Dublin transnational network partners would like to thank all the staff of the administrative authorities, Dublin units, UNHCR and appellate authorities who kindly gave of their time to be interviewed for this research. We also would like to thank all those who participated in the Dublin II Regulation Legal Seminar in September 2012 particularly our guest speakers: Nuala Mole (AIRE Centre), Seraina Nufer (OSAR), J. Bouwman (IARLJ), Constantin Hruschka (UNHCR) and Christophe Pouly (Lawyer). Special thanks is also extended to Judith Ruderstaller for her expert analysis of Eurostat and Eurodac statistics. We are especially grateful to all the asylum seekers who agreed to share their experiences of the Dublin procedure with our national project partners. Abbreviations Art: Article EU: European Union AsylGH: Asylgerichtshof (Asylum Court, Austria) FRA: Fundamental Rights Agency BAMF: German Federal Office of Migration FOM: Federal Office for Migration (Switzerland) and Refugees (Germany) IND: Immigration and Naturalization Service Bundesasylamt: Federal Asylum Office (Austria) (the Netherlands) CEAS: Common European Asylum System NGO: Non-governmental Organization CFR: Charter of Fundamental Rights OAR: Spanish Office for Asylum and Refuge CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union (Spain) CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child OIN: Office of Immigration and Nationality D,T&V: The Service for Repatriation (Hungary) and Departure (the Netherlands) SAR: State Agency for Refugees (Bulgaria) EASO: European Asylum Support Office SPRAR: System for the protection of asylum ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights seekers and refugees (Italy) ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights TAR: Administrative Tribunal (Italy) ECRE: European Council on Refugees VfGH: Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional and Exiles Court, Austria) Executive Summary seekers’ connectionswithparticularMemberStates. principles of theDublinRegulationneed tobefundamentallyrevised totakeintoaccountasylum flaws intheDublinsystem.ECREandpartnerorganisations believethatultimatelytheunderlying the short term. Nevertheless, it is clear that these interim reforms fail to address the fundamental the DublinRegulation.Suchinterimreforms willimprove theapplicationofDublinRegulationin system exceptfordeficienciesthatwillbeaddressed byacorrect implementationofthe recast of for immediateactiontoaddress theshortcomingsidentified incurrent practicewithintheDublin 6 SeeECRE,SharingResponsibility for Refugee Protection inEurope: DublinReconsidered, March 2008(‘Dublin Reconsidered’). 5 4 3 2 1 often leftinaprolonged stateofanxietyanduncertaintywiththeirliveseffectively ‘onhold’. examination of their asylum claim. Having sought protection inEurope, suchasylumseekersare asylum seekers subject to the Dublin Regulation are not always guaranteed a fair and efficient There are vastdivergences inthewayMemberStatesapplyDublinRegulation.Asaresult, Main Findings and problems remain in the operation of this system. Over 15yearshavepassed since the first Dublin Conventionentered into force andyetinconsistencies of thisRegulation. and analyseMemberState practice surrounding thetechnical application knowledge of theimplementation of the DublinRegulation and investigate The objective oftheDublinTransnationalNetwork projectistoenhance areas forfurtherimprovement intheImplementingRegulation. implementation phase oftheforthcoming recast Dublin‘III’Regulationinadditiontodetermining the Commission and Member States inidentifying specific areas that require monitoringinthe practice by Member States is highlighted where appropriate. This report alsoendeavours to assist rights ofthosesubjecttoit,particularlyinlightafuture ‘fitnesscheck’ofthesystem. contributing toabetterunderstandingoftheDublinsystemanditsimpactonfundamental standards ofprotection as well to deficiencies within theRegulationitself.This report aimsat premise that the Dublin system rests upon i.e. a level playing field across Europe with harmonized Member States. reports national of produced byprojectpartnersandalsodrawsuponthejurisprudenceinthese findings the of synthesis a as serves It Netherlands. the France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, Italy, Slovakia,Spain,Switzerlandand State practice in applying the Dublin Regulation in Austria, Bulgaria, application lodged inoneofthe MemberStates byathird-country national[2003]OJ L222/3(‘Implementing Regulation’). (EC) No.343/2003establishing thecriteria andmechanisms for determining theMemberState responsible for examining anasylum Commission Regulation (EC)No. 1560/2003of2September 2003laying down detailed rules for theapplication ofCouncilRegulation sharing andmore mutualtrust,COM (2011)835final,2.12.2011, p.7. Committee andtheCommittee of theRegions onenhanced solidarityinthefield intra-EU of asylum, anEUagenda for better responsibility- Commission (EC)Communication from theCommission to theEuropean Parliament, theCouncil, theEuropean Economic andSocial European Communities(97/C254/01)(‘DublinConvention’). Convention determining theState responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged inoneoftheMemberStates of the the DublinRegulation isalsoavailable there. To access nationalreports seewww.dublin-project.eu. Areport onnationalpractice inRomania concerning thetechnical application of (‘Dublin Regulation’). Afulloverview of theactivitiesofDublintransnational network project isprovided inAnnex III. State responsible for examining anasylum application lodged inoneoftheMemberStates byathird-country national[2003]OJ L50/1 Council Regulation (EC)No.343/2003of18February 2003establishing thecriteria and mechanismsfor determining theMember 2 1 Thisreportprovidesacomparative analysis ofMember 6 3 Thisis due both to the intrinsically flawed 5 Thereport makesrecommendations 4 Good
5 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary 6 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary thorough cost-benefitanalysisofapplyingthisRegulation. enable acompleteappraisaloftheeffectiveness oftheDublinsystemitisimperativethatthere isa There continuestobeapaucityofinformationonthefinancialcostthissystem.Inorder to numbers of asylum seekers between themselves highlights the illogical nature of the Dublin system. result inimplementedtransfers.ThefactthatcertainMemberStatesfrequently exchangeequivalent The efficacy oftheDublinRegulationisquestionable.Onlyalimitednumberoutgoing requests Statistical dataandthecostofDublinsystem are rarely applied. there is a degree of flexibility inhow Member States apply them. In practice,both these provisions Due tothefactthatsovereignty clauseandhumanitarianare bothdiscretionary provisions The useofdiscretionary provisions apply theDublincriteria. system. This report finds that there are vast disparities in the waythatMemberStates interpret and A consistentapproach totheapplicationofcriteriaiscentralforsmoothfunctioningDublin The applicationoftheDublinRegulationcriteria Bulgarian StateAgencyforRefugeesstatistics) provisions to Germany (six), France (one), Italy (one) and Austria (one) respectively (Source: reasons. ThistransferwastoGermanyandoneoutofninerequests sentunderthese In 2011,inBulgariathere wasonlyoneoutgoingtransfer implementedontheground offamily National Fact: Analysis ofEurostat data). 34.86% of accepted requests resulted in actual transfers during that same time period. (Source: resulted inactualtransfersofasylumseekersundertheDublinRegulation.Approximately On average across Europe in 2009 and 2010, approximately only 25.75% of all outgoing requests Fact: • • • • • • prevented from reviewing theuseofthisclause onthebasisthatit is anon-bindingprovision. number a in clause sovereignty the of MemberStates, for example, Bulgarian jurisprudence hasheldthatnationalCourtsare applying for place in restrictions procedural are There context ofDublintransfers toGreece duetothehumanitarian situationthere. to particularlyvulnerable individualsdependingonthecircumstances ofthecaseorin related grounds limited on clause sovereignty the apply only States Member of majority The position inthehierarchy ofcriteria. Member Stateresponsibility fortheexaminationofanasylumclaimdespiteitsrelatively low Art. 10 on the basis of Eurodac data and irregular for entry is the most utilized criterion for claims assigning as wellwithregard totheinterpretation oftheArt.6criterion. asylum of inter aliaassignmentofaguardian, familytracing,assessmentoftheirbestinterests andage examination the within theDublinprocedure variesconsiderablyamongsttheMemberStateswithrespect to for responsibility unaccompanied children resembles a‘lottery’.Theexperienceofunaccompaniedchildren State Member Determining Rights (CFR). in Art8European Convention onHumanRights(ECHR)andArt7CharterofFundamental under theDublinRegulationinamannerinconsistentwithMemberStatesobligationsenshrined frequently appliedinarestrictive mannerleadingtomanyinstancesoffamiliesbeingseparated Even if the family provisions are considered Art. 7, 8 and 14 and/or the humanitarian clause are to thehierarchy ofcriteria. account andMemberStateresponsibility isassignedonthebasisofanotherground contrary Sometimes the presence of family members in the territory of Member States is not taken into trafficking victims subjecttotheDublin Regulation. was apaucityofinformation ontheexperienceofapplicantswithother specialneedsforexample the personmayhavein advanceoftransfer. Apartfrom personswithspecific healthneedsthere some MemberStatesto effectively informthereceiving Stateofanymedical conditionsorillnesses that continuity of care within the Dublin procedure is not always guaranteed due to the failure of but mayresult inthetransferbeingpostponedto alaterstage.Theresearch alsodemonstrates examinations. Vulnerability is inconsistentastowhetherasylumseekers intheDublinprocedure are subjecttomedical identification procedure inplace foridentifyingpersonswithspecialneeds.MemberStatepractice In the majority of Member States researched, there is no definition of vulnerablepersons nor formal Vulnerable personssubjecttotheDublinprocedure safeguards are inplacetoguaranteeasylumseekers’rightsacross theMemberStatessurveyed. subject totheDublinRegulation.However, thisreport findsthatfrequently inadequateprocedural Procedural safeguards needtobeinplaceguarantee thelegalandadministrativerightsofthose Procedural safeguards Only 25oftheserequests were onthebasisofhumanitarianclause. In 2011,Germanyaccepted2,169incomingrequests fortransfersfrom otherMemberStates. National Fact: • • • • • • • asylum procedure in“repeat” cases,where theDublin Regulationisappliedmore thanonce. for admission to the asylum procedure. A number of Member Statesseverely restrict access to an withdrawn, the strict requirements of subsequentasylum applications andarbitraryprocedures This isduetoanumberoffactors,interaliaasylumclaimsbeingdeemedhavebeenimplicitly procedure isnotalwaysguaranteedbothwithrespect totakingbackandcharge ofcases. Contrary totheobjectiveofDublinRegulation,thisreport foundthataccesstoanasylum notes aswellthequalityofinterpretation andtranslationofthesedocuments. information include the language employed, technical terminology used in leaflets and/or guidance amount andqualityoftheinformationdelivered variesextensively. Obstaclestoeffective provision of Regulation eitherbywayofaninformationleafletand/oradmissibilityinterview. Despitethis,the The majorityofMemberStatesprovide someformofinformationtoasylumseekersontheDublin for third countrynationals whodidnotclaimasylumintherequesting MemberState. before removal. This report found that access to an effective legal remedy is particularly restricted to alawyerandthefactthat,insomeMemberStates,transferdecisionisonlydelivered shortly accessing aneffective legal remedy includetheuseofdetention,restricted access tolegalaidand a numberofreasons including withrespect torequesting suspensiveeffect ofappeal.Obstaclesto Regulation. However, there is divergent practiceastotheeffectiveness oftheselegalremedies for All Member Statesprovide some form of an appeal to a transfer decision under the Dublin remedy. properly notifiedofatransfer decisionalsohasramificationsforaccesstoan effective legal States obligationsunderArt.19(1-2)and20(1)(e)oftheDublinRegulation.Failure tobe Member to contrary decision, the of informed correctlyare transfer to subject persons all Not the responsible MemberState isomittedfrom thesefiles. administrative authoritiesandsometimesimportantinformationregarding theidentificationof practice showsthatlengthydelaysoccuringainingaccesstocasefilesheldbytheGerman are grantedaccesstotheir Dublincasefilesheldbynationaladministrations.Nevertheless, Good practice is identified in Germany, Slovakia and the Netherlands whereby asylum seekers authorities. included initsscopemeansthatthehumanitarianclauseishardly everinvokedbyadministrative members family of definition the and/or clause humanitarian the of interpretationrestrictive A Germany andSwitzerland. Austria, in clause sovereignty the apply to required not is seeker asylum the of consent The per se will commonly not lead to a transfer decision beingcancelled
7 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary 8 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary 7 Annex IIoftheImplementing Regulation includesList A(meansofproof) andList B(Circumstantial evidence). Dublin Regulationisextremely variedinalltheMemberStatesincludedthisstudy. The approach totransfers,circumstantial evidenceandadherence tothetimelimitsunder Practical aspectsoftheDublinRegulation role inmeetingthisprotection gapandassistingdestituteasylumseekers. secondary categoryofpeoplewithfewerentitlements.NGOsandcharitiesoftenplayaninvaluable and socialconditions where asylumseekersintheDublinprocedure are frequently treated as a The operationoftheDublinsystemdepictsaEurope withvaryingstandards ofreception facilities Reception ConditionsandDetention • • • • • • • • • • • • Implementing Regulation. months. Evidentiaryrequirements are generallyapplied inaccordance with AnnexIIofthe seeker hasshownthattheyhavelefttheterritory oftheMemberStatesforatleastthree asylum an that basis the on 16(3) Art. under responsibility accept rarely States Member Most disputed cases. Member of number a in States for proving family links can be quite stringent, with an increasing requirements resort to DNA tests in evidentiary the evidence, circumstantial regards As 18 months. broadly leadstotheextensionof timelimitfortransfersuptoamaximumof whichinturn relatively 20(2) Art. and 19(4) Art. under ‘absconds’ term the interpret States Member Some Austria andGermany. if thetimelimitsexpire prior toremoval. LongdelaysintheDublinprocedure are reported in Member States fail to assume responsibility for the examination of an asylum seeker’s claim areRegulation Dublin the in out set limits time the general, In respected. However, sometimes the applicationofare-entry ban. practice existsinGermanywhereby theenforcement ofaDublintransfersometimesresults in transfer of unaccompanied children, for example, in Slovakia and the Netherlands. Problematic in Bulgaria,SpainandGreece. SomeMemberStateshavespecialmeasures inplaceforthe in themajorityofMemberStates.However, voluntarytransfersare themainmethodofremoval Transfers by force are predominantly used to execute removals pursuant to the Dublin Regulation States surveyed. Detention is almost systematically used immediately prior to transfer in the majority of Member to travelthewholedurationofDublinprocedure whichmay takesixmonthsorlonger. procedure. Theaveragelengthofdetentionvariessignificantlyrangingfrom 24hoursprior Nine out of the eleven Member States researched frequently use detention as part of the Dublin them inreception centres withmore limitedsupportservices. who Regulation previously claimed asylum there either by way of providing less monetary allowance or placing Dublin the under back sent seekers asylum penalize States Member Some asylum seekersintheDublinprocedure oftenbeingthefirstaffected. reported inanumberofMemberStatessuchasGreece, Italy, FranceandSwitzerlandwith within and amongst dramatically vary Member States.Insufficient reception capacitiesand shortageofaccommodationfacilitiesare facilities accommodation and standards Reception themselves. to due from unpredictable recourse totheCourtsorganization ofmakeshiftsettlementsbyasylumseekers is States Member of number insufficient capacity. Thishasledtosomeasylumseekershaving resort tomeasures small varying a in accommodation to Access reception conditionsbothpendingandsubsequenttoaDublintransfer. to access of terms in rights fewer granted often are procedure Dublin the in seekers Asylum of timeoruntilnotificationatransferdecision. different to assigned are States accommodation facilitiesand/ortheprovision ofaccommodationislimitedtoaspecificperiod Member some in procedure Dublin the in Applicants 7
of concern thatrequireof concern additionalstudy. 9 8 failure to address these issues. positions thatECREhastaken which are necessarytoreiterate inlightofMemberStatescontinued will notaddress. Itshouldbenotedthatsomeoftheserecommendations reflect long-standing below inresponse todeficiencies inMemberStatepracticeswhichthe recast DublinRegulation reforms intheoperationof theDublinsystem.Anumberofpracticalrecommendations are provided The implementation of thenewrecast DublinRegulationwillintroduce significanthumanitarian Court ofJusticetheEuropean Union(CJEU)jointcasesofC-411/10andC-493/10. conditions there. Divergent practicealsoexistsinrelation totheinterpretation ofkeyfindingsinthe Union prohibiting removal there duetosystemicdeficienciesintheasylumprocedure and reception rulings from boththeEuropean CourtofHumanRights andtheCourtofJusticeEuropean minority ofMemberStatesstillhavenotformallystoppedalltransferstoGreece despitelandmark Member StatesimplementationofkeyEuropean jurisprudenceisinconsistentandvaried.A The implementationofEuropean jurisprudence the guaranteedrightofasylumunderArt.18CharterFundamentalRights. readmission agreements andtheircompliancewith MemberStateslegalobligations,mostnotably, The research showsthatthere are surrounding anumberofconcerns theimplementationofthese agreements outsidethecontextofDublinRegulationalsooccurinBulgaria,ItalyandGreece. and include provisions on practical measures regarding actual transfers. Bilateral readmission agreements commonlyresult inshortertimeframes forsendingandresponding torequests Switzerland allengageinbilateralagreements inaccordance withArt.23.Theseadministrative States intheDublinsystem.Austria,Bulgaria,Germany, Hungary, France,Romania,Slovakiaand exchange ofDublinliaisonofficers are commonpracticalcooperationmeasures usedbyMember insufficient informationbeingtransmittedforidentificationpurposes.Bilateralagreements andthe Regulation isgenerallygoodthoughthere havebeensomereported instancesofincorrect and/or Communication andadministrativecooperationbetweenMemberStatesinapplyingtheDublin Member Statecooperation in response to theCommission’s Green Paper ontheFuture CommonEuropean Asylum System (COM (2007) 301),AD5/9/2007/Ext/RW. for Refugee Protection inEurope: DublinReconsidered, March Submissionfrom2008; ECRE, the European CouncilonRefugees andExiles See for example, ECRE/ELENAReport ontheApplication of the DublinIIRegulation inEurope , MarchSharing Responsibility 2006;ECRE, Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, EqualityandLawReform, Judgmentof21December 2011. CJEU, Joinedcases C-411/10andC-493/10, N.S.v. Secretaryof State for andM.E.others theHomeDepartment v. Refugee 9
Proposals for further research are also advanced for priority areas *** 8
9 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary 10 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary Recommendations 2. DublinRegulationstatistics shouldbedisaggregated onthebasis ofsexandage. 1. 2. • • 1. 1. 1. 3. 2. • • • • 1. Withrespect totheforthcoming‘fitnesscheck’: Enhance and publish the collection of data on the quality and operation of Member States Member asylum systemsthatitobtains. of operation and quality the on data of collection the publish and Enhance in thisfield. to related practices national the applicationofDublinRegulationwhichwill includeorganizations withspecificexpertise problematic address to competent workshops expert Create into accountallavailablesources, includingUNHCRandNGOs. procedure shouldbeprioritisedbytheEuropean CommissionwiththesupportofEASO,taking Dublin the in seekers asylum of detention and reception the on practices national Monitoring assigned onthebasisoffamilymembers. Further study should be conducted on the reasons why limited Member State responsibility is the support of Member States on the impact of the Dublin system on unaccompanied children. with EuropeanCommission the gathered by be should data qualitative and Morequantitative the Dublinsystem. The European Commission should conduct a comprehensive audit of all costs associated with 862/2007. and enhancedincompliance withMemberStateobligationsunderRegulation (EC) The collectionofstatistics ontheapplicationof Dublin Regulation shouldbepublished Curriculum moduleontheDublinRegulationby MemberStates. EASO should conduct a thorough review of the implementation of the European Asylum management, EASOshould: preparednessIn viewoftheestablishmentamechanismforearlywarning, andcrisis fundamental rightsinEurope. FRA should undertake research on the impact of the Dublin system on asylum seekers consistent withtheirECHRobligations. of the Dublin system and press Member States to apply the Dublin Regulation in a manner The CouncilofEurope CommissionerforHumanRightsshouldcontinuetomonitortheimpact proceedings where appropriate. EU asylumlegislationisproperly implementedatthenationallevelandtakeinfringement The European Commissionshouldensure thatthe recast DublinRegulationalongwithother content issufficiently clearandunderstandablepresented inauser-friendly format. a testphaseshouldbeconductedwithsamplegroup ofasylumseekerstoensure thatthe When draftingthecommoninformationleafletenvisagedunderanewimplementing regulation, European AsylumSupport Office (EASO): Fundamental RightsAgency(FRA): European Commission: Council ofEurope: Member States: 17. 16. 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. Withrespect tounaccompaniedchildren: 3. 1. reasonable periodinadvance ofremoval. Applicants intheDublinprocedure shouldbeinformedofatransferdecisionwithin the Dublinprocedure. Applicants shouldberegularly provided withinformationontheprogress oftheircasewithin find themselves. manner thataddresses thecomplexandvaryingsituationsinwhichmanyasylumseekers The sovereignty andhumanitarianclauseshouldbeappliedinafair, humaneandflexible law.be incompatiblewiththeirobligationsunderinternational Member Statesmustrespect thedutytoapplysovereignty clausewhere atransferwould criteria wouldresult insuchfamiliesbeingseparated. procedure byapplyingthehumanitarianclauseincaseswhere adherence tothebinding Member Statesmustensure thattheprincipleoffamilyunityisrespected withintheDublin and publishedbyMemberStates. Comprehensive dataonthefinancialcostofoperatingDublinsystemshouldbecollected to trafficking victimsandLGBTI asylumseekers. Further research shouldbe conductedontheapplicationofDublinRegulation withrespect • • • the jurisprudenceofEuropean CourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)andCJEU. Member States must ensure that Dublin Regulation is applied in a manner consistent with humanrightsandrefugeeunder theDublinRegulationandinternational law. Readmission agreements shouldnotbeusedtocircumvent MemberStatesobligations links intheDublinprocedure, MemberStatesshouldprovide themfree ofcharge. of other documentation proving family links. If DNA tests are a requirement for proving family DNA testingshouldonlybeusedincomplexDublin caseswhere necessary intheabsence procedural timelimitsunderArt.19(4)and20(2). The definitionofabscondingshouldbenarrowly defined forthepurposesofextending bans. Transfers pursuanttotheDublinRegulationshouldnotresult intheimpositionofre-entry Regulation. in practice,allMemberStatesmuststrictlyadhere tothetimelimitssetoutinDublin In order to ensure that the objective of swift access to an asylum procedure is achieved procedure. equivalent standards ofreception conditionsforallasylumseekersincludingintheDublin Immediate stepsmustbetakentoimplementtheCJEUCourtrulingofC-179/11andensure procedure andtoafullexaminationoftheirasylumclaim. all personssubjecttotheDublinRegulationmustbeguaranteedaccessanasylum Pursuant to the right toasylum guaranteed by Art. 18 of the Charterof Fundamental Rights, and thevarietyofmethodsusedinagedeterminationprocedures. The benefit of the doubt should be applied in age-disputed cases given the margin of error of MemberStates; family trace members ofunaccompaniedchildren intheDublinprocedureto livingelsewhere intheterritory efforts their in assiduous and consistent more be should States Member identifying theresponsible MemberState; in consideration paramount the be should child the of interests best the of principles The NGOs operatinginthe fieldofasylum: Member States: 11 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Executive Summary 12 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction I. Introduction 12 11 10 European Community. to astheDublinConventionwhichwassigned in June1990bythethen12MemberStatesof for asylumlodgedinoneoftheMemberStates oftheEuropeanCommunities,commonlyreferred forexaminingapplications theStateresponsible was firstcodifiedintheConventiondetermining MemberStatecompetenceoverasylum seekers.InEurope,concerning thesafethird countryconcept between Member States, it became clear that these measures needed to be accompanied by rules With theintroduction ofthe1985Schengenagreementborders andfollowingtheliftingofinternal to European asylumpolicyinthe1990sresponse toasignificantincrease inasylumapplications. The originsoftheDublinsystemcanbetraced backtothesafethird country conceptintroduced • From SchengenandBeyond 1.1. LegalFramework obligations. applies at the national level with respect to reception conditions, detention and other Member State this Regulation. Information was also gathered on the context inwhichtheDublinRegulation report dealsprimarilywith theapplicationofcriteriaandMemberStateco-operationinapplying is alsomadetorelevant legislation andpolicieswithintheDublinsystemwhere appropriate. This at thenationallevel.Althoughfocusofresearch isonadministrativepractices,reference reports shouldbereferenced foramore detailedpicture oftheapplicationDublinRegulation by project partnersandalsodrawsuponjurisprudence inMemberStates.Thenationalcountry and in This research provides acomparativeanalysisofthetechnicalapplication theDublinRegulation Comprehensive number of Member States has not been gathered since 2006 it. to subject those information on the of technical application of the Dublin II Regulation in a large rights fundamental the respecting whilst efficiency increase to aiming system Dublin the to reforms substantive which maintains the underlying principles of the Dublin system and introduces have recently reached a political agreement on a recast Dublin ‘III’ Regulation within which the Dublin system operates. At the same time, the EU institutions and (ECtHR) Rights Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) changed the legal framework Human of Court European the both from judgments seminal 2011, In operates. system Dublin the which within developments landscape the significant in been have there when time a at comes report The report aimstofillthatgap. research focuses on the impact of certain aspects of the Dublin system. Dublin the of aspects certain of impact the on focuses research one MemberState, thecriteria for whichwere listed in Art. 30ofthatChapter. Previous to the DublinConvention the1985SchengenAgreement title II Chapter 7provided that asylum seekers could apply inonly of theMemberStates by athird-country national, April2010. establishing thecriteria andmechanismsfor determining the MemberState responsible for examining anasylum application lodged inone For example, CIRDubliners Research andexchange of experience andpractice ontheimplementation of the CouncilRegulation DublinII Discussion Paper , April2006. ECRE/ELENA Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland the Netherlands.Thereport servestosynthesise thefindingsofnational reports produced Report ontheApplication of the DublinIIRegulation inEurope, March 2006; UNHCRTheDublinIIRegulation: AUNHCR 12 Itentered intoforce on1September 1997andaswellthe12original 10 and more recent 11 This 13 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction 14 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction 13 of theDublinRegulation. whilst theImplementingRegulationlaysdowndetailedrulesforapplicationofvariousaspects comparison offingerprintsasylumapplicantsforthepurposesapplyingDublinRegulation instruments, whichtogethercomprisethe‘Dublinsystem’.TheEurodac Regulationprovides forthe examination ofanasylumclaim.TheDublinRegulationissupportedbyanumberotherregulatory A fundamentalcharacteristicofthesystemisthatasingleMemberStateresponsible forthe well asthefollowingSchengenAssociatedStatesIceland,Switzerland,NorwayandLiechtenstein. an asylumapplication. As aregulation, it has direct effect andisbindingon all EUMemberStatesas The DublinRegulationisaimedatdeterminingMemberStateresponsibility fortheexaminationof • TheDublinRegulation hoped. establishment there waswidespread agreement thatitwasnotfunctioningaswellhadbeen take responsibility forthedeterminationoftheirasylumclaim.However, withintwoyearsofits the potentialtoremedy thesituationof“asylumseekersinorbit”whichnoMemberStatewould When the Dublin Convention was established, it was thought by some commentators tohave had Finland. signatories, itwasadoptedon1October1997byAustriaandSwedenJanuary1998 16 15 14 States as the Regulation.Byorder manner. MemberStatesmustapplythiscriteriaintheorder ofimportanceinwhichtheyappear The Regulationcomprisesofasetcriteriaforallocatingresponsibility setoutinahierarchical with regard totheexaminationofasylumclaims. but the Dublin system was not intended to be a mechanism for equitably sharing responsibilities in theresponsible Member State.Itissometimesreferred toasaresponsibility sharingmechanism as possibletheresponsible MemberStateandtoguaranteeeffective accesstoanasylumprocedure abuse ofasylumprocedures intheformofmultipleasylumapplications;c)todetermineasquickly examination ofanasylumclaimandtherefore avoid“asylumseekersinorbit”scenarios;b)prevent The aimoftheDublinRegulation is multifold: a)ensure thatoneMemberStateisresponsible forthe was adopted(hereafter theDublinRegulation). for examininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird countrynational 343/2003 establishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingMemberStateresponsible legal framework for the Dublin system. As a result of that,in 2003 Council Regulation (EC) No the DublinConvention.Therefore theCommissiontookopportunityatthattimetoreview the With the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty it was necessary that a Community instrument replaced an instrumenttoidentifytheresponsible MemberStatefortheexaminationofanasylumclaim. for establishmentofaCommonEuropean AsylumSystem(CEAS)includingthedevelopmentof which MemberState isresponsible for considering anapplication for asylum submitted inoneof theMemberStates, SEC(2000)522. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: Revisiting Developing theDublinConvention: Communitylegislation for determining Convention [2002]OJ L62/1. 2725/2000 concerning theestablishment of“EURODAC” for thecomparison offingerprints for theeffective application ofthe Dublin Regulation’) andCouncilRegulation (EC)407/2002of28February 2002laying down certain rules to implement Regulation (EC) “EURODAC” for thecomparison offingerprints for theeffective application ofthe DublinConvention [2000]OJ L316,(‘Eurodac The Implementing Regulation andCouncilRegulation (EC)2725/2000of11December 2000 concerning theestablishment of on theFunctioning oftheEuropean Union(‘TFEU’). submitted by athird country national inoneof theMemberStates”. Thelegal basisfor theDublinRegulation isnow Art.78(2)(e)Treaty Council adopt“criteria andmechanismsfor determining whichMemberState isresponsible for considering anapplication for asylum The legal basisfor theDublinRegulation was underArt.63(1)(a)oftheAmsterdam Treaty. Art.63(1)(a)required thattheEuropean international organisations. the Treaty of Amsterdam andtheViennaActionPlan.TheEuropean Councilstresses theimportance of consulting UNHCRandother To that end,theCouncilisurged to adopt, onthebasisof Commission proposals, thenecessary decisionsaccording to thetimetable set in be completed with measures forms of onsubsidiary protection offering anappropriate status to any person inneedof suchprotection. conditions of reception of asylum seekers, andtheapproximation of rules ontherecognition andcontent of therefugee status. Itshould also responsible for theexamination of anasylum application, common standards for afairandefficient asylum procedure, common minimum Tampere ConclusionNo.14stated: Thissystem term, should aclear determination include,intheshort andworkable of theState 13 At a special Council meeting in Tampere in October 1999 the European Council called follows: a)aStateinwhichtheapplicanthas familymember(asdefinedinArticle 16 of priority, thecriteriasetouthowresponsibility isattributedtoMember
15 2(i) 14
location”. becauseoftheirgeographical pressures and thatfindthemselvesunderparticularmigratory and absorption capacities in additional burdens on Member States that have limited reception result In the2007Green Paper, theCommissionitselfacknowledged thatthe“Dublinsystemmaydefacto responsibility fortheexamination ofasylumclaimstothoseMemberStatesattheborders ofEurope. The very foundation of the Dublin Regulation counteracts true solidarity in Europe as it shifts system remains a cornerstone inbuildingtheCEAS”. acornerstone system remains to theDublinsystemasreaffirmed intheStockholmProgramme, whichstatesthat‘theDublin Despite increasing evidenceofitsflawednature, MemberStatescontinuetobestrongly committed civil societybutalsobytheCouncilofEurope, inparticulartheCommissionerforHumanRights. The detrimental impact of the Dublin Regulation on asylum seekers has been highlighted not only by those MemberStates,whichisfarfrom areality within today’s’ Europe. for allocating Member State responsibility is contingent upon harmonizedprotection standards within 19 18 Seefor example, ECRETheDublinRegulation: Twenty Voices –Twenty Reasons for Change,March 2007. 17 have avisaiswaived, take place,iftheapplicantenters been crossed illegallybytheapplicant;c)incase State whichhasprovided theapplicantwitharesidence permit of theRegulation)whohasrefugee statusorwhoseapplicationforasylumis 24 23 ECREDublinreconsidered paper. 22 Commission Green Paper onthefuture of theCommonEuropean Asylum System, COM(2007) 301final,6.6.2007 p.10. 21 CoEParliamentary Resolution andasylum: Migration mounting tensions intheEastern, 1918(2013). Mediterranean 20 asylum seekersare frequently detained. seeker neverreceives anexaminationofhis/herclaimbyanyMemberState,familiesare separatedand its harshimpactonasylumseekerssubjecttoit.Indeed,aDublintransferhasoftenmeantthatan Over theyears,sharpcriticismhasbeenlevelledatDublinsystemduetoitsinherent limitationsand responsible forexaminingit(Art.13). criteria are applicable,thefirstMemberStateinwhichasylumapplicationislodgedbecomes challenges that the European Union is facing in terms ofmixedmigrationflows”. challenges thattheEuropeanUnionisfacinginterms Union to to migrationandasylum,theParliamentaryAssemblyofCouncilEurope invitedtheEuropean For example,recently, Mediterraneaninrelation inthecontextofmountingtensionsEastern procedure aswellfacilitatetheintegrationofrefugees. Such anapproach would likely reduce irregular movementpriortotherefugee statusdetermination connections betweenasylumseekersandMemberStatesseeker’s ownpreferences. Dublin system,replacing it witharesponsibility determinationprocedure, whichfocusesonexisting other organizations have advocated and continue to advocate for a fundamental revision of the Given thattheapplicationofDublinRegulationunderminesrefugee rights,ECREalongwith for example,inthepoorreception conditionsforasylumseekersinGreece. likely thatthiswillalso have detrimental effects for asylum seekerspresent there, asdemonstrated gap withinEurope. Thisis particularlyproblematic, inthat‘overburdened’ situationsitismost and reception conditionsavailableforasylumseekersvarywidelyacross MemberStates. (CEAS), vastlydiffering recognition ratescreate an‘asylumlottery’forindividualsfleeingpersecution 2011 therecognition rate atfirst instance inFinlandwas 66.7%whilst therate inIreland was 4.2%(Source: UNHCRGlobal Trends for 2011). An ‘asylum lottery’ continues to exist inEurope asevidenced byrecognition rates in2011,whichare extremely variable. For example, in by athird-country national,thatMemberState shallberesponsible for examining theapplication. Article 12alsoprovides thatwhere theapplication for asylum ismadeinaninternational transit area ofanairportaMemberState of theDublinRegulation withinterim reform envisagedintherecast oftheDublinRegulation. instruments onthe basisof anevaluation’. However, intheshortterm, MemberStates favour maintaining thefounding principles in theStockholm Programme invites theCommission to ‘consider, ifnecessary, inorder to proposing achieve theCEAS, new legislative This doesnotexclude thepossibility ofafundamental replacement oftheDublinsystem inthefuture though,astheCouncil European CouncilTheStockholm Programme –anopenandsecure Europe andprotecting serving citizens, (2010/C115/01),Chapter 6.2. Release 683(2010). Committee, 8December 2010;CoECommissioner for HumanRights, The‘DublinRegulation’ underminesrefugee rights, Press (‘CoE’) Parliamentary Assembly press release, ‘DublinRegulation: unfair, expensive andineffective’ saysnew Chairof PACE Migration European Parliament Evaluation oftheDublinSystem (OwnInitiative Report), INI(2008)2262,2July 2008;CouncilofEurope “revise and implement the Dublin Regulation in a way that provides a fairer response tothe response and implement the Dublin Regulation in a way that provides a fairer “revise 22 Thesystemcreates additional burdens forthesecountriesandthefeelingofasolidarity that Stateisresponsible forexaminationoftheapplication 18 territory ofaMemberStateinwhichtheneedforhim/herto Within the context of the Common European Asylum System WithinthecontextofCommonEuropean AsylumSystem when thecircumstances specifiedabovedonot 24
23
or avisatheborder ofwhichhas being examined;b)a 21 17
. If noneofthese 19 Any system Anysystem 20
15 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction 16 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction four pendingpreliminary reference questionsontheinterpretation oftheDublinRegulation. up untilNovember2012,theCJEUhasruleduponfivepreliminary references andthere are afurther Rights (CFR). would result ininhumanor degradingtreatment inviolationofArt.4theCharterFundamental Member Stateshaveanobligationnottotransferasylumseekerswhere suchatransfer Similarly, inDecember 2011, the CJEU in the joinedcasesofC-411/10andC-493/10ruled must notbecarriedoutandthesovereignty clauseArticle3(2)shouldbeused. the asylumseekerwouldfaceareal riskofaviolationhis/herfundamentalrights,thenthetransfer the responsible MemberState. Whenthere are substantialgrounds forbelievingthatupontransfer decision whethertotransfer, thetransferringMemberStatecannotdisregard thefactualsituationin Dublin Regulation,theM.S.S. basis of a interim measures grantedbytheECtHRinproceedings related totheDublinRegulationon a large amountofRule39requests. Since2007alone,there havebeenmore than910Rule39 andotherarguablerefoulement claims of humanrights violations. that respect theirhuman dignity andtoeffective remedies, includingprocedures toprotect against applying theDublinRegulationcannotignore therights ofasylumseekerstoreception conditions effective remedy againsttheDublindecision.Thejudgmentunderscores that MemberStatesin the CourtheldthatitwasinviolationofArt.13conjunctionwith3becauselack an detention andlivingconditionsinGreece. Withregard tothenationalappeal procedure inBelgium, Regulation. Belgium was held to bein violation of Art.3 for exposingtheasylum applicant to the violated Art.3and13ECHRbysendingasylumseekersbacktoGreece undertheDublin theECtHRGrandChamberruled,amongstotherfindings,thatBelgiumhad Belgium andGreece will be observed. basis of a conclusive presumption that asylum seekers’ fundamental rights in each Member State C-493/10 33 32 31 30 SeealsoECHRTIvUK,Application no.43844/98,7March 2000. 29 28 ECHR,M.S.S.v. Belgium andGreece, Application No.30696/09,21 January2011. 27 26 25 case Belgium andGreece The deliveryoftwolandmarkjudgmentsin2011from theECtHRGrandChamberinM.S.S.v the applicationofDublinRegulation. As of October 2012, there are approximately 90 cases currently pending before the ECtHR concerning regard totheapplicationofDublinsystem,particularly inrelation tochallengestransfersGreece. the past few years, there hasbeenan increase in litigation at boththenationalandEuropean level with have increasingly beenrequired tointerveneprotect thefundamentalrightsofthosesubjecttoit.Over in thefaceofmountingevidenceitsdeficiencies,Courts,bothatnationalandEuropean level, Given thislackofwillingnessbyMemberStatestorevisit thefoundationalprinciplesofDublinsystem • European Jurisprudence:CracksintheDublinSystem indirectly, to hiscountry of originwithout any evaluation of therisks hefaces from the standpoint of 3of Article theConvention.” sure that theintermediary country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees toanasylum avoid seeker beingremoved, directly or See for example M.S.S.vBelgium andGreece, para. 342“…Whenthey apply the Dublin Regulation, therefore, theStates mustmake of 2011vMinister for Immigration andCitizenship [2011]HCA 32(31August 2011). Australian HighCourt. SeeHighCourtofAustralia, Plaintiff M70/2011vMinister forandCitizenship Immigration , PlaintiffM106 the 1951Refugee Convention and1967Protocol andAustralia’s agreement withMalaysia, whichwas held to beinvalid bythe This principle of conclusive presumption hasalsobeendenounced outside thecontext oftheDublinIIRegulation inrelation to or punishment. Art. 4Charter ofFundamental Rights (‘CFR’):Nooneshallbesubjected to torture orto inhumanordegrading treatment Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, EqualityandLawReform, Judgmentof21December 2011. CJEU, JoinedCasesC-411/10andC-493/10,N.S.v. Secretaryof State for andM.E.others theHomeDepartment v. Refugee C-245/11. Thefollowing DublinRegulation cases are still pending:C-4/11,C-528/11,C-648/11andC-394/12. The CJEU hasissued rulingsinthefollowing DublinRegulation cases: C-19/08,C-411/10andC-493/10,C-620/10,C-179/11, 2012 sothenumberofRule 39requests onthebasisofDublinRegulation may now besignificantly higher. ECRE/ELENA see CoECommissioner for HumanRights, The‘DublinRegulation’ underminesrefugee rights, Press Release 683(2010). submitted to theECtHRconcerning asylum seekers requesting thattheirtransfers undertheDublinRegulation were suspended– CoE ECtHRPress Unit,Fact Sheet–‘DublinCases’, October 2012;Alsonote thatfrom 2009-2010there were noless than700cases prima facie risk of a violation of an asylum seekersrights under the ECHR. fundamentally changedtheautomaticoperationofDublinsystem. Research onECHRRule 39interim measures, April2012,Annex B(4)p.100.Thatinformation was up-to-date asofApril 31 BoththeseCourtrulingsclearlyshowthattheDublinsystemcannotworkon 32 Theoperation of mutualtrustunder the Dublin Regulation cannot be absolute. 28 andtheCJEUGrandChamberinjoinedcasesofC-411/10 judgmentclearlyholdsthatwhenmakinga v BelgiumandGreece 25 Thisadditionalpressure ontheCourtiscompounded by 30 Inthecurrent application ofthe 29 26 InM.S.S.v Additionally, 27 that 33
early warning, preparednessearly warning, andcrisismanagement. systems. However, duringthepoliticalnegotiations,thisproposal wasreplaced byamechanismfor better address situationsofparticularpressure onMemberStates’reception facilitiesandasylum within aDublinprocedure. Theproposal alsoenvisagedatemporarysuspensionmechanismto was toincrease thesystem’s efficiency whilstensuringhigherstandards ofprotection forthose 40 39 38 CyprusPresidency oftheCouncilEuropean UnionPolitical Agreement ontheDublinRegulation, Press Release, 6.12.2012 37 36 35 For furtherinformation seeArt.33oftheDublinrecast compromise text. 34 components oftheCEASandEUsolidaritytoolsare builtup’. is welcomed.Sucha‘fitnesscheck’shouldalso review theefficacy oftheDublinsystemas‘other system, covering its legal, social and economic effects as well as its effects on fundamental rights, Therefore, theCommission’s commitmenttoconductacomprehensive ‘fitness-check’oftheDublin asylum policiesandpracticeacross Europe, however, problems withintheDublinsystemwillremain. and inaprotection-sensitive manner. Aslongasthere islimitedconvergence andharmonizationin The keychallengeinthisnextphaseoftheDublinsystemistoensure thatitisappliedeffectively is transferred totheresponsible MemberState. explicitly obligesMemberStatestocompletetheexaminationofanasylumclaimwhenaperson applying theDublinRegulationtoallchildren. Moreover, recast Art.18ofthecompromise textnow the explicitinclusionofbestinterests ofthechildprincipleasaprimaryconsiderationwhen inter alia the provision of an individual right to information and a right to a personal interview, and The Dublinrecast compromise textcontainssomesignificantareas ofimprovement including different approach toallocatingMemberStateresponsibility. underlying principlesintheDublinRegulation,absenceofpoliticalwillforafundamentally In 2008,inthecontextofrecasting theDublinRegulation,Commissionproposed toupholdthe • RecastingtheDublinRegulation the fundamentalrightsofrefugees. Member Stateswillhavetoensure thattheyapplytheDublinRegulationinamannerwhichrespects fully resourced andimplementedcorrectly. CEAS toaddress seriousdeficienciesinMemberStates reception facilitiesandasylumsystemsif crisis managementmechanismhasthepotentialtobebuiltintoapermanent‘healthcheck’of the Regulation sixmonthsafteritsformaladoptionandwillalsobeapplicableinCroatia in2013. writing, formaladoptionoftherecast isstillpending.TheDublin‘III’Regulationwillreplace theDublinII Political agreement onthe recast DublinRegulationwasreached inlate2012. mechanism, ratherthanthesmoothfunctioningofDublinRegulationitself. subject totheDublinprocedure whenoperatingsucha shouldalwaysbetheprimaryconcern responsibility-sharing andmore mutual trust,COM 2011(835),2.11.2011p.7. Social Committee andtheCommittee oftheRegions onenhanced intra-EU solidarityinthefield ofasylum AnEUagendafor better European Commission, Communication from theCommission to theEuropean Parliament, the Council,theEuropean Economic and protection submitted before that date shallbedetermined inaccordance withthecriteria set outinRegulation (EC)No.343/2003”. of thedate onwhichtheapplication made.TheMemberState was responsible for theexamination of anapplication for international month following its into entry force and,from that date, itwillapply to any request to take charge of ortake backapplicants, irrespective the OfficialJournalof theEuropean Union.Itshallapply to applications for international protection lodged asfrom thefirst day of thesixth Art. 49recast Dublincompromise text “ThisRegulation shallenter into force onthetwentieth day following that of its publication in Asylum System, January2013. On thisissue solidaritytools seeECRE, Enhancingintra-EU to improve qualityandfundamental rights protection intheCommonEuropean http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st15/st15605.en12.pdf 129, CODEC 2520,OC 601,Interinstitutional File: 2008/0243(COD), Brussels, 14December 2012,accessed at: application for international protection lodged inoneof theMemberStates by athird-country national orastateless person (recast) , ASILE Parliament andof theCouncilestablishing criteria andmechanismsfor determining theMemberState responsible for examining an Council oftheEuropean Union,Position of theCouncilat first reading with aview to theadoption of aRegulation of theEuropean proposal’). States byathird-country nationalorastateless person, (Recast), SEC(2008)2962,2008/0243(COD), 3.12.2008(‘Commission recast for determining theMemberState responsible for examining anapplication for international protection lodged inoneoftheMember Commission (EC)Proposal for aRegulation oftheEuropean Parliament andoftheCouncilestablishing thecriteria andmechanisms 37 Respectforthefundamentalrightsofasylumseekers 36 In addition, the early warning, preparedness Inaddition,theearlywarning, and 35 34 40 Themainaimoftherecast proposal
38 However, atthetimeof 39 17 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Introduction 18 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Methodology II. Methodology terminology usedinthecontextofthisstudy. States applyingtheDublinRegulation.AnnexI of thisreport provides furtherclarificationonlegal within thescopeofthisresearch, bothwithrespect toEUMemberStatesandSchengenAssociated the reference to Member States includes all countries bound by the Dublin Regulation included of therecast DublinRegulation whichisstillpendingatthetimeofwritingthisreport. Inthisreport the numberingofspecific recast Regulationarticlesmaynot reflect thefinaljournalversion official have beenfurtherminorchangesafteranassessmentbylawyer-linguists sincethattime.Therefore, compromise text’. as setoutinthe14December2012Councildocumentversionandreferenced asthe‘Dublinrecast Throughout this report references are made to the compromise text of the recast Dublin Regulation necessary toreiterate inlightofMemberStatescontinued failure toaddress theseissues. number of these recommendations reflect long standingpositionsthat ECREhastaken whichare by acorrect implementation oftherecast oftheDublinRegulation.Itissignificanttonotethata identified incurrent practicewithintheDublinsystemexceptfordeficienciesthatwill beaddressed applicable. on national practice and therefore only limited references to Spain are made in this report where 43 42 Thenationalreport for Romania willbeavailable atwww.dublin-project.eu inFebruary 2013. 41 Allofthecase summariesare available inthejurisprudence database atwww.dublin-project.eu. of thepartners. too latetobereferenced andincludedinthecomparativereport despite theoriginalintentions was alsopublishedonbehalfofRomaniabytheRomanianJRSbutunfortunatelythissubmitted this reportthematthenationallevel.A duetoapaucity ofinformationconcerning Information onsomeDublinRegulationprovisions (forexampleArt.11and12)wasomittedfrom mainly oninformationrevealing cross-cutting trends intheapplicationof theDublinRegulation. surrounding receiving detailedresponses toquestionnaires. Thiscomparativereport focuses during the research such as delays in meeting the relevant staff inDublin units andchallenges The informationinthisreport isuptodateasofOctober2012.Somedifficulties were encountered illustrate nationalpracticesandjudicialinterpretationoftheRegulation. to quoted are summaries cases these appropriate, Where project. this of part judgments concerningorlinkedtotheDublinRegulationwheregatheredas Dublin unitsandotherrelevant stakeholders. Furthermore,approximately 190 through country-specific questionnaires sent to and meetings held with national individual caseswhichtheycameacrossinthecourseoftheirworkandalso the Regulation by way of desk-based research,ananalysisof asylum seekers’ national experts gatheredinformation on administrative practices concerning national experts. Overthe period of time from November 2011 to October 2012 The informationinthisreportsynthesizesthegatheredby accessible at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st15/st15605.en12.pdf. 129, CODEC 2520, OC 601,Interinstitutional File: 2008/0243(COD), Brussels, 14December 2012,(‘Dublinrecast compromise text’) application for international protection lodged inoneof theMemberStates by athird-country national orastateless person (recast), ASILE Parliament andof theCouncilestablishingcriteria andmechanismsfor determining theMemberState responsible for examining an Council oftheEuropean Union,Position of theCouncilat first reading withaview to theadoption of aRegulation of theEuropean The report makes recommendations for immediate action toaddress the shortcomings 42 SomestakeholdersinSpainwere alsounabletoprovide sufficient information 43 Thistextincludesthemainamendmentsinrecast Regulationbutthere may 41
19 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Methodology 20 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System III. & the CostofDublinSystem Statistics of thenationalreports. provided detaileddatatouseforcomparison. a statisticalanalysismustbeemphasizedasevenwithinEurostat noteveryMemberStatehas resulted in transfers. across allEUMemberStates for2009and2010,only34.86%ofacceptedrequests actually Depending ontheDublincaseloadpercentage of actualtransfersisrelatively low. Onaverage, 47 46 45 44 gathered byEurostat. obliged toprovide thisinformationtoEurostat. Therefore, thisinformation isonthebasisofdata Many nationalauthoritiesdonotmakestatisticsavailableattheleveldespitebeing 3.1. DublinRegulationStatistics applications toexamine. procedures, someMemberStatesendupwithmore orlessthesameoverallnumberofasylum cases indicatesthatdespitetheconsiderablecostandadministrativeeffort toimplementDublin 482 requests backonaverage from Sweden.ThisequivalentnumberofexchangesDublin Switzerland. Similarly, forthesameperiodNorwaysent458requests toSwedenandreceived 306 outgoingrequests to Switzerlandandalsoreceived inthesameperiod350requests from Norway andSweden.Onthebasisofaveragenumberrequests for2010Germanysent of Dublinrequests betweenthemselves,forexample, betweenSwitzerland The statisticaldatashowsthatcertainMemberStatesfrequently exchangedequivalentnumbers the efficiency oftheDublin system. seekers totheresponsible MemberState.Thislowrateoftransfersraisesseriousquestionsasto States approximately athird ofacceptedrequests forresponsibility result intransfersofasylum Unit, ItalianMinistryofInterior). In contrast to this, Italy only implemented 14 transfers to other Member States (Source: Dublin As regards implemented transfers, 4,645 asylum seekers were transferred to Italy in 2011. States. Duringthatyear, Italysent1,275outgoingrequests tootherMemberStates. In 2011,Italyreceived 13,715incomingrequests undertheDublinRegulationfrom otherMember National Fact Member State. Duringthesametime period,73.91%ofoutgoing requests were accepted bythereceiving MemberState. In additiononaverage for 2009 and2010only 25.75%of allrequests actually resulted insuccessful transfers to theresponsible envisaged undertherecast DublinRegulation.. need for accurate statistical information for theforthcoming ‘Early Warning, Preparedness andCrisisManagement Mechanism’ States to Eurostat andthosestatistics available atthenationallevel. Thisrequires furtherconsideration particularly inlightofthe difficulties. Aspartofthisresearch itwas noted thatthere appearto be significant differences inthefigures submitted byMember Even ifsufficientstatistical data isavailable, thedata isnotcollected andevaluated inauniform mannerdueto methodological national reports. For example, statistical information ontheapplication oftheDublinRegulation isavailable intheannexes oftheHungaryandItaly 533 final,21.9.2012. the Council,AnnualReport to theEuropean Parliament andtheCouncilonactivitiesof theEURODAC Unitin2011, COM(2012) Central Further information ontheuseofEurodac isavailable at:Commission, report from theCommission to theEuropean Parliament and 47 44 This show that across the European Union and the Schengen Associate 45 Furthernationalstatisticalinformationisavailableinannexesanumber Nevertheless,from thestartmethodologicaldifficulties inconducting 46
and Germany
21 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System 22 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System are notdisaggregated byageorsex. to share undertheDublinRegulationwithCommission (EC)No.862/2007 50 Itisnoted thatthesex oftheapplicant will becollected inrelation to Eurodac data. 49 48 The piechart • Chartonthemainlegalgrounds foroutgoingrequests in2010 with Art. 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007. that oftheImplementingRegulationshallbecommunicated totheCommissioninaccordance Art. 47oftherecast Dublincompromise textprovides itsoperationand thatstatisticsconcerning only consistofasmallproportion ofcasesforsendingoutgoingrequests tootherMemberState. movement inthecontextoftakebackrequests andEurodac data.Familialandhumanitarianreasons best interests oftheasylumseekerwithmainbasis foroutgoingrequests beinglinkedtoirregular The piecharthighlightsthefactthatDublinRegulationcriteriahasnotbeenfullyutilizedin the under theDublinRegulation. grounds predominantly usedforoutgoingrequests relate toEurodac dataandtakebackrequests for humanitarianreasons under Art.15i.e.0.1%ofrequests in2010were on thisbasis.Thelegal on thebasisoffamilyreasons. Evenfeweroutgoingrequests were senttootherMemberStates 2010 only0.5%ofoutgoingrequests toanotherMember StateundertheDublinRegulationwere year 2010ontherelevant grounds oftheDublincriteriaforallMemberStates.Forexample,in disadvantage ormonitortheamountofunaccompanied children subject to Dublintransfers. whether theapplicationofDublinRegulation placesasylumseekersofonesexataparticular EDAC TKB_16/1/e TKB_16/1/d TKB_16/1/c TKB_45 HUM DOC FAM workers, L199/23OJ 31.7.2007(‘Regulation onStatistics’). migration andinternational protection and repealing CouncilRegulation No.311/76onthecompilation ofstatistics onforeign Council Regulation (EC)No.862/2007oftheEuropean Parliament andofthe Councilof11July 2007 on Communitystatistics on terminology usedbyEurostat. State andtheaccording legal basisfor that request asprovided inEurostat data. Thelegend ofthepiechartisonbasis The data for thispiechartwas produced onthebasisofcalculating theaverage numberofoutgoing requests from eachMember 48 abovedepictsthepercentage of theaveragenumberoutgoingrequests forthe EDAC =43% Total requests basedonEURODAC=43% Taking backrequests: Rejection-nopermissiontostay=10% Taking backrequests: Withdrawal-newapplication=0% Taking backrequests: Underexamination-nopermissiontostay=31% (Art.4.5) =0% Taking backrequests: WithdrawalofapplicationduringDublinprocedure Humanitarian reasons (Art15)=0,1% Documentation andentryreasons (Art9,10,11,12)=15% Family (Art6,7,8,14)=0,5% TKB_16/1/e =10% 50 Therefore, withoutthisdata it wasnotpossibletoassess 49 FAM =0,5% However, the statistics Member States are obliged TKB_16/1/d =0% DOC =15% HUM =0,1% TKB_45 =0% TKB_16/1/c =31% TKB_45 =0% TKB_16/1/c =31% Regulation. statistics separatelyitisdifficult toascertaincomprehensively thecosts related totheDublin operating theDublinsystemandduetofactthateachoftheseauthoritiesstores theirown (DT&V). According officials, to Dutch governmental asthere isno centralizedadministrationfor Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and the Service for Repatriation and Departure Dublin IIRegulation:theImmigrationandNaturalizationService(IND),Police, the Netherlands thefollowingnationalauthoritiesarethe involvedindifferent aspectsofapplying the no informationonthecostsincurred attheregional levelbythecantonalauthorities.Similarly, in Regulation whilstregional cantonsare responsible forconductingDublintransfers.TheFOMhas (FOM) registers asylumapplicationsanddeterminesMemberStateresponsibility undertheDublin to theresponsible MemberState.Asanexample,inSwitzerlandtheFederalOffice forMigration aspects linkedtoascertainingtheMemberStateresponsible aswellconductingactualtransfers and/or branches are involvedintheDublinprocedure, encompassingboththeadministrative to calculatethefinancialcostsduefactthatseveraldifferent nationaladministrationunits In response torequests forinformationanumberof nationalauthoritiesindicatedthatitwasdifficult Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia,Spain,SwitzerlandandtheNetherlands). in theirnationalDublinunit. For example, the German Dublin unit hosts approximately 40 staff whilst Dublin unitsaloneitisevidentthatthere wouldbehugedisparitiesincostamongstMemberStates. operating theDublinsystemcannotbeaccountedforindetail.Onissueofstaffing levelsin 56 55 54 53 Nationalexpert interview withINDofficials,theNetherlands,18June2012. 52 51 Equally,statistics onthebasisofage,sexandcitizenship ofthepersonconcerned. theadditional Understanding the impact of the Dublin system couldbeimproved byfurtherdisaggregating the requirements forsharingspecificdataontheoperationofDublinsystemare relatively limited. improvement ontheavailabilityandcomparabilityofasylumrelated data.Nevertheless,the asylum claims. Since the introduction of Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 there has been a significant information ontrends asylumseekers’movementsandMemberStatesexaminationof concerning Evaluating theeffectiveness oftheDublinsystemrequires reliable empiricaldataandstatistical in The issueofthefinancialcostDublinsystemhasbeensubjectparliamentaryenquiries cost”. data,itwasnotpossibletoevaluateoneimportantelementoftheDublinsystem, namelyits precise In the2007Commissionevaluationreport ontheDublinsystemitwasnoted,“Owingtolackof 3.2. OperationalcostoftheDublinsystem available ontheoperationalcostsofapplyingDublinRegulation(Austria, with migration, asylum and border control. In none of the Member States requested was information the national Dublin authorities are part of a broader, more general administrative structure that deals transfers tootherMemberStates.However, ithasproven difficult tomeasure thesecosts,asoften support includingthetakingandstoringoffingerprintdataaswellcostconducting operation ofDublinunitsincludecostssuchasoffice equipment,personnel,EURODACinfrastructure on thecostsrelated totheapplicationofDublinRegulation.Costsrelated totheadministrative aspx?gesch_id=20081112 ;http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20094276 http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20093817 ;http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte. http://www.parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20103561. Further Parliamentary enquiriesofrelevance: dokumentation/curia-vista/vorstoesse-tabellen-grafiken/Documents/cv-10-3561-f.pdf Federal DepartmentofJustice andPolice, reply to enquiryNo.10.3561,17September 2010,http://www.parlament.ch/f/ btd/17/026/1702655.pdf, Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/265526,October 2010, p. 6,accessible at:http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/ Austrian parliamentary question XXIV.GP-NR 10892/AB,16May 2012. available. According to theAustrian Ministry oftheInterior nostatistical data concerning thecost oftheDublinsystem inAustria ispublicly Interior nostatistical data concerning thecost oftheDublinsystem inAustria ispublicly available. SEC (2007)742,COM(2007) 299final,6.6.2007(‘Commission 2007Evaluation Report’). According to theAustrian Ministry ofthe Commission (EC)Report from theCommission to theEuropean Parliament andtheCouncilonevaluation oftheDublin system, Austria, 51 Therefore aspartofthisresearch, nationalexpertswere requested toascertainfurtherdata 54 53
Germany 55 andSwitzerland 56 butthe response thusfarhasbeenthatthecostof *** , annexed tables withcosts: Greece employs six staff 52 Bulgaria,France, 23 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System 24 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System system. assessment andcalledontheCommissiontoremedy thatasanimportantaspectofevaluatingthe response, theEuropean Parliamentina2008resolution expressed atthelackofacost- itsconcern 61 Thisissue was alsoraised intheECREDublinreconsidered paper, p.4. 60 59 Commission 2007Evaluation Report, p.13. 58 57 Recommendations ways tocollectreliable and comprehensive dataonthecostofapplyingDublinRegulation. of itseconomicimpact,MemberStateswiththesupportCommissionshouldexplore future launchofa‘fitnesscheck’theDublinsystemwhichwillalsoincludeanassessment Dublin Regulationfrom othermigrationandasylumactivities.InviewoftheCommission’s system needstobeestablishedatthenationalleveldistinguishcostsofapplying that there is a serious cost/benefit analysis of applying the Regulation. A cost-accounting In order toenableacompleteappraisaloftheeffectiveness oftheDublinsystemitisessential Dublin request, decisionand/ortransfer. used byMemberStatestoenable data tobegathered bya onthenumberofpersonsconcerned information for disaggregation provided in Art. 8 of Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 should always be operating this system of assigning Member State responsibility. thecostof Since thetimeofDublinConventionquestionshavebeenraisedconcerning the political objectives of the system as very important, regardless ofitsfinancialimplications”. important,regardless the politicalobjectivesofsystemasvery could notbeevaluatedbutthenstatedthatdespitethis“MemberStatesconsiderthefulfillingof 2007 Commission evaluation report it was noted that the lack of precise data meantthat the cost has stillnotbeenacomprehensive studyonthecostsassociatedwithDublinsystem.In evaluating it. accessible at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48ca663ca.html European Parliament, European Parliament resolution ontheevaluation of theDublinsystem, 2September 2008,P6_TA(2008)0385, public policies.”SEC(2001)756,13.06.2001p.18. so that they can becompared withtheresults obtained, since cost-effectiveness considerations are anessential of theassessment part of generates asubstantial workload andcosts for theauthoritiesinMemberStates. to Itisdesirable form anaccurate picture of these, In the2001Commission staff working paperevaluating theDublinConvention itwas noted thatthe“Application of theConvention concerned bytherequest, decisionandtransfer. Art. 8(1)b)Regulation onStatistics, provides for furtherdisaggregation for theDublinRegulation onthebasisofnumberpersons • • • Dublinstatisticsshouldbedisaggregated onthebasisofsexandage. • collected andpublishedbyMemberStates. be should system Dublin the operating of cost financial the on data Comprehensive h cleto o saitc o te plcto o te uln euain should under Regulation obligations Regulation (EC)862/2007. State Dublin Member with the compliance in of enhanced application and published the be on statistics of collection The h Erpa Cmiso sol cnut cmrhnie ui o al costs all of associated withtheDublinsystem. audit comprehensive a conduct should Commission European The 60 InatimeofausteritywithinEurope, knowingthecostofDublinsystemiscriticalto 61 European Commission 57 Member States
58 Nevertheless, up until now there 59 In
25 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Statistics & the Cost of the Dublin System 26 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings IV. Report Findings 62 maintained intheDublinrecast compromise text. be appliedintheorder inwhichtheyare setoutinChapter IIIoftheRegulation.Thisprinciplehasbeen Art. 5 4.1. TheHierarchy ofCriteria Regulation Criteria IV. TheApplicationOfDublin 63 Regional CourtZwolle (CaseofRechtbank Zwolle)Case No.04/51294, 27January 2005. the basis of an asylum application. the basisofanasylumapplication. provisions linked to the possession of a residence permit or valid visa in Art. 9 come before Art. 13 on this translatesinpracticebutitmayleadtoanincorrect interpretation ofthehierarchy ofcriteria,as the humanitarianorsovereigntyItisunclear how clauseappliesintheindividualcaseconcerned. priority overtakecharge-based requests fortransferinHungary,unlessthefamilyunityprovisions, According to the Hungarian Dublin unit a previous asylum application in another Member Statehas transfer decisionontheresponsibility ofanotherMemberState. amended toensure respect forthehierarchy. Thiscanoccuratanystageuptothetimeofissuing the the Dublinprocedure, indicatingadifferent ground forresponsibility, thentheapplicablecriteriacan be Dublin Unitatthetimeofcommencementprocedure. Ifthesefactsare revealed aspartof criteria isobservedinpractice.Nevertheless,sometimesalloftherelevant factsare unknowntothe In Regulation onthebasisofaEurodac hitorprevious asylumapplicationrespectively. close familymemberinanotherMemberStateandinsteadappliedArt.10(1)or13oftheDublin has shownthere hasbeen anumberofinstanceswhere thestaff inBAMF ignored thepresence of a information forthecorrect assignmentofresponsibility totheGermanDublinunit.However, practice BAMF havingtherequisite knowledgeofthehierarchy ofcriteriaandtherefore forwarding alltherelevant The correct applicationof thehierarchy ofcriteriainGermanyisdependentoncaseofficers inthe regards tofamilyunitycaseswithresultant ramificationsfordeterminingthe responsible MemberState. been reported instancesofArt.14beingappliedinsteadthemore appropriate provision ofArt.8with crossing intoaMemberState.Ingeneral,Austriarespects thehierarchy ofcriteria,however, there have over halfoftheMemberStatesresearched irregular themost usedcriterionisArt.10concerning border that thecriteriawascorrectly appliedonanindividualbasis.However, itisinteresting tonotethatfor this wouldrequire havingsufficient knowledgeoftheparticularcircumstances ofeachcasetoensure It isdifficult toascertainwhetherthehierarchy of criteria is respected ingeneralbyMemberStatesas ”. regarding thesubstance”. and 25respectively, andthat theprevious applications for international protection of theasylum seeker not have yetbeensubjectof afirst decision evidence isproduced before another MemberState accepts therequest to take charge ortake backthe person concerned, pursuant to22 Articles presence, ontheterritory of aMemberState, of family members, relatives orany other family relations of the applicant, oncondition that such the application of thecriteria referred 8,10and16,MemberStates to inArt. shalltake into consideration any availableevidence regarding the presence offamily members withrespect to Art.8,10and11undertheDublinrecast compromise text. Recast Art.7(3)states “Inview of However thesituationpertaining to acertain pointintimefor determining theresponsible MemberState hasbeenqualifiedfor the been theresponsible MemberStateduetothepresence oftheasylumseeker’s motherthere. not respected asArt.6takesprecedence overArt.13andaccordingly theNetherlandsshouldhave clear thatthisisanexampleofacasewhere thehierarchy ofcriteriaundertheDublinRegulationwas Ca Slovakia, basedontheinformationprovided duringtheinterviewatDublinUnithierarchy of se S of the Dublin Regulation states that the criteria for determining the Member State responsible shall t
u
d y application of the child and ordered that he should not be transferred toSpain. thathe shouldnotbetransferred application ofthechildandordered CourtofZwolleruledthatthe Netherlandsshouldexaminetheasylum regional legally intheNetherlands.Uponappeal authorities thathermotherwasresiding shewasnaturalized.The DutchauthoritiesdidnotnotifytheSpanish Netherlands where inthe child’ onthebasisofArt.13DublinRegulation, whilsthismotherresided Dutch CaseStudy: The Netherlands requested Spain to take back an ‘unaccompanied Spaintotakeback an‘unaccompanied The Netherlandsrequested 62
63
It is It is 27 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 28 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 66 65 64 The secondparagraphofArt.6 4.2.1. InterpretationofArt.6 is inhis/herbestinterests. Member Statewhere thechildlodgedhis/herasylumapplicationisresponsible provided thatthis on thebestinterests ofthechild.According torecast Art.8(4)intheabsenceoffamily, thenthe It alsobroadens thepossibilitytoreunite withrelatives whocantakecare oftheminor, depending its scopemarriedchildren whoare present intheterritoriesofMemberStateswithouttheirspouse. Art. 8)extendsfamilymemberstoincorporatesiblingsunderthisprovision andalsoincludeswithin child lodged his/her asylum application is responsible. The Dublin recast compromise text (Recast of thechild.Ifthere are nofamilymemberspresent inEurope, thentheMember Statewhere the is thatwhere amemberofhisorherfamilyislegallypresent, provided thatthisisinthebestinterest Article 6statesthatifanunaccompaniedchildappliesforasylumthentheresponsible MemberState 4.2. case. Commission topotentiallyrevise thetextofrecast Art.8(4)subsequenttotheCJEU’s rulinginthis text provides ajointdeclaration bytheEuropean CouncilandEuropean Parliament invitingthe Member State. As this reference is still pending, an addendum to the Dublin recast compromise designates responsibility to incaseswhere children havelodgedasylumclaimsinmore thanone Civil Division)totheCJEUinC-648/11requesting clarificationonwhichMemberStateArt.6(2) provision apreliminary reference request wassentbytheCourtofAppeal(EnglandandWales Member Statewhere they lodgedanasylumapplication.Giventhevaryinginterpretations ofthis children inAustria,Switzerland,SlovakiaandtheNetherlands are usuallysentbackto the first to atransferanotherMemberState.Incontrastthis,intheabsenceoffamily, unaccompanied child haslodgedanasylumapplication.Therefore, suchunaccompaniedchildren are notsubject Member States,thenresponsibility MemberStatewhere isassignedonthebasisofpresent the and ItalyArt6isappliedinsuchawaythatifnofamilymembersare locatedintheterritoriesof asylum application or the first Member State where he/she submitted an asylum application. In across theMemberStates,eitherasStatewhere theasylumseekerhascurrently lodgedan information givenbyhimwasnotsufficient to determine Italy’s responsibility forthetwochildren. of aguardian according toSwisspractice.Inthiscase,theEurodac hitoftheoldestbrother and Administrative Courtnotedthateveryunaccompanied childshouldbeinterviewedinthepresence the authoritieshadnotinterviewedtheminpresence ofaguardian. Upon appeal,theFederal their rightsasunaccompaniedchildren seekingasylumwere violatedintheDublinprocedure as The FOM ordered the transfer of all three siblings to Italy. Their legal representative claimed that his twoyoungerbrothers were notregistered inItalyand claimedtohavenotsoughtasylumthere. older brother hadrequested asyluminItalyandwassubjecttoaEurodac category1hit. Two unaccompaniedsiblingsandtheiradultbrother arrivedinSwitzerlandviaGreece andItaly. The Procedural safeguards forunaccompaniedchildren Jurisprudence of fingerprintdata stored intheEURODAC database. A EURODAC Category 1hitiswhenaperson hasbeenregistered asanasylum applicant inanotherMember State onthe basis This isaccessible at:http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st17/st17712-ad02.en12.pdf accepts to consider thisinvitation, whichitunderstands asbeinglimited to thesespecificcircumstances andnot creating a precedent.” the bestinterests of thechild. TheCommission, inaspiritof compromise andinorder to ensure theimmediate adoption of theproposal, of theDublinRegulation. TheEuropean Parliament andthe Councilwillthenboth exercise theirlegislative competences, takinginto account on case C-648/11MAandOthers Secretary of State vs. for andat theHomeDepartment thelatest by thetimelimits set 46 in Article without prejudice to its right of arevision initiative, of 8(4)of Article theRecast of theDublinRegulation once of Justice theCourt rules An addendumto theDublinrecast compromise text states “TheCouncilandtheEuropean Parliament invite theCommission to consider, examining theapplication shallbethat where theminorhaslodged hisorherapplication for asylum.” Art 6(second sentence -para 2)DublinRegulation states “intheabsence of afamily member, theMemberState responsible for 65 Unaccompanied Children (Art.6) 64 (hereafter referred toasArt.6(2))isinterpreted indivergent ways 66 However, France interests ofthechildare takenintoconsiderationasshown inthejurisprudencebelow. addition, practiceintheNetherlandsdemonstratesthatitdoesnotalwaysensure thatthebest There are noDutch policy ruleson what constitutessufficient care forthe purposes ofArt. 6. In 67 Par C3/2.3.5 subtitle ‘Article 6:niet-begeleide minderjarige asielzoeker’. the bestinterests ofthechildasanintegralelementwhenapplyingDublinRegulation. forimplementingit”.TheGermanadministrativeauthoritiesdonotviewtheprincipleof be responsible responded anotherauthoritywould thatthisconcept isnotfoundinGermanlegislationand“ifitwere, to requests byNGOsand legalrepresentatives toapplythisprinciplethe administrativeauthorities no explicitcriteriaorprocedure existsastowhatthismeansinpractice.InGermany,response interest determinationisconsidered tobepartoftherole ofthelegalguardian inBulgaria.However, necessity of examining the best interests of the child when applying the Dublin Regulation. A best In Austria,neithertheAustrianAsylumlawnorForeigners Policelegislationrefers directly tothe respect toallDublinprocedures. children, whichsetsoutthatthisprinciple,shallbeaprimaryconsiderationforMemberStateswith further references tothebestinterests ofthechildincludedinrecast Art.6onguaranteesforall of familymembersbeinglegallypresent there. Under therecast Dublincompromise textthere are Art. 6refers tothebestinterest ofthechildwhendeeming aMemberStateresponsible onthebasis 4.2.2. Theapplicationofthebestinterestschildprinciple subject totheDublinprocedure. Switzerland asitsetsoutanumberofimportantprocedural safeguards forunaccompaniedchildren i.e. Italy(FederalAdministrativeCourt,E-8648/201021September2011).Thisisaleadingcasein need tobemaderegarding availableinstitutionsfor unaccompaniedchildren inthereceiving State sovereignty clause.Inaddition,theCourtruledthat,incaseofatransferdecision,furtherenquiries further inorder todeterminetheresponsible MemberStateandincaseofdoubt,itshouldapplythe not requested asylumin Italy. Therefore theCourt held that theFOM needed to clarifythefacts Also, thedecisionofFOMwasheldtocontraveneArt.6DublinRegulationaschildren had c) b) a) translation). the familymemberisabletoprovide theminorwithsufficient care (informal minor bythisfamilymember; there isnopresumption ofmistreatment (physically, mentallyorsexually)ofthe or guardian oftheminor; of theminortobeplacedwithsomeonewhoisnotconfirmedfather, mother a core familyconnectionneedstohavebeenestablished; itisnotinthebestinterests include thefollowingconsiderations: determination ofthebestinterests ofthechild whenapplyingArt.6should Good Practice:
In theNetherlands,according totheAliensCircular, 67 the 29 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 30 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings DNA testingifappropriate. child with his/herparents and/orsiblings needs to be confirmedbywayoflawfulevidenceincluding to reunify withfamilymembersinotherMemberStates.Therelationship oftheunaccompanied In humanresources”. not havethenecessary staff findfamilytracingquitedifficult asthey anddo are “notaccustomedtothistypeofresearch in unifyingthefamilywithinDublinprocedure inAustria.According totheBulgarian authorities, are knownfamilymembers locatedinanotherMemberState.Inpracticethere canbelengthydelays Similarly, inAustriatheFederalAsylumOffice willinitiateaDublintransferaccording toArt.6ifthere procedure istheninitiatedonthebasisofthatinformationunderArt.6or15DublinRegulation. 69 Further information ontheevidentiary requirements for establishing family links isavailable inChapter IX,9.3.1. 68 State inaccordance withArt.21DublinRegulation. claims tohavefamilymembersinanotherMemberStatetheninformationmayberequested tothat in thetracingoffamilymembers.InSwitzerlandandNetherlandsifanunaccompaniedchild basis ofconcrete information onidentityandlocation.TheDutchRefugeeCouncilmayalsoassist the MemberStates.InNetherlandsINDwilltrytotracefamilymembersofchildren onthe to provide some relevant information as to identify if a family member is present in the territory of across theMemberStates researched will have butoverall it appearsthatthechildconcerned There thetracingoffamilymembersunaccompaniedchildren isvariedpractice concerning including through facilitatingthechild’s accesstothetracingservicesofsuchorganizations. orotherrelevantthat MemberStatesmaycallupontheassistanceofinternational organizations, oftheMemberStates,whilstprotectingminor’sthe territory Italsoprovides bestinterests.” oftheunaccompaniedminorin action toidentify the family members, siblings or therelatives compromise textincludes inrecast Art.6(4)anobligationforMemberStatesto“takeappropriate There is no provision related to family tracing in the current Dublin Regulation. The Dublin recast 4.2.3. FamilyTracing State, AdministrativeLawSection,No201000393/1/V315September2010). held thattheasylumapplicationshouldbeexaminedbyDutchauthorities(DutchCouncilof than being in Malta. The appeal of the Secretary of State was dismissed and as a result it was united withhissisterintheNetherlandsduringexaminationofasylumapplicationrather be upheld. To the contrary, it ruled that it would be in the best interest of the child if he could be Circular. The Dutch Council of State ruled that this proposal by the Secretary of State could not stay withthemuponreturn to Somalia.Thiswasinaccordance withthetextofC3/2.3.6.3Aliens sister intheNetherlandsashismotherandgrandmotherwere stilllivinginSomaliaandhecould State inanappealstatedthatitwasnotthebestinterest ofthechildtobereunited withhis a sister present in the Netherlands and amother and grandmother in Somalia.TheSecretary of Dutch authoritiesconsidered Maltatoberesponsible undertheDublinRegulation.Theboyhad In September2010 Article 6andthepresence offamilymembersinEurope Jurisprudence between Member States. Article 21 oftheDublinRegulation includesanumberofprovisions onadministrative cooperation andtheexchange ofinformation Slovakia theMigrationOffice paysparticularattentiontounaccompaniedchildren thatare willing a Somaliunaccompaniedchildrequested asylumintheNetherlandsbut 69
68 Iffamilymembersare located, atakecharge 73 72 71 70 during theprocedure. The DublinRegulationissilentontheissueofaguardian beingassignedtounaccompaniedchildren 4.2.4. AppointmentofaguardianduringtheDublinprocedure guardian’s own legal knowledge they shouldcontacta legal advisorforassistanceonbehalfofthe schooling andaccommodation.According toSwisspracticeifthecase is toocomplicatedforthe whilst inSwitzerlandtheguardian’s role istoassistthechildinallmattersincludingwithregard to to beingpresent duringtheasyluminterviewsandatservingof Dublintransferdecision unaccompanied children. AsanexampleinBulgaria Depending ontheMemberStateguardians playdifferent roles intheDublinprocedure for borders. cases where guardians haveappealed against adecisiontoremove unaccompanied children at the if the conditions to remove a child are met. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee has yet to witness guardians merely payattentiontotheformalitiesofalienpolicingprocedure anddonotexamine apprehended attheborder butaccording totheHungarianHelsinkiCommittee’s experiencethese protecting achild’s bestinterests. Legalguardians are alsoassignedtounaccompanied children the necessarytrainingandexpertiseitisquestionablewhetheralegalguardian canassistin theexpertiseandtrainingofguardians havebeenraisedconcerning inHungary.Concerns Without in theirbestinterests. However, inGreece thelocalprosecutor often doesnottrulyactasaguardian fortheseminorsor according tonationallegislation guardians shouldbeappointedtoassistchildren inGreece . Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Switzerland andtheNetherlandsduringDublinprocedure. Similarly, Dublin Regulation.Currently aguardian isappointedtoassistunaccompaniedchildren inBulgaria, ensure thatarepresentative represents and/orassiststheunaccompaniedchildwithrespect tothe accessible at: http://www.gcr.gr/sites/default/files/evros.pdf Greek Councilfor Refugees, Unaccompanied minors intheGreek-Turkish Borders: Evros Region, March 2011-March 2012, June2012, the applicant orrefugee isaminorandunmarried andtheguardianship already existed inthecountry oforigin. As regards thefamily definition underArt.2(I)(iii)aguardian isconsidered to beafamily memberofanunaccompanied child when States inwhichtheapplication for international protection was lodged to take appropriate actionto identifyfamily members. It isunclear whether thisissue willbe resolved bytheDublinrecast compromise text as recast Art.6(4)only requires theMember Minors andIOMinItaly. However, tracing outside theDublinprocedure andinthecontext ofthereturn ofchildren doesoccur bytheCommittee ofForeign no issue of refoulement. no issueofrefoulement. Ca se S t
u
d y not trytotracehis/herfamilymemberslivinginotherMemberStates. is applicableonlyduetoaprevious asylumapplication,theHungarianPolicedo particular ifapersondoesnotclaimasyluminHungaryandtheDublinRegulation retrieve information on familymembersresiding in otherMemberStates.In the Office of Immigration and Nationality (hereafter OIN) in Hungary oftenfails to with respect totheDublin procedure Bad Practice: Bad Practice: a MemberStatewhere theirfamilymembersare present. ensure that unaccompanied children have their asylum application examined in the re-admission agreement as the Hungarian authorities deemed that there was astheHungarianauthoritiesdeemedthatthere agreement the re-admission hefledhiscountry.or thereasons toSerbiaunder HewasexpelledfromHungary hissituation,familymembers to hiscaseaskedanyfurtherquestionsregarding due toproblemsathome.NeithertheBorderPolicenorguardianappointed hisbrothersinSwitzerland Hungarian borderandstatedthathewantedtoreach Hungarian Case Study: 72 73 UndertheDublinrecast compromise textArt.6(2)obligesMemberStatesto
According totheHungarianHelsinkiCommittee’s experience In Italyafamilytracingprocedure doesnotexist inpractice A 14-year-old atthe Afghan child was apprehended 70 andtherefore Art.6(1)is rarely appliedto the role oftheguardian isinprinciplelimited 71
31 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 32 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings provided totheOIN,thenitwillbeevaluatedandaccepted ifproven tobereliable. another MemberStatecontradicts the Hungarian age determinationandthisnewevidenceis Helsinki Committee,theDublinunitinHungary statedthatifanageassessmentprocedure in is commonlyfoundto be anadult. However, contrarytothepractice observedbythe Hungarian a newageassessmentprocedure andinthemajorityofage-disputedcasesasylumseeker is achild,thisreportedly nottakenintoconsideration.InsteadtheHungarian authoritiesconduct child isreturnedfrom anotherMemberStatetoHungary determination irrespective ofthetransferringMemberStates’ageassessment. Ifanunaccompanied a priorasylumprocedure, theywillstillbeconsidered to beanadultonthebasisofthisearlierage 76 75 74 Sometimestheappointed guardian isinfact anofficialofacanton authorityandis therefore notalways independentintheiractions. information pertainingtoanassessmentoftheageapplicant. to transmitessentialinformationsafeguard includingany therights ofthepersonconcerned Under theDublinrecast compromise text,recast Art.31obligesthetransferring MemberState responsible MemberState orviceversaallofwhichimpactsupontheirrightsandentitlements. itself. Sometimesasylumseekersare transferred asadultsandthendeemedtobechildren inthe to thelevelofsupportprovided withrespect toreception conditionsand theasylumprocedure can haveimportantrepercussions bothwithregard totheapplicabilityofDublincriteriaandinrelation Dublin Regulation.However, thedeterminationastowhetheranasylumseekerisachildoradult procedures are undertakenortakenintoaccountbydifferent MemberStateswhenapplyingthe The current Dublin Regulation does not have any rules regarding how different age determination 4.2.5. AgeAssessment represent thebestinterests ofthe child. it isunclearwhethertheyalwayshavesufficient capacityoriftheyare sufficiently independentto when required. AdditionallyinSwisspracticeaguardian isoftenresponsible formanychildren and organizes thisdifferently. Therefore children are notalwaysguaranteed accesstoalegaladvisor child. Howevertheexperienceandqualityofworktheseguardians varywidely, aseachcanton Specifically intake back cases inItalyand Member Stateistakenintoconsiderationbythenationalauthorities. there. InSlovakia that mayhavebeenusedtodetermineitand/orwhyhe/sheclaimedbeachild/adult registered ageofanasylumseekerasdeclared inanotherMemberStateregardless ofthemethod are conductedinAustria , there havebeencaseswhere theAustrianauthoritieshavetaken amongst theMemberStateswithinscopeofthisstudy. Thoughspecificageassessments As towhetherMemberStatesrecognize oneanother’s agedeterminations,there isvariedpractice where appropriate furtherinformationisprovided inthenationalreports. assessment procedures, thatinformationisbeyondthescopeofthiscomparativereport, however, applicant. However recast Art.31doesnotclearly definewhattheresponsible MemberState should dowithsuchinformation ontheageofan available). In theNetherlands,every minorissupported byaspecializedcase worker –seewww.nidos.nl for furtherinformation (Englishpages care andeducation. a supervisoryrole inensuringthebestinterests ofthechildandare responsible fortheir guardian from the expert guardianship organisation Nidos. Good Practice: law guardians forunaccompaniedchildren. These independentguardians play independent guardianship andfamilysupervisionagencywhichappointsby and the Netherlandsfactthatthere hasbeen anageassessmentinanother
In theNetherlandsunaccompaniedchildren are assigneda 74
Hungary, if an applicant was deemed to be an adultin with documentationattestingthathe/she 76 Astotheactualnationalage 75 Nidos is an procedure. adult theirasylumapplicationmaybeexaminedasmanifestlyunfoundedinanaccelerated procedure, forexampleinBulgariaifanagedisputedcasethepersonisdeemedtobe The outcomeofanageassessmentprocedure mayalsohaveconsequencesforchildintheasylum the ageassessmentmethodusedbythatState. whereby theauthoritieshavetakenregistered agefrom theotherMemberState,irrespective of instruction,inpracticelawyershavecomeacrossbe conducted.DespitetheBAMFinternal cases personal interviewwiththechildtodetermineagewhilstinotherStatesmedicalassessmentsmay on theregulations ofthedifferent FederalStates.Forexample,inHessensocialworkersholda Federal Stateauthorities.Theactualageassessmentprocedure across Germanyisdependent 78 77 where theapplicantresides. Member Statemaynottakeprecedence overtheageregistered bytheGermanFederalState In Jurisprudence value ofthebirthcertificate.(CourtCassation,No.06-13344,23January2008). results, giventheir margin oferror. There reason wasnoexternal toquestiontheevidentiary value ofthebirthcertificateattestinghisage,whichshouldbegivenprecedence overx-raytest of lawandthatitsdecisionwaslegallycorrect. There wasacorrect assessmentoftheprobative decision oftheAppealCourtMetz,rulingthathadnotcommittedanerror submitted afurtherappealattheCourtofCassation.TheCassationconfirmed which wasgrantedinhisfavourfrom theAppealCourtofMetz.TheDepartmentMoselle that hisbirthcertificatewasinsufficient toidentifyhisage.Theapplicantappealedthisdecision, renewal of hisresidence was refused on the basis that he seemed older than18 years oldand time hewasdeemedtobe14yearsoldonthebasisofasubmittedbirthcertificate.In2005 the responsibility oftheyouth care serviceoftheDepartmentMosellefor2years.Atthat After arrivinginFrance2003anunaccompaniedchildfrom theDRCongowasplacedunder case no.12/9988,22May2012). himself previously asan adult inAustria(RechtbankDenBosch(RegionalCourtBosch), asylum seekerwhoclaimedtobeachildwasanadultonlyonthebasisthathehadpresented In May2012theRegionalCourtofDenBoschfoundthatINDshouldnotassume Age assessment determining the ageofanasylum applicant. Though thiscase doesnotinvolve theDublinRegulation ithighlights someoftheissues around thetypeofevidence accepted in Dienstanweisungen-Asyl_BAMF2010.pdf p.23. BAMF-Dienstanweisung Altersbestimmung beiMinderjährigen,accessible atwww.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/i_Asylrecht/ Germany, according instruction,anapplicant’s toaBAMFinternal registered ageinanother 77 BAMFdeclares itselfboundbytheagethatwasregistered bythe 78 33 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 34 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings prioritising itandmovingfurtherupthehierarchy ofDublincriteria. entitled the ‘family procedure’ incorporates the principlesincurrent Art.14provision thereby 79 Thisisinaccordance withtheexpansion ofthescope oftherecast DublinRegulation to beneficiariesofsubsidiaryprotection. not beinterpreted intherestricted senseoftheDublinRegulationbutin amore expansiveway, of theFrench Dublin unit. TheConseil d’Etat hasruledthatthedefinitionoffamily membershould The definitionoffamilyin FrancevariesbetweentheConseil d’Etat’s jurisprudence andthepractice areapplicant concerned alsoincluded. asylum seekerwhosuffer from amentalorphysicaldisabilityandtherefore are dependentuponthe Hungary andSlovakia.Abroader definitionoffamilyexistsinGreece whereby adultchildren ofthe Unmarried partners in a stable relationship are not included in the definition of family members in recognized marriagesorregistered partnershipsinthecountryoforigin. Netherlands. Same sexpartnershipsare alsoincludedinthedefinitionoffamily inSwitzerlandandthe definition andtherefore thisisdeterminedonthebasisofanindividualassessment. Bulgaria there isnodefinition of a‘stablelong-term relationship’ forthepurposes ofthefamily stable relationships inAustria,Bulgaria,Greece, Spain,SwitzerlandandtheNetherlands.In According toMemberState practice,thedefinitionoffamilyincorporatesunmarriedpartnersin provisions (recast Art.2(h)). The recast compromise textalsoincludesanewdefinitionof‘relative’ forthepurposesoffamily (recast theapplicantispresent’ law orbythenationalpracticeofMemberStatewhere Art.2(g)). but amendsguardian forhim/herwhetherby inthecontextofminorsto‘anotheradultresponsible is a minor andunmarried. The Dublin recast compromise text retains thesamedefinitionof family adopted as defined under national law; the father, mother or guardian whentheapplicant or refugee are unmarriedanddependent andregardless ofwhethertheywerein oroutofwedlock born relating toaliens;theminor children ofsuchcouplesortheapplicant,onconditionthatthey treatsState concerned unmarriedcouplesinawaycomparabletomarriedunderits law his/her unmarriedpartnerinastablerelationship, where thelegislationorpracticesofMember persons whoare present intheterritory of theMemberStates:spouseasylumseeker or Art. 2 (i) defines the family insofar as it already existedin the countryoforigin,as the following 4.3.1. FamilyDefinition(Art.2(i)) have notyetbeensubjecttoafirstinstancesubstantivedecision(recast Art.10). protectionbeen grantedinternational (recastprotection Art.9)andapplicantsforinternational who Under theDublinrecast compromise textthefamily provisions extendtofamilymemberswhohave to thembeingseparatedinpractice. procedure tobeconductedtogetherinawaywhichensures thattheDublincriteriadoesnotlead family memberssubmitasylumapplicationssimultaneouslyorindatescloseenoughfortheDublin regarding substance.Art.14aimsatidentifyingMember Stateresponsibility incaseswhere several with familymemberswhoseasylumapplicationhasnotyetbeenthesubjectofafirstdecision family memberswhohaverefugee statusare present, whilstArt.8allowsapplicantstobeunited Regulation enablesasylumseekerstohavetheirclaimexaminedinaMemberStatewhere in accordance withArt.8ECHRand7CharterofFundamentalRights.theDublin manner compatiblewiththerespect andprotection offundamentalrightssuchasfamilyunity 6 oftheDublinRegulation.ItisimperativethatMemberStatesapplyRegulationina Art. 7,8and14are provisions aimedatpreserving theprincipleoffamilyunityasnotedinRecital 4.3. TheFamilyUnityProvisions (Art.7,8 &14) Austria also includes within the scope of thefamily definition same sex formally 79 RecastArt11 ”. basis that“DublinRegulationshouldnotbecomeaninstrumentoffamilyreunification approach theFrench Dublinunitmaintainsastrict definition ofthenotionfamilymemberson 83 82 For further information ontheuseofre-entry banspursuant to Dublintransfers seeChapter IX.9.1.2. 81 Quote from representative oftheFrench Dublinunit,personal interview 17thJuly 2012. 80 Conseild’Etat M.Tamir of theInterior, AvMinistry App.No.281001,24March 2003. under whichArt.7couldbeappliedtoassignMember Stateresponsibility. granted subsidiaryprotection inGermanyonthebasisthatthiswaswrong residence ground one casetheBAMFsoughttoremove parents toanotherMemberStatewhosechildren hadbeen The Germanauthoritiestakeastrictlyformalinterpretation ofthefamily provisions, forinstancein mustexpresspractice. Thepersonsconcerned theirconsentinwritingforsuchDublintransfers. his applicationwithaMemberState.However, itcanleadtofamilymembers beingseparatedin shall bedeterminedonthebasisofsituation obtainingwhentheasylumseekerfirstlodged Member State.Thisisformallyinconformitywith Art.5(2),inthattheMemberStateresponsible requested asylumbefore appliedforasylumelsewhere thefamilymemberconcerned inanother under this provision is only accepted in cases where the applicant in the Netherlands had already decided uponbyIND.TheDutchAlienscircular confirms that responsibility forafamilymember member ofanasylumseekerwhoseapplicationintheNetherlandshasnotyetsubstantivelybeen The Netherlands,inaccordance withArt.8, acceptsresponsibility foranasylumrequest ofafamily state ofuncertainty, separatedfrom oneanotheroverlongperiodsoftime. for bringingfamilymemberstogetherundertheDublinRegulationleavingfamiliesinaprolonged Member States as evidenced in the case study below. There are also significant delays in at alaterstageintheDublinprocedure, whichindicatesthepresence offamilymembersinother the familylinks.However, sometimestheauthoritiesfailtotakeintoaccountinformationsubmitted in anotherMemberStatetheauthoritieswillcontactthatforfurtherinformation on According toAustrianpractice, iftheasylumseekercanidentifylocationofafamilymember 4.3.2. reunite suchfamilymembers.Inreality theywillmostlikelynotbeabletoreunite atalaterstage. pursuant to a previous Dublin transfer may also have serious implications for the issuing of a visa to from theresponsible MemberState.However, thefactthatthere maybeare-entry banissued merely refers tothepossibilityinfuture oflaunchingavisaprocedure forfamilyreunification though there isasiblingrelationship, noguardianship existedinthecountryoforigin.TheBAMF a casetheBAMFwilltrytotransferresponsibility toanotherMemberStateonthebasisthateven purposes oftheDublinprocedure evenifhe/shehasthecapacitytotakecare ofthatchild.Insuch lived inthesamehouseholdtogethercountryoforigintobecomethatminors’guardian forthe German practiceforexample,itisnotpossibleanadultsiblingtounaccompaniedchild,who adherence with the definition under Art. 2(i) but may result in families being unfairly separated. In previously actingasaguardian inthecountryoforigin.Thisisstrictly forthechildconcerned In Germanythedefinitionofaguardian forthepurposeofArt.6is restricted tosomeonewhowas as long as the intensity of family relations is proven in the individual case. State. ECtHR HodeandAbdivUK,Application No.22341/09,6November 2012. from those whomarriedpre-flight. By analogy thisshould alsoapply to marriagesconducted inthecountry ofrefuge i.e.the Member Art. 14read together withArt. 8ECHRfound thatthere was nojustification for treating refugees whomarriedpost-flight differently This isinaccordance withtherecent ECtHRrulingin HodeandAbdivUKwhere the Courtinholding thatthere was abreach ofECHR (Art. 7,Art.8&14) Family UnityandtheapplicationofDublinRegulation have existedpriortotheirentryintoHungary. Good Practice: previously existedinthecountryoforiginunderArt.2(i).
The Hungarianauthoritiesdonotrequire that thefamily 83 Thefamilymustonly 80 Despite the Court’s Austria 81 82 35 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 36 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings the Greek administration. pay thecostsoftransferstootherMemberStatesduedelaysandinsufficient resources within another Member State. Even if the time limit has not yet expired, asylum seekers themselves often therefore deprivingtheasylumseekerofpossibilitysubmittingatakecharge request to the three-month deadlineforsubmittingtakecharge requests underArt.17(1)mayhavepassed, at thetimeofsubstantivepersonalinterviewwhichmaybemanymonthslater. Atthisstage verifying thepresence offamilymembersisonlyconsidered bytheAthensAsylumDepartment access totheasylumprocedure. Evenonceanasylumclaimisregistered, theapplicationform 87 86 For further information onevidentiary requirements for family links seeChapter IX,9.3.1. 85 84 first place. oftherequirementis withoutinformingthepersonsconcerned toprovide suchinformationinthe provisions duetothelackofDNAinformation,whichwouldprovide evidenceoffamilylinksbutthis asylum application.Asaresult, theBAMFsometimesrejects takecharge requests underthese State and,conversely, ifaMemberStaterequests Germany totakecharge ofafamilymember’s authorities donotalwaysnotifyapplicantswhenatakecharge request ismadetoanotherMember are notinformedoftheprogress oftheirDublincasebythenationalauthorities.TheGerman A procedural problem hinderstheapplicationofArt. 7and8inGermanywhereby asylumseekers continues tobeextremely difficult inpractice. process thesecasesbutfirstlyasylumseekersneedto register theirasylumclaiminGreece, which wishing tounitewithfamilymembersinotherMemberStates.TheGreek Dublinunitattemptsto In (one), Italy(one)andAustriarespectively. Germany andwasoneoutofninerequests undertheseprovisions senttoGermany(six),France only oneoutgoingtransferimplementedontheground offamilyreasons. Thistransferwasto Bulgaria: According to the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees statistics, in2011there was National Fact: Art. 7. the 1951Refugee Convention and1967Protocol. Therefore, thoughthetransfer isunderArt.15,itoperates inthesamemanneras State thatatransfer to theNetherlandsispossible underArt.15 ifthefamily memberhasaprotection status for reasons otherthan based onthepresence ofafamily member. TheDutch authoritieswillinform therequesting MemberState therequesting Member of protection status intheNetherlands,thatState should contact theDutch authorities to investigate ifArt. 7orArt.15isapplicable In practice whenanotherMemberState receives information from theasylum seeker thatthere isafamily memberwithsomeform seekers resort to paying for suchtransfers to ensure thatthey are united withfamily members assoonpossible. The Greek authoritiescurrently donotformally obligeasylum seekers to pay for thecosts oftheirDublintransfers butmost asylum org/news/2012/oct/gre-asylum-attica-report.pdf The campaign for theaccess to asylum inAttica area, http://asylum-campaign.blogspot.com / accessiblehttp://www.statewatch. at: beneficiary concerned includinginthecontextoffamilyunitywithinDublinprocedure.beneficiary concerned between allfourasylumbasedresidence permitsasfartherightsthattheyoffer tothe is basedontheprincipleinDutchAsylumsystemwhereby there isnodistinction Arts. 3(2)and15oftheDublinRegulationare invokedtofillthisgap. Greece, currently the majority of outgoing Dublin transfer requests relate to asylum seekers 86 On atechnicallevel,Art.7doesnotpermitbroader interpretation, therefore basis ofArt.29AliensAct(subsidiary, humanitarianandcategoricalprotection). refugees, butalsotopersons withanasylumrelated residence permit onthe Good Practice: 85
In theNetherlandsArt.7isappliednotonlytolegallyresiding 84 ThesupportofanNGOisnecessarytoensure 87 Thisinterpretation subsequently settledthecase. 2011, stoppedtheseparationoffamily(Application.64208/11).TheGermanauthorities underRule 39totheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,whichwasgrantedinOctober measures and move to Italy. of the family could also leave Germany rest Only an application for interim advanced bythenationalauthoritieswasthatfamilywouldnotneedtobeseparatedas asdidtheConstitutionalCourtuponfurtherappeal.Thereasoning suspend hisremoval, Italy. applicationto anotherurgentinterimrelief forthefatherrejected TheCourtresponsible ofthefamily,clause fortherest ofthefatherto theBAMFstillcontinuedtopursueremoval to Italy in the principal appeal proceedings, obliging the Federal Office to invoke the sovereignty forthemothersuspendedremoval absconding. EvenaftertheCourtthatwasresponsible family,removal by the 2011aflightwasbookedandthefatheronlyprevented inJanuary removal ofthefatherwouldcauseaseparation ofthe ofthefact Federal Officewasaware system.However,and reception thefatherwasnotsuccessfulinhisCourtappeal.Although ofthedeficienciesin Italianasylum themtoItalyasaresult infringement oflawinremoving wouldbeanimminent onthebasisthatthere procedure transfer inanurgentinterimrelief suspended theDublin forthemotherandchildren States. TheCourtthatwasresponsible Federal Administrative Courts in theirrespective appealed this decision to their local responsible Ca claims. clause shouldhavebeenappliedtoensure familyunityduringtheexaminationoftheirasylum take charge request onthebasisofArt.7or8mayhaveexpired, thehumanitarianorsovereignty Member States.Thiscaseisanexampleofasituationwhere, eventhoughthetimelimitfora indifferent two years,thefamilyhadtoliveseparatelyandconducttheirownasylumprocedures examined inNorway. whichaltogethertookapproximately Duringthewholeasylumprocedure, hadtheirasylumapplications minorchildren oftimelimitswhilehiswifeandthree expiry inAustriatohavehisasylumapplicationexamineddue tothe admitted totheasylumprocedure Ca se se S S t t
u u
d d
y y there after having received Italy’s after having received there acceptance of responsibility. The parents the family with Italy and tried to remove the BAMF initiated a Dublin procedure On the basis of a Eurodac Federal hit, State separate from his wife and children. Germany, thefamilywasseparatedandfatherassignedtoanother viaItalyinSeptember2010.In Germany two uptoelevenyearsoldentered German CaseStudy: conducted no procedure withNorway.conducted noprocedure Eventually, aftersixmonthshewas the AustrianFederalAsylumOfficebutitissuedatransferordertoPolandand Poland. Afterfour months theapplicantlocated his familyinNorway. Heinformed with basis of other Dublin criteria, the authorities initiated a Dublin procedure locatedinEurope.Onthe were hiswifeandchildren seeker didnotknowwhere Austrian Case Study: A Syrian couple and their five children ranginginagefrom A Syriancoupleandtheirfivechildren At the start of the Dublin procedure inAustria,anasylum At thestartofDublinprocedure 37 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 38 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 89 88
therefore theappealwasrejected (Conseild’Etat,France No.281001,3June2005). the applicanthadnotdemonstratedintensity oflinkswithfamilymembersinFranceand insofar astheintensityoffamilylinksisproven. Inthedirect casetheConseild’Etatruledthat be interpreted intherestrictive senseoftheDublinRegulationbutinamore extendedsense, Art 15were applicable.TheCourtdeclared thatthedefinitionofafamilymembershouldnot French authoritiesshouldhaveconsidered whetherthediscretionary provisions ofArt3(2)or that even though the applicant’s situation does not fall within the scope of those provisions the Regulation andtherefore was notapplicabletoArt.7and8.However, theCourtstated that theapplicantdidnotfallwithindefinition offamilymemberunderArt.2theDublin and thenhesubmittedafurtherappealbefore theConseild’Etat.The d’Etatfirstlynoted seeker appealed.TheAdministrativeTribunal ofMontpellierrefused theapplicants’initialappeal The Italy. Hismother, sisterandbrother resided inFrancehaving previously appliedforasylumthere. A MongoliannationalclaimedasyluminFranceafterhavingpreviously spenttimeinAustriaand Definition offamily U653/12, 11June2012). applicant wasgrantedaccesstotheasylumprocedure inAustria(ConstitutionalCourt, been considered bythe Asylum Court.SubsequenttotheConstitutionalCourtdecision aunt wastheapplicant’s legalguardian. Theapplicationofthesovereignty clauseshouldhave not provided sufficient reasons foritsdecisionanddidnottakeintoaccount thefactthat removal toPolandwould constituteaviolationoftherighttofamilylife.TheAsylumCourthad guardian bytheAustriansocial welfare authorities.There wasanobligationtoexaminewhether child’s parents hadalready diedinhiscountryoforiginandauntwasconfirmedaslegal the applicants’appealstatingthatthere wasaseriousriskofviolationArt.8ECHR.The therefore theapplicantappealedtoConstitutionalCourt.TheCourtallowed under theDublinRegulation. The Asylum Courtagreed withtheAustrianauthoritiesdecision, but thiswasfoundtobeinadmissibleandadecisionissuedtransferhimPoland with refugee statusinAustria whotookoverfullcustodyofhim.HeclaimedasyluminAustria The asylumapplicantwasanorphanedchildwhoentered theEUviaPoland.Hehadanaunt Family unityandguardian inEurope protection gapinthebestinterests ofthechild. in theseparationoffamilylifeFranceandArticle15shouldhavebeeninvokedtofillthis a technicalformalreading ofArt.7thisinterpretation bytheConseild’Etatiscorrect itresults Court’s decision was dismissed (Conseil d’Etat, France No. 302034, 2 March 2007). Though on under Art 2. The Court ruled in favour of the Minister of the Interior and the Administrative brother wasirrelevant forinvokingArt.7assiblings are notincludedinthedefinitionoffamily theapplicationofArt.7.TheConseild’Etatruledthatpresenceconcerned oftheapplicant’s Interior subsequently lodged an appeal to the Conseil d’Etat. The substantive issue in the case applicant appealedsuccessfullyagainstintheAdministrativeCourt.However, theMinisterof French authoritiesordered thechild’s transfertoGreece undertheDublinRegulation,which status inFrance1998andwassubsequentlynaturalizedasaFrench citizenin2004.The in Greece inanirregular manner. Hiselderbrother, anadultsibling,hadbeengrantedrefugee An IranianunaccompaniedchildappliedforasyluminFrancehavingpreviously spentsixmonths Article 7andpresence ofasiblinginEurope 2U00653_2_00 This judgmentisaccessible at:https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Vfgh&Dokumentnummer=JFT_09879389_1 within themeaningof 2(g)orhis/hersiblingislegally Article present, provided that isinthe bestinterests of the minor.” the MemberState responsible for examining theapplication for international protection shallbethat where amemberof hisorherfamily It isnoteworthy thattheDublinrecast compromise text Art.8(1)provides that“where theapplicant isanunaccompanied minor, Jurisprudence Prefecture ofPyrénées OrientalesissuedatransferdecisiontoAustriawhichtheasylum 89 88 Despite the 91 Thisjudgmentis accessible at: http://www.asyl.net/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/18651.pdf 90 2011). the responsible MemberState(SaarlandAdministrativeCourt,Germany 2L458/11,3May and totallydisregarded theguardianship ofthebrother residing inGermanywhendetermining ruled thattheBAMFfailedtoexercise itsdiscretionary powertoinvokethesovereignty clause child interimrelief bywayofaninjunctiontoprevent hisimminentremoval toBelgium.TheCourt Belgium undertheDublinRegulation.UponappealSaarlandAdministrativeCourtgranted legal guardian. Despitethis,theGermanauthorities proceeded to tryremove theapplicantto brother hadtheabilityto take care ofhisyoungerbrother andwasaccordingly assignedashis His olderbrother livedin Germanyonthebasisofanunlimitedsettlementpermit.Thechild’s An IraqiunaccompaniedchildfirstappliedforasyluminBelgiumandsubsequentlyGermany. Guardianship ofsibling 4595 of2010,20August2010). translation)(Sofia CityAdministrativeCourt,Bulgaria (informal made in2006Austriaandtheacceptanceofhistransfertocompetentcountry” to examine the application of I.H., considering hisapplication for granting astatuswas country to the circumstance that Republic of Bulgaria is not a competent not related Human Rights, are under article16ofRegulation343/2003/EC withaBulgariancitizen,histransfertoAustriawouldviolatethefamilyprinciple of theforeigner ECHR stating“Theconsiderationsstatedintheappealthat,viewofforthcomingmarriage of hisfamilylife.TheCourtdismissedtheappealanddidnotengagewithissueArt.8 forthcoming marriagetoaBulgariancitizen.Heclaimedthatthetransferwouldresult inaviolation issued atransferorder toAustria.Theasylumseeker appealedthedecisiononbasisofhis had submitted two previous asylum applications in Austria and Greece. Bulgarian authorities A Pakistani asylum seeker applied for asylum in Bulgaria but according to Eurodac data he Family Life:Fiancée 201012024/1/V2, 2May2011). take charge of the asylum application under Art. 7 of the Dublin Regulation (Council of State,No purposes oftheDublinRegulation.Asaresult theDutchauthoritieshadtorequest Germanyto to establishwhetherhisfiancéeisconsidered afamilymemberoftheasylumseekerfor charge oftheasylumapplication before examining it. ThenGermanywouldhavebeenable the countryoforigin.Therefore, theDutchMinister shouldhaverequested Germanytotake asylum application of the asylum seeker regardless whether the family was already formed in family memberlivesandwhoisallowedtoreside asrefugee, isresponsible forexaminingthe of Stateruledthatinaccordance withArt.7oftheDublinRegulation,countrywhere a charge request to Germany on the basis that his fiancée livedthere. Uponappealthe Council A Turkish asylumseekerintheNetherlandsrequested thattheDutchauthoritiessubmitatake Definition offamily:Fiancée Regulation torespect theprincipleoffamilyunity. demonstrating theneedtohaveanextendedinterpretation offamilywhenapplyingtheDublin fact thattheapplicant’s appealwasrefused inthiscase,theCourt’s reasoning isimportantin of theasylum seeker’s claim. In accordance withArt.16(1)(c)DublinRegulation, Bulgaria hadrequested Austria to take backresponsibility for theexamination 91 90 andunderarticle8oftheEuropeanConventionon Decision no2829of2010,Admincaseno. 39 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 40 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings Limited information onMemberState practicewasreported underArt.9.MemberStates applyit text. applicant. Nosubstantive changeswere madeto these provisions intheDublin recast compromise Regulation maybetransferred toaMemberState,whichissuesresidence documentforthe also beapplicablewhereby theobligationstotake charge ortakebacksomeone undertheDublin committed afterthedocumentorvisawasissued. Inthecontextofresidence permitsArt.16(2)may issuing theresidence documentorvisashallnotberesponsible ifitcanestablishthatafraudwas invalid documents,doesnotinvalidateMember Stateresponsibility. However, theMemberState was issuedonthebasisofafalseorassumed identity oronsubmissionofforged, counterfeitor residence permitsorvisas.Itisimportanttonotethefactthatifaresidence documentorvisa by different MemberStates,and whenresponsibility can bedeterminedonthebasisofexpired when the asylum seeker is in possession of more than one valid residence document or visa issued residence Italso provides document and/or visa tothe asylum seekerconcerned. modalities for Art. 9setsoutrulesassigningMemberStates’ responsibility onthebasisofissuingavalid 4.4. VisasandResidence Documents(Art.9) is notconsistentonthispoint. submitting atakecharge request underArt.17(1).However, thejurisprudenceofAsylumCourt 14 provision mustbeapplied.Thisappearstolinkedthegeneralthree-month timelimitof conducted together”asmeaningthatthere isatimeframeofthree months withinwhichtheArt. tobe MemberStateresponsible fordetermining or ondatescloseenoughfortheprocedures Austria. SomeAustrianAsylumCourtjurisprudencehasinterpreted theprovision of“simultaneously, There wasapaucityofinformationrelated totheapplication ofthisprovision withtheexceptionof 4.3.3. SimultaneousApplicationsfromFamilyMembers(Art.14)
of hisfamilyshouldhavehadtheirclaimsexaminedinAustriaaswellonthatground. had notyetbeensubjecttoafirstdecisiononhisasylumclaimArt.8wasapplicableandthe rest members beingseparated.Inthiscaseasthefatherwasinasylumprocedure inAustriaand where theapplication of theothercriteria set outinthe Dublin Regulationwould leadtofamily by theadministrativeauthoritiesofArt.14instead8.isonlyapplicableinsituations family’s asylumapplicationwasexaminedinAustria.Thiscaseshowstheincorrect application decision was found to be a violation of Art. 5(1) of Dublin Regulation. Subsequently the whole which hastoberespected. Therefore, Art8isapplicableinthiscase.ThustheAsylumCourt’s for almostfourmonths.DuetoArt5(1)DublinRegulation,there isahierarchy ofthecriteria procedure inmeritswhentherest ofhisfamilyarrivedinAustriaandhehadbeenpresent there 14 wasusedinsteadofArt8,althoughthefatherfamilyalready admittedtothe The ConstitutionalCourtruledthattheAsylumdidnotprovide reasoning astowhyArt the wholefamilybacktoPoland.SubsequentlyappealedConstitutionalCourt. this wasrejected onthebasis thattheprincipleoffamilyunitywouldberespected bysending issued a transfer decision there. The applicants appealed this decision to the Asylum Courtbut procedure andconsultedPolandinrelation tothewholefamilyincludingfatherandthen children arrivedinAustriaviaPoland.TheFederalAsylumOffice re-opened theadmissibility to thesubstantiveasylumprocedure inAustriaApril2008.Two weekslaterhiswifeand regarding the applicability of the Dublin Regulation with Slovakia and France, he was admitted In December 2007 a Chechen applicant claimed asylum in Austria.Subsequentto consultations Simultaneous applicationsfrom familymembersandthehierarchy ofcriteria Jurisprudence In requests. asylum application. Similarly, the residence permit criterion is frequently used in Spain are utilizedmostofteninrequesting otherMember Statestotakeresponsibility forexaminingan States totakeresponsibility for theexamination of asylumclaims.InSpainthecriterialinkedtovisas and entry reasons Art. 9 is invoked most frequently on the basis of visas to request other Member In for applyingtheDublinRegulation. asylum seekersatthestartofprocedure, Art9islistedasthesecondpotentialground 94 93 According to Dutch visapolicy, ifthere isanindication thattheapplicant may request asylum inEurope then thevisaisrefused. 92 the DublinRegulation is applicable. circulars andPrefectures alsocheckthevisainformationsysteminindividualcasestodetermineif where appropriate in individual cases. InFrancethevisacriterionis regularly citedintheMinisterial tourist visas. visas. ThismaybeduetothefactthatNetherlandsappliesaverystrictpolicywhenissuing Eurostat statistics suggest that responsible fortheexamination ofsuchasylumapplications. the senseofArt.16(2)Dublin Regulation. Asaconsequence,theNetherlandsbecomes due tomedicalreasons onthebasisofArt.64AliensActisconsidered in permit’ asa‘residence in anotherMemberState.Itisalsointeresting tonotethatthepostponementofaDublintransfer permit criterionisnotapplicablewhenanasylumseekerrecognized asarefugee withstatus moment ofentrythataDublinprocedure canbestarted.According toDutchpracticetheresidence those asylumseekershavebeengrantedavisabyparticularMemberStateitisapparent from the entering Dublin Regulation. Itwas shared withthenational researcher duringaninterview withtheFrench Dublinunit, 17July 2012. This case study highlights thecomplexity ofcircumstances for determining MemberState responsibility thatcan occur underthe State isresponsible for theexamination ofanasylum claimonthebasisofanissued visa. The visainformation system (VIS)allows SchengenStates to exchange visadata andcan alsoassist withdetermining whichMember over responsibility forthewholefamily.over responsibility whole family on thebasis of Article 15 ofthe Dublin Regulation. Eventually, totake Spain agreed and askedSpaintotakechargeoftheasylumapplications forallthesereasons, request thetakecharge refused DublinUnittherefore (accommodation, profession,etc.).TheFrench of thisfamily who came to Europe and Spain becausethe father hadstarted a life there thattheycould notparticipateintheuprooting authoritiesdeclared of Art.9criteria,theFrench for the determination France issued the highest number of visas in thiscase which is ofrelevance Moreover,Regulation shouldnotbeusedforthepurposes offamilyreunification. although adamantthattheDublin authoritieswere established onasustainablebasis.TheFrench thefatherseemstobe inSpain,where familyreunification family shouldhaverequested Dublin unit was U.K., of Spain) the under opinion that the Dublin this Regulation. The French countries(France, move toFrance.Thiscasethroughtheissuanceofvisas,implicatesthree asyluminSpain,andnoneofthemwantedto Spring’. Howeverthewholefamilyrequested authoritiesduringtheeventsof‘Arab daughters obtainedaSchengenvisafromtheFrench Hiswifeandtwo resided. business between theU.K.andSpain,countries in whichheregularly could beexaminedtogether. asyluminFranceandheconducted Thefatherneverrequested two daughters)andonthebasis of Article 14 for the fathersothatall the asylumapplications
C Slovakia, according totheDeputyHeadofDublinunitcriterialinkeddocumentation a the se S t
u Netherlands forasylumseekersarrivingbyACSchipolfrom anon-Schengencountryand d
via airportorseaport,responsibility isoftenestablishedonthebasisofvisacriterion.If y 93 grounds of Article 9(2) of the Dublin regulation (valid visas ofthemother and her grounds ofArticle9(2)theDublin regulation onthe France totakeresponsibility requested authorities.Spaintherefore French authorities. His wifeandtwodaughters each hadvisasissuedfrom the German was inpossessionoftwovisas:onefromtheBritishauthoritiesand onthegrounds ofanumbervisasissuedontheirbehalf.Thefather procedure French Case Study: the Netherlands is rarely assigned responsibility on thebasis of 92 Furthermore, intheFrench Dublininformationnoticegivento A family was present in Spain and subject toaDublin A family was present 94 for outgoing 41 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 42 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings d’Etat rulingof2November2009 which isinvokedin45%ofalloutgoingDublintransfers. from theFOMindicatethat themostfrequently usedground foroutgoingrequests isArt.16(1)c) involving outgoingrequests tootherMemberStates.Howeveritshouldalsobenotedthatstatistics entry under Art. 10. According to the FOM in judgment,themosttakebackrequestsGreece received byGreece were linkedtoirregular border Prior totheinformalsuspensionoftransfersGreece onthebasisofM.S.S.vBelgiumand such applicantshavenorighttoaccommodation. his/her obligationtoco-operateandsubmittheiridentitytheEurodac systemandaccordingly after repeated attempts,thisconstitutesconclusiveevidencethattheasylumseekerisnotmeeting Greece Greece crossing in Austria. This arisesin the contextof transfers to Greece pursuant tothe There havebeentwophases inhowArt.10isinterpreted andappliedinthecontextofirregular border the DublinRegulationinsuchcases. Federal AsylumOffice and AsylumCourtnolongerassumeatheoretical responsibility ofGreece under 101 100 For further information seeFilzwieser/Sprung:DublinIIVerordnung³ (2010),107,K11. 99 98 SeealsoChapter XIontheimplementation ofEuropean jurisprudence. 97 96 95 seekers toreturnfrequently totheiroffices toattempt to record theirfingerprints. seekers for the purposes of Eurodac. The Prefectures’ general practice is to order such asylum In Netherlands are onthebasisofEurodac dataandArt10oftheDublinRegulation. The majorityofoutgoingrequests from Bulgaria,Italy, France,Slovakia,Hungaryandthe or Stay). substantively remains thesameunderDublinrecast compromise text(recast Art.13Entryand/ another Member State, then thatState is responsible forhis/herasylumapplication.Thisprovision for asylumtheapplicanthaspreviously beenlivingforacontinuousperiodofatleastfivemonthsin assigning responsibility underthisprovision suchaswhetheratthetimeoflodgingapplication on whichtheirregular border crossing tookplace.Otherfactorsare alsotakenintoaccountin examining the application for asylum. This responsibility shall cease 12 months after the date land, seaorair, havingcomefrom athird country, thatMemberStateshallberesponsible for Eurodac datathatanasylumseekerhasirregularly crossed theborder intoaMemberStateby Art. 10statesthatwhere itisestablishedonthebasisofproof orcircumstantial evidenceincluding 4.5. Irregular Border Crossing andEurodac (Art.10) Greece isthenconsidered tobetheresponsible MemberStateunderArt.10. by default(Art.18(7)). wereconcerned transferred toGreece regardless asitwasdeemedthathadacceptedresponsibility on Eurodac. TheGreek authoritiescommonlydidnotrespond tosuchrequests, buttheasylumseekers Greece, duetothefactthattheycrossed theborder illegallyevenifthere wasnofingerprint datafound entered theEUviaGreece. to betheresponsible MemberStateinsuchcases,despitethefactthat theasylumseekeroriginally Helsinki Committeehasalsonotedrecently thatanumberofotherMember StateshavefoundHungary S22 416.465-1/2010andAsylGH 30.11.2010,S22415.911-1/2010. The following Austrian Asylum Courtcases are examples ofthis practice: AsylGH 16.12.2010,S8416.443-1/2010;AsylGH 06.12.2010, application isunderexamination andwhoisintheterritory ofanotherMemberState withoutpermission. Article 16(1)c)obliges theresponsible Member State to take back,undertheconditions laiddown inArticle 20,anapplicant who development v.supportive Mrs,CaseNo.332890,2November Selamawit 2009. Conseil d’Etat, section ducontentieux, jugedesréférés, CaseNo.332890Minister of Integration, Immigration, National Identity and required to immediately remove theapplicant’s permitto remain. Thereby placingtheasylum seeker inanaccelerated procedure. seeker after onemonthto make anotherattempt to take fingerprints. Ifthisremains impossible after manytriestheauthoritiesare In aFrench Ministerial Circular of2April2010Prefectures are ordered inthecase ofunreadable fingerprints, to recall theasylum France there are sometimesdifficulties with recording damagedfingerprintsofsomeasylum 421.164-2/2012; AsylGH 19.04.2012, S5426.038-1/2012;AsylGH 18.04.2012,S7425.624-1/2012; andmanyothers See for example, thefollowing Austrian Asylum Courtcases: AsylGH 29.03.2012,S3422.460-2/2012/7E; AsylGH 07.05.2012,S4 judgment. 98 requested to send many asylum seekers to PriortotheECHRCourtruling,Austriarequested to sendmanyasylumseekers to 99 Since the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber ruling, the Austrian SincetheEuropean Court ofHumanRightsGrandChamberruling,theAustrian 96 100 theCourtdeclared thatiffingerprintsstillcannotbe recorded ThenextMemberStatetheasylumseekerscross illegallyafter Switzerland, Art.10 is used in 22.5% of Dublincases 97
101 Similarly the Hungarian SimilarlytheHungarian M.S.S. v Belgium and M.S.S. v Belgium and 95 InaConseil
104 103 102 SeeVfGH27.06.2012,U330/12. consistent withtheprincipleoffamilyunity. ascertain the reasons behind such data to ensure that this legal instrument is applied in a manner a smallpercentage ofactualtransferstootherMemberStates.Further study mayberequired to in ChapterIIIapplyingtheDublinRegulationon thebasisoffamilyprovisions onlycontributesto criterion is Art.10linkedtoirregular entry andborder control. Asshowninthe statistics provided one ofthemostimportantfactors.However, thefindingsaboveshowthat most commonlyused under the Dublin Regulation are set out in order of priority with the presence of family members being The criteriaforidentifyingtheMemberStateresponsible fortheexamination ofanasylumclaim that underArt.10(1),HungaryandnotGreece wasresponsible forassessingtheseclaims. entered that, althoughtheapplicantsentered theEUthrough Greece, theyhadthentravelledonand ruled thatresponsibility forassessingsuchcasesshouldbeassumedbyHungary.TheCourtfound in such cases entered regarding theapplicationofArt.10(1)Dublin Regulationincaseswhere asylumseekersfirst Prior tothesuspensionofenforced transferstoGreece, courtpracticeinHungarywasinconsistent submit apreliminary rulingtotheCJEUseekingclarificationoninterpretation ofArt.10(1). Due tothisdiverging practice,theAustrianConstitutionalCourtordered theAsylum Courtto responsible Stateincertaincases. Sometimes, however, theCourtitselfdidnotfollowthisreasoning andGreece wasconfirmedtobe judgment ofwhichisstillpendingatthetimewriting. Subsequently theAsylumCourtsubmittedapreliminary reference inthecaseofC-394/12,
September 2011). asylum seekerstoGreece duetothesituationthere (AdministrativeCourtofLille,No.1105278,16 asylum applicationwasstrictlyGreece, howeverFrancecurrently hasapolicyofnottransferring specific circumstances of thiscase.TheMemberStatethatshouldhavebeen responsible forM.A.’s Lille AdministrativeTribunal wascarefully todenotethatthisdecisionwasonlyonthebasisof to Italyandordered theFrench authoritiestotakeresponsibility fortheasylumapplication.The M.A. withinthetermsofDublinRegulation.TheAdministrativeTribunal suspendedhisremoval Tribunal concludedthatItalycouldnotbeheldresponsible forprocessing theasylumapplicationof indicated thattheapplicants’wifeandfourotherchildren were stilllivinginGreece. Onthisbasisthe third State outside the territories of EU Member States. Evidence submitted from the Greek Police transfer toItaly. TheLilleAdministrativeTribunal foundthatM.A.didnotarriveinItalydirectly from a therefore it was responsible under Art. 10. M.A. appealed this decisionrequesting suspension of the basis thatEurodac datashowed thathehadpreviously beenfingerprintedillegallyenteringItalyand France viaItalyandclaimedasylumthere. ThePrefecture refused M.A’s request for asylumonthe Greece where his wife and four children remained whilst he travelled on with one of his daughters to in An AfghanasylumseekerM.A.fledAfghanistanwithhiswifeandfivechildren. Theyfirststopped Application ofArt.10 Jurisprudence www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4d7610d92&page=search 3(2)ofArticle theDublinII Regulation inthecontext inparticular of intended transfers to Greece, 31January2011,accessible at:http:// (Afghan), Ref. No. 6.Kpk.45.765/2010/2,9July 2010.Source: UNHCRUpdated Information Note onNational Practice intheApplication of May 2010;ShamsullahAhmadi,wife andthree children (Afghan). Ref. No.17.Kpk.45.642/2010/3 , 7June2010;andMohmandSinwari For example, Metropolitan CourtofBudapest, judgments inQurbanHasan,wife andchild (Afghan), Ref. No.6.Kpk.45.500/2010,28 no-195-dublinii-austria-hungary.pdf Legal responsibility before on Dublin,August humanrights: story 2012,accessible ashort http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/ at For further information andacademic commentary onthiscase seeStatewatch analysis, Was the first Hungary EUcountry of arrival? Greece, butthenarrivedinHungaryviaathird country(e.g.Serbia).According totheOIN, Hungary viaSerbia,athird countrynotparticipatingintheDublinsystem.TheCourtruled Greece remained responsible. However the Municipal Court of Budapest sometimes *** 103 104 102
43 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 44 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings this principle will be a key challenge. list offactorstobetakenintoaccountinassessingthisprinciplebutthenationalimplementation Dublin recast compromise textwillgosomeway to improving thisbyincludinganon-exhaustive . The ofresponsibility’ principle withsomenationalauthoritiesdeclaringittobe‘beyondtheirarea tonotethatinthemajorityofMemberStates,littleconsiderationisgivenapplyingthis concerning in otherMemberStates.Timelimits within theDublinRegulationrequire thattakecharge requests An additionalproblem is related tothelateacknowledgmentofpresence offamilymembers C-245/11 reaffirms theimportanceoffamilyunityincludingwithinDublinprocedure. obligations enshrinedinArt8ECHRand7CharterofFundamentalRights.Therecent CJEUcaseof of familiesbeingseparatedundertheDublinRegulationinamannerinconsistentwithMemberStates child. Theseprovisions are rarely appliedandinterpreted inarestrictive wayleadingtomanyinstances principle offamilyunityhaveeffectively failedtoprotect thisrightincludingwithrespect totherightsof This research demonstratesthatthebindingprovisions ofArt.7,8and14whichaimatprotecting the the benefitofdoubtinage-disputedcases. procedures administrative authorities should take a cautious approach and apply the principle of determinations intheDublinprocedure. Giventhelackofprecision inallformsofageassessment uniformity ofpracticeinrelation totheconsiderationofdifferent MemberStates’ ageassessment 109 108 107 106 105 family membersforunaccompaniedchildren. them. Administrativeauthoritiesshouldtakeamore proactive approach totracingandidentifying children who have no contact with their family members who require the most support in finding unaccompanied children once concrete information is provided on their location, yet it is the very This research foundthatmostMemberStatesonlyassistwithtracingfamilymembersfor problematic reception standards and asylum procedures. within theDublinprocedure particularlywithrespect totransfersMemberStateswhere there are specific needs.Theirinherent vulnerabilitynecessitatesadifferential treatment forsuchchildren Unaccompanied children withintheDublinprocedure require specialprotection inlinewiththeir treatment ofunaccompaniedchildren outsidetheircountryoforigin. also beobtainedfrom theCommitteeofRightsChildGeneralCommentno.sixon Regulation asrecognized inArt.24CharterofFundamentalRights. The bestinterest ofthechildprincipleisparamountimportancewithincontextDublin obligations interaliatheConventiononRightsofChild. all aspectsofasylumpolicyincludingtheDublinRegulationinconformitywiththeirinternational will provide furtherclarityandlegalcertaintyonthismatter. MemberStateshaveadutytoapply to theinterpretation ofArt.6.HoweveritisanticipatedthatthependingCJEUcaseC-648/11 to theapplicationofprinciplesbestinterests ofthechildwithinDublinprocedure and http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0213:FIN:EN:PDF Parliament andtheCouncil, ActionPlanonUnaccompanied Minors (2010-2014),COM (2010)213final,6.5.2010.accessible at: efforts inconducting family tracing. For furtherdetails see:Commission Communication from theCommission to theEuropean The Commission aspartofits ActionPlanonunaccompanied minors hasalsoraised points inrelation to supportingMemberStates outside theircountry oforigin,June2005accessible at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/GC6.pdf UN Committee ontheRights oftheChild General Comment No.6(2005)Treatment ofunaccompanied andseparated children where there isariskofthechild beingavictimoftrafficking; d)theviews oftheminorin accordance withhis/her ageandmaturity. reunification possibilities; b)theminors’ well-being and socialdevelopment; c)safety andsecurity considerations, inparticular Recast Art.6(3)provides anon-exhaustive list offactors whichMemberStates should take dueaccount ofincludinga)family ascompetentas well .” supervision their staff, conform withthestandards establishedby competent authorities,particularly intheareas of safety, health,inthenumberandsuitabilityof measures. 3.States Parties shallensure that theinstitutions,services andfacilitiesresponsible for thecare orprotection of children shall guardians, orother individuals legally responsible for himorher, and,to thisend,shalltake allappropriate legislative andadministrative such protection andcare asisnecessary takinginto for hisorher well-being, account therights anddutiesof his orherparents, legal or legislative bodies,thebestinterests of consideration. thechild 2.States shallbeaprimary Partiesundertake to ensure thechild actions concerning children, whether undertaken by publicorprivate socialwelfare institutions, courts of law, authorities administrative See alsotheinternational legal principle ofbest interests ofthechild inArt.3Convention ontheRights oftheChild “1.Inall illegally staying third-country nationals,L348/98OJ 24.12.2008. European Parliament andtheCouncil of16December 2008oncommon standards andprocedures inMemberStates for returning of hisorherfamily, anominated guardian oradequate reception facilitiesintheState of return ” CouncilDirective (EC)2008/11/EC ofthe from theterritory of aMemberState, theauthoritiesof that MemberState shallbesatisfied that heorshewillbereturned to amember For example parallels could bedrawn from Art.10(2)oftheReturns Directive whichstates “Before removing anunaccompanied minor 107 Further guidance on what this principle constitutes should 109 Nationalpracticealsoshowsthatthere isno 105
Diverging practice exists with respect 108 106 Therefore itisparticularly Art. 80TFEU. which wouldbeinconsistentwiththeprincipleofsolidarityandfairsharingresponsibility under of responsibility forasylum applicationstothoseMemberStatesattheborders ofEurope, aneffect its optimalbestandallrequests wouldresult inactualtransfersthiswouldclearlyleadtoashifting the unpredictable circumstances oftheirflight.Accordingly iftheDublinRegulationwasworkingat seekers haveanymeaningfullinktosuchaMemberStateorjusthappenedarrivethere through responsibility forasylumapplicationstoirregular entry failstotakeintoaccountwhetherasylum provision usedindeterminingMemberStateresponsibility undertheDublinRegulation.Linking As regards theotherresponsibility criteria,Art.10withthesupportofEurodac dataisthemain Commissions forthcoming‘fitnesscheck’. respect tofamiliesandunaccompaniedchildren should becarefully evaluatedinthecontextof to cometogether. ConsideringthesefindingsthesocialimpactofDublinRegulationwith butwillalsonotsolvetheissueofsecondarymovementasfamiliesendeavour concerned bring togetherfamilymemberswithintheDublinRegulationisnotonlydetrimentaltopersons 110 Recommendations parents ofadultasylumseekersandotherfamilymemberswillremain unresolved. will remain relatively restrictive and accordingly theseparationofsiblingsand issuesconcerning family provisionsprotection. toallapplicantsforinternational Despitethis,thefamilydefinition The recast Dublincompromise textwillassistwithsolvingthisissuebybroadening thescopeof examination oftheirasylumclaimandinsuchsituationsthehumanitarianclauseshouldbeapplied. the journey. Thisfactshouldnotdenythemtheopportunitytobebrought togetherduringthe flight, whichoftenmeansthatpeoplewillbeseparated,andlosecontactwithoneanotheralong preservation of familyunity. MemberStatesshouldtakeintoaccounttheverynature ofrefugee procedure. Speedandcallsforefficiency mustnotbeusedinamannerwhichobstructsthe must besubmittedwithinthree monthsinlinewiththeaimofgrantingrapidaccesstoanasylum With respect tounaccompanied children: children withinaDublin procedure outside thecontext ofthediscretionary provisions. family unity. Anew definitionofrelative isincludedinthe Dublin recast compromise text butthisisonly linked to unaccompanied This problem iscompounded bythefact thatMemberStates rarely apply thesovereignty andhumanitarian clausesto preserve error andthevarietyofmethods usedinagedeterminationprocedures. The benefit of the doubt should be applied in age-disputed cases giventhe margin of territory ofMemberStates. members ofunaccompaniedchildren intheDublinprocedure livingelsewhere inthe Member States should be more consistent and assiduous in their efforts to trace family in identifyingtheresponsible MemberState. The principlesofthebestinterests ofthechildshould betheparamountconsideration responsibility isassignedonthebasisoffamilymembers. Further studyshouldbeconductedonthe reasons whylimited MemberState children. the supportofMemberStatesonimpact oftheDublinsystemonunaccompanied More quantitativeandqualitativedatashouldbegathered bytheEuropean Commission European Commission Member States 110 Failure to with 45 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 46 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 112 111 Recast Art.17contains norequirement for asylum seekers to consent to theapplication ofthesovereignty clause. is refused inAustriaandSlovakia the administrative authorities are not legally obliged to consider such motions. If such a request Similarly inHungary,lawyersmaysubmitmotionsrequesting theuse ofthesovereignty clause but basis bytheadministrativeauthoritiesdepending ontheindividualcircumstances ofthecase. such requests rarely result in theapplicationofthisprovision asitisusedonlyonadiscretionary national administrativeauthoritiestoapplythesovereignty clauseinindividual cases.Nevertheless Asylum seekersinAustria,Bulgaria,Greece, and 5.1.1. Proceduralaspectsofthesovereignty clause level, however, Germanyhasgathered somedata specifically in relation toGreece andMalta. Statistical dataontheapplicationofsovereignty clauseisnotreadily availableatthenational the Dublinrecast compromise text. the DublinConvention,however, regrettably, thisproposal wasrejected duringthenegotiationson the Commissionhad proposed to require the consentof asylum seekertouse this clause, asin practical”. ranging from humanitariantopurely reasons, clause for different States apply the sovereignty to anotherMemberState.Inits’2007EvaluationReporttheCommissionreported that“Member for substantivelyassessingiteveniftheDublincriteriawouldotherwiseassignthisresponsibility Art. 3(2) permits Member States to examine an asylum application and thus take responsibility 5.1. Sovereignty Clause(Art.3(2)) IV) whilstclarifyingthecircumstances andprocedures forapplyingthem. these provisions, bringing them together under a separate chapter of the Regulation (recast Chapter are discretionary provisions withintheDublinRegulation.Therecast compromise textretains Art 3(2)and15commonlyreferred to,asthesovereignty andhumanitarianclauserespectively V. Provisions TheUseOfDiscretionary rights inaccordance withEuropean jurisprudence. to transfersStateswhere there wouldbeariskofpotentialviolationasylumseekers’human vulnerability. MemberStateshavealsoexceptionallyappliedthesovereignty clausewithrespect to apply this provision and use it restrictively, for example only in individual cases basedon extreme In general,initialadministrativeauthoritiesinthemajorityofMemberStatesresearched are reluctant indirect applicationofArt.3(2). procedure andproceeds todirectly examinetheasylumapplication. Thismaybeviewedasan where Greece mayberesponsible theSlovakMigrationOffice doesnotcommencetheDublin Slovakia hasneverappliedthesovereignty clause.Nationalpracticeshowsthatincases 2012) responsible MemberState (Source: Emailcorrespondence from BAMFtoPro AsylinMarch In 2011Germanyappliedthesovereignty clausein42caseswhere Maltawasidentifiedasthe 2012). the responsible MemberState (Source: Emailcorrespondence from BAMFtoPro AsylinMarch In 2011Germanyappliedthesovereignty clausein4630caseswhere Greece wasidentifiedas National Facts: cases NS&Others C-411/10 and C-493/10. See alsoChapter XI11.1.onMemberStates implementation oftheECHRM.S.S.vBelgium andGreece judgmentandthejoinedCJEU The Dublinrecast compromise textretains thisprovision underrecast Art.17.Originally, 111 the authoritieshaveaduty toprovide legalreasoning fortheir
112 Slovakia havetherighttolegallyrequest the on theuseofsovereignty clauseare availableinItalyandtheNetherlands. ” (unofficialintegration ofhim/herintheItalianterritory translation) or the effective professional why the applicant cannot be transferred, of it, containingthe reason mustbesupportedbyproper documentationwritteninItalianoracertifiedtranslation The requests 343/2003 willbetakenintoaccountinorderto consideraneventualacceptanceofresponsibility. oftheapplicant’sof revision transfer toanotherMemberState,accordingtheDublinRegulation and socialservicesstaff workingforasylumseekerswithintheSPRAR,whichstated“requests the ItalianDublinUnitdistributedaministerialcircular toallreception centres, lawyers,municipalities a tendency to apply the discretionary clauses, in particular in cases of vulnerability. In February 2009 provision are availableinFrance, No guidance notes or official policies for identifying the relevant circumstances forinvoking this State. Incontrasttothistheconsentofasylumseekerisrequired inHungary. swift examination of his/her asylum claim, is easier than transferring him/her to another Member the basisof‘economicorprocedural reasons’ ifremoval tothecountryoforigin, afterasubstantive and The consentoftheasylumseekerisnotrequired toapplythesovereignty clauseinAustria,Germany to thisprovision bytheadministrativeauthoritieswhen usingthesovereignty clause. applying thesovereignty clause. Italian societyisarelevant factortakenintoconsiderationbytheadministrative authoritieswhen right. 3(2) isasovereignauthoritiesandnotanindividualasylumseeker’s decisionbythegovernmental As regards Spanish practice, the Spanish National High Court has ruled that the application of Art. responsibility underArt.3(2)iscurrently pendingbefore theCJEUincaseofC-4/11. of whetheranasylumseekerhasenforceable personalrighttoobligeaMemberStateassume refusal. Thisisparticularlyimportantforthesubmissionofanysubsequentappeals.Thequestion 115 Italian circolare, 23February 2009. 114 113 For further information seeSpanishHighCourtruling1570/2011. responsible inaccordance withtheDublincriteria. the French authoritiesto takeoverresponsibility foranasylumapplicationeveniftheyare not Switzerland. InFrance,Art.3(2)is linked to Art. 53(1)of the French Constitution, whichempowers therefore asylumseekerscanonlyrely onitinconnectionwithanotherprovision offederallawin Swiss jurisprudenceindicatesthatthesovereignty clauseisnotaself-executingprovision and of suchassessmentisunclear. wording suggeststhatthesovereignty clauseisconsidered ineachindividualcasebutthedepth humanitariangroundswhichhinderadeportation”(informaltranslation).Thisgeneric extraordinary in Germanyfrequently containthefollowingstandardized wording: no are there “Apparently Irrespective oftheMemberStateresponsible under theDublinRegulation,transferdecisions violations oftheasylumseekers’humanrights. Bulgarian Courtscanprovide aneffective legalremedy insituationswhere transfersmayresult in it cannotobligetheBulgarianadministrativeauthoritytoapplyit.Thiscallsintoquestionwhether sovereignty clause. As the sovereignty clause is a non-binding provision, the Court has ruled that In specific mannerinHungary. Member State.Thesovereignty clauseisappliedonacase-by-casebasisasopposedtocountry- clause should be on the individual circumstances of the case and not on the general conditions in a Bulgaria, thejurisprudenceofBulgariancourtprevents itfrom reviewing theuseof translation). any foreigner whoispersecuted for hisactioninpursuit of freedom orwhoseeks theprotection of France on other grounds ” (unofficial within theirjurisdictionundertheterms of suchagreements, theauthoritiesof theRepublic shallremain empowered to asylum grant to of determining theirrespective jurisdictionasregards requests for asylum submitted to them.However, even iftherequest doesnot fall identicalundertakings withits own inmatters of asylum andtheprotection of humanrights andfundamental freedoms, for thepurpose Art 53(1)Constitution delaRépublique française “TheRepublic may enter into agreements withEuropean States whichare boundby it can be invoked against the wishes of the person concerned on Switzerland. InGermanyitcanbeinvokedagainstthewishesofpersonconcerned 113 InthiscasetheSpanishHighCourtalsodeclared thatthefocusinapplyingsovereignty Hungary and Switzerland. However, nationalpolicyinstructions 114 Despitethis,there isnosystematic reference 115 .
Professional integrationwithin Italy demonstrates 47 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 48 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 118 117 116 shows, withsubstantialevidence,thatthisprinciple isnotapplicabletotheircase. to Dublintransferscanaccesssuchfacilitiesupon transfer. Anexceptionis madeiftheapplicant it isassumedthatmedicalfacilitiesare comparableinallMemberStates andthatpersonssubject sufficient todemonstrate‘specialindividualcircumstances’. Basedontheprincipleofmutualtrust, medical aspectsalone,forexampletheavailability orlackthereof of medical treatment, isnot their discretion toapplythesovereignty clauseintheNetherlands.According toDutchpractice, him/her on the basis of his/her individual circumstances, then the Dutch authorities may use If anasylumseekerisabletodemonstratethat thetransferwillbedisproportionately harshfor Dublin transfersthere. to Greece, Switzerland applied the sovereignty clause in relation to vulnerable persons subject to Malta. Similarly, priorto the European jurisprudence leadingtoageneralsuspensionoftransfers the sovereignty clause in cases where particularly vulnerable personsare due tobe transferred to vulnerable groups. Sinceautumn2009inGermanythere hasbeenanunofficial policyofapplying clause totakeoverresponsibility forindividualasylum applicationsoraspartofageneralpolicyfor including medicalfacilitiesoftheresponsible MemberStatemayleadStatestousethesovereignty an individualisparticularlyvulnerablecombinedwithcertaindeficienciesinthe reception conditions by thesubmissionofsupportingdocumentationsuchasmedicalreports. Sometimesthefactthat asevidenced the impactandseverityofillnessonindividualasylumseekerconcerned Whether ornotaMemberStatewilltakeoverresponsibility foranasylumapplicationdependson reasons incasesofevident vulnerabilityincludingwithrespect tobothphysicalandmentalillhealth. Some MemberStatesdemonstratewillingnesstoutilizethesovereignty clauseforhumanitarian 5.1.2. Applicationofthesovereigntyclauseinvulnerablecases
no. 1938of2011;5April2011. fulfilled”(unofficialDublin IIRegulationare translation),Decision no.1597of2011;Admin.Case underarticle3(1)ofthe ofthecompetentcountry judicial waywhenthecriteriafordetermination Member State,butnotwiththeCourt.Thelackofsuchanassessmentcannotbesanctionedin the Courtstated“Theassessmentofthisprovisionliesonlywithadministrativeorgan fulfilled’.Inrelation itsissuancewere and proceduralrulesregarding tothesovereignty clause issued bythecompetentorgan(i.e.Bulgarianadministrativeauthorities)andthatmaterial there. TheSofiaAdministrativeCourt rejected theappeal onthebasisthat‘transferorderwas Dublin transfer to Greece on the grounds that he would not be able to access an asylum procedure In April2011theSofiaAdministrativeCourtexaminedanappealfrom anasylumseekeragainsta Assessment ofthesovereignty clause Jurisprudence Dutch policy in AliensCircular C3/2.3.6.4; Seealsothefollowing Dutch caselaw: No.201002874/1(30August 2010)and No.11/23402 11.1.1. on anindividualbasisstill sendssomeDublinapplicants to Greece. For furtherinformation ontransfers to Greece seeChapter XI, See Chapter VIIfor furtherinformation onvulnerable persons subjectto the Dublinprocedure. Itshould benoted that Switzerland Decision 1629of2011andAdmin Case 1870of2011. The following cases from theSofia City AdminCourtstate similarreasoning inrelation to theCourt’s non-engagementwithArt.3(2): a Practice: Bad seeker toapplythesovereignty clause. Good Practice: asylum seekerisnotarequirement forapplyingthesovereignty clause. wishes oftheasylumseekerforeconomicorprocedural reasons. Theconsentofthe 117 InGermanythesovereignty clausemaybeappliedagainstthe TheHungarianauthoritiesrequire theconsentof theasylum 116 118
case concerned involvedarequestcase concerned totakebackorcharge ofanasylumapplication. the basis of Art. 3(2). According to the Dutch Aliens Circular this applies irrespective of whether the to thecontrary. IfthisisthecaseNetherlandsmaytakecharge ofanasylumapplicationon their obligationsunderthe1951RefugeeConventionandECHR,unlessthere isconcrete evidence principle ofmutualtrust,itisassumedbytheDutchauthoritiesthatallMemberStatescomplywith challenges havebeenmadeinthecontextoftransferstoItaly, MaltaandHungary.Basedonthe is withregard toparticularlyvulnerablepersons.Similarly, intheNetherlandsanumberofjudicial Switzerland theonlyexceptionswhere thesovereignty clausemaybeinvokedinthecontextofItaly 121 120 Withregard to Austria, there are alsomanychallenges concerning transfers to Hungary. 119 123 AliensCircular C2/3.6.1. 122 Regulation. for asylumclaimswhenGreece isidentified asthe responsible MemberStateundertheDublin meant thatmostMemberStatesinpracticeusethesovereignty clausetotakeoverresponsibility Charter ofFundamentalRights.Giventheextensiveproblems intheGreek asylumsystemthishas a real riskof being subjected to inhumanordegradingtreatment withinthemeaningofArticle4 that MemberStateamounttosubstantialgrounds forbelievingthattheasylumseekerwouldface systemic deficienciesintheasylumprocedure andinthe reception conditionsofasylumseekersin not transferanasylumseekertotheresponsible MemberStatewhere theycannotbeunaware that The CJEUjudgmentinjoinedcaseC-411/10andC-493/10clearlyshowsthatMemberStatesmay 5.1.3. taken anyinfringementproceedings againstItalyinthecontextofthatDirective. some difficulties inpractice, theAustrianauthorities rely onthefactthatCommissionhasnot Italy. the main challenges associated with Dublin transfers relate tothe general reception conditions in application ofthesovereignty clausebytheDutchauthorities.Currently inAustriaand for persons transferred to certain Member States under the Dublin Regulation should lead to an Netherlands haveargued thatpoorreception conditionsincludingtheuseofunjustifieddetention As aresult ECtHRGrandChamberjudgmentlawyersinthe oftheM.S.S.vBelgium&Greece the sovereignty clausetostopindividualtransfersStatessuchasHungary, ItalyandMalta. in otherMemberStateswhereby administrativeauthoritiesand/ornationalCourtshaveinvoked There are also increasing regarding concerns the generalreception conditions and asylumsystems fulfills itsobligationsundertheReceptionConditionsDirective. this CJEU judgment. This sectionshould beread inconjunction withChapter XI,whichillustrates MemberState’s practice inresponse to theprinciples in [2003] OJ 6.2.2003(‘Reception ConditionsDirective’). Council Directive (EC)2003/9/ECof27January2003laying down minimumstandards for thereception ofasylum seekers L31/08 and 11/23401(2November 2011) with regard to transfers to Italy, available inthecase lawdatabase atwww.dublin-project.eu. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-law-and-monitoring/infringements_by_policy_asylum_en.htm regarding theinfringementofmainEUasylum legislation underArt.258 TFEU.Further information isavailable at: Such anapproach may needto berevised inlightofthefact thatasofOctober 2012theCommission hasgiven formal notice to Italy 120 However, theAustrianandSwissadministrativeauthoritiescontinuetomaintainthatItaly conditions inanotherMemberState Application ofthesovereigntyclauseforreasonsgeneral 119
121 Thoughnotingthatthere might be 122 InAustriaand Switzerland, 123 49 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 50 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 129 128 127 126 125 124 severe forms of Hepatitis C or epilepsy, problems. AustrianAsylum Courtjurisprudencedemonstratesthatillnessessuchasdementia,very humanitarian clauseisgenerallyonlyappliedinafewcasesrelating toextremely serioushealth as longthere isevidence ofstrong dependency. Despite thispolicy, practiceshowsthatthe line fall under the humanitarian clause. It also applies to more distant relatives such as cousins In lead toanincrease inits’utilizationwithrespect totheapplicationofArt.15. procedure intheDublinrecast compromise textasopposed totheImplementingRegulationwill reunited onhumanitarian grounds butitremains tobeseenwhethertheinclusion oftheconciliation the factthatformalconciliation procedure isnotuseddiminishesthechancesofrelatives tobe appear toprefer touseinformalmethodsofcommunicationresolve them.Itisunclearwhether and information wasavailableontheapplicationofconciliationprocedure inAustria,Bulgaria,Italy has neverbeenusedinGreece, Hungary, France,SlovakiaandtheNetherlands.Furthermore, no is sometimesrequired astotheresponsible MemberStateunderArt.15,theconciliationprocedure outgoing requests onthisground represent 0,5%ofalloutgoingrequests in2010.Althoughclarity requests sent by Member States to their counterparts on this basis. It is noteworthy that the This clause,likethesovereignty clause,isappliedinarestrictive mannerwithfewoutgoing reasons, inparticularonfamilyorculturalgrounds. possibility ofbringingtogetherfamilymembersaswelldependantrelatives, forhumanitarian application ofthebindingcriteriawouldleadtoaseparationfamilymembers.Itprovides the The humanitarianclauseisadiscretionary provision tobeappliedinsituationswhere astrict 5.2. HumanitarianClause(Art.15) procedure. unaccompanied children, procedural issuesandthepossibilityofrecourse toaconciliation provides guidanceonits’applicationincludingwithrespect tosituationsofdependency, unaccompanied children reuniting withrelatives. Additionally, Art.15(3)isnowincorporatedasalegallybindingprovision underrecast Art.8(2)for clarified withtheinclusionofanewseparateprovision aimedatbringingtogetherdependents. clause. Implementing RegulationwhilstinotherPrefectures there isawiderapplicationofthehumanitarian practice across thePrefectures. SomePrefectures onlyconsiderthecriteriawithinArt.11of together dependentfamilymembersandrelatives underArt.15.InFrancethere isinconsistent Austria, according tojudicialdoctrine, allsiblingsandrelatives indescendingorascending in account inassessing thenecessity andappropriateness ofbringingtogether thepersons concerned underArt.15(2). Article 11ofthe Implementing Regulation provides guidance onsituationsofdependency includingalist offactors to betaken Member State, Poland. This case involved aperson withavery severe form ofepilepsy where themedication neededwas notavailable intheresponsible application oftheDublinRegulation. Dublin recast compromise text (Art. 37)theconciliation procedure may beutilizedto resolve adispute onanymatter related to the or astateless person (recast), ImpactAssessment, SEC(2008) 2962,3.12.2008.p.13.(‘ImpactAssessment Paper’). Underthe responsible for examining anapplication for international protection lodged inoneoftheMemberStates byathird-country national of theEuropean Parliament andoftheCouncilestablishing thecriteria andmechanismsfor determining theMemberState of theEuropean ConventiononHumanRights”. SeeCommission staff working documentaccompanying theproposal for aRegulation to abreach of thefundamental right tofamily 7of of unityasenshrinedinArticle theCharter Fundamental Rights 8 andinArticle clause isnot useddiminishes thechance of relatives to bereunited onhumanitarian grounds, whichinsomecases….could amount The Commission intheCommission staff working document stated that“Thefact theconciliation mechanismfor thehumanitarian unite theminorwithhisorher relative andshallbetheMemberState responsible, provided that itisinthebestinterests of theminor.” State andwhere itisestablished,basedonindividualexamination, that therelative can take care of himorher, that MemberState shall Recast Art8(2)states that“Where theapplicant isanunaccompanied minorwhohasarelative whoislegally present inanother Member adopted orrejected bythe parties,thesolutionproposed isfinalandirrevocable. the matter ofthedispute. After receiving arguments from bothpartiestheCommittee members propose asolution.Whetheritis It consists ofaChairmanCommittee and three Committee members representing three MemberStates notconnected with dispute, eitherontheneedto carry outatransfer orto bringrelatives together onthebasisofArt.15DublinRegulation. The conciliation procedure underArt.14oftheImplementing Regulation may beusedwhen MemberStates cannot resolve a grounds aslaiddown inrecital 7oftheDublinRegulation. The objective ofArt.15seeks to allow MemberStates to bringtogether family members where thatisnecessary onhumanitarian Spain. Whendisputesariseastotheapplicationofhumanitarianclause,MemberStates 129 125 UndertheDublinrecast compromise text,theapplication ofthisclausehasbeen 128 cancer or HIV statusresult in bringingand/orkeeping 126 124 ChapterIVoftheImplementingRegulation 127 seekers. According totheAliensCircular intheNetherlands , thehumanitarianclauseonlyappliestoasylum to familymemberswhoappliedforasylumthemselvesisprohibited. recent Courtdecisionfrom theCouncilofStateconfirms that restricting theapplicationofArt.15(3) the familymemberofanunaccompaniedchildisnotrequired tobeanasylumseekeraswell.A to invokethehumanitarianclause. the EnglishversionofRegulation. the mannerabove. described ruling, theAliensCircular continuestoprescribe thatthehumanitarianclausebeappliedtominors in 136 ABRvS[Council of State] CaseNo. 201000393/1/V315September 2010. 135 AliensCircular C3/2.3.6.3.‘Minderjarigen’. 134 SeeCouncilofState decision,No.201100666/130November 2012. 133 132 Par. C3/2.3.6.3AliensCircular. 131 130 the nuclearfamily. to indicatethatfamilyunityonthebasisofhumanitariangrounds onlyencompassesmembersof The GermanlanguageversionoftheDublinRegulationformulatesArt.15inamannerwhichappears asylum applications will be processed in one country only.asylum applicationswillbeprocessedinonecountry ’ Member Stateas‘…thisisanapplicationofthebasicassumptionDublinRegulation,that as yetbeenadecisiononthesubstanceofasylumseeker’s applicationfrom anotherDublin When applyingthehumanitarianclause,DutchAliensCircular alsorequires thatthere hasnot therefore the AliensCircular, andruledthatitwasinthebestinterest oftheminortostaywithhissisterand to transfer him toMalta.Uponappeal the Dutch Council of Staterejected this interpretation of mother and grandmother were still living in Somalia the IND did not apply Art. 15 and proceeded of anunaccompaniedboyfrom Somaliaeventhoughhissisterresided intheNetherlands.Ashis to ambiguityinpractice.Forexample,theINDrequested Maltatoexaminetheasylumapplication on the basis of articlein 15principle Dublinnot Regulation’, eligible has for led reunification they are above, that Netherlands” (unofficial translation). Netherlands” (unofficialtranslation). willnotbegrantedasylumandhavetoleavethe the Netherlandsisindeedresponsible, been decided that the family member for whose when application it has already asylum procedure intheDutch After all,itwouldbeundesirabletoprocessasylumapplicationsofotherrelatives ‘If possible’should,amongstothers,beunderstoodtomean: oforiginispreferred. inthecountry of theDublinRegulation,reunification familyispossible,asmeantinarticle2(i) ofthechildwithmemberscore all, ifreunification on the basis ofminor articleis 15in Dublinprinciple Regulation.not After eligible for reunification fortheminor, isapossibilityofcare there oforigin,andtherefore inthecountry and/or relatives the ofthechild.Itshouldbenotedthat,ifunaccompaniedminorhasafamily member interests forhim/heronthebasisofarticle15(3)DublinRegulation,unlessthisisnotin thebest able tocare inanotherMemberStatewhoare minors,ifpossible,withrelatives “Member Statesshallreunite following inrelation totheapplicationofArt.15(3)forunaccompaniedchildren: Extract: requirement for thefamily memberandperson concerned to bothbeasylum seekers. III of that regulation and,conversely, where itisthat family memberwhoisdependent ontheassistance of theapplicant.“ There is no dependent onamemberof hisfamily present inaMemberState other thantheoneresponsible pursuant to thecriteria set outinChapter whereby it states of15(2) Article Regulation that“theobjective No343/2003isattained both where itisthe asylum seeker whois It should benoted thatsuchaninterpretation isnotconsistent withtherecent CJEU rulingofC-245/11inthecontext ofArt.15(2) Asyl_BAMF2010.pdf, page109f. BAMF-Dienstanweisung Dublinverfahren, availabe athttp://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/i_Asylrecht/Dienstanweisungen- of family underArt.15(2)asreflected intheEnglishversion oftheRegulation. the wording ofArt.15(2)diverges indifferent languages was noted bytheCJEU inC-245/11whichopted for abroader interpretation 15 relatives isalsotranslated as Familienangehörige sonodistinction ismadebetween family members andrelatives. Thefact that In theGermanLanguageversion oftheDublin Regulation, Art.2(i)Family Members istranslated asFamilienangehörige andinArt. b) a)
132 the Netherlandswasresponsible forexamininghisasylumapplication. The DutchAliensCircular (AliensCircular par. C3/2.3.6.3.subtitle‘Minderjarigen)statesthe unaccompanied minor. ofthe isstillpossible,alsointhelightofinterests whetherreunification reviewed intheNetherlands,itshould be oftherelative(s) depending ontheasylumprocedure familyasdefinedinarticle2(i)DublinRegulation); notbeingamemberofthecore relative really isafamily tie(the it shouldbemadesufficientlyplausible,ordemonstrated,thatthere Therefore this means that all family members and/or relatives must have claimed asylum ‘if the unaccompanied minor has a family member and/or relatives in the country of origin in the ‘if country the unaccompanied minor has a family member and/or relatives 130 TheBAMFremovedpolicyinstructionstoresemble thisambiguityinitsinternal 133 HoweverDutchauthoritiesinterpret Art.15(3)differently inthat 131 Stillthisprovision israrely appliedinGermany 135 Thestatementinthecircular extract 134
136 Despite this Court DespitethisCourt in practice. 51 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 52 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings clause in2011. Dublin unitsenttwooutgoingrequests tootherMemberStatesonthebasisofhumanitarian on thehumanitarianclause,butasylumseeker’s transfertoHungary wasnotexecuted.The States ineightcases,fourofwhichwere accepted.In2011there wasoneincomingrequest based The Hungarianauthoritiessentoutgoingrequests basedonthehumanitarianclausetootherMember Hungary: In2010theOINreceived noincomingrequests on thebasisofhumanitarianclause. 2010. authorities haveonlyacceptedoneincomingrequest onthebasisofhumanitarianclausesince Slovakia: responsible fortheexaminationofasylumapplicationsfamilymembers. Greece: In2011thehumanitarianclausewasinvokedin25casestofindotherMemberStates’ States. Only25oftheserequests were onthebasis ofthehumanitarianclause. Germany: In2011Germanyaccepted2,169incomingrequests fortransfersfrom otherMember no incomingtransferswere madetoBulgariaonthebasisofhumanitarianclause. humanitarian clausefrom asingleMemberState,Norwaybutrefused themall.Accordingly in2011 another MemberState.Asregards incomingrequests, Bulgariaonlyreceived sixrequests tousethe clause tootherMemberStates.Onlyonerequest actuallyledtothetransferofanasylumseeker Bulgaria: In2011theBulgarianadministrativeauthoritiessentsixrequests underthehumanitarian National Facts: up untilthistime. Mrs A.Sofar, toFrance andshehasnotbeentransferred havenotbeenanswered herrequests responsibility, request to terminate has filed a d’Asile. Meanwhile, Germany request of at the for her with the assistance of France Terre Dublin Unit to take responsibility to the French ofher.integrated inFrance,hersonisthebestperson to takecare request fileda He therefore whoisfully duetoillness.Asarefugee toahospital inGermany from thedetentioncentre Ca separated. andsotheyremain inAustriaasarefugee hasnorighttoremain father respectively andequallytheChechenapplicant,husband have norighttostayinPolandasrefugees, bytheAustrianauthoritiesin2011andfamilywasseparated.Thewifechild refused Ca se se S S t t
u u
d d
y y Despite thefactthattheyhaveonlyreceived asmallnumberofrequests, theSlovak reliant due to her age and health problems. Furthermore, she had to be transferred shehadtobetransferred duetoherageandhealthproblems. Furthermore, reliant clause.Mrs.Aisnotself- a DublintransfertoFranceaccordingthesovereignty Sheappliedforasylumandrequested andplacedinadetentioncentre. Germany Duringherjourney, statusthere. have obtainedrefugee in shewasarrested asyluminFranceordertobewithhersonanddaughter-inrequest lawwho French CaseStudy: toPoland Regulation. Afterhewasremoved fromPolandaccordingtoArt15Dublin father couldapplyforfamilyreunification thefather toPolandandstatedintheDublintransferdecisionthat transferred statusinAustria.Despitethis,theAustrianadministrativeauthorities refugee childtoPolandundertheDublinRegulation.Thehad father ofanewborn Austrian CaseStudy: in August2006,MrsA.,aChechenwoman,fledRussiato Austrian authorities transferred aChechen In 2010,theAustrianauthoritiestransferred the request toapplyArt.15was the request
September 2011). women’s asylumapplication(SwissFederalAdministrative CourtSwitzerlandE-1727/2011,6 credible dependency. Theappealwasgrantedand theCourtordered the FOMtoexaminethe than Art.2i),andthatthere isnofixedboundarybutwhatdecisive the relationship anda humanitarian clause.Itfurtherstatedthatthedefinitionoffamilymember inArt.15(2)iswider of pregnancy etc, the margin of appreciation of the FOM is reduced so that it must apply the according totheCourtifconditionsunderArt.15(2)are meti.e.dependencyonaccount await arequest from anotherMember StatetoapplyArt.15(2)incontrast15(1).Therefore particular whatthewording “keeporbringtogether”meant.Itheldthatitwasnotnecessaryto inSwitzerland. TheCourtexaminedArt.15(2)andin and duringherappealsonwasborn issued anegativedecision.Theasylumapplicant appealedtotheFederalAdministrativeCourt or thepresence ofherhusbandinSwitzerland.TheItalianauthoritiesfailed toreply andtheFOM FOM requested theItalian authoritiestotakeherbackwithoutinformingthemofpregnancy time andclaimedthatsuchlivingconditions were toodangerous foralonepregnant woman.The where she was exposed to sexual harassment. She was pregnant with her husband’s child at that applied forasylumagain.DuringhertimeinItalysheclaimedhadtoliveatrainstation Despite thistheFOMtransferred hertoItaly. ShesubsequentlyreturnedtoSwitzerlandand before claimingasylumin Switzerland.Herhusbandhadsubsidiaryprotection inSwitzerland. A Somaliwomanwasregistered ashavingbeenpreviously inItalyonthebasis ofEurodac data Definition offamilyandArt.15(2) (Administrative CourtofDijon,FranceNo.0901156,2May2009). ordered the Prefect to apply Art. 15 and examine the family’s asylum application in France oftherighttoaprivatelifeandArt.15DublinRegulation’.TheCourt and illegalbreach found that the decision of the Prefect to transfer the son and family to Poland was a ‘serious to theAdministrativeCourtofDijonstayinFrance.Initsdecision of herandhewastheonlyfamilymembershehadleftasrest haddied.Thefamilyappealed any reasoning astothedifferent decisiononMemberStateresponsibility. Mrs D’s sontookcare April theprefect allowedMrs Dtostayfortheexaminationofherasylumclaimwithoutproviding the woman’s family a temporary stay permit, placing them in the Dublin procedure instead. In with hersecondsonandhisfamilyaftertransitingPoland.InMarch 2009thePrefect didnotgrant In December2008MrsD,a70yearoldwomenwithserioushealthproblems, arrivedinFrance Family lifeandArt.15 Jurisprudence CJEU caseofC245/11KvBundesasylamt. clause, which provides for a wider definition of family then under Art.2(i) as confirmedin the Regulation” (informaltranslation). based on the above stated transfer to Italy has not been possible to realise the requested dependantonhisbrother,these categoriescitedbytheDublinRegulationandisnotdirectly Ca se S t
u
d y the DublinRegulationand“becauseasylumseekerdoesnotbelongtoanyof 2012thatthedefinitionof‘familymember’iscontainedinArticle2(i) January totheItalianauthoritiesandclaimedintransferdecisionof this request with hisbrotherinItaly. However,refused toinitiate theSlovakMigrationOffice based on the humanitarian clause to unitehim to initiate the Dublin procedure theMigrationOffice Slovakian CaseStudy:APakistaniasylumseekerrequested This isbasedonaflawedinterpretation ofthehumanitarian 53 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 54 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings family unity. is necessarytoderogate from theDublincriteriaonbasisofhumanrightsobligationslinkedto Such anevaluationshouldparticularlyexaminetheuseoftheseprovisions insituationswhere it provisions shouldbecarefully evaluatedbytheCommissionandotherrelevant stakeholders. 137 ECHR,M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No.30696/09,21January 2011. Recommendations law.international clause/humanitarian clausewhere atransferwouldbeincompatiblewiththeirobligationsunder to do so. European jurisprudence shows that Member States have a duty to apply the sovereignty application ofthebindingDublinprovisions andmayincertaincircumstances haveanobligation Member Statescanusethesediscretionary clausestomitigatesomeoftheinjusticecausedby the interpretation ofArt.15(2)byMemberStatesandshouldbeimplementedaccordingly. applied in practice. The recent CJEU ruling in the case of humanitarian clauseand/orfamilymemberscomingwithinitsscopehasleadtoitrarely being Similarly thehumanitarianclauseisappliedinalimitedmanner. Arestrictive interpretation ofthe consent oftheasylumseekerinapplyingthisprovision wasremoved duringrecast negotiations. will not beaddressed undertheDublin recast compromise text as the requirement to seek the examination ofanasylumclaimforaswiftreturntothecountryorigin.Unfortunatelythisissue asylum seekersasshownin humanitarian situationthere. Howeverithasalsobeenappliedtothedetrimentofindividual particularly vulnerableindividualsorinthecontextofDublintransferstoGreece The majorityofMemberStatesonlyapplythesovereignty clauseinlimitedgrounds related to indicate onlyalownumberofcaseshaveresponsibility assignedonthisbasis. an asylumclaimismoststrikinglyevidentinthestatisticsregarding thehumanitarianclausewhich unity. TheunwillingnessofMemberStatestoapplytheseprovisions totakeoverresponsibility for apply thesovereignty and/orhumanitarianclausestoalleviatethisproblem andpreserve family the multitudeoffamilysituationsinDublinprocedure. However, manyMemberStatesfailto As showninChapterIVthebinding family provisions intheDublin Regulationoftencannotcover asylum seekersfindthemselves. and flexiblemannerthataddresses thecomplexandvaryingsituations inwhichmany Member Statesshouldapplythesovereignty andhumanitarianclauseinafair, humane law.would beincompatiblewiththeirobligations underinternational Member Statesmustrespect thedutytoapplysovereignty clausewhere atransfer binding criteriawouldresult insuchfamiliesbeingseparated. Dublin procedure by applying the humanitarian clause in cases where adherence to the Member Statesmustensure thattheprincipleoffamilyunityisrespected withinthe 137 Asthenewrecast Dublin Regulationisimplementedtheuseofdiscretionary Germany whereby thesovereignty clausemaybeused toexpeditethe Member States *** C-245/11 provides further clarification on given the interpreter ifnecessary. employee whoexplains thecontentofleafletorallytoasylum seekerwiththeaidofan asylum seekersduringthe asylumprocedure. Thisdocument isalsosignedbytheSlovakauthority thereby declaringthattheyhavereceived andunderstoodtheinformationon therightsanddutiesof asylum seekersare alsoobligedtosigntheasyluminformationleaflet attheDublininterview of the leaflet’s contents there bydepriving the applicantof thenecessaryinformation. InSlovakia, an interpreter. However, there havebeencaseswhere interpreters havefailedtofullyinterpret all declare thattheyunderstandtheircontent,byproviding apersonalsignature inthepresence of Asylum seekersinBulgariaare required toacknowledge receipt oftheseinformation leafletsand the applicationofthisRegulationasreported inAustria,Bulgaria andGermany. full contentoftheseleafletsisoftennotdelivered totheapplicantenablethemfullyunderstand interpreters and/or legal advisors to explain the content of these information leaflets.In practice,the Many obstaclesare facedbyilliterateasylumseekerswhohavetorely officials, upongovernment that there isasequentialhierarchy ofcriteria. set outinaccordance with Art.5.Similarly, asylumseekersinFranceare notinformedofthefact for responsibility determination or explain the factthatitmustbeappliedin order inwhichitis comprehend. TheHungarian OINinformationleafletalsodoesnotclearlylisttheapplicablecriteria contain formal, complex and legalistic language which isdifficult forasylumseekerstofully accessibility oftheseinformationleafletshasbeenquestionedinAustriaandHungaryasthey procedure contain specific sectionson thepotential applicationoftheDublinRegulation. The In 6.1.1. Informationleaflets Commission (recast Art.4(2)). of acommoninformation leaflet forasylum seekersbywayofanimplementingactadoptedthe grounds foromittingsuch aninterview. Therecast compromise textalsoenvisagestheadoption applicant inorder tofacilitate theprocess ofdeterminingtheMemberStateresponsible withlimited the Dublinprocedure. RecastArt5obligesMemberStatestoconductapersonalinterviewwiththe the application of the Regulation, including providingconcerning for a specific personal interview in The Dublinrecast compromise textintroduces significantimprovements ontherighttoinformation their dataincludingthepurposeforwhichwill be processed withinEurodac. rights of asylum seekers to information within the scope oftheEurodac Regulationinrelation to Dublin Regulation, its time limits and its effects. Art. 18 of the Eurodac Regulation beexpectedtounderstand’regardinglanguage thattheymay‘reasonably theapplicationof Article 3(4)oftheDublinRegulationrequires that asylum seekersshallbeinformedinwritinga 6.1. Accesstoinformation particular Art.18,19,41and47oftheCharterFundamentalRights. in order to respect and protect the fundamental rights of those within theDublin procedure, in assigned responsibility fortheirasylumapplication.Therefore procedural safeguards are essential Member State.TheymayhavelimitedunderstandingastowhyaparticularStatehasbeen often inaprecarious uncertainsituation,havingfledpersecutionandsought refuge inaparticular Asylum seekersintheDublinprocedure are particularlyvulnerableduetothefactthattheyare VI. ProceduralSafeguards Austria, Bulgaria,Hungary, SlovakiaandSpain,generalinformationleafletsontheasylum also sets out the 55 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 56 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 138 investigation hasbeenlaunched intotheapplicabilityofDublinRegulation intheircase. asylum claiminanotherMember State,are rarely informedbytheGermanauthoritiesastowhether an Persons irregularly present inGermany,whohavenotappliedforasylumthere buthaveaprevious even thoughapplicantsare subject totheDublinprocedure there. this informationnoticeisvariedacross allthePrefectures, forexampleinLyon nosuchnoticeexists intelligible orthere wasnotranslationavailableinthelanguagerequired. Thepracticeofproviding Despite thisinpractice,there havebeeninstanceswhere thenotewaspoorlytranslatedand/or the Prefectures, thisinformation noticeisinterpreted orally fortheapplicantortranslatedinwriting. responsible MemberStateandthepotentialextensionoftimelimitsfor the transfer. According to evidence ofthepossibleresponsibility ofanotherMemberState,response deadlinesforthe information notice contains details on the Dublin Regulations’impacton the asylum application, receivesseeker concerned astandard one-pageinformation noticeontheDublinRegulation.This In 6.1.2. In is dependentontheavailabilityofinterpreters. orally informedoftheapplicabilityDublinRegulationbyGreek Policethoughthisinitself the Dutchasylumprocedure includingontheDublin Regulation.InGreece, applicantsare only a personalinterviewtheDutchCouncilforRefugeesprovides informationtoallasylumseekerson format inSwitzerland,Hungary, ItalyandtheNetherlands.Inaddition,in,during NGOs provide informationleafletsontheapplicationofDublinRegulationinauser-friendly explained totheasylumseekerandisoftennotavailableinalanguagehe/sheunderstands. Regulation. TheinformationleafletdistributedinGermanyisneitherorallytranslatednorcompletely National authoritiesinBulgariaandGermanyissuespecificinformationleafletsontheDublin require toconsidertheapplicabilityofDublinRegulation onthisbasis. presence of family members, it fails to provide any details on what kind of information the authorities although theadministrativeauthoritiesacknowledgeimportanceofproviding informationofthe technical detailsoftheRegulationwhilstmakingitunderstandableforasylumseekers.Inthisexample, information intheseleafletsandthebalancetobeachievedbetweenproviding informationonallthe the informationleafletbelowhighlightssomeofissuessurrounding thecontentanddeliveryof developing anewleafletthatwillincludespecificsectionontheDublinRegulation.Theextract from with anyinformationontheDublinRegulation,however, currently thenationalauthoritiesinSpain Ministry oftheInteriors’website.Upuntilrecently theSpanishauthoritiesdidnotprovide applicants family formationwiththeminoneofthemembercountriesapplyingDublinRegulation. If yourfamilymembersagree withit,according totheDublinRegulationyouhaveright Regulation, pleaseinformimmediatelytheMigrationOffice employeeofthisfact. If your family members stay in the territory of another member country applying the Dublin the DublinRegulation: 30: Formationofthefamilythatstayinterritoryanothermembercountryapplying entitled “AdviceoftheAsylumseekeronRightsandDutiesduringProceeding” Extract from theSlovakianMinistryofInteriorInformation leaflet France, onceitbecomesapparent thattheDublinRegulation maybeappropriate, theasylum Italy continue to beuninformed abouttheinitiation of aDublinprocedure and apotential removal to anotherMember State. any potential removal to theresponsible MemberState. Despite this, practice demonstrates thatalarge amount ofsuchpersons persons would infuture be informed atanearly stage about requests to other MemberStates concerning theDublinRegulation and April 2011,available athttp://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/055/1705579.pdf p.6).TheFederal government declared thatsuch This practice bytheGermanauthorities was subject to aParliamentary enquiryin 2010. SeeBundestags-Drucksache 17/5579,18 a manual containing details on the operation of the Dublin Regulation is available on the a manualcontainingdetailsontheoperationofDublinRegulationisavailable Regulation inanindividualcase Information onthepotentialapplicationofDublin 138 The BAMF TheBAMF are are which MemberStatehasbeenaskedtotakeoverresponsibility fortheasylumclaimandonwhatbasis. procedure. TheINDalsonotifiestheasylumseeker ifaDublinprocedure hasbeenstartedincluding the preliminary meetingwithaDutchCouncilforRefugees’representative isdedicatedtotheDublin As regards theNetherlands,ifapplicabilityofDublinRegulationisbeingconsidered bytheIND, authorities inresponse totheallocationofMemberStateresponsibility. asylum application. The asylum seeker is then given the opportunity to makea statement to the Swiss either orallyorinwritingtotheasylumseekerwhichMemberStatemightberesponsible forhis/her of thepotentialapplicationDublinRegulationintheircase.TheauthoritiesSwitzerlandexplain the commencement of a Dublin procedure. In Spain OAR officials inform asylum seekers in interviews Slovakia, the asylum seeker receives a short written notice from the Dublin unit informing him/her of the OINhasanobligationtoexplainitorallyapplicantinalanguagethathe/sheunderstands.In claim pendingtheresult ofanyinvestigations.ThisdecisionisissuedintheHungarianlanguagebut Dublin Regulationandthesuspensionofadmissibilityprocedure fortheexaminationofasylum In taken allrelevant considerationsintoaccountinapplyingtheDublinRegulation. information there isnopossibilityfortheasylumseekerstoensure thattheGermanauthoritieshave notified astowhatinformationhas resulted inthembeingsubjecttotheDublinprocedure. Withoutthis personal interviewisheldatall.Ingeneral,thosesubjecttotheDublinprocedure inGermanyare not personal interview. However, in reality this does not always occur during the interview or sometimes no has adutytoinformasylumseekersaboutthepotentialapplicationofDublinRegulationduring 139 receiving a final result of the Dublin procedure. result oftheDublinprocedure. afinal receiving will be communicated to you after of the procedure Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003. The result oftheEuropeanUnionaccordingtoCouncil of yourfirstasylumapplication ontheterritory We about yourtransfer to thecountry you about the start of the procedure would like to inform of theapplicationDublinRegulation: Example ofaSlovakiannoticeinformingthird countrynational Hungary, protection. protection. the response provided bytheapplicantandhis/herlegalrepresentative. Subsequent tothis,theINDofficial re-assesses theinitialdecision,takingintoaccount legal representative are thengiventheopportunitytorespond tothisletterofintention. Dublin Regulation is being applied. Dublin Regulationisbeing applied. provided astowhichMemberStatemaypotentially beresponsible or onwhatgrounds the systematic manner. Itdependsontheindividualcaseworker. responsible for theexamination oftheir asylum claim. Sometimestheword ‘Dublinreferat’ ismentioned inthisletter butnotina Regulation for applicants who have appliedfor asylum inGermanyandthere are indications thatanotherMember State may be Unit 431inDortmund,Germanyis thelarger oftwo Dublinunits inGermany. Thisunitisresponsible for theapplication oftheDublin Bad Practice: Bad Practice:
asylum seekers receive a written decision informing them of the potential application of the asylum seekersreceive awrittendecisioninformingthemofthepotentialapplication handling theasylumapplicationi.e.Dublin unit. Regulation, justpostsaGermanlettertothe applicantstatingthatunit431is way ofinformingtheasylumseekerpotential applicabilityoftheDublin to the asylum seeker as to what this means for their application for international to theasylumseekeraswhatthismeansfor theirapplicationforinternational Dublin Regulationmaybecitedonthe‘Cedolino’ withoutanyexplanationprovided is oftennotinformedof its application. Thewordingapplicant concerned ofthe Good Practice: for theintendedrejection anditsconsequences.Theasylumseekertheir on thebasisofDublinRegulation.Thisincludesinformationreasons intention toissueanadmissibilitydecisionrejecting theapplicationforasylum If a Dublin procedure is started in Italy in a particular case, the Since Autumn 2010,the Dublin unit in Dortmund, Germany, by In theNetherlandsasylumseekerreceives aletterof 139 No further information is Nofurtherinformationis 57 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 58 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings the responsibility ofanotherMemberState. usually thewholeasyluminterviewiscarriedout evenifthere hasbeen aEurodac hitindicating substantive reasons forasylumonceGermanyisidentifiedasthe responsible MemberState.However, when consideringtheapplicabilityofDublinprocedure andthenonly resuming theinterviewon the examines thereasons forseekingasylum.Sometimestheinterviewersonly askthe25questionsfirst name, age,personaldocuments,family,questions concerning detailsandsoonthen andjourney asylum interview. As this is commonly the main asylum interview it always begins with 25 standardized information astotheapplicabilityofDublinRegulation are gathered bytheGermanauthoritiesat 141 140 is onlyconsidered duringthesubstantiveasyluminterviewinGermany. In contrasttothepracticeofmostMemberStates thepotentialapplicationofDublinRegulation is notclearhowthe‘where necessary’provision isinterpreted andappliedinpractice. a provision (Art.67(b)(2)LAR) provides that‘where necessary’aninterviewis takenwiththeapplicant.It interview inFrance.InBulgaria, France, SpainandSwitzerland.Usuallynolawyersorinterpreters are present atthispreliminary Dublin Regulationisobtainedaspartofgeneralpreliminary admissibilityinterviewsinAustria,Hungary, is heldforthepurposesofDublinRegulationinGreece . Informationrelevant tothe applicabilityofthe ask questionsframedaround theDublinRegulationandpossibilityofatransfer. Nointerview complete astandardized form giventoallasylumseekerswithgeneralquestionsanddonotspecifically Netherlands. However, inSlovakiatheemployeesofDublinunitoftenonlyusethisinterviewto Applicants receive apersonal interviewforthepurposesofDublinRegulationinSlovakia Dublin criteriaandinorder tofullyreflect theprincipleofrighttobeheard. to enableadministrativeauthoritiesmakeaninformeddecisiononthecorrect applicationofthe text. Suchaninterviewisalsonecessarytoallowasylumseekersprovide thenecessaryinformation Regulation, anobligationtoholdapersonalinterviewwasinsertedintotheDublinrecast compromise responsible MemberState, andifneedbe,toinformasylumseekersorallyoftheapplicability seeker. However in order for the national authorities to gather all necessary information to identify the The current DublinRegulation containsnorequirement toconductapersonal interviewwithanasylum 6.2. Apersonalinterview
fundamental righttoasylum(CERefere liberte,No.313767,30July2008). affectedseriouslyandclearlyillegallytheir ofLoire-Atlantique 2003,Prefect of 18February (EC)No343/2003 procedural safeguardsinaccordancewithArt.3.4oftheCouncilregulation topetitioners admissibility oftheasylumapplicationinFrance.Quote:“…havingnotoffered the removal order forPolandwassuspendedand the French authoritieshadtore-examine the that the French authorities failed to respect the procedural safeguards in place and consequently and itseffects inaccordance withthe Art. 3.4ofthe DublinRegulation.TheConseild’Etatruled reasonably beexpectedtounderstandabouttheapplicationofthisRegulation,itstimelimits decision on thegrounds that theywere not informed inwritinga language thattheymay Poland onthebasisofDublinRegulation.Theapplicantschallengedlegality appliedforasyluminFranceandwereThe applicantsconcerned issuedatransferorder to Right toinformationontheDublinRegulation Jurisprudence authorities may still tryto sendoutgoing requests to otherMember States. have notime limits inthecurrent DublinRegulation. Even iftimelimits have expired for take charge cases, inpractice theGerman interview generally doesnotaffect thetimelimits undertheDublin Regulation asitnormally relates to take backcases, which According to the nationalexpert thisdelay inexamining theapplicability oftheDublinRegulation tillthestage ofthemainasylum interview varies significantly between thedifferent branches ofBAMF. asylum seekers have beenintheDublin procedure inGermanyfor more thanayear. Alsothepractice concerning theasylum lodging anasylum application andattending anasylum interview can vary from two days to up to eightmonthsorlonger. Some This meansinpractice asylum seekers intheDublin procedure inGermanymay experience lengthy delays. Thetimeperiodbetween
once aDublinprocedure isinitiatedaccording tothe nationallegislation, 141 Moreover ifrelevant informationisgathered, itisnot 140 Not all the facts or relevant Notallthefactsorrelevant the and the correspondence betweentheNetherlandsandotherresponsible MemberStates. extension oftimelimits.IntheNetherlands,asylumseekerscanreceive copiesoftheofficial important informationsuchasnotificationsand requests tothe responsible MemberStateforthe asylum seeker’receives his/herfiles.Inaddition,sometimesthefiles are incompleteandmissing to filescanbesubmittedtheauthoritiesbut oftenittakesweeksorevenmonthsbefore the information withregards totheapplicationofDublinRegulation.InGermanyrequests foraccess representatives’ accesstotheirpersonalfileswiththeauthoritiesincludingany relevant administrative In right togoodadministrationunderArt.41oftheCharterFundamentalRights. their Dublincasefilesheldbynationaladministrations.Suchameasure reflects theobligation ofthe It isnoteworthythatanumberofMemberStatesprovide theopportunityforasylumseekerstoaccess 6.3. AccesstoDublincasefiles to gotheresponsible MemberStatewhere applicable. ties inAustria,thephysicalandmentalhealthofasylumseekerhis/herreasons forrefusing The interviewconductedbytheAustrianauthoritiesincludescollectionofinformationonfamily presence offamilymembersinotherMemberStatesthepersonalinterview. under theDublinRegulation.Incontrasttothis,inNetherlandsquestionsare askedaboutthe in otherMemberStatesandapplicantsare familyunity notfullyinformedoftherulesgoverning no specificquestionsare askedbytheItalianauthorities regarding familialorother relevant links requested anditspertinencetotheapplicabilityofrelevant Dublincriteria.Generallyspeaking, isnotalwaysinformedofthereasonsbut theasylumseekerconcerned whythisinformationis In and consequencesofsuchinformationonidentifyingtheresponsible MemberState. persons are notconsidered intheinterviewandasylumseekerisnotinformedastoimportance asked regarding familymembersandrelatives butthepersonalrelationship anddependencytothese whether the asylumapplicantisdependent on another relative or vice versa. Frequently questionsare relation tothepossibilityofapplyinghumanitarianclauseforexamplenoquestionsare raisedasto without anypersonalinterview. IfapersonalinterviewisheldinGermany,noquestionsare askedin instructions withintheGermanMinistryindicatethatsometimesDublinprocedures are undertaken of thisinterviewisplacedontheapplicant’s fileatalaterstagewithinthe Dublinunit.FederalOffice responsibility. OftentheasyluminterviewisonlyheldmonthsintoDublinprocedure andtherecord guaranteed thatthiswillbeproperly takenintoconsiderationinthedeterminationofMemberState this interviewrecord where necessary. directly afterthepersonal interviewandfollowingthattheymaysubmitcorrections to understands forthispurpose. Italy questions of relevance to the Dublin Regulation are askedas part ofthe preliminary interview Germany andSlovakiathenationalauthoritiesare obligedtogiveapplicantsortheirlegal seeker and their legal representative receive a copy of the interview report why theywishtheNetherlandstoexaminetheirasylumapplication.The the INDofficial provides theopportunityforapplicanttostateany reasons Good Practice: Good Practice: Office isobligedtoprovide interpretation inthelanguageapplicant receive copiesofthedocumentationcontained inhis/herfile.TheMigration asylum filewiththenationalauthoritiesupon request inSlovakia andmay
In theNetherlandsaspecificDublininterviewisheldwhere The asylumseekerhastherighttoinspect his/herown 59 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 60 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings In provided astowhyRomaniaisconsidered responsible undertheDublinRegulation. notice issuedtothird countrynationalswhohavenotclaimedasyluminSlovakia. Noreasons are for thesetwodistinctgroups ofthird countrynationals.Theexamplebelowshowsthetransfer to theresponsible MemberState.InSlovakia,different procedural guaranteesare setinplace decision. Such persons only receive a shortwritten notice with nopossibility to appeal the transfer are subjecttoaDublintransfer onthebasisofatakebackrequest are not issued withanytransfer by theSlovakauthorities.Third countrynationalswhohavenotrequested asyluminSlovakiabut Slovakia atransferdecisionandnotnotifyingthosewhoare apprehended inanirregular manner practice, adistinctionismadebetweenservingthird countrynationalswhohaveclaimedasylumin the proposed itineraryor date forremoval totheresponsible MemberState. According toSlovak the applicantisdetained.InSlovakiaandItalytransfernoticedoesnotcontaininformationon own language. In responsibility fortheirasylum applicationbutthere isnowrittennoticeprovided tothemintheir In others donot. transfer order inFrance.Itisnotknownwhyonlysomeapplicantsreceive thetransferorder whilst that theyunderstandthecontentsofdecision.Howevernotallasylumseekersreceive aDublin seekers inBulgariaandFranceare required tosignthetransfernoticeissuedthemdeclare Prefecture the notice is in French but may be translated orally by aninterpreter or in writing. Asylum post isusuallyinalanguagethattheapplicantunderstands.Ifservedduringappointmentat the issued tohim/herduringanappointmentattherelevant Prefecture. Thetransfer noticeissuedby The DublintransferdecisioninFranceisdelivered byposttotheasylumseeker’s residence or decision andnotallthenecessaryinformationcontainedwithinnotice. asylum seekershavesometimesclaimedthattheinterpreter onlytranslatestheoutcomeof of aninterpreter. Theinterpreter isrequired totranslatethefulltextofdecision.Inpractice, In appeals. how tosubmitanappealifrequired orprovide contactdetailsofNGOswhocouldassistwithsuch Hungary, notice containsinformationontherighttoappealandtimeframesforsuchaninBulgaria, 142 Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia The notificationoftheDublintransferdecisionisservedinpersonbywayawritten include relevant informationontheavailablelegalremedies againstsuchatransferdecision. recast compromise textinrecast Art.26strengthens thisprovision byrequiring MemberStatesto appear, ifshe/heistravellingtotheMemberStateresponsible byhis/herownmeans.TheDublin transfer and,ifnecessary, certaininformationontheplaceanddateatwhichapplicantshould thetimelimitforcarryingout a on whichthetransferisbasedandshallcontaindetailsconcerning the forthcomingtransfertoresponsible MemberState.Thisdecisionshallsetoutthegrounds Art. 19(1)(2)and20(1)(e)provide thatthetransferringMemberStatemustnotifyapplicantof 6.4. Notificationofthe Transfer Decision notified directly totheasylumseekerevenifhe/she hasalegal representative. Thisdirect notification in Switzerland,whichpermitsinadmissibility decisionsonthebasisofDublinRegulation tobe be problematic Asof1January2011 anewlawwasintroduced fortheasylumseekerconcerned. reception centre canhelptranslatethedecisionbutifnobodybefoundtoitthis nor isthere anyinterpretation provided totranslatethe decisionorally. Usually, apersonfrom the The transferdecisionisnotissuedinotherlanguages whichtheasylumseekermayunderstand Switzerland, Bulgaria, asylumseekersreceive thetransferdecisioninBulgarianlanguage,presence Greece, asylumseekersare orally informedwhenotherMemberStateshavetakenover II Regulation. Iftheperson concerned has not claimedasylum inSlovakia thenthey are not properly oftheDublintransfer decision. their application hasbeenfound to beinadmissible dueto thefact thatanother MemberState isresponsible pursuant to theDublin Notification ofthetransfer decisionisonly applicable insituationswhereby anasylum seeker hasclaimedasylum inSlovakia and Italy, Slovakiaand the Dublintransferdecisionisnotifiedinwriting oneoftheofficial Swiss languages. Slovakia, the transfer decision notice is delivered in person by the authorities if Switzerland. SometimesinItalythenoticedoesnotclearlyexplain 142 and Switzerland. The transfer decision 143 Thiscase is available athttp://www.asyl.net/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/18795.pdf an appealagainstthedecision. not informedintimeorcannotgetcontactwithhim/hertodiscussthepossibilityofsubmitting could be problematicto the person concerned if he/she is detained and the legal representative is
the Member State responsible forexaminingyourasylumapplication. the MemberStateresponsible positiveanswerfromRomania,becauseofthisRomaniais 343/2003. On24.8.2012wereceived forexaminingyourasylumapplicationaccordingtoCouncilRegulation(EC) No. responsible We the Member State of determining of procedure you about result would like to inform 343/2003 Subject: Information about result of procedure according Council Regulation (EC) No. asylum there: Example ofaSlovakianTransfer NoticetoThird-Country Nationalswhohavenotclaimed of accessingalegalremedy. (WiesbadenAdministrativeCourt,5L147/11 W.I.A, 19April2011). Federal Office washeldtoprevent thepossibilityofvoluntaryand moreover return anypossibility she istravellingtotheresponsible MemberState byhimself/herself.Thedeliverypracticeofthe any informationonwhere the asylumseekershouldpresent himself/herselffor transferifhe/ the FederalOffice toissueatransferdecisionwithspecifictimelimits foras removalaswell State. TheWiesbadenAdministrativeCourtheld thatArt.19(2)oftheDublinRegulationrequired to issueatransferdecisionthoughplanswere madeforthechild’s removal toanotherMember anagedisputedunaccompanied childtheGermanFederaloffice In acaseconcerning failed Delivery ofatransferdecision Jurisprudence Ca receive acopyofthedecision noticebypostthedayafterremoval ofhis/herclient. se S t
u
d y Bad Practice: Bad Practice: Member StatewiththeDublintransferdecisionnotice. documentation includingacopyofthetransferrequest senttotheother her legal representative receives a copy of his/her own files and other relevant Good Practice: the Conseild’Etat(CaseNo356458,13February2012). decision noticetotranslatethedecision.Thispracticehasbeencondemnedby their owninterpreter totheappointmentfordelivering theDublintransfer transfer. Itiscommonforthelegalrepresentative oftheasylumseekeronlyto another MemberState.Theasylumseekerisgivennopriornotificationofthe deliver thetransferdecisionnoticeondayofunannouncedremoval to fulfilled because ‘his wife had translated the important information orally’. fulfilled because‘hiswifehadtranslatedtheimportant information obligationwas tosignthenotice,information thateven if herefused declared andtheabsenceofanofficialinterpreter.of information However, thePrefecture decision notice,onthebasisthathehadnotunderstoodduetolack French CaseStudy:
Certain Prefectures inFrancerequire thattheapplicant brings In Germany, generalpracticeshowsthatthepoliceoftenonly
In theNetherlandsandSwitzerland,applicantand/orhis/ In Caen, an asylum seeker refused tosignaDublintransfer In Caen,anasylumseekerrefused 143 61 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 62 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings of thehierarchy ofcriteria.However, asillustratedinthetableabove,there isdivergent practiceas of humanrightsgrounds orinrelation toprocedural issuesforexample,anincorrect application asylum Courts.Depending onthecompetenceofCourt,appealsmay besubmittedonthebasis appeals are submittedtogeneraladministrative CourtsorTribunals asopposedtospecialized decision undertheDublin Regulationintheirnationalpractice.Inthe majority ofMemberStates As illustratedinthetableaboveallMemberStates provide someform of anappealtoatransfer 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Table 1:AppealsundertheDublinRegulationperMemberState assistance forsuchappeals(recast Art.27). effect ofappeal,dependingonnationalpracticeaswellcertainobligationsinrelation tolegal text provides anexplicitprovision onremedies whichcontainsavarietyofgrounds forsuspensive for this. In order to strengthen legal safeguards for asylum seekers the Dublin recast compromise Courts or competent bodies so decide, on a case-by-case basis whether national legislation allows However suchanappealorreview shallnotsuspendtheimplementationoftransferunless Pursuant toArt.19(2)and20(1)(e)aDublintransferdecisionmaybesubjectanappealorreview. 6.5. Appeals(Art.19(2)and20(1)(e)) France Netherlands The Slovakia Bulgaria Italy Hungary Switzerland Spain Germany Greece State Member DUBLIN REGULATION APPEALS Austria In theNetherlandsaspecializeddepartmentofCourtdealswith asylum and immigration appeals. Netherlands. time before aDublinrequest isaccepted bytheresponsible Member State. Further information isavailable inthenationalreport for the is 4 weeks. Whether the Dublin procedure is dealt with in the framework of an extended asylum procedure depends on the length of If theDublinprocedure occurs withintheextended asylum procedure intheNetherlandsthen timeframe for submittinganappeal and thushave nopossibility to appeal. country nationalsnotapplying for asylum inSlovakia receive only awritten transfer notice ontheirDublin transfer andnotadecision This appeal right applies only to those who have lodged an asylum application in Slovakia and are subject to the Dublin Regulation. Third circumstances requests can alsobe madeto thehigherAdministrative Courtifthedecisiononmerits isnegative. If the request for suspensive effect is rejected an appeal can bemade to the Constitutional Court in Germany and under certain practice, inmost cases but notalways, theCourtmay grant suspensive effect. ItdependsupontheCourtinGermany. According to § 34a of the German Asylum Procedure Act there is no formal possibility to request suspensive effect in Germany but in The decisionsofRegional Administrative Courts can beappealed to theConseild’Etat. Regulation, whichare undertheremit ofRegional Administrative Court Even thoughFrance hasaspecializedAsylum Courtfor asylum appeals,thisCourtdoesnotexamine appealsundertheDublin of theEuropean Convention onHumanRights, theseappealsfor interim measures benefitfrom avery shortdeadlinefor examination. refere). Althoughthesenationalinterim measures have nopower ofsuspensionandare therefore seenasineffective intheframework In general asylum seekers intheDublinprocedure in France file anappealfor interim measures atthe Administrative Court(recours en specialized asylum Courtorgeneral administrative Court. This sectionoftheTable examines whethertheCourtexamining theapplication oftheDublinRegulation atthenationallevel isa submitting an Timeframe 2 months 1 week 20 days 7 days 60 days 3 days days 5 working 2 months 2 weeks 15 days 7 days Appeal For 8 7 Suspensive Automatic Effect Yes No No No No No No No No No No Suspensive to request Possibility Effect Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a 2 5 Suspensive decides on ex-offico Effect Court Yes No No No Specialized Asylum Court Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No 3 9 1 Access to a Higher Court of Appeal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 4 6 Other Review Mechanisms Available Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No suspensive effect. to instructtheBAMFnottransferperson before theCourthas ruledontherequest for in itselfsuspensive.Therefore, inGermany of thisrequest inHungary submitted doesnotnecessarilyprevent thetransferbeingundertakenprior toaCourtexamination case inAustriaandFrance.Similarly, thefactthatarequest forsuspensiveeffect hasbeen The majorityofasylumseekersare transferred before theappealisdecidedupon in theirindividual vovo’), toprevent removal inadvance oftheCourtdecisiononsuspensiveeffect ofappeal. that itdecidesontherequested provisional measure before thedateofplannedtransfer(‘spoed- practice thisisrare –thattheasylumseekerhastoapproach theCourtasecondtimeandrequest of aprovisional measure onsuspensiveeffect ofappealcanprevent this.Itmayhappen–thoughin person concerned ifthetransfertime-limit of sixmonthsisjeopardized.person concerned interim measure, aslong as theCourthasnotruledonthisrequest, theINDcanstilltransfer In legislation andhasnotbeenabolished. 145 AliensCircular C22/5.3. 144 asylum seekertoGreece . lower Courtswere confirmed bytheConstitutionalCourtasitsuspended removal ofanIraqi interim relief shouldbegranted insuchDublincases.InSeptember2009thecaselawofthese be extendedtoasixthground whichwouldcapture thesituationoftransferstoGreece andthat number ofGermancourtslowerinstancehaveruledthatthefiveexceptionalgrounds should able toaccessanasylumprocedure there SinceApril2008a andisatriskofchainrefoulement. country isitselfthepersecutingStateinconcrete caseand/ortheasylumseekermaynotbe five exceptionswere taken intoconsideration. Theseexceptionsincludegrounds suchasthethird removals tosafethird countriesiscompatiblewiththeConstitutionaslongalimitednumberof by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found that the exclusion of interim relief for country’ appeals system and its compatibility with the German Constitution has been examined effective bylawinGermany . Art.34a)(2)oftheAsylumProcedure Actisbasedonthe‘safethird relief application by the Court. Therefore, appeals on Dublintransferscannothave suspensive removal orders pursuanttotheDublinRegulationmust notbesuspendedonthebasisofaninterim According toGermanlawArt.34a(2)AsylumProcedure Act(Asylverfahrensgesetz) stipulatesthat Legal representatives more frequently request interimmeasures underleréféré liberté. within approximately 15days.Thejudges’powersunderleréféré suspensionare more restricted. violation ofanapplicant’s fundamentalrightswhilstleréféré suspensionmustonlybereviewed suspension). Leréféré libertémustbeexaminedwithin48hoursbyajudgeinorder toprevent a référé liberté)andarequest forinterimmeasures tosuspendanadministrativedecision(Leréféré to apendingappeal:request forinterimmeasures toprevent aviolationofhumanrights(Le In offico ruleonsuspensiveeffect oftheappeal. is required torequest suspensiveeffect from theresponsible Court.InAustriatheCourtmayex Hungary, Italy, Slovakia,Spain,SwitzerlandandtheNetherlandsasylumseekerconcerned Suspensive effect isonlyavailableautomaticallyuponappealinGreece . InBulgaria,Germany, 6.5.1. Suspensiveeffectofappeals appeal tohavesuspensiveeffect. to theeffectiveness oftheselegalremedies with regard totimeframesandthepossibilityfor the NetherlandsalthoughaDublinapplicantmaygenerallyawaitdecisiononrequest foran France group next to the five exceptional cases. in thesecases, sofar theConstitutional CourtinGermany hasyet to rule onwhetheritconfirms theview ofincorporating asixth There have beenatleast 12suchinterim measures bytheConstitutional Court.However, althoughanoral hearinghastaken place there are twodifferent typesofinterimmeasures availabletostopaDublintransferprior 144 and Germany. Thesubmissionofarequest forsuspensiveeffect isnot Despitethis,Art.34a(2)AsylumProcedure ActisstillintheGerman legal representatives commonlyrequest theCourts 145 Onlythetimelyissuance 63 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 64 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings rights obligationssuchastheECHRandCharterofFundamentalRights. administrative authorities’obligationtoexercise discretion withintheframeworkofbindinghuman not subjecttojudicialreview. However, thisjurisprudentialapproach isquestionableinlightofthe humanitarian clauseisonlywithinthecompetenceofinitialadministrativeauthoritiesand is binding provisions of legislation. Therefore the application of discretionary provisions such as the whereby according toBulgarianadministrativelaw, theCourtonly has competencetoruleon sovereignty clause.Thisisbasedonthedistinctionbetweenbindinganddiscretionary provisions jurisprudence hasruledthattheCourtcannotorder theinitialadministrativeauthoritiestoapply The Bulgarianadministrativelawcaseseverely impactsthescopeofappealas,thusfar, 147 146 Article 83(1)Dutch AliensAct. policyisinviolationofthelaw.Council ofStatecanrulethatgovernment procedure andruleswhetherthe appeal was (un)foundedinthe same wayasaregional court.The court madeawrong assessment,itexaminestheappealgrounds thatwere raisedinthefirstappeal both factsandlawthatexistedduringdecision (extuncassessment).Ifitrulesthattheregional the regional courtmadeacorrect assessmentduringthefirstappealprocedure, whileexamining a furtherappealbyeithertheINDorapplicant, theDutchCouncilofStatedetermineswhether of theCouncilStatemaybenecessarytoprevent transferinadvanceof theCourthearing.During effect isnotavailableuponappealtotheCouncilofState.Aprovisional measure from thepresident Dutch Minister also has the possibility to appeal to theCouncil of State. Automatic suspensive of State. When an appeal at the regional Court level is granted on behalf of the asylumseeker, the In or circumstances submitted before itbutwillonlyfocusoninformationprovided tothelowerCourt. constitutionally guaranteedright.TheAustrianConstitutionalCourtwillnotexamineanynewfacts This righttoappealahigherCourtinAustriamustbeonthebasisofpotentialviolation Netherlands. Often,atthishigherlevel,thecompetencyofCourtislimitedtopointslaw. higher CourtdependingonnationallawinAustria,Germany, Greece, Italy, Slovakiaandthe When aninitialappealisrefused there isthepossibilitytosubmitafurtheronward appealtoa 6.5.3. AccesstoaHigherCourtofAppeal that entered intoforce aftertheINDdecision. that are raised after the contested IND decision The DutchCourtsconsideringDublinappealsalsotakeintoconsiderationfactsandcircumstances specific provision intheDublinRegulationsuchassovereignty clause. a remitted backtotheFOMeitherconductfurtherinvestigationsorwithspecificinstructionsapply re-examine theapplicabilityofDublinRegulation.Asanexample,inSwitzerland Courts havethepowertoeitherissueanewdecisionorrequire theinitialadministrativeauthoritiesto for anewexaminationoftheapplicabilityDublinRegulation.InHungaryandSwitzerland Slovakia result intheasylumseeker’s claimbeingre-submitted totheinitialadministrativeauthorities Successful Dublin appealsinAustria, Bulgaria and competences intheMemberStateconcerned. Netherlands. have thepowertoexaminebothfactsandpointsoflaw, includingforexampleinHungaryandthe The competenceofCourtsisregulated bynationallaw. ThemajorityofCourtsexaminingDublinappeals 6.5.2. ThecompetenceoftheCourt the Netherlands a further appeal against the Regional Court’s ruling is possible with the Council Council ofState. policy rules, thesewillbereversed during the appealprocedure withtheRegional Court,orthefurtherappeal procedure withthe If thegovernment fails to changeits policy, ordecidesnotto adhere to theruling andcontinues to issue new decisionsbasedonold The decisionsofnationalCourtsalsoledtodifferent actions dependingontheirrespective 146 (ex nunc assessment), as well as policy changes 147
the case may be the casemaybe to invokethesovereignty clause. the FederalMinistry of theInterior not toimplement the removal ofaChechen familytoPolandand change its decision. As an example, in 2011, the German Bundestag unanimouslyrecommended consisting ofmemberstheGermanParliament, mayrecommendto the FederalGovernment 149 Thisisinaccordance withthebasicright ofpetitionunderArt.17the BasicLawinGermany. 148 MeiningenAdministrative Court,8E20032/11Me.14March 2011andHannover Administrative Court1B1818/11. Parliament ofonetheresponsible FederalStates. In within 120daysofnotificationthetransfer decision.Thoughnotaformal review mechanism available inItalywhereby theasylumseekercanlodgeanappealtoPresident oftheRepublic of thediscretionary provisions oronotherprocedural grounds.recourse Analternative toreview is Regulation, cansubmitawrittenreview request tothecompetentPrefecture onthebasisofuse An asylumseekerinFrance,uponreceipt of an inadmissibilitydecisionsubjecttotheDublin decision. OnlyinFrance Art 19(2) and Art. 20(1)e) also give Member States the power to conduct a review of the transfer 6.5.5. Otherreviewmechanisms of theirtransfertoanotherMemberState. conducted the whole Dublin procedure with the notification and issued the individuals concerned irregular migrants subject to the Dublin procedure. However, it was specifically the Dublin unit who there thattheyhaveadeciding competencyonlyinrelation toasylumseekersandnotinrelation to decision withtheresultant possibilitytoappeal.TheSlovakDublinunitinformedthenationalexperts haveonlyreceivedpersons concerned writtennotificationoftheirDublintransferandnota asylum there havebeen deprived of the right to appeal Dublin transfers.Insuchsituations, the have recently monitored caseswhere personssubjecttoaDublinprocedure whohavenotclaimed Member Statemayalsoimpacttheirrighttoaccessaneffective legalremedy. NGOsinSlovakia The fact that the person within the Dublin procedure has not claimed asylum in the requesting three workingdaysinadvance ofissuingtheDublintransferdecision. Administrative Court obligedtheGerman authoritiestonottransfertheasylumseekerforatleast of aDublintransferdecisionatleasttwoweeksbefore plannedremoval, whilsttheHannover prior to removal is varied. For example, the Meiningen Administrative Court ordered theissuing Court’s interpretation ofordering thenotificationofatransferdecision reasonable amountoftime authorities toserveDublintransferdecisionsacertainamountoftimeinadvanceremoval. The day ofremoval impedesasylumseekersrighttoappealandinresponse haveordered theGerman German courts have stated that the BAMF’s practice of issuing Dublin transfer decisions on the the transferorder hasnotbeenissuedatthattimeandtherefore there isnoappealabledecision. legal remedy. InsuchcasestheAdministrativeCourtsare effectively unabletostopthetransferas started goingtoCourtsprioraDublintransferorder beingissuedtotryaccessaneffective from an appeal.Usuallylawyersonlyreceive thetransferdecisionaftertheirclienthasbeenremoved as the actual transfer renders it impossible in the majority of cases for asylum seekers to submit Switzerland. InGermany, detention centre. TheissueofdetentionhinderingaccesstoaCourtappealwasalsoreported in appeal. Occasionally, NGOstaff are obligedtowriteinterimappealsthemselvesifpresent inthe Even whensuchpersonsdomeet a lawyer, there isofteninsufficient timetodraftandsubmitan in detentioncanhaveparticularconsequencesforthoseasylumseekerswhoare unrepresented. of accesstolegalaidandconsultingalawyerforsubmittingappeals.Thefactthatthepersonis order andplacement in detention occur atthe same time.Thiscanthenbeproblematic interms Court inadvanceofaDublintransfer. InFrancesometimesthenotificationofaDublintransfer Apart from non-suspensiveeffect ofappealthere mayalsobeotherobstaclestoaccessingthe 6.5.4. Practicalobstaclestoaccessinganeffectiveremedy Germany, anapplicantmaysubmitapetition to the Bundestag(FederalParliament)orto Germany. Inresponse tothispracticebytheGermanauthorities,legalrepresentatives have and the factthatmosttransferdecisionsare delivered onthesameday Italy isthere anyopportunityprovided foranotherformofreview. 149 OnthisbasistheCommitteeonPetitions, 148 65 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 66 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings court. Certain lawyers will often refuse to take cases unless there are solidgrounds for appeal. in Franceare required torequest legalaidfrom theLegalAidBureau attherelevant administrative legal aidschemesubjecttoameanstestbasedontheirfinancialincome.Formally, asylumseekers Similarly, inFranceandHungaryasylumseekersmaybenefitfrom legalassistancebywayofafree seekers mayalsoreceive legalassistancefrom other NGO’s orlawyersoutsidetheseorganizations. of a transfer decision (ARGE Rechtsberatung or Verein Menschenrechte Osterreich). Asylum State appointedlegalrepresentatives are assignedtoasylumseekersinAustriauponnotification a CourtorTribunal againstthisdecision. Court orTribunal thenMemberStatesare required toprovide therighttoaneffective remedy before decision ismadenottograntfree legalassistanceandrepresentation byanauthoritywhichisnota means andmeritstestonthebasisthatthere isa‘tangibleprospect ofsuccess’uponappeal.Ifa text underArticle27obligesMemberStatetoensure thatlegalassistanceisgrantedsubjecttoa Dublin procedure. There are NGOsthatprovide legalaid. does notprovide legalaid anditisuptotheasylumseekerthemselvesfindalawyerduring Access tofree legalassistance isnotguaranteedbylawinBulgaria.TheStateAgencyforRefugees NGOS tohelpthemfindalawyer. provide free legalaidInItaly. Althoughthislistispublicasylumseekersneedtheassistanceof legal assistance in ItalyandSlovakiaalso.Onlylawyersregistered onaspecificlistare ableto procedure, albeitwithproblems ofcapacityandresources. NGOsplayacentralrole inaccessing is theworkbyNGOssuchasHungarianHelsinkiCommitteeforasylumseekersinDublin affectsin turn thequality of legalrepresentation fundingisindispensableas available.Alternative translation costs and the fee offered for lawyers workingunderthe scheme isextremely low which Hungary theeffectiveness ofthelegalaidschemeislimitedasitdoesnotcoverinterpretation and 153 152 151 component/content/article/57-policy-papers/247-ecreelena-survey-on-legal-aid-for-asylum-seekers-in-europe.html procedures seeECRE/ELENASurvey onLegalAidfor Asylum Seekers inEurope, October 2010accessible at:http://www.ecre.org/ 150 For furtherinformation ontheavailability oflegal aidfor asylum seekers inthe Dublin procedure orotherrelated asylum There are noprovisions onlegalaidinthecurrent DublinRegulation. 6.5.6. LegalAid the appealisrefused theasylumseekerthemselveshastopayforcosts ofthelawyer. have topayforthecostsoflawyerincase the asylumseekersucceedsbefore Court.Incase As regards legalrepresentation before theCourt,basicprincipleisthatGermanauthorities need oflegalassistancefrom alawyerisrequired topayforitprivatelywithhisorherownmeans. extremely limitedcapacities andresources toprovide legalaid.Ultimately, inGermany,aperson centres ofcharities/welfare organizations andotherNGOs.However, theseorganisations alsohave paid legalrepresentation, whichiscompensatedonlytoaminorextentbyaccesscounselling time intotheprovision of legalrepresentation/advice. Inreality, Germanylacksanyeffective state legal representation issolowthatthemajorityoflawyersreject suchmandates orinvestonlylimited a lawyer. Inaddition,thefinancialamountof€84net,whichispaidtolawyersforprovision of being challenged is factualissuesandnot legalquestionsandtherefore thesewouldnot require to the practice of regional Courts. Such Courts may reject requests on the grounds that what is (Beratungshilfegesetz). Despitethis,inreality there islimitedaccesstolegalrepresentation due In judge decidesonthatrequest, takingintoaccountthecomplexityofcase. court, theasylumseekermayasktobeappointedalawyerfree ofcharge forthecourthearing.The only exceptiontothisiswithrespect tolegalaidforunaccompaniedchildren wherein alawyer Germany, formalaccesstolegalrepresentation isprovided forintheLegalAdvice AidAct If they have financialmeans they are required to pay thecost. In practice thismeansthatiftheasylum seeker remains inGermanyandare notemployed they must pay thiscost over time. for Refugees (SAR)atnational level. The majorsource offinancing for these legal aidservices inBulgaria istheEuropean Refugee Fund operated bytheState Agency administrative procedures. expenses for low-income individuals. Since the introduction ofanew lawof11July 1991,legal aidalsoappliesto non-judicial to lawyers whoaccept legal aidcases are very low whencompared withregular legal representatives fees. TheState covers all with therelevant supportingdocumentation andaddress itto thecompetent legal aidbureau oftherelevant Court.Thepayments vulnerable persons have the rightto have theirlegal expenses paidfor bytheState. Applicants must fillina form, accompanied The Lawof1972establishes thelegal aidregime inFrance. Itreplaced the previously existing judicialassistance system. Themost 152 Oncethecasereaches the Bulgarian 150 TheDublinrecast compromise 153 151 The In at seaports of arrivals,NGOShave noaccesstothemarine vesselsunlessexpressly authorized of theRome-Fiumicino airport. Howeverthesituationatseaborders isquitedifferent. InItaly, available with interpreters at the main airports for Dublin returnees for example in the transit area and across them.ForexampleinItaly,dependingoncapacity and resources, there are NGOservices to theresponsible MemberStatethere isdivergent practice bothwithinregions of MemberStates As regards NGOsupportandassistanceinaccessinganasylumprocedure subsequenttoatransfer various scenariosforasylumseekerstransferred underthe Dublinprocedure. Therefore thispartofthereport isdividedintoanumber ofdifferent subsectionsdependingonthe the previous asylumclaimhasreached priortoonward traveltothetransferringMemberState. a takecharge request onothercriteria)inthatMember Stateandifsoatwhatstageofexamination on whetherthere wasaprevious asylumapplicationsubmitted(i.e.atakebackrequest) ornot(ie. Access totheasylumprocedure uponaDublintransfertotheresponsible MemberStateiscontingent Dublin procedure. proceed toafullassessment oftheprotection needsofasylumseekerstransferred toitunderthe access toanasylumprocedure byclarifyingtheobligationofMemberStateresponsible to Rights.’ oftherighttoasylumguaranteedby Article18CharterofFundamental fullobservance ensure asylum claim.Thisisinaccordance withRecital15, whichstipulatesthattheRegulation‘seeksto Member StateundertheDublinRegulationisobligedtocompleteexaminationofapplicant’s processing of asylum applications’ (own emphasis added). Pursuant to Art. 16(1)b) the responsible statusandnottocompromisetheobjectiveofrapid refugee fordetermining to theprocedures soastoguaranteeeffectiveaccess rapidly the MemberStateresponsible, possible to determine One ofthemainobjectivesforDublinRegulationasoutlinedinrecital 4isaimingto‘makeit 6.6. AccesstotheAsylumProcedure granted inSwitzerland. futile). From areview ofnationalpracticeitisevident thatfree legalrepresentation isonlyrarely necessary forsafeguarding theasylumseekersrights(i.e.ameritstestfindsthatappealisnot representative. Iftheappealisrejected, free legalrepresentation isonlygrantedifitconsidered problematic thatdecisionscanbenotifiedtotheasylumseekersdirectly eveniftheyhavealegal NGOs. Accesstofree legalaidcanbedifficult ifthe applicantisindetention.Inthis regard itisalso must either advance the costs ofa lawyer orrely upon theservices of legal advisory offices runby retrospect, andinmostcasesonlyiftheappealis successful. Thismeansthattheasylumseeker Free legalassistanceandrepresentation isonlygrantedintheappealprocedure inSwitzerland have hadgoodprospects forsuccessinthebeginning. assistance forprocedural costsbyarguing thatifanappealisrejected, thewholecasecouldnot costs hasbeengrantedinDublinappeals.AmajorityofCourtsrefuse anyrequests forreceiving initial merits test. There have only been a few cases in practice in which assistance for procedural which were not successful intheendbut did havesomegoodprospects ofsuccess during an costs’ (Prozesskostenhilfe),whichaimsatsafeguarding thepaymentoflawyers’costsforcases An instrumentforlegalrepresentation wasdeveloped inGermany,entitled‘assistanceforprocedural procedure. (Ergänzungspfleger) ispaidbythenationalauthoritiestorepresent theminorduringasylum The Dublinrecast compromise textunderrecast Art.18strengthens theprincipleofeffective Good Practice: procedure. the daybefore thecommencement oftheasylumapplicationand/orDublin In the Netherlands, asylum seekers’ access free legal aid from 67 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 68 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings were notautomaticallytreated asasylumseekersbytheHungarianauthorities, despitethefactthat Regulation wasparticularly problematic. Asylum seekersreturnedunderatakebackprocedure In therecent pastaccesstotheasylumprocedure uponreturntoHungary undertheDublin asylum procedure doesnotstart automaticallyuponreturn. as anapplicantuponreturn.He/Shestillhasa righttosubmitanewasylumapplicationbutthe asylum intheprevious asylumprocedure inSlovakia,suchathird countrynationalisnotdeemed as inadmissibleormanifestlyunfoundedina casewhentheapplicantwaspreviously refused if itisasituationwhere thethird countrynational’s asylumapplicationhasbeenpreviously rejected that, theformallodgingandregistration oftheasylumapplicationassuch isstillrequired. However, practice, thismeansthatthepolicedonotwait untilthepersonrequests asylum.Irrespective of airportandautomaticallyadmitsthe persontransferredinternational tothe asylumprocedure. In situation theSlovakDublinUnitinformspolice departmentattheborder checkpointoratthe Good practice is reported inSlovakiathat once a Dublintransferisconfirmedin atakeback is stillpending,theItalianauthoritieswillcontinueto examine his/herclaim. is required toleaveItalywithin15daysatthelatest.3)Ifapplicant’s asylumprocedureItaly in decidesnottosubmitanappeal,thenhe/she an appealwithin15-30days.Ifthepersonconcerned was onlyinformedofthefirstinstance refusal uponthenhe/shehasthepossibilitytolodge return, and possiblysenttoadetentioncentre (CIE:Centre forIdentificationandExpulsion).Iftheperson leaving Italyanddidnotappealagainstit,theasylumseekerwillbenotifiedofanexpulsionorder If theapplicantreceived a refusal onhis/herfirstasylumapplicationandwasnotifiedofthisbefore applicant willbeentitledtothesamebenefitsasotherbeneficiariesofinternational protection; 2) ifthepermitofstayisnolongervalidthenaprocedureconcerned; canbestartedtorenew it.The this outcome;ifthepermit of stayisstill valid then aresidence permitwillbeissuedtotheperson the applicantwasgrantedprotection inhis/herprevious asylumprocedure butwasnotnotifiedof In and thedeportationprocess tothecountryoforiginisinitiated. they havenotappealed,thentheasylumprocedure hasfinished.Subsequentlytheyare detained to theircountryoforigin.InGreece iftheasylumseekerhasreceived afirstinstance rejection and willbetreatedsuch ascenario,thepersonconcerned asanirregular migrantandrequired toreturn been refused oriftheapplicant hasbeenabsentforover3monthsand10days.Upontransferin The asylumprocedure inBulgaria requested toreport totheAliensPoliceDivisioncontinueexaminationoftheirclaim. in still pendinguponreturn,he/sheshallreceive adecisiononitssubstanceinBulgaria.Similarly, previous asylumapplication was atintheresponsible MemberState.Iftheasylumapplicationis Access totheasylumprocedure inatakebacksituationdependsonwhatstagetheasylumseeker’s 6.6.1. Accesstotheasylumprocedureinatakebacksituation able tofindaccommodationthere. receive nofurtherinformationonwhethertheasylumseekersreached theirdestinationandwere seekers travelthere onthebasisofaformalagreement withthelocalPrefecture. Often,NGOstaff responsible Questura.Therefore, inpractice,NGOssometimesprovide travelticketstohelpasylum previous asylumapplication.Italianlegislationdoesnotforesee anysupporttoactuallytravelthe fingerprinted orphotographed, where his/her files are keptorwhere he/she mayhave submitteda asylum procedure. Therelevant Questuraisbasedonwhere he/shemayhavepreviously been to gotheoffice oftheQuesturacompetentforhis/herasylumclaimtocontinuewith protection.in needofinternational Inaddition,inItalythetransferred asylumseekerisrequired by theItalianPoliceauthoritiesandtherefore they are notalwaysabletoassistthosewhomaybe Italy, iftheasylumseekerhaspreviously appliedforasylumthere, three scenarios mayarise:1) Greece, if the asylum application is still pending, asylumseekersreceive a pink card and are is discontinueduponreturniftheprevious asylumapplicationhas each asylum application submitted by persons transferred under the Dublin procedure inmerit.” undertheDublinprocedure each asylumapplicationsubmittedbypersonstransferred 15 July2012withintheframeworkofexistingnationallegislationHungarianauthoritiesexamine claims according toapress statementissuedbytheOINinOctober2012.Thestated“Asof changedtheirpolicyinwithrespectHungarian government totheassessmentofDublinreturnees’ 157 156 155 154 they previously appliedforasylumthere. the changeofpracticehasbeenwarmlywelcomedbycivilsocietyandUNHCR. changed in Despite thefactthatitisveryearlytogiveavalidgeneralassessmentofhowsituationhas
was ordered within24hourstoprovide accesstotheasylumprocedure andreception conditions the fundamentalrightsofasylumseekersbutalsochild.ThePrefect ofMoselle Court notedtheprecarious situationofthefamilystatingthatsuchainfringesnotonly the actionsofadministrativeauthoritiestobeunlawfulandacceptedMrs.D’s appeal.The also deniedaccesstoreception conditionsinFrance.TheStrasbourg AdministrativeCourtheld administrative authorities andactionswere takentoremove herfrom France.Thefamilywere conditions to France. Upon arrivalatRoissyairport,MrsDwastakeninforquestioningby Mr &MrsDandtheirthree children were subjecttoaDublintransferdecision undertakeback Access to an asylum procedure and reception conditions subsequent to a Dublin transfer Jurisprudence authorities ofSerbiaasasafethird country. EU MemberStatesbyvirtueoftheDublinRegulationanddesignationHungarian EU MemberStates,hisasylumapplicationwasneverexaminedonthemeritsbyanyofthese practice bytheHungarianauthorities.Despitefactthatthisapplicantwaspresent infour exampleoftheprevious toSerbia.Thisisaparticularlyconcerning seeker wastransferred grounds,sincehearrivedviaSerbia.Hisappealwasunsuccessfulandtheasylum country on safe third in the admissibility procedure his claim. His asylum application was rejected Ca examined theapplicant’s claimfor international protection effectively leaving himinlimbo. It isimportant to note thatalltheseevents took place over three years. Over that timeperiodnoMemberState substantively unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/50d1d13e2.pdf updated note onDublin transfers of through to people transited December Hungary whohave Serbia 2012,accessible at: http://www. are alsono longer rejecting applications asinadmissible from asylum seekers whopreviously transited Serbia.SeealsoUNHCR’s 2012 andtheasylum authoritieshave stopped automatically considering Serbiaasasafe third country. Theasylum authorities The HungarianHelsinkiCommittee hasnoted thatthenumberofimmigration detainees ingeneral hasdecreased since November note-on-asylum-seekers For furtherinformation see:http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-interior/news/the-ministry-of-interior-s-response-to-unhcr-s- http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Access-to-protection-jeopardised-FINAL1.pdf 2011, accessible at: Helsinki Committee, “Access to Protection Jeopardized: Information note onthetreatment of Dublinreturnees,” inHungary December legal-documents/unhcr-handbooks-recommendations-and-guidelines/hungary-as-a-country-of-asylum-2012.html andHungarian asylum-seekers andrefugees inHungary, April2012,§20,accessible at:http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/pdf/resources/ asylum claimshave notyet beenexamined. asacountry of SeealsoUNHCRHungary asylum , Observations onthesituation of there undertheDublinRegulation were generally notprotected against expulsion to third countries, even ifthemerits oftheir an expulsion order was automatically followed byplacement inadministrative detention. Asaresult, asylum seekers transferred procedure decidedthattheprohibition onrefoulement was notapplicable. Inmost cases, uponreturn to Hungary, theissuance of on expulsion orremoval measures, iftheOINorCourtinits previous examination oftheapplicant’s claim,appealorexpulsion which they could nothave raised intheirinitial applications. Subsequentapplications donothave automatic suspensive effect be subsequentapplications, whichmeansthepersons concerned were required to show new elements insupportoftheirclaims Such persons were obligedto re-apply for asylum once they have beenreturned to Hungary. Theseapplications were considered to se S t
u
d y Hungary for such persons as a result of the amendments to Hungarian law and policy, Regulation, but both countries refused. Hungary therefore took responsibility for tookresponsibility therefore Hungary Regulation, butbothcountriesrefused. for his case under the Sweden Dublin and Austria to accept the responsibility asked throughSerbia.Hungary HethentravelledtoHungary back toGreece. hewastransferred toSweden.Fromthere sohecontinuedhisjourney Greece, authoritieswantedtosendhimback HemovedontoAustriawhere Greece. Hungarian CaseStudy: 154 An Iranian asylum seeker first entered theEUthrough An Iranianasylumseekerfirstentered However, duringthetimeofwritingthisreport, the 157 156
155
69 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 70 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings transfer isalsoshowninthenationalpracticeGreece, Hungary, Bulgaria,Italyand France. The requirement fornewsfactsandcircumstances forsubsequentapplications pursuanttoaDublin authorities ifthefirst request hadalready been rejected duetolackofnewfacts andcircumstances. this period. In general subsequent applications for asylum are frequently rejected by the Dutch and noattentionispaidtothefactthatasylumseekermaybedestitutehomelessduring she awaitsaformalappointmentforsubmittingnewapplication.Thiscantakeuptofewweeks no formalrest andpreparation ashe/ periodoraccommodation availableforthepersonconcerned for theasylumprocedure itselfandthereception conditionsavailabletotheasylumseeker. There is 159 158 for Refugees.Ifthere isaremoval order againsthim/her, itcanbeexecutedinthemeantime. he/she isnotregarded asanasylum seekeruntilhe/sheisregistered assuchby theStateAgency registration ofanasylum procedure there. Evenifapersonhassubmittedtheasylumapplication, and takecharge situations,asinpracticethere isagapintimebetweenthesubmissionandformal Access to the asylum procedure in seekers faceinaccessingtheasylumprocedure inGreece. Member State.Likeallasylumapplicantssuchpersonsfacethesamedifficulties thatallasylum ‘take charge’ casemeansthattheasylumseeker has notappliedforasylumbefore intheresponsible Greece andtheNetherlands when theDublintransferisonbasisofatakecharge request. A Normal procedural rules for accessingtheasylumprocedure applyinBulgaria,France,Italy, 6.6.2. Accesstotheasylumprocedureinatakechargesituation been closedwithafinaldecisionorhasdiscontinuedand/orclosed. The term ‘subsequent’ refers to an application submitted once a previous asylum procedure has than other asylum seekers. then he/shemustlodgeasubsequentasylumapplicationandrunshigherriskofbeingdetained an applicant is returned to the Netherlands after their first asylum application was formally rejected for asylum,evenifthepersonwasnotinterviewedduringfirstasylumprocedure there. Also,if Any DublintransferinatakebackscenariotheNetherlandsistreated asasubsequentapplication Directive withitsinherent conditions. application shallnot,however, betreated asasubsequentapplicationundertheAsylumProcedures protection.of his/herclaimiscompletedortolodgeanewapplicationforinternational Suchanew instance hasbeentaken,itshallensure thattheapplicantisentitledtorequest thattheexamination an applicationfollowingitswithdrawalbytheapplicantbefore adecisiononsubstanceinthefirst Art. 18hasclarified thatwhenthe responsible MemberStatehasdiscontinuedtheexaminationof opportunity to submit a subsequent application for asylum.The Dublin recast compromise text under previous asylumapplicationintheresponsible Member Stateisfinishedhe/shemaybegiventhe 6.6.1.1. Subsequentasylumapplications for thewholefamily(Strasbourg AdministrativeTribunal, FranceNo.100301,25January 2010). origin andistherefore considered likely to abscond. Detention isoften usedinsuchasituationastheauthoritiespresume thattheapplicant isnotwillingto return to hiscountry of example because theperson absconded orwas considered to have implicitly withdrawn inanearly phaseoftheprocedure. A previous discontinued asylum application refers to acase which isclosed withoutadecisiononthemerits oftheclaimfor 159 The fact that it is a subsequent application has repercussions both Bulgaria is quite arbitrary and unpredictable in both take back 158 Iftheapplicant’s entitled tofourweeksofaccommodationunlikeotherfailedasylumseekers. of aformalrest andpreparation periodandifhis/herasylumrequest isrejected, he/shewillnotbe 161 Art.62(3)Aliens Act. 160 without everreceiving atransferdecisionwhichhe/shecouldappealagainst. Inmanycasessuch once more, istransferred theasylumseekerconcerned immediatelybytheAustrianauthorities if thefirsttransferwasnotenforced, oriftheMemberStateagrees totaketheasylumseekerback Member State’s acceptance intheDublinnegotiationsisstillopenforanumberofreasons including suspensive effect forthesubsequentapplicationitselforanyfurtherappeal.Incaseresponsible the DublinRegulationissuedwithin18months ofthefirstapplicationthenthere isgenerallyno In and are therefore subjecttomore thanoneDublinprocedure. are transferred totheresponsible MemberStatebutthen returntotherequesting MemberState repeated numberoftransfers totheresponsible MemberState.Thisoccurswhenasylumseekers Limited informationwasgathered withrespect totheissueofrepeata Dublincasesconcerning Repeat Dublincases application undernationallaw. its meritsduringthesubstantiveasylumprocedure, pursuanttothetermsofasubsequentasylum fact thattheirasylumclaimwasneverexaminedbyaMemberState.Therequest isexaminedon Similarly, intheNetherlands,asylumseekerhastosubmitasubsequentapplicationdespite applicants intheacceleratedasylumprocedure. despite thefactthatCourtshavemadeseveralrulingsagainstthisinappropriate placementof a temporarypermitfortheexaminationofanasylumapplication.Thispracticecontinuestooccur seekers are systematically placedinanacceleratedasylumprocedure andare notprovided with they are locatedinFrance . Forexample,inRouenandParis,practicehasshownthatsuchasylum applicants maynotbeabletoaccessthenormalasylumprocedure. Thisisdependentonwhere procedure in the Member State where they are present. In and willnotbetransferred toanotherMemberState,theyshouldbegrantedaccesstheasylum or onhuman rights grounds. Therefore, have requested giventhat the persons concerned asylum application for anumberofreasons includingtheexpiryoftimelimits undertheDublinRegulation Sometimes, therequesting MemberStatemaybecomeultimatelyresponsible fortheasylum 6.6.3. foreigner enters the territory oftheSlovakRepublic ” (unofficial enterstheterritory translation). foreigner shallcommenceonce the who havenotbeengrantedasylum,theasylumgrantingprocedure inthepastasinadmissibleormanifestlyunfounded or application forasylumhadbeenrejected whose anapplicant;exceptforaforeigner shallbeconsidered the asylumgrantingprocedure State oftheEuropeanUnionduetofactthatSlovakRepubliciscompetentactin oftheSlovakRepublicfromanotherMember totheterritory an applicantandwhoisreturned in accordance whoisnot withtheDublinRegulation.Section4(6)AsylumActstates“Aforeigner Slovakia National Fact: Austria, ifapersonsubmitsfurtherasylumapplication afteraninadmissibilitydecisionunder fast-track procedurefast-track ). evasion -Paris Administrative CourtNo.0717755,29November 2010,Mrs. K.marriesV. Ex-Dublin:cancellation of the placement in Medena A.,Dublinandfast-track procedure: Presentation ofsummonsfor readmission withoutchildren constituting anintentional in fast-track procedure dueto thenon-execution ofaDublin readmission –CouncilofState, 25October 2010,No.342842,Mrs. confirming CESouleymanov 31December 2009,No.334865;(Lyon Adminstrative Court,1October 2010;Suspensionofa placement See for example thefollowing French jurisprudence: Conseild’Etat, No.334865,20October 2009,CE19October 2010,No.337932, Dublin Regulationcases took overresponsibilityforanasylumapplicationandrepeat Access totheasylumprocedureinaMemberStatewhich has anexplicitprovision initsAsylumActwithrespect toapplicantstransferred there 161 Asnotedabove,thismeansthattheasylumseekerisdeprived 160 France, in such scenarios these 71 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 72 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings fairness. The righttoinformationontheapplicationofDublinRegulationisacentralelementprocedural positive, othersinfringingtheveryrighttoasylumguaranteedinCharterofFundamentalRights. obligations in theDublinprocedure.international ItillustratesaEurope of varied practices, some asylum procedures. However, thisresearch showsthatMemberStatesare notfullyrespecting their and effective judicial protection must also be respected byMemberStatesinthe operation of procedure andwillbeaccommodatedintheusualreception facilitiesforasylumseekers. 165 164 163 FOM, circular letter to cantonal authoritiesandborder guard agency, 23March 2012. 162 Fundamental RightsandECHR. its 1967Protocol andother relevanthumanrightsinstrumentsinteraliatheCharterof international undertaken byMemberStatesvirtueoftheiraccessiontothe1951RefugeeConventionand derives from fundamental respect forthedignityofindividualandfrom thelegalobligations including procedures related to the Dublin Regulation. The need for procedural safeguards Effective legal and procedural safeguards are essential for a fair and efficient asylum procedure repeatconcerning Dublincases. recent therefore itsimpactisyettobeassessed.Vulnerable personsare exemptedfrom thispolicy facts orevidencesubstantiatingtheneedforasecondapplication.Thispracticeisstillrelatively as arequest forre-examination withanaccording decision.Thisisthecaseifthere are newrelevant The FOMalsohasthepowertodecidewhetherornotnewasylumapplicationshouldbetreated responsible MemberStateuponrequest bythecanton. and executesthetransfer. Therefore, theFOMonlystartsanothertakebackprocedure withthe Member State. The canton then grants the asylum seeker the right to be heard with a short interview The cantonalauthoritymayasktheFOMtointroduce anothertakebackrequest totheresponsible transfer is responsible for the execution of the second removal to the responsible Member State. on theprevious inadmissibilitydecision.Thesamecantonwhichwasresponsible forthefirstDublin the responsible MemberStateandmusttherefore leaveSwitzerland.Theorder toleaveisbased subsequently had received aninadmissibility decision undertheDublinRegulationandwassentto receive aninformationnoticestatingthathe/shepreviously requested asyluminSwitzerlandand having beentransferred totheresponsible DublinMemberState.Theasylumseekerwillonly asylum procedure ifapersonappliesforasylumagaininSwitzerland,withinsixmonthsafter Dublin transfers,theFOMbrought inanewpracticeApril2012.There willnormallybenonew In order todiscouragerepeated returnstoSwitzerland from theresponsible MemberStateafter of Art.19(2)theDublinRegulation. introduced in2010,seemstodrasticallyreduce the chanceforaneffective remedy andisinviolation asylum seekersonlyreceive apreliminary interview conductedbythepolice.Accordingly, thislaw, cannot fully understand its contents. In light of these findings the Commission should ensure in and translationofthesedocuments.Theefficacy ofaleafletisquestionable whenthe recipient technical terminologyusedinleafletsand/orguidance notesaswellthequalityofinterpretation surveyed. Obstaclestoeffective provision ofinformationincludethelanguageemployedand the amountandqualityofinformationdelivered isextremely variedacross theMemberStates States provide someformofinformationtoasylumseekersontheDublinRegulation.Despitethis their situation and to exercise their rights. It is positive to note that a significant number of Member mothers withsmallchildren. Vulnerable persons inSwitzerlandare deemedto includeelderly orsickpersons, women inadvanced stage ofpregnancy, single report-092010_en.pdf Thematic Report, September 2010,accessible at:http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1052-asylum-access-info- Fundamental Rights Agency(FRA),Thedutyto inform applicants aboutasylum procedures: Theasylum-seeker perspective, 1967 relating to thestatus of refugees, andother relevant treaties.” principle of non-refoulement. Thispolicymustbeinaccordance withtheGeneva Convention of 28July 1951andtheProtocol of 31January a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection andensuringcompliance withthe See Article 78(1) TFEU“1.TheUnionshalldevelop acommon protection policy onasylum, subsidiary protection andtemporary with 165 Thepossessionofsuchinformationisessentialforasylumseekerstofullycomprehend 164 162 GeneralprinciplesofEUlawsuchastheprincipleeffectiveness Therefore, vulnerablepersonswillreceive anotherasylumDublin *** 163 a particularly prompt response; it also requires that the person concerned shouldhaveaccessto that thepersonconcerned italso requires a particularlypromptresponse; toArticle3,aswell contrary riskoftreatment existsubstantialgroundsforfearing areal there closescrutinybyanationalauthority,requires independentandrigorousscrutinyofany claimthat withinthe meaningofArticle13imperatively “theeffectivenessofaremedy Belgium andGreece be rendered practicallyimpossibleorexcessivelydifficult. principle ofeffectiveness according towhichtherealization ofrightsconferred byEUlawmaynot CJEU. Itisclearthattheminimumcontentofrighttoaneffective remedy mustsatisfythe effective legalremedy inreflecting thejurisprudenceofEuropean CourtofHumanRightsand accessing alegalremedy. RecastArt.27hasthepotentialtosignificantlyimprove accesstoan legal aid,thecompetenceofCourtandpracticalobstaclesadministrativeconstraints to decision inamannerofwaysinteraliawhethertheappealhassuspensiveeffect, availabilityof The findingsinthis research demonstratevariedpracticesontherighttoappealaDublintransfer 47 CharterofFundamentalRights. appealable decisionisinviolationoftherighttoaneffective remedy underArt.13ECHRand the DublinRegulation.ThefactthatinSlovakiasomepersonssubjecttotransfersare notissuedan transfer are properly informedofatransferdecisioninviolationArt.19(1-2)and20(1)(e) 169 SeeOpinionofAdvocate General Trstenjak inthecase ofC-411/10, 22September 2011,para 161. 168 167 SeeCJEU ruling in C-277/11para. 85and87inrelation to therightto beheard. 166 that simple and accessible language is used. drawing upthecommoninformation leaflet envisagedundertheDublin recast compromise text State aspartofthedutytoconsultandreflecting therighttobeheard. particular MemberStateand/orotherrelevant informationastoidentifytheresponsible Member is provided forasylumseekerstoraisetheirreasons forwantingtohavetheirclaimexaminedina implementation, it is crucial that such interviews take place in a manner in which every opportunity Regulation and is in the interests of Member States and asylum seekers alike. Therefore upon recast compromise textislikelytocontributea muchmore effective applicationoftheDublin Regulation anditseffects. Theexplicitrequirement toconductapersonalinterviewundertheDublin The provision ofapersonalinterviewwillalsoassistasylumseekersunderstandingtheDublin of theirDublincaseforexamplewhetheradditionalevidenceisrequired toestablishfamilylinks. such aprocedure inplace.Furthermore, asylumseekersshouldbekeptinformedoftheprogress Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is positive to note that a numberof Member States already have Another importantprocedural rightisthegrantingofaccesstopersonalcasefilesinlinewithArt.41 of cross-checking whethertheinformationprovided withintheleafletisunderstandableornot. common leafletatestphaseisconductedwithsamplegroup ofasylumseekersforthepurposes in areasonable periodof timepriortoremoval. all thereasons uponwhich theyare basedandmustbecommunicatedtothepersonconcerned are abletoaccessaneffective legalremedy where necessary. Transfer decisionsshouldinclude in determiningwhetherasylumseekersfullyunderstandtheconsequencesofsuchadecisionand quality ofinterpretation (if anasylumseekerisalsonotifiedorally)and/ortranslationare keyfactors Asylum seekersare notified ofaDublintransfermainlybywrittendecision.Theprovision and application. for exampleGermanyapersonalinterviewmayonlybeheldmonthsafterlodginganasylum the interviewinatimelymanneriswelcomedasthisresearch showsthatinsomeMemberStates the MemberStateresponsible. Therequirement underrecast Art.5(3)thatMemberStatesconduct interview intheDublinprocedure shouldbeappliednarrowly giventheircrucialrole inidentifying the responsible MemberState. adequate healthcare needsare metduringtravel andintheresponsible MemberState andarranging practical details withfamily in exercise his/herright to aneffective remedy“. However, time priorto transfer may alsoberequired for otherreasons such asensuring Recast Art.27(2)states that“MemberStates shallprovide for areasonable periodof timewithinwhichtheperson concerned may examination procedure referred to 44(2).” inArticle to complete itwithadditionalMemberState-specific information. Those implementing acts shallbeadopted inaccordance withthe an applicant may beprocessed withinEurodac. Thecommon leaflet shallbeestablishedinsuchamannerasto enable MemberStates also includeinformation regarding theapplication of Regulation (EC)No2725/2000and,inparticular, thepurposefor whichthedata of a specificleaflet for unaccompanied minors, containing at least the information referred 1.Thiscommon leaflet to inparagraph shall Dublin recast compromise text Art4(3)“TheCommission shall,by meansof implementing upacommon acts, draw leaflet, as aswell 166 It is also recommended that upon completion of the 168 Practiceshowsthatnotallpersonssubjectto 169 AsoutlinedinthecaseofM.S.S.v 167 Omissionstoapersonal 73 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 74 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings Directive. which shallnotbetreated asasubsequentapplicationwithinthetermsofAsylumProcedures of anasylumclaimorensure thattheapplicant is entitledtolodge anewapplicationforasylum text willsolvesomeoftheseproblems byobligingMemberStatestocompletetheexamination years andyettheseproblems continuetoexistasevidencedabove.TheDublinrecast compromise examine an asylumclaimisoneofthe most renowned problems with theDublinsystemover does noteffectively guaranteesuchaccess.Thefailure tohaveasingleMemberStateeffectively access to an asylum procedure but this study shows that the current operation of the Dublin system One ofthemainobjectivesDublinRegulation outlined inrecital 4isguaranteeingeffective challenging appealsontheDublinRegulation. Therefore itiscriticalthatthere are nopracticalobstaclespreventing accesstotheCourtsfor 171 For furtherinformation ontheobligations oftheMemberState responsible seerecast Art.18 Dublinrecast compromise text. 170 ECHR,M.S.S.v. Belgium andGreece, Application No.30696/09,21January2011.para 293. Recommendations withautomaticsuspensiveeffect.” a remedy Rights. ensuring fullobservanceoftherighttoasylumguaranteedbyArt.18CharterFundamental persons are alsoguaranteedaccesstoanasylumprocedure inaccordance withtheobjectiveof various reasons suchasfailure tocomplywithreporting requirements. Itisimperativethatsuch where an asylum claim has not been explicitly withdrawn by an applicant but has been closed for user-friendly format. to ensure thatthecontentissufficiently clearandunderstandablepresented ina regulation, atestphase shouldbeconductedwithasamplegroup ofasylumseekers When draftingthecommoninformationleafletenvisagedunderanewimplementing asylum procedure andtoafullexaminationoftheirasylumclaim. Rights, allpersonssubjecttotheDublinRegulationmustbeguaranteedaccessan Pursuant totherightasylumguaranteedbyArt.18ofCharterFundamental reasonable periodinadvance ofremoval. Applicants intheDublinprocedure shouldbeinformedofatransferdecisionwithin within theDublinprocedure. Applicants shouldberegularly provided withinformationontheprogress oftheircase 171 However, it is not clear that recast Art. 18 of the Dublin Regulation will cover situations European Commission Member States 170 Alegalremedy mustbeeffective andnotillusory. 172 psychological examination. from thedetentioncentre. TheobligatorymedicalexaminationinHungary immigration detentionprovide foranobligatorymedicalexaminationbefore thepersonisreleased upon arrival.Inaddition,inBulgariaifthepersonisdetainedatanystage,national regulations on Asylum seekersinBulgaria,HungaryandSlovakia are subjecttoanobligatorymedicalscreening 7.1. Medicalexaminations withintheDublinprocedure provided byasylumseekers themselvesduringinterviews. way ofamedicalcheckconductedduringtherest andpreparation periodandthrough information Hungary andSpain.However, vulnerabilityofDublinapplicantsintheNetherlandsisidentifiedby There are no procedures for identifying vulnerable applicants in the Dublin procedure in should receive preferential treatment withintheasylumprocedure. her individualsituation”.Furthermore theHungarian AsylumActstipulatesthatvulnerablepersons sexual violence,found,afterproperindividualevaluationtohavespecialneedsbecauseof his/ ofpsychological,physicalor rapeoranyotherform fromtorture, and apersonwhohassuffered particular, aminor, raisingaminorchild woman,singleparent elderlyordisabledperson,pregnant the term‘personswithspecialneeds’asan“unaccompaniedminororavulnerableperson,in of psychological, physical or sexualviolence”.InHungarySection2(k)AsylumActdefines forms rapeorotherserious andpersonswhohavebeensubjectedtotorture, withchildren single parents be considered women, vulnerablepersons“minors,disabledpeople,elderlypregnant with specialneeds.Art.8oftheItalianLegislative Decree 140/2005statesthatthefollowingshould In ItalyandHungarythere are specific references inthenationallegislationtovulnerablepersons considered asvulnerablepersonsinneedofspecial care withintheDublinprocedure. persons withdisabilitiesandvictimsoftorture andsexualgender-based violenceare generally condition. Similarly, intheNetherlands,unaccompaniedchildren, singleorpregnant women, family withapregnant motherandafamilywiththree children where themother hadapsychological persons withinthecontextofDublinsystem:asinglemotherwiththree ormore children; a Nevertheless, theAustrianConstitutionalCourthasconsidered thefollowinggroups asvulnerable There isnoformaldefinitionofvulnerablepersonsinAustria,Germanyand of psychological,physicalandsexualviolence. pregnant women,minorsandpersonsthathavebeensubjecttotorture, rapeorotherseriousforms provision ofmedicalcare ortreatment, disabledpersons,elderlypeople, inparticularconcerning States totransmithealthdatawiththeresponsible MemberStatefortheexclusivepurposeof handicap oroldage”.UndertheDublinrecast compromise text,Art.32 explicitlyobligesMember child, serious illness, severe or a new the born assistance of another “on account of pregnancy procedure exceptimplicitlywithinArt.15(2)whichrefers topersonswhomaybedependenton The DublinRegulationcontainsnoexplicitprovisions onvulnerablepersonssubjecttotheDublin VII. to theopinion ofamedical specialist. required bytheperson’s state ofhealthprovided free ofcharge withconsideration for the person’s individual situationandaccording eligible for thehealthcare services, rehabilitation, psychological andclinical psychological care orpsychotherapeutic treatment According to the Section34oftheAsylum ActGovernmental Decree, aperson withspecial needsseekingrecognition shallbe To TheDublinProcedure Vulnerable PersonsSubject 172 does notincludea the Netherlands. France, 75 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 76 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings judgment,forexampleinGermany,v BelgiumandGreece SwitzerlandandSpain. have beenspecificpoliciesofnottransferringvulnerablegroups there priortotheleadingM.S.S. 175 174 173 Italian circolare, 23February 2009. is documented evidence of a particular vulnerability. for thepossibilitytorequest are-examination of the applicationofDublinRegulationifthere specific ministerial notehasbeendeveloped with respect tovulnerablegroups whichprovides to vulnerablegroups asillustratedinnationalpracticeItaly, GermanyandSpain.InItalya Specific policies may be developed with respect to the application of the Dublin Regulation 7.2. ImpactofvulnerabilityonDublintransfers way ofanappealincaseinadmissibilitydecisionundertheDublinRegulation. investigate theapplicant’s stateofhealthforaDublinprocedure whichcanthenbechallengedby no examinationtookplace,thisisconsidered asafailure bytheAustrianauthoritiestocorrectly Austrian jurisprudence,Ifthere isaclearindicationofthenecessitymedicalexamination,but at thereception centersonafrequentAccording basisforthose withmentalhealthconcerns. to undertaken by a specialist doctor. Furthermore, the nationalauthorities provide access to doctors that there are attheadmissibilityinterview, medicalconcerns amedical examination canbe medical examinations conducted on behalf of the applicant or not. In In Francethere isinconsistentpracticeamongthedifferent prefectures astowhetherthere are In report withoutbeingpaidforit. seeker hastopayforithimself/herselforrely onthegoodwillofamedical professional towritea such medicalexaminationsandneitherisanylegal aidprovided forthiscost.Generally, theasylum submit acorresponding medicalreport proving it.However, theSwissauthoritiesdonotarrangefor clause. InSwitzerlandaccording totheFOMif a personclaimstobeunfitfortravel,theyhave assess when an illness or medical condition is considered severe enough to invoke the sovereignty will receive equivalent care in theresponsible Member State.Equally, inGermanyitishard to difficult tostopatransfer onmedicalgrounds asnationalauthoritiesbelievethatanasylumseeker complains ofaseriousmedicalillness,whichprohibits travel.InFrance,GermanyandAustriaitis to transfer is only undertaken if a person objects to thetransfer on medical grounds or ifhe/she than cancellingthemaltogether. InHungary practice isshowninAustriaandGermany,whereby medical reasons willonlydelaytransfersrather to-be transferred thenthedateofhis/herDublintransfer ispostponedratherthancancelled.Similar person is fit-to-be transferred. If medical examinations in Bulgaria reveal that an applicant is not fit- Some MemberStatesconductmedicalexaminationspriortotransferensure thataparticular to them. consider applyingthehumanitarianclauseifmedicalevidenceofparticularillnessissubmitted the humanitarianclause,accompaniedbymedicalevidence.SimilarlyinSpain,authoritiesmay request foraninformalreview tothenationalauthoritiesonbasisofsovereignty clauseor In vulnerable personstoMalta. policy hasalsobeenappliedinGermanysinceautumn2009ofsuspendingtransfersparticularly fly’. DT&V) will seek medical advice from a physician to determine whether the asylum seeker is ‘fit to a real obstacletothetransfer. Insuchcases,theRepatriationandDeparture service(hereafter will onlytakeplacewhenthere are indicationsthatthemedicalsituationofanasylumseekeris France if a person’s health impacts the Dublin procedure, he/she is recommended to submit a the Netherlands, examinations to determine whether a person is fit for transfer – Medische Advisering’, (BMA)),they may challenge theexpert report bycarrying outa ‘contra-expertise’ (i.e.they may seekanother official, 26April2012.Iftheasylum seeker disagrees withthemedical report produced bytheOffice for Medical Consulting (‘Bureau The physician ishired bytheDT&V, butworks for anindependentmedical institution, Information basedonInterview with DT&V vulnerable asylum seekers to Greece. In 2011theInter-ministerial Commission ofAsylum andRefugees (theEligibilityCommission) inSpainalsostopped transferring 175 TheDutchauthoritiesensure thetransferofvulnerablepersonsbyproviding acustomized and Slovakiaanadditionalmedicalexaminationprior 173 In relation to transfers to Austria, if it is indicated Greece there 174 ‘fit tofly’– A similar document’ inthesenseofarticle16(2)DublinRegulationbyDutchCourts. transfer formedicalreasons onthebasisofArt.64AliensActhasbeenfoundtobea‘residence of thisprovision hasparticularconsequenceswithintheDublinprocedure. Thesuspensionofa 178 177 CouncilofState CaseNo.201000724/1,12July 2010. 176 problems withreception capacitieswithinthatsystem. SPRAR systemforpersonswithspecialneeds,inpracticethisisnotalwaysguaranteeddue to under theDublinRegulation,thoughformallythere are accommodationandserviceswithinthe continuity ofcare. Alsowhen particularlyvulnerableasylumseekersare transferred backtoItaly of personstransferred there. Asaresult Greece wasnotalwaysprepared toprovide thenecessary authorities being informed sufficiently in advance of the particularly vulnerability or health concerns many instanceswhereby vulnerablepersonswere senttoGreece, withouttheGreek national From theperspectiveof the receiving MemberStateitwasreported that in thepast,there were State. however, a German doctor accompanied the ill personon the transfer to the responsible Member with themnoequivalentmedicine available intheresponsible MemberState.Insomeinstances instances where persons whowere transferred from Germany illness orhis/herstateofhealthanasylumseekerbefore his/hertransfer. There havealsobeen the BAMFoftenfailstoinformresponsible MemberStateabouttheasylumseekers’particular Member State,theSwissDublinoffice informstheauthoritiesofthatStateaccordingly. InGermany In 7.3. Continuityofcare withintheDublin procedure to accommodationandothersupportintheNetherlandsisextended. in responsible MemberState.Inthiscase,thetransferwillbetemporarilypostponed,andright stopping theirtreatment willresult inamedicalemergency, andifmedicaltreatment isnotavailable medically safefortheasylumseeker–oroneoftheirfamilymemberstotravel.Forexample,if the AliensActisapplied.OnbasisofArt.64Act,removal issuspendedifitnot that an asylum seeker may not be removed due to a psychological or physical illness, Art. 64 of transfer. ThismeansthattheDT&Vassesswhatcare isneedduringthetransfer. Ifitisestablished application lieswiththeNetherlands. Art. 16(2)oftheDublinRegulationisapplicable,responsibility fortheexaminationofasylum Switzerland, iftheasylumseekerneedsmedicalcare subsequenttothetransferresponsible the medicaltreatment ofvulnerablepersons. to that Member State.” states “Where aMemberState issues aresidence document to 1shallbetransferred theapplicant, theobligations specified inparagraph outcome after medical recovery, theasylum seeker may beremoved to theircountry oforigin.Art.16(2)theDublinRegulation asylum seeker still hasevery interest inreceiving adecisiononhis/her asylum application. Iftheasylum procedure hasanegative This occurs after thetransfer issuspendedonthebasisofart.64Aliens Act.Asthissuspensionisnotreally aresidence permit,the medical reasons, for whichthere are strict conditions. this Court,preventing expulsion until adecisiononhisappealhasbeenreached. There isaspecialresidence permitavailable for against adecisionbytheINDnotto apply Article 64oftheAliensAct.Theasylum seeker can request aprovisional measure at suspended for theperiodduringwhichtravelling onmedical grounds isdeemedirresponsible. Anappealmay belodged inCourt However, Article 64 Aliens Actdoesnotprovide theperson concerned with aresidence permit.Theexpulsion ortransfer isonly expertise: Therole of expert advice intheasylum procedure“ (6July 2012),accessible at:http://www.acvz.org/en/index.php. a majorobstacle inasylum procedures according to theAdvisoryCommittee onMigration Affairs (ACVZ). See:ACVZ, “Evaluating opinion andrequest another medical report). Theasylum seeker must pay for thecosts ofthisfurthermedical report whichis regarding guaranteesonassigningguardianship toanunaccompanied childor other responsible MemberStatebefore theactualtransfer, forexample persons, theDutchauthoritiesmakearrangementswithin Good Practice:
In the Netherlands, in some cases concerning vulnerable In theNetherlands,insomecasesconcerning 178
were notallowedtotake medicine 176 However, theapplication 177 Therefore, once 77 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 78 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings parents with small children andpersons thathavebeensubject totorture, rapeorother serious inter aliaunaccompaniedchildren, people withdisabilities,elderlypeople,pregnant women,single Only afewMemberStates definevulnerablepersonsforthepurposes oftheDublinprocedure Dublin system. and rehabilitation servicesacross Europe alsoneedstobetakenintoaccount in thecontextof Regulation shouldbeappliedatall.Thefactthat there are vastdisparitiesintheprovision ofmedical itself. Sometimes,thespecificneedsofapplicant mayalsodeterminewhetherornottheDublin ensuring that procedural safeguards are put in place to meet these needs during the procedure Firstly there is the issue of identifying the special needs of asylum seekers in the process and then Asylum seekerswithspecialneedsare oftennotadequatelyprotected undertheDublinRegulation. Jurisprudence (Regional AdministrativeTribunal TAR-LAZIO, Cn.7657/2010,No.05784/2011,1July2011). authorities toapplythesovereignty clauseandexaminetheapplicants’ asylumclaiminItaly not verifiedthoroughly theapplicant’s healthcondition. TAR-LAZIO ordered theadministrative which declared thetransfer order unlawfulbecausetheItalianadministrativeauthoritieshad mental health.TheapplicantappealedtotheRegionalAdministrativeTribunal (TAR-LAZIO) from severe mentalhealthproblems andrequired targeted psychiatriaticvisitstomonitorhis that MemberStatetotakeresponsibility forhisasylumapplication.Theseekersuffered previously claimedasylum intheCzechRepublictherefore theItalianDublin Unitrequested In November2009aKurd applicantclaimedasyluminItaly. In2008theasylumseekerhad Failure toinvestigatemental healthconditionofapplicant (Austrian AsylumCourt,AustriaS7423.367to370-1/2011/2E,28December2011). for furtherexaminationsandinAugust2012thefamilyreceived subsidiaryprotection status the riskofaviolationArt.3ECHR.Thecasewasthenreferred totheFederalAsylumOffice held thattheFederalOffice failedtoadequatelyconsidertheapplicant’s medicalconditionand enough oxygen when he is upset which could lead to severe brain damage or be fatal. The Court boy’s heartdiseaseeventransportationcouldbelife-threatening asthe childdoesnotreceive transfer itselfwaslife-threatening forthechild.Medical examinationsfoundthatbecauseofthe Asylum Court.TheAustrianCourtallowedtheappealongrounds thattheactual Austrian authoritiestriedtotransferthefamilyPoland,adecisionwhichwasappealed Also thechild’s grandmother and three aunts already had residence permissioninAustria.The well. She claimed that the medical care in Poland was insufficient for the boy’s medical needs. birth. Hisparents were seperatedandhismothercametoAustriawithherthree otherchildren as The childsuffered from alife-threatening heartdiseaseandhadanoperationshortlyafterhis The asylumapplicantwasathree inPolandwithparents montholdbaby born from Chechnya. Impact ofactualDublintransferonchild’s health in Austria.(AustrianConstitutionalCourt,AustriaU591/09,28December2011). was successfullybefore theConstitutionalCourtandtheirasylumapplicationswere examined and therefore apotentialviolationofArt.3ECHRcouldnotbediscounted.Thefamiliesappeal had failedtoinvestigatewhethermedicaltreatment wouldbeaccessibletothechildinPoland 3 ECHRasthechild’s lifewasatriskinbeingtransferred toPoland.TheAustrianauthorities the ConstitutionalCourt.TheCourtruledthatAsylumdecisionwasinviolationofArt. authorities andAsylumCourtrefused theirappealsandtherefore anappealwassubmittedto on the basis that they failed to access medical treatment fortheirchildthere. The administrative to PolandundertheDublinRegulationinatakebackcase.Thefamilyclaimedtheyleft A ChechenfamilywithachildwhowasseverallyhandicappedinAustriawere duetobetransferred Availability ofmedicaltreatment inrequested MemberState *** asylum seekers’fundamentalrightsincludingrespect forhumandignity. must bebefore thesovereignty clauseisapplied. Thisshouldbeviewedinthecontextof Member State.However, incasesrelated tohealth,questionsremain astohow severe anillness the individualasylumseekersvulnerability and sometimesthesupportservicesinrequested practice showsthatexemptionsnowonlyoccurinnarrowly definedcircumstances dependingon health datafortheexclusivepurposeofprovision ofhealthcare isverymuchwelcomed. compromise texttooblige MemberStatessubjecttotheprincipleofconfidentialityexchange illnesses the person may have in advance of transfer. Therefore, the new provision in the Dublin recast failure ofsomeMemberStatestoeffectively inform thereceiving Stateofanymedicalconditionsor demonstrates thatcontinuityofcare withintheDublinprocedure isnotalwaysrespected duetothe 184 183 Seerecast Art.32ontheexchange ofheathdata before atransfer iscarried out. 182 181 180 Seeinparticular, Art.1andArt.3(1)Charter ofFundamental Rights. 179 and victimsoftrafficking. gathered atthenational level withrespect toothervulnerablegroups interalia LGBTIapplicants Apart from personsparticularly vulnerableonhealthgrounds, insufficient empiricaldatawas from theDublinRegulationforexamplepriorto2005Austriaoperatedsuchapolicy. the past,goodpracticeexistedwhereby traumatizedasylumseekerswouldbeipsofactoexempt cautious approach totheapplicationofDublinRegulationforthissubsetasylumseekers.In some Member States for vulnerable persons indicating that administrative authorities take a more forms ofpsychological,physicalandsexualviolence.Specificpoliciespracticesexistin being cancelledbutmayresult initbeingpostponedtillalaterstage. In theMemberStatesresearched vulnerabilitypersewillcommonlynotleadtoatransferdecision their medialtreatment inthereceiving MemberState. from TB continue to be transferred under the Dublin Regulation with no assurance of continuity of occur inEurope, alarge proportion ofthemamongmigrantsandyetstillasylumseekerssuffering example, theWorld HealthOrganization estimatesthatmore than400,000tuberculosis (TB)cases suffering from illnessesmayalsohavebroader healthimplicationsasamatterofpublicpolicy. For clause totakeoverresponsibility fortheexamination ofanasylumclaiminappropriate cases. this canonlybeguaranteedifMemberStatesalsoapplythesovereignty clauseand/orhumanitarian respecting thefundamental rightsofvulnerablepersonssubjecttotheDublinprocedure. However, The Dublinrecast compromise textwillgosomewaytosecuringMemberStatescompliancein groups undertheDublinRegulation. vco/Humantraffickingguidelines.pdf/Files/Humantraffickingguidelines.pdf depending onwhetherthey are identifiedasatrafficking victim,for furtherinformation see:http://www.victimsofcrimeoffice.ie/en/ cmhaff/23/23we04.htm. Itshould benoted thatinIreland trafficking victimsappearto notbesubject to theDublinRegulation from-dublin-ii-procedures-for-victims-of-trafficking/. Seealso:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/ Project, 30 April2008,accessible at:http://www.atlep.org.uk/policy-work-and-publications/publications-list/call-for-exception- exemption from DublinII procedures for victimsof Jointsubmission trafficking, withtheAIRECentre, Asylum Aid,ECPAT UKandPoppy that they should beexempted from its application onprotection grounds. For example, seeAnti-Trafficking LegalProject, Callfor refworld/docid/4ebba7852.html. Asregards trafficking victimssubjectto theDublinRegulation somenationalNGOs have advocated Asylum ClaimsRelated toOrientation Sexual andGenderIdentity inEurope, September 2011,accessible at:http://www.unhcr.org/ Fleeing Homophobiastudyundertaken by theVUUniversity of Amsterdam in2011,Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Fleeing Homophobia, This problem ofalackempirical data ontheexperience ofLGBTI asylum seekers intheDublinprocedure was alsonoted inthe travel to theresponsible MemberState onhealthgrounds for asignificant periodoftime. Member State, whereby responsibility isassigned to therequesting MemberState iftheasylum seeker/dependent person cannot In manyways thisisdirectly converse to theapproach underrecast Art.16for dependentasylum seekers/persons inarequesting timely communication regarding transferred TBpatients. TB care between countries should bedonethrough ashared updated list ofTBservices andnationalfocal points for effective and Regulation inorder to foster andsafeguard thecontinuity ofTBcare for asylum seekers. According to thetask force, continuum of the WHOEuropean region: a Wolfheze consensus statement, May 2012.Thetask force recommended anamendmentto theDublin World HealthOrganisation, Wolfheze Transborder Task Migration Force, Minimumpackagefor cross-border TBcontrol andcare in March 2011,accessible at:http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/returns/174.html ECRE Guidelinesonthetreatment ofChechenInternally Displaced Persons, Asylum Seekers and Refugees inEurope, Revised 184 Furtherresearch isnecessarytoexaminethespecialneedsofthese 181
180 Thetransferofpersons 182 Thisresearch also 179 Thecurrent 183 79 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 80 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings Recommendations respect totrafficking victimsandLGBTIasylumseekers. Further research shouldbeconductedontheapplication oftheDublinRegulationwith NGOs operatinginthefieldofasylum: to theactualtransfer theresponsible Member State.Giventhestructuralproblems anddire of the transfer decision, they often have to leave the reception facility where they are housed, prior accommodated withinthereception system.Inpracticehowever, onceasylumseekersare notified Similarly, inItaly, according tonationallegislation,thoseintheDublinprocedure are entitledtobe a reception centre untiltheyare takenintocustodyfortheDublintransfer. of four weeks accommodation in time ofservingtheinadmissibilitydecisioninNetherlands. Thoughthere isastandard period 187 Onspecialdispensation grounds thismay beextended byonemonththe French authorities. 186 185 of different accommodationfacilitiesasshowninAustria, Sometimes, the fact that the asylum seeker is within a Dublin procedure leads to the assignment a repeat Dublincase. being transferred underthe DublinRegulationwhocomebacktoapplyforasyluminAustria conditions forasylumseekerswhosubmitasubsequentapplicationwithinsixmonths of the righttoaccommodation. Similarly, in procedure followingirregular entryorstay, are grantedmore restricted rights,whichdonotinclude to such persons, however, the legislation then goes on to state that asylum seekers in a Dublin In the Netherlands. Reception ConditionsDirective asotherasylumseekers inAustria,Hungary,and Slovakia,Spain within theDublinprocedure generallyhaveaccesstothesameminimumstandards underthe seekers within the Dublin procedure to support services and accommodation. Asylum seekers There is divergent practice within the Member States as to the rights and entitlements of asylum 8.1.1. State andinthereceiving MemberStatewithinaDublinprocedure. is dividedintothetwodifferent phasesintheDublinprocedure principallyintherequesting Member apply tothosewithintheDublinprocedure. Thissectiononaccesstomaterialreception conditions recast compromise text, recast recital 11 confirms thattheReceptionConditionsDirective should contained withintheReceptionConditionsDirective. Inorder toaddress thisgapundertheDublin seekers undertheDublinprocedure are entitledtobenefitfrom theminimum reception conditions to aDublinprocedure. However, theCJEUinrecent caseofC-179/11hasclarifiedthatasylum The DublinRegulationdoesnotcontainanyrulesonaccesstoreception conditionsforthosesubject 8.1. ReceptionConditions VIII. ReceptionConditions&Detention the dateofnotificationDublintransferin France time asshowninthenationalpracticeofFrance andtheNetherlands.Thistimelimitvariesfrom Accommodation facilitiesforasylumseekerssubject toaDublinprocedure mayalsobelimitedin immigration detentioncentres forforeign nationals. procedure. Pending the construction of these transit centres, asylumseekers were detained in Bulgaria establishedspecifictransitcentres foraccommodatingasylumseekersintheDublin Bulgaria nationallegislationexplicitlystatesthattheReceptionConditionsDirective isapplicable Dublin cases. In Switzerlandthisisonly inrelation to repeat asylum applications involving theapplication oftheDublinRegulation i.e.repeat to thoseasylum seekers havingtheirclaimexamined onthe merits. This isalways thecase inAustria where asylum seekers in theadmissibility procedure are assigned different reception facilities Member State Reception conditionspendingtransferintherequesting the Netherlands, in practice, asylum seekers generally remain in Austria, there maybe a restriction onaccess to reception 187 orastandard fourweekperiodfrom the 185 Switzerland 186
and Bulgaria. In2012, i.e. in 81 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 82 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings allowance. In thepast,asylumseekerssubjecttoDublinprocedure didnotreceive a temporary tide-over accommodation forthem.However, thePrefectures donotalwaysexecutethese Courtdecisions. to accommodationbefore anadministrative judge whofrequently orders thePrefecture tofind many becominghomeless.SomeasylumseekerswiththesupportofNGOscanasserttheirright are ofteninsufficient in regions where there are large numbersofasylumseekerswhich results in in decision. Inpractice,accesstoaccommodationforasylumseekersundertheDublinprocedure as reported above,thisaccommodation is onlyavailableupuntil thenotificationoftransfer procedure inFranceare supposedtohaveaccessemergency accommodationfacilities.However, Based oncircular 18December2009andcircular 24May2011,asylumseekersundertheDublin homeless pendingtransfertoanothercountry. in The qualityofreception conditions variesaccording todifferent regions ofthecountryasreported urgent healthcare needs. in theDublinprocedure inSlovakia only haveaccesstoemergency healthcare three monthsafterarrival.Incontrast, asylumseekers under theDublinprocedure havenoaccesstouniversalhealthcare coverage(CMU)inFranceand facilities, accesstofoodandclothingisonlypossiblethrough charitiesinFrance.Asylumseekers estimated toliveinthesesettlements. settlements themselvesinmetropolitan areas. Forexample,inRomeupto1,200-1500personsare accommodation placeshasledtoasylumseekersandmigrantsresorting toorganising make-shift systems runbytheCivilProtection serviceforemergency purposes.Despitethis,thelackof a commonproblem inItaly and Greece. InItaly,thishasledtothecreation ofparallelreception 192 191 190 InSwitzerlandthisiswithregard to temporarily opened centres dueto ashortage ofaccommodation places in2011and2012. 189 188 Atemporary tide-over allowance isamonetary allowance ofapproximately €11Euros perday per adult. In reception conditions in regular reception centres, but insteadwillonlyreceive emergency assistance(averybasicplaceto a restriction onreception conditionsfortheseasylumseekers.Theywillnotbeaccommodatedin As regards repeat Dublincases, thenewpolicyinSwitzerland traumatized asylumseekers. However itcontinuestobeusedandisclearly notsuitableaccommodationforfamiliesand/or of asylumseekersinarmybunkerswassupposedtobeaninterimmeasure forafewmonths. was openedasanemergency sheltertoprovide additionalplacesduringtheshortage.Theplacing to spendthenightinanemergency shelterorevenoutdoors.Inresponse tothis,anarmybunker there have been a few reported incidents where asylum seekers in Basel were away and had turned has beenashortageofaccommodationplacesinSwitzerland.Thefederalcentres are full,and applicants intheDublinprocedure stillreceive notide-overallowance. receive thistide-overallowancebutthepracticeacross Franceisinconsistent.Forexample,inLyon, centres. Duetotherisein asylumapplicationsattheendof2011andbeginning2012, than thefederalreception centres. Theactualconditionsvarysignificantlybetweenthedifferent canton reception centre. Thesecentres normallyhavelessreporting restrictions andare smaller the Dublinprocedure takeslonger, theywillbeassignedtoaregional cantonandtransferred toa reception centres near the border. They are entitled to stay there for a maximum of 90 days. If Austria, France,Italyand France oftenremains uncertainandvariesaccording totheregions. Thereception capacities Switzerland http://www.bfm.admin.ch/content/bfm/fr/home/dokumentation/zahlen_und_fakten/asylstatistik.html. in thefirst quarter of2011,seeyearly andquarterly asylum statistics by theFOM, accessible at: compared to 15’567in2010.7’150new asylum applications were alsosubmitted inthefirst quarter of2012compared to 4’371 As regards theincrease inasylum applications inSwitzerlandnote thatin201122’551new asylum applications were submitted http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/q_PUBLIKATIONEN/2011/Italyreport_en_web_ENDVERSION.pdf ASYL TheLivingConditionsof Refugees inItaly, Areport by MariaBethke andDominik Bender,February 2011,accessible at: For further information seeNew York Times,InItaly, Shantytowns of Refugees Reflect Paradox onAsylum, 2January2013.AlsoPRO ruling inC-179/11. It should alsobenoted thattheNovember 2009circular regarding thetide-over allowance hasnotbeenamended since theCJEU 188 SincetheCourtrulinginC-179/11,manyasylumseekersDublinprocedure asylum seekersintheDublinprocedure are mainlyaccommodatedinfive federal Greece Switzerland. for all asylum seekers, most persons in the Dublin procedure are left receive thesamemedicalcare asotherapplicants i.e.onlyfor 191 190 Thelackandshortageofaccommodationplacesis introduced inApril2012envisages 189 Asregards otherreception 192 there national policy. 193 oftheSlovakRepublic…”. the territory to returned oftheSlovakRepublicandwere pocket moneyiftheyhavevoluntarilylefttheterritory asylum seekers.Art.22(8)c)oftheAsylumActstates:“Theapplicantshallnotbeentitledtoany absconded When anasylumseekerisreturnedundertheDublinRegulationtoSlovakiahavingpreviously for amaximumlengthofsixmonthsuptooneyear. place tostay. Asylumseekersare entitledtobeaccommodatedinCARAorSPRARcentres inItaly seekers oftenfindthemselveswithoutaccommodationunlessthey receive NGOs’supporttofinda protection request, whichcantakeseveralmonths.Therefore, duringthisinterimperiod,asylum immediate sincesuchservicesare onlyaccessibleaftertheformalregistration oftheinternational Upon transfertoItaly, accesstoreception conditions,includingaccommodation,isnotalways not haveaccesstofree legalassistanceandthereception conditionscanbeproblematic. who are not held in detention are placed in the community shelter in Balassagyarmat where they do examined, theyare notentitledtothesamereception servicesasotherasylumseekers.Returnees person hastosubmitasubsequentasylumapplication,evenifhis/herfirstonewasnotsubstantively there thentheyare entitled tothesame reception conditions asotherasylumseekers.However, ifthe If anasylumseekerhasneverappliedforinHungarybefore whentheyhavebeentransferred are formallyadmittedintotheasylumprocedure. under the Dublin Regulation, no reception rights are explicitly provided to Dublinreturnees until they support servicesandaccommodationasotherasylumseekers.ForthosereturnedtoBulgaria Upon transfertotheresponsible MemberState,asylumseekersshouldbeentitledtothesame 8.1.2. ReceptionconditionsintheresponsibleMemberState minimal financialassistanceforfoodorvouchers). sleep, ofteninmilitarybunkersandonlyaccessibleduringthenightprovided withvery year. to Italyand4,645asylumseekerswere transferred toItalyundertheDublinRegulationthat system canonlyaccommodate3,000people.Inaddition,13,715incomingrequests were sent Italy: In2011,Italianauthoritiesreceived 37,350asylumapplicationswhilsttheSPRARreception National Fact: by thisallowance. Switzerland, anditmust cover everything needed,soinaddition to food, hygiene products andotherexpenses must alsobecovered amounts are sometimesabit higher where there isnopossibility to cook. Itisvery little money considering thehighcost oflivingin regards financialassistance, itisvery low, approximately 10Swiss Francs perday (=8.33EUR).Itvaries from canton to canton, and In somereception facilities there are cooking apparatus and utensils, however inotherreception facilities this isnotavailable. As and beentakenbackhe/sheshallbedeprivedofamonetaryallowancegrantedtoall 193 Vulnerable groups are exemptfrom this 83 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 84 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 196 For furtherinformation thenationalreports are available atwww.dublin-project.eu 195 COM(2007) 299final,6.6.2007(‘Commission 2007 Evaluation Report’). (EC) Report from theCommission to theEuropean Parliament andtheCouncilonevaluation oftheDublinsystem, SEC(2007)742, of theDublinIIRegulation inEurope, March 2006;UNHCRTheDublinIIRegulation: AUNHCRDiscussion Paper, April2006.Commission 194 Theuseofdetention intheDublinprocedure was alsohighlighted in thefollowing reports: ECRE/ELENAReport ontheApplication also documentthelegalguaranteesavailablefor those detainedpursuanttotheDublinRegulation. focuses on the use of detention for the purpose of a Dublin transfer. However, the national reports whilst thepersonisinaDublinprocedure dependingontheMemberState.Thissectionspecifically purpose ofcarryingoutDublintransfers,oritmay beappliedonotherimmigration-related grounds According tonationallaw detentionintheDublinprocedure maybeinvokedspecificallyforthe 4 3 2 1 Table 2:DetentionandtheApplicationofDublinRegulation procedure. the increasing resort tocustodialmeasures and/ordetentionforthosesubjecttotheDublin and detention,overthepastnumberofyearsECRE,UNHCRotherorganisations havenoted Although there isnospecificprovision withintheDublin Regulationin relation tocustodialmeasures 8.2. Detention them from abscondingbefore thetransferiscarriedout. frequently use custodial measures onpersonssubjecttoatransferdecisioninorder toprevent States included in the scope of this research project. Nonetheless, it is clear that Member States within theDublinprocedure, duetothefactthatnocomparabledatawasavailablefrom theMember It wasnotpossibletogatherinformationonthe estimatednumberofpeoplesubjecttodetention proportional, ifotherlesscoercive measures alternative cannotbeappliedeffectively. absconding, ascertainedonthebasisofanindividualassessment,andonlyinsofarasdetentionis States todetainpersonsinorder tosecure transfer procedures whenthere isasignificantriskof and specific(short)timelimitswhenapersonisdetainedpriortotransfer. ItonlyallowsMember on detention(recast Art.28)forthepurposeoftransfers.Itaimstoprovide procedural safeguards The Netherlands Switzerland Spain Slovakia Italy Hungary Greece Germany France Austria Member State Bulgaria Procedure Decree. In Italy there isanexplicit prohibition to detaining unaccompanied children intheDublinprocedure according to Art.26(6)oftheItalian seekers wholook clearly underage are detained inHungary. Theageofsuchpersons may bedisputed. It isspecifically prohibited inHungarianlawto detain unaccompanied children. However, instances have occurred whereby asylum Helsinki Committee hasrecorded adecrease inthenumberofsuchasylum seekers detained there. Up untilrecently, asylum seekers were frequently detained upontransfer to Hungary. However, since November 2012theHungarian different authorities,butreference ismade to eachoftheseprocedures inthenationallegislation. procedure. However, thedecisionwhetherto detain someoneismadebytheforeigners police. Sothere are different legal acts and regulated intheForeigners police lawwhichrefers to thesteps oftheDublinprocedure. Theasylum authoritiesconduct theDublin On aformal level inAustria, detention itisnotapartoftheDublinprocedure (whichisregulated intheasylum law).Detention is subject to theprinciple ofnecessity as well asproportionality. Recast recital 20alsostates thatthedetention ofapplicants must beinaccordance withArt.31ofthe 1951Refugee Convention and 194 Forthisreason, intheDublinrecast compromise text,there isaspecificprovision YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES Dublin Procedure Detention appliedaspartofthe YES 2 1 NO YES NO NO NO YES NO children intheDublinprocedure Detention ofunaccompanied NO - - YES 4 3 195 196
responsible Member State within the Dublin procedure” (unofficial MemberStatewithintheDublin procedure” responsible translation). fromdetentiontothe directly achieve detentionpendingdeportationandtotransfer theforeigner totheborderpolice(…).Theaimis forasylumshouldbeaddressed thathisrequest informed from detentionoranappointedattorney, shouldbe Theforeigner shouldnotbeconsidered. which, if applicable, is submitted initiated, the asylum application of a foreigner Member State are againstanother takechargeorbackprocedures (…)andwhere intheborder area illegal entry caughtattheborderorafter nationalsare intended. Itstated,“Incasesinwhichthirdcountry the Interiorfrom 3March 2006alsoshowsthatdetentionwithintheDublinprocedure ispolitically is required by law to order the detention with some exceptions. A decree of the Federal Ministry of In Member State. centre inRotterdam underimmigrationdetentionjustbefore theactualtransferstoresponsible Dublin applicantsare generally detainedforamaximumoffiveworkingdaysatthedeportation order ornationalsecurity. Detentionmaybenecessaryifthere isademonstrableriskofabsconding. immigration detention if there is a reasonable prospect of removal and/or if itis required for public face lengthier detention. Those persons located within Asylum seekersmaybedetainedthere untilthetransfertoanotherMemberStateandtherefore territory. Border detentionisenforced atSchipolAirport ApplicationCentre (Aanmeldcentrum,AC). airportorifhe/shewasfoundonthe on whethertheasylumseekerarrivedataninternational In instances whenpersonsclearlyunderagehavebeendetainedinHungary. Nevertheless, according totheHungarianHelsinki Committee’s experiencethere havebeen when theyare clearlyrecognized aschildren inFrance, the agesof15-18yearsold).There isaprohibition onthedetentionofunaccompaniedchildren Unaccompanied children maybedetainedinAustria 197 and children, encouragingtheuseofhousearrest and/orconfinementinstead. authorities inFranceindicatingthatrestrictions shouldbeputinplaceforthedetentionoffamilies circularthe family for custodial purposes. An internal was issued inJuly 2012 by the administrative instead of being detained, under-which circumstances often, the father would be separated from a newprocedure wasestablishedsothatwholefamilies maywaitinapartmentspendingremoval been someimprovements to thisdetrimentalpracticeinbothMember States.In2010,inAustria, beforeFrance forfamiliestobeputindetentionthemorning beingtransferred. However, there have In responsibility whenenforcement ofthetransferisimminent. may beappliedpriortoaDublintransferdecisionorafternotificationofanotherMemberState’s almost systematicduringthe24hourspreceding aDublintransfer. InSwitzerland,detention stage whenitappearslikelythatanotherMemberStateisresponsible. InAustria,detentionis grounds are, notonlylimitedtowhenatransferorder isissued,butalsoapplyintheinadmissibility number ofgrounds underwhichsomeonemaybedetainedwithintheDublinprocedure. The In Member Statesare detainedrespectively forthree tofivedayspriortransfer. in and irregularly isalsousedasaground forfurtherdetention asshowninthepracticeofAustria,Bulgaria Member State. Sometimes, the fact that the person previously absconded or entered the country In themajorityofMemberStatesdetentionisusedtotransferasylumseekersresponsible the Netherlandsbothborder detentionand/orimmigrationcustodycan beapplicabledepending Austria France andtheNetherlands.Onaverage,asylumseekerswithinDublinprocedure inthose Germany, the Police authorities are required to apply for detention before the Courts as a judge Austria, under§76oftheForeigners PoliceAct(Fremdenpolizeigesetz) there are anextensive même code NOR:INT/K/12/07283/3. L.561-2 duCESEDA enalternative auplacement desfamilles enrétention administrative surle fondement del’article L.551-1du Circulaire duministère del’Intérieur du6juillet 2012relative àlamiseenœuvre del’assignation àrésidence prévue àl’article the Netherlands. and France, familiesmaybedetainedwithintheDublinprocedure . Itisnotuncommonin Detention is systematically applied immediately priortothe Dublin transfer and Hungary, SlovakiaandtheNetherlands. the Netherlands may also be subject to Switzerland (onlyforchildren between 197
85 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 86 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings practical reasons afewdayspriortotransfer. seekers isnotcommonpractice,butNGOshavemonitored caseswhere detentionwasappliedfor 202 201 200 199 Seehttp://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-interior/news/the-ministry-of-interior-s-response-to-unhcr-s-note-on-asylum-seekers 198 Spain Asylum seekerssubjecttotransfersotherMemberStatesare notdetainedinGreece, Italy and Until relatively recently, detentionwastheruleratherthanexceptioninHungary. that thenumberofasylumseekersdetainedinHungaryhassignificantlydeclined2012. procedure are beingaccommodatedthere asopposedtobeingdetained.UNHCRhasalsonoted in Debrecen alsoobservedthatanincreasing number ofasylumseekersreturned undertheDublin living conditions.AHungarianHelsinkiCommittee’s lawyerwhoworksinanopenreception centre the Dublinprocedure shouldbeaccommodatedin openreception facilitiesandprovided withbasic The OIN stated that during the asylum procedure as a general rule asylum seekers transferred under revisedgovernment itsdetentionpracticeregarding thosereturned undertheDublinRegulation. actually takes place. In October2012according to a press statementfrom the OIN the Hungarian transfer. Thisdetentionperiodcannotbelongerthan72hoursinorder toensure thatthetransfer in aDublinprocedure underArt.49(5)AsylumActproviding fordetentionpriortotheapplicant’s general immigration grounds fordetention, there is also aspecificdetentionprovision forthose order toprocess andchecktheirfingerprints.The legality ofthisdetentionhasbeenquestioned. the Dublin Regulation and whoapply for asylum the firsttime are detainedforashortperiodin
38Sp/12/2011, 22November2011). Dublin Regulation(RegionalCourtofTrnava, XXv. theDepartmentofForeign PoliceBratislava, applicant hadbeendetainedforthepurposeofremoval toNigeriaandnotinaccordance withthe of theapplicant’s detentionaftertheDublinprocedure wasinitiatedillegalbecausethe appeal theRegionalCourtofTrnava ordered hisrelease onthegrounds thatthecontinuation Regulation. Hisremoval to Nigeriawasstoppedbuthenotreleased from detention.Upon that hewasanasylumseekerinAustriaandacceptedtotakehimbackundertheDublin detention and subsequent removal to Nigeria. One week later the Austrian authorities confirmed confirm thatthepersonwasanasylumseekerandSlovakauthoritiesissuedadecisiononhis to thepolice.Hestated that hewasanasylum seekerinAustria.TheAustrianauthoritiesdidnot a traveldocumentandanAustrianresidence permitbelongingtohisfriend,whichhereported In September2011,aNigerianpersonwasarrested atBratislavaairport,Slovakia.Hesubmitted Purpose ofDetention Jurisprudence page/project-airport-eleftherios-venizelos Regulation, (22February –14April2010),First ConclusionsandRecommendations, accessible at:http://www.aitima.gr/?q=en/en/ AITIMA Programme for theProvision of Legal andSocialSupportto Asylum Seekers Transferred to Greece underDublinII and 38Sp/23/2012. decisions ondetention for example seeDecisionno.38Sp/24/2012from 7August 2012oftheRegional CourtinTrnava 38Sp/25/2012 asylum applications there andbefore theactualDublinprocedure was initiated. However, thusfar theCourthascancelled such for thepurposesofaDublintransfer just basedonfingerprintdata found in theEurodac system onthesame day they lodged Recent practice inthesecond halfof2012was alsomonitored by NGOs inSlovakia whereby third country nationalswere detained http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/50d1d13e2.pdf UNHCR Note onDublintransfers to Hungaryofpeople whohave transited through Serbia–update, December 2012,accessible at: 2011, accessible at:http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Access-to-protection-jeopardised-FINAL1.pdf Helsinki Committee, “Access to Protection Jeopardized: Information note onthetreatment of Dublinreturnees,” inHungary December documents/unhcr-handbooks-recommendations-and-guidelines/hungary-as-a-country-of-asylum-2012.html andHungarian asylum-seekers andrefugees inHungary, April2012,accessible at:http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/pdf/resources/legal- under theDublinprocedure. For furtherinformation asacountry of seeUNHCRHungary asylum , Observations onthesituation of Section 55(1)oftheThird CountryNationalsActsets outthegrounds for detention inorder to secure anexpulsion oratransfer prior to their transfer to another Member State. Similarly, in 201 *** Asylumseekerswhoare returned toGreece under Slovakia, detention of asylum 198 Apartfrom 200 202 199
measures alsohasnegative consequencesontheirmentalhealth. Asylum seekersasagroup are inherently vulnerableindetentionandthe useofsuchcustodial harsh impactofdetentiononasylumseekersanditslong-termeffects cannotbeunderestimated. to the responsible Member State under the Dublin Regulation but this comes at a humancost. The research. From theperspectiveofMemberStatesdetentionisanimportant tooltosecure transfer An increasing trend towards detainingapplicantsintheDublinprocedure isapparent from this receive theminimumstandards ofreception conditionsasoutlinedinthatDirective. C-179/11. NationalimplementationofthatCourtrulingwillbekeyinensuringallasylumseekers confirmed thattheReceptionConditionsDirective isapplicableduringtheDublinprocedure in 206 205 204 203 law. Everyone isentitledtoabasicstandard oflivinginaccordancehumanrights withinternational asylum procedure andtoexercise his/herrighttoappealatransferdecision. rights, inparticulartherightforanasylumseekertosubmitclaimafairandefficient right toasylum.AspointedoutbyUNHCR,thedenialofreception conditionsmayinfringeother The issueof access toadequatereception conditions canalsohaveconsequencesforapplicants’ accommodation andsocialassistance. rights oftheirfamily members toabasicstandard oflivingincludingwithrespect tohealthcare, the rights of asylum seekers to pursue their asylum application, their human dignityand the compliance with Art. 16 Reception Conditions Directive but such sanctions should not jeopardize in reception centres with more limited support services. Formally this administrative action is in who previously claimedasylum,eitherbyproviding lessmonetaryallowanceorbyplacingthem isthefactthatsomeMemberStatespenalizereturnedasylumseekers Of particularconcern resources andcapacities. in meeting this protection gap and assisting destitute asylum seekers depending on their own transfer. InthemajorityofMemberStatesresearched NGOsandcharitiesplay aninvaluablerole are often granted fewer rights in terms of reception both pending and subsequent to a Dublin information gathered in this report mainly focuses on access to accommodation. Asylum seekers of access to reception conditions and the standard of the facilities and services provided. The people subjecttofewerentitlements.TheissueforapplicantsintheDublinprocedure isbothone where asylumseekersintheDublinprocedure are frequently treated asasecondarycategoryof the DublinsystemdepictsaEurope ofvaryingstandards ofreception facilitiesandsocialconditions or forthewholedurationofDublinprocedure (sixmonthsorlonger).Itisalmostsystematically procedure. The average length of detention varies significantly ranging from 24hours prior totravel Nine outoftheelevenMemberStatesresearched commonlyusedetentionaspartoftheDublin origin. detention maybecompoundedbythepossibilityofprevious arbitrarydetentioninthecountryof hinder thelong-termintegration prospects ofasylumseekers.Furthermore thenegativeeffects of the policies of Member States with respect to reception conditions. describe theirmental healthasbeingpoor while indetention.” june%202010_public_updated%20on%2012july10.pdf Seeinparticular, pg.69“ In thecase of “Dublin”asylum II seekers, 77percent 2010, accessible at:http://detention-in-europe.org/images/stories/DEVAS/jrs europe_becoming%20vulnerable%20in%20detention_ in Detention, CivilSocietyReport ontheDetention ofvulnerable asylum seekers andirregular migrants intheEuropean Union,June ECHR, M.S.S.v. Belgium andGreece, Application No.30696/09,21January2011paras 232and251;JRSEurope, Becoming vulnerable at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e37b5902.html UNHCR Statement onthereception conditions ofasylum-seekers undertheDublinprocedure, 1August 2011, C-179/11, accessible Reception ofAsylum Seekers, November 2001,accessible at:http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/143.html There may, however, be differentiation ofservices inorder to positively assist thosewithspecialneeds.SeeECREPosition onthe vom 18.7.2012,Absatz-Nr. (1-140). 2012; 1BVL 10;1BVL2/11; available at:http://www.bverfg.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-056en.html Zitierung:BVerfG, 1BvL10/10 Constitutional Courtdecisiononinhumanconditions for asylum seekers: GermanFederal Constitutional Court,Judgmentof18July (CCT 53/03)[2004] ZACC 7;2005(1)SA217(CC); available at:http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/7.html andtheGerman (Art.11(1) oftheCovenant); Seealso theConstitutional CourtofSouthAfrica, Port Elizabeth MunicipalityvVarious Occupiers – his control”; Office oftheHighCommissioner for HumanRights, CESCRGeneral CommentNo.4TheRightto Adequate Housing right to securityintheevent of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old ageorother incircumstances lackof livelihood beyond of himselfandofhealth andwell-being his family, includingfood, clothing, housing andmedical care andnecessary socialservices, andthe See for example Universal Declaration hastheright to onHuman Rights, astandard Article 25(1)“Everyone of livingadequate for the 203 Equally, respect fortheprinciplesofhumandignityandnon-discriminationshouldunderpin 206 204 Detentionhasthepotentialto Despite this, the operation of 205 TheCJEUhas 87 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 88 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings with duediligence,especiallyforthoseindetention. Member Stateshavethecapacitytoefficiently fulfillthe required administrativedutiesfortransfers week deadline.To prevent suchanoccurrence, itisvitalthattheadministrativeauthoritiesinall assigned merely because therequested administrativeauthoritycouldnotrespond withinthetwo and Statesbutthisshouldnotoccurtothedetrimentofdetainedapplicantifresponsibility is State responsible for examining an asylum application is in the interests of both asylum seekers increased resort tosuchcustodial measures. Aquickresolution to identifythe correct Member is not used as a method of fast-tracking the Dublin procedure, leadtoan which couldinturn to itsrequest inthecaseofdetention. the current DublinRegulation,whichallowsaMemberStatetoclaimurgency inreceiving areply detention issometimeswrongly usedsimplytoacceleratetheDublinprocedure underArt.17(2)of leading to a ‘two-tier’ Dublin system. As noted by the Commission in its 2008 impact assessment, of securingatransfer, itmaypotentiallyleadtodifferential treatment fordetainedDublinapplicants this provision havingthepositiveobjectiveofrestricting thedurationofdetentionforpurposes 212 211 210 209 208 207 in theDublinprocedure, thispracticeshouldbeabolishedimmediately. mind theinherent vulnerability ofasylumseekers.Asforthedetentionunaccompaniedchildren work. Nevertheless,ifdetentionisutilized,itshouldbefortheshortesttimepossiblebearing in basis, asameasure oflastresort where non-custodialmeasures havebeendemonstratednotto affected by this policy of detention. Member States should onlyuse detention on anexceptional to detentionwithintheDublinprocedure soitisnotpossibletoestimatejusthowmanypeopleare Currentlyissue of concern. no empirical data is available on the number of asylum seekers subject national level, theCommissionwithsupport of NGOSshouldcarefully monitoritsuseasapriority Given theharmfuleffects ofdetention,uponapplicationtherecast DublinRegulationatthe purpose ofatransfer(RecastArt.28). applicants, the Dublin recast compromise text introduces a specific provision ondetentionforthe Whereas the current Dublin Regulation contains no provisions dealing with the detention of Dublin including theirabilitytocontactalawyerlodgean appealwhere necessary. asylum seekerisdetainedmayalsohindertohis/heraccessjusticeandjudicialprotection, used immediatelypriortotransferinthemajorityofMemberStatessurveyed.Thefactthatan deadline will lead to the acceptance of responsibility by that Member State by default. States bydefault. the perverse effect of increased use of detention in order to shift responsibility to other Member detained intheDublinprocedure butItsrole inassigningMemberStateresponsibility mayhave clarity onthegrounds, limitsandprocedural guarantees toberespected whenasylumseekersare Member StateswillcontinuetodetainasylumseekersintheDublinsystem.RecastArt.28provides text are aimedatreducing theriskofarbitrarydetention. However, remain seriousconcerns that held to beunlawful.Greece was held to beinviolationofECHRfor its failure to consider thebest interests ofthechild. See for example ECHR,Rahimi vGreece, Application No.8687/08,5April2011.Inthatcase for achild even two days indetention was retained withintheDublinrecast compromise text. obligations arisingundertheDublin Regulation have thenecessary resources for carrying outtheir tasks. Thisprovision is also Article 22(1)ofthe DublinRegulation requires MemberStates to ensure thatthoseauthoritiesresponsible for fulfillingthe Assessment, SEC(2008)2962, 3.12.2008.p.13.(‘ImpactAssessment Paper’), p.18. for international protection lodged inoneoftheMemberStates byathird-country nationalorastateless person (recast), Impact Council establishing thecriteria andmechanismsfor determining theMemberState responsible for examining anapplication See Commission staff working documentaccompanying theproposal for aRegulation of the European Parliament andofthe person, includingtheobligation to provide for proper.” arrangements for arrival reply periodshallbetantamount to accepting withinatwo-week therequest andshallentail theobligation to take charge ortake backthe this Regulation shallaskfor anurgent reply reply insuchcases. Such weeks withintwo of receipt shallbegiven of therequest. Failure to request shallnot exceed onemonth from then lodging of theapplication. TheMemberState outtheprocedure carrying inaccordance with Recast Art.28(3)alsostates “Whenaperson isdetained pursuant to theperiodfor thisArticle, submittingatake charge ortake back guarantees indetention recast Art.28(4)provides thatrecast Article 9,10and11oftheReception ConditionsDirective shallapply. is proportional andother less coercive alternative measures cannot beappliedeffectively”. Asregards theconditions andprocedural to secure procedures transfer inaccordance withthisRegulation, onthebasisof anindividualassessment andonly insofarasdetention Recast Art.28(2)states that“Whenthere isasignificant riskof absconding, MemberStates may detain theperson concerned inorder aperiod aspossibleshort andsubjectto theprinciples of necessity andproportionality“. Recast Recital 20isalsoofrelevance asitreflects theprinciples ofECHRjurisprudence providing that“detention should befor as 208 Thefailure ofarequested MemberStatetospeedilyrespond withinatwoweek 207 210 Theproposed safeguards intheDublinrecast compromise Itisimperativethatunderthenewrecast rules,detention 211
212 209 Despite Recommendations of EASO,takingintoaccountallavailablesources, includingUNHCRandNGOs. Dublin procedure shouldbe prioritised by the European Commission withthe support Monitoring nationalpracticesonthereception anddetentionofasylumseekersinthe the Dublinprocedure. ensure equivalentstandards ofreception conditionsforallasylumseekersincludingin Immediate stepsmustbetakentoimplementtheCJEUCourtrulingofC-179/11and European Commission Member States 89 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 90 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings must beinahumanemannerwithfullrespect forfundamentalrightsandhuman dignity. Member Statesensure thatiftransfersare carriedoutbysuperviseddeparture orunderescort,it 213 Recast Recital 24oftheDublinRegulation. Applicants maybeaccompanied ontheflightsarrangedinSwitzerland foroutgoingtransfers only informedofthedate andtimeoftheflight required togothe airport byhimself/herself. seeker, he/sheiseither taken totheairport by cantonalpolice, andaccompaniedontotheplane,or cantons andtheindividual circumstances ofthecase.Dependingoncooperation oftheasylum Similarly, inSwitzerland,themannerandmethodoftransfervariesaccording tothedifferent the applicantassoontransferorder isnotifiedtothemandonly conductforced transfers. the asylum seeker to travel voluntarily to the responsible Member State whilst others apprehend In has beenconfirmedwiththeasylumseeker. Dublin Regulationiscompletedoncethecorrect MemberStatehasbeenidentified and responsibility transfers are specificallyusedinSpain removal inBulgaria,SpainandGreece andtheysometimescanoccurinHungary.Onlyvoluntary in Transfers byforce are predominantly usedtoexecuteremovals pursuanttotheDublinRegulation 9.1.2. Transfer methodsandmodalities Member State,followingnotificationoftransferdecisions bytheFOM. cantonal authoritiesinSwitzerlandare responsible forexecutingthetransfertoresponsible and hand them over to the DT & V to conduct the transfer to the responsible Member State. The responsible Member State.IntheNetherlands,immigrationpolicedetainDublinapplicants co-ordinates the arrangements for transfer whilst the Police actually undertake the transfer to the responsible forundertaking transfersundertheDublinRegulation.InHungary,unit In themajorityofMemberStatesresearched immigrationauthoritiesand/orborder policeare 9.1.1. Responsibleauthorities transfersonhumanitariangrounds’. regards caselawinparticular as of thechildandtakingutmostaccountdevelopmentsinrelevant for human dignity,compliance with fundamental rights and respect as well as the best interests undertakeninahumanemanner, orescortedtransfersare ensuring ‘…thatsupervised infull transfers undertheDublinRegulation by providing adequateinformation totheapplicantand the procedure. In accordance with recast recital 24 Member States should promote voluntary transfers whilstalsoensuringthatthefundamentalrightsofasylumseekersare safeguarded during compromise textintroduces anumberofprovisions aimedatimproving theefficiency ofDublin should transfersfollowanacceptancebydefaultundertheDublinRegulation.Therecast arrangements andco-operationfortransfers,postponeddelayedtransfersguidelines State. ChapterIIIoftheImplementingRegulationcontainsanumberprovisions onpractical with thenationallawofrequesting MemberState,afterconsultationwiththereceiving Member Art. 19(3)and20(1)(d)bothstipulatethatDublintransfersshallbecarriedoutinaccordance 9.1. Transfer Procedures IX. Austria, SwitzerlandandGermany. Bycomparison,voluntarytransfersare themainmethodof France, there isdivergent practiceacross thedifferent Prefectures. SomePrefectures allow Of TheDublinRegulation Practical AspectsOfTheApplication as theSpanishauthoritiesconsiderthattheirduty underthe 213
Recast Art.29alsorequires inmandatorytermsthat place within that time period.Normally the applicant isdetainedand the DT&Varranges a flight a termof28daystoleavethecountry. Nevertheless, enforced Dublintransfers sometimestake After atransfernoticeisissuedtotheasylumseeker intheNetherlandstheyare generallygiven State attheborder. directlyauthority handsoverthepersonconcerned totheauthoritiesofresponsible Member seeker and/orhis/herconduct.Asregards overlandtransfersfrom Hungary,thecompetentpolice ontheplane.Theymaytravelunderescortdependingageofasylum person concerned In national administration. delays bytheGreek authorities takingintoaccountthefinancialdifficulties besetbythe Greek from present inotherMember States.However, itmustbe notedthatthecostofoutgoingtransfers place onavoluntarybasis,astheasylumseekerusuallywantstoreunite withfamilymembers by plane,busorpolicecarunderescort.InGreece transferstootherMemberStatestake responsible MemberState andthenumberofpersonsbeingtransferred, thetransfertakesplace applicant isbrought toa detention centre foronetotwodayspriortransfer. Dependingonthe arrive attheasylumseekers’residenceandapprehend veryearlyinthemorning him/her. The In thecaseofaforced transfer from Austriatotheresponsible Member Statethepoliceusually Regulation hasbeenreimbursed totheGermanAliensAuthority. bythepersonconcerned significant periodoftimehaspassedandtheStatecostsprevious removal undertheDublin the visarequest. There-entry banmaybelimiteduponrequest butthisisconditional onwhethera be required toapplyforavisa.Ifthere-entry banisstillinforce, theGermanauthoritieswilldeny later stagesuchpersonswishtore-enter Germanyforfamilypurposesorotherreasons theywill in accordance withSection58AufenthG(Deportation-ResidenceActAufenthaltsgesetz).Ifata long-term implicationsforthoseDublinapplicantstransferred totheresponsible MemberState 214 re-entry banunderSection11AufenthG(ResidenceActAufenthaltsgesetz). in thatadeportation,removal orexpulsionfrom Germanymayleadtotheissuanceofanunlimited Asylum seekersremoved forGermanyundertheDublinRegulationmayfaceadditionaldifficulties voluntary transfersincasetheasylumseekerabscondsbefore theplannedtransfer. this bywayofvoluntarydeparture. TheFederalauthoritiesinGermanygenerallyopposetheuseof Even asylumseekerswhowishtotraveltheresponsible MemberStateare notallowedtodo practice removal is carried out under Section 57 (Removal) or Section 58 (Deportation) of that Act. (Aufenthaltsgesetz) there isnospecificprovision ontransfersundertheDublinRegulation,butin implemented immediately(§34aAsylVfG(AsylumProcedure Act)).IntheGermanResidenceAct do notprovide anyadvanceinformationtothepersonaboutplannedremoval anditmaybe Once anasylumseekerhasbeennotifiedofaDublintransferdecisioninGermany, handed overtotheborder officials. State isneartheborder withSwitzerland, State uponarrivaloraccompaniedflightsavailable.Ifthedestinationin responsible Member a laissez-passerandaninstructiontocontacttherelevant authoritiesintheresponsible Member Whenunaccompaniedflightsaredepending onthecaseconcerned. used,applicantsare given Hungary, if the transfer is by flight the competent police authority assists with boarding the section 1,sentence 7(official translation). of permission would constitute unduehardship. Sub-section1,sentence 8shall apply mutatis mutandisincases pursuant to sub- stipulated inaccordance withsub-section1,sentence 3,ifhisorherpresence isrequired for compelling reasons oriftherefusal 1, sentence 7,begranted temporary entrance into theFederal territory for ashortperiodpriorto expiry ofthe exclusion period exemptions from sentence 7inindividualcases. (2)By way ofexception, theforeigner may, except incases covered bysub-section crime against humanity, oronthebasisofadeportation order pursuant to Section58a.Thesupreme Landauthoritymay permit shall beappliedifaforeigner hasbeendeported from theFederal territory onaccount ofacrimeagainst peace, awar crimeora territory voluntarily andingoodtime.Thetimelimitbeginsupontheperson concerned leaving theFederal territory. Notimelimit to publicsafety orlawandorder. Thesettingofthetimelimitshalltake dueaccount ofwhether theforeigner hasleft theFederal exceed five years iftheforeigner hasbeenexpelled on thegrounds ofacriminalconviction orifhe sheposesaseriousdanger effects stated insentences 1and2onapplication. Thetimelimitshallbesetaccording to individualcase concerned andmay only even iftherequirements entitlinghimorherto atitle inaccordance withthisActare fulfilled. Timelimits shallbeappliedto the or deported shallnotbepermitted to re-enter orstay intheFederal territory. Heorsheshallnotbegranted aresidence title, Section 11AufenthG (Residence ActAufenthaltsgesetz) Banonentryandresidence (1)Aforeigner whohasbeenexpelled, removed Greece are usuallypaidforbythe asylumseekersthemselvestoavoidlengthyadministrative the asylumseekercanalsobedriventoborder and 214 Thiscanhave the authorities 91 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 92 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings travel documentsandpersonalluggageand,ifnecessary, afit-to-flystatement. whether theasylumseekerhasavalidflightticket,theirmoneyandotherpersonalbelongings, the circumstances ofacase.Whenanasylumseekeristransferred byplanetheDT&Vstaff check luggage checked. Dublin liaison officers may also make extra travel arrangements depending on has anappointmentwithaDT&Vofficial fordiscussingthetransferprocedure andhashis/her asylum seeker for transfer. During this preparation time, he/sheundergoes medical examinations, belongings theymayhavehadintheirpossessiononarrival.Three daysare spentpreparing the However, theDT&VwillholdtoaDublintransferandenforce itiftheasylumseekerconcerned towards voluntaryrepatriation ifitcantakeplacewithin30daysafterapplyingforrepatriation. 217 216 For further information onfit-to-fly statements intheDutch practice seechapter VIIofthisreport. 215 for voluntaryrepatriation includingafinancialcontribution. Officereturn to their country of origin, the International for Migration (hereafter IOM) may offer support In State. choose tovoluntaryreturn totheircountryoforiginratherthanbeingtransferred toanotherMember Switzerland bothhavespecificprocedures inplaceforpersonssubjecttotheDublinRegulation were beyond the scope of this research but require further consideration. instead of Dublin transfers to the responsible Member State. The reasons behind such practice Supplementary informationwasgathered ontheuseofvoluntaryrepatriation tothecountryoforigin 9.1.3. Voluntary oforigin returntothecountry is guaranteeduponarrivalintheresponsible MemberState. guardianship ofthechild. NIDOSalsoinvestigatesifaccommodationfortheunaccompaniedchild Member State.Thenewguardian mustdeclare inwritingthathe/sheiswillingtotakeover to anotherMemberStateNIDOSmusttransfertheguardianship toaguardian intheresponsible guardian canaccompany thechildtoborder. Itisimportanttonotethatifachildtransferred child. Inthecaseofchildren belowtheageof16, DT&VconsultswithNIDOStoseewhetherthe the responsible MemberState toarrangefortheassignmentofaguardian fortheunaccompanied flight. TheDutchauthorities rely onNIDOStocontactguardianship organisations/institutions in guardianship organisation NIDOS by letter about the preparations for transfer and the planned time toarrangeappropriate reception facilitiesandguardianship. Secondly, theDT&Vnotifies in contrasttofivedaysthe regular removal procedure. Thisgivesthe receiving MemberState advance andthereceiving MemberStateisnotifiedoftheplannedtransfertwoweeksinadvance children. Firstly, insteadofbookingtheflightfivedaysinadvance,aisbookedtwoweeks small children. Similarly, intheNetherlands,specialrulesapplyfortransferofunaccompanied on the individual circumstances of the case. In practice this is generally only applied with respect to other vulnerablepersonssubjecttoaDublintransfertheresponsible MemberStatedepending children undertheDublinRegulation.InSlovakiaaguardian mayaccompanysuchchildren and Some MemberStateshavespecialarrangementssetinplacefortransferringunaccompanied 9.1.2.1. Transfers ofunaccompaniedchildren seeker receives alaissez-passer to theresponsible MemberStatewithinfiveworkingdays.Onthedayoftransfer, theasylum the Netherlands,ifasylumseekerwithinDublinprocedure indicatesthattheywantto and Georgia. Seehttp://www.iom-nederland.nl/english/Programmes/Return_Reintegration (last accessed August 2012). within theDublinprocedure asofAugust 2012. The relief contribution hasalsobeenstopped for asylum seekers from Macedonia this procedure for asylum seekers from Belaruswhoarrived intheNetherlandsafter 16November 2011andfor Russian applicants excluded from receiving asubsistence allowance andreintegration grant due to alleged abuse. Recently, theDutch Minister halted child. Theasylum seeker may alsobeeligible for asupplementary reintegration contribution of€1750. Somenationalitiesare The financialcontribution offered by IOMamounts to aminimumof€200andmaximum of€500for anadultorunaccompanied arrival. by airplane,thelaissez-passer isgiven to theaircraft commander, whowillhandover thedocumentto theborder authoritiesupon seeker. Iftheasylum seeker travels undersupervision,thesupervisorwillkeep thelaissez-passer withthem.Whentransferred In cases where theasylum seeker travels independently to theresponsible country, thelaissez-passer isgiven directly to theasylum 215 andanyidentitydocumentand/ormoneyotherpersonal 217 DT&Vismore favourablydisposed The Netherlands 216 and 218 However theseguidelines are notpublicly available. heavy workloadandlarge amountofrequests from otherMemberStatescombinedwiththelimited frequently became responsibility for asylum applications by default. At that time this was due to the unable torespect allthetimelimitsforresponding toincomingrequests. ThisleadtoGreece In thepast,priorto generalsuspensionoftransferstoGreece , theGreek authoritieswere appear tobelargely compliedwithbyMemberStatesnotableexceptions. being complied with by Member States. Time limits for requests and transferring asylum seekers manner itwasdifficult fornationalpartnerstogatherdetailedinformation onwhethertimelimitsare administrative progressAs theinternal onDublincasesare notalwaysconductedinatransparent 9.2.1. Respectfortimelimits determination process willbecomemore efficient andrapid. with respect totakeback andtakecharges caseswiththeaimofensuringthatresponsibility within certaindeadlines.TheDublinrecast compromise textintroduces more explicitdeadlinesboth seekers, responding tosuch requests andeffectuating transferstotheresponsible MemberState 18 and19oftheDublinRegulationinrelation tomakingrequests totakecharge ortakebackasylum guarantee effective andefficient accesstoanasylumprocedure. Timelimitsare setoutinArt.17, to ensure thatasingleMember Stateisidentifiedas responsible asquicklypossibleinorder to Member Stateandinrelation toconductingtransfersthatMemberState.Theoverallobjectiveis The DublinRegulationsetsvarioustimelimitsduringtheprocess ofidentifyingtheresponsible 9.2. TimeLimits State. a personprefers toreturnhis/hercountryoforigininsteadreturningtheresponsible Member In in severalcountries. returned tohis/hercountryoforiginwithIOMbefore oriftheyhavearecord ofapplyingforasylum Rights. must respect therighttoasylumguaranteedbyMemberStatesunderCharterofFundamental country oforigin.ThoughformallyincompliancewithArt.3(3)theDublinRegulation,suchactions preferred togotheresponsible MemberStateundertheDublinRegulationasopposedtotheir to the responsible asylum seekers who would have Member State. These cases all concerned Regulation, andyetthecasewasfoundinadmissibleonothergrounds andnorequest wassent a Eurodac hitfrom anotherMemberStatewaspresent showingtheapplicabilityofDublin As anexample,aSwisslawyerhasreported recently comingacross anumberofcaseswhere decisions onthebasisofdifferent grounds toreturn theapplicantdirectly tothecountryoforigin. a numberofindividualcaseswhere theDublinRegulationisappropriate, appliedinadmissibility Recent practiceinSwitzerlandreveals acontrastingtrend whereby theSwissauthoritieshave,in or origininsteadofanotherMemberStateupuntilthree monthsbefore thetransferdeadlinelapses. Regulation. their countryoforiginwithIOMratherthanbesenttoanotherMemberStateundertheDublin files received bytheDT&V, 10-15%ofthesecasesinvolvedpersonswhovoluntarilyto returned The Netherlands:BetweenSeptember2011andApril2012,oftheDublinRegulationrelated National Fact: Switzerland theFOMhasproduced policyguidelinesforcantonalauthoritiessituationswhere 218 According to those guidelines, the cantonal authorities can organize returns to the country 93 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 94 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings lapsing ofdeadlines. agreesbe carriedoutiftheMemberStateconcerned totakebackasylumseekerdespite the had expired. TheSwiss Court confirmedinaleadingjudgment2010thattransferscouldstill receiving MemberStatestill agreed totakebackanasylumseekerdespitethefactthatdeadline by mostMemberStates.However, there maybeexceptions asshowninSwitzerland,where the general therequirement toacceptresponsibility pursuanttoanexpired timelimitisrespected Member Statebecomesdefacto If thetimelimitsexpire before theapplicantistransferred undertheDublinRegulation,requesting previous asylumapplication intheotherMemberState. and thenthecaseissimplydeclared asatakeback request eventhoughthere isnoevidenceofa charge requests are senttootherMemberStatesaftertherequired three monthsunderArt.17(1) responsible MemberState wasevensentout.Anotherreported problem in Germanyisthattake has beensubmitted.There are casesinwhichittookoverayearuntilrequest tothepotentially priority mattersinGermanyandare therefore oftenexaminedmonthsaftertheasylumapplication across Europe. Astakebackrequests are nottime-bound,thosecasesare notconsidered as despite thefactthatGermanDublinunitsare amongsomeofthemore staffed Dublinunits queries onthisissue,theDublinunitofficials explainedthatthisisoftenduetoheavyworkload Likewise, in whole process aprotracted onebefore aMemberStatefinallyexaminestheasylumapplication. in complexcases,there maybemore thanoneDublintransferdecisionandappealmakingthe Long delaysintheDublinprocedure are reported inAustriaandGermany.In,practice Regulation. response oftherequested MemberState.Thisis still withintherequired timelimitsintheDublin 221 220 219 InSpaintheadmissibility procedure isnormally only onemonth. informed as to the responsible Member State. Courts considerthesixmonthsdeadlinefortransfernotbindingifapplicanthasbeenproperly There havebeenanumber ofjudicialdecisionsregarding timelimitsinSpain , whereby theSpanish Member State,theadmissibilityprocedure inSpainmaybeextendedtotwomonths transfers. Ifarequest totakecharge ortakebackaDublinapplicanthasbeensenttoresponsible to otherMemberStatesfrom thenationalauthorities,whichmayhaveanimpactondeadlinesfor deadline underArt.19(3).InSpainthere are oftendelaysinthetransmissionofinformation requests Switzerland, althoughinFrancethere havebeensometransfersconductedbeyondthesix-month In generalthetimelimitssetoutinDublinRegulationare respected inFrance,Slovakiaand Dublin Regulationisapplicableinaparticularcase. take charge requests, forexample,duetodelaysbytheGreek policeinidentifyingwhetherthe generally respected bytheGreek Dublinunit.Nevertheless, sometimesdeadlinesare missedin capacity oftheGreek Dublinunit.Now, thetimeframesforsendingoutrequests from Greece are despite thefactthathis/herasylumclaimhasnot beensubstantivelyexamined. Netherlands, whichistreated asasubsequentasylumapplicationwithitsinherent limitations, However, mustthen formally lodgeanapplicationforasyluminthe theasylumseekerconcerned If thetransferdeadlinelapsesinNetherlands, itbecomesresponsible fortheasylumapplication. 20(2). the Regulation i.e. for reasons other than imprisonment and absconding underArt. 19(4) andArt. that sometimesMemberStatestrytoextendthetimelimitforreasons otherthanthatprovided in month deadlinehad lapsed. Colombian asylum seeker anddecidedto transfer herbackto Belgium undertheDublinRegulation despite thefact thatthesix- For example, NationalHighCourtrulingSAN937/2010appeal583/2009where theCourtdismissed theappealbrought bya download?decisionId=3b504784-5ac7-456d-92f3-aa1a45048719 Swiss Federal Administrative Court,BVGE 2010/27E-6525/2009,29June2010 accessible at:http://www.bvger.ch/publiws/ Germany, theDublin procedure can take several months if not longer. In response to 220 responsible andmustexamine his/herasylumapplication.In 221 Anotherissue evident from case law in Franceis 219 toawaitthe transport orthefactthat theasylum seekertransport from haswithdrawn procedure thetransfer .” either to anappealorreview procedure effect, withsuspensive orphysical reasons suchasillhealthof theasylum seeker, of non-availability 223 Article 9(1)Implementing Regulation states “TheMemberState responsible shall beinformed withoutdelay of any postponement due 222 Thisjudgmentisaccessible athttp://www.asyl.net/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/18463.pdf
(Hamburg AdministrativeCourt,Germany19AE173/11,11April2011). BAMF wasordered todeliverthedecisiontwoweeksbefore theplannedremoval toHungary clause”.The itselfthatisinvokingthesovereignty outtheasylumprocedure intention ofcarrying itsufficientlydemonstratesaclear totakechargeorbackprocedures, withregard measures months aftertheinterview, theFederalOfficeforMigrationandRefugeeshasnottakenany to theasylumprocedure withinareasonable period oftime.TheCourtstatedthat“Ifwithineight Court considered thatthedecisiverole oftheDublin Regulationisguaranteeingeffective access sovereignty clause,ifitisnotsolelyaimedatdeterminingtheresponsible MemberState.The that apersonalinterviewaboutfleeingandseekingasylummaybeinterpreted asinvokingthe longer beheldresponsible forexaminingtheasylumapplication.Thiswasongrounds interim relief (Eilrechtschutz) againsttheDublinremoval onthebasisthatHungaryshouldno under theDublinRegulationeightmonthslater. TheHamburg AdministrativeCourtgranted the BAMF. TheFederalOffice requested Hungarytotake responsibility forhisasylumapplication In Germany, anunaccompaniedchildwasinterviewedabouthisreasons forclaimingasylumby for theexaminationofanasylumclaim Lengthy delaysinprocessing outgoingrequests result intheassumptionofresponsibility other physicalreasons. Regulation does not have the legal effect of allowing the extension of time limits for transfer for is possibleunderArt19(4)andArt.20(2)oftheDublinRegulation.9(1)inImplementing accepted their appeal holding thatthere are onlytwogrounds inwhichtheextensionoftimelimit decision tobetransferred toPoland.Thefirstappealwas rejected however, theConseild’Etat extend thetimelimitfortransferonbasisofson’s illhealth.Thefamilyappealedthe then after August 2010 the French authorities informed the Polish authorities of the need to Poland. Theyhadaveryillson.PolandacceptedtotakethefamilybackinFebruary2010and A Russianfamilyrequested asyluminFrancehavingpreviously submittedanasylumclaimin Grounds fortheextension ofthetimelimitsunderArt.19(4)and20(2) the asylumdeterminationprocedure. significant caseinhighlightingtheobjectiveofDublinRegulationtoafford rapidaccessto stated thatanasylumseeker canrely uponanindividual provision oftheDublin Regulationifit been transferred canstillhaveapracticalandongoing interest toappealthe decision.TheCourt clarified thatanasylumseekerwho receives anegativeDublindecision andwhohasalready representative submittedanappealtotheFederalAdministrativeCourt.FirstlyCourt was notthecaseinthissituation.Theapplicants were thentransferred toItaly. Theirlegal Italy’s responsibility, aslong asthisdidnotviolatetheirfundamentalrights,holdingthat not deductanyindividualrightsfrom theDublinRegulationwithwhich theycouldchallenge take backrequest bydefaultdespitethelapsedtransferdeadline,andthat theapplicantscould months hadlapsed.TheFOMrejected therequest onthegrounds thatItalyhadacceptedthe reconsideration totheFOM,claimingchangedcircumstances sincethetransferdeadlineofsix inSwitzerland.Followingthat,theapplicantsmadearequestchild wassubsequentlyborn for transfer couldnotbecarriedoutasthemother’s pregnancy wasatanadvancedstage.Her the basisofItalianauthorities’tacitacceptanceatakebackrequest. Howevertheplanned previously beenpresent inItaly. TheFOMinSwitzerland issuedatransferdecisiontoItalyon The asylumapplicants,aSomalifamily, were registered onthebasisofEurodac dataashaving Transfer ofanapplicantafterprocedural deadlineshadlapsedunderArt.20(2) time limit(Conseild’Etat,FranceNo.343184,17September2010). this hastobewithinthesixmonthtimelimit.Suchreasons are nobasisforanextensionofthat Jurisprudence 223 TheCourtruledthatifatransferispostponedduetohealthreasons 222 Thisisaparticularly 95 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 96 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings authorities alsoapplyawideinterpretation ofabsconding.Apersonmaybedeemedtohave In months, forexample,where asylum seekershaveonlymissedoneappointmentattheiroffices. however, Prefectures interpret abscondingextremely broadly andhaveextendedtimelimitsto18 226 225 224 allocated tohim/herbyacertaintimeintheeveningorcasehe/shemissespresence check. often withoutrealizing itthemselves forexampleifhe/shedoesnotreturntothereception centre In ‘absconding’ relatively broadly, impactsthedeadlinesforDublintransfers. whichinturn asylum seekerabscondsbutadministrativeauthoritiesinAustria,GermanyandFranceinterpret Member Stateshavediscretion toextendthetimelimitsupmaximumof18monthsif months). Thisprovision ismaintainedwithintherecast Dublincompromise text(recast Art.29(2)). applicant cannotbetransferred duetoimprisonment(oneyear)orbecausehe/sheabsconded(18 Art. 19(4)and20(2)allowfortheextensionoftimelimitatransferonbasisthat asylum seekerhasabsconded 9.2.2. Extensionofthetimelimitfortransferonbasisthat authorities of the country responsible for their asylum request” (informaltranslation). fortheirasylumrequest” responsible authorities ofthecountry administrative authorities in order to delay the implementation of the decision to hand them over the “an asylumseekerabscondswhentheyintentionallyandsystematicallyeludecontrolbythe In Art. 19(4)and20(2)DublinRegulationbeingextendedfortransfers. as homelessinAustriaare alwaysconsidered tohaveabscondedwiththeresultant timelimitunder for transferisalmostimmediatelyextendedbytheAustrianauthorities.Asylumseekersregistered limited possibilitytobehousedinanaccommodationcentre again.Inthesecasesthetimelimits In suchsituationshe/shewillautomatically be removed from thereception centre andwillhave time limitshouldbeextendedandifsoforhow long. that theArt.20(2)provision entailsdiscretionary thequestionofwhether powersconcerning Dublin Regulation. The Administrative Court of Braunschweig criticised this approach and stated maximum amountoftimeitcanbeextendedto before thecessationof responsibility underthe despite thefactthatlengthoftimeisdiscretionary and18monthsisonlyidentifiedasthe Switzerland BVGE2010/27E-6525/2009,29June2010). for reconsideration. Theappealwasrejected. (Leading casebytheFederalAdministrativeCourt, presumption andtherefore theFOMhadbeenrightinrejecting theasylumapplicants’request should stillbeconsidered responsible. Theapplicantshadbrought nothingforward torefute this be assumedthattheotherMemberStatestillassumesresponsibility theninthiscaseItaly hand, ifthepersonhasalready beentransferred andifaccording tothecircumstances itcan the responsibility forhis/herasylumapplicationhastransferred toSwitzerland.Ontheother person isstillinSwitzerlandandthetransferdeadlinehaslapsed,thenhe/shecanclaimthat time. Therefore theasylumapplicantshadarightto rely ontheseprovisions. Itheldthatifthe asylum seekeri.e.therighttoanexaminationofclaimwithinareasonable periodof Art. 19(4),20(1)(d)and20(2).Furthermore theseprovisions aimatprotecting therightsof Court heldthatthefollowingprovisions undertheDublinRegulationwere sufficiently defined the authoritiesapplyinglawandaimsatprotecting therightsofasylumseeker. The is self-executing.Thisthecaseifprovision issufficiently definedandclear, ifitaddresses France, thenotionofabscondinghasbeendefinedthrough theCourt’s jurisprudenceasfollows Germany, Austria, anasylumseekermaybedeemed to have abscondedbytheadministrativeauthorities upload/dokumente/18899.pdf Braunschweig Administrative court, decisionof9August 2011,2B196/11,accessible at:http://www.asyl.net/fileadmin/user_ Application durèglement CEn° 343/2003duConseil18février 2003 ditrèglement Dublin. Conseil d’Etat No307401of17July 2007.Thisjurisprudentialapproach hasalsobeenconfirmed intheApril 12011Circular: reception centre and thebarcode whichisonthegreen card willbescanned asevidence that the person concerned was present. about once every 48hours. Atthiscertain timeevery asylum seeker hasto be in his/herroom to confirm thathe/sheisstill inthe them whenthereception centre willcheckfor thepresence ofasylum seekers atthereception centre. Thischecktakes place A presence checkinAustria iscalled «Anwesenheitskontrolle.» Underthissystem theasylum seekers receive anote, which informs if a person absconds, the time limit is always extended to the maximum of18months 226 LiketheFrench Prefectures, theGerman 225 Inpractice, 224
227 Conseild’Etat, No.343807,25October 2010. State toinformtheresponsible MemberStatebutnottheindividualasylumseekerconcerned. transfer timelimitinaccordance withArt.20(2)oftheDublinRegulationrequires therequesting Member the DublinRegulation,itstimelimitsandeffects. Thus,theConseild’Etatheldthatextensionof responsible MemberState willbeextendediftheywere previously informedabouttheapplicationof not includetheobligationtoinformasylumseekerthattimelimitforhis/hertransfer the deemed tohaveabsconded.InFrancetheConseild’Etathasheldthatrightinformationdoes also beinformedofthiswhilstimprisonedorafterreporting backtotheauthoritiessubsequentbeing should Member State,butquestionshavealsobeenraisedastowhethertheasylumseekerconcerned According toArt.19(4)and20(2)theextensionoftimelimitmustbenotified receiving before beingdeemedtohaveabsconded. is more restrictive with asylum seekers having more than one opportunity to report to the authorities In limits were extendedundertheDublinRegulationonbasisof‘openchurchasylum’. practice, however, ecumenicalgroups havecomeacross anumberofcaseswhere aperson’s time unit thisisnotabscondingandtherefore thetimelimitshouldnotbeextendedonthisground. In not remove someonebyphysicalforce from Church grounds. According totheDortmundDublin a church communityadmitsandshelterssomeoneontheirpremises. TheGermanauthoritieswill asylum’ constitutesabscondingforthepurposesofaDublintransfer. Thisoccursincaseswhere Furthermore, inGermany,there isalsothecontroversial issueofwhetherseeking ‘openchurch other MemberStatesonextensionoftimelimitsforabsconding lacksubstantivefoundation. be inadifferent area ofthepremises. Inpractice,alarge numberofnotificationsfrom Germanyto authorities calluponthem,irrespective ofthefactthattheymayhavejustleftroom andmay absconded for not being present in their assigned room in a reception centre when the German Jurisprudence 2010). the interpretation ofabscondinginFrance(ParisAdministrativeCourt, No.1013300,17July theextensionoftimelimitsfortransferitprovides not specificallyconcerning somebackground on June 2010whenthesixmonthtimelimitfortransfer toGreece hadexpired. Althoughthiscasedoes Mr. Jhadnotabsconded,Francewasresponsible forexamininghisasylum applicationsince24 did notprovide anyreasons astowhyitfoundthatMr. Jhadabsconded.TheCourtruledthatas always attendedsummonsatthePrefecture andhadprovided hisaddress. Inaddition,thePrefecture the ParisAdministrativeCourtruledthatMr. Jcould notbeconsidered ashaving abscondedashe application. ThePrefecture claimedthatthetransferorder waslegal,asMr. Jhadabsconded.Firstly, Dublin Regulationexpired on24June2010andbydefault,Francewasresponsible forhisasylum application totheParisAdministrativeCourtarguing thatthesixmonthtime limitunderArt.19ofthe arrested againandplaced indetentiononthebasisofanewtransferorder. Hesubmittedanurgent Mr. Jwasreleased from detentionbythelibertiesandjudge.On14July2010Mr. Jwas to Greece. Hewasarrested andplacedindetentionorder toenforce histransfer. Subsequently Eurodac data. On 26 February 2010 the Prefecture summoned Mr. J and a transfer order was issued On 24October2009theFrench authoritiesrequested Greece totakeback Mr. Jonthebasisof Mr. J,anasylumseeker, transitedthrough Greece onhiswaytoFrancewhere heclaimedasylum. Requirement toprovide reasoning fordeemingthatanapplicanthasabsconded the Netherlandspracticesurrounding theextensionoftimelimitsunderDublinRegulation 227 97 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 98 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 228 be required are toverifythatthepersonsconcerned related inAustria, stringent withanincreasing resort toDNAtestsindisputedcases.Ifnecessary, DNAtestingmay In a number of Member States the evidentiary requirements for proving family links canbe quite requirements forprovingfamilylinks 9.3.1. Evidentiary means ofevidenceorproof. Rather, itusescircumstantial evidenceonlyifsubmittedtogetherwith,orlatersupportedby, other not accept circumstantial evidence alone as the basis for proving Member State responsibility. be responsible are taken into account by the national authorities. In As regards circumstantial evidenceinSwitzerland, the responsible MemberStateispossibleunderArt19(4)andArt.20(2)oftheDublinRegulation. they provide mustbetakenintoconsiderationalongwithallotheravailableevidenceinidentifying from afamilymembermaynotnecessarilybeanobjectivesource forinformation,yettheinformation member) maynothaveaninterest intheoutcomeofproceedings. Asanexample,astatement should bederivedfrom an‘objectivesource’ thus thatthesource(e.g.witness/family concerned and AnnexIIoftheImplementingRegulationthat‘othercircumstantial evidenceofthesamekind’ Netherlands to identifywhetheranotherMemberStatewasresponsible undertheDublinRegulation.In Bulgaria Implementing Regulation.However, someMemberStatesgatherfurtherinformation.Forexample, The majorityofMemberStatesusetheprobative andindicativeelementsofevidenceinthe proof andcircumstantial evidencenecessaryforidentifyingthecorrect MemberState. II of the Implementing Regulation contains lists of probative and indicative evidence for meansof the proper application of theDublin Regulation. Furthermore, asrequired underArt.18(3),Annex evidence aswelldeclaringthattherequirement of proof shouldnotexceedwhatisnecessaryfor responsible. Art.18alsoprovides furtherdetails onwhatconstitutesproof andcircumstantial circumstantial evidencethatshallbeusedbynationalauthoritiesindeterminingtheMemberState Art. 18(3)DublinRegulationdesignatestheestablishmentofalistelementsproof and 9.3. Circumstantial Evidence Federal Bureau ofCriminalInvestigation(Bundeskriminalamt ) toprove authenticity. Additionally, in Depending onthecountry oforiginandsource ofthesedocuments,they are assessedbythe Marriage certificatesand/or birthcertificates are required ona regularbasisto prove familylinks. asylum procedure, eveninotherMemberStateswhere theymighthaveappliedforasylumbefore. every asylumseekermusthaveexplicitly mentioned theotherfamilymemberbefore inhis/her In Greek authorities. pay forthese DNA teststhemselves as theyare notincluded inthefree medical care offered bythe DNA testscanonlybeconductedinAthens.Asylum seekers,includingchildren, are required to present. Mostreception centres forunaccompaniedchildren are indistantprovincial citieswhilst in The requirement torequest DNA testscanposepracticaldifficulties forunaccompaniedchildren of ithimself/herself.IftheDNAtestispositiveINDpaysforit. the bestinterests ofthechild.Incaseanegativeresult, must coverthecost thechildconcerned the guardian mayconsider whetherrequesting aDNAtestfrom theadministrative authoritiesisin Netherlands Greece unaccompaniedchildren, andtheNetherlands . Incasesconcerning theguardianthe in Austria, inorder toprove familylinksincaseadidnotarrivesimultaneouslyEurope, Greece seeker isstill present inAustria, theasylum seeker can apply to getthe costs refunded. The asylum seeker first hasto pay theDNAtest byhimself/herself inAustria. Incase theDNA test ispositive andtheasylum has alsotrackedflightpathsintoEurope, whichasylumseekersclaimedtheytook, who wishtobetransferred tootherMemberStateswhere theirfamilymembersare the DutchCouncilofStatehasruledthatitdoesnotfollowfrom theDublinRegulation needs togivepermissionforaDNAtestbecarriedoutbytheauthorities.Equally, all indicationsthatanotherMemberStatemay Slovakia, theDublin unit does 228 Slovakia,Germany, 229 the departure oftheasylumseeker. leaving the country and/or a certificate from the former responsible Member State who registered from anotherMemberStateauthority, documents from anNGO,whichprovided assistancewhen their stayoutsidetheterritoryofMemberStates. Ideally, thisevidenceisprovided bydocuments In as wellhard evidence suchasflightticketsormunicipal registration inanon-Dublincountry. authorities consistsinteraliaofcredible andconsistent statementsmadebytheasylumseeker of theEUMemberStateforatleastthree months. EvidencetakenintoaccountbytheDutch In The asylumseekermustalsoshowformalevidenceofexitandre-entry totheEUterritory. asylum seekerastotimespentoutsideare notsufficient forcessationofMemberState responsibility. must submittheoriginaltraveltickettoFrench authorities.Similarly, inSpain,statementsbythe Dublin unithasstatedthatatrainticketorferrycanserveasproof buttheasylumseeker prove difficult when theasylumseeker hasbeen forced to travelby clandestine means.TheFrench when leavingtheEUterritory, aswellanytraveldocumentsuseduponhis/herreturn.Thiscan considered assufficient. Asylumseekersare often requested toprovide thetraveldocumentsused local authorities in a third country certifying time spent outside the EU territory is generally not proof ofexitandre-entry totheEUterritory. Therefore, official documentsissuedbyhospitalsor In States under Art.16(3)inaccordance withtheImplementingRegulation’s listofprobative evidence. It appearsthatalotofMemberStatesinterpret evidence ofbeingoutsidetheterritoriesMember identifying adeparture from theterritoryofMemberStates. Regulation alsoincludetwolistsofprobative andcircumstantial evidencetobeconsidered in outside EUterritoryforatleastthree months.AnnexIIListA(9)andBoftheImplementing the MemberStateresponsible. Theburden ofproof isontheapplicanttoshowthattheystayed months, unlessthethird-country nationalisinpossessionofavalidresidence documentissuedby cease where a third-country national has left the territory of the Member States for at least three Pursuant toArt.16(3)oftheDublinRegulation,obligationstakecharge ortakebackshall 9.3.2. members duringtheasylumprocedure. ‘take charge’ requests under Art. 7 and Art. 8 Dublin Regulation and thebringingtogether of family certificates ofcouplesthatdonothavechildren. hasimplicationsfortheapplicationof Thisinturn There havebeenreported problems thenon-recognition inGermanyconcerning ofmarriage of theDNAtestfrom otherasylumseekers. togetmoneyinadvanceandoftentheyhavetryborrowseekers concerned tocoverthecost in their family life. If DNA tests arefamily members deliver consistent statements concerning required case there are thefamilystatus,oralhearingsmaybeconductedtoseeif doubtsconcerning Austria, asylumseekersthemselvesmustpayforthecost.There isnopossibilityfortheasylum the Netherlands, France Prefectures onlyaccepttimeoutsidetheEUterritoryifthere isevidence andmaterial Austria, asylumseekershaveto prove thatthey left theEU as wellprove thedurationof of originorto anothercountry to whichhemay lawfully travel. withdrawal orrejection oftheapplication, the provisions thatare necessary before thethird country nationalcan goto hiscountry cease once theMemberState responsible for examining theapplication hadadopted and actually implemented, following the In thiscontext itisimportant to note thatArt.16(4)alsoprovides thattheobligationsto take backunderArt.16(1)(d)and(e)shall States underArt.16(3) ofMember Evidence concerningstayoutsidetheterritory an asylumseekerisrarely considered tohaveproved thattheylefttheterritory 229 99 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 100 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 230 transfers. highlighted thatMemberStatesoftenencounterpracticaldifficulties inimplementingaccepted voluntary basis,bysuperviseddeparture orunderescort. In2007theCommissionevaluationreport State responsible for theexamination of anasylumclaimcantakeplaceinthefollowingways:ona In accordance with the Dublin Regulation and its implementing rules, transfers to the Member Voluntary repatriation schemesneedtobemonitored carefully to ensure thattheassistance and the countryoforiginbeing usedinsteadoftransfersinaccordance withtheDublinRegulation. Further research andstatistical dataisalsorequired as tothephenomenonofvoluntaryreturn demonstrate thathe/shehasfullycompliedwith theDublintransferdecision. be in place to allow for the withdrawal of such a re-entry can ban when the person concerned to itsapplication,whichissubjectaseparate appeal.Administrativeprocedures shouldalso is to remain in place, re-entry bans should only be issued on the basis of a reasoned decision as Dublin transfers.Thispracticeofissuingre-entry bansshouldbeabolished. However, ifthispractice claim. Furtherresearch isnecessarytodiscoverhowwidelyre-entry bansare usedpursuantto person’s freedom ofmovement within theSchengen area beyond theexaminationofhis/her asylum charge purposes. The imposition of such a sanction can also have long term ramifications for a difficult to reconcile withtheprincipleofproportionality particularlywhere thetransferisfortake The Germanpracticeofissuingabanonre-entry onthebasisofaDublinRegulationtransferis safeguards forthetransferofunaccompaniedchildren. be identified asexamples of goodpractice with respect totheprovision of additionalprocedural to complywithitsimplementingmeasures. SlovakiaandtheNetherlandscantoacertainextent requisite understandingof theDublinRegulationanditsconsequencesthentheyare more likely linked totheinformationanapplicantreceives insofarthatonlywhenasylumseekershavethe accompanied byotherharshmeasures suchasdetention.Themeansoftransferisalsoinextricably under escort.Thepromotion ofvoluntarytransfersispreferred overforced transfers,whichare often In mostMemberStatesthemainmethodsofimplementingtransfersare bysuperviseddeparture or accepted requests resulted intransfers. between 2009and2010only25.3%ofoutgoingrequests resulted intransfersandonly47%of Jurisprudence State (AdministrativeLawSection),theNetherlands,Nr. 201002493/1/V2,28April2011). so thetransfertoNorwaywasupheldandasylumseekersappealrejected (Councilof to demonstratethattheasylumseekershaveleftEUterritoriesformore thanthree months to befrom anobjectivesource. Neverthelessthis evidencewasconsidered tobeinsufficient circumstantial evidenceunderAnnexIIoftheImplementingRegulationandnotallhas the applicant’s employer’s statementandpayslipswere sufficient enoughtobeconsidered as to prove thiswere notfrom anobjectivesource. UponappealtheCouncilofStateheldthat Dutch Ministerrefused thisclaimstatingthattheevidencesubmittedbyasylumseeker EU territoriesinAfghanistanandthensubsequentlyclaimedasylumtheNetherlands.The The applicantclaimedthathehadleftNorwayandspentmore thanthree monthsoutsidethe that Norwaywasresponsible fortheexaminationofclaimunderDublinRegulation. An asylumapplication of anAfghanasylumseekerwasrejected in theNetherlandsonbasis The sourcing ofevidencetoshowtimespentoutsidetheterritoryMemberStates Commission ImpactAssessment, p.8. acceptances for example in2006implemented transfers represented 61.3%ofoutgoing requests and54.4%ofincoming requests, The Commission impactassessment alsonoted thatthenumberof implemented transfers islow incomparison to thenumberof 230 Thisissueisstillapparent todayasillustratedbyEurostat statisticsthatonaverage *** 233 explicit deadlinesinsubmittingsuchtakebackrequests. issue isremedied underArts. 23and24intheDublinrecast compromise text,whichprovides for to significantdelaysintheprocessing ofsuchDublincases.Therefore itis positive tonotethatthis access to an asylum procedure. In particular the absence of time limitsfortake back requests leads of lengthydelaysintheDublinprocedure isatvariancewithitsobjectiveofguaranteeingswift 234 233 232 231 C-245/11para 48. Member Statesshouldnotmisusethissystembyapplyingittoobroadly ininappropriate situations. that apersonhasabscondedforthepurposesofobtainingmore timetoundertaketransfers. With respect totimelimits thisresearch showsthattoowideaninterpretation istakenfordetermining not compromisetheobjective statusandwhichdoes refugee fordetermining which guaranteeseffectiveaccesstotheprocedures thattheimplementationofRegulationNo343/2003iscarriedout in amanner obligation toensure As declared by the under CJEU an in the case of C-245/11 “..the competent national authorities are Preamble totheRegulation. Dublin procedure in order toassess whether it meets theobjective of efficiency identifiedinthe to be willing to accept responsibility. Further data should be collected on the average length of the that transfers can still occur beyond the six month time limit if the receiving Member State continues in processing outgoing requests indicates an assumption ofresponsibility whilstother Courts found the MemberStatesincludedinthisstudy. SomenationalCourtshavedeclared thatlengthydelays Jurisprudence surrounding theextensionofdeadlinesinRegulationissignificantlyvariedacross though there are exceptionstothispracticeas reported inFrance,GermanyandSwitzerland. Member Statesbroadly appeartoberespecting the timelimitsrequired undertheDublinRegulation of his/herasylumapplication. during thedurationofprocedure foridentifyingthe MemberStateresponsible fortheexamination examined itisadvisablethatnationaladministrativeauthoritiesdonotpromote voluntaryreturn that applicantswithintheDublinprocedure maynever havehadtheirasylumclaimsubstantively only considervoluntaryreturnfollowingafullconsultationwithanindependentlegaladvisor. Given in thecountryoforigin)andthattheirvoluntarynature isnotcompromised. Asylumseekersshould advice theyoffer isappropriate (includingwithrespect toanup-to-dateassessmentofconditions under Art. 41CharterofFundamentalRights. reasons foranextensionofthetimelimitshis/hertransferaspartMember Statesobligations purposes ofextendingtransferdeadlines.Applicants, oncelocated,shouldalsobeinformedofthe provide areasoned decisionastowhyapersonhasbeendeemedhaveabscondedforthe and inlinewiththeprincipleofsincere co-operationtherequesting MemberStateshouldalways decision tothateffect. In order toensure thattimelimitsare onlyextendedintheappropriate cases isconsideredclearly whythepersonconcerned tohaveabscondedbyproviding areasoned be definednarrowly innational legislation. access toreception facilities asreported inAustria.Theriskcriteriafordefining‘absconding’should A broad interpretation ofabscondingmayalsohaveimplicationsfortheusedetentionand/or person hasabsconded. Furtherlitigationmaybenecessarytodefinethe relevant circumstances forindicatingthata a third-country national orastateless person whoissubjectto procedure atransfer may abscond .” meaning “theexistence of reasons inanindividualcase, whichare criteria defined basedonobjective by law, to believethat anapplicant or Recast Art 2(n) of the Dublin recast compromise text incorporates a definition of ‘risk of absconding’ for the purposes of detention as absconding” withinthemeaningofArt.19(4) oftheDublinRegulation. a “suicideattempt, evenonewhichisfaked, asaresult of to whichtransfer theMember State responsible isnot possible, constitute claim. Inthecase ofC-666/11aGermanCourtsubmitted apreliminary reference to theCJEU whichincludedaquestion onwhether for apreliminary ruling was later withdrawn bythereferring CourtasGermanytook over responsibility for theasylum seekers’ Further clarification asto whatabsconding meanscould have beenprovided bytheCJEU inthecase ofC-666/11butthisreference the requesting MemberState becomes aware thatanotherMemberState may beresponsible for theperson concerned. made withintwo monthsofaEurodac hitorifthetake request isbasedonotherevidence, withinthree monthsofthedate onwhich no new application hasbeenlodged inthe requesting MemberState recast Art.24provides thatthetake backrequest should be three monthsofthedate onwhichtheasylum application was lodged. Withrespect to thesubmission ofatake backrequest when receiving aEurodac hit.Ifthetake backrequest isbasedonotherevidence itshallbesentto therequested MemberState within Recast Art23obligesMemberStates to submitatake back request asquickly aspossibly andinanyevent withintwo monthsof of therapidprocessinganasylumapplication”. 234 Administrativeauthorities must beableto demonstrate 232
231 Theexperience
101 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 102 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings Recommendations to fleeand/ortheconsequencesofconflictincountryorigin. example difficulties inobtaining formal documentation due tothe mannerinwhich thepersonhad due accountoftheparticularcircumstances ofasylumseekersshouldbetakenintoaccountfor is forfamilyunificationduringtheDublinprocedure. As regards otherformsofdocumentaryproof, that additional research becarried out as to how much of a barrier the requirement for DNA tests such testsparticularlywithrespect tounaccompaniedchildren. Furthermore itisrecommended other probative evidence.IfDNAtestingisanessentialrequirement MemberStatesshouldfund clearly showsthatDNAorbloodtestsshouldonlybeusedwhere necessary, intheabsenceof during the course of their asylum procedure. Annex II List A.1 of the Implementing Regulation impactstheirability to proveturn their relationships withfamily members andreunite withthem obtaining suchtestsmayprove prohibitive forasylum seekerswithlittlefinancialmeans.Thisin In countrieswhere DNAtestsare anobligatoryrequirement forproving familylinksthecostof family linkscanberestrictive asillustratedinthenationalpracticesofanumberMemberStates. As regards circumstantial evidence,thisreport showsthatevidentiaryrequirements forproving free ofcharge. for proving familylinks in theDublinprocedure, MemberStatesshouldprovide them absence ofotherdocumentationproving familylinks.IfDNAtestsare arequirement DNA testingshouldonlybeusedincomplexDublincaseswhere necessaryinthe the procedural timelimits underArt.19(4)and20(2). The definitionofabscondingshouldbenarrowly definedforthepurposesofextending bans. Transfers pursuanttotheDublinRegulationshouldnotresult intheimpositionofre-entry Dublin Regulation. in practice,allMemberStatesmuststrictlyadhere tothetimelimitssetoutin In order toensure thattheobjectiveofswiftaccesstoanasylumprocedure isachieved Member States information requests. has beenreported which has resulted in the Greek authoritiesresponding in a timely manner to requests underArt.21DublinRegulation.However, since2011,animprovement incommunication for themundertheDublincriteria. In the past Greece commonlydidnotrespond toinformation authorities haveincorrectly transferred applicantstoFrance where itclearlywasnotresponsible of transfer. CooperationwiththeUK Cooperation with It isreported that in France, and byvisitinginvitingdelegatesofotherMemberStatestotheNetherlandsfordiscussion. solve suchdisputedcasesthrough liaisonofficers inotherMemberStates,viabilateralconsultations for aparticular asylum application between Member States. However, theDutchauthoritiestryto or review. According toINDstaff intheNetherlands,disputessometimesariseoverresponsibility States’ acceptanceforthetransferhasonlytakenplaceonbasisofarequest forre-examination of thetransferdecisionstootherMemberStates from Bulgariareveal thatthereceiving Member for arequest tobere-examined inaccordance withArt.5(2)oftheImplementingRegulation.Many of responsibility under‘take back’and‘takecharge’ requests theBulgarianauthoritiesoftenask When actual transfers. to itsterritoryeitherexplicitlyorbydefault,there isno furtherfollowupregarding arrangementsfor Italy. Acommonproblem reported wasthat,eventhoughItaly States reported insufficient communication with the Italian Dublin Unit in relation totransfers to the purposesofDublinRegulationare sufficient betweenMemberStates.Anumberof and non-excessive.From theinformationgathered, ingeneral,itappearsthatcommunicationfor other obligationarisingundertheDublinRegulationaslongsuchrequests are appropriate, relevant responsible MemberState,forexaminingtheapplicationasylumorimplementationofany and request anasylum seeker forthepurposesofdetermining personal data concerning Art. 21oftheDublinRegulationprovides theopportunityforMemberStatestoexchangeinformation 10.1.1. CommunicationbetweenMemberStates(Art.21) State authoritiesinapplyingtheDublinRegulation. The ImplementingRegulationwasalsoestablishedtofacilitatecooperationbetweenthecompetent functioning oftheDublinsystembymeanseffective communicationbetweenMemberStates. Chapter VIoftheDublinRegulationsetsoutanumberprovisions aimedatensuringthesmooth Member Stateco-operationiscentraltotheeffectiveness ofapplyingtheDublinRegulation. 10.1. AdministrativeCooperation X. MemberStateCooperation
deemed to have not offered a reasonable explanationforhisabsence attheinterview. areasonable deemed tohavenotoffered rejected hisasylumapplicationasmanifestly unfoundedbecausehewas the FederalOffice two weeks to Germany attend it as he was only transferred Ca se S t Bulgaria receives negativereplies from otherMemberStatesinrelation totheestablishment
u
d y March 2011 but the applicant was not informed ofthisdatenorwasheableto March 2011buttheapplicant wasnotinformed in Migration andAsylumarranged adateforthesubstantiveasyluminterview TheFederalOfficefor authoritiesacceptedthetake backrequest. German submitted an asylumapplicationinGermany.seeker whohadpreviously The to take back an Afghan asylum Germany 2011 Sweden requested In January German CaseStudy: Italy is difficult mainly due to organisational problems the modalities concerning co-operation and communicationcanbe difficult withItalyandtheUK can alsobedifficult asthere havebeencaseswhere theBritish after thescheduled interview. Still accepts thetransferofanapplicant 103 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 104 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings her interview, whichmayindicateanotherMemberState’s responsibility. the Dublinunitwillhavenoknowledgeofstatementsasylumseekersubmittedduringhis/ added tothefilesinDublinunitaftertwothree months.Insuchascenariothecaseofficer in updated withintheGermanDublinunits.Forexampleinterviewrecords sometimesmayonlybe within the relevant authoritiesresulting in theasylumseeker’s casefile notbeingsystematically during theirinterview. Suchanomissionmayalsobeduetoinsufficient administration internal even thoughtheapplicantsclearlytoldofficers theydidleavetheterritoryofMemberStates requested MemberStatesthatthere were anyindicationsthatanapplicanthadlefttheEUterritories, In the evidencesubmittedbyapplicantandhowitwasdeterminednottobecredible. the EU for a certainnumber of months and that this was not credible without providing information on Member Stateforexamplesubmittingrequests thatonlystatedtheapplicantclaimedtohaveleft out takebackorcharge requests withinsufficient informationtocorrectly determinethe responsible Austria’s own responsibility for the asylum application.TheAustrian authorities have sometimes sent from such correspondence to Dublin units in other Member States, which would have demonstrated There havebeenseveralinstanceswhereby theAustrian authoritiesdeliberatelyomittedrelevant facts it erased. has anobligationtoimmediatelyinformthereceiving MemberStateandcorrect theinformationorhave timely informationwithoneanother. Ifincorrect informationistransmitted,thetransferringMemberState Pursuant toArt.21(8)ofthe Dublin RegulationMemberStatesare obliged toexchangeaccurateand 10.1.1.1. Provisionofincorrectinformation(Article21(8))
3/2012/4E and others, 20 January 2012). 3/2012/4E and others,20January2012). Polands acceptance is invalid” unofficial translation (AsylGH Austrian Asylum Court S23 242.800- of trust between the of trust Member States of the Dublin II Regulation. breach Based on that breach illegitimate because it is a makes the consultation procedure in Austria. This lack of information protection PolishDublinauthoritiesthattheclaimanthas statusofsubsidiary It didnotinform way. inan arbitrary [...]TheFederalAsylumOfficeledtheconsultation procedure asylum procedure. fortheconductionof an theexaminationof theresponsibility concerning of fundamentalinformation agoodcooperationbased ontrustbetweentheMemberStates.Thisincludesanexchange requires isafundamentalerror.Poland todecideonthecase,lackofinformation TheDublinIIRegulation whichallows consultation procedure, protection.Basedonthedutytomakea transparent subsidiary thattheclaimanthas[...]statusof Polandintherequest toinform It wouldhavebeennecessary isaproceduralerror.in Austria.TheAustrianAsylumCourtstatedupon appeal: “Inthiscontextthere transferred thefamilytoPolandunderDublinRegulationeventhoughthey hadtherighttoremain responsibility withoutbeinginformedofthefamily’s residence statusinAustria. Austrianofficials Chechnya where theytransitedPolandonthereturnjourney. ThePolishauthoritiesaccepted A familywasgrantedsubsidiaryprotection inAustria,whichremained validafterashorttripto translation (AsylGHAustrianAsylumCourt,S1404.238-1/2009/2E,10February2009). [...]BasedonthattheFederalAsylumOffice’srefugee. decisionhastobecancelled”unofficial Austria’sbe excludedthatPolandwouldhaverefused knowingthatsheismarriedtoa request 343/2003cannotbevalid.It II Regulation,adecisionaccordingtoArt19(1)regulation inawaythatmanifestlyviolatesthelegalprinciplesofDublin lead aconsultation procedure Austrian AsylumCourtinstrikingoutthetransferdecisionorder, stated:”…IftheMemberStates Polish authoritiesofthepresence ofherhusbandwhowasarefugee inAustria.Uponappealthe authorities initiatedaDublintransferprocedure toPolandforthewomanwithoutinforming A womantraveledthrough Polanden-route tojoiningherhusbandinAustria.TheAustrian Failure toprovide alltherelevant informationtotherequested MemberState Jurisprudence Germany, lawyers havecomeacross caseswhere theGerman authoritiesdidnotinformother the possibilityofarranginganadhoc-workinggroup toresolve disputes. Hungary describing theroute theytraveledthrough MemberStates,where appropriate. TheSlovakia- requires partiestotheagreement topresent awrittendeclarationbytheasylumseekerconcerned evidence required toprocess therequests fortakebackorcharge cases.Forexample,this applied inrelation toasylumseekersreturned there whohavepreviously transitedSerbia. as ofNovember2012indicatethatthesafethird countryconceptisnolongerbeingautomatically 238 Emailcorrespondence with Hungariannationalexpert, January 2012. 237 236 235 between agreements thebilateral outsidethecontext oftheDublinRegulation.Theseconcern In someMemberStatesinformationwasalsoobtainedonotherreadmission andborder control 10.1.2.1. BilateralagreementsbeyondtheDublinRegulation actual transfers. for sendingandresponding torequests andincludeprovisions onpractical timeframesregarding The bilateraladministrativearrangementsindicatedabovecommonlyresult inshortertimeframes Table 3:BilateraladministrativearrangementsbetweenMemberStates under recast Art.36(1)(b)withtheDublinRegulation. the Commission may check the compatibility of any amendedor new administrative arrangement Dublin recast compromise textthisprovision willbemaintainedwithanadditionalstipulationthat the procedural aspectsofthearrangementdonotinfringeDublinRegulationitself.Under an obligationonMemberStatestoreport thesearrangementstotheCommissionverifywhether transmission andexaminationofrequests totakecharge ofortakebackasylumseekers.There is officers andthesimplificationof procedures andtheshorteningoftimelimits relatingtothe and increase itseffectiveness. Sucharrangementsmayrelate totheexchangeofDublinliaison Bilateral administrativearrangementsare usedtofacilitatetheapplicationofDublinRegulation thepracticaldetailsofimplementationDublinRegulationunderArt.23. concerning Member States may establish on a bilateral basis administrative arrangements between themselves 10.1.2. Bilateraladministrativearrangements(Art.23) procedure in Hungary whopreviously transitedSerbiaastheymaybedeniedeffective accesstoanasylum concept byHungaryinrelation toSerbiaalsohasimplicationsforasylumseekerstransferred to France Switzerland Slovakia Hungary Bulgaria Member State accessible at:http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Serbia-report-final.pdf to-protection-jeopardised-FINAL1.pdf andHungarianHelsinki Committee, SerbiaasaSafe Third Country:Revisited, June2012, on thetreatment of Dublinreturnees inHungary, ” December 2011,accessible at:http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Access- unhcr.org/refworld/docid/50471f7e2.html andHungarianHelsinkiCommittee, “Access to Protection Jeopardized: Information note on thesituation of asylum-seekers andbeneficiaries of international protection, August 2012,accessible inSerbia at:http://www. recommendations-and-guidelines/hungary-as-a-country-of-asylum-2012.html asacountry of asylum. ;UNHCR, Serbia Observations in Hungary, April 2012,accessible at:http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/pdf/resources/legal-documents/unhcr-handbooks- For further information asacountry of see:UNHCRHungary asylum, Observations onthesituationofasylum-seekers and refugees at www.dublin-project.eu Further detailed information onthesubstantive content of eachtheseagreements are available intherelevant nationalreports to concerned amendthearrangement withinareasonable periodof asto timeinsuchaway eliminate any”. incompatibilities observed Regulation, it shall, withinareasonable theMemberStates period,notify concerned. TheMemberStates shalltake allappropriate steps Recast Art.36(4)states that“IftheCommission considers thearrangements referring 1(b)to beincompatible to inparagraph withthis Italy andGreece andGreece agreement establishesthree agreed border crossings forDublintransfersandincludes Hungary. 236 The Bulgarian agreement with 237 However it should be noted that recent reports on Hungarian practice and Bulgaria Germany &Switzerland Austria &Germany Austria &Hungary Austria, Bulgaria,Romania,Slovenia&Slovakia Austria, Hungary&Romania with theseMember Bilateral AdministrativeArrangement Romania also includes details on the documentary 235 respectively. Theuseofthesafethird country 238 105 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 106 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings seekers onthisroute are identifiedassuch. thatnotallasylum it withnoengagementbytheDublinauthorities.Itisparticularlyconcerning international protectioninternational subject tothisreadmission agreement. objective oftheDublinRegulationasitdeniesaccesstoasylumprocedure forthoseseeking returns”. asitsbasisforsuch agreement invokinginsteadthereadmission toGreece, it wishestoreturn As UNHCRhasnoted“inpractice….ItalydoesnotapplytheDublinIIRegulationtoasylumseekers agreement inthismannerItaly are backbytheItalianauthoritiestoGreece. turned Convention) withinitsscope.However, indirectly itimpactsthoseseekingasyluminItalywho 247 246 245 244 243 242 241 240 239 of migrants. Since March 1999ItalyandGreece haveimplementedabilateralagreement onthereadmission persons movingbetweenGreece According tocaselawnoted bythenationalexpert,Bulgariaavoidsregistering asylum seekers evaluation oftheircaseand/orvulnerability”. oftheirclaim,identificationandindividual protection,toanysortofregistration to international back to Greece, without being granted any access readmitted or are to the Italian territory entry coastsofItaly, intheItalianportsandsouthern detected andapprehended eitherrefused are protectionandunaccompaniedminors whoare the Italianseaports,peopleinneedofinternational researchthe ItalianseaportstoGreece” findingsclearlyindicatethat“inthemajorityofcasesat by theGreek from CouncilforRefugeesandPro readmission Asylentitled“HumanCargo:Arbitrary between theseMemberStates. Greece the readmission agreement protection includeasylumseekersseekinginternational inBulgaria. procedure in sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR29/60-61.pdf January 2012,accessible at:http://lcrien.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/information_note_access.pdf andhttp://www.fmreview.org/ For further information seeArbitrariness regarding access to theasylum procedure inBulgaria, Information Note, Dr. Valeria Ilareva 2 Ministers to confirm the agreement ispublished. Persons, signedin Athenson15December 1995.Thetext oftheagreement isnotpublic,only thedecisionofCouncil Law 2406/1996Agreement between theRepublic ofBulgaria andtheRepublic ofGreece ontheReadmission ofIllegally Staying and Greece (Application No.16643/09),October 2009, pg.7. UNHCR 2009, available at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4afd25c32.html. United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees intheCaseof Sharifiandothers vItaly andGreece (Application No.16643/09),October to otherMemberStates undertheDublinRegulation. For furtherinformation seeUNHCRWritten Submission by theOffice of the omits theword ‘third’ andtherefore theItalian authoritiesmaintain thatthisconfers arightto sendpeople withoutformalities a ‘third country ’ andhence outside theparticipatingStates oftheDublinRegulation. TheItalian version oftheDublinRegulation seeker to acountry, incompliance withtheprovisions of theGeneva Convention“. Theauthoritative Englishtext inArt.3(3)refers to Regulation whichstates underArt.3(3)that“Any MemberState shallretain theright, pursuant to its to national sendanasylum laws, This practice bytheItalian authoritiesisinter aliabasedonatranslation error intheItalian languageversion oftheDublin reports/italy0113ForUpload_0.pdf childrenmigrant andadultasylum seekers from Italy to Greece, January2013,accessible at:http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5003da882.html ;HumanRights Watch Turned Away, Returns Summary of unaccompanied Verbrechen/humancargo_01.pdf ;UNHCRRecommendations Aspects onImportant of Refugee Protection inItaly, July 2012, accessible Ports to GreeceItalian Sea , July 2012,accessible at:http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/p_KAMPAGNEN/Flucht-ist-kein- For furtherinformation see,for example, Greek Councilfor Refugees andProAsyl HumanCargo, Readmissions Arbitrary from the 27765/09) 23February 2012,para 133. expressly request asylum didnot exempt Italy from fulfillingits 3”seeHirsi obligations underArt. Jamaa&Others vItaly, Application no. out aboutthetreatment to whichtheapplicants beexposed would upontheirreturn….the concerned factthat theparties hadfailed to it considers that“itisfor thenational authorities,faced withasituation inwhichhumanrights were beingsystematically violated…to find where theirfamily members andotherthird country nationalsreside. Irrespective ofthis,theECtHRGrand Chamber hasheld that to besentbackto Greece asthey donotwant to seekasylum inItaly andwould rather reach, irregularly, otherEuropean countries However, according to CIR’s experience attheseports, itshould bepointed outthatmanypersons subjectto thisagreement prefer InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2143096&SecMode=1&DocId=1926434&Usage=2 of Europe, following hisvisitto Italy from 3 to 6July 2012,CommDH(20122)6accessible at:https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet. theirstatus any andidentifying protectionclarifying needs“. Report byNilsMuižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights oftheCouncil irregular ontheAdriatic mannerinItalianports whoare returned to Greece withouthaving access to procedures aimedat formally agreement; Seepg.3onwards inhisJuly 2012report onItaly: “There are also numerous reports concerning persons arrivinginan The CoECommissioner for HumanRights hasalsoreferred to “automatic returns to Greece“ inthecontext ofthatreadmission applicable“. The agreement alsoexplicitly excludes from its scope thosethird country nationalsto “whomtheDublinConvention of 15June1990is is notapplicable inter aliato thoseindividualsrecognized bytherequesting State asrefugees underthe1951Refugee Convention. The readmission agreement contains anumberoftheoretical safeguards for example Art.6states thattheobligationto readmit irregolare” signedon30April1999andentered into force on1February 2001. “Accordo deliaRepubblica ilGoverno tra deliaRepubblica ItalianaeilGoverno Ellenica sullariammissione delle persone insituazione also has a readmission agreement with 245 Written Submission by theOffice of theUnited Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees intheCaseof Sharifiandothers vItaly
239 Italy This readmission agreement does not include the Dublin Regulation (and the Dublin and are sent directly back to 246 is disregarding itsobligationsderivingfrom theDublinRegulation. In 2012 concerns were In2012concerns raisedastowhetherpersonssubject and Italy on theAdriaticCoastsandBorder Policeimplement 241 243 Thesepeopleare givennoaccesstotheasylum Thiscanbeseenasanindirect violationofthe Greece Bulgaria for the movement of irregular migrants 240 Thisagreement appliespredominantly to as irregular migrants. 244 Byimplementingthereadmission 242 In a recent report 247
from 79in2010to2302011. be seenbythesharpriseinnumberofpersonsreturnedunderreadmission agreements back underthereadmission agreement toGreece. who haveentered thecountryfrom Greece andtreats themasirregular migrants,sendingthem 251 250 249 Thesestatistics were obtained from theBulgarian Migration Directorate. 248 Thenationalexpert Valeria Ilareva hasgathered information asalawpractitioner inBulgaria from thecases shehasobserved. serves asaformofpracticalcooperationforthe efficient functioningoftheDublinsystem. asylum andtheDublinRegulation.Thepresence ofDublinliaisonofficers inotherMemberStates Member Stateinindividualcasestoexchanging informationandpolicydevelopmentsinthefieldof liaison officers performavarietyoffunctionssuchasliaisingwithnational authoritiesina receiving number ofMemberStates,predominantly thosewithlarger Dublinunitsandresources. Dublin Liaison officers forthepurposeofDublinRegulationappeartobeemployedbyonlyacertain 10.1.3. Dublinliaisonofficers hinder accesstoanasylumprocedure forindividualasylumseekers. the mannerinwhich the Bulgarian authorities apply the readmission agreement inawaythatcan Bulgaria with Greece. betweenBulgariaand agreement immigrants under the readmission irregular Police to return inthepowers oftheBorder the asylumseekers was because they didnotwanttointerfere Greece. theirimmediatedeportationto submitted totheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsprevent and process their asylum was applications. At the same time a register Rule 39 interim measure requesting theCourttocompelSAR theSofiaCityAdministrativeCourt, proceedings before byalawyerinstituted 2011eachoftheasylumseekers,represented to illness.On9February 2011themotherwashospitalizedinSofiadue 2011.On13January on 4,14and25January bythefamilywithhelpofalawyer requests their applicationsforasyluminspiteofrepeated SARon22December2010.Howevertheasylumauthoritydidnotregister applications reached requested asylumandtheir inSofia.Thefamily placedinanimmigrationdetentioncentre were andthey agreement migrantsunderthereadmission orders fortheirdeportationasirregular violenceinIraq.On16December2010theBulgarianborderpolice issued had alsosuffered 2011 and were subsequently granted subsidiary protection. subsequently grantedsubsidiary 2011 andwere asasylumseekersinMay registered of subsequentnationalCourtchallengesthefamilywere againstthefamily’sHuman RightsgrantedaRule39interimmeasures andonthebasis removal asylum. The imminent European Court despite of the fact that the applicants had requested thelatter’sthe caseasoneunderSchengenagreement”, intoforceforBulgariabeing entry Ca were registered asasylum seekers inBulgaria and were notatriskoffurther removal to Greece. ECHR, Athens on15December 1995. Agreement between theRepublic of Bulgaria andtheRepublic ofGreece ontheReadmission ofIllegally Staying Persons, signedin se
S Greece. t
u
d
Kerim andOthers v. Bulgaria, Application no.28787/11.Thiscase was subsequently struck outbytheECtHRasapplicants y ceased sendingoutgoingrequests toGreece. 250 The explanation provided by the Bulgarian asylum authority for its inaction to register The explanationprovidedbytheBulgarianasylumauthorityforitsinactiontoregister
The StateAgencyforRefugees(SAR)statedthattheirintentionhadbeento“process This canbederivedfrom thefactthatfollowingjudgmentsbyECtHRandCJEU, kidnapped. The mother was in a very fragilephysicalandmentalstateasshe kidnapped. Themotherwasinavery that theprincipalasylumseeker’s husbandhadbeenkilledandherson They fled persecution in Iraq on the basis unspecified location outside Greece. Theasylumseekershadboardedthetruckatan Bulgaria fromGreece. foundhiddeninatruckbyBulgarianauthoritiesafterentering were children On 15 December 2010, an Iraqi family consisting of asingle mother andtwo Bulgarian CaseStudy: 249 Thevastmajorityofthesereadmissions are under theagreement 248 Anindicationthatthismaybeoccurringcan The Bulgariancasestudybelowhighlights 251 107 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 108 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 252 cooperation betweentheFrenchauthoritiesand theirEuropeancounterparts. embassies. Thesespersonsare notDublinliaisonofficers specificallybuttheirmissionistofacilitate Similarly, stationed inRomepermanently, ornot,withtheItalianauthoritiesconsent. conclusion ofthispilotproject, theSwissauthoritieswillevaluatewhetheraliaisonofficer willbe the fact that Italyis project aimed at exploring closer co-operation in relation to the Dublin Regulation. This is due to cases. Additionally, Switzerland individual cases where applicants are particularly vulnerable in order to facilitate solutions to their The ItalianDublinUnithoststwoliaisonofficers from theUKandGermanywhointervenein responsible andalsoprovides technicalassistanceonasylumissuestotheGreek authorities. co-operates with the Greek authorities in relation to individual cases where Since thesuspensionoftransfersfrom Germanyto transferred from theirrespective MemberStatesreceived accesstotheasylumprocedure inGreece. Greece. AtthattimebothDublinliaisonofficers were taskedwithensuringthatasylumseekers Headquarters. Previously in2010there wasalsoaliaisonofficer from theNetherlandspresent in Currently inGreece there isoneliaisonofficer present fromGermany basedattheGreek Police the hostMemberState. developments aswellexchangingcountryoforigininformationandnationaljurisprudencewith mediating role withrespect toindividualasylumseekers andcollectingupdatesonrelevant policy German liaisonofficers stationedinotherMemberStatesare taskedwithproviding anadvisoryand Dublin liaisonofficers from theNetherlands, linked totheDublinRegulationintheirrespective countries. responsible forconductingresearch andcollectingupdatesonthelatestdevelopmentsinpolicy for Belgium are alsoresponsible fortheUKandFrance , whilstthoseinGermanyare alsoresponsible depending onwhere theyare stationed,sofor example, theDutchliaisonofficers present in The DutchINDDublinliaisonofficers have regional responsibility foranumberofMemberStates Table 4:DublinLiaisonOfficers present inMemberStates UK Switzerland Germany The Netherlands Member State dokumentation/mi/2011/2011-09-200.html. Federal DepartmentofJustice andPolice, Press Release, 20September 2011,http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/de/home/ Switzerland, Austria and the France employs a general liaison officer for immigration questions in some of itsEuropean Switzerland’s has recently sentaDublinliaisonofficer toRome, Czech Republic. These liaison officers stationed abroad are most important partner under the Dublin Regulation. After the Belgium andtheUKare present inGermany. The Italy Present inItalyaspartof a PilotProject Ireland, Poland,Italy&Hungary Present intheNetherlands, France,Greece, UK, Present inBelgium&Germany Dublin LiaisonOfficers Presence inMemberStates Greece theGermanDublinliaisonofficer now 252 Germany may be as partofapilot on his/herlocationinthat MemberState. national level so that for instance an asylum seekers’ access to procedural rights is not dependent be takenbynationalauthoritiestoensure consistencyandstreamline Dublinprocedures atthe related totheDublinRegulationbothbetweenMemberStatesandatnational level.Stepsmust for thesmoothoperationofDublinsystem.Nevertheless thisstudyshowsvariationinpractices transfer, subjecttosomeregional exceptions. Federal States,thepracticeremains ofnotifyingtheasylumseekerhis/herremoval onthedayof the person affected, enabling him/her to take the opportunity to submit an appeal, whilst in all other 16 FederalStatesissueaDublindecisionfewdaysbefore theplannedremoval inorder toinform in relation topracticesurrounding notificationoftransferdecisions.Sincesummer2011,fourout are carriedoutbyregional orlocalAliensAuthorities.Theimpactofthesedifferences ishighlighted different branches. Furtherregional government differences existduetothefactthatDublintransfers interviews, forexample,andthedurationofprocedures are bynomeanshomogenousinthe Germany, implementdifferent aspectsoftheDublin procedures. Themethodofconducting regions isvaried.This duetothefactthatlocalbranchoffices ofBAMF, spread throughout Although there are two centralized Dublin units established in Germany the practice across these absconded, whilstothersonlycontacttheasylumseekertoinformhim/heroftransferdecision. seeker togive them progress updates on theDublinprocedure ortoverifythatthey have not also to the procedures put in place. Some Prefectures, for example, regularly summon the asylum relates notonlytodifferent interpretations ofcertainconceptssuchasthehumanitarianclause,but 255 254 253 There are 32Prefectures alltogether across France. communication andpartnershipbetweenMember States. determining responsibility forexaminingasylumapplicationscanonlyoperate efficiently withgood Effective cooperation is central to the functioning of the Dublin system. Any arrangement for In this istheresponsibility oftheregional cantons. However, variedpracticeisreported inrelation thepracticeofconductingDublin transfersbecause regards theapplicationofDublinRegulationwithinthoseStates.As uniformity indecisionsconcerning authorities inSlovakia, The factthatthere isacentralizedsystemwithonlyoneDublinoffice operatingwithinthenational are centralizedinthatState. Member StatedependsonwhethertheadministrativefunctionsforapplyingDublinRegulation of theDublinRegulationatnationallevel.Whetherthere isvariedpracticeornotwithinaspecific of theDublinsystem.Informationwasalsogathered onwhetherthere wasaconsistentapplication States. Nevertheless,itisevidentthatMemberStates’practicevariesinrelation tocertainaspects The Dublin system, as established by way of regulation under EU law has direct effect in Member 10.2. examination ofanasylumclaim. consultations withoneanothertoenablethecorrect identificationofthe responsible countryforthe sincere cooperationunderEUlawMemberStatesmustprovide accurate,detailedinformationin France there isdivergent practiceacross thedifferent Prefectures. in fullmutualrespect, assist eachother outtasks incarrying whichflow from theTreaties. Article 4(3)TEUTreaty onEuropean Union:Pursuant to theprinciple of sincere cooperation, theUnionandMemberStates shall, protected inconsultations between MemberStates (Art.8CFR). It isalsoimportant to ensure thatthefundamental rights ofapplicants with respect to theprocessing oftheirpersonal data is Switzerland, withintheFOMthere isconsistencyinrelation toDublin Regulationdecisions. Regulation withinMemberStates Heterogeneity intheapplicationofDublin the NetherlandsandGreece meansthatinpracticethere isahighlevelof 255 Cross-agency cooperationatthenationallevelisalsonecessary *** 254 Inaccordance withtheprincipleof 253 Thisvariationinpractice 109 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 110 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 256 SeeHirsi Jamaa&Others vItaly, Application no. 27765/09)23February 2012. Recommendations agreements. humanrightslawbyrelyingunder international oncommitmentsmadebilateralreadmission accordance aMemberStatecannotevade its obligations with theprincipleofpactasuntservanda right toasylumcannotbecircumvented bytheapplicationofbilateralreadmission agreements. In humanrightslaw.in violationoftheirfundamentalrightsunderinternational Thedutytorespect the protectiontheir application may lead to persons in need of international being sent back to Greece, agreements thatBulgariaandItalyhaveestablishedwithGreece are inthat particularlyconcerning be appliedinamannerwhichviolatesthefundamentalrightsofasylumseekers.Thereadmission assigning MemberStateresponsibility. Althoughbilateral agreements canbeused,theymustnot agreements toacceleratetheoperationofDublinprocedure whilstsimplifyingtheprocess of As regards otherpracticalcooperationmeasures, asignificantnumberofMemberStatesusebilateral conditions intherequested MemberState. administrative authoritiesintherequesting MemberStatetogaingreater knowledgeonthe cooperation mechanismtoenhancemutualtrustbetweencountries.Itisalsoonewayofenabling The presence ofDublinliaisonofficers inanumber ofMemberStatesisapositivepractical protection. no systeminplacebothpracticeandlawtoproperly identifypersonsinneedofinternational agreements cannotbeappliedingoodfaithaccordance lawaslongthere withinternational is not beusedtodisregard obligationsundertheDublinRegulation.Itisclearthatthesereadmission under the Dublin Regulation and international human rightsandrefugeeunder theDublinRegulationandinternational law. Readmission agreements shouldnotbeusedtocircumvent MemberStatesobligations 256 EquallygiventhatEUlawtakesprecedence thesereadmission agreements must Member States 257 recast compromise textunder Art.3(2)albeitwithouttheimportantsafeguard inthejudgmentthat Charter ofFundamental Rights.Theprincipleinthisjudgmenthasbeen codifiedwithintheDublin real riskofbeingsubjectedtoinhumanordegradingtreatment withinthemeaningofArt.4 Member Stateamounttosubstantial grounds forbelievingthattheasylumseekerwouldfacea deficiencies intheasylumprocedure andinthe reception conditionsofasylumseekersina receiving an asylumseekertotheresponsible MemberStatewhere theycannotbeunaware thatsystemic State observes the fundamental rights of the EU. It declared that a MemberStatemay not transfer Grand ChamberheldthatEUlawprecludes aconclusivepresumption thattheresponsible Member Court dealtwiththesameissueoftransfersto Greece withinthecontext ofEUlaw. TheCJEU The joinedCJEUcasesofC-411/10from theUKCourtofAppealand C-493/10theIrishHigh the Greek authoritiesappliedtheirlegislationonasylum inpractice. would betreated inconformity withhumanrightsobligationsbutitwasuptothemfirstverifyhow presented onthesituation inGreece, theBelgianauthoritiescouldnotpresume thattheapplicant that theGreek authorities wouldseriouslyexaminehisasylumapplication.Giventheevidence Greece. exposing theasylumseekertorisksarisingfrom thedeficienciesinasylumprocedure in what is important to note is that Belgium was held to be in violation of Art. 3 and Art. 13 ECHR for to beaviolationofArt.13inconjunctionwith3ECHR.Withrespect totheDublinRegulation and livingconditionsthere andregarding deficienciesintheasylumprocedure where there washeld Grand ChamberfoundGreece tobeinviolationofArt.3ECHRbothwithrespect tothedetention was abandonedtoliveonthestreets withoutanysupportbytheGreek authorities.TheCourts’ twice, duringwhichhewassubjectedtodegrading detention circumstances. Afterhisrelease, he country through whichhe hadirregularly entered theEU.InGreece hewasplacedindetention application inBelgium.BasedontheDublinRegulation,BelgiumsenthimbacktoGreece, the respect anAfghanasylumseekerwholodged totheDublinRegulation. Itconcerned wastheEuropeanM.S.S. vBelgiumandGreece Court of HumanRights’landmarkdecisionwith 11.1. Regulation bywayofchangestonationalpolicies,practicesorjurisprudence. States’ implementationofthemainjudgmentsfrom theDublin theECHRandCJEUconcerning most notablywithrespect toGreece. Thissectionof thereport provides abriefoverviewofMember CJEU posttheLisbonTreaty andthestarkdeficienciesinasylumsystemssomeMemberStates, influenced thisdevelopmentinteraliatheexpansionofscopeforpreliminary references tothe is oneofthemostlitigatedpieces of legislation within theEUasylumacquis.Severalfactorshave Regulation atboththenationalandEuropean level.ItisnotinaccuratetosaythattheDublinsystem Over recent yearsthere hasbeenasignificantincrease theDublin injurisprudenceconcerning XI. remains to beseenhow they will interpreted andimplemented atthe nationallevel. the fact thattheCourtonly issued thesedecisions relatively recently inSeptember andNovember 2012respectively. Therefore itstill This sectiondoesnotcontain information ontheimplementation oftheCJEU rulingsinthecases ofC-179/11andC-245/11dueto Jurisprudence AtNationalLevel The ImplementationOfEuropean The Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known that the applicant had no guarantee h ECHR The Others C-411/10andC-493/10 judgment andthejoinedCJEUcasesNS& M.S.S. v Belgium andGreece 257
111 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 112 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings serious responsibilities bothonthediplomaticsideandimageofcountry”. serious responsibilities implies onthepartofItalianGovernment Greece ofEuropeanprinciplesconcerning respect had notrespected theprinciples laiddownintheEuropean jurisprudencestatingthat“thenon- the Italian authorities were forced to pay the legal costs for the case, as the judge outlined that they have increasingly stepped intostoptransfersGreece. Inarecent judgmentby the TAR LAZIO, The Italian Courts have adopted the principles in the two actualtransferswere conductedtoGreece 210 casestoGreece totakeresponsibility for asylum applications.Nevertheless,inpractice,only individual examinationofeachcaseisconducted.In2011,theItalianauthoritiessentrequests in Likewise, inItaly,there hasbeennogeneralofficial suspensionofDublintransferstoGreece. An procedure andratherexaminetheasylumapplicationthemselves. Greece is the responsible Member State, the Slovak authorities simply do not apply the Dublin transfer of asylum seekers to 2011, Slovakiahasnottransferred anasylumseekertoGreece. Anyofficial policyprohibiting the asylum procedure andaccommodationthere. SincealeadingConstitutionalCourtdecisioninMay Greece, forexample,theauthoritieshelditwasvalidtoreturnsomeonewhohasaccess Switzerland, onthebasisofanindividualizedassessment,certainpersonsmaybetransferred to but there havebeenrelatively fewtransfersinpractice toGreece Switzerland. InAustria,forexample,anindividualassessmentofeachcasecontinuestobemade, a generalpolicyprohibiting DublintransferstoGreece , 2012, there were 14casesofDublintransferstoGreece from Switzerland. cases concerning has obtainedresidence status there. set in place for conducting a Dublin procedure with In August2011,theFederalAdministrativeCourtinSwitzerlandstrengthened thepreconditions judgment. M.S.S. vBelgiumandGreece The majorityofMemberStatesofficially suspendedtransferstoGreece inthedirect aftermathofthe 11.1.1. Transfers toGreece by usingthesovereignty clause. unreasonable amountoftime,thepresent Member Statemustitselfexaminetheasylumapplication if theexaminationoffurthercriteriatodetermineanotherMemberStateisresponsible takesan 262 FOM letter to theSwiss Refugee Council 24January2012. 261 Federal Administrative Court,BVGE 2011/35of16 August 2011. 260 TAR-LAZIO c.N.6471/2009S.7880/2012ofSeptember 19th2012. 259 258 Within thattimeperiod,Bulgariasent63outgoingrequests andcarriedout44transfersinpractice continued carryingoutDublintransferstoGreece phases. Inthefirstphase,from January2011toAugust2011,theSARandBulgarianCourt The policyofBulgariatowards suspensionof transfers toGreece isdividedintotwodifferent transfers to Greece, 31January2011,accessible at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4d7610d92.pdf information Note onNational Practice intheApplication of 3(2)of Article theDublinIIRegulation inthecontext inparticular of intended the Convention. For furtherinformation seeECRE/ELENAResearch onECHRRule 39interim measures, April2012;UNHCRUpdated transfers inrespect ofasylum seekers whoclaimedthattheirreturn to Greece mightexpose themto ill-treatment inviolationof State challenges hisorherreturn to Greece. TheEuropean CourtofHumanRights invited MemberStates to refrain from issuing judgment, theCourtwould grant Rule 39oftheRules oftheCourt in anycase where anasylum seeker inanotherContracting the European CourtofHumanRights indicated to MemberStates that,pendingtheadoptionofM.S.S.vBelgium andGreece judgment, for example, Belgium suspendedtransfers inOctober 2010.Thiswas for anumberofreasons includingthefact that A numberofMemberStates hadalready unofficially suspendedtransfers to Greece inthelead upto theM.S.S.vBelgium and Greece international protection” the application lodged, thedetermining was MemberState becomes theMemberState responsible for examining theapplication for to any MemberStatethis paragraph designated onthebasisof thecriteria set outinChapter IIIorto thefirst MemberState withwhich in order to establishwhether another MemberState can bedesignated asresponsible. Where cannot thetransfer bemade pursuant to Fundamental Rights of the European Union,thedetermining MemberState shallcontinue to examine thecriteria set outinChapter III applicants inthat MemberState resulting treatment inriskof inhumanordegrading withinthemeaningof 4of of Article theCharter there are substantial grounds for believing that there are intheasylum systemic procedure flaws andreception conditions for asylum Recast Art.3(2)“…Where itisimpossible to anapplicant transfer to theMemberState primarily designated asresponsible because Greece. However, it should be noted that between February 2011 and February Greece 258 261 has not been issued in Inpractice,theFOMappliessovereignty clauseinmost 259 However, anumberofMemberStateshavenotissued from ruling. despite theM.S.S.vBelgiumandGreece Greece by requiring that the asylum seeker judgment and M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Italy inthecontextofDublinRegulation. as reported inAustria,Italy, Slovakiaand Slovakia, but when it is indicated that since January2011.Similarly, in 262 260 law. State is safeand respects refugee its obligations under both EUand International and humanrights Dutch policy, itistheasylumseeker’s responsibility torebut thepresumption thatanotherMember Netherlands effectively prohibited alltransfersundertheDublinRegulationtoGreece. According to examined approximately 2050 ‘Greek’ Dublincases. 269 AliensCircular C2/3.6.1. 268 267 Letter from theMinister ofJustice, 13October 2010,Kamerstukken II2010/2011,19637, no.1363. 266 ECRE/ELENAResearch onECHRRule 39interim measures, April2012. 265 264 For furtherinformation ontheimpactofreadmission agreement between Greece andBulgaria seeChapter X,10.1.2above. 263 2010. In toextendthispolicyofsuspensiontillJanuary2014. German government was subsequentlyextendedtoJanuary2013.InDecember2012,thedecisionmade by the Germany announcedageneralpolicyofsuspendingtransferstoGreece untilJanuary2012.This the basis when asylum seekers explicitly consent to beingsent there. in TheFederalgovernment judgment, in Belgium and Greece before theirrequest for asylumwasregistered atthecompetentPrefecture. SincetheM.S.S.v immediately suspended andthefactthatsomeasylumseekershadtowaitanumberofmonths there were someinitialdifficulties inapplyingitduetosometransfersofpersonsnotbeing France suspendedDublintransferstoGreece on2March 2011untilfurthernotice.However, subsequent toAugust2011. second phaseofBulgarianpolicytowards transferstoGreece becameapparent intheperiod to refrain from registering asylum seekers who entered Bulgariairregularly through Greece . The to Circular isplannedonthis issue. and C-411/10C-493/10judgments,there isnoindicationthatarevision oftheAliens Aliens Circular havenotyet beenbrought judgment intolinewiththeM.S.S.vBelgiumandGreece asylum seekerspresent in theNetherlands. case. transfers were conducted pendingtheGrandChamberrulinginM.S.S.vBelgiumandGreece seekers who transited There havebeenreported instancesofBulgariapreventing theregistration ofclaimsfrom asylum good practice,itappearsthatthereadmission agreement withGreece place andtheBulgarianauthoritieshavestoppedsendingDublinrequests toGreece . Despitethis the readmission agreement toGreece. the Netherlands,ageneralsuspensionoftransferstoGreece wasimplementedinOctober Greece. Duringthesemonthsitwasalsonotedbylegalpractitioners’thattheSARstarted january 2012). ‘Beantwoording schriftelijke met kenmerk vragen 2011Z24518(het Rapport Vreemdelingenketen lidSpekmanover juli–januari 2011)(31 the ‘Greek’ asylum requests hadbeenprocessed, ofwhich60%were granted apermit.Seereply to Parliamentary Questions: Kingdom Relations ‘Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen januari-juni’p.18.AttheendofNovember 2011 2011,more than90%of Dublin applicants reported to theIND,whohadpreviously departed to ‘anunknown destination’. SeeMinistry ofInterior and Once theNetherlandsstarted examining applications of Dublinapplicants whoentered through Greece, around 100additional violation ofECHR. This suspensionwas only applicable to cases where asylum seekers appealed theirremoval to Greece onthebasisofa riskofa the M.S.S.vBelgium and Greece ruling. It isunclear why there was only achangeofpolicyinAugust 2011bytheBulgarian authorities,several months after theissuing of 269 266 265 Thoughthere hasbeenasuspensionontransfersto Greece, thepolicyrulesinDutch Atthattime,Greece wasresponsible forthe asylum applicationsofapproximately 1900 Thiswasaresult ofaletter from theEuropean CourtofHumanRightsrequesting thatno Greece, 263 Sincethen,notransfersundertheDublinRegulationhavetaken treating them as irregular migrants so they can be removed under Hungary, transfers to 264 267 Asaresult ofthischangepolicy, theNetherlands 268 FollowingtheECtHRCourtruling, Greece have only been carried out on is beingappliedinitsplace. 113 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 114 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 270 paragraph 107inNS&Others. Currently, there isdiverging theinterpretation of practiceamongstMemberStatesconcerning 11.1.1.1. therefore the sovereignty clauseforallasylumseekerswho entered Italy via meaning thatGermanyisentitledtotransferanasylumseekerItalyiftheyentered Germany of otherMemberStatescanbeexamined.Thishasbeenexplainedbyrepresentatives ofBAMFas The BAMFinGermanyconsidersthatparagraph107hasgivenclarityastowhethertheresponsibility responsible MemberState. Hungary orItalytotakeoverresponsibility foranasylumapplicationwhere Greece wastheprimary an irregular border crossing underArt.10.TheFOMinSwitzerlandhassometimesrequested Germany sometimestrytoidentifyanotherMemberStateasresponsible usuallyonthebasisof When atransferisnotpossibletoGreece, administrativeauthoritiesinSwitzerland,Austriaand pending before theCJEUattimeofwriting. seeking clarification bytheCJEU whichthe AustrianCourtdid,in thecase ofC-394/12 which istill practice, theConstitutionalCourtordered theAustrianAsylumCourttorequest apreliminary ruling which theasylumseekertransitedisresponsible undertheDublinRegulation.Duetothisdiverging no longerassumedandinsteadtheAustrianauthoritiesconsidersthatnextMemberState However, asimilarpracticeisevidentinAustria,thattheoretical responsibility byGreece is Regulation torapidlyidentifyoneresponsible Member Statefortheexaminationofanasylumclaim. Such aninterpretation of the CJEUrulingseemsatvariancewithoverallobjectiveofDublin in accordance withtheprocedure laid downinArticle3(2)ofRegulationNo343/2003. length of time. If necessary, the first mentioned MemberStatemust itself examine theapplication using aprocedure fordeterminingtheMemberState responsible, whichtakesanunreasonable not worsen asituation where the fundamental rights of thatapplicant have beeninfringedby 108: TheMemberStateinwhichtheasylumseekerispresent must,however, ensure thatitdoes the examinationofasylumapplication. one ofthefollowingcriteriaenablesanotherMemberStatetobeidentifiedas responsible for transfer mustcontinue to examine the criteria set outinthatchapterorder toestablishwhether set outinChapterIIIofthatregulation, entailsthattheMemberStatewhichshouldcarryout where that Stateis identified asthe Member State responsible in accordance with thecriteria No 343/2003,thefindingthatitisimpossibletotransferanapplicantanotherMemberState, 107: NS &OthersC-411/10andC-493/10 there were 38transferstoGreece from otherMember States(Source: Greek DublinUnit). 43 ofwhomcamefrom Bulgaria(Source: Eurostat statistics).From JanuarytoSeptember2012 Greece: Dublin Regulation(Source: Parliamentary enquirytotheAustrianMinistryofInterior). back 124asylumseekersfrom Austriaandonlytwopersonswere transferred there underthe were actuallytransferred there undertheDublinRegulation. In2011Greece accepted totake Austria: National Facts: Court atthetime ofwritingthisreport. concerning theinterpretation ofArt. 18,19andArt.10DublinRegulation inthecase ofC-394/12whichisstill pending before the See VfGH27.06.2012,U330/12.Accordingly theAustrian Asylum Court sentanumberofpreliminary reference questions to theCJEU Greece andItaly. BAMFrepresentatives claimthatItalyisequallyresponsible for invoking Subject totherightitselfexamineapplicationreferred toinArticle3(2)ofRegulation Italy’s In 2011 a total of 55 asylum seekers were transferred to Greece under the Dublin Regulation, In 2010Greece acceptedtotakeback494asylumseekersfrom Austriaand178persons Others C-411/10andC-493/10 Interpretation ofthePrinciplesinJoinedCJEUcasesNS& obligation to invokethesovereignty clausemayantecedeGermany’s obligation. 270
via Greece thenGermanyand being thelarge influxof refugees from NorthAfrica. were grantedinsomecases inGermanCourtstostopremovals toItaly, arelevant factatthattime factorsintheresponsibleexternal MemberStateare takenintoaccountforexampleinterimreliefs nothing tothecontrarysuggestotherwiseincountryreports onthatMemberState.Onoccasion State respects the1951Refugee Convention,theECHRandrelevant EUlaw, holdingthatthere is Rights. Frequently national jurisprudencecontainsstatementstotheeffect thataparticularMember in theresponsible Member Statemayresult inaviolationofECHRortheCharterFundamental to compared withwhenfacedchallenges from asylumseekersonthebasisthatconditions Some nationalCourtsviewGreece asthegeneralbenchmarkagainstwhichallMemberStatesare basis oftheconditionsinthoseStateslightCJEUrulings. Greece’. ItalianCourtshaveinindividualcasesstoppedtransferstoMaltaandHungaryonthe only toemphasisethatconditionsinMemberStatesthoseare ‘notasbad by theadministrativeauthoritiesinAustriarelation toDublintransfersItalyandHungarybut stopping transferstoGreece undertheDublinRegulation.NS&Othersare oftencitedindecisions in 275 274 273 272 Frankfurt Administrative Court7/3/20117L.449/II.F.A. 271 was availableforparticularlyvulnerablepersons. whether theadministrativeauthoritiesobtainedpre-removal assurancesforexamplewhetherhousing Depending ontheindividualcircumstances ofacasenationalCourtssometimestakeintoaccount suspended. c) UNHCRand/orNGO’s haveformallyrecommended thattransferstocertainMemberStatesare in theimplementationofrelevant EUasylumlegislationinthatMemberState; b) regular andunanimous reports byNGOshavebeenpublished documenting practicalproblems standards inrelation totransferscountriessuchasHungary, ItalyandMalta. receptionRecently questions have been raised concerning conditionsandasylumprocedures 11.1.2. Transfers tootherMemberStates A few common trends can be drawn from the jurisprudence gathered as part of this research. State fornon-compliancewithrelevant EUasylumlegislation; a) theCommissionhasstartedinfringementproceedings before theCJEUagainstthatMember evaluating therisksthatasylumseekersmayfaceinaparticularStateare whether: The mainfactorstakenintoaccountbyMemberStates’administrativeauthoritiesandCourtswhen over aperiodoftime.Theasylumseekers’past experiencesintheresponsible MemberStateis conditions intheresponsible MemberStateparticularlywhendifferent partieshaveraisedconcerns Germany www.dublin-project.eu Case summariesofallthejurisprudence gathered aspartofthisproject are available inthejurisprudence database at 1/2011-5E; S16422.760-1/2011-5E. Austrian jurisprudence from December 2011:S16422.756-1/2011-5E;422.757-1/2011-5E; S16422.758-1/2011-5E;422.759- 3310/2011 regarding thecancellation ofatransfer decisionto Hungary. Austrian Asylum Court,S22423.415-1/2011-3E,16January2012inthecontext oftransfers to Italy; SeealsoItalian TAR decision Cn. 08.06.2011 -11B36/11. Administrative CourtRegensburg Decisionof 24.06.2011-RO 7E11.30281;Administrative CourtSchleswig-Holstein Decisionof Darmstadt Decisionof15.03.2011-4L316/11.DA.A(1); Administrative CourtMagdeburg Decisionof28.06.2011-5B174/11MD; to Malta onthisissue include:Administrative CourtRegensburg Decisionof06.09.2011-RN7E11.30429;Administrative Court fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/18418.pdf ;Similarcases from GermanCourts whichgranted interim relief against deportation detention practice andconditions inMalta, whichwere held to beinviolationofArt.3ECHR,accessible at:http://www.asyl.net/ For example atransfer decisionwas suspendedbytheRegensburg Administrative CourtRO 7E11.30131onthebasisof Ca se S t
u
d y there havebeenmore than200administrativeCourt decisionssinceJanuary2011 Case Study: had expired. (NationallitigationinSwitzerlandisstillpendingthiscase). had expired. permits despite the fact that their residence to Greece The family was transferred whentheyclaimedasyluminSwitzerland(Art.9DublinRegulation). in Greece permits that hadappliedforasylumonthegroundsthisfamilyresidence aSyrianfamilytoGreece In September2012theSwissauthoritiestransferred
275 272 MemberStateshaveadutytoinvestigatethe
274 271
Forexample 273
115 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 116 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 277 SeealsoBulgaria SofiaCityAdministrative Decisionno.79 of2009,Admincase no.7450of2009,30November 2009. 276 as theDublinRegulation and operativerulesdonotseemtoresolve thisissue. the momentofCourt’s decisiontosendthecasebackFOMbut furtherguidancemayberequired FOM decision. A literalreading of the CJEU ruling in C-19/08 seems to suggestthat the timestarts from moment ofthedecisionCourttosend case backtotheFOMoratmomentofnew ambiguity astowhenthenewsixmonthdeadline forimplementationofthetransferstartsi.e.at Dublin decisionandthecaseissentbacktobere-examined bytheFOM. Insuchascenariothere is a further clarificationasto whathappenstothe timelimit when theCourtgrantsan appealagainst In considerable delaysbefore theirasylumapplicationisexaminedbyaMember State. anew eachtime,thismakesthewholeprocess a protracted oneandasylum seekerscanbesubjectto there maybemore thanoneDublindecisionandappeal.Therefore, asthedeadlinefortransfers starts reported thatinmanycases whenappealsgrantedare remitted backto the FederalAsylumoffice that it is applied in cases where suspensive effect is granted at the appeal stage. In Austria, it was Most MemberStatesresearched didnothaveanyfurtherinformationonthisapartfrom acknowledging and whichisnolongersuchastoprevent itsimplementation. procedure, buyonlyasfrom thetimeofjudicialdecisionwhichruleson the meritsofprocedure not asfrom thetimeofprovisional judicialdecisionsuspendingtheimplementationoftransfer CJEU heldthatwithrespect totimelimits,theperiodforimplementationoftransferbeginsrun, stage does the period for the implementation of transfer start to run from under those provisions. The Regulation where anational procedure hasanappealwithsuspensiveeffect andaccordingly atwhat theinterpretationThe CJEUrulingofC-19/08concerned ofArt.20(1)(d)andArticle20(2)theDublin 11.2. also arelevant factorindeterminingwhethertheyare atriskuponreturntothatState. in SwitzerlandchallengingatransfertoRomaniaonthebasisoftheirpolicyreturns. asylum policiesinMemberStates,anexampleofwhichisprovidedaCourtcase belowconcerning number ofCourtshavealsoaddressed theissueofchallengestotransfersonbasisdifferent Jurisprudence (Federal AdministrativeCourtSwitzerlandE-5265/20117December2011). order wascancelledandthecaseremitted back totheFOMapplysovereignty clause principle.Thetransfer granted asylum,asexpulsiontoChinawouldviolatethenon-refoulement contrast toSwisspracticewhereby according tonational jurisprudencemostTibetansare generally for RefugeesdemonstratingthatRomaniahadapolicyofreturning TibetanstoChina.Thisisin Switzerland suspendedthetransfertoRomania.Letterswere submittedfrom theRomanianCouncil being sentbacktoChinaifhewastransferred toRomania.TheFederalAdministrativeCourtin his informationtotheChineseauthoritiesasbrother there wassubsequentlyarrested. Hefeared previous year. Heclaimedtheinterpreter intheRomanianasylumprocedure hadleakedsomeof A Tibetan asylumseeker claimed asylum in Switzerland after having claimedasylum in Romania the Challenges totransfersonthebasisofMemberStatepolicy Switzerland, the nationalauthorities apply this Court ruling but there isone point thatmayrequire decision regarding atransfer to CyprusinCaseNo.306700. Conseil d’Etat N°1013868/9-regarding thetransfer ofanasylum seeker from France to Hungary;seealsotheConseild’Etat C-19/08 The CJEU case of Migrationsverket v Petrosian 276 277 Asmall an interimmeasure hasbeenissuedanasylumseekerenjoyslawfulresidence intheNetherlands, Member State, then the person concerned canstillbetransferred.Member State,thenthepersonconcerned However ifthewithdrawaltakesplaceafterDublinrequest wasacceptedbytheresponsible considered responsible, thetransferiscancelledbecauseasylumrequest haslostitsrelevance. is withdrawnbefore the claim totakecharge oftherequest isacceptedbytheMemberState C-620/10 isinterpreted as follows in DutchpracticetheNetherlands,ifanasylumrequest and theDublinprocedure are considered tobeindependent ofeachother. application does not impact the Dublin procedure and it maybe continued as the asylum procedure withdraw atanytime.However, according toestablished caselaw, thewithdrawalofanasylum As regards Switzerland,submittinganasylumapplicationisapersonalright,soitpossibleto has withdrawntheirasylumapplication. of withdrawal.InpracticenotransferismadetoanotherMemberStatewhenthepersonconcerned cases, buttheDublinUnithasanobligationtoinformresponsible MemberStateabouttheact application hasnoinfluenceonthecontinuationofDublinprocedure in relation totakeback the MemberStatesresearched. InSlovakiaitwasreported thattheactofwithdrawingasylum Only limited information was available on the impact of withdrawing from an asylum application in the effect thattheRegulationcannolongerbeapplicable. which occursbefore theMemberStateresponsible hasagreed totakecharge oftheapplicant,has operation oftheDublinRegulation.TheCJEUheldthatwithdrawalanasylumapplication, theeffectThe CJEUcaseofC-620/10concerned awithdrawalanasylumapplicationhadonthe 11.3. the procedures oftheEuropean CourtofHumanRightssuspendsthetransferterminarticle20. C-19/08. IntheNetherlandsCouncilofStatehasalsoheldthataninterimmeasure underRule39of The DutchCouncilofState’s interpretation ofarticle20(1)(d)isinaccordance withthejudgment in 282 Thisisinaccordance withprevious practice intheNetherlands. 281 280 ABRvS[CouncilofState], 11November 2011,case no.201007173/1/V4. 279 ABRvS[CouncilofState], 25May 2004, case no.200400863/1. 278 ABRvS[CouncilofState], 22February 2012,case no.201105103/1/V4. exist with respect to the interpretation of the CJEU rulings, further clarification of which should occur Greece andtoacertainextentbeyondthatotherMemberStates.Nevertheless variationsstill significantly affected thewayinwhichDublinRegulationisapplied in respect oftransfersto Both those subjecttotheDublinRegulation. fundamental rightsinprincipleare notinthemselvessufficient toensure adequateprotection for treatiesthe existenceofdomesticlawsandaccession tointernational guaranteeingrespect for law.States obligations under international judgmentshowsthat TheM.S.S.vBelgiumandGreece It isclearthattheDublinRegulationcannotoperate inalegalvacuumdetachedfrom Member of HumanRightsisregarded asafactualbarrierrelating tothepostponementofmomenttransfer. may therefore notbetransferred undertheDublinRegulation.Aninterimmeasure from theEuropean Court in lightofC-620/10 atthetimeofwritingthisreport. FOM, DublinOffice 1,information provided inwriting,29March 2012.Itwas notknown whetherthisjurisprudence has beenrevised andthejoinedCJEUcasesofC-411/10C-493/10 have M.S.S. vBelgiumandGreece C-620/10 The CJEUcaseofMigrationsverketvKastrati *** 282
281
278 279 Once Once and and 280
117 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 118 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings applicants undertheDublinRegulation. obligationswhentheytransfers ensuring thatMemberStatesfullycomplywiththeirinternational of thequalityreception conditionsandasylumprocedures inMemberStatesisalsocentralto 285 284 283 Recommendations challenges totheDublintransfersandimplementationoftheserulings. practitioners, andNGOstomonitor, report anddisseminaterelevant nationalcase lawregarding In theaftermathofthesemilestonejudgmentsitisimportanttounderscore theneedforlegal in theCourt’s rulinginthependingcaseofC-394/12. requesting MemberState. that all persons subject to the Dublin procedure have access toan effective legal remedy in the authorities conductacloseandrigorous scrutinyoftheindividualcircumstances ofeachcaseand Greece shouldnotbeviewedas‘thebenchmark’.Therefore itisalsoessentialthatadministrative the presumption ofsafetyisrebutted willvarydepending onthecircumstances ofthecaseand outweigh respect forthefundamentalrightsofeachandeverypersonsubjecttoit.Aswhen authorities andCourtsrecognize thatthepresumption ofsafetywithintheDublinsystemcannot the presence of objective evidence by NGOs and other actors. It is imperative that administrative is aseriousriskofasylumseekers’fundamentalrightsinotherMemberStatesthanGreece despite project showsthatMemberStateshavearestrictive approach toidentifyingsituationswhere there http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/. Belgium andGreece, July 2011.Inthiscontext seealsotheEuropean Database onAsylum Law(EDAL), accessible at: International Commission ofJurists, workshop onmigration andhumanrights inEurope: Non-refoulement inEurope after M.S.S.v Re-thinking of theDublinIIRegulation’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 30No.3,pp.107-128. Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012)HumanRights LawReview, 287;Patricia Mallia‘ Case of M.S.S.vBelgium andGreece, aCatalyst inthe Journal ofMigration andLawVol 14No.1 2012. pp.1-31;CathrynCostello, Access ‘Courting to Asylum inEurope: Recent Supranational See for furtheranalysis onthisissue: Violeta Moreno Law, ‘DismantlingtheDublinSystem: M.S.S.vBelgium andGreece’, European outset constitute anevent establishing responsibility withinthemeaning ofArticle 10ofRegulation (EC)No343/2003? Others vRefugee Applications Commissioner]? Inparticular, can itbeassumed thatastay insuchaMemberState cannot from the of Justice of21December 2011inJoinedCasesC-411/10andC-493/10[NSvSecretary of State for andME theHomeDepartment with primaryresponsibility withinthemeaningofRegulation (EC)No343/2003,notwithstanding thejudgmentofEuropean Court Court ofHumanRights of21January2011,M.S.S.,30.696/09,isitnecessary to come to adifferent assessment oftheMemberState a MemberState whoseasylum system displays systemic deficienciesequivalent to thosedescribedinthejudgmentofEuropean irregular entryinto thefirst MemberState. Irrespective of theanswer to Question 2,ifthe‘first MemberState’ referred to therein is directly to athird MemberState, where helodges hisfirst asylum claim. Atthispoint,less than12monthshave elapsedsince his Member State (‘second MemberState’), whichheenters irregularly. From thatsecond MemberState, hecontinues immediately and claim asylum there. Hethen departs for athird country. After less thanthree months,hetravels from athird country to anotherEU situation materialises: Athird-country nationaltravels from athird country, entering thefirst MemberState irregularly. Hedoesnot Member State’) must accept its responsibility for examining theasylum application ofathird-country nationalifthefollowing Regulation (EC)No343/2003to beinterpreted asmeaningthattheMemberState inwhichafirst irregular entrytakes place (‘first for asylum examined byaparticularMemberState responsible inaccordance withthoseresponsibility criteria? IsArticle 10(1)of purposes ofits appeal orreview procedure? Inthat regard, doesevery asylum seeker have anindividualrightto have hisapplication not beenrequested to take charge orhasnotgiven its agreement), to determine thatthe otherMemberState isresponsible for the another State istheMemberState responsible pursuant to Chapter IIIofRegulation (EC)No343/2003(even where thatState has procedure inaccordance withArticle 19(2)ofRegulation (EC)No343/2003,irrespective ofthatagreement, itcomes to theview that Regulation No343/2003,ordoesEuropean lawobligethenational review authoritywhere, inthecourse ofanappealorreview State istheState responsible for examining theasylum application withinthemeaningofintroductory partofArticle 16(1)of to beinterpreted asmeaningthat,following theagreement ofaMemberState inaccordance withthoseprovisions, thatMember The questions intheCJEU case ofC-394/12are asfollows: IsArticle 19inconjunction withArticle 18ofRegulation (EC)No343/2003 infringement proceedings where appropriate. other EU asylum legislation is properly implementedat the national level and take The European Commission should ensure that the recast Dublin Regulation alongwith with thejurisprudenceofEuropean CourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)andCJEU. Member Statesmustensure thatDublinRegulationisappliedinamannerconsistent 284 European Commission Member States 283 Thejurisprudencegathered aspartofthis 285 Awareness raising States. sharing andtakesintoaccountmeaningfulconnectionsbetweenasylumseekersMember in replacing systemthatensures theDublinRegulation withanalternative genuineresponsibility other componentsoftheCEASandEUsolidaritytoolsare builtup. inbuildingtheCEAS’tobefundamentallyreviewedof theDublinsystemasa‘cornerstone as protection obligations,is essential inthenextstageofCEAS.Thisresearch callsfortheposition a harmonizedapplicationofEUprotection standards,andregional whichmeetinternational to create hardship forasylumseekersaslongthere isan‘asylumlottery’inEurope. Therefore the applicationofDublinRegulationalonewillnotsuffice, astheDublinsystemwillcontinue effectively, whilefullyrespecting thefundamentalrights ofthosesubjecttoit.Improvements in In thisnewstageoftheCEAS,challengeforEurope willbetoapplytherecast DublinRegulation they donotoccuragainunderthisnextphaseoftheCEAS. to highlighttheproblems characterizingthecurrent operationoftheDublinsystemtoensure that may notinitselfrectify a number ofproblems identifiedinthis report. Nevertheless,itisimportant Dublin system. This is regrettable as though an improved recast Dublin Regulationwill be helpful it engaged intherevision of theDublinRegulationasopposedtoafundamentalre-thinking ofthe It is human rightslaw, mostnotablythefundamentalrighttoasylum. a mannerthatresults inevadingobligationsundertheDublinRegulationandinternational report alsoshowsthatreadmission agreements are sometimesimplementedbyMemberStatesin case, identifyingnoMemberState,thusperpetuatingthesituationof“asylumseekersinorbit”.This is inconsistentleadingtolengthydelaysinidentifyingaresponsible MemberStateor, intheworst resorting to the use of detention to secure Dublin transfers. Cooperation between Member States are oftensubjectedtolessthenadequatereception conditionswithMemberStatesfrequently vary significantlybothwithinandacross MemberStates.AsylumseekersintheDublinprocedure Member States apply the binding Dublin criteria and discretionary provisions. Procedural safeguards which have been the subject of this study. There are vast andworrying disparities in the way different A harmonizedapplication of theDublinRegulationisfarfrom reality intheelevenMemberStates, identified byUNHCRandECREin2006are asapplicabletodaytheywere then. fortheexaminationofanasylumclaim.Manyissues identifying aMemberStateresponsible failstoachieveitsobjectiveof ofsuchasystemwhichfrequently questions astotheraisond’être As thetenyearanniversaryofDublinRegulationapproaches, thefindingsinthis report raise XII. Conclusion 288 ECRE,SharingResponsibility for Refugee Protection inEurope: DublinReconsidered, March 2008(‘Dublin Reconsidered’). 287 Recital 9oftheDublinrecast Dublincompromise text. 286 recommended: and protection ofthefundamentalrightsasylumseekersfollowing additionalmeasures are In order toensure thattheDublinRegulationisappliedinamannerconsistentwithrespect On thebasisofthisresearch, specific recommendations havebeenprovided throughout the report. Discussion Paper, April2006. ECRE/ELENA acknowledged that this report comes at a time when EU institutions and Member States are 288
Report ontheApplication of the DublinIIRegulation inEurope, March 2006; UNHCRTheDublinIIRegulation: AUNHCR 287 Ultimately, thesolutionlies 286
119 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings 120 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Report Findings Recommendations in amannerconsistentwiththeirECHRobligations. impact oftheDublinsystemandpress MemberStatestoapplytheDublinRegulation The CouncilofEurope Commissioner forHumanRightsshouldcontinuetomonitorthe Curriculum DublinRegulationmodulebyMemberStatesatthenationallevel. EASO shouldconductathorough review oftheimplementationEuropean Asylum States’ asylumsystemsthatitobtains. enhance andpublishthecollectionofdataonqualityoperationMember expertise inthisfield. to theapplicationofDublinRegulationwhichwillincludeorganizationswithspecific create expertworkshopscompetenttoaddress problematic nationalpracticesrelated management, EASOshould: preparednessIn view of the establishment of a mechanism for early warning, and crisis fundamental rightsinEurope FRA shouldundertakeresearch on the impactofDublinsystemonasylumseekers European AsylumSupportOffice (EASO) Fundamental RightsAgency(FRA) Council ofEurope Annexes 121 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 122 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes • • • • • • • • • • • • Definitions Annex I provides informationonwhere andwhenhis/herfuture appointmentswiththeQuesturawillbeheld. Cedolino: registering asylumseekersanddeliveringresidence permits. Prefecture: States toMemberdifferent from theoneoffirstarrival. movement: Secondary seeker from therequesting MemberState. to signifythattheMemberStateisreceiving anincomingrequest and/orreceiving anasylum Requested/Receiving Member State: thesetermsare usedinterchangeably intheDublinreport asylum seekertothereceiving MemberState. report to signify that the Member State is sending an outgoing request and/or transferring an State: thesetermsare usedinterchangeably intheDublin Member Requesting/Transferring sent bythereferring MemberStatetoanother State. application, orfortakingcharge ofanasylumseekerinorder toexaminehis/herasylumapplication, Outgoing Request: application, sentbyanotherMemberState. asylum application, or for taking charge ofan asylum seekerinorder toexamine his/her asylum Incoming Request: Requestsforanasylumseekertobetakenbackinorder tocompletehis/her Member Statemustatthelatter’s request takehim/herback. protectionfor international or might stay without permission, in which case the responsible responsible MemberStateandentersanotherwhere heorshemightapplyagain Back:‘TakeTake back’refers tothesituation where theapplicantleavesterritoryof (such asfamilyreasons, legalorillegalentry, etc.)andconsequentlyhastoexaminetheapplication. for anapplicantonthebasisofobjectiveandhierarchical criterialaiddownintheRegulation Take Charge: under theDublinRegulation. transferees: asylum seekers/applicant subject to a transfer decision returnees/Dublin Dublin asylum inrespect ofwhichafinaldecisionhasnotyetbeentaken(Art.2(d)DublinRegulation). seeker/Applicant:meansathird countrynationalwhohasmadeanapplicationfor Asylum Geneva Convention(Art.2(c)DublinRegulation). which canbeunderstoodasarequestprotection forinternational from aMemberStateunderthe TakeCharge: a receipt provided to asylum seekers at the end oftheir identification procedure, which regional delegationsoftheStateadministrationinFrancewhoare incharge of ‘Take charge’ means the procedure under which a Member State takes responsibility Application for Asylum: meansanapplicationmadebyathird-country national for Application Requests for an asylum seeker to be taken back to complete his/her asylum voluntary displacement of theasylumseeker withintheEUMember Recommendations Annex II 2. 1 1. 1. 3. 2. 1. Withrespect totheforthcoming‘fitnesscheck’: EASO should: In viewoftheestablishmentamechanism module ontheDublinRegulation byMemberStates. EASO shouldconductathorough review oftheimplementation oftheEuropean AsylumCurriculum rights inEurope. FRA shouldundertakeresearch ontheimpactofDublinsystemasylumseekersfundamental with theirECHRobligations. the Dublinsystemandpress MemberStatestoapplytheDublinRegulationinamannerconsistent The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights should continue to monitor the impact of where appropriate. asylum legislationisproperly implementedatthenationallevelandtakeinfringementproceedings The European Commissionshouldensure thattherecast DublinRegulationalongwithotherEU content issufficiently clear andunderstandablepresented inauser-friendly format. a testphaseshouldbeconductedwithsamplegroup ofasylumseekerstoensure thatthe When draftingthecommoninformationleafletenvisagedunderanewimplementing regulation, • • • • • • Enhance and publish the collection of data on the quality and operation of Member States’ States’ Member of operation asylum systemsthatitobtains. and quality the on data of collection the publish and Enhance this field. application oftheDublinRegulationwhichwillinclude organisations withspecificexpertisein the to related practices national problematic address to competent workshops expert Create into accountallavailablesources, includingUNHCRandNGOs. procedure shouldbeprioritisedbytheEuropean CommissionwiththesupportofEASO,taking Dublin the in seekers asylum of detention and reception the on practices national Monitoring assigned onthebasisoffamilymembers. is responsibility State Member limited why reasons the on conducted be should study Further the support of Member States on the impact of the Dublin system on unaccompanied children. with Commission European the by gathered be should data qualitative and quantitative More the Dublinsystem. The European Commission should conduct a comprehensive audit of all costs associated with European AsylumSupportOffice (EASO) Fundamental RightsAgency(FRA) European Commission Council ofEurope for early warning, preparedness for earlywarning, andcrisismanagement, 123 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 124 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes Recommendations Annex II 1. trafficking victims andLGBTIasylum seekers. Further research shouldbeconducted on theapplicationof DublinRegulationwith respect to 17. 16. 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. • • • 4. 3. 2. 1. variety ofmethodsusedinagedeterminationprocedures. margin the given cases error age-disputed of the in and applied be should doubt the of benefit The unaccompanied children intheDublinprocedure livingelsewhere intheterritory ofMemberStates; Member States should be more consistent and assiduous in their efforts to trace family members of the responsible MemberState; The principles of the best interests of the child should be the paramount consideration in identifying published by Member States. published byMemberStates. Comprehensive dataonthefinancialcostofoperatingDublinsystemshouldbecollectedand period in advance of removal. period inadvanceofremoval. Applicants in the Dublin procedure should be informed of a transfer decision within a reasonable Dublin procedure. Applicants shouldberegularly provided withinformationontheprogress oftheircasewithinthe that addresses thecomplex andvaryingsituationsinwhichmanyasylumseekersfindthemselves. The sovereignty andhumanitarian clauseshouldbeappliedinafair, humaneandflexiblemanner law.incompatible withtheirobligationsunderinternational Member Statesmustrespect thedutytoapplysovereignty clausewhere atransfer wouldbe in suchfamiliesbeingseparated. by applyingthehumanitarianclauseincaseswhere adherence tothebindingcriteriawouldresult Member Statesmustensure thattheprincipleoffamilyunityisrespected withintheDublinprocedure With respect tounaccompaniedchildren: Dublin Regulationstatisticsshouldbedisaggregated onthebasisofsexandage. enhanced incompliancewithMemberStateobligationsunderRegulation(EC)862/2007. The collectionofstatisticsontheapplicationDublinRegulationshouldbepublishedand jurisprudence oftheEuropean CourtofHumanRights (ECtHR)andCJEU. Member Statesmustensure thatDublinRegulationisappliedinamannerconsistent withthe humanrightsandrefugeeDublin Regulationandinternational law. Readmission agreements shouldnotbeusedtocircumvent MemberStatesobligationsunderthe the Dublinprocedure, MemberStates shouldprovide them free ofcharge. other documentation proving family links. If DNA tests are a requirement for proving family links in DNA testingshouldonlybeusedincomplexDublin caseswhere necessaryintheabsenceof procedural timelimitsunderArt.19(4)and20(2). The definitionofabscondingshouldbenarrowly definedforthepurposes ofextendingthe Transfers pursuanttotheDublinRegulationshould notresult intheimposition ofre-entry bans. all MemberStatesmuststrictlyadhere tothetimelimitssetoutinDublinRegulation. In order toensure thattheobjectiveofswiftaccesstoanasylumprocedure isachievedinpractice, procedure. equivalent standards ofreception conditionsforallasylumseekersincludingintheDublin Immediate stepsmustbetakentoimplementtheCJEUCourtrulingofC-179/11andensure to afullexaminationoftheirasylumclaim. persons subject to the Dublin Regulation must be guaranteed access to an asylum procedure and Pursuant totherightasylumguaranteedbyArt.18ofCharterFundamentalRights,all NGOs operating in thefieldofasylum Member States In order toachievethesegoals,theproject partners This project consistedoftwoobjectives,whichwere specificandinterdependent: and associations,theproject establishedacross border “casereferral” system. procedure in its different stages. Based on a European network of refugee-supporting organisations Refugee Fund. Thisproject aimedat providing more support topersonsplacedunder the Dublin application of the Dublin regulation”, Dublin the of application experience gainedfrom thatproject whilstenhancingitwiththeadditionalactivities. Thenewactivities This project maintainsthegeneralobjectivesoffirsttransnational Dublinproject, utilizing the with aspecialfocusonthelegalandjudicialaspects oftheDublinsystem. national and European levels. Thisproject focused on information gathering andknowledgesharing, stakeholder’s capacityto dealwithissuesrelated totheimplementationofDublinIIRegulationat assistance network for asylum seekers under a Dublin process” Dublin a under seekers asylum for network assistance concerned inboththetransferringMemberStateandreceivingconcerned MemberState. country whenthetransfertakesplace.Thisaimsatensuringcontinuityofcare fortheasylumseeker by thenetworkmemberincountryoftransferandtransmittedtotheircounterpartreadmission the situationofasylumseekerssubjecttoDublinprocedure. Thefileiscompletedduringinterviews Dublin procedure wasdesigned.Thisfileintendedtogatherasmuchinformationpossibleabout a As anotherpartofthisfirstphase,anindividualstandardized identificationsheetforasylumseekersin collection oftoolsdevelopedwithinthisfirstphasetheproject are availableonthiswebsite. and informationonthesituationineachcountryrelation totheDublinRegulation.Inaddition, (www.dublin-project.eu). Itprovides thelatestnewsonoperationofDublinsystemandresources A websitededicatedtotheDublinRegulationproject wasestablishedduringthisfirstphase 290 289 Transnational advisoryand assistance network for asylum seekers underaDublinprocess, FinalReport, 2011. 288 The secondEuropean RefugeeFundproject In December2009,ForumRéfugiés-Cosiestablishedaproject entitled Report ontheImplementationofProject Annex III Arabic, Somali,Farsi). (Eight nationalleafletswere created andprovided insixdifferent languages:English,French, Russian, national asylumsystemsandtheapplicationofDublinRegulationatlevelwere alsocreated of theDublinIIRegulation,results ofwhichwere compiledinthefinal report. Romania, France, Poland andtheNetherlands. Information leaflets are available inthefollowing countries: Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Switzerland,Spain,Italy, Hungary, (Belgium). Theseinformation leaflets are accessible at:www.dublin-project.eu (Ireland), Jesuit Refugee Service (Romania), Organisation Suisse d’Aide auxRéfugiés (Switzerland), Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen d’Asile (France), Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka (Poland), HungarianHelsinkiCommitee (Hungary),IrishRefugee Council (Spain), DanishRefugee Council(Denmark),Dutch council for Refugees (Netherlands),Forum réfugiés (France), France Terre The partnerorganizations were Asyl inNot(Austria), Italian refugee Council(Italy), ComisiónEspañoladeAyuda alRefugiado 2) 1) to which an asylum seeker is entitled. to whichanasylumseekerisentitled. practice, Dublintransfersoftenresult inaninterruptionthelegal,socialandmedicalsupport to ensure continuityinthelegal,socialandpracticalsupportprovided totheasylumseeker. In process ofbeingtakenincharge, ortakenbackbyMemberStatesundertheDublinRegulation. to strengthen theabilityofassociationsandorganisations toinformasylumseekersonthe 290
Second phaseoftheproject First phaseoftheproject started in July 2011. The aim of this project is to further develop startedinJuly2011.Theaimofthisproject istofurtherdevelop “European network for technical cooperation on the the on cooperation technical for network “European 288 undertookresearch onthenationalapplication which was supported by the European whichwassupportedbytheEuropean “Transnational advisory and and advisory “Transnational 289 Information booklets on Informationbookletson
125 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 126 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes distributed toasylumseekersintheDublinprocedure As intheprevious project, informationleaflets/brochures were developedbythenewpartnersand When thenetworkwasextended,particularconsiderationgivento: 293 New information leaflets were provided for the following countries: Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria andGermany. 292 291 than 1,000asylumseekersunderaDublinprocedure. been completed.Throughout thenetwork,wehaveassistedandprovided specificcounsellingtomore asylum seekers,therefore, received assistancefrom partnerorganisations withouttheformeverhaving form isoftendifficult, due tolackoftimewiththeasylumseekerorabsenceaninterpreter. Some However, monitoringasylumseekersinaDublinprocedure, andfillingouttheindividualmonitoring the partners. partners rightatthestartofthisproject. Thistoolisoperationalanditusedsystematicallybymostof seekers inaDublinprocedure continuestobeusedbythepartnersandhasalsobeenprovided tonew country ofreadmission when thetransferactuallytakesplace.Theindividualmonitoringformforasylum This activityaimstomonitorthetreatment oftheasylumseekersinbothcountrytransferand 1. Legal,socialandmaterialassistancefollow-upforasylumseekersinaDublinprocedure II Regulation. The production ofnational reports andaEuropean comparativereport ontheapplicationofDublin States regarding theapplicationofDublinIIRegulation;3)RegulationTraining Module;4) 2) Enhanceknowledgeandshare expertiseonlegalstandards andcaselawamongdifferent Member assistance andfollow-upforasylumseekerswhichincludesthedevelopmentofaninformationleaflet; The project activitiescanbedividedintoanumberofdifferent themes:1)Legal,socialandmaterial Ireland, Belgium and Poland. Most ofpartnerorganisations forthefirstproject participatedinthissecondphaseoftheproject, except application oftheDublinRegulationitself. into contactwithasylumseekersintheDublinprocedure andtoenhanceknowledgeonthetechnical included the development of a training module for legal representatives and support staff who come case summarieshave been drafted and uploadedon the project website within ajurisprudence database. an established methodology, which summarized the key legal elements of eachjudicial decision. 193 vulnerable personsandtheuseofdetention.Thisinformation wasconvertedintobriefingnotesfollowing help identify current failures as well as good practices and focusingon sensitive issues like familyunity, The project partnerscollectedexistingnationalcaselawontheapplication oftheDublinRegulationto States regarding theapplicationofDublinIIRegulation. 2. Enhance knowledge and share expertise on legal standards and case law among different Member (France) andFrance Terre d’asile (France). Committee (Hungary), LegalClinicfor Refugees andExiles (Bulgaria), HumanRights League(Slovakia), Forum réfugiés-Cosi Several partners organizations usetheindividualmonitoring form onaregular basis: Asyl inNot(Austria), Hungarian Helsinki Réfugiés (Switzerland). League (Slovakia), European CouncilonRefugees andExiles, DanishRefugee Council(Denmark)andOrganisation Suisse d’Aide aux (Hungary), JesuitRefugee Service (Romania), Aitima(Greece), LegalClinicfor Refugees and Immigrants (Bulgaria), HumanRights Dutch Councilfor Refugees (Netherlands),Forum Réfugiés (France), France Terre d’Asile (France), HungarianHelsinkiCommittee Partner organizations are: Asyl inNot(Austria), Italian Refugee Council(Italy), ComisionEspanoladeAyuda alRefugiado (Spain), c) b) a) received ahighnumberofin-comingandout-goingrequests): Germany. A major MemberStateregarding the impact of the DublinII Regulation (i.e. a country which European Union:SlovakiaandBulgaria; where there are highstakesregarding borders theirgeographicallocationattheexternal of Member States where informationon the application of theDublin procedure wasscarce and States and the situation of asylum seekers arriving in these States: Greece; States andthesituationofasylumseekersarrivingintheseStates:Greece; Member Stateswithparticulardifficulties with regard totheexecutionoftransfersthese 291 The scope ofthe project was also extendedtofourmore countries. Project activities 293 292 . relation totheapplication oftheDublinIIRegulationinEurope. Report whichisasynthesisofthenationalreports andshedslightontheoverallEuropean situationin asylum systemsintheseMemberStates.Thisworkisstrengthened bytheEuropean Comparative national level.Supplementaryinformationwasalsogathered onreception conditionsandthegeneral every country. TheyaimtoclearlysetoutthetechnicalapplicationofDublinIIRegulationat The nationalreports drafted byproject partnersare thefruitofextensiveresearch workcarriedout in Dublin IIRegulation the of application the on report comparative European a and reports national of production The 4. audience ofprofessionals (NGOs,lawyers,socialworkers...). training module,project partners atthenationalleveldelivered oneseminaropentoamultidisciplinary Romanian, Bulgarian,German,Italian,Spanish,Greek, Hungarian,Bulgarian,Slovakian).Basedonthis national languages of partner countries and is available in 11 different languages (English, French, The trainingmodulecanbedownloadeddirectly from theprojects’ website. Itistranslatedintothe knowledge ofthisRegulation. contains general principles, case studies and exercises for readers to enable them to recap on their module usesexamplesfrom lawyers’practiceonhowtheDublinIIRegulationworks.Eachchapter its supportingregulations, European HumanRights lawandotherrelevant EUasylumlegislation.The to thisRegulation.Itprovides anoverviewoftheDublinsystem,basedonIIRegulation, beneficial forNGOstaff andothersupport/serviceproviders whocomeacross asylumseekerssubject Regulation. Thisinteractivemoduleisdesignedforlawyersandlegalpractitionersitwillalsobe A veryimportantachievementoftheproject isthecreation ofatrainingmoduleontheDublinII 3. DublinIIRegulationTraining Module asylum organisations, administrativeauthoritiesandlegalpractitionersacross Europe. national caselawregarding theapplicationof Dublin IIRegulationwhichwillbehighlyusefulfor In addition,theproject websitewasfurtherdevelopedwiththecreation ofadatabaseEuropean and will bepublishedaspartoftheproject activities. legal experts,lawyersandjudges.Asummaryreport ofthemainfindingsarisingfrom thislegalseminar challenges surrounding theDublinIIRegulation.Participantsincludedproject partners,legalofficers, to bringtogethervariouslegalpractitioners,expertsandmembersofthejudiciarydiscuss the Dublinsystem,aEuropean legalseminarwasorganised inSeptember2012Budapest,Hungary Given thatthere isaconsiderableamountoflitigationinmostMemberStatesrelated totheoperationof 127 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 128 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes BIBLIOGRAPHY ANNEX IV • • • • • • • http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st15/st15605.en12.pdf. (COD), Brussels,14December2012,(‘Dublin recast compromise text’),accessibleat: stateless person (recast), ASILE 129, CODEC 2520, OC 601, Interinstitutional File: 2008/0243 protectioninternational lodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-country nationalora mechanisms fordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsible forexamining an applicationfor of aRegulationtheEuropean ParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishing thecriteriaand Council of the European Union, Position of the Council at http://www.ulb.ac.be/assoc/odysseus/CEAS/SEC%282008%292962.pdf first reading with a viewperson (recast), Impact Assessment, SEC(2008) 2962, 3.12.2008, accessible at: to the adoption protection lodgedinone of theMemberStatesbyathird-country nationalorastateless determining theMemberStateresponsible forexamininganapplicationinternational European Parliamentand oftheCouncilestablishingcriteriaandmechanismsfor the of Regulation a for proposal the accompanying document working staff Commission COM:2008:0820:FIN:EN:PDF (COD), 3.12.2008, accessible at:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= by athird-country national orastatelessperson,(Recast),SEC(2008)2962,2008/0243 protectionexamining anapplicationforinternational lodgedinoneoftheMemberStates establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for Commission (EC) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Official 62/1. Journal to rules certain the comparisonoffingerprintsforeffective applicationoftheDublinConvention[2002] down laying 2002 February 28 theestablishmentof“EURODAC”for implement Regulation(EC)2725/2000concerning of 407/2002 (EC) Regulation Council Convention. [Official L316of15.12.2000] Journal of “Eurodac” forthecomparisonoffingerprintseffective applicationoftheDublin Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment L 222of5.9.2003]. application lodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-country national[Official Journal and mechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsible forexamininganasylum rules fortheapplicationofCouncilRegulation(EC)No343/2003establishingcriteria detailed down laying 2003 September 2 of 1560/2003 No. (EC) Regulation Commission L 050,25/02/2003P. 0001–0010] application lodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-country national[Official Journal mechanisms fordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsible forexamininganasylum and criteria the establishing 2003 February 18 of 343/2003 No. (EC) Regulation Council Recast Documents The Dublinsystem
• • • • • • • • • • • on-legal-aid-for-asylum-seekers-in-europe.html at: accessible http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/57-policy-papers/247-ecreelena-survey-2010, October Europe, in Seekers Asylum for Aid Legal on Survey ECRE/ELENA on-rule-39-interim-measures.html at: accessible 2012, http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/68-publications/290-ecreelena-research- April measures, interim 39 Rule ECHR on Research ECRE/ELENA no-3069609.html ministers-of-the-council-of-europe-in-the-case-of-mss-v-belgium-a-greece-application- of-the-european-council-on-refugees-and-refugees-and-exiles-to-the-committee-of- of elena-publications/280-joint-submission-of-the-international-commission-of-jurists-and- Committee the to submission 30696/09), May2012,accessibleat:http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/64- Joint Jurists, of Commission Ministers oftheCouncilEurope inthecaseofM.S.S.vBelgiumandGreece (ApplicationNo. International the and ECRE accessible at:http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/134.html ECRE Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, March 2008, 2007, March 20 Change, for Reasons Twentyaccessible at:http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/136.html - Voices Twenty Regulation: Dublin The ECRE 2006, March Europe, in Regulation II Dublin the of accessible at:http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/135.html Application the on Report ECRE/ELENA http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/133.html Proposal torecast theDublinRegulation,April2009,accessibleat: ECRE Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission dublinerCORRETTO-definitivo.pdf. a third-country national,April2010,accessibleat:http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/ State responsible forexamininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesby Council RegulationDublinIIestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingMember the of implementation the on practice and experience of exchange and Research Dubliners CIR com2007_0301en01.pdf. 301 final, 6.6.2007, accessible at: COM(2007) System, Asylum European Common the of future the on Paper Green Commission LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0835:FIN:EN:PDF more mutualtrust,COM(2011)835final,2.12.2011,accessibleat:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ intra-EU solidarityinthefieldofasylum,anEUagendaforbetter responsibility-sharing and the European EconomicandSocialCommitteetheofRegionsonenhanced Council, the Parliament, European the to Commission the from Communication (EC) Commission http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0299:FIN:EN:PDF (‘Commission 2007EvaluationReport’),accessibleat: on theevaluationofDublinsystem,SEC(2007)742,COM(2007)299final,6.6.2007 Commission (EC) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council General documents http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/
129 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 130 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes • • • • • • • • •
proposal, March 2009,accessibleat:http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/mar/pe410690 European Parliament, Reflection note on the evaluation of the Dublin system and on the Dublin III Dublin the of docid/48ca663ca.html evaluation the on system, 2September2008,P6_TA(2008)0385, resolution accessibleat:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ Parliament European Parliament, European at: accessible cases”, 26C5B519-9186-47C1-AB9B-F16299924AE4/0/FICHES_Affaires_Dublin_EN.pdf “Dublin on Sheet Fact ECHR solidarity-tools.html http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/56-ecre-actions/315-enhancing-intra-eu- protection intheCommonEuropean AsylumSystem, January2013,accessibleat: ECRE, Enhancing intra-EU solidarity tools to improve quality and fundamental rights refworld/docid/49c0ca922.html (COM(2008) 825,3December2008),18March 2009,accessibleat:http://www.unhcr.org/ ‘Eurodac’ forthecomparison offingerprintsfortheeffective applicationof[theDublinIIRegulation] the Regulation of the European the establishment of Parliament and of the Council concerning (COM(2008) 820,3December2008)andtheEuropean Commission’s Proposal forarecast of lodged inoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird countrynationalorastatelessperson(«DublinII») Regulation the determining theMemberStateresponsibleprotection forexamininganapplicationinternational of recast a for Proposal of theEuropean ParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishing thecriteriaandmechanismsfor Commission’s European the on Comments UNHCR accessible at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4d7610d92.pdf the of 3(2) Article of Dublin IIRegulationinparticularthecontextofintendedtransferstoGreece, 31January2011, Application the in Practice National on Note information Updated UNHCR at: accessible 2006, April Paper, Discussion http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4445fe344.html UNHCR . A Regulation: II Dublin The UNHCR assets/commissiemeijers/Co_opmaakOmslag06.pdf. and JannemeikeOuwerkerk,December2011,accessibleat:http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/ Reconciling Trust andFundamentalRights,byHemmeBattjes,EvelienBrouwer, PauliendeMorree Mejiers Committee, The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration and Criminal Law, and-greece-18-april/. http://icj.wpengine.com/icj-workshop-non-refoulement-in-europe-after-m-s-s-v-belgium- Europe: in rights human and migration Non-refoulement inEurope afterM.S.S.vBelgium andGreece, July2011,accessibleat: on workshop Jurists, of Commission International http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ _ en.pdf
131 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes 132 The Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold - Annexes
European Network for Technical Co-opera- tion on the Application of the Dublin II Regulation
By creating a European-wide network of NGOs assisting and counselling asylum seekers sub- ject to a Dublin procedure, the aim of the network is to promote knowledge and the exchange of experience between stakeholders at national and European level. This strengthens the ability of these organisations to provide accurate and appropriate information to asylum seekers subject to a Dublin procedure. This goal is achieved through research activities intended to improve knowledge of national legislation, practice and jurisprudence related to the technical application of the Dublin II Regulation. The project also aims to identify and promote best practice and the most effective case law on difficult issues related to the application of the Dublin II Regulation including family unity, vulnerable persons, detention. During the course of the project, national reports were produced as well as a European comparative report. This European comparative report provides a comparative overview of the application of the Dublin II Regulation based on the findings of the national reports. In addi- tion, in order to further enhance the knowledge, we created information brochures on diffe- rent Member States, an asylum seekers’ monitoring tool and a training module, aimed at legal practitioners and civil society organisations. They are available on the project website. The Dublin II Regulation aims to promptly identify the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application. The core of the Regulation is the stipulation that the Member State responsible for examining the asylum claim of an asylum seeker is the one where the asylum seeker first entered.
www.dublin-project.eu
European Partner Organisations: