The Kurdish Diaspora in the Netherlands

Transnational involvement and inter-ethnic tensions in the host society

Name: Josie Joanna Kolsteren Student ID: 10608893 Supervisor: dr. A.J. van Heelsum Second reader: dr. P.E. Pallister-Wilkins University: University of Amsterdam Program: MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance Word count: 23,934 Date: June 28, 2018

Table of content

List of abbreviations ...... 5

Acknowledgements ...... 6

1. Introduction ...... 7

2. Theoretical framework ...... 9

2.1 The concept of diaspora ...... 9

2.2 Diasporas and transnationalism ...... 10

2.3 Transnational identity ...... 11

2.4 Cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities ...... 13

2.5 The role of diasporas in conflict ...... 15

2.6 Determinants of transnational involvement ...... 16

2.7 Research themes ...... 18

3. The Kurdish diaspora ...... 19

3.1 Kurdish identity and history ...... 19

3.2 The Kurds in Turkey ...... 20

3.3 The Kurds in Iraq ...... 21

3.4 The Kurds in Iran ...... 23

3.5 The Kurds in Syria ...... 24

3.6 Kurdish migration into Europe ...... 25

3.7 The Kurdish diaspora in Europe ...... 26

4. Methodology ...... 29

4.1 Research design ...... 29

4.2 Operationalization ...... 30

4.3 Respondents ...... 31

4.4 Methodological limitations ...... 32

4.5 Ethical considerations ...... 32

5. Results ...... 34

5.1 Kurdish transnational identity...... 34

5.2 Transnational activities...... 40

5.2.1 Cultural transnational activities ...... 40

5.2.2 Social transnational activities...... 42

5.2.3 Economic transnational activities ...... 45

5.2.4 Political transnational activities ...... 47

5.3 Inter-ethnic tensions in the host society ...... 55

6. Conclusion ...... 60

6.1 Outcomes ...... 60

6.2 Reflections on theory ...... 61

6.3 Limitations and further research ...... 62

7. Bibliography ...... 64

8. Appendix ...... 71

6.1 Interview guide ...... 71

List of abbreviations

KDPI Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party KJAK Kurdistan Free Life Party KNC Kurdish National Council KSVN Koerdische Studenten Vereniging Nederland PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PVV Partij Voor de Vrijheid PYD Democratic Union Party YPG People’s Protection Units YPJ Women’s Protection Units

Acknowledgements I would like to thank dr. Anja van Heelsum for the structured guidance and support that she gave me throughout the process of writing this thesis, and for giving me constructive feedback on my work. I greatly appreciate the effort that Anja spend on continuously reviewing my work and the time that she took to discussing possible points of improvements with me. Furthermore I would like to thank dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins for taking the time and effort to review this thesis as a second reader. Last not but least, I would like to express my gratitude to all my respondents, as without their contributions I would not have been able to write this thesis. I would like to thank all inspiring Kurdish respondents for telling me their personal stories, for opening up and being vulnerable, for being so welcoming, for sharing their traditional food with me, and for inspiring me with their hopes and dreams for a peaceful future for the Kurds.

1. Introduction The role of diasporas in conflict resolution has been explored by several studies in the past decades (Antwi-boateng 2011; Fagen & Bump 2006; Lyons 2007; Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009; Sheffer 2003; Shain 2002; Smith & Stares 2007). Diasporas have been characterized as both ‘peace-wreckers’ and ‘peace-makers’ (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009; Smith & Stares 2007). The extent to which diasporas engage in homeland conflict today, either positively or negatively, is largely influenced by the increasing speed of globalization and channels of communication. Migrants are now more than ever able to retain close socio-cultural, economic and political ties with their homelands. Along with the growing concerns around the migration influx of refugees in the European Union today it remains uncertain what the effects of such processes of transnationalism are. The huge flows of migration have raised many controversial debates and pose challenges to policymakers across Europe. Whereas much research has focused on how transnational communities affect politics in their homeland, the existing literature attributes relatively little attention to questioning how migrants import homeland conflicts and accordingly maintain inter-ethnic tensions in the country of settlement. Apart from existing theories around transnational activities and identity, rarely social scientists have focused on the link between transnational (political) involvement and inter-ethnic relations among different migrant communities in the host country (Brown 2004: 6). With the continuation of globalization processes and conflict-related migration flows, it is likely that host governments in Europe will have to deal with the issue of inter-ethnic conflict in the diaspora context increasingly. It is therefore essential to examine what factors and characteristics define transnational involvement of diaspora communities and what shapes potential inter-ethnic tensions and conflict in the host country context. A relatively recent example of the described issue is the politically active Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, France and other countries in Europe have been following political developments and conflict in their homelands closely, particularly with respect to recent events in Turkey. As a result, the politics of the homeland play out in Europe through conflict and tensions between the Kurdish and Turkish community. To illustrate, many instances of violence during Kurdish demonstrations have been reported in Germany and the Netherlands. Besides, political cleavages between the two communities are articulated in (sometimes tacit) expressions of antipathy and discrimination in everyday activities. In an attempt to narrow the research gap, this thesis examines to what extent ‘the Kurdish question’ is transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands. This study contributes to

the existing knowledge on the development of diaspora identities, particularly those who are stateless and generated by conflict. Moreover this thesis adds to the understanding of how inter- ethnic tensions in the host country reinforce a common diaspora identity and increase active political transnational involvement. By taking a comprehensive approach, this research involves stories of Kurdish diaspora members from Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and shows the united identity and political activism among Kurds from different regions. As previous studies in the Netherlands have solely focused on Turkish Kurds (Bruinessen 1998) this approach presents a significant addition to the existing literature regarding the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. In order to create a framework through which the research question can be analyzed, this thesis first explores the existing literature around the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism, the role of diasporas in conflict, and determinants of transnational involvement in chapter two. On that basis, the case of the Kurdish diaspora is examined by looking at the historical roots of the Kurds in different regions in chapter three. Chapter four covers the methodology section and describes and justifies the use of qualitative semi-structured interviews in this study. The results of the obtained data will be discussed in chapter five, including an analysis of transnational identity, transnational activities, and inter-ethnic tensions in the case of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. Finally, chapter six presents the conclusions and outcomes of this study and gives recommendations for further research.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter provides the theoretical basis for the study of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands by laying out essential arguments and concepts. The first sections (2.1 and 2.2) explore the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism as well as their connection. Following, the characteristics of transnational involvement are examined through the notions of transnational identification (2.3) and transnational activities (2.4). Consecutively, theories around the role of diasporas in conflict are discussed (2.5) in order to provide a basis for understanding the conflict-related nature of the Kurdish diaspora. Additionally, factors that determine transnational involvement (2.6) are considered and provide several indicators to differentiate between diaspora members. Finally, this chapter ends with the operationalization of the theoretical framework into sub themes (2.7) that are instrumental in answering the main research question.

2.1 The concept of diaspora The ‘diaspora’ concept was historically linked to the experience of particular groups such as Jews, Greek, and Armenians (Cohen 2008; Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003; Vertovec 1997). The meaning of the term diaspora therefore was negatively associated with traumatic exile and victimization (Safran 1991; Vertovec 1997). From the 1980s onwards the term has been used more broadly in both theory and practice. Expatriates, political refugees, ethnic and racial minorities started to be categorized as diasporas. The broad and varied use of the concept was criticized from the mid- 1990s onwards by social constructivism, which led to the idea that diasporas are inherently connected to a particular ethnic identity in the ‘homeland’ (Cohen 2008). As the concept lacked analytical strength and specificity, Brubaker referred to the “diaspora’ diaspora”, a “dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space” (2005: 1). Correspondingly the diaspora concept becomes useless if we would allow it to apply to an ever-broadening set of cases, such as language communities, labor migrants, national movements and religious communities (Brubaker 2005: 3). The remaining question relates to what essential criteria characterizes diasporas and based on what definition-in-use this study will analyze this concept. Three elements are key to the definition of diaspora, when referring to it as a social form (Vertovec 1997). Firstly, diasporas are characterized by a dispersion in space from their ‘original homeland’, related to causes of migration, such as forced migration or labor migration. Usually diasporas are dispersed from a specific original center to two or more peripheral regions (Safran 1991: 83).

Secondly, the idea of a ‘homeland’ constitutes an essential element in the experience of diasporas. Diasporas will always be engaged in cross-border experiences related to their homeland. Often times the return to the homeland functions as a basis for solidarity and a common identity. Yet many diaspora members never return as a result of continuous violence in their homelands, or it simply does not (or no longer) constitute “a welcoming place with which they can identify politically, ideologically, or socially; or because it would be too inconvenient and disruptive, if not traumatic, to leave the diaspora” (Safran 1991: 91). Continuous contact with the original home country through social relationships, political and economic linkages are also connected to this characteristic (Vertovec 1997: 3-4). Thirdly, diasporas are characterized by distinguished identities in their host country. The collective memory within the diaspora shapes identity formation in the host country. These preserved distinctive identities maintain boundaries with the host-society. Discrimination, social exclusion or alienation are factors that determine and are influenced by the extent to which groups integrate in society, and which in turn provide the basis for the creation of ethno-national diaspora organizations (Brubaker 2005: 6; Clifford 1994: 311; Cohen 2008: 165-166; Safran 1991: 96; Sheffer 2003: 83). All in all, the described defining characteristics are shaped by a triadic relationship between the self-identified ethnic groups that constitute the diaspora, the homeland country and context, and the host society where the diaspora resides (Vertovec 1997: 5).

2.2 Diasporas and transnationalism The activities that are undertaken by diaspora members are linked to theories of transnationalism. Both concepts relate to cross-border processes, yet transnationalism is used in the more narrow sense of the durable ties and networks that migrants uphold in the host country (Faist 2010: 9). Transnational activities involve the everyday activities that diasporas or migrant groups engage in. ‘Transmigrants’ in this sense “develop and maintain multiple relations- familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders […] and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously” (Schiller et al. 1992: 2). While the diaspora concept refers to particular communities or groups, transnationalism is an abstract term that encompasses processes that transcend borders (Faist 2010: 13). Diaspora theories focus to a larger extent on collective identity and the multi-generation pattern that has been established through transnational practices, whereas transnationalism evolves around contemporary migration flows (Faist 2010: 22).

Having established the difference between diasporas and transnationalism, it remains the question whether transnationalism constitutes a ‘new’ term along with notions as globalization, deterritorialization and post-nationalism (Brubaker 2005: 8). Since the term emerged in the latter half of the 20th century it has been perceived as a new notion within the field of migration, focusing on patterns of activities that relate to both home and host societies (Schiller et al. 1992: 1). Although the concept might have been relevant in the past as well, the politicization of transnational communities is rather new. Moreover, recent developments in the field of modern transport technologies as well as the current speed of communication and global media have significantly changed the position of migrants and transnational communities (Clifford 1994: 309; Demmers 2002: 86; Sheffer 2003: 96; Van Amersfoort 2001: 51). Globalization has increased opportunities to engage in transnational activities as the distance between different places in the world is reduced by airplanes, internet and a mobile job market (Clifford 1994: 304). This has allowed transnational communities to evolve in a manner and scope that was previously impossible (Snel et al. 2006). Additionally, recent large refugee flows have changed the context of transnationalism. In 2015 the largest number of war refugees and displaced people worldwide since the Second World War was reached, including 65.3 million individuals (UNHCR 2016). The large share of civilian casualties and displaced people is related to the relative increase of intrastate conflicts, which characterizes ‘new wars’ as described by Kaldor (2006). These trends, related to globalization and increasing flows of conflict-related migration, explain why transnationalism is useful as a concept today.

2.3 Transnational identity The concept of transnationalism in practice encompasses the concept of transnational involvement, which includes transnational identification and transnational activities (Snel et al. 2006). Transnational identification relates to the extent to which migrants identify themselves with a certain ethnic identity outside of the host country, and therefore maintain an identity that crosses borders. The concept of transnational identification is based on the idea that identities are socially constructed and that people define themselves in relation to their social environment (Snel et al. 2006: 290). The notion of identifying yourself in relation to a social category or group forms the basis of social identity theory. Social identities are constructed on the basis of self-categorization and social comparisons (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). Self-categories involve certain labels that are based on rules of membership and on sets of characteristics or behaviors that define who belongs to

the in-group (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). Accordingly social categorization involves emphasizing similarities with other in-group members and accentuating differences with out-group members (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). The social comparison process involves the positive evaluation of in- group characteristics and members, and correspondingly the negative assessment of the out-group. This has also been referred to as “identity politics” (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). Ethnic identity is a form of social identity that is characterized by behaviors or rules related to religion, language, customs and common myths (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). Ethnic identity concerns “the extent to which people feel related to a particular ethnic group and orient themselves towards the norms and values of that group” (Snel et al. 2006: 290). Ethnic identity is commonly defined by political and cultural discourses (Verkuyten 2005). When ethnic groups cross borders, and migrants sustain a feeling of belonging to their homelands and continue to identify with compatriots abroad, ethnic identity becomes transnational. Transnational social categories involve behaviors and rules that are linked to more than one physical place and community. Experiences in multiple environments or communities “compromise people’s cultural repertoires, which in turn influence the construction of identity – or indeed multiple identities” (Vertovec 2001: 578). The ‘translocality’ (Appadurai 1990) that is created by these multiple contexts affects the construction of a transnational identity on the basis of a perceived feeling of belonging (Vertovec 2001: 578). For diasporas, the feeling of belonging relates to physical spaces or social relations that are connected to the homeland. The connection to the homeland is based on a kind of awareness or consciousness of a national identity that exists in the minds of each (Anderson 1983). In the case of diasporas, this concept of imagined communities constitutes a kind of long-distance nationalism. Identities of diasporas are produced by the very fact that they live outside of their homeland, and thus national identity is in fact an imagination (Appadurai 1990). National consciousness in the diaspora develops on the basis of positive and negative experiences. Diaspora identity is produced through common histories, shared myths, traditions and culture which are influenced by the distance between the home and host country (Clifford 1994; Shain 2002). In the case of conflict-generated diasporas, homeland conflicts play a large role in the formation of diaspora identities (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009). In these cases collective identities develop on the basis of exclusion and discrimination produced by homeland regimes of inequality or political domination. This resembles the concept of ‘resistance identity’, referring to identity- building produced by collective resistance against oppression, possibly on the basis of ethnicity (Castells 2010: 9). Besides the connection with conflict in the homeland, diaspora identity that is

constructed on the basis of exclusion can also result from alienation in the host society. As a consequence of social exclusion or marginalization, migrants develop more radical identities and engage in transnational activities on a larger scale (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The less positive an immigrant perceives the host-country context, the larger the probability of engagement in transnational involvement (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 772). In sum, the existence of diaspora communities relies on the willingness of migrant populations to engage in transnational activities and accordingly maintain their ethno-national identities. Collective identity forms the basis for social movements and mobilization, such as through transnational activities.

2.4 Cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities Transnational activities involve a variety of cross-border activities that affect multiple nation-states (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 767; Snel et al. 2006: 289). Often such activities are initiated from below (by migrants, social movements or nongovernmental organizations) but sometimes they commence in a top-down manner. States often maintain a continuous connection with their diaspora populations in order to maintain their expatriates’ loyalty, resulting in valuable remittances for the homeland (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1214). Transnational activities are either focused on the country of origin or involve practices among the diaspora in the host country. They can take place at the individual and familial level, or through (international) community institutions (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2007). The array of activities are not mutually exclusive as participation and motives for social action vary (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Yet for the purpose of analyzing transnational involvement, this study employs the categorization of transnational activities into cultural, social economic and political activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2007). Cultural transnational activities relate to sustaining certain ideas and behaviors connected to the homeland. Engagement in cultural events and rituals that are linked to the homeland, contribute to the feeling of belonging of migrants (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Such activities can be developed in and mediated by the host country context. Cultural traits and traditions in the case of diasporas become a mix between the modern reality of the country of residence and the original practices from the homeland (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007: 139). Examples of cultural transnational activities include language, in some cases religion, musical events, national holidays, celebrations and performing arts. Also events to promote culture through education, such as

weekend schools for children, belong to the dimension of cultural transnational activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 625). Social transnational activities involve “the recreation of a sense of community that encompasses migrants and people in the place of origin” (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002: 768) . Social and cultural transnational activities are usually more common than political and economic activities (Snel et al. 2006: 294). Social and cultural activities are also more symbolic and less instrumental or rational (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 769). Social transnational practices are very much related to cultural activities in the sense that often times, social transnational gatherings involve cultural practices and the other way around. Social transnational activities involve processes of sociability, social obligations and mutual help (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Social practices focused on the home country involve social remittances, visiting friends and family and maintaining social contacts. Social practices among the diaspora in the host country involve the membership of social diaspora clubs and gatherings, links with organizations and online connections among diaspora members (Al- Ali et al. 2001a: 619). Economic transnational activities are less common than social and cultural activities as they are very much dependent on the income of migrants. Economic transnational activities can be professional or private activities (Snel et al. 2006). Private activities that relate to the homeland mostly involve sending money or goods (such as medicine and clothes) to family members (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619; Snel et al. 2006: 291; Van Amersfoort 2001: 30). It also encompasses donations to the homeland, either directly or as community remittances through charity organizations. Moreover paying taxes in the country of origin also constitutes an economic transnational activity (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619). Host-country focused private economic transnational activities involve financial support to homeland-related organizations in the host country. Professional economic activities, which are usually uncommon, concern business-related remittances, trips and investments (Snel et al. 2006: 291). Although economic transnational activities are often perceived as uncommon, Vertovec (1997) refers to the economic strength of transnational groups in the area of international finance. Many others have suggested that remittances from diaspora communities provide financial sustainability to parties in the homeland context or can contribute to economic development (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fagen & Bump 2006; Lyons 2007; Newland & Patrick 2004). Political transnational activities are defined by Østergaard-Nielsen as “direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees[…] as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country or international organizations” (2003: 762). Through the faster flows of news, opinions and images, diaspora

communities transfer political beliefs from their homeland to the host society. Political struggles therefore are no longer tied to territorial borders (Demmers 2002). Political activities that are concentrated in the homeland involve direct participation in elections or referenda, membership of political parties in the homeland, reading the news and keeping up-to-date with the politics of the homeland (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619; Snel et al. 2006: 292). Activities that take place in the host country involve lobbying, participation in rallies and demonstrations and membership of political organizations in the host country (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619). Generally speaking, the involvement of diaspora members in political activism is in many cases perceived to be relatively small (Guarnizo et al. 2003).

2.5 The role of diasporas in conflict Transnational activities and identification develop differently when undertaken by a conflict- generated diaspora, or in case of conflict in the homeland. The construction of diaspora identity is affected by homeland conflict to a large extent, particularly in the case of oppressive policies and discrimination in the homeland. In case of conflict-generated diasporas, collective identity is shaped by traumatic memories resulting from forced migration, violence or repression. The desire to maintain a certain identity in this case revolves around the homeland’s survival in conflict, or around the survival of a particular ethnic group. Conflict-generated diasporas continue to emphasize the cause of their original displacement and their related grievances (Lyons 2007: 532). This serves as a basis for activism, the creation of institutions and the raising of funds (Shain 2002: 129). With declining support from foreign governments in civil wars, the role of diasporas in conflict has become increasingly important (Shain & Barth 2003). Particularly political and economic transnational practices can have large impact on peace processes, in both positive and negative ways. Regarding economic influences, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argued countries with large diaspora populations are more likely to experience recurrences of violence in civil war, due to the financing of rebels by diasporas. When one however perceives diasporas as development actors, economic remittances can also have positive effects (Turner 2008: 174-77). Through providing many families with a basic income, diaspora remittances have a positive impact on poverty and potentially on conflict resolution. Such money flows nonetheless create larger inequality in the homeland and do not constitute long-term productive investments (Turner 2008: 167-77). With regard to political practices, diasporas can exert influence on conflict dynamics in the homeland through supporting certain political parties or by lobbying in the home or host society. Shain & Barth (2003) have argued that diasporas have the ability to build bridges or act as mediators by transferring democratic values of their host society. Moreover, diasporas sometimes

have the capacity to influence foreign policies concerning the homeland conflict (Shain 2002: 120). Diasporas can thus function both as external and internal supporters of peace. It remains questionable whether such involvement is justified, considering the fact that diasporas are not surrounded by the same societal context. Shain (2002: 116) argues that diasporas generally have an independent stance on the homeland conflict because of their remoteness. Demmers (2002: 95) in contrast argues that diasporas hold more extreme views as they only experience conflict from a certain distance and do not suffer directly, which makes up for different realities. This ‘hate from a distance’ can translate into negative influences on peacebuilding in conflict settings, through spoiling peace processes or supporting certain parties in the conflict (Antwi-boateng 2011; Turner 2008). The political views and the distinct identity that diaspora members pursue as a form of belonging do not only have consequences for conflict dynamics in the homeland, but also create challenges for stability in the host state. Diasporas are affected by the way they are perceived by the host society, because of the homeland conflict, or through physical threats by those who are engaged in the conflict (Shain 2002: 125). Collective action and transnational political activities can result in conflict and tensions with the host government, the host society or between different diaspora groups. Cleavages between migrants groups can be related to previous tensions in the homeland or can be developed in the new context (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009: 26). Conflict and collective action in that case spread from the homeland to the diaspora context and are diffused across borders (Tarrow 1994: 253). Tarrow refers to the concept of relational diffusion: “the transfer of information along established lines of interaction through networks of trust or formed around mutual advantage” (1994: 253). As such ethnic conflict is no longer bound to the internal dynamics of the territorial state but has the potential to spread across the world along with forces of globalization (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 926). As a result, western European countries can transform into settings in which homeland conflicts plays out between different ethnic migrant groups. Conflict resolution as well as host country policies therefore should address the needs and concerns of diaspora communities, besides simply looking at the conflict within the territorial boundaries of the state (Shain 2002).

2.6 Determinants of transnational involvement An examination of the connections between homeland conflict and transnational involvement of diasporas requires differentiating between different types of involvement. Determinants of transnational involvement help explain why certain diaspora members are more transnationally

involved than others. Although transnational involvement is dependent on a very wide scope of determinants, this section will discuss a selection of factors that are particularly relevant in the case of diasporas and that are further explored in the results section. First of all, transnational involvement is dependent on whether and how much migrants connect and relate to social, economic and political processes in their homelands. The stronger diaspora members are emotionally attached to maintaining their identity and ties with their homeland, the more they are inclined to participate in transnational activities (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 772). This emotional connection is often considered to be particularly present among the first generation (Rumbaut 2002). Second generations are however naturally influenced by the cultural background of their parents on a daily basis even if they have never returned to their parents’ homeland themselves (Portes 2001; Schiller & Levitt 2004). This generational experience is therefore not necessarily bound to territory (Schiller & Levitt 2004: 1017). As a result of the physical distance to the homeland of their parents, second generation migrants can even be less willing to compromise. Second generation migrants are sometimes perceived as more actively involved in transnational politics than their parents (Bruinessen (1997). Besides generational differences it is often found that gender influences the extent to which transnational activities are undertaken. Generally, men experience downward occupational mobility after immigrating and therefore are more likely to engage in transnational activities. Women on the other hand experience an opposite effect and usually become employed in the host context whereas they would not have participated in the labor market before (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1216). Particularly with regard to political transnational activities, men are more likely to engage extensively in homeland politics and to maintain a strong political opinion. This has been perceived as related to the loss of status in the host country context (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1216). The extent to which diasporas engage and commit to transnational practices also depends on their level of organization (Shain 2002: 132). In the beginning, diaspora institutions are usually quite informal and related to personal networks of family members and friends. Such social networks can sustain diaspora identity and activities, even in case of scarce economic resources. Yet more formal and professional organizations are necessary in order to establish long-term diaspora communities and official ties to the homeland (van Amersfoort & van Heelsum 2007: 241). The wider these networks are, the larger the possibilities for strong and extensive political transnational action (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1218). Sheffer describes the example of the Kurdish and Palestinian case: “With every wave of Palestinians and Kurds who were driven out of their homelands or who left voluntarily for political, social, and economic reasons and settled in various host countries, their

international trans-state networks became more extensive […] those resources either have been transferred to their homelands or have been used in host countries to promote their causes” (2003: 107). The way in which these networks are set up and diaspora communities are organized, differs between state-less and state-linked communities. Particularly with regard to conflict settings, stateless diasporas are more likely to provoke violence and mobilize themselves in order to help the armed struggle back home, such as through campaigning for independence or recognition (Cohen 2005: 180).

2.7 Research themes In the theoretical framework several issues have been discussed including the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism, transnational identity, the variety of transnational activities, the connections between diasporas and homeland conflict and several determinants of transnational involvement. This discussion of relevant theories and concepts helps to establish a framework through which the main research question of this study can be answered, namely, to what extent ‘the Kurdish question’ is transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands. As transnational involvement in the theoretical framework has been divided into transnational identification and transnational activities, both the Kurdish transnational identity and the range of social, cultural, economic and political transnational activities of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands will be examined. Considering the theoretical discussion of the role of diasporas in conflict, and the possibility of the continuation of homeland conflict in the diaspora context, inter- ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands will be examined from the perspective of Kurdish diaspora members. As transnational identity in the case of conflict-generated diasporas is often shaped by experiences of discrimination, the connections between the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions in the host country and diaspora identity formation will be explored lastly. This leads to the examination of the following sub questions:

1. What characterizes the Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands? 2. What social, cultural, economic and political transnational activities do members of the Kurdish diaspora community in the Netherlands undertake? 3. To what extent do inter-ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks shape and reinforce Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands?

3. The Kurdish diaspora

Before examining the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, this chapter provides background information that is key in understanding the Kurdish question, the position of Kurds across different regions and the origins of Kurdish migration. This will be helpful in interpreting the perceptions and behaviors of Kurdish diaspora members in the Netherlands. This chapter starts by describing the historical roots of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish identity (3.1). Following, an overview is provided of the historical position of the Kurds in Turkey (3.2), Iraq (3.3), Iran (3.4) and Syria (3.5) including the characteristics of Kurdish identity and activism in these countries. Finally, flows of Kurdish migration will be discussed (3.6) as well as the features and position of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (3.7).

3.1 Kurdish identity and history The early history of the Kurds can be traced back to the migration of Indo-European tribes into Iran around 2000 B.C. One of these tribes, the Medes, probably comprises a large part of the ancestry of the Kurds. Yet it remains difficult to trace the origins of the Kurdish people and identity as it is likely that the Kurds have mixed ancestry. Today still, the Kurds are a highly heterogeneous population considering the different states that they live in and the variety of religions and languages (Khayati 2008: 66). The majority of Kurds today is Sunni Muslim, along with many Shiite, Yezidis, Alevites, Yârsâns, Jewish and Christian Kurds (Acker 2004). Despite the mixed ancestry, a strong Kurdish ethnic identity has developed on the basis of tribal structures and familial ties throughout history. McDowall (1996) argues that the distinct Kurdish nationalist community emerged in the 20th century. The Kurdish people have been divided across the Ottoman and Persian empires from the 16th century onwards, but the end of the First World War constitutes the start of their spread across the Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed by Britain and France to further their colonial interests in the Middle East, resulting in the division of control over the different regions in the old Ottoman empire among the Allied Powers (Muir 2016). As a consequence, national borders were drawn without much consideration for ethnic, tribal, religious or linguistic differentiation in the region (Muir 2016). The Sykes-Picot agreement was further finalized in 1923 when the Lausanne Treaty was signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers. This treaty involved the final formation of the borders of the Republic of Turkey and the permanent jurisdiction of the Kurds under Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (Khayati 2008: 67). The following sections will discuss the position of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria respectively. Although this study does not focus on Iranian Kurds, the position of

Kurds across all regions should be discussed in order to create a comprehensive overview of Kurdish history.

3.2 The Kurds in Turkey The Kurdish minority in Turkey today makes up for between fifteen and twenty percent of the Turkish population (BBC 2017b). Deep hostilities have continuously existed between the Turkish state and the Kurdish population throughout history. Despite nationalist policies designed by Turkey around 1920, the Kurds proved to be a difficult population to integrate (Bruinessen 1998). All forms of Kurdish expression were banned at this time, including schools, associations and the use of the Kurdish language in public ( 2011: 6; Griffiths 2002: 80).

These assimilation policies generallyBaşer proved successful until the 1960s, when new Kurdish social movements arose in Turkey (Bruinessen 1997: 3). Kurdish left-oriented organizations increasingly demanded political, cultural and linguistic rights ( 2011: 6). The revived activism was a combined result of the military coup in 1960 and theBaşer increasing Kurdish middle class (Griffiths 2002: 84). The protests and revolts of the 50s and 60s organized by this new movement were however crushed quickly and many Kurdish leaders were killed or imprisoned (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 930). A new national movement arose during the 1980s with the foundation of the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK) in 1978 (Griffiths 2002: 85; Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 935; McDowall 2004: 421). The PKK, led by Abdullah Öcalan, was a Kurdish national liberation movement based on Marxist thought. What started as a small group became increasingly popular, particularly among the poor (Griffiths 2002: 86; McDowall 2004: 420). Many people living in eastern Turkey, though not of Kurdish decent, started to identify ethnically as Kurds in relation to extensive state oppression and their low socio-economic position (McDowall 2004: 4). From 1984 onwards the PKK started to launching strikes against government forces, landlords and villagers who were armed by the state (McDowall 2004: 420-23). The insurgency led by the PKK resulted in more than 37,000 deaths up until the beginning of 2000 (Gunter 2008: 6). Due to policies of large state oppression and widespread poverty in Turkey, the PKK nonetheless continued to have mass support. Around 1990 the Kurdish quest for a state and the insurgency by the PKK had become an internationalized issue. Öcalan at the same time was ready to leave the armed struggle, and announced a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993, followed by the start of peace talks (McDowall 2004: 437). The Turkish state however continued to defeat the PKK and diminished the position of

the group at the negotiation table. This eventually led to the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 and the withdrawal of the PKK (Ünal 2016: 101). In the following years the PKK focused on legitimizing themselves as an official political organization for Kurds, both in Turkey as well as internationally. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Turkish state has been working towards EU membership since 2005 and subsequently has started to recognize the Kurdish question to a limited extent. The PKK has violated ceasefires frequently, aiming to coerce Turkey to compromise (Ünal 2016: 103). The ceasefire that was announced in 2013 by Öcalan broke down again in 2015, followed by an escalation of violence from 2016 onwards (Human Rights Watch 2016). Since 2015, Turkish military forces have officially been involved in the fight against Islamic State in Syria (Gunter 2016: 82). The involvement of the Turkish military in Syria escalated with the military operation in the Kurdish region of Afrin from January 2018 onwards (The Economist 2018b). In March 2018, after a two-month offensive, the Turkish military took control over Afrin, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and more than 1,500 Kurdish fighters dead (The Economist 2018a). Turkish officials later have stated to continue their fight against Kurdish militias in other regions of Syria as well as in Iraq (The Economist 2018a). This regional involvement shows the importance of the perceived threat of Kurdish independence or autonomy against all four states, and the willingness of the Turkish state to oppose this.

3.3 The Kurds in Iraq The Kurdish population in Iraq today compromises between fifteen and twenty percent of the population (BBC 2017b). The Kurdish movement in Iraq originated with the beginning of the existence of the state of Iraq after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Kurds in Iraq have mostly populated oil production and reserve areas. Along with the fact that Iraq was already divided religiously between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, this made the Kurdish population more inclined to revolt (Gunter 2008: 12). Possibly as a result the Kurds in Iraq have experienced relatively much autonomy and national rights (Katzman 2010). Yet the Iraqi government has continuously perceived the Kurdish question and possible secession as security threats to the state (Yesiltas 2014). Around 1931 the Kurdish fight for autonomy started when Mulla Mustafa Barzani emerged as the new leader for the Kurds in Iraq. Barzani formed the foundation for the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 and finally passed on his leadership to his son Masoud Barzani (Katzman 2010: 1).

After a long military struggle with the Iraqi army, the KDP finally negotiated more autonomy for the Kurdish region under the Baathists government in March 1970. This agreement however was not fully implemented in practice, leading to increasing levels of violence and friction up until 1974 (Yesiltas 2014: 42). The KDP faced many internal difficulties at that time as another Kurdish front was formed by the Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 (Gunter 2008: 13). The PUK was led by Jalal Talabani. The KDP generally is more dominant in the northern Kurdish areas, close to Turkey, while the PUK is supported largely in the south of Kurdistan at the borders with Iran (Katzman 2010: 1). Between 1970 and 1974 the Iraqi government enlarged their Arabization policies by moving Arab families to Kurdish regions, giving Arab names to public institutions and streets, and transferring Kurdish officials to other regions. In relation to the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdish revolt was supported by Iran. The increasing influence that the Kurdish movement accomplished was feared by the Iraqi government (led by Saddam Hussein from 1979 onwards). In response, the government initiated the Al-Anfal campaign, which forcibly replaced and killed hundreds of thousands civilians in the Kurdish region, involving the use of chemical weapons (Yesiltas 2014: 123). Part of this campaign was also the chemical attack on Halabja in 1988. The involvement of the United States army in Iraq from the 1990s onwards in response to the Gulf War provided a basis for Kurdish autonomy, as the U.S. and its allies established a no-fly zone above the Kurdish region. This provided the Kurds with the opportunity to establish their own administration and hold elections in 1992, resulting in the joint rule of the KDP and PUK (Katzman 2010: 2). The coalition between Barzani and Talabani however broke down between 1994 and 1998 (Gunter 2008: 14). The U.S. however finally negotiated a cease-fire agreement between the two parties, leading to the return of stability in the region. The unified parliament in 2002 declared the federal state of Iraqi Kurdistan (Gunter 2008: 14). The U.S. launched the Iraq War and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. The provisional government led by the U.S. established the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, which held the right to differentiate from national legislation and reestablish their Kurdish militias, also known as the Peshmerga (Katzman 2010: 3). Jalal Talabani held office as the president of Iraq between 2006 and 2014. In the 2009 Kurdistan elections, Barzani was reelected as president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Katzman 2010: 4). Barzani decided to organize an independence referendum in 2017, despite objections from the region, the Iraqi government and the U.S. While 92% of the Kurdistan Region voted in favor of

the referendum, the Iraqi government deployed its troops in the region of Kirkuk (BBC 2017a). This disputed region had been reclaimed by the Peshmerga when the Iraqi army was defeated by Islamic State in 2014 (BBC 2017a). As a result of the unacknowledged referendum and the defeat of Kurds in Kirkuk, the political situation and autonomy of the Kurdish region in Iraq has deteriorated since (Cockburn 2017).

3.4 The Kurds in Iran The Kurds in Iran are estimated to constitute around ten percent of the population in Iran, and mostly populate the border regions with Turkey and Iraq in the northwest of the country (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018). Over all, the Iranian government has been successful in their approach to the Kurdish movement as a result of their strong regimes and the close relationship between Persians and Kurds (Gunter 2008). The first Kurdish revolts in Iran were initiated in the 1920s, when Iran emerged as a modern state under the Pahlavi Dynasty. The Iranian regime took control over the Kurdish regions during the 1930s and established assimilation policies in order to promote the Iranian identity, language and culture (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6). These policies were less extensive and violent than the policies implemented by the Turkish state. During and after the Second World War the Kurdish movement gained more support and established the Kurdistan Democratic Party for Iran (KDPI) in 1945 (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6; Stansfield 2014: 71). In 1946 the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan was established, signifying the first autonomous state of Kurdish rule. The republic promoted Kurdish language and culture and accordingly formed the basis for a distinct Kurdish identity in Iran (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6). After one year however the Mahabad Republic collapsed. With the beginning of Islamic rule in Iran, the Kurdish movement was divided into several splinter groups, leading to much internal conflict and disputes (Stansfield 2014: 73). Nonetheless Kurdish militias continued fighting during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and were supported by the KDP in Iraq. During the early 1990s Kurdish activism in Iran remained relatively calm as a result of the assassination of several leaders of the KDPI (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 7). More freedom and rights were established for Kurds in Iran following the election of Muhammad Khatami as president in 1997 (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 7). Khatami’s policies allowed more autonomy for Kurds and created more cultural and political freedom (Stansfield 2014: 76). The larger autonomy that Kurds in Iraq received led them to increase their nationalist demands. Their position however became subject to the Iranian regime again with the new government from

2005 onwards. The assassination of a young Kurdish leader in 2005 resulted in protests of thousands of Iranian Kurds, which the government in turn responded to with force (Gunter 2008: 134). During the same period the newly established Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) started to launch attacks against the Iranian regime. The PJAK was based in the mountains of northern Kurdistan in Iraq and was supported by both the PKK and the U.S. government (Gunter 2008: 134). The Iranian regime responded with increasing levels of violence and repression, shown by their assassinations of many Kurdish political leaders and activists from 2007 onwards up until today (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 9). Thousands of Kurds in Iran launched demonstrations in support of the vote for Kurdish independence in Iraq in September 2017 (Cunningham 2017). Although the KDPI only advocates Kurdish autonomy under the democratic regime of Iran, Kurdish nationalism continues to be perceived as a security threat to the state.

3.5 The Kurds in Syria The Kurds in Syria today compromise between seven and ten percent of the Syrian population, being the largest non-Arab minority in the country (BBC 2017b). Particularly the north and northeast of the country are populated by Kurds, including the Jazeera, Efrin, and Ain-Al Arab regions (Ziadeh 2009: 2). Similar to Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Kurds in Syria have been denied basic rights and have been oppressed by the Syrian state ever since Syria became independent. The tensions that already existed between the Kurdish regions and the government under the French rule continued after Syria gained independence in April 1946 (Zisser 2014: 198). During the initiation of Arab nationalism throughout the 1950s and 1960s the first policies against non- Arab ethnic minorities were implemented and political activists were arrested (Zisser 2014: 210; Ziadeh 2009: 2). Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were denied Syrian citizenship in 1962 as the government stated they had crossed the border with Turkey illegally (Zisser 2014: 200). Until 1970 various regimes in Syria established extremist and radical policies, including the exemption of Kurds from political representation and bans on expressions of Kurdish identity (Ziadeh 2009: 2). From 1970 onwards Syrian state policies towards Kurds softened slightly as a result of the new government led by Hafiz al-Asad (Zisser 2014: 203). Nonetheless, Arabization policies continued, forcing Kurdish families to leave their home and banning Kurdish names as well as Kurdish language in schools (Zisser 2014: 204). At the same time the Syrian regime was pressuring Turkey and Iraq by establishing relations with Kurdish parties abroad, such as the KDP, PUK and PKK (Zisser 2014: 204).

From 2000 onwards, under the new rule of Bashar Al-Asad, repressive measures against the Kurds continued. This led amongst other things to the Kurdish Intifada in 2004, where many Kurds were killed and hundreds wounded after they had set a government building on fire (Zisser 2014: 195). The Arab Spring in Syria that broke out in 2011 was supported by the Kurdish movement. In order to mitigate the protests, the position of Kurds in Syria suddenly improved significantly as Asad granted more than 100,000 Kurds Syrian citizenship (Zisser 2014: 208). At the same time, Kurdish parties in Syria established the Kurdish National Council (KNC) with the support of Barzani. Another Kurdish front was formed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The PYD later formed a military branch including the People’s Protection Forces (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), both supported by the PKK (Schøtt 2017: 15). The YPG took power over the Kurdish areas in Syria after government forces withdrew in 2012 (Schøtt 2017: 15). During 2014 and 2015 the YPG accomplished to recapture the Kobane region from Islamic State, supported by the U.S.-led coalition. As Turkey has been very concerned with the increasing power of the PYD in Syria, the Turkish military has been involved in the war in Syria since 2015 by attacking not only Islamic State but also the PKK, YPG and YPJ (Schøtt 2017: 17). The war has led to increasing international attention to the Kurdish question in Syria. The position of Kurds has particularly been highlighted as a result of the Turkish military operation in Afrin (The Economist 2018b). The complex involvement of various regional and international actors in Afrin, but also in Syria more generally, continues to hinder a united Kurdish struggle for self- determination in Syria (Schøtt 2017: 19).

3.6 Kurdish migration into Europe A large part of Kurdish migration to Europe can be attributed to the regimes of oppression in the Kurdish regions in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. The rise of Arab nationalism in these countries caused the forced displacement or political migration of hundreds of thousands Kurdish communities from 1980 onwards (McDowall 2004: 457). More recently there has been a large influx of Syrian refugees in Europe amongst which many Kurds. Before the period of predominant political migration, Kurds mostly migrated for economic reasons : 7). Around the 1960s many young Kurds emigrated to pursue their education in European(Başer countries. 2013 The first Kurdish student organizations and political parties in Europe were established at that time (McDowall 2004: 457). Together with the first generation of Kurdish students, the nationalist sentiment in the diaspora increased from that moment onwards.

Particularly the second generation was inclined to be interested in their parents’ origins during the 1980s and 1990s (McDowall 2004: 457). The 1970s were particularly characterized by labor migration, often concerning Turkish Kurds. As a result of the bilateral agreements between European countries and Turkey in particular, this period was characterized by large influxes of migrant workers initially from the western and central parts of Turkey, and later on also from eastern Turkey ( 2011; McDowall 2004: 456;

Van Bruinessen 1999). Kurdish migrants were motivated by the prospectBaşer of extensive employment opportunities in Europe yet also by increased repression in eastern Turkey (McDowall 2004). The Kurdish diaspora today in Europe is particularly spread out over France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Norway ( 2011: 8). Estimates of the amount of Kurdish migrants in Europe lies between 850,000 to oneBaşer million Kurds in western Europe, of which the majority lives in Germany. Others have estimated the Kurdish population of Europe to be double of that amount ( 2011: 8). These ambiguous statistics are due to the large amounts of undocumented Başermigrants in Europe and the fact that Kurds hold Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian or Iranian citizenship.

3.7 The Kurdish diaspora in Europe The Kurdish migrant community is seen as one of the most politically active diasporas in Europe ( 2011; Sheffer 2003). When Kurdish migrants came to Europe, the barriers to Kurdish culturalBaşer and political expressions were finally lifted. In the context of the host country there were plenty of opportunities to explore Kurdish identity, language and culture, which enabled the development of the Kurdish diaspora community (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 933). Most of the initial (labor) migrants in the 70s mainly identified as Turkish when they came to Europe, even if they would have identified differently in Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1999: 9). Europeans additionally regarded all incoming labor migrants from Turkey as Turkish citizens, as Kurds were not registered separately. As a result, labor migrants and their descendants are less politically active in the host society compared to refugees who entered Europe after 1980 (Ba

2011: 9; Van Bruinessen 1999: 10). Though many Kurdish cultural organizations were establishedşer by students and labor migrants in the years before, the political Kurdish question only became part of the European debate from 1980 onwards ( 2013: 10).

The distinct Kurdish identity in the diasporaBaşer was particularly emphasized and reinvented as a result of the political events in Turkey with the 1980 coup and the escalating events that led to the start of the civil war in 1984. Political refugees that arrived during this period were responsible for

building the Kurdish movement in Europe and gaining broad support ( 2011: 9). In contrast to earlier migrants, these refugees had usually been politically active inBaşer their homelands and were often traumatized as they had been arrested before or had experienced violence ( , 2013). The political mobilization of Kurds initiated by this group of immigrants also adhered toBaşer labor migrants. The latter group only started to become more aware of their ‘Kurdishness’ in the host country, in response to the development of a distinct politicized ethnic identity ( , 2013: 11).

Bringing both migration flows together, the Kurdish diasporaBaşer grew and developed itself in connection to political oppression and deprivation in the homeland. As a result of both these nationalist discourses on belonging and instances of marginalization in the host society, a strong Kurdish diaspora identity emerged (Alinia & Eliassi 2014: 73). The Kurdish common diaspora identity advanced and became a significant source of political mobilization (Khayati 2008: 65). The Kurdish question became a European matter instead of only a struggle in the homeland countries ( 2011). The Kurdish nationalist movement in Europe established a variety of cultural, linguisticBaşer and political organizations. These associations over the years have played an essential role in forming the Kurdish diaspora identity, through major gatherings, celebrations, Kurdish festivals and by fostering the use of one of the dialects of the Kurdish language (Adamson 2005: 40; Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 114; Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 934). The Kurdish Institute in Paris, established in 1983 by Kurdish intellectuals, organizes all kinds of activities to promote Kurdish language and culture ( 2011: 16). Many Kurdish publishing houses have been set up in order to gain support for theBaşer Kurdish question through journals and magazines, and subsequently mobilize Kurds in Europe. Radio and TV broadcasts have also been used by the PKK to catalyze nationalist awareness among the diaspora ( 2011: 15). Additionally the Kurds in Europe became increasingly connected with their homelandBaşer through internet, which made it easier to maintain transnational ties (Wahlbeck 1998: 7). Kurdish political organizations and bodies were established in Europe during the 1980s. Many of these political initiatives were linked to the PKK, which aimed at mobilizing the Kurds for their cause in Europe. The PKK particularly aimed at engaging young second-generation Kurdish migrants to get involved in the Kurdish struggle, adhering to their feelings of alienation and marginalization in the host society (Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 114; McDowall 2004: 457). According to : 11), second generation Kurds in Europe engage in transnational activities to a larger extentBaşer (2011in case their parents have experienced maltreatment and discrimination in the homeland. An important objective of the PKK in Europe was to actively recruit guerilla fighters, activists and technicians among Kurds for the struggle in the homeland ( 2013: 21). The PKK

Başer 27

moreover was largely financially supported by donations from the Kurdish diaspora (Adamson 2005: 40). Through all these activities in Europe, the PKK established a second front on which their battle was fought (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 928). The transnational political network established by the PKK across Europe was headquartered by the Kurdistan Regional Government in Brussels, along with national offices in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK, Switzerland, Italy and Scandinavia (Adamson 2005: 39; Khayati 2008: 90). The PKK established the Kurdish National Congress in 1995, which later became known as the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. With the aim to create a political center for Kurdish activism in Europe, this institution organized all kinds of conventions and gatherings. Kurdish institutions at the supranational level initiated the Kurdish lobby for political and cultural rights at different political and legal EU institutions . Whereas these institutions were perceived as legitimate by European authorities, the(Başer PKK itself 2013) has been recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU since 2002 ( 2013: 20; Casier 2010: 393).

Today pro-Kurdish demonstrationsBaşer are held almost monthly in Europe. This often causes spillovers of the conflict in the homeland to Europe, revealing itself in violence during protests between Turkish and Kurdish groups. An example of such spillovers was the immense response of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe to the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 (Sheffer 2003: 110). Also more recently there have been many Kurdish outbursts, demonstrations and instances of violence in response to political events and developments in Turkey and Syria. This leaves challenges for internal policies in European states considering its Kurdish and Turkish population and foreign relations (Lyon & Uçarer 2001).

4. Methodology This chapter provides an overview of the research methods that have been employed in order to examine the research question “To what extent is ‘the Kurdish question’ transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands?”. The first section of this methodology chapter (4.1) explains and justifies the qualitative research design of this study. The second part (4.2) elaborates on the operationalization of the themes discussed in the theoretical framework into the three research sub questions. The third section (4.3) describes the group of respondents that participated in this study. Finally ethical challenges and limitations to this research design are considered in the last paragraph (4.4).

4.1 Research design The qualitative research design of this study involves the use of semi-structured interviews for the purpose of collecting data. Semi-structured interviews focus on the application of respondents’ subjective theories in daily activities, including implicit and explicit assumptions (Flick 2009: 156). It provides the respondent with the opportunity to talk about concrete descriptions of events or things they are engaged in or have witnessed (Weiss 1994). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to develop questions that guide the respondent towards the topics that are related to the research topic. At the same time, semi- structured interviews provide flexibility by allowing respondents to express their own views and stories as they are given the space to discuss topics that might not be covered by the guiding questions. This provides the opportunity to discover new relevant topics as they come up during the collection of data. More specifically, this study has employed the method of descriptive/interpretive semi-structured interviewing. Descriptive/interpretive semi-structured interviews involve the exploration of the perspectives and experiences of the respondents within certain established themes (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 4). The research design of this study provides the opportunity to gain an understanding of the position of the Kurdish diaspora in The Netherlands, their backgrounds, their (political) views, their feelings and behavior. This approach furthermore caters the understanding of the construction of Kurdish identity, and provides insights into why respondents take part in a variety of transnational activities, how they perceive their participation in these activities, and how they relate personally to the homeland. The narratives of respondents are moreover helpful in understanding how members

of the Kurdish diaspora view and describe their relations with the Turkish community in the Netherlands. In using the method of semi-structured interviewing, in some cases an ‘empathetic turn’ of the interview has been employed. Through this technique, the interviewer shifts from an objective stance to being involved personally. As Fontana and Frey (2008: 696) state: “empathetic interviewing takes an ethical stance in favor of the individual or group being studied. The interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee”. Considering the political sensitiveness of certain topics that have been discussed during interviews, this contributed to the willingness of the respondent to discuss all aspects of their views and experiences.

4.2 Operationalization The main research question of this study has been analyzed according to the three sub questions that followed from the theoretical framework. These research themes, in support to the main research question, formed the starting point for the use of semi-structured interviews and the guiding questions. In the following section, the operationalization of research themes into guiding interview questions will be discussed. A complete guide of questions can be found in the appendix. The first sub question of this study examines the origins, meaning and characteristics of Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands. This part explores to what extent respondents identify as Kurdish, what ‘being Kurdish’ means to them, and is therefore also related to the migration cause, language, culture and the feeling of ‘home’. The second sub question examines the cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities that are undertaken by the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. This firstly involves questions relating to cultural practices including language, religion, traditional food, clothing and holidays. Secondly this covers questions related to social transnational activities, including topics such as homeland return, family connections and social gatherings organized by Kurdish associations in the Netherlands. Thirdly economic transnational practices are operationalized through questions related to economic remittances and support to family members, as well as to political parties. Fourthly, questions related to political transnational activities include topics such as watching the news, discussing political preferences and opinions, political party support in the home and host country and political activism. The third sub question examines the connection between transnational involvement and the potential for inter-ethnic tensions between Kurdish and Turkish communities in the Netherlands.

Interview questions that relate to this topic focused on tensions and conflict in the Netherlands, related to developments in Turkey, such as violent clashes during demonstrations. This part in the interview also covered the less expressive tensions that might be present or felt by the Kurdish community. Interview questions in this section were related to the extent in which respondents expressed their identity openly in the Netherlands. Additionally this part covered questions regarding respondents’ perceptions of the Turkish community and Turkish state. The described questions and research themes provided the foundation for the process of collecting data as well as for the categorization and analysis of results. After the recording and transcribing of interviews, transcriptions have been categorized and analyzed by relating them to the sub questions that followed from the theoretical framework, through coding. The use of (open) coding provides the possibility of analytically breaking down the data in order to compare similar experiences or events (Corbin & Strauss 1990: 12).

4.3 Respondents In total, interviews were conducted with eighteen (first and second generation) respondents of Kurdish origin from Syria, Iraq and Turkey. No respondents from Iran were found. The first respondents were found through my personal network. On the basis of these first contacts, many other respondents were consecutively found through snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted with fifteen female and three male respondents between the ages of 19 and 48 years. Six respondents were (originally) from Syria, six from Iraq and six from Turkey. Ten respondents were not born in the Netherlands, yet seven of them were below four years old when they migrated to the Netherlands and therefore their memories remain limited. Eight respondents were born in the Netherlands. This study differentiates between first generation migrants (foreign-born) and second generation migrants (born in the Netherlands). Yet, first generation migrants that have migrated before the age of four will be discussed separately in the analysis of results. This provides a distinction between first generation migrants who have a conscious memory of their experiences in the homeland and those who can barely remember that period of their life. The majority of the respondents’ original migration cause was connected to political reasons. The remaining five respondents (or their parents) emigrated from Turkey to the Netherlands within the context of labor migration.

The duration of the interviews varied between 45 minutes and two hours. All interviews were held in Dutch. Most interviews took place in a public space such as a café or on campus, but some took place at respondents’ homes. Most interviews were held in Amsterdam, and several others in Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden, and one in Breda.

4.4 Methodological limitations The main limitations of this research design are concerned with the sample of respondents and getting access. The sample that has been selected through my personal network and by the use of snowball sampling possibly represents a relatively active group. This might imply that, because mostly active members of the diaspora identify as Kurdish openly and would respond positively to an interview request, the sampling method did not enable me to research all levels of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. This limitation is extended by the fact that only three male respondents and no respondents of the Iranian Kurdish community were found. It remains therefore difficult for such a small sample to be representative of all members of the diaspora community. Nonetheless, the aim of this study is not to generalize results, but to provide interesting insights into the narratives of a variety of Kurdish respondents and to highlight the differences as well as commonalities of these stories. Another limitation to the design of this research relates to the position of the researcher. As the interviewer was not part of the Kurdish community, this outsider influence could have resulted in respondents softening their views in their stories. This effect is possibly strengthened by the fact that several of the discussed topics during interviews were sensitive. In order mitigate this effect, a safe space was aimed to be created during interviews, in which respondents were able to talk about their true opinion. Respondents were at times shown affiliation and understanding while the researcher remained objective, through use of empathic interviewing as discussed in section 4.1.

4.5 Ethical considerations At the start of the interviews, respondents were always informed about the content and the purpose of the research. This provided respondents with the opportunity to ask questions or withdraw their participation. Respondents were additionally asked permission to record and transcribe the interviews. All respondents granted verbal consent for this. Anonymity of participants has been ensured throughout this research. Several respondents indicated specifically they wanted to remain anonymous. Particularly respondents from Turkey feared to be arrested in Turkey or to be threatened or abused in the Netherlands. Apart from

ensuring anonymity, the political sensitivity of these issues has been taken into account during the collection and processing of data. Lastly, this particular group of respondents includes migrants with traumatic pasts or experiences. Possibly, family members of respondents are currently still facing threats, discrimination or war in the homeland. This has also be taken into account during the interviews, as stories related to these experiences have not been specifically asked for, nor were they necessary for the purpose of answering the research question.

5. Results This results chapter discusses the empirical data obtained from the interviews along the lines of the theoretical framework. In the first part (5.1) the Kurdish diaspora identity will be discussed, looking at how respondents identified themselves and what Kurdish identity meant for them. The second part (5.2) involves results regarding the transnational activities that respondents engaged in, ordered by cultural (5.2.1), social (5.2.2), economic (5.2.3) and political (5.2.4) transnational activities. The last part of this section (5.3) considers ethnic tensions and conflict with the Turkish community in the Netherlands, experienced by Kurdish respondents.

5.1 Kurdish transnational identity This section provides an overview of the meaning and characteristics that respondents of this study attached to Kurdish identity. Accordingly this part aims at answering the first sub question: “What characterizes Kurdish transnational identity in the Netherlands?” Kurdish transnational identity is an interesting phenomenon to study considering its relation to the conflict and the position of Kurds in the homeland region. Yet many features of this identity are similar to common issues that migrant groups in the Netherlands are facing, such as struggling with identity formation. Several respondents found it difficult to answer the question “How do you identify?” Four respondents named the word “identity crisis” to describe a phase in their lives or in their parents’ lives. This was often related to the way in which their identity was perceived by others. One respondent described that she took a DNA test in order to explore her true identity as she experienced a dilemma regarding her identity as well. She was the only respondent that had mixed ancestry, namely a Kurdish grandmother and a Turkish grandfather. She explained:

I had an identity crisis for a long time, because I do have a Turkish name, but both of my parents grew up here and have raised me as Dutch but with the Turkish culture. I have been doubting for a long time how I feel about my identity. Because of my name.. my name is a stigma for certain people. People ask me: do you eat pork? […] In Turkey I am not a Turk, and I do not speak the language fluently, and I don’t look Turkish. I feel Dutch with a touch of Turkish and Kurdish. I am stuck in the middle. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Almost all respondents mentioned the difficult position that they were in with regard to their identity. On the one hand, they are perceived as ‘foreign’ in the Netherlands, but on the other hand they do not completely experience a feeling of belonging when they return to the homeland. One of the respondents would have preferred to belong to the first generation instead of the second generation, as she explained:

It’s a pity that I was not born there [Kurdistan]. Originally I’m from there, and even though I consider myself Dutch, I am still an immigrant here. That’s why I would have preferred to be a ‘true’ immigrant, then I maybe would have felt more connected. Because I am originally from there but I was born here. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

All respondents in the end could answer the question by indicating to what extent they felt Dutch, Kurdish, Turkish, Syrian or Iraqi. In total six respondents identified exclusively as Kurdish. One out of those six respondents was born in the Netherlands. The other five were first generation migrants, amongst which two who had migrated before the age of four. Two out of three male respondents identified as only Kurdish. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in identification as Kurdish across the countries of origin. This indicates that respondents from all regions perceived their Kurdish identity as independent from citizenship in their homeland or in the Netherlands. Despite the varying migration causes and the different historical backgrounds of Kurds from Iraq, Syria and Turkey, their common political aim for Kurdish autonomy and rights strongly unites them. Twelve respondents, the majority, identified as both Kurdish and Dutch. Of that group, three respondents also identified as Turkish to a certain extent. All of the respondents that identified as both Kurdish and Dutch were second generation migrants, or first generation migrants that migrated to the Netherlands before the age of four. Five of these respondents namely were born in Syria, Iraq or Turkey but could barely remember that time in their lives. The respondents that both identified as Kurdish and Dutch explained their double identity in different ways. For approximately half of this group, Dutch identity slightly dominated the feeling of being Kurdish. In these cases, respondents recognized their upbringing in the surroundings of the Netherlands, yet explained that they were raised them with Kurdish culture and traditions as well:

The Netherlands is also just my country. Of course I have my Kurdish roots that my parents have passed on to me at home, and of course I really feel that strong connection. But I also feel that connection with the Netherlands. So it is a double feeling. But I do certainly choose to stay here. I would not go there [Syria] by myself, for that I feel too western. (Female, second generation, from Syria)

The quotation above exemplifies that many second generation Kurds sometimes felt ‘too Dutch’ to really immerse themselves in Kurdish culture or to return to their homeland. Some respondents indicated that regardless of their personal connection with Kurdish culture, they felt satisfied with their lives in the Netherlands. The feeling of being at home in the Netherlands was often experienced when respondents arrived back at the airport after holidays. Some respondents stated that the way of living in ‘Kurdistan’ was too conservative for them. Other (second generation)

respondents explained their feeling of disconnection by the fact that their parents did not really talk much about their past and homeland. One respondent explained that her parents wanted her to integrate as much as possible in order prevent difficulties later on in life. Others explained that their parents went through too much pain and trauma in order to talk about it. Some respondents or their family members experienced life-threatening situations, were part of Kurdish militias or had experienced custody. As a result of these traumas they did not want to be continuously reminded of the past. The other half of the Dutch-Kurdish identifying respondents explained their split identity as predominantly focused on the Kurdish part. These respondents felt a deep personal connection and a certain nostalgia with regard to their homeland. This kind of attitude and consciousness involved the perception of the Netherlands as a host society that provides employment opportunities, education and a basic income. Respondents in this group (first and second generation migrants) described their enjoyment of their freedom and the fact that they are grateful for the possibilities that the Netherlands provides them with. This indicates that respondents preserved a feeling of belonging to the Kurdish homeland while they respect and accept their country of residence. Particularly the feeling of ‘gratefulness’ provides an interesting insight. The fact that respondents were grateful and appreciative of certain provisions and opportunities of Dutch society, implies that they normally do not take those things for granted. The following quote illustrates this:

This is the country that gives me money when I have worked hard, and provides me with education. This is the country that offers me a diploma. I am Kurdish, yet I am therefore also Dutch. I am not ungrateful to the Netherlands. […] I feel Kurdish and I adhere to the Kurdish morals, culture, and religion. But I also respect your culture, and there are always things that are better of Dutch culture. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

The fact that this respondent refers to “your culture” implies that she is ‘othering’ native Dutch people. Over all, many respondents talked about “us” or “we” when they referred to fellow Kurds, sometimes while being aware of it. The definition and meaning of ‘being Kurdish’ was referred to in different ways. When respondents were asked what Kurdish identity meant for them, in seven cases they mentioned Kurdish culture, traditions and morals. Examples of this distinct culture were celebrating Newroz, eating typical Kurdish food, wearing Kurdish clothing, and attending weddings. Language was mentioned as typically Kurdish in only four cases. The latter might be related to the fact that many Kurds do not speak one of the Kurdish dialects as a result of assimilation policies. Religion was only

named twice as belonging to the Kurdish identity, as this also widely varies across the Kurdish regions. Besides the cultural meanings of being Kurdish, the majority of the respondents referred to the political connotation of ‘Kurdishness’. In eleven cases, ‘being Kurdish’ was defined as standing behind your people, being proud, having nationalistic feelings and aiming for an independent Kurdistan. Among those eleven were all of the three male respondents that participated. Whereas most of the female respondents focused more on the cultural aspect of being Kurdish, or on both the cultural and political aspects, all male respondents only mentioned the Kurdish struggle and oppression as defining factors. Interestingly, the respondents that related being Kurdish to the conflict, mostly came from Turkey and Iraq. Only two respondents from Syria mentioned the political aspect in addition to the cultural meaning. This is a first indication of the extent to which various Kurdish groups are politically active. “Being combative” was named several times in relation to Kurdish identity, as well as “constantly getting up again and again despite setbacks” and “being stabbed in the back repeatedly”. This inherent relationship between Kurdish identity and the struggle for autonomy signifies the fact that identifying as Kurdish is a statement by itself, and therefore ‘being Kurdish’ inherently means you (should) identify and express yourself as Kurdish openly. Being Kurdish was accordingly related to “freedom”, in the sense that by being Kurdish you exercise your freedom to express your identity. One respondent said:

A real Kurd stands behind Kurdistan, is open to it, and says he or she is Kurdish. A real Kurd is proud of his or her origins and heritage and everything that has to do with Kurdistan. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Identifying as Kurdish therefore appeared to be an important part of staying true to the continuous battle for Kurdish rights and autonomy. Through expressing Kurdish identity, many Kurds make a political statement or start the conversation about the Kurdish question in general. This constitutes one of the ways in which diaspora members contribute to the Kurdish fight and struggle from a distance. One respondent explained why:

I will always say that I’m Kurdish, I am proud of that. I will not tell people “I’m Syrian, I’m not a Kurd”. Because what would these people over there otherwise fight for? They will fight for nothing? (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Another respondent mentioned that Kurdish people by nature are combative:

Of course we know that the Kurds will not say calm. We cannot stay calm either. For one reason or the other it is in our blood. We are active people. We cannot help it, as our whole history is characterized by the struggle. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Kurdish diaspora identity originates from collective traumatic memories, resulting from oppression and forced migration. Correspondingly, Kurdish identity is inherently shaped by the fight for Kurdish rights and autonomy. ‘Being Kurdish’ means you take an active stance in the conflict, since that attitude opposes those who deny Kurds as a separate nation and identity. This identity therefore is related to cultural and social factors, but is particularly maintained for political purposes. Kurdish identity in the diaspora is actively preserved because of the denial of Kurdish identity elsewhere and revolves around the survival of Kurds in the homeland conflict. The following quotation shows the importance of the conflict and struggle in preserving Kurdish identity:

Because of the conflict, my heart is over there. If Kurdistan was a free country, and the people would not have to suffer, perhaps I would have worried less or I would have occupied myself less with Kurdish identity, and the Kurds. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Although many Kurds consider expressing their Kurdish identity as vital to their fight for Kurdish rights and autonomy, three respondents also identified as partly Turkish. They mentioned it was sometimes more convenient to tell people they are Turkish, as this takes away the difficulties of explaining the Kurdish issue. Four other respondents mentioned that they usually try to assess the situation that they are in as well as the people that they are talking to, and accordingly decide whether they will say they are Kurdish. This underlines the fear of non-acceptance based on ethnicity, and points out the ways in which discrimination continues among diaspora groups in the host-society. Half of the respondents explicitly did not want to be related to Turkey, Iraq or Syria in any way. Among these respondents were all three male respondents and six female respondents from both the first and second generation. Four of these respondents were originally from Turkey, four from Iraq, and two from Syria. Over all, the impression that Syrian respondents gave, involved not as much hatred and antipathy against their homeland states as was perceived with Turkish and Iraqi respondents. Frequently mentioned was the fact that Kurdish culture is unique and different from Islamic culture, as also most forms of religion exercised by Kurds are more liberal. The respondents that specifically mentioned they could never identify themselves with Turkey, Iraq or Syria, also

mentioned that they disapproved Kurdish people who would (out of fear or ease) identify with these states. Many respondents called this group “fake Kurds”. They often named that these Kurds fear not to be accepted. One respondent stated:

I have mixed feelings about Kurds that tell Turkish people that they are Turkish as well. I have experienced that and I think it is very hypocritical. In my opinion I do not consider you as a Kurd anymore and I lost respect for you. You are no longer a Kurd then. I just think it’s bad for the Kurdish community that there are such Kurds out there. Actually, traitors. Only when it suits you, you are Kurdish. If there officially would be an independent Kurdistan, then suddenly there would be many more Kurds coming from all places. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

As indicated by the comments about “fake Kurds”, the Kurdish diaspora in itself is quite heterogenic. Active members of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands blame those who are less active. Not expressing yourself as Kurdish or not attending a demonstration is acknowledged by many as betrayal. The heterogeneity of the Kurdish diaspora is related to the fact that members have experienced different levels of oppression and conflict in their home countries. Respondents who would identify less with the Kurdish question, or who would identify as mostly Dutch, did usually not (consciously) experience oppression or conflict themselves. In addition, some respondents mentioned that particularly Iraqi Kurds constituted the group that was the least active in politics, or the least present during demonstrations. This points at certain persisting tensions across Kurds from different regions. Even though the meaning that respondents gave to Kurdish identity was often identical, and the diaspora therefore seems significantly ‘homogenous’, some rivalries persist across the Kurdish diaspora. Half of the respondents mentioned this disharmony among Kurds:

There is a kind of disunity among all Kurds. The Turkish Kurds have their own association, the Iraqi Kurds, everyone has their own association. Of course everyone has their own dialect, which can result in miscommunication. The nation is really divided. […] The Iraqi Kurds are more engaged with what happens over there, while the Turkish Kurds have the same.. because it just feels closer to them. But I do believe that everything that happens in all regions affects all Kurds. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

The other half interestingly argued the opposite by stating that the Kurds are united:

Although there are different dialects, we are all the same. It doesn’t matter for me which region you are from, it all belongs to my country. If they asked me to fight in Turkey or Syria, I would have done it as well. The Kurds constitute one piece, not four. That is just what England and France did. (Male, first generation, from Iraq)

In conclusion, identity formation among members of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands is perceived as challenging and varies across cases considering the different social environments that members relate to. Yet it remains striking that all respondents identify as Kurdish, or as Kurdish and Dutch. No systematic differences were found across generations or country of origin. This indicates the strong awareness of the common Kurdish identity among the diaspora, regardless of different backgrounds. This strong identity resembles the imagined community that Anderson (1983) referred to and underlines the relevance of collective identity formation through the accentuation of differences with out-group members (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). The self-identification of Kurdish identity is constructed on the basis of both cultural and political aspects. To a certain extent, the Kurdish diaspora identity is distinguished by shared cultural traditions, behaviors, religion and language. However, the majority of respondents connected Kurdish identity to the struggle and conflict in the homelands. Ethnic Kurdish identity is therefore largely produced by political discourses (Verkuyten 2004). The politicization of Kurdish identity creates the incentive to maintain Kurdish identity in the diaspora and engage in transnational activities. As Pirkkalainen and Mahdi (2009) and Shain (2002) indicated, conflict-generated diasporas mobilize on the basis of an identity that is particularly formed by conflict in the homeland. Conflict in Iraq, Turkey and Syria up until today continues to influence the construction of diaspora identity of Kurds in the Netherlands. Kurdish diaspora identity is accordingly shaped largely by negative experiences of oppression, discrimination, persecution and conflict. Moreover, the perception of expressing identity as a form of activism largely coincides with the concept of resistance identity (Castells 2010).

5.2 Transnational activities This section aims to explore the second sub question: “What social, cultural, economic and political transnational activities do members of the Kurdish diaspora community in The Netherlands undertake?”. Transnational activities are divided into cultural (5.2.1), social (5.2.2), economic (5.2.3), and political (5.2.4) activities.

5.2.1 Cultural transnational activities Cultural transnational activities relate to the recreation of cultural events and behaviors by members of the diaspora. Many cultural practices and rituals related to the homeland were

described by respondents, such as language, religion, traditional food, clothing and traditional holidays such as Newroz. Newroz was referred to by respondents as “Kurdish New Year” or the “celebration of Spring”. In total eight respondents mentioned they celebrated this traditional holiday in the Netherlands, mostly at gatherings organized by Kurdish associations. Language constitutes an interesting cultural transnational activity, considering the different existing Kurdish dialects. Many Kurds cannot speak one of these dialects due to assimilation policies in their countries of origin. Nonetheless a majority of sixteen respondents indicated that they speak one of the Kurdish dialects (Kurmanji, Zazaki or Sorani dialect). The remaining two respondents spoke Turkish. Many respondents perceived language as an instrument of oppression through assimilation policies in their home countries. This politicization became clear by the fact that second generation Turkish Kurds were intentionally not taught the Turkish language by their parents. Moreover the respondents who could not speak the Kurdish language, or who did not teach this to their children, deeply regretted this. This in turn indicates the use of language as an expression of identity and as a form of activism in itself, which hints at the political nature of all aspects and expressions of Kurdish identity. This was illustrated by the following respondent:

I think as a Kurd, if your parents speak Kurdish, it is your duty to also learn the language, especially in these times. Of course I understand, that some Kurds cannot speak the language because of what happened in the past. But sometimes I feel that is just an excuse for some people who do not make an effort to learn Kurdish. […] I would definitely teach my children Kurdish. That is my duty. Doesn’t matter who I marry, a Chinese or a Dutchman. That is a duty you have as a parent, if you can speak the language then you should learn your child the language. To pass it on. In that way we grow more and more and accordingly have a larger reach. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Besides language, religion is interesting to analyze as a cultural transnational activity, considering the fact that many Kurds continue to exercise their religious beliefs in the Netherlands. Seven respondents mentioned that they believed in Islam. One respondent stated that she is a Yezidi Kurd, and one other respondent was an Alawite. None of the respondents exercised Jewish or Christian religion. Over all however respondents were quite liberal in exercising their religion. Again this is related to the history of imposing Islam as a national religion by different Arab states. One respondent mentioned that she did not want to raise her children with Islam:

On paper we are Muslims, but I do not believe in Islam anymore. I do not have a religion, and my husband even officially withdrew his Islamic religion at the municipality. And I also did not want to raise my children with Islam. Actually Kurds are usually not religious. (Female, first generation, from Iraq)

Over all, cultural activities form an important part of Kurdish transnational involvement. Many cultural activities are organized by Kurdish associations in the Netherlands and are very much related to social activities accordingly. The next section discusses this social transnational network among the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, describing in more detail how these associations foster expressions of Kurdish language and culture.

5.2.2 Social transnational activities Many respondents continuously stayed in touch with their homeland through social relations with Kurdish family and friends as well as through gatherings organized by Kurdish associations. The social transnational activities that will be discussed in this section involve ties with Kurdish family members or friends both in the homeland and in Europe. Social connections within the Kurdish community in the Netherlands are additionally recognized as social transnational activities. All respondents maintained ties with their families and friends in their homeland. First generation respondents who migrated as adults maintained contact with their close family members on a daily basis. Three second generation migrants maintained limited to no contact with their family members, as they only reached out to them during particular events such as birthdays. Six second generation respondents maintained regular contact with their family members through Facebook and Skype. One respondent described how she maintained intensive contact with her niece:

I had a really close connection with my niece in Syria, she was my correspondent, sort of. Recently, a month ago, she passed away. She had really close ties with the Kurdish army and hung out with them a lot. She told me about everything that was going on over there, and if I saw something in the news I asked her to check if it was correct. She told me everything really detailed, because she really knew what was actually going on. (Female, second generation, from Syria)

Respondents generally felt the need to keep in contact with their family members as many felt good about connecting with those who are alike. This was partly related to the position of respondents as migrants or ‘foreigners’ in the Netherlands. Returning to the homeland to visit family has been mentioned by fifteen respondents as an important part of their lives. One respondent who had left Syria when she was three years old, said:

I heard classmates talking about their grandparents, aunts, and cousins, which I did not have. When I went back to Syria, suddenly I had twenty uncles and aunts, cousins, and we did a lot of fun things, and played. These were just really good times. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Some respondents returned to their homeland three or four times in their lives for holidays and to visit family, and others returned on a yearly basis. The majority of respondents never wanted to go back permanently. Most respondents who were originally from Syria stated they could not return because of security reasons since the war started. Two first generation migrants had never returned to their homeland because of their fear to get arrested there. Another reason not to return would be out of fear to get arrested in the Netherlands, as one respondent explained:

I could go back, but then the Dutch government will think I went fighting for IS or something, or I get arrested over there. There they see me as someone who has fled. So I prefer not to go. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Besides social relations that were maintained with family and friends abroad, the Kurdish socio-cultural network in the Netherlands constituted an important part of many respondents’ lives. Thirteen respondents had at least once taken part in social and political activities organized by Kurdish associations in the Netherlands. The following section will concentrate on the social aspect of these activities. Eight of the abovementioned thirteen respondents were active members of Kurdish associations, as they had organized events themselves or acted as ambassadors. Among these was a variety of respondents from Syria, Iraq and Turkey. The most active members were all youth and thus were born in the Netherlands or migrated when they were below the age of four. The older generations sometimes took part in academic lectures or Newroz celebrations, but would not attend the Kurdish association on a weekly basis. Younger (mostly second generation) Kurds felt a larger need to reconnect with their roots through Kurdish associations, whereas older (first generation) respondents perceived that as an organic part of their identity and life. Four respondents had never attended activities organized by the Kurdish association, and one respondent had only been there once or twice when he was young. These respondents, all university students, mentioned they simply did not feel the specific need to connect with Kurdish people. One first-generation respondent who had migrated when she was three years old, also did not feel this connection:

I’m not really involved with any Kurdish organization, no. I do feel a little bit Kurdish but I do not really do anything to keep that alive. […] Why would I go to a Kurdish association? Dutch people are also nice to hang out with, or Surinamese people.. I like people because I like them and not because of their ethnicity. I don’t want to do something just because it is Kurdish. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

The active respondents usually took part in activities together with their friends and family, but in a few cases they would also go to meetings by themselves. Many friendships originated from the activities organized by the Kurdish association. This social element of connecting with people with the same ethnic roots was one of the motivations to attend such activities, besides expressing support towards one another. The communal feeling of participating in these social activities was described by this respondent:

I came in there for the first time, and I thought, I have never seen this before. […] It was quite special. It was a kind of café, and it looked really nice, which I actually had not expected. Everyone was super involved with one another, nobody was alone. You immediately feel welcome. You are greeted as ‘Hewal’, which means ‘friend’. That is a sort of name for everyone. I like that. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Amongst the social activities that were organized by the Kurdish associations were dinners, lectures, trips to amusement parks, Newroz celebrations, Kurdish folk dance, saz instrument classes and celebrations of the birthday of Abdullah Öcalan. Many young respondents also named their involvement in the Kurdish student association (KSVN), which organizes both social and political activities throughout the year. One young respondent furthermore talked about the (international) youth camps, organized by the Kurdish association:

We used to go the a youth camp in Belgium, where we only did fun things. It was organized by the Kurdish association. From eleven to one in the morning we were educated about Abdullah Öcalan, and then we read from his books every day. […] After class we did fun activities. Hiking, sports, city trips. Once we went hiking for five days in Germany, and then we slept at Kurdish people’s houses over there. It was a lot of fun! (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Besides the preservation of social connections through Kurdish associations, social media platforms such as Facebook, Snapchat and Twitter proved to play a large role in connecting Kurds in the Netherlands as well as worldwide. Dozens of Facebook and Snapchat groups related to the Kurdish question as well as Twitter were used by respondents to connect to other members of the Kurdish community. On these platforms mainly political issues are being discussed, but also more common day-to-day things such as beauty. None of the male respondents indicated their participation in such general social activities online, unless they were related to the news and politics. Four respondents indicated that they got to know their friends through Facebook. One respondent described how everyone supports each other in a Kurdish Facebook group:

There are hundreds of Facebook groups. We support each other there. Also, with all of us, we block those people who want to disturb the group. We do not want to occupy ourselves with these discriminative people. We have to act as one. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

In sum, social transnational activities undertaken by the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands involve returning to the homeland, maintaining social relations with family members abroad, connecting to other Kurds through social media and participating in social events organized by the Kurdish association in the Netherlands. Kurdish associations play an important role in bolstering the Kurdish social network as well as in creating and maintaining a communal feeling among the diaspora. The amount of non-political social activities however is relatively small. This is further demonstrated by the extensive use of social media platforms related to the Kurdish question, which provide the opportunity to debate political events and simultaneously create friendships online. Correspondingly, the political realm is largely present and visible in social activities. Whereas Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002: 769) specify socio-cultural transnational activities as symbolic and non-instrumental, this case proves otherwise. A relatively large part of Kurdish social and cultural transnational activities is rational in the sense that language, cultural traditions, and social relations are intentionally preserved for political purposes.

5.2.3 Economic transnational activities The Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands is involved in economic transnational activities to a limited extent and usually not by professional means. Economic transnational activities for the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands are therefore either socially or politically-linked. In most instances that economic transnational activities came up, people would talk about the remittances that they send to their families once in a while. Four respondents mentioned they send money to their families in the homeland because of declining economic circumstances in their homelands, after attacks, or for the purpose of buying medicines. One respondent mentioned she would support her family in order for them to cross the border and for her uncle to be released from prison:

We support our family financially, especially after the attacks in Afrin happened. Then we all contributed. My father sent around 200 euros, and in total we sent quite a considerable amount. But still that’s not a lot, since just in order to cross the border, you already need half a million [Syrian pounds]. And for my uncle to be released you need one or two million. And we don’t have that anymore. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Five respondents mentioned the political cause for which they send economic remittances to their homelands. Two young respondents organized fundraisers at school:

In the fourth class of high school I organized a fundraiser, for which I bought food and sold that, and I earned 700 euros. I gave that to the Kurdish association. They were collecting money for the people there. They were really happy! (Kurdish from Syria, first generation).

During the attacks on Kobany I held a fundraiser in school. It really was a success. I had three vans full of clothes. It was really special to do. For now, I just send money to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Syria once in a while. (Female, second generation, from Syria)

Also the collection of donations by Kurdish associations or political parties in the Netherlands was mentioned, in order to support Kurdish fighters:

During some Kurdish celebrations there are occasionally also associations that collect donations for the PKK, or for other fighters. And yes I usually give them some money. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

One respondent, a former fighter in Kurdish PUK militias in Iraq, specifically mentioned he would never provide financial support to the PKK:

I was asked by the PKK to give them money. But I did not to that, because it made me angry. I told them, when I was young and went fighting in Kurdistan, I smoked parts of a newspaper instead of actual cigarettes. I asked him, did you send me some money back then? I said, you [PKK fighters] have good food, you smell good; back then we [PUK fighters] would be in the mountains and we would not eat for three or four days, except for dry bread and dates. Sometimes we had to walk four days back and forth just for dry bread. (Male, first generation, from Iraq)

Over all, economic support and remittances do not play a very large role in transnational activities undertaken by the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. This is in line with the existing theory, since economic activities are usually less common than other types of transnational involvement (Snel et al. 2006). Nonetheless, financial support to family members was very prevalent. Also economic support to political parties and Kurdish associations was common among the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. Following the argument made by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), these remittances arguably negatively influence the homeland conflict since they support the armed struggle of Kurdish militias. Yet considering the scope of this support it remains questionable whether such effects are significant.

5.2.4 Political transnational activities As described in previous sections, Kurdish diaspora members are often intrinsically politically driven in their involvement in cultural and social activities. This section takes a closer look at the political engagement of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, through transnational activities such as following the news, engaging in political activism in the Netherlands, and political participation in both the home and host country. Almost all respondents (fifteen out of eighteen) frequently discussed the political situation in their homeland or their parents’ homeland with their family and friends. Two of these fifteen respondents would only talk about the situation in case of significant events. Second generation respondents often discussed Kurdish history and politics with their parents, and in that way gained more knowledge on their parents’ homeland. Interestingly, seven of these respondents mentioned that they would particularly talk about politics with their father, or that their father was more actively engaged with politics and watching the news than their mother. The three male respondents additionally indicated they watched the Kurdish news every day. In total, ten respondents watched the news related to the Kurdish question on a daily basis. Among them was a variety of respondents from Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Six other respondents only occasionally watched the news, during salient political events or developments. In case they did not speak and understand Kurdish, they would watch an international or Turkish news channel. One respondent would intentionally watch the Turkish news to obtain more knowledge about how ‘the other side’ perceived and presented the conflict. But besides television, an important way of obtaining information about homeland politics was through internet and social media. Respondents mentioned their use of several news websites as well as the use of Twitter and Facebook. Frequently mentioned were the Kurdish Facebook groups where members would post related news updates in. Two respondents stated they never watched the news related to the Kurdish question, as they would usually hear about important developments through their parents. Young respondents would usually be informed by their parents about family members of friends that were facing oppression in the homeland or were arrested, as one respondent explained:

My parents told me a lot about that period in Turkey. My great grandfather was arrested because of the Kurdish question. There was so much injustice back then, the Turkish army thought they could get away with everything. Really awful things happened. […] My cousin was also arrested lately because she ran for office in the elections, for a Kurdish political party. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Of the respondents who would have many conversations about the Kurdish issue at home, many described the personal effects the conflict had on them. Seven respondents specifically named how they are regularly emotionally affected by political incidents and developments in the homeland. Again, this was experienced by respondents from all three regions. Stress sometimes was related to the circumstances in which family members lived, but in other cases involved general worries about the conflict or the position of Kurds in the homeland. Four younger respondents mentioned the Kurdish issue affected their study results because of the stress they experience and the amount of time they are occupied with the conflict. One respondent mentioned the generational trauma that he experiences:

There is a lot of trauma in that society, which needs more time. I feel that also really strongly, with all my heart. I’m always concerned with the issue. […] It also really hurts that studying doesn’t go that well. Now I’m relatively okay, but last semester [during the referendum] I cried a lot and I was quite emotional. I did not attend classes for two weeks. […] I failed three courses, it was a really tough period.. (Male, first generation, from Iraq)

The emotional and personal connection to political developments in the homeland in some cases also resulted in a reluctance to talk about the issue or to watch the news. The latter was explained by this respondent:

If I come across such an article in the newspaper sometimes I doubt whether I should read it or not. On the one hand I want to know what is going on there, but on the other hand I always feel very sad afterwards. Even though I only lived there for four years, I still get very upset if I feel it is not going well there. Perhaps if you’re not emotionally involved, it is interesting to read, but for me it is really awful. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Older (first generation) respondents also mentioned they found it difficult and confronting to talk about the past or to watch the news. Even though they would often talk to their children about politics, they declined to talk about their traumatizing personal experiences. Two respondents specifically mentioned their trauma related to the past. One of them had fought for Kurdish PUK militias in Iraq against the regime of Saddam Hussein. He explained that his son often asked questions about that period, but that he refused to talk about it. The other respondent who experienced trauma would sometimes tell stories to her children, but would not go into too much detail as it was really confronting for her. In total, three respondents stated they would never talk about politics at home. These respondents were all university students and had moved away from their parents. Two of them

mentioned their parents did not want to burden them with political issues as this would prevent them from focusing on school. The extent to which respondents showed interest in political developments in their homeland by following the news or by discussing political issues with their relatives, was largely connected to their involvement in political activism. The first generation respondents who stated they were traumatized and therefore did not closely follow the news every day, neither would take active part in demonstrations in the Netherlands, or at least not anymore. The rest of the first generation respondents, plus a significant amount of second generation migrants, would participate in demonstrations whenever they could. Twelve respondents in total would often go to demonstrations. Seven of those mentioned they had regularly visited demonstrations abroad, such as in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy. This respondent described the demonstrations in the Netherlands:

With the attacks in Afrin, we went three or four times per week. The Kurds in the Netherlands are not really known, so with the demonstrations, we try to make our voice heard so that people can see who we are, or can help us, and that people will research the Kurdish question further. The demonstrations are usually in the Hague, Amsterdam, or Rotterdam. We usually gather at one point and then walk from there. A van is driving in front. You usually yell: ‘Turkey is a terrorist country’, or ‘Erdogan is a terrorist’, or ‘Afrin, Free, Free Free!’. We usually bring many flags, flyers, and posters. We also have our own security guards. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

When respondents were asked what their reasons were to attend demonstrations related to the Kurdish question, the majority mentioned their need to show support and make their voice heard:

My goal to go to demonstrations is to make my voice heard and show my support. But if you go there and scream, and show your support, at the end of the day you come home and you wonder, will they be happy with our support? Sometimes I wish I could do more. […] It hurts so much to see these children crying. I just want to go there then. I have so much respect for those who give up their lives for Kurdistan. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

In general I think demonstrations are really important. That the people are stronger than the state, and that the people rise up. I think making my voice heard is really important for the people who cannot make their voices heard. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

My dad prefers I spend more time on my school work, he wants me and my sister to have a good future, as he himself never finished school. He always tells me, first finish school, then do whatever you want. But I’m stubborn. I just want to support my people. Once I was on TV at AT5, and also once I sung the Kurdish national anthem, and then my dad sent that to all of our family members. So he still is very proud of me doing all these things. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Only a couple of respondents mentioned reaching out to the Dutch and European governments as their objective of protesting. Interestingly, many of the active respondents doubted the significance and influence that demonstrations in the Netherlands could have. Yet, they felt they could not sit tight and do nothing and therefore they attended the demonstrations:

If you look at the demonstrations that are organized in the Netherlands, these do not really make a difference. It doesn’t change much. How long has the conflict been going on? Does another 40 years of bloodshed need to pass? I will not stop going to demonstrations, but I don’t see anything changing soon. (Female, first generation, from Turkey)

The contradiction between continuing to stay politically active whilst not believing in the effectiveness of that action is an interesting phenomenon. For the Kurdish diaspora this hints at the importance of expressing Kurdish identity. Rather than protesting for a particular objective, going to demonstrations is simply associated with being Kurdish. This respondent even blamed the Kurds that would not attend demonstrations:

In my opinion, you have to attend a demonstration as a Kurd. If you are Kurdish and you have never been to a demonstration, then, well.. I mean, you have so much time. You should be aware of what is happening to your people. That is really important I think. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Six respondents had never been to a demonstration related to the Kurdish question before. This was either due to their busy lives, their lack of interest, or because they did not get exposed to these events. Four of them were born in the Netherlands, and two of them migrated here when they were below four years old. Two were from the Turkish region, two from Iraq, and two from Syria. Considering this split between generations and regions, it remains difficult to draw conclusions regarding the reasons for active involvement. Nonetheless there is definitely a connection between active involvement in demonstrations, regularly discussing politics at home, and closely following news updates. Though political activism among Kurds from different regions might not vary significantly, there is a large spectrum of political parties and movements that Kurds from Iraq, Syria and Turkey support. Among those who were politically active, eight respondents explicitly named their active

support to the PKK. Five of those eight were originally from Turkey. One of them recognized the PKK as inherently linked to Kurdish identity:

I support the PKK for a 100%. In my Kurdish association there are also many people who sympathize with the PKK. I think that actually, every Kurd sympathizes with the PKK, and Kurds who don’t, are assimilated into Turkish. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

One respondent described her personal ties with the PKK:

I lost two cousins because they decided to join the PKK. […] Last June we got the message that he was shot and died. […] But I fully support the PKK. Every party perhaps should do some things differently, but what do you expect? These people have been oppressed and threatened for years. They cannot speak their own language, have their own names.. […] They wanted to establish a political party to fight for their rights, but any member of a Kurdish party will be arrested.. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

The majority of the rest of the respondents still sympathized with the PKK, yet they would not actively support the party. All respondents that were politically active perceived the PKK as an organization that has accomplished significant positive changes for the Kurds by raising awareness about the Kurdish issue worldwide. The accomplishments of the PKK were described by the following respondents:

I think they have accomplished many things. The PKK makes sure that we actually know what is going on. They accomplished more freedom in Turkey than what we had before. There is now a Kurdish TV channel, and Kurdish music is allowed. Of course it is limited, but we could not even have dreamed about these things. They made everyone know that we are Kurds. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

What they try to do in the Netherlands is giving Kurds more hope and strength; let them know they are not alone, and that the PKK fights for the people. I feel quite brave because of the PKK. If the PKK wouldn’t exist, I would go out on the streets and shout I am a Kurd. Perhaps I would not even be aware of the fact that I was Kurdish. Probably I would not even have a Kurdish name. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Several respondents mentioned negative aspects of the PKK as well, such as the fact that the party no longer fights for an independent Kurdistan or their use of violence. The latter however was often perceived as inevitable:

After all, the PKK is an armed party, something which I am actually against. But I don’t think they have another option. There is no other option. The PKK originally was founded by university students, it was not an armed battle in the beginning. But at a given moment, in these circumstances, you have to go to the mountains to fight.. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

In addition to the PKK, many respondents emphasized the importance of their leader Abdullah Öcalan. Several respondents mentioned they felt a personal connection with Öcalan, and attributed their willingness to fight for Kurdish rights to him. One respondent explained her gratefulness to Öcalan:

Personally I really support Öcalan. He is in prison for us. That man did so many things for the Kurds. Because of him, I call myself a Kurd today, and not a Syrian. I am grateful to him and I am glad to say that. I think it is awful that he is unjustly arrested and in custody. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Of all respondents, eight actively supported the PKK, four supported other political parties and six did not support any party. Respondents that did not support any party were split between those who were not politically active and those who deliberately choose not to support one particular political party. They felt that the Kurds should all be united rather than split in different movements:

I don’t support any political party. If I pick up one flag I need to pick up all flags I think. I am neutral. I support all Kurds. We all have the same purpose and goal, but every party has its good and bad sides. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Parties that other respondents affiliated with were the KDP and PUK in Iraq and the YPG and YPK in Syria. The respondents from Syria supported the YPG and YPK, and respondents from Iraq the KDP and PUK, as they fight for freedom in the regions that the respective respondents originally come from. One of the YPG and YPK supporters expressed her support in the following way:

I really would love to visit the YPG and YPK, just to really thank them, give everyone a hug and a kiss on their foreheads, and tell them that they are the true heroes, and that I am so proud of them. Because of them I am just truly happy. In my view they are just the real fighters, who were the only ones that fought ISIS. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Besides supporting political parties in the homeland, some Iraqi respondents mentioned they participated in the homeland elections. Three respondents voted in favor of the referendum concerning the autonomy of Kurdistan. Many respondents expressed not only their hopes for an autonomous region in Iraq, but an independent Kurdistan covering the four regions:

I really hope it stops at a certain moment. That Kurds can live in freedom. I want an independent Kurdistan, but if that would bring too much problems, then I would also just accept rights for us. It has been enough after 40 years, so many people have died. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

I will always be concerned about the Kurdish question. Who knows, that in ten years, I’ll work at the Kurdish Institute in Paris. And then we talk to each other again and you ask me, how are you? And I’d say, fine, the Kurds are independent now! (Male, first generation from Iraq)

The data furthermore suggested that the extent to which respondents identified as Kurdish and engaged in transnational activities also affected their political preferences in the Netherlands. Half of the respondents, including Kurds from Iraq, Turkey and Syria, explicitly mentioned their antipathy against the Dutch political party Denk. They perceived this party as related to president Erdogan and as only representing the rights of the Turkish population in the Netherlands. Two respondents stated that the party should be forbidden. One respondent mentioned that Denk pays people to vote for the party, and that is in not in line with the Dutch constitution. Besides the common antipathy against Denk, four respondents affiliated with the Dutch right-wing political parties PVV and Forum voor Democratie. One young respondent described:

One time I said, a little bit joking, I will vote for the PVV and then you [Turks] all get a free flight ticket back to your own country. Then I got attacked from all sides. But if I want to do that, I just do it right? People were relating it to religion, which doesn’t make sense at all. They tell me religion is nothing worth to me. […] I told them, I would rather vote for PVV than for Denk. But then the whole Turkish people will come after you. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Interestingly, all four older respondents of the first generation talked negatively about the “islamization of the Netherlands”. They criticized the Dutch government for allowing too much, such as the construction of mosques and wearing headscarves in the Netherlands. All four respondents argued that migrants should adjust to the culture of their host country:

This country will help you.. In Iraq they live with 30 people in one house, in the Netherlands they suddenly want to have one house for themselves and get welfare benefits. Well, then just stay in Iraq, if you only want to talk about Islam and Iraqi politics. Go back! This is a Christian country, not a Muslim country, you have to have respect for them. This is not your country. You do what they do. You just have to say thank you, learn how to say thank you. That word is important, because this country is not obliged to help you. You get all sorts of things for free here. (Male, first generation, from Iraq)

The Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands is influenced to a large extent by their homeland conflict in their political activism and participation here. Besides participating in demonstrations in

the Netherlands, Kurdish diaspora members are influenced by the homeland conflict also in their political participation in Dutch politics. In sum, a variety of political transnational activities is exercised by respondents from all three countries. Interestingly, Kurds mobilize in the diaspora for the purpose of Kurdish rights and autonomy in all regions, despite their origins. Though no systematic differences were found, male respondents seemed very politically interested, particularly with regard to watching the news. Besides gender, no major generational differences were found with regard to political transnational activities. Yet, it can be concluded that few of the older first generation were very politically active in demonstrations or sometimes even in watching the news, as they were traumatized and did not want to continue dealing with the issue anymore in the Netherlands. The second generation proved to be significantly active on average. The majority of respondents cared deeply for the Kurdish question, would watch the news most of the days and would attend demonstrations once in a while. The least politically active respondents were three university students who did not feel connected to the Kurdish question or to politics in general. On the other side, among the most politically active diaspora members where those who had been part of Kurdish militias in the homeland, or who were considering to join the fight in Syria now. This active group would go to every demonstration and was occupied with the Kurdish struggle every day. In conclusion, political transnational activities constitute a relatively large and significant part in the transnational involvement of members of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. Whereas Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller (2003) conclude that political activism among Latin-American diaspora members in the United States is generally small, the Kurdish case proves differently. Most likely this is related to the continuation of politics of suppression in the homelands. As described, both socio-cultural and economic transnational activities are shaped and affected largely by political events and developments. Furthermore, the extent to which members of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands are preoccupied with news updates from their (parents’) homelands, talk about politics at home and engage in demonstrations, is extraordinary. This has been elevated further in recent years due to the faster flow of news, as is shown by the frequent use of social media as well as news websites to remain up-to-date with political developments in the homeland.

5.3 Inter-ethnic tensions in the host society As a result of the extensive involvement in different transnational activities by the Kurdish diaspora, the Kurdish identity as well as issues around Kurdish autonomy and national rights are to a certain extent transferred to Dutch society. Considering the large Turkish population in the Netherlands, expressions of Kurdish identity and political support to the Kurdish question at times result in inter-ethnic tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish community in the Netherlands. This section explores these tensions and cleavages in order to answer the third sub question: “To what extent do inter-ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks shape and reinforce Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands?”. As shown by the extensive involvement of the Kurdish diaspora in political transnational activities in the Netherlands, many Kurds feel very strongly about the oppressive policies executed by states in their homelands. Yet the Syrian and Iraqi respondents did not feel as much hatred against their homeland governments as Turkish respondents did. Eleven respondents expressed themselves negatively towards the Turkish state and president Erdogan, of which five were from Turkey, four from Iraq and two from Syria. The remaining respondents did not specifically mention their views on the Turkish state or generally were not concerned with politics. The respondents that expressed themselves negatively towards the Turkish state mentioned they would rather not visit the country (anymore), as they would prefer not to spend their money on the Turkish economy and state:

I have been to Turkey once, when we moved back to Syria. But I don’t want to go there anymore, since their leader is murdering my people, my nation. I will not go to his country. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

While it was not unexpected that the majority expressed their hatred against president Erdogan, seven respondents articulated their hatred towards the Turkish people as a whole. This included three first generation migrants and four second generation migrants. They named the nationalist nature of Turks and the Turkish state, and the fact that everyone blindly follows the government. Usually this sentiment was strengthened by visits to Turkey and the experience of oppression and discrimination against there. One respondent argued that all Turks perceive Kurds as terrorists:

The PKK is a terrorist organization according to all Turks. In any case, every Kurdish army is considered terrorist, regardless of what they fight for, whether it is against ISIS, or whether they do something good for the world. I always say: Turkey prefers to have terrorists as their neighbors than Kurds. […] That is just how all Turks are.. in 99% of the cases that is their way of thinking.. If you don’t agree you go to jail or you get killed. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Another respondent described the hatred and aggression that she felt against Turks:

When I’m there [Turkey], I feel some kind of aggression coming from I don’t know where, you don’t even know you have it in you. […] You develop so much hatred towards the Turkish state and people, that much, that it really shocked me. You for example see the Turkish army, and then you just want to spit on them… though you know that they will arrest you then. But if you’re in jail, when you get beaten, then at least you can call them names!

[…] The Turks in the Netherlands are really extreme. They are not really developed or something.. They are not people who have read a lot of books. I mean, many books are also forbidden in Turkey. And education over there is really nationalistic as well. But here in the Netherlands you have all the opportunities to develop yourself and to read. So how can they still be like that then? What kind of nationalism and hate then resides within you? I think you’re a twisted person then, you’re not good. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

The feelings of antipathy against the Turkish population are shaped by experiences of oppression in the homeland, either by respondents themselves or by members of their family. The perception of ‘the other’ furthermore results from experiences of marginalization or discrimination in the host country. Many respondents experienced difficult situations with regard to expressing their identity in the Netherlands. Six respondents would in certain circumstances refrain from expressing their real origins. They would particularly be afraid to convey their Kurdish identity when talking to Turkish individuals in the Netherlands. One respondent felt that if she would express her Kurdish identity towards Turkish people, she would be provoking them. Two other respondents would rather not express their Kurdish identity in their working environment. One of them explained how she handles this in her job as a nurse in an elderly home:

I have a Turkish client, and just to be respectful to her, I make sure to not really talk about being Kurdish or the Kurdish conflict. I just don’t want to give her bad feelings. Usually I tell her: “whatever you want me to be, I am.” […] Because maybe she cannot handle the fact that I’m Kurdish or she will struggle with it for weeks – and I don’t want to do that to her. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Another respondent was a teacher in a culturally mixed school in Amsterdam, and also very consciously reflected upon expressing her identity in class. Even though she previously would

always attend demonstrations, she would now no longer go to those protests in case she could possibly be seen by one of her students:

I don’t go that often anymore. Lately my students sent pictures around of a demonstration, with the title “what kind of terrorists are they”, and then I thought, well, if they would have seen me, that would have been a tricky situation.. […] If parents would find out, that would just not be so pleasant. I really love my job and I don’t want this to impede certain things in my life. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

In total, fifteen respondents had faced responses in reaction to their Kurdish identity such as: “Kurdistan does not exist”, “where do you land by plane, if you go to Kurdistan?” or “you are a terrorist”. Many cases were mentioned in which people would immediately link Kurdish identity to the PKK. Respondents that expressed their identity on social media, usually received offensive anonymous responses in reaction to their online posts concerning the Kurdish question. Some would ignore it, while others would start an online debate. Respondents who experienced oppression firsthand or had close relatives that had been oppressed or arrested were more likely to feel personally offended by such responses. Eight respondents described actual confrontations or clashes that they experienced with Turkish people in the Netherlands, related to the Kurdish conflict or Kurdish identity. This varied from being ignored, to being bullied and not accepted in class to being mistreated and discriminated against in public. One respondent described such a situation concerning his sister:

Recently a Turkish man in a shop, in the Primera, has treated my sister really badly, and suddenly started yelling at her once she said she was Kurdish. He was saying she should do groceries for her, and all these kind of inappropriate things. Eventually he did apologize because there were a lot of other customers in the shop as well. (Male, second generation, from Iraq)

Another respondent described how she was bullied in class because of her Kurdish identity:

When we first introduced ourselves in class, I said, I’m Kurdish, from Syria, and then all Turkish students started talking and gossiping. We had just moved to a new city back then. I was bullied a lot. They always teased me, called me names, such as ‘terrorist’ and so forth. I did not even know what the word ‘terrorist’ meant. It just really hurt me.. I was only a small child and the whole class was against me. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

Many respondents described instances of escalation between Kurds and Turks during demonstrations. All respondents that had attended demonstrations usually had experienced disruptions by clashes between Turkish people and Kurdish protesters. According to most respondents, such confrontations resulted from people waving the Turkish flag in front of the

protest, or using the sign of the Gray Wolves (an ultranationalist Turkish organization). Respondents would usually feel some kind of tension while participating in protests, considering the large probability of walking along Turkish shops or Turkish cab drivers. Demonstrations are therefore guided by security officers that the Kurdish association provides themselves, in addition to the police. One respondent explained her anger towards those disrupting the demonstration:

It is just really disrespectful when Turks come to a demonstration with Turkish flags. Previously I really could not cope with that, I just attacked them. That was once, with the Kobany demonstrations, when they came with their flags and Grey Wolves signs. I felt so much anger, because Kurds are being massacred over there.. and you are powerless, and then Turks here are also yelling these things. That brings even more anger, pain, and grief. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

In connection to the experiences of discrimination or intolerance in the Netherlands, several respondents indicated they did not have any Turkish friends. Four respondents indicated they would never befriend Turkish people. This usually rested on the assumption that all Turkish people are nationalistic and supporters of president Erdogan. This respondent explained why she did not have Turkish friends:

I don’t have Turkish friends. Maybe it’s a coincidence, but I think it is also a conscious decision. Fifty/fifty, I’d say. The Turks in the Netherlands are really Turkish, they would never say they are Dutch.. They are scarily nationalistic. They are sometimes just like animals. They act with so much hate and aggression that it seems like they can eat your raw. They don’t know their limits or fear if it is related to Turkey. They would just shoot you and then be proud when they are in jail.. proud because they shot a Kurd. (Female, second generation, from Turkey)

Most respondents nonetheless had Turkish friends or were open to friendship with Turkish people despite the negative experiences they had during demonstrations or whenever they expressed themselves as Kurdish. Yet they would only befriend Turks that do not support Erdogan, and they would not talk about politics with their Turkish friends. They would nevertheless respect each other’s values and opinions. One respondent explained that she would befriend a Turkish person on Facebook, though she would not ‘like’ messages regarding Turkey or Erdogan. Similarly, that friend would not ‘like’ her online posts related to the Kurdish question:

My Turkish friends know I am really proud of my people and that I am against their president. But they respect it. Whenever I post something regarding Turkey, they will not ‘like’ it on Facebook, because it does remain their country of origin. But I also respect that. No one ‘unfollowed’ me up until now, so that is nice. (Female, first generation, from Syria)

The last quote exemplifies that Kurdish and Turkish communities in the Netherlands tolerate but not really accept each other. Although the two communities befriend each other and are culturally similar, the fact that one identifies as Kurdish and the other as Turkish carries the implicit reference to a longstanding conflict in the homeland. These tensions result in conflict and violent clashes during demonstrations, but are mostly articulated in daily events at work, school or in the grocery store. Interestingly, such instances, as well as antipathy towards Turkish people, have been cited by respondents from all three countries of origin. This underlines the collective identity among the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, as not only Kurds from Turkey but also from Syria and Iraq express antipathy towards the Turkish nation. Little differentiation between generations was found in taking radical positions towards the Turkish state and people. Second generation Kurds generally would hold more extreme positions, as they would also be slightly more involved in political activism. This can be explained by the argument that engaging in conflict from a certain distance might result in more extreme behavior (Demmers 2002). In sum, inter-ethnic tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish community, as perceived by the latter, are disclosed in different ways. Firstly, considering the negative responses that many respondents receive, expressing Kurdish identity in the Netherlands is generally perceived as challenging. Secondly, antipathy against the Turkish community is apparent by indications of hatred towards the ‘other’ as well as by instances of generalization and stereotyping. Although the Netherlands has an open political climate, a less accepting environment for Kurds is created by the continuation of inter-ethnic cleavages that originate in the homeland. This combination increases the likelihood for stronger migrant identities to emerge (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Quinsaat 2013). Correspondingly, Kurdish diaspora identity is reinforced by the continuation of political cleavages and ethnic tensions in the host society. As a result of social marginalization, migrants take on more radical identities and engage in more cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities (Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Hence the Kurdish conflict in the homelands continues in the diaspora and is transferred to Dutch society by expressions of ‘othering’ and inter-ethnic tensions between members of the Turkish and Kurdish community.

6. Conclusion This thesis has delved into the story of the active Kurdish diaspora community in the Netherlands, analyzing transnational identifications, transnational activities, and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The research question that has been answered is: “To what extent is ‘the Kurdish question’ transported to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands?” The first section (6.1) of this conclusion discusses the main outcomes of this research, also relating to the relevance and wider implications of the results. The second part (6.2) describes to what extent the theory that has been used was helpful and applicable to the observed data. Finally, the limitations to this study as well as recommendations for further research are discussed in the last paragraph (6.3).

6.1 Outcomes This study has provided an in-depth account of transnational involvement of first and second generation Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds in the Netherlands. The comprehensive approach forms a unique contribution to this field of study as various perspectives of Kurds with different backgrounds have been taken into account. The unity of Kurdish diaspora identity and transnational involvement among Kurds from all regions, considering the many common values and behaviors, is a striking outcome of this study. Despite the different pathways that Kurds from Iraq, Syria and Turkey have followed, their common political aim for autonomy and rights for the Kurds strongly connects them in one united diaspora. The characteristics of this diaspora identity, as well as of undertaken transnational activities, have been explored extensively and lead to several conclusions. First of all, Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands is largely shaped and maintained by the political context and position of Kurds in the homeland. The experiences of discrimination, oppression and persecution in the homeland establish the foundation for the development of a common Kurdish identity in the diaspora. As firsthand traumatizing experiences are passed on to next generations and maintained by the expansive Kurdish transnational network, an imagined community away from the ‘physical’ homeland is created. Kurdish identity is furthermore strengthened by the instances of discrimination and intolerance in the host country context of the Netherlands. Subsequently, the homeland conflict plays out in the context of the host society through the development of a strongly politicized ‘resistance’ identity in the diaspora. The establishment of a strong diaspora identity among Kurds in the Netherlands enlarges transnational involvement of diaspora members in terms of cultural, social, economic and political

activities. The light that the political situation in the Kurdish homelands sheds on the diaspora in the Netherlands is evident not only in the construction of Kurdish identity or through the scope of political activism in the host society, but also in the extent to which social gatherings are organized among the diaspora, the extent to which Kurdish language is fostered and in the amount of economic remittances to the homeland. The conflict that exists in the homelands around the Kurdish question therefore endures in the minds of diaspora members, resulting in challenging circumstances for host country governments. The Kurdish diaspora is also affected by the conditions of Dutch society, taking into account the multicultural context of the Netherlands. In the case of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, a continuation of ethnic conflict and tensions is particularly present with regard to the Turkish community, considering its significant size and influence in the Netherlands. As instances of overt violence and conflict take place occasionally, political cleavages that originate in the homeland conflict are mostly imported to Dutch society in forms of tacit and blatant discrimination, verbal abuse, bullying and feelings of antipathy. These experiences reinforce the distinct Kurdish identity in the diaspora and strengthen transnational involvement. In sum, both the collective memory of experiences of oppression in the homeland and the incidents of intolerance in the host society shape Kurdish identity, and enlarge transnational involvement. This extensive transnational involvement centered around politics, along with the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions and conflict with the Turkish community, result in the transfer of this conflict to Dutch society. This internationalization of the Kurdish issue does not only pose challenges to the Dutch government. With the continuation of globalization processes and conflict-generated migration flows, many host governments across Europe will have to deal with the issue of inter-ethnic conflict in the diaspora context increasingly. The implications of this study accordingly are likely to apply to multiple European states in which large Kurdish communities are present. Particularly countries with a large Turkish population, such as Germany, have experienced tensions and eruptions of violence between the Kurdish and Turkish community and will continue to face these challenges as long as the Kurdish question in the homelands remains unresolved.

6.2 Reflections on theory Theories revolving around the concept of diaspora, diaspora identity and transnationalism have proved to be considerably useful in analyzing the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands.

First of all, the diaspora concept appeared to be very relevant as the characteristics ascribed to diasporas by Safran (1991) and Vertovec (1997) correspond largely to the Kurdish community in the Netherlands. In particular the described connection between elements of social exclusion and the construction of diaspora identity (Clifford 1994; Cohen 2008; Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003) was useful in understanding how in the Kurdish case, a largely conflict-generated and stateless diaspora, identity is constructed on the basis of negative experiences. Accordingly the concept of resistance identity (Castells 2010) was relevant for the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands as well. In general, theories evolving around the construction of diaspora identity, translocality and imagined communities (Anderson 1983; Appadurai 1990; Vertovec 1997) were essential in understanding how Kurdish diaspora identity emerged and how it is passed on to next generations. Theories around transnationalism proved really helpful in analyzing patterns of transnational activities and thus were relevant in the analysis of results. The concept of transnationalism moreover provided the opportunity to analyze the increasing relevance of transnational processes today, as was shown by the widespread use of social media through which transnational connections were activated and maintained. The distinctions between various transnational activities were useful in categorizing transnational involvement and understanding that these activities are not mutually exclusive. Yet, in the Kurdish case transnational political involvement constituted a relatively large part of transnational involvement, in contrast to what the theory suggested. The theories that examine the connection between diasporas and homeland conflict appeared to be useful to a limited extent, considering the focus of this study was on the host society. Though some theories noted the possibility of the continuation of political cleavages or ethnic conflict in the host country context, the existing literature did not provide extensive accounts of how inter-ethnic conflict evolves in the host country. Yet, as the results indicated that the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions between diaspora communities largely coincided with active political transnational involvement, theories around transnationalism helped to fill this gap.

6.3 Limitations and further research Despite the insights that this study contributes to research around transnational involvement and inter-ethnic tensions in the diaspora context, this thesis inevitably has its limitations. First of all, due to the small scope and short time span of this study, only eighteen respondents could participate in in-depth interviews. The most important limitation that this brings about is not necessarily related to the defining features of Kurdish identity and transnational activities, but mostly to the ability of

the research to examine variations across diaspora members such as generational differences, age, gender, education, and country of origin. The limited scope of the study furthermore limits the ability of the research to generalize results to every member of the Kurdish diaspora community in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Another limitation of this research is related to the analysis of inter-ethnic tensions in the diaspora context. This study has solely focused on the perspectives of Kurdish respondents in analyzing inter-ethnic tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish community. In order to comprehensively examine how inter-ethnic conflict, inequality or discrimination plays out in the host country context, all conflicting parties should be subject to analysis. Taking into account the limitations of this research, several recommendations can be made with regard to future research on this topic. First of all, future research on this topic should be executed on a larger scale in order to decisively establish the determinants of transnational involvement. Such research could examine differentiation between factors like gender, education, generation and ethnicity, possibly through additional quantitative measures. Moreover, in order to truly understand the transportation of conflict into the diaspora context, further research should take into account both conflicting parties. Furthermore, as this study has only looked at conflict with the Turkish community, further research could examine possible tensions with other diaspora communities originating from the same states as Kurds, such as other ethnic groups from Iraq, Syria or Iran. Only then future studies can be conclusive about the determinants and effects of imported conflict into the diaspora context. Finally, on the basis of the contribution of this thesis, the effects of transnational involvement of diasporas on the host country context are very interesting and essential to consider in future research. Important subjects to be explored involve the integration of a politically active diaspora into the host society, as well as the political and societal effects of inter-ethnic conflict in the diaspora context, considering the ongoing influx of immigrants that European countries face today. On that basis, future research can explore the necessary policy changes for host countries when it comes to integration, but also with regard to dealing with conflict and tensions among migrant communities. Such research will finally contribute to the existing knowledge on complex questions around integration and dual citizenship.

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8. Appendix

6.1 Interview guide Identity o Where do you come from? o What is the history of your family and your residence in The Netherlands? o How do you identify? o What do you consider your ‘homeland’? o Where do you feel most at home? o Who do you identify with more? o What do you say when people ask you about your origins? o What languages do you speak? o What does ‘being Kurdish’ mean to you?

Cultural transnational activities o What languages do you speak? o Are you religious? o What religion do you hold? o What does Kurdish culture mean to you? o How often do you eat Kurdish food? o How often do you wear traditional Kurdish clothing?

Social transnational activities o How often do you visit your (or your parents’) country of origin? o What are your family ties with your homeland? o Why do you return to your homeland (family, holidays, etc)? o How often do you keep in contact with your family abroad and in the Netherlands? o How often do your parents have contact with your family? o Do you have contact with your family through social media? o Do you connect to other Kurdish people through social media? o Do you have Kurdish friends? o Do you engage in social activities organized by the Kurdish association? How often? o Do you have Kurdish friends through the Kurdish association? o Would you want to return to your homeland for good

Economic transnational activities o Do you ever send money back to your family? Or your parents? How much? o Why do you send money back to your family? o Do you ever send goods or medicine back to your homeland? o Do you support any organization in your homeland financially? o Do you support a political party financially? o Do you support a Kurdish organization or party in the Netherlands financially? o Do you make donations for charity in your homeland or in the Netherlands, related to the Kurdish question?

Political transnational activities o How often do you watch Kurdish/Turkish news/radio/other forms of media? o Do you follow the news through social media?

o How do you feel affected or engaged by political news related to your homeland? o How often do you talk about (homeland) politics at home? o How often do you talk about politics related to your homeland with others (friends, classmates)? o How and why are you engaged in any Kurdish organization’ political activities? o What political party in your homeland do you support, if any? And in what ways? o What is your opinion about the PKK / YPG? o Do you participate in politics (voting) in your homeland? o Are you engaged in protests or demonstrations in the Netherlands related to your homeland or the Kurds? How often? o How do you feel about protesting for this cause? o Did you engage in any other form of political activism? o What is your opinion about Kurdistan and the struggle for independence? o What is your opinion about the current state of political affairs in Turkey/Syria/Iraq? o Do you ever consider fighting in your homeland, for the Kurdish cause? o Do you know anyone who has joined the battle? o How are you engaged with Dutch politics?

Inter-ethnic tensions in the host society o How do you feel about the Turkish state currently? o How do you feel about the Turkish people in general? o What do you think about the Turkish community in the Netherlands? o How do you feel about Turkish supporters of the current regime in Turkey? o How often do you engage with members of the Turkish community in The Netherlands? o Do you have Turkish friends? o Would you marry a Turkish man/woman? o What do you think about eruptions of violence between Turkish and Kurdish groups during protests? o Do you feel confident about expressing your Kurdish identity in the Netherlands? o Do you feel confident to express your culture as well as your political views in The Netherlands? o Did you ever experience negative responses to your Kurdish identity in the Netherlands? o Did you ever experiences clashes, tensions or conflict related to the Kurdish question with Turkish people in the Netherlands? o Did you ever experience these eruptions of violence and conflict during demonstrations?