Cesifo Forum 4/2015 (Winter): the Baltic Tigers: Past, Present and Future
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CESifo, a Munich-based, globe-spanning economic research and policy advice institution WINTER Forum 2015 VOLUME 16, NO. 4 Focus Anders Åslund THE BALTIC TIGERS: Karsten Staehr Alessandro Turrini and PAST, PRESENT AND Stefan Zeugner FUTURE Karlis Bukovskis Peter Friedrich and Janno Reiljan Kadri Ukrainski Specials THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr DEAL: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IN- AND OUTSIDERS THE TRADE AND JOBS NEXUS IN Lucian Cernat and Nuno Sousa EUROPE: IMPORTANCE OF MODE 5 SERVICES EXPORTS CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL ACTION: Hagen Lesch A COMPARISON OF OECD COUNTRIES SHARE BUYBACKS AND EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS Bolko Hohaus Spotlight HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN CENTRAL AND Marcus Drometer and Katrin Oesingmann EASTERN EUROPE Trends STATISTICS UPDATE CESifo Forum ISSN 1615-245X (print version) ISSN 2190-717X (electronic version) A quarterly journal on European economic issues Publisher and distributor: Ifo Institute, Poschingerstr. 5, D-81679 Munich, Germany Telephone ++49 89 9224-0, Telefax ++49 89 9224-98 53 69, e-mail [email protected] Annual subscription rate: €50.00 Single subscription rate: €15.00 Shipping not included Editors: John Whalley ([email protected]) and Chang Woon Nam ([email protected]) Indexed in EconLit Reproduction permitted only if source is stated and copy is sent to the Ifo Institute. www.cesifo-group.de Forum Volume 16, Number 4 Winter 2015 Focus THE BALTIC TIGERS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE Why Have the Baltic Tigers Been So Successful? Anders Åslund 3 Exchange Rate Policies in the Baltic States: From Extreme Inflation to Euro Membership Karsten Staehr 9 Baltics’ External Balance: Still a Constraint? Alessandro Turrini and Stefan Zeugner 19 Capital in Latvia: Notes on a Hungry Tiger Karlis Bukovskis 31 Estonian Economic Policy during Global Financial Crises Peter Friedrich and Janno Reiljan 37 Fostering Innovation in Estonia: The View from the Governance Framework of the National Innovation System Kadri Ukrainski 45 Specials The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr 53 The Trade and Jobs Nexus in Europe: How Important Are Mode 5 Services Exports? Lucian Cernat and Nuno Sousa 65 Changes in Industrial Action: A Comparison between Germany and Other OECD Countries Hagen Lesch 68 Share Buybacks and Employee Stock Options Bolko Hohaus 79 Spotlight Household Debt in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Marcus Drometer and Katrin Oesingmann 82 Trends Statistics Update 85 Focus THE BALTIC TIGERS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE WHY HAVE THE BALTIC TIGERS Baltic countries had an average annual growth rate of 4.1 percent compared with only 0.7 percent for the EU BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL? as a whole (Figure 1). The Baltic economies have con- verged significantly with EU economies as a result. ANDERS ÅSLUND* The aim of this paper is firstly to analyse how the Baltic countries managed to accomplish their success. In August 1991, the three Baltic nations, Estonia, Its second aim is to assess where they are now. What Latvia and Lithuania, suddenly regained the inde- are their achievements, lingering concerns and new pendence lost in 1940, thanks to the failed coup by rising worries? The paper will conclude by considering Soviet hardliners in Moscow. Their economic situa- the broader implications of the Baltic experience. tion was desperate. They were major importers of en- ergy and other raw materials, and their Soviet manu- factured goods were of substandard quality. Soviet How the Balts reformed public finances collapsed in every regard, which also hit the Baltic states. All three managed to limit their Looking back at the situation of the Baltic states in inflation to about 1,000 percent in 1992, but their out- autumn 1991, it is truly remarkable that they managed put was in free fall. In 1992 Latvia’s GDP officially fell to get their economies back on track. None of them by 35 percent. The Baltic countries did not return to had been independent since 1940. They lacked nearly economic growth until 1995. Their economies grew all relevant national institutions, including central soundly from 1996 to 1998, but the Russian financial banks and ministries of finance. All three had large crash of 1998 wiped out their growth once again ethnic minorities, mainly Russians, and they har- (Åslund 2013). boured around 200,000 Soviet soldiers and major mil- itary installations. Their economies were in a state of From 2000 onwards, however, the three Baltic econo- complete collapse. mies started growing extraordinarily at an average of 8–9 percent a year. Latvia even recorded average They did, however, have four favourable precondi- growth of 10 percent for the three years from 2005 to tions. Firstly, all three developed strong national 2007. Alas, this was overheating. The three Baltic fronts in the late 1980s that aroused a strong sense of countries were hit hard by the liquidity freeze that fol- national community in each of the Baltic countries. lowed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in Secondly, these national fronts won the republican September 2008. In 2009, output in all three countries parliamentary elections in early 1990 and were al- plummeted at a double digit rate. All three reacted as lowed to form national governments, although these they had done in the early 1990s, with radical and governments had minimal powers. Thirdly, their re- front-loaded fiscal adjustment accompanied by struc- newed independence in August 1991 was not contest- tural reforms; and they succeeded once again. ed, but recognised by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The world welcomed the Baltic countries to all inter- Since 2012 the three Baltic countries have recorded the national institutions and no violence erupted. highest growth rates in the EU. Their growth is no Fourthly, they had friendly and wealthy western neigh- longer as high as it was during the golden years of the bours who welcomed them. early 2000s. The global credit boom is over, and growth rate in the neighbourhood has declined. Yet All three Baltic republics are small and vulnerable. during the four years from 2011 to 2014 the three Each is ethnically and linguistically distinct, unable to understand one another’s languages. Yet in their * Atlantic Council, Washington DC. In this paper I draw on three of reforms they acted very similarly, sharing ideas and my books: Åslund (2002); Åslund (2013); and Åslund and Dom- brovskis (2011). experiences. Estonia tended to take the lead with ei- 3 CESifo Forum 4/2015 (December) Focus Figure 1 Ventspils. Its mayor Aivars GDP Growth 2004–2014 Lembergs became the country’s % richest man and remains so to 15 this day. Latvia started corrup- 10 tion proceedings against him in 5 2006, but the case is ongoing and there is no real end in sight. 0 Latvian politics became dominat- - 5 ed by three oligarchs, who each EU28 controlled one political party. - 10 Estonia These three groupings dominated Latvia - 15 Lithuania Latvian politics until 2010, show- - 20 ing how dangerous the quick en- 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 trenchment of rent seeking inter- Source: Eurostat. ests are – see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1992 and 1993). ther Latvia or Lithuania following suit. It is therefore natural to focus on Estonia as the pioneer, whose ide- All three countries carried out rigorous macroeco- as quickly travelled to and were embraced by Latvia nomic stabilisation in 1992, introducing their own and Lithuania, where they were frequently adopted currencies in the summer of 1992: first Estonia, next with minor adjustments. The main reform govern- Latvia and finally Lithuania. The Estonians argued ment in Estonia was led by Prime Minister Mart that a national currency was the best wall against Laar, 1992–94 (Laar 2002). After achieving little in Russia. Their currency reforms were unilateral with- 1991, key reforms were implemented in 1992. Intense out any consultation with Russia or other members reforms continued in 1993 and 1994. of the rouble zone, cutting them off from otherwise ample Russia central bank credits. Estonia and The central goal of the early Baltic reforms was to se- Lithuania established formal currency boards with cure national independence. Being small and having fixed exchange rates in 1992, while Latvia pursued a been occupied for half a century, the Baltic nations similar policy. All three have been firm fiscal conserv- never took independence for granted. While other big- atives, regardless of political party in power, carrying ger former Soviet republics asked Russia for assis- out radical expenditure cuts aimed at a balanced tance, the Baltic states preferred independence and budget. Tax reforms took a slightly longer time to im- never even considered joining the post-Soviet Com- plement. In 1994, Estonia minimised its taxes and in- mon wealth of Independent States. Their urge to gain troduced a flat income tax, initially of 26 percent. independence was fundamental to their economic pol- Latvia and Lithuania quickly adopted flat income icy. They shared central Europe’s two slogans ‘we taxes too, and rates were reduced as far as public fi- want a normal society’ and a ‘return to Europe’, which nances allowed them to be. At present, Lithuania has meant the EU, embracing early radical reforms. the lowest flat income tax rate of 15 percent. Democracy and freedom were self-evident. Corporate profit taxes have fallen in line with person- al income tax. The first economic policy needed was a radical and early deregulation of trade and prices, which was pio- The Baltic countries carried out early and fast privati- neered by Estonia, with Lithuania quickly following zation, doing almost as well as the Central European suit. Estonia abolished all foreign trade tariffs and countries. All three countries insisted on the restitu- quotas, becoming the only truly free-trading country tion of agricultural land and housing to a far greater in Europe.