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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2003 European Re-Union: Representations of Eastern in NATO and EU Expansion Jason N. Dittmer

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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL

EUROPEAN RE-UNION: REPRESENTATIONS OF IN NATO

AND EU EXPANSION

By

JASON N. DITTMER

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2003

The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Jason N. Dittmer defended on 25, 2003

______Patrick O’Sullivan Professor Directing Dissertation

Jonathan Grant Outside Committee Member

______Jonathan Leib Committee Member

______Jan Kodras Committee Member

Approved:

______Barney Warf, Chair, Department of Geography

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above committee members.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, who always made her children’s education a priority and gave up many of her own personal satisfactions to make sure that we were in the best schools with the best teachers. Thanks Mom…

This dissertation is also dedicated to Karl Fiebelkorn, who would be mortified to know that something so academic as this dissertation was dedicated to him. But think of it this way Karl – this is just to tide you over until I can dedicate to you my magnum : “I See How It Is”: Reflections on Brotherhood. You are missed, Karl.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of a great many of my colleagues and friends, who have all influenced my thoughts on these matters (and many others). In particular I would like to thank Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan, who read a great many drafts of varying quality. His critiques kept me intellectually honest and for that and all of his effort I am grateful. Also, special thanks to Dr. Jonathan

Leib, Dr. Jan Kodras, and Dr. Jonathan Grant for their reviews and help. Former committee members, namely Dr. Jason Hackworth and Dr. Burt Atkins, also served brilliantly, if briefly, in the formulation of my original concept for this dissertation. Of course, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention my graduate student colleagues here at

Florida State University, especially Jeff Ueland and Andy Walter, who allowed me to bounce ideas off them (even if most of those ideas were of ways to waste time and postpone our graduation). In addition, recognition for Aristotle’s Coffee Garage is also in order. The staff’s donation of many dozens of white mochas to this cause is gratefully acknowledged. A special acknowledgement also has to go to Dr. Pulsipher and the people of Montserrat, who collectively hosted me during the summer of 2002 while the first draft of this dissertation was being written.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES vi ABSTRACT vii

1. Introduction 1

2. Philosophical Bases 14

3. Research Question and Methodology 26

4. Review 36

5. Operationalizing the Identities 62

6. in Expansion Debates 73

7. Representations of Eastern Europe in EU Expansion 85

8. Representations of Eastern Europe in NATO Expansion 110

9. 154

10. in EU and NATO Expansion 186

11. Other in EU and NATO Expansion 201

12. Perspectives on the Media 229

13. Conclusion 244

APPENDICES 251 REFERENCES 255 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 266

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of some East-West divisions in Europe 52

Figure 2: Graph of total EU articles and references to Central Europe therein 82

Figure 3: Graph of total NATO articles and references to Central Europe therein 83

Figure 4: Total articles and references to Central Europe therein 84

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to establish the relationship between formal political processes, such as NATO and EU expansion, and the formation and re- construction of identity, in this case “Western” identity and “European” identity.

By studying this nexus between political action and identity formation some conclusions regarding the meanings of those identities are drawn. The methodology used to study this intersection of politics and identity is a content analysis of newspaper articles covering NATO and EU expansion from April 17,

1991 to April 19, 2002 found in the Lexis-Nexis newspaper database. The output of this analysis is a series of representations, not only of Eastern Europe but also of specific states within Eastern Europe (such as Russia) and regional identities such as Central Europe or the . These representations are taken (with historical evidence) to constitute, to varying degrees, the “Other” for NATO and the EU. Thus, these representations are used to reflect back on the identities that are inherent to those organizations, namely that of “the West” and “Europe”.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide an introduction to the historical period and political processes that are the subject of this dissertation. Its purpose is to provide the reader with the background information necessary to appreciate the more theoretical chapters of this dissertation. The End of the The removal of Cold War barriers across Europe has thrown the imaginary of Europe into a period of transition. As soon as American and Western European leaders saw advantage in expanding their institutions into Eastern Europe they began the long process of re-imagining Eastern Europe to make it more palatable to their constituents. Traditional signposts of Eastern “stagnation” were repositioned further east on the map and Western history was reconstituted and reformulated to include more of the Cold War . However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the (EU) expansion debates were not the beginning of the discursive creation of regional borders within Europe or of the attachment of meanings to places. These debates simply serve as a useful lens through which to observe the shifting imaginary geographies of Europe in the post-Cold War era. One of the larger issues facing foreign policy makers and the public during the post-Cold War era has been the future of NATO. Its Cold War function of deterring Soviet Western expansion fulfilled, the decision of whether to let NATO wither from lack of purpose or to convert it to some other function was made in favor of expanding NATO’s membership to turn it into the foundation of European security. However, in the and in Europe this expansion is not simply a geostrategic decision, it is an inherently political process. Although “members of Congress often have tremendous freedom to act in foreign policy because most voters are not paying attention to these issues, (Goldgeier, 1999, p.110)” the ’s morale and dedication in the event of a

1 defensive war in Eastern Europe will be distinctly weaker if there is no geopolitical reason for the ally and no perceived bond between the two nations. The creation of a perceived bond between Eastern European countries and NATO/EU states has become an ongoing goal of leaders on both sides. In the United States in particular, permanent military alliances have been frowned upon for the entire period of American independent history dating back to George Washington’s farewell address, with this policy lasting until the end of World War II and America’s new superpower status. Still, George Washington’s maxim (the address was edited and amended by Madison and Hamilton, but the ideas ensconced were Washington’s from start to finish) rings true in many American citizens’ ears to this day. Overcoming this isolationist impulse among the American people has, in the past, required an overriding geopolitical imperative. This was the case in the creation of NATO and also in the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and others. However, in the era following the fall of there is a definite lack of overwhelming threats to American security to justify in American minds an extension of security guarantees to new nations. The apparent danger in the eyes of most Americans now resides in terrorist threats (i.e. Osama bin Laden’s 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and massive terrorism of the type seen in September 2001). Other significant threats include “rogue states” (i.e. , Iran, and North Korea), as seen in the public support for a national missile defense. Neither of these has traditionally warranted permanent treaties as a basis of defense. The American public is more apt to overlook this lack of necessity if they feel a cultural bond with the partner nation in a treaty. This is often perceived as a “natural” alliance, one between nations with common ideals and common perceptions of the rest of the world, often described as the “Western” culture. This can be seen in brochures that are used by the United States government to promote NATO: “The ties between Europe and are deep and durable, having survived wars of independence, occasional disagreements, and the separation imposed by the Atlantic Ocean. Over the past five centuries, these ties have evolved into a strong bond based on a shared history as well as on common

2 values. From the Magna Carta to the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Europeans and Americans have espoused a vision of individual rights, , economic freedom, and democracy. These similarities in culture, , and ideals are what have linked us together for hundreds of years (USIA, 1999, p.3).” In fact, one of the things most often cited by the United States in these public relations brochures for NATO as a reason for NATO’s success is the common vision that the member-states have. “The glue that holds NATO together is the shared ideal of freedom and democracy, which now extends throughout Europe. It reflects the desire deep within its people to participate in deciding how their lives will be lived. NATO promotes the adoption and spread of democratic standards and helps fledgling democracies institute them (USIA, 1999, p.14)." NATO’s actions are in line with its words, as a 1995 study on enlargement included democratic structures, a free market , and respect for as prerequisites for potential new members (Legislative Background, 1999). Senator Richard Lugar clearly put the newest NATO members within that scope: “Poland, , and the are democratic, free-market nations with professional militaries under civilian control (Pro & Con, 1999, p.120).” The difference between perception and “reality” could, however, be seen during that same 1999 enlargement of NATO, during which many of the naysayers in the US public expressed extreme doubts about American troops dying for the protection of places like Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Clearly a feeling of “Westernness” is important for the extension of American security guarantees when a clear and present danger to American interests is missing. Again, this can be seen in the US brochures about NATO: “Twice in this century, this transatlantic bond has been powerful enough to have the United States send its young men and women across the ocean to fight for freedom in Europe (USIA, 1999, p.4).” The question, as previously alluded to, is not so much one of “reality” as of perception. This dissertation is not aimed at determining how “Western” the new countries of Eastern Europe are, but instead at how they are becoming “Western”. Clearly, we are not discussing actual spatial direction or even historical linkage to

3 . Japan, hearth of significant portions of what is perceived as eastern culture, is nearly always thrown in with the West by media and pundits. However, Russia, which has historically played an important role in European affairs and featured heavily in Western and literature, is often relegated to a semi-peripheral eastern role. Unfortunately for the new round of applicants to NATO much of their land area was thrown into the East by the Western intelligentsia with the due to the schism of the Cold War: “These areas had long been cultural as well as political borderlands between historic Europe and the ‘East’ (Jackson, 1999, p.284).” The NATO expansion process has been integral in reformulating these identities. Of course, the political elite of the United States does not have a monopoly on the creation of identities. A similar process to the one that NATO is going through can be seen in the EU, where the identity being created is less that of “the West” as it is that of “Europe”. This identity is being further refined into , Eastern Europe, and the newly emergent Central Europe. Geopolitics, although still a factor, are less important than in the NATO expansion process. For the EU, cultural issues as well as economic and political issues are dominant in the equation. Background – NATO Expansion The fall of the Berlin Wall followed soon after by the dissolution of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the bipolar system that had dominated international relations since the end of the Second World War. Without the Soviet threat to counteract, many predicted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, now without a clear-cut purpose, would fade out of existence. Book and journal article titles from these first few years into the ‘End of History’ (as Francis Fukuyama mistakenly dubbed it) reflected the idea that NATO was on the way out. Titles such as ‘The End of NATO?’ by Henry Kissinger (1990), ‘NATO’s Final Mission’ by Ronald (1989), and ‘The Graying of NATO’ by Hugh de Santis (1991) all indicate the prevailing prediction about NATO’s future. Even Kenneth Waltz, with his strong belief in and the utility of military force, said in 1990 “NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on (Gordon, 1997, p.1).”

4 However, the need for an alliance with NATO’s capabilities and high level of integration in the post-Cold War era became evident to political and military leaders after the Gulf War. The demonstrated need for an international coalition to deliver significant military power in the defense of a common interest belied the creation of a ‘New World Order’ in which the utility of military force was in decline. The question then became not whether NATO should continue as an institution, but how it could be revitalized and given new purpose. One of the paths taken by the member states to this end has been an expansion of NATO membership. NATO expansion is a key part of what Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel called in May 1990 making NATO “the seed of a new European Security System” (Solomon, 1998, p.7). NATO enlargement is a continuing process, the first part of which has already taken place. The expansion process came under fire before, during, and after the first round of expansion, which added Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the membership. The second round of expansion is in progress, with , , , , and the Baltic States all invited to join. Critics attack the three purposes of expansion. These are commonly defined as guaranteeing NATO’s future role, preventing a security vacuum in Eastern Europe, and consolidating democratic rule in that same area (Zelikow, 1997, p.84). Some claim that NATO does not need expansion to revitalize its mission and purpose. The return of to the integrated military command, NATO’s importance in the resolution of the Bosnian war, NATO’s role in the conflict in Kosovo, and the sheer number of countries wanting to join it are all indicative of an organization whose future is not in jeopardy. Similarly, they refer to the presence of a security vacuum as a fallacy, and point to the example of Poland as proof. Reassuring Poland about safety from Russian imperialism is certainly historically justified, but the Polish government does not seem overly concerned about its possibility. Poland is on friendly terms with all of its neighbors, and has cut both the length of conscription as well as the size of its defense budget (Zelikow, 1997, p.85). Indeed, policymakers were ambivalent in the beginning of the 1990s, as even pro-expansionist German Defense Minister V. Ruhe said

5 regarding expansion, “Either we will be exporting stabilization or we will end up importing destabilization (Dutkiewicz & Jackson, 1998, p.87).” Regardless of whether these criticisms are valid, expansion is now a foregone conclusion. For the first half of the 1990s expansion was much talked about but there was little progress. Many of the new democracies in Eastern Europe were lobbying for entry to NATO as well as the European Union to solidify the rather ambiguous position that they found themselves in after the end of the Cold War. In effect, they wanted to join the West. In fact, joining NATO and joining the West are often seen as interchangeable, as can be seen in this quote from James Goldgeier: “[Admitting] Slovenia [to NATO] could send a signal to proponents of reform elsewhere in the that countries from that could formally join the West if they chose the right path at home (Goldgeier, 1999, p.119)”. There was great fear among all of the hopefuls that the doors to NATO would remain closed. However, on a trip to Warsaw in July of 1994 President Clinton threw the door wide open: “As I have said, [NATO expansion] is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region...And now what we have to do is get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be (Asmus, et al., 1997, p.93).” The ‘when and how’ would take three years to work out, but at the Madrid conference in July of 1997 it was announced that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would join the alliance. There had been a lot of discussion about other possibilities, most notably Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, which were advocated by in addition to the other three (Dutkiewicz & Jackson, 1998). The addition of these three new allies was meant as a steppingstone toward further expansion. In March of 1997 President Clinton expressed support for a second wave of NATO enlargement as well as a special security charter with the Baltic States: , , and (Dutkiewicz & Jackson, 1998). The Baltics, as well as other hopefuls such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, have recently (November 2002) been accepted for the next expansion. Other countries like the Ukraine

6 and Moldova are outside of the range of immediate NATO expansion, but nevertheless participate as well in the Partnership for Peace. The initial addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary achieved two strategic goals of NATO. First, it creates a legal barrier to military action between the two historic conquerors of Eastern Europe, and Russia. This in and of itself increases confidence and security in Europe. Second, the inclusion of Hungary provides a staging area from which to launch operations in the Balkans, especially Bosnia (Hillen and Noonan, 1998). Geopolitically, however, the first round of expansion left some interesting questions. For instance, until the complete inclusion of the countries from the second round of expansion, Hungary is isolated with no fellow NATO member on its border. This would have made supply and reinforcement very difficult. This provided opportunity for Slovakia and Slovenia, both of whom were included in the second round in part to provide a linkage with the main body of the NATO membership. Slovakia is strategically important because the Carpathian Mountains in the east hold the main rail and road routes from the Ukraine to Poland, Hungary, and Germany. Similarly, it has a growing economy, with numerous natural resources including zinc, timber, and an oil field that is shared with Poland and the Ukraine. Slovenia also provides a link with Hungary (Hillen and Noonan, 1998). However, it will be difficult for geostrategists to ignore the other implications of admitting Slovenia, which include creating a second front on the Balkans (Hungary being the first) and the regional instability that currently resides there. Romania and Bulgaria have similar problems, with Romania adding the additional instability of Moldova. Bulgaria is an enthusiastic supporter of NATO and the US. Both were included in the second round of expansion. The Baltic countries have other issues. There is a strong affinity among leaders in the West for the intellectuals in these countries because of their long battle for independence from the Soviet Union. However, the difficulty of defending countries so far removed from the supply lines of the alliance and so close to the Russian heartland has been seen as a major obstacle to expansion until recently. In addition, there was the added difficulty of assimilating areas which Russia has long considered part of its sphere of influence, even if the Baltics have always been focused to the West. In addition to

7 simply having been part of the Soviet Union, there is a substantial number of ethnic Russians living in these countries – Latvia is 30.4% Russian, while Lithuania is 8.7% and Estonia is 28.1% Russian (CIA World Factbook, 2001). As a final complication, the inclusion of Lithuania will surround the Kaliningrad exclave with NATO , cutting it off entirely. Until recently the idea of NATO expanding to include the Baltics was mostly seen as a pipe dream because many were afraid that there would be a lasting and negative effect on relationships with Russia (Blank, 1998). Former Russian Prime Minister Primakov even went so far as to say that the entire status of East/West relations pivots on the potential inclusion of the Baltic republics in NATO. This concern though has largely disappeared in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. President Putin of Russia has taken a step back from his predecessor’s bluster regarding NATO’s expansion into the Baltics in an effort to define his country as an ally of the United States in the so- called War on Terrorism. “If we change the format of the relationship between Russia and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be a relevant issue (Putin offers, 2001).” Putin appears to have been satisfied – there was only a fraction of the concern displayed with the second round of expansion in comparison to the first round (Gordon, 2002). Indeed, the post-Cold War emphasis on public opinion in the implementation of foreign policy in the former USSR compliments Putin’s views. Polls show that there is no consistent anti-Western feeling in the Russian people (O’Laughlin and Kolossov, 2002). Nevertheless, the nature of the NATO-Russia relationship is not rooted in any concrete geopolitical analysis. The construction of “necessity” and “national interest” denies the fluid nature of political events and geopolitical perception. Indeed, there have even been (slight) moves in the direction of Russian membership in NATO. While nobody seems to consider it a possibility in the short term nobody seems willing to close the door in the long term. Indeed, with the increasing anti-American sentiment found in the original NATO European heartland of France and Germany, the inclusion of more Eastern European countries may increase the leverage of the United States in NATO. In January of 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the American Secretary of Defense, labeled France and Germany the “Old Europe” while the Czech Republic,

8 Hungary, and Poland were referred to as “New Europe”. This inversion of old stereotypes underscores the potential for the inclusion of more of “New Europe” like Russia and Ukraine. Finally, there is the issue of how large NATO can get. According to Sandler and Hartley’s cost-benefit analysis (1999) there is a theoretical limit to the size of NATO, based on the thinning of forces that occurs with the expansion of the defense perimeter as well as the political cost of adding members. By thinning the forces available at any particular portion of the NATO perimeter expansion can make the defense of the alliance more difficult. Furthermore, additional members can hamper the decision-making process. Should the alliance remain attached to the current process, which requires unanimity, it will become harder to reach a decision. Similarly, if the alliance changes to a majority-rule based system for reaching decisions in a crisis the political cost to each member increases as new members dilute their vote. In either event, eventually the cost of new members will outstrip the advantage of having new members (Sandler & Hartley, 1999). Therefore, when studying NATO expansion it is important to remember that, although not explicitly stated, there is a limit to the size of the organization, and each slot taken by a new member means that there is an unnamed country somewhere that will not get in. Apparently, however, this point has not been reached. With the inclusion of almost every eligible candidate (Russia and Ukraine excluded), it remains to be seen what this limit point is. Background - European Union Expansion While the expansion of NATO has provided for a lively debate about the pros and cons, few seem to expect that the future expansions are going to fundamentally alter the structure of the organization. For the European Union, there are many more issues that need to be considered as enlargement proceeds. While much attention is focused on the and its impact on the global economy, the entire structure of the EU is being reworked and refashioned into an institution based not on unanimity but on majority-rule voting. This loss of veto power, and therefore of sovereignty, underscores the question that is on many Europeans’ minds: “How much diversity can the EU accommodate before it ceases to be a durable community?” (Preston, 1997, p.3)

9 It is this elemental difference between this expansion and its previous four enlargements that calls into question most the issue of culture and identity. Diluting each member’s decision-making power within the EU requires a real commitment both to enlargement and the new members. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War the EU has participated in ten Europe Agreements that at least open the door to full membership in the future for former countries of the Warsaw Pact (or other COMECON states). In 1990 it was decided to extend these Europe Agreements to Poland and Hungary as the first step in solidifying the new status of the free states of Eastern Europe. These agreements began the process of trade liberalization between the EU and Eastern Europe (Preston, 1997). Until the mid-1980s, a relationship between Eastern Europe and what would become the EU of the sort embodied by the Europe Agreements was almost unimaginable. The USSR had refused to officially acknowledge the European Community (which would in 1992 become the EU), and most of the USSR’s satellite states in Eastern Europe toed that line (with the notable exception of Romania). The EC was also reluctant to deal with COMECON since that would reinforce Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe. Without real incentives to liberalize trade between the two blocs (in the 1970s trade between the blocs averaged about 2% of GDP each) discussions had more or less gone nowhere (Preston, 1997). Geopolitical interests of the USSR overshadowed Eastern European interest in trade with Western Europe during this time. The rise of Gorbachev to power in the 1980s led to a loosening of control by the Soviets over Eastern European policy. By 1986 the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to negotiate their own agreements with the EC, which were paralleled by multilateral EC-COMECON talks. Hungary concluded its agreement with the EC in 1988 and Poland did the same in 1989. Most of the other states of Eastern Europe followed soon thereafter. The Europe Agreements mentioned above were the “second generation” of ties to bind Eastern Europe and the EC together. They committed the EC to lowering trade barriers at a rate faster than that of the Eastern partners. Nevertheless, the goal was to create a free trade area, not to guarantee enlargement to the Eastern European partners.

10 This next step of enlargement was not guaranteed until 1993. In April of that year Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia announced their desire to join the EU. In June of 1993 the heads of government of the members of the EU held a meeting in and announced that the door would be open to whoever could meet the entry requirements. These requirements were that: The candidate has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. (, 1993) These “Copenhagen criteria” have been interpreted to mean having free and open elections contested by multiple parties, as well as a four-part formula for evaluating the economic progress. These four variables include macroeconomic stabilization, price and trade liberalization, a legal system appropriate for an advanced market economy, and privatization of government-owned industries. Progress in these areas has been rapid for some hopeful members (Hungary, Poland) and slower for others (Romania, Bulgaria). The concluding of Europe Agreements, although symbolically very important, did very little to actually improve the in the newly freed states of Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s Western Europe found itself in recession, to which the EU responded by tacking on “ad hoc quotas” for Eastern European goods. (Pond, 1999, p.54) So while tariffs were going down, other barriers were going up. Nevertheless, as the world economy boomed through the late 1990s the EU was able to soften its resistance to competitive imports such as Czech steel and Polish cherries. Still, fears persist in Western Europe of socioeconomic and political fallout resulting from the actual inclusion of Eastern European states into their labor markets. Indeed, the increasingly multicultural nature of Europe’s labor force has been difficult for many European citizens to stomach. “Even though foreign residents remain a small fraction – about 4 percent – of the European Union’s population, the actions of the racist

11 minority have created an atmosphere of tension and crisis, with public opinion calling on governments to do something about the ‘race problem’”. (Hitchcock, 2003, p.413) The twofold problem of industrial jobs shifting to the relatively low-wage East and labor flooding the high-wage West is a daunting prospect for Western politicians to face. (Smith and Timmons, 2000) Nevertheless, for these politicians there is a “moral imperative behind the creation of a pan-European order [that] has been a significant factor in the EU enlargement debate in a manner that was not the case for NATO”. (Smith and Timmons, 2000, p.124) Integration of the European states has been seen by many as a goal unto itself, a method for preempting any further inter-state wars in Europe. The debate over NATO expansion is slightly more pragmatic, focusing on military issues as it does. The creation of Operation Phare in 1990 symbolizes this moral viewpoint of the EU. Viewed as a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era, it has distributed about 11 billion ECU (European Currency Units) in the last 10 years. Certainly there is a self-serving interest in this as much as there was for the Marshall Plan, when the United States was attempting to revive demand for US goods. Nevertheless it shows the lengths to which the EU and others are willing to go to assist in the transition from the command economic structures of the Soviet era to the liberal market based economy of the West. Similarly, there are major changes being wrought in the Common Agricultural Policy to accommodate the new members. It has been estimated that farm subsidies will increase 70 percent if Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic are all admitted. (Wood & Yesilada, 1996) In 1993 this was estimated to cost between 23 and 27 billion ECUs. Prior to the December 2002 announcement of accession dates for the candidates, the system had been set up using “accession partnerships” that set forth the specific criteria (including the Copenhagen criteria) that each state much reach before joining. These were negotiated on a state-by-state basis with Hungary’s negotiation launched in March of 1998. This provides for a different style of enlargement than the “block-style” enlargement of NATO. States may join on a singular basis as they reach their criteria. While this was exciting for the front-runners in the enlargement debate, as they would

12 not have to wait for states further behind, it was criticized as a lack of commitment to the less qualified states. Similarly, some critics saw the lack of deadlines or timeframes as a backdoor for the EU to escape from a concrete commitment to enlargement. Recently (December 2002) the EU has announced that 10 applicants (the Baltic States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, , and Malta) are ready for admission in 2004. These 10 applicants did not include , which has been labeled by former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing as “a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life (Richburg, 2002).” While other prominent European leaders argued for Turkey’s inclusion, perhaps Turkey represents the limit point for a consensus of what can be considered European. Conclusion This chapter has sought to inform the reader about the processes of NATO expansion and EU expansion, and also to outline the history of those processes. A few brief allusions to identity formation in the discussion of those processes have paved the way for a further explication of the body of theory relating to identity formation. Identity formation and representations of place will step to the forefront in the next chapter.

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2. PHILOSOPHICAL BASES

Introduction The goal of this dissertation is to understand how Eastern Europe (and Central Europe, as well) is created as a place by media reports on the expansion of NATO and the EU into Eastern Europe. A lot has been written about NATO and EU expansion, especially in the period leading up to the NATO expansion of 1999. Similarly, there has been a wealth of information written about the constitution and evolution of the region known as the West, or alternatively, of Europe. However, there has been very little written directly connecting the growth of NATO/EU landmass with conceptual region building. Although the linkage is not always explicitly mentioned, there is a correlation between the creation (and re-creation) of the West and NATO expansion, and likewise between the definition of “Europe” and the enlargement of the EU. Kurth wrote that “It [NATO expansion] is a fulfillment of two great historical ideas, the idea of Europe and the even broader idea of the West (1997, p.555).” The superimposing of mental maps of the West or “Europe” and physical maps of NATO or the EU is at the root of expansion policy. As Alan Henrikson said, “Statesmen respond to the world as they perceive it and imagine it - which may not be the way the world really is (Henrikson, 1980, p.495).” Today’s statesmen are reacting to representations of Eastern Europe and also creating new representations to be passed on to other leaders and also to the public. These representations are similarly produced, consumed, and reproduced by the media as they attempt to provide a summation of the events of Eastern Europe. Identity Formation The root of the questions being raised here is just as much “Where is Eastern Europe?” as it is “Where is Western Europe?” (Or indeed, where is Central Europe?) The frontier boundaries of who is admissible to NATO or the EU say much about how the West and Europe have created their collective identity. The differentiation of those

14 who are like “us” from those who are not is a complex process mediated through politics, pop culture, the media, the educational establishment, and other institutions. These positions of authority take part in the production of knowledge. This self/other nexus is perhaps best understood in its original dialogical form, as described by Hegel: “Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” (Hegel, 1977 edition, p.112) This is distinct from the dialectical mode that is usually attributed to Hegel in that the Other has both ontological and epistemological status, whereas in dialectics the Other simply is, and has no epistemological position. This interpretation of Hegel’s work is that of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose life in the Soviet Union allowed him to see firsthand the situation where “public discourse had all but been mopped up by Stalin and in which the possibility of face-to-face discourse had all but vanished” and therefore caused him to theorize about the alternative idea that texts could “carry on a dialogue with each other across time and space.” (Neumann, 1999, p.14) Bakhtin’s aversion to totalizing narratives, rooted in his reaction to the Marxist dialectics he was surrounded with and the policies that came from them, led him to seek a more polycentric system of identity formation. Thus, the elevation of the Other to an epistemological position similar to the subject. Bakhtin, however, deals with the identity of the individual, while the focus of this dissertation is collective identity formation. Many geographers, sociologists, and anthropologists have addressed this issue, among them Stephen Cornell and Douglass Hartmann (1998), who claim that ethnic identity and all collective identities are formed through a reciprocal relationship – that of assertion (what we claim to be) and assignment (what others say we are). Neither one is sufficient to describe the identity totally, but together some image can be obtained. They refer to this as the constructionist approach to collective identity. Collective identity formation is addressed in a more esoteric fashion by Emmanuel Levinas, a Lithuanian philosopher (but French citizen for most of his life) from the inter-war and post-WWII periods whose work claims that the Other is not known or comprehended as the Other, but instead questions and challenges the

15 complacency of the self through desire, language, and the concern for justice. He says of collective identity: Indeed, if there were only two of us in the world, I and one other, there would be no problem. The other would be completely my responsibility. But in the real world there are many others. When others enter, each of them external to myself, problems arise. Who is closest to me? Who is the Other? Perhaps something has already occurred between them. We must investigate carefully. Legal justice is required. There is need for a state. (Levinas, 1989, p.247) Thus, the creation and recreation of the state is in fact an exercise in collective identity formation. Deciding who is out and who is in reflects a matrix of decisions about what “we” are like, and therefore, what “they” must be like. Of course, this is recursive, as “they” by definition are the negative to “our” identity. As Levinas points out (and Campbell [1992] illustrates further), this dependence on the Other for its foundation is the underlying flaw in the concept of the state: Unable to exist without adoring itself, it is pure idolatry. This striking vision arises independently of any text: in a world of scruples and of respect for man derived from monotheism, the Chancellory, with its Realpolitik, comes from another universe, sealed off from sensibility, or protest by “beautiful souls,” or tears shed by an “unhappy consciousness.” (Levinas, 1989, p.274) In other words, this disconnect between ethics you apply when dealing with your neighbor (ostensibly a member of your collective identity, at least at the international scale) and the morals applied to interactions with the Other is a clear problem in this mode of thought as Levinas see it. It invariably leads to disparity and a lack of empathy from one side to the other. It is important to realize that according to the dialogic formation of this relationship the same thing is happening on the other side of the self/other nexus as the subject/object relationship is inverted due to the epistemological equality found there. The lack of empathy as expressed by Levinas is the subject of David Campbell’s concern as well. He claims that the main problem in American foreign policy (the subject of his 1992 book) is in creating an American narrative, an imagined community,

16 without relegating other identities to inferior status. He argues that “for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.” (Campbell, 1992, p.11) Hence, the process of othering is a Catch-22. You must do it or else suffer into individual identities, but at the same time forming collective identities necessarily excludes Others and imposes a hierarchy of needs (“Us” first, “Them” later if at all). While Iver Neumann quite rightly points out that power does not necessarily create a "fiercer othering” he neglects to mention that it quite clearly has a large impact on the consequences of othering. (Neumann, 1999, p.27) If the dialogic description of the self/other nexus is accepted, clearly the hegemon has greater power to dole out benefits to its “selves” and punishments to its Others. The hegemon’s other still has the dialogic power to construct its own identity, but less relational power to affect its Other. Neumann and Campbell together are part of a growing movement among International Relations theorists, who see in people like Levinas the seed of a change in the way the world is viewed. Levinas began a small shift in some from a focus on “man” to a focus on the differences between men (or groups of men). Neumann and Campbell see this as the creation of a moral space within International Relations theory, injecting ethics into the realm of international politics in a way that the previous focus on “man” did not. Levinas argued that the deadly events of the first half of the 20th Century partly stemmed from the philosophical focus on “man”, and those events justified a shift to the focus on difference. Campbell and Neumann bring this view into their politics by emphasizing the importance of difference in policy formation, empirically showing the confluence between identity and past decisions, and subtly calling for more respect for the Other in future policy decisions. These studies of identity politics have been tremendously influential as some of the theoretical bases for this dissertation by providing insights into the process of identity creation. Other identity formation theorists (e.g., Elmhirst, 1999) have already done the groundbreaking work that has led to the study of margins as a method of studying identity. This understanding of the process of identity formation has enabled me to see the media coverage of NATO and EU expansion as part of an ongoing process to create (or move) boundaries.

17 Theorizations of the “Region” The relationship between geography and the idea of regions has been complex, with the two often intertwined and with also geography often attempting to ignore “regions”. This relationship dates back to the earliest geographers, such as Strabo (1983 edition), who described the geographer as “the person who attempts to describe the parts of the earth.” Thus, from its very conception, geography was related to the study of regions (the aforementioned “parts”). This conceptualization of geography as regional description (or “chorology”) became a major foil for the second major classical conceptualization of geography, that of geography as a holistic study of the Earth’s surface. Ptolemy argued this position forcefully when he described Strabo’s geography as having “the purpose of describing the parts, as if one were to draw only an ear or an eye.” (1991 edition) This debate was foundational in the later construction of a discipline split by the fundamental question of what geography is. (Bowen, 1981) Twentieth century geography began with chorology ascendant, emblematized by Paul Vidal de la Blache’s studies of French pays (1908) – a celebration of the local in French life. He asserted that the French landscape could be rationally divided according to physical landscape features and (more importantly) the way that the residents interacted with them. His view of chorology was very influential in the later work of Carl Sauer, Alfred Hettner, and Hettner’s student Richard Hartshorne. Hartshorne would go on to become the geographer most equated with chorology, or as it came to be known. His The Nature of Geography (1939) argued that the role of the geographer was to observe the uniqueness of a region and render it understandable to others. Hartshorne believed that this rendering of a small-scale region would allow a process of aggregation with other renderings to allow an aggregate understanding of the earth. While pleasing to the Ptolemy-inspired scholars who sought something greater than idiographic conclusions about a region’s nature, this style of geography was disappointing to those seeking a more systematic theory-centered geography. Fred Schaeffer, who argued that the primary role of was to create new, testable forms of knowledge, questioned Hartshorne’s conceptualization of geography. In Schaeffer’s view, Hartshorne’s version of geography did not accomplish this because

18 it encouraged extremely local, non-testable research. Schaeffer (1953) argued that geography needed to reform itself in order to make it relevant to the larger world of science. As part of this critique of the discipline Schaeffer made some important statements about the concept of the region. He argued that regional geography was a lost cause because regions are inherently indefinable by universal standards; in other words, that they are constructs. Schaeffer’s nomothetic approach seeks to identify processes that shape landscapes in varied places; in short, to theorize. Schaeffer’s revolution in geographic thought coincided with increasing access to computing power by researchers. This technological advance facilitated the new “scientific” turn in geography of the 1960s and the old chorology that was concerned with regions fell by the wayside as spatial science came to the forefront of the discipline. Spatial science, concerned mainly with the study of phenomenal distributions, backgrounds the concept of the region entirely. This was the result of the necessity of a move from the study of complicated, idiosyncratic lived place to a more Euclidian surface that is amenable to computer modeling. Because regions, which emblematize uniqueness, were seen as antithetical to the construction of generalizable knowledge, they were ignored or actively discarded. “Locations are not unique. They are all located relative to each other.” (Bunge, 1966, pg.375) Nevertheless, even as the quantitative revolution was ongoing, the need for regions was reasserted within the discipline. This move was to disavow the existence of “natural”, universally valid regional divisions, and instead to reflect on the relationship between formal regions (the type previously studied by chorologists, which centered on some form of homogeneity across the region) and functional regions, which were shaped by processes and structures resulting from human activity. In other words, functional regions emphasize the interrelatedness of human activities, which link disparate places into a functional whole. The first example of this type of region, the , was given by Robert Dickenson (1947) when he described a functional region as a series of formal regions linked together. This growing acceptance of functional regions dovetailed with the quantitative revolution, itself empowered by the contemporary revolution in computing, to create the study of “spatial systems”. Combining the distribution-

19 discovering power of computers with the appreciation of place as a functional region, it was argued by Brian Berry (1964, p.10) that while much was known about the “static structure” of geography (i.e., idiographic description), little was known about the

“connectivity of parts” and even less about “dynamic processes”. This theorization of the region has been long-lasting and productive in many ways to this day, but nevertheless the 1980s saw the rise of a less-functional view of the region which has co-existed uneasily with the “region as spatial system” theory ever since. Instead the region was theorized as the site of social interaction, which has an impact on the result of that interaction. This view of the region retains both the importance of the characteristics of the region but also gives that regional description utility in explaining phenomena (Sayer, 1985). In other words, space and place are not determinative of outcome but instead are one factor of many structuring the consequences of action (and inaction). This theorization of the region accompanied the rise of structuration theory but has recently also had to contend with another rival, this one anti-realist. This formulation of the region (and identities based on that region) as a socially constructed entity is the one with which this research engages. and Eastern Europe This conceptualization of a region as a socially constructed entity owes a debt to Edward Said, whose groundbreaking work on “othering” has led to a fundamental shift in the way people view representations of geographies. Representations of geographies are a necessary evil, he posits, as it is impossible to understand truly any place other than that which we occupy in our everyday existence. However, the search for knowledge is an almost universal goal that most cultures undertake, thus beginning their quest for knowledge of other places. A point of contention for most philosophers is how close to reality any human understanding can be. C. Wright Mills once said: The first rule for understanding the human condition is that men live in second- hand worlds. They are aware of much more than they have personally experienced; and their own experience is always indirect. The quality of their lives is determined by meanings they have received from others. Everyone lives

20 in a world of such meanings. No man stands alone directly confronting a world of solid fact. No such world is available (Mills, 1967, p.405). He alludes later to the meaninglessness and confusion of human infancy as the closest to “reality” that humans can get. The insecurity brought by this meaningless condition propels humankind into the arms of a world with shared meanings. “Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them by crowds of witnesses they have never met and never shall meet. Yet for every man these images - provided by strangers and dead men - are the very basis of his life as a human being (Mills, 1967, p.405).” There is a branch of epistemological thought that now takes for granted the idea that knowledge of objective reality is at best an ideal that cannot be fully reached. While this is a hotly debated topic in the larger world of philosophy, it is relatively uncontested that the delineation of regions and the ascription of values to those regions is an exercise in social construction. The social construction of regions has been the subject of much study (for example: Carter, 1998). Because these regions are socially constructed they are the results of the exercise of political power. Nevertheless, this epistemological shift has only lately begun to penetrate the various sub-fields that fit within the Area Studies rubric, and many academics (according to Said) are overly confident of their ability to comprehend and interpret worlds other than their own. This overestimation occurs despite the methodology that is used to gain understanding, which usually entails generalizing and reductionism. Flawed methodology is allowed to run rampant, Said claims, because of the marginal status of Middle East Studies (or area studies in general) in the world of academia. Said claims that this allows dubious scholarship to perpetuate itself with no outside critique, as it is only reviewed in “one or two highly specialized publications of limited circulation, and then it disappears. (Said, 1997, p.148).” Because the popular American culture is so ignorant of regional geographies and cultures, these regional “experts” are trotted out in times of conflict (most notable recently have been “Middle Eastern experts” and “Far Eastern experts”) and used as talking heads for the media. These media experts (again, Said refers exclusively to experts on the Middle East, but the remark could be made with regard to area specialists in general) convert their sound bite generalizations into three-minute university lectures that are supposed to

21 summarize the Islamic world. These experts often conform their remarks to the conflict- oriented visage that TV news programs have adopted in the past decade. Since the middle 1980s…studies of political - most of them aggressive studies of fundamentalism, terrorism, and anti-modernism as principal aspects of Islam have flooded the market. Most of them draw on a handful of scholars…to mobilize popular opinion against the ‘threat’ of Islam. In this way the scholarly constituency perpetuates itself, while the clientele for Islam as news continues to get the massive doses of Islamic punishment, gratuitous violence, terrorism, and harem capers that it has been fed for decades (Said, 1997, p.149). This three-minute lecture is given in the context of policy decision-making, with the advice of the advisor going simultaneously to the public and the policymaker. The assumed objectivity of the academic hides the fact that the advice is given as a prescription for the government, a set of instructions to achieve American goals. Even if the government is not watching the broadcast itself, an academic just like the media expert has been called into policy discussions to render advice. Said outlines quite clearly the contemporary relationship between representations of foreign countries in the media and the free hand of the government in foreign policy decisions: It would be irresponsible to dismiss the effects that American electronic media coverage of the non- - and the consequent displacements in print culture - has on American attitudes to, and foreign policy toward, that world. I argued the case…that limited public effect on the media’s performance coupled with an almost perfect correspondence between prevailing government policy and the ideology ruling news presentation and selection (an agenda set by certified experts hand in hand with media managers) keeps the United States’ imperial toward the non-Western world consistent. As a result United States policy has been supported by a dominant culture that does not oppose its main tenets: support for dictatorial and unpopular regimes, for a scale of violence out of proportion to the violence of native insurgency against American allies, for a steady hostility to the legitimacy of native nationalism (Said, 1993, p.322).”

22 Said argues that this lack of critical attention to foreign places (including Eastern Europe) and issues in the media and the educational establishment prevents anything but sound bite representations of foreign countries. This is one of the fundamental starting points of this dissertation – that short sound bites about Eastern Europe in the media are important parts of the construction of Eastern Europe in the minds of media consumers. However, it is not just the media that promotes simplistic reductions of Eastern Europe (although the media will be a major focus of this dissertation). Educational texts, governmental officials, and other sources also perpetuate the oversimplifications. Edward Said has made a significant contribution to academia by making it more aware of its own biases and the social costs for others associated with some academic work. Nevertheless, many feel that his attacks on academia are broad and lack the very same subtlety that Said accuses Orientalist academics of lacking. By reducing academics to co-conspirators (or at best, blithely meandering ethnocentrists) in a plot against the Other, he is disparaging a lot of good research that, taken with a grain of self- consciousness, can be very useful. At the very least, Said does himself a disservice by making his very valuable insights so easy to caricature. Said draws large conclusions about the “Orient” from a very limited source of information. His study is limited to the literary and artistic efforts of the British and the French from the late 1700s to the present in the Islamic world, which although substantial and interesting is not a broad enough scope to draw conclusions about the West as a whole. In addition, while disputing the timelessness of the Orient (an idea that Said ascribes to Orientalists) Said himself ascribes timelessness to the West by claiming that everywhere and in all time periods (at least, from the Ancient on) the West has treated the East the same. In reality, the inscribing of the Ancient Greeks as “Western” occurred much later and over a long period of time, as Enlightenment scholars (in particular, Germans) fell in love with literature (the very same texts that Said studies in Orientalism) and constructed Ancient as the foundation of Western Civilization. Furthermore, Said posits a metanarrative through which all texts regarding the “East” should be interpreted. Any metanarrative is necessarily incomplete and insufficient to explain the multifaceted reality in which we live. In other words, surely not all texts about the East are

23 Orientalist. Yet this is the impression that Said leaves. There is no room for the influence of other economic forces or political forces. Still, given certain caveats, Said’s criticism of Orientalism can be useful for the interpretation of texts, such as the newspaper articles that this dissertation studies. There is, in fact, precedent for blending the positive contributions of Said with a more nuanced understanding of Eastern Europe than strict Orientalism provides. Historian Maria Todorova has outlined such a framework for the Balkans. Todorova’s “Balkanism” differs from Said’s Orientalism in several ways. While Orientalism (in Said’s formulation) is intimately connected to Islam, Balkanism is based on a representation of ethnic impurity or mixing. Religion is de-emphasized in the Balkans because for most of modern history Western European elites felt more connected with the elites of the Ottoman Empire than with the Turks’ Christian nationalist subjects. Therefore, the Balkans came to be constructed as a place of “racial mixture”: On the one hand, there exists a discourse that describes the Balkans as a racial mixture, as a bridge between races. From a pervasive but not explicit theme about the mongrel nature of the Balkans in travelers’ accounts until the end of the nineteenth century, it adapted itself neatly to the dominant racial discourse of the twentieth century and resorted to overt racial slurs in the interwar period. On the other hand, despite the presence of the theme of racial ambiguity, and despite the important racial hierarchies, in the final analysis the Balkans are still treated as positioned on this side of the fundamental opposition: white versus colored, Indo- European versus the rest. This also comes to explain the preoccupation with the war in Yugoslavia in the face of more serious and bloody conflicts elsewhere on the globe…It is my thesis that while Orientalism is dealing with a difference between (imputed) types, Balkanism treats the differences within one type. (Todorova, 1997, pp.18-19) Todorova further claims that “Balkanism evolved to a great extent independently from Orientalism and, in certain aspects, against or despite it.” This is an important distinction, and one that is applicable to the rest of Eastern Europe. While Todorova’s Balkanism is a historically and geographically specific construct, its relationship to

24 Orientalism is not necessarily unique, but instead could be applicable to other regions and places, like Eastern Europe. It would be a mistake to believe that Said’s Orientalist framework could be dropped into Eastern Europe and used to explain all of the issues of perception inherent to the region. Similarly, it would be a mistake to think that issues of “the East” are not to be found in Eastern Europe’s identity. It is hoped that through extensive investigation this dissertation will outline the form of “Eastern Europeanism” or “Central Europeanism” using elements of Orientalism and elements of European identity. Conclusion This chapter has sought to outline the philosophical bases that underpin this research. It has described a series of insights that together have informed my model of the relationship between representations of place and identity formation. This model explicitly links some identities with place, as in “European” or “Westerner”. These identities are forged relationally, in contrast to the “Other” that is viewed (at least theoretically) as the absolute opposite of everything that the “Self” is. The “Other” is not a static construct, but instead a dynamic set of qualities that can change alongside the material conditions in which it exists.

25

3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction This chapter will seek to designate a concrete research question, the assumptions built into that research question, and the methods used to answer the question. After reading this chapter, it should be clear to the reader what the goal of the author was and how it was reached. Formulation of the Research Question The research question that is to be entertained has been formulated through a survey of the aforementioned literature and other available information. Put together, there is an impressive body of information available on identity formation and how policymakers use their power to shape perception to influence public representations. A prime example was the amazing shift in American perceptions of the Soviet Union during World War II. Prior to the war there were Red Scares and the formation of the House Un-American Activities Committee (in May 1938). However, during the war Stalin was Uncle Joe, and Life Magazine proclaimed Lenin as “perhaps the greatest man of modern times.” (Campbell, 1992, p.148) Nevertheless, it would be difficult to find an issue of any mainstream magazine in the post –war era that remotely complimented Lenin or Stalin. This is but one example of many either included in this dissertation or in the general body of literature to illustrate the theory of identity formation. This theory of collective identity formation seems to be ascendant as a Kuhnian paradigm, and so this dissertation serves as a (very) small part in the larger product of testing the theory by describing how “the West”, “Europe”, and “Central Europe” are constructed as identities vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. The fundamental starting point of this dissertation is that there is no identity beyond that which is constructed. As historian Hans Kohn wrote (1944, p.13):

26 “Nationalities are products of the living forces of history, and therefore always fluctuating, never rigid…They defy exact definition.” This holds true for either people or places. Since there is no a priori “natural” identity, and because there are multiple contingent possibilities for any given identity, each of which would have supporters, identities are contested. Of course, all contestants are not equally powerful in their ability to affect the discourse. Those in positions of power, whether political, cultural, or something else, are more likely to see their particular version of identity prevail. This leads me to believe that political leaders, through the media (and often with the media acting as well), have a large influence on the identity of Europe and the West, and consequently Central and Eastern Europe as well. Similarly, a form of institutional inertia can also identity. If one particular discourse remains dominant for a long period of time it will filter down throughout a society and permeate the society to the extent that it will take a massive influence to change that representation. This can be seen in the reversion of Russian discourse to the “reform” motif, as well as the “trying to become European” theme. This leads me to believe that there are some long-standing representations of Eastern Europe that have become naturalized to the extent that political leaders will not change them in the short term. This is not meant to be so extreme as to deny identity’s contingency, but instead to show the depth to which social structures can affect an identity. The impact of structures is visible in the case of the newspaper articles surveyed in this dissertation – the content is incredibly similar to almost every other article, utilizing the same quotes and even format. An apt metaphor would be a comparison to human DNA. 99.9% of human DNA is shared with every other human. That is how the newspaper articles are – remarkably similar, even sharing some wording. The uniformity of those phrases and ideas is helps inculcate a uniformity of geopolitical perspective among a nation, at least in the short term. This uniformity is part of what Said refers to as “Orientalism”: the monolithic representation of a metageography of East and West. This dissertation is designed in part to test for Orientalist tinting of the representations of Eastern Europe, but also to see what other representations can be found within the newspaper articles covering NATO and EU

27 expansion. Because the intended expansion of NATO and the EU into Central and Eastern Europe (however that is defined) requires a change in identity for both the institutions and the regions, it is an excellent lens through which to watch the formation of collective identity by political leaders. The thesis for this dissertation therefore is that by researching and studying the NATO and EU expansion debates it is possible to discover and document several competing representations of Central and Eastern Europe, and furthermore to gain insight into how NATO and EU expansion contributes to the construction of Central Europe vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Research Assumptions The objective of this project is to study the NATO and EU expansion debates in newspapers so that the various contending representations of Central and Eastern Europe can be documented, thereby shedding light on the process by which geopolitical terms like “Eastern Europe” or “Central Europe” are constructed. Newspaper articles are interesting in the context of this dissertation because they provide a two-tiered example of the process of representation. First, newspaper articles structure representations of Central and Eastern Europe by using primary quotations from political leaders and other authorities about the nature of the places being considered for NATO and EU expansion. Second, the journalists themselves help to structure the representation by choosing which of these quotations are to be included. This passive form of structuring is often combined with a more activist form of representation, such as the introduction of background material, historical narratives, or other information not directly taken from a source. Together, this two-tiered process of representation forms a concrete product, the article itself, which is then presented to the reading public. Since the two tiers of construction are inseparable in the end result (i.e., the journalist cannot deviate far from what authorities tell him/her, but neither can the authority compel the journalist to use certain quotes), this project will not attempt to break the process down, but only to study the final product (the representation from the article). With a project like this, as with any research project, there are several fundamental assumptions about the subject matter. Many of these assumptions stem from the constructivist nature of this project. This work assumes that there is no concept

28 of the West or Europe to compare Eastern Europe with beyond that constructed by the society at large. The “realities” of the West and Europe take multiple forms via different mental constructions composed of different experiential and social constructions. These constructions are local and specific and lack a hierarchy of truth (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). This dissertation, therefore, is not concerned with evaluating the “truthfulness” of the representations, as that would be ultimately impossible given the generalizing quality of the representations. Some representations may be “true” for some parts of Eastern Europe, but not for other parts, and any effort to evaluate relative “truthfulness” is beyond my ability. Instead it is concerned with the process of defining Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the West, Central Europe, or Europe itself. These constructions of the West, Europe, and Eastern Europe are mutable as attitudes and experiences change. Let it not be lost in this process either, that NATO and the EU themselves are constructions. Although they are to a certain extent a “concrete” organization, whose hierarchy and procedures can be witnessed physically, they are also metaphors and symbols. The meanings attached to them are constructed transactionally in a manner similar to the West or Europe. An assumption on which this project is based is that much of the consensus on the Western or European construction of what is self and what is other is created by the action of governmental officials’ descriptions of foreign places, in this case Eastern Europe. Large corporate news outlets and other aggregating media forces mediate this. Similarly, a pro-Western bent in education and other socializing structures has created a national culture that understands what the West is and what Europe is. It is a part of the taken-for-granted world that there is a West and a Europe and they are bounded and unique. However, as Said’s attacks on Orientalist practices have been incorporated into the literature, the idea of a homogenized East has become largely passé (at least in academic literature – the mainstream press, as we shall see, still uses the idea). Still, there has been little discussion of how “the West” is also a reductionist concept (i.e., Occidentalism). Anthropologist James G. Carrier had this to say about Occidentalism: Seeing Orientalism as a dialectical process helps us recognize that it is not merely a Western imposition of a reified identity on some alien set of people. It is also

29 the imposition of an identity created in dialectical opposition to another identity, one likely to be equally reified, that of the West. Westerners, then, define the Orient in terms of the West, but so Others define themselves in terms of the West, just as each defines the West in terms of the Other…Of course, the way I have cast this privileges the West as the standard against which all Others are defined, which is appropriate in view of both the historical political and economic power of the West. (1992, p.197) As we shall see, Carrier’s description of the West as a generally reified entity is valid, as the West is used as an ontological reality in newspapers’ discussions of NATO and EU expansion. Methods To assess the symbolism of the West, Europe, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe is a difficult prospect, but one that is perhaps best attempted using unobtrusive methods. By seeking the material evidence of social action (in this case, newspaper articles) I was able to gain a better understanding of the processes at work by documenting the contending representations. In the course of this research I used content analysis as the method for assessing the political attempt at re-presenting Eastern Europe to the Western or European gaze. Content analysis is a very efficient way to assess communication, especially large-scale mediated communication such as the socializing force of news reports or political speeches (Babbie, 1998). The form of content analysis primarily practiced in this dissertation is thematic text analysis. In this form of content analysis common themes are sought throughout the documents in question. A theme in this context refers to the “attributes, as well as subjects, of texts” (Stone, 1997). In this case I coded the documents (how these documents are selected is described in the next paragraph) for representations of Eastern Europe, which means that I read the articles and noted any time I read a sentence or paragraph that was describing or representing Eastern or Central Europe, or any countries or regions within that area. This is admittedly a subjective task, although much care was taken to not exclude any representations of Eastern or Central Europe. The sentence or paragraph was then aggregated with other quotes that were similar either in the content of

30 the quote or tone of the author. This was a computer-assisted process, using Nvivo Qualitative Analysis Software to make notes and organize similar quotes. Nevertheless, it must be said that the decision to put some quotes in the same category as others was a human process and not a computerized one. Still, a great deal of effort was made to establish logical connections between the quotes based on their content and method of argumentation. The result is an extensive list of newspaper quotes that have been summarized and cataloged according their content (“coded”). Finally, all of the codes (quotes) were analyzed in their individual contexts to find commonalities. These commonalities were then be used to find macro-scale representations. This process, it was hoped, would enable a better understanding of the highly political significance of the phrases “Central Europe” and “Eastern Europe”. In addition, a limited amount of quantitative analysis (such as word counting) was used to answer specific questions that arose during the research. The Choice of Qualitative Content Analysis Content analysis has a long and fruitful history in the social sciences, especially in the realm of media/newspaper analysis (e.g., Lasswell, Lerner, & de sola Pool, 1952; Lester & Smith, 1990; Simmons & Lowry, 1990; Evans, Krippendorff, Yoon, Posluszny, & Thomas, 1990). Historians of academics trace the initial critical viewing of texts to the study of wartime propaganda by political scientists (Severin & Tankard, 1992). While initially researchers overestimated the impact of texts on their audiences, the consensus soon came around to the more moderate view that texts do not determine behavior, but instead simply have effects (Krippendorff, 1980). “Rather than being the result of any single cause (e.g., the message), communication effects reflected a variety of contingent conditions.” (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico, 1998, p.6) To understand these effects, it became necessary to formulate a systematic way to study texts. Initial forays into this methodology emphasized a quantitative assessment of the source documents, as described thus: Usually, but not always, content analysis involves drawing representative samples of content, training coders to use the category rules developed to measure or reflect differences in content, and measuring the reliability (agreement or stability

31 over time) of coders in applying the rules. The data collected in a quantitative content analysis are then usually analyzed to describe what are typical patterns or characteristics, or to identify important relationships among the variables measured. If the categories and rules are conceptually and theoretically sound and are reliably applied, the researcher increases the chance that the study results will be valid (e.g., that the observed patterns are meaningful). (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico, 1998, p.2) Content analysis has since become used not just to evaluate communication effects, but also causes. A great deal of insight can be made into the personality or culture of an author by analyzing the content of a produced text (Cohen & Young, 1973; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). An additional bonus to the usage of content analysis is that it is non- obtrusive; since the data is by definition an artifact, there is no possibility of causing an adverse reaction in the originators of the text. Furthermore, it is much easier to gain access to texts that originate with elites than to the elites themselves. Insights can be gained about people (authors) who otherwise would be off limits, such as US presidents or deceased authors. Quantitative content analysis, as previously mentioned, was the original content analysis method of choice, for a variety of reasons. It utilizes a standardized set of principles to code documents. This standardized set of principles allows the resultant analysis to be highly reliable and valid in a scientific sense. “Content analysis is a research technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context." (Krippendorff, 1980, p.21) Quantitative content analysis puts a great deal of faith in the capability of the data to speak for itself, as it is a method designed to reduce the impact of the researcher on the results. This is, in and of itself, an advantage according to traditional scientific principles. Nevertheless, the impact of the researcher is inherent to the creation of the “objective” principles by which the text is coded. Ultimately, all quantitative content analysis is, initially, qualitative. This is because not only the design of the coding principles but also the individual allocation of specific text fragments to the coding categories reflects decisions by the researcher (Tesch, 1990).

32 As these (among other critiques) began to undermine the quantitative revolution (of which quantitative content analysis was a part) in the discipline of geography, some researchers with a more humanistic outlook began to incorporate a more openly qualitative outlook into their repertoire of methods. Without abandoning the goals of reliability and validity, these researchers (e.g., Harley, 1988; Said, 1993; Tuan, 1991) nevertheless abandon the restrictions of quantification in an effort to get closer to the way in which the world is codified in texts (such as maps, travel literature, or even newspaper accounts). Indeed, the extension of content analysis methods into non-quantifiable areas has resulted in some of the most interesting variations of the method. Often requiring a more reflective assessment of the positioning of the initial author (or originator of a text) and the positioning of the expected reader (or receiver of a text), qualitative methods of content analysis allow fragments of text to be read in their original context. This is a key reason why qualitative techniques dominate this research project. Simply coding and counting the representations of Eastern Europe would remove the representations from their surrounding context. Understanding the context of representations is critical to a complete understanding of how the representations are deployed, and how they may be selected on a case-by-case basis over other possible contradictory representations. Furthermore, in order to code and order the representations found in the text, it is necessary to have some understanding of the historical formation of Europe’s and the West’s identities. Thus, the intrusion of the researcher into the data is to some extent required to make sense of texts and subtexts. The mediation of meaning through language is a complex process that is not particularly amenable to the abstraction of the quantification process. Thus, while the more objectivist parts of this research are assisted by quantitative analysis (such as the longitudinal study of occurrences of “Central Europe” in the text), the majority of the research actively engages in the “interactive nature of the inquirer-inquired.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p.200) There are, nevertheless, limits to what can be accomplished through qualitative content analysis. In this particular case, one major limitation is imposed in the process of data selection. Necessarily, the results of a content analysis are critically influenced by

33 the choice of what content is being analyzed. Therefore, the selection of the Lexis-Nexis database has several negative impacts on this study (in addition to its positive impacts, such as cheapness and ease of access). First, while limiting the sample to the newspapers of record with the largest circulations provides a sample with the greatest reach and influence, it also neglects to provide the representations of marginalized populations such as those in rural areas, where circulations may be low and distributions may be wide. Second, the linguistic limitations imposed by the restriction to English-language newspapers in Lexis-Nexis screens out the views of those in non-English speaking areas of the West/Europe, such as France and Germany. In their stead is provided a few English-language newspapers in places like Singapore and India, where the clientele is most likely not broadly populist. In this research the unit of observation is individual newspaper articles taken from a Lexis-Nexis search. These articles were selected because their topic matter was NATO or EU expansion and they date from the post-Cold War era. This was operationalized for articles about EU expansion through a search for articles that included the phrases “Eastern Europe”, “European Union”, and either “expansion” or “enlargement” in the headline or lead paragraph, and for articles about NATO expansion through a search for articles that included “NATO expansion” and “Eastern Europe”. Specifically, the articles studied date from April 17, 1991 to April 19, 2002. Furthermore, to be in a Lexis-Nexis search an article has to come from an English language newspaper that has a significant readership (see appendix “A” for a full listing of newspapers surveyed), or as Lexis- Nexis describes its selection methods: “U.S. newspapers must be listed in the top 50 circulation in Editor & Publisher Year Book. Newspapers published outside the United States must be in English language and listed as a national newspaper in Benn's World Media Directory or one of the top 5% in circulation for the country.” Content analysis has been used in other research to discover how geopolitical views are mediated to populations, for example in Condensing the Cold War by Joanne Sharp. Similarly, in 1990 John O’Loughlin and Richard Grant used Presidential State of the Union addresses to assess the areas geopolitically important to the United States every four years. (O’Loughlin and Grant, 1990) Nevertheless, the use here is the inverse

34 of that paper: instead of seeking to assess how imaginary geographies influence policy makers I am assessing how policy makers influence imaginary geographies through the media. The unit of analysis for this research is not the newspaper article, but instead the rather more ethereal concept of the representation itself. The articles each present a snapshot of Eastern Europe as the journalist conceives of it. Since these snapshots are individually so small an aggregate of them (culled from Lexis-Nexis, individually coded and then analytically combined) will provide a viable way to assess the larger process of representation that is at work. In one view, this dissertation is not uncovering anything new, because everyone conducts content analysis every day as part of “the intelligence function that makes democratic and rational decision making possible” (de Sola Pool, 2000, p.22) and quite clearly people have an idea (or ideas) in their head of what Eastern Europe signifies. In another way, this dissertation has uncovered something quite new, by shedding light on the manner in which otherwise taken-for-granted definitions and representations are constructed by political elites and journalists. Conclusion This dissertation seeks to answer several questions. What does it mean to be European/Western? How are those identities (and places) created in relation to their neighbors (and/or Others) in Eastern Europe through the processes of NATO and EU expansion? Answering these questions requires a content analysis of newspaper articles covering the expansion processes because that is one way in which the political process is mediated to the public. Through newspaper articles, readers are given snapshots of what Eastern Europe is like and how they relate (or don’t relate) to the citizens of the applicant countries. Thus, by analyzing the newspaper articles about the political processes of expansion, it is possible to study the material evidence upon which mental maps and representations of place are based. These mental maps are critical to understand the dialogical processes that underpin the creation of a “Self” identity, such as that of “Westerner” or “European”.

35

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader some insight into the literature that has been written on this topic prior to this dissertation. While nothing has been written that addresses the same questions as this dissertation (i.e., there has been no media analysis of the relationship between NATO/EU expansion and identity formation), many have written on topics that are within the scope of the question. These topics will be addressed one by one in the hope that the reader will more fully appreciate the results of the dissertation. The Meaning of Europe The word “Europe” is more than just the name of a region or continent – it is a construction that has had varying meanings and values attached to it at different times during its history. The word “Europe” itself comes from the ancient Greek legend of . She was the mother of Minos, the king of and therefore the legendary matriarch of the first European civilization (as dominant histories would have it). She previously had been abducted by the Greeks in retribution for a previous abduction of the daughter of the King of Tyre. This however, was turned into legend as abduction by the Greek god Zeus, who came to her as a bull and carried her off from the Phoenician shore (Davies, 1996). Europa and her abduction came to symbolize transferal of the fertility of the old Oriental empires to the new land in the West. It is apparent that even the name of Europe connotes a normative superiority to other continents, as it symbolized civilization’s “changing of the guard” from the East to the West. The creation of a divide between Europe and begins with the Greeks differentiating between their Europe and the Asia of the Persian Empire (McNeill, 1997; Bassin, 1991). The imagery of the legend of Europa illustrated the Greek belief in their own dynamism and their view of the stagnant but vast Persian Empire.

36 Europe first came into usage during the reign of Charlemagne as a descriptor to differentiate his empire from that of the Byzantine realm or pagan lands (Davies, 1996). This was a short-lived usage, however, as Charlemagne’s empire crumbled into three parts upon his death. Europe remained, however, an identity held in the background while other identities were prominent. For instance, the idea of held sway as a collective identity (at a scale larger than the feudal identities that were prevalent) for much of the time following the fall of the . As the Enlightenment became more and more significant in the late 17th and early 18th centuries the need for a secular identity became acute, and European gradually began to eclipse the idea of the Christian Commonwealth. Europe, however, had only hazy physical borders to the east, which were very vulnerable to the shifting definitions of those with differing political motivations. Furthermore, there was a lack of an overarching political structure to define Europe’s limits and so the idea of Europe became rooted in cultural linkages. These, of course, were also contested – but some generalities have been promoted as being the essentials of European-ness. The first among these is the continuation of Europe’s identity as the home of Christian civilization. Even after dropping the label of “Christendom”, Europe tacitly accepted its existence as innately the home of . Even the later growth of atheism and agnosticism among Europeans could not dissipate the Christian identity within, at least according to T.S. Elliot (1948): The dominant feature in creating a common culture between peoples, each of which has its own distinct culture, is religion…I am talking about the common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural elements which this common Christianity has brought with it…It is in Christianity that our have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe – until recently – have been rooted. It is against a background of Christianity that all our thought has significance. An individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true; and yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all…depend on [the Christian heritage] for its meaning. Only a could have produced a Voltaire or a Nietzsche. I do not believe

37 that the culture of Europe could survive the complete disappearance of the Christian Faith. In this view, Christianity is fundamental to the idea of Europe. This will be born out in later discussions of Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the European Union. In addition, there is a linkage between Europe’s identity as Christian and its identity as “civilized”. This is best shown through the chief problem with this rule – the Russians. Early Muscovy was marginal to Europe because it presented a categorical problem – they were Christian but they had a “characteristic lack of civility” (Neumann, 1999, p.69). This posed problems for Europeans seeking to categorize them precisely because in all other cases they were seen to go together. A second element attributed to European identity is the idea of a future utopia inhabited by various different groups who are unique but united in their culture. This is the element of European-ness that has come to be embodied in the European Union. Perhaps as the realm of Christendom has grown to include most of the Western hemisphere and other areas beyond, it is the European project that has replaced it. Europe has been called a project in “transnational progressivism” – a step away from liberal democracy and towards a more bureaucratic future (Fonte, 2002). That “Europe” is a project is indisputable, with various leaders at varying times pushing for a European identity, often at the expense of the national identities. It is projected as a normative good, somehow a more fundamental and “real” identity than the national one. Often the idea of Europe has become equated with peacefulness, and the idea historically comes to prominence over and over again when peace is being promoted. “European” rhetoric has been used during the end of the 30 Years War, the conclusion of the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and in the Concert of Europe (Davies, 1996). It was also used extensively during the Imperial Age (when Europe’s aggression was directed outwardly instead of in…an era of peace for those not being colonized) and in the post-World War eras as a belated sense of common humanity among the destroyed nations. It is ironic that the word “Europe” should be associated with idealistic peace when the continent it denotes is so blood-soaked.

38 A third characteristic of the meaning of Europe is that of diversity. As previously noted, the very idea of Europe constructs a singularity out of many people that historically have not felt any kind of with their surrounding peoples. Jean Monnet, a strong proponent of European identity, even had to admit this: “Europe has never existed, one has genuinely to create Europe (quoted in Davies, 1996).” This kind of construction can either gloss over differences or use them as the very basis of the identity. Since for the most part Europeans are extremely proud of their unique cultural identities it makes sense that Europe should be predicated on diversity. This “unity in diversity” concept can be seen in this quote from historian Hugh Seton-Watson: “The unity of European culture is simply the end product of 3000 years of labour by our diverse ancestors. It is a heritage that we spurn at our peril, and of which it would be a crime to deprive younger and future generations. Rather it is our task to preserve and renew it (Seton-Watson, 1985).” Others argue that diversity is weakening Europe, in the form of Muslim refugees from North (Gress, 1997). Topical to the subject of this dissertation is another comment of Hugh Seton- Watson, which speaks even further to the issue of diversity: The European cultural community includes the peoples living beyond Germany and …something in no way annulled by the fact that they cannot today belong to an all-European economic or political community...Nowhere in the world is there so widespread a belief in the reality, and the importance, of a European cultural community, as in the countries lying between the EEC and the Soviet Union…To these peoples, the idea of Europe is that of a community of cultures to which the specific culture or sub-culture of each belongs. None of them can survive without Europe, or Europe without them (Seton-Watson, 1985).” Seton-Watson is reacting to the belief by many in Western Europe in a fundamental difference between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. He has a great deal of sympathy for the Eastern Europeans, but even he does not disagree with the fundamental difference between East and West, because he apparently has no sympathy for the Soviet

39 Union, which is purposefully left out of the “European cultural community.” It is to this perceived difference between Western and Eastern Europe that we now turn. The Social Construction of Eastern Europe Larry Wolff (1994) attributes the construction of an Eastern Europe that is separate from the “civilized” portions of Western Europe to Enlightenment philosophers (in particular Voltaire and Rousseau) who perpetuated and mythologized each other’s accounts of a backward and barbaric homogenous region (some of them despite never actually going there). For example, Voltaire’s History of Charles XII was critical in mapping Eastern Europe in the popular imagination by describing Charles’ march through Eastern Europe. This book was written in the first person and instilled a fantasy- filled image of Eastern Europe that later travelers would bring with them to Eastern Europe, inserting a lens of preconceptions in their imagination. The book was massively influential because it had several printings and translations so its effect was far-reaching and long lasting. Later Voltaire would write a history of the under the rule of Peter the Great and he used the popular image of Peter as a “modernizer” to paint Russia as innately backwards and in need of Europeanization. This book marked the beginning of Voltaire’s personal relationship with the rulers of Russia, as he wrote the book with the encouragement (and gifts) of the Empress Elizabeth. This resulted in what many have viewed as a collection of sycophantic platitudes about Peter the Great (Elizabeth’s father). Later Voltaire would have a highly publicized epistolary relationship with Catherine the Great in which he would heap accolades upon her for further civilizing her people in the manner of her grandfather-in-law (Peter) and in which she would proclaim him the wisest of Enlightenment writers. This correspondence (which was all published) further established Russia as a backward land, and by association, all of Eastern Europe was as well. In addition to this representation from writers who had actually been to Eastern Europe there were similar depictions available to the public from fictional travelers, such as those of Baron Munchausen (Wolff, 1994). While there was a real Baron Munchausen who did travel through Eastern Europe, the stories published about his namesake were tall tales written by Rudolf Raspe that portrayed Eastern Europe as a ridiculous place.

40 This representation became fashionable just as travel to the region increased, which is interesting as evidence supporting the cliché “Familiarity breeds contempt” because Southwest Asia and received a much more romantic image, perhaps because of its inaccessibility for most Europeans. Todorova (1997) outlines a similar process of “discovery” for the Balkans, where diplomats and other travelers to the region came back with stories and descriptions that are rich in detail and description, especially of the beauty of the women and the “crudeness” of the men. This attribution of one monolithic representation to such a heterogeneous region is a feature of the larger East/West dichotomy that Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen (1997) described. Built on a foundation of Edward Said’s Orientalism, Lewis and Wigen draw in vivid colors the historical geography of the West and its polar opposite, the East. They claim that perhaps the most enduring definition of the West is the area of Europe dominated by Christendom (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). This definition is most useful for this discussion, because it describes a dividing line separating the Russian and Byzantine spheres of Orthodox Europe from the West, often using the practice of Caesaropapism (the unification of religious and secular power in one figure) as a justification. It must be modified however, as history has shifted the commonly perceived borders around, with East Central Europe being cast into the East by Cold War “realities”, and Anglo-America as well as Japan being included in the West for economic and political reasons (McNeill, 1997). That last example is given by Lewis and Wigen as reason to believe that the West has no real spatial aspect at all anymore, but is in fact a substitute term for the developed world; hence the exclusion of from the West (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). An alternative model of the West is used by Said, who draws the borders of the West to fit the context of the imperialism of which he writes. This “West” is limited to Britain, France, and the United States (Said, 1997). Clearly these larger models of Westernness present interesting questions, but it is the division of Europe that concerns us here. The boundary line between the West and the East is commonly perceived to be somewhere in Europe, even if different people place it in different places (McNeill, 1997). This division has taken on a life of its own, being made

41 real by everyone from academics to policymakers. Take for example this quote from historian Thomas W. Simons, Jr., noting both the reification and the othering of the East: “The first scenario, as we all remember, was euphoric, in both West and East. It projected that the East would simply become the West, in short order and at practically no cost, because it has always been the West, and had been prevented from being the West by the artificial Communist system…But that scenario has had its day; it has run up against the creeping realization that the East is different from the West, that it will not simply become the West, and that efforts on both sides to harmonize structures and interests will be politically costly (quoted in Lampe & Nelson, ed., 1993, p.8)." Larry Wolff (1994) goes on to relate his view that the East/West division of Europe stemmed from the economic differentiation that was becoming more visible between the two halves of Europe during the Industrial Revolution. The Enlightenment belief in teleological “progress” imputed a moral difference because Eastern Europe was “lagging” behind in industrial capacity and social relations. This “lagging” could be ascribed to any number of “Eastern” influences, including irrationality, laziness, or superstition. In addition, by creating an underdeveloped and stagnant East, it was possible to ignore the formal delineation of the Europe/Asia border at the . This was a standard imposed by Peter the Great’s geographer, Vassily Tatishchev (and later amended by Philipp-Johann von Strahlenberg), in the 1690s to highlight the European nature of the Russian core and consign the Siberian area as a land fit for colonial expansion (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). The Asian/European border could now be moved West to wherever the Enlightenment ended and the alleged stagnation began. This schism of Europe was not the first intellectual project of this sort; in fact it replaced the previously dominant view of two Europes, north and south (Wolff, 1994). Until the it had been in vogue in the West to contrast classical with barbarian Germanic Europe to the north. However, with the growth of the Northern Renaissance followed soon after by the Enlightenment, it was no longer plausible to maintain this division. In addition, it should be noted that the dialectic of Southern Europe/ was nested within the larger Eastern Europe/Western

42 Europe schism. For much of the medieval era the East was constructed by Byzantine elites as ascendant, while the West (both northern and southern parts) was the pejorative region, synonymous with “barbarity and crudeness” (Todorova, 1997, p.11). In return, the West constructed itself as being morally superior (if less affluent) in comparison to the corrupt East, represented by the (McNeill, 1997). In any event, the construction of an informal meridian of difference between East and West influenced Western policy makers for centuries, according to Wolff. In particular he notes the Iron Curtain as embodying the policies influenced by the East/West cultural dichotomy. It is incredibly easy for the Western observer to imagine Eastern Europe as living behind a curtain, with the light of Enlightenment knowledge having been extinguished and the people having submitted to the free reign of cunning Slavic/Oriental despots. Oriental despotism is a common representation that typically stemmed from the environmentally deterministic view that Asian society was despotic because of the necessity of centralized control over irrigation (Wittfogel, 1957). Although this environmental description does not apply to Eastern Europe it nevertheless was viewed as a heartland for despotism (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). Historian Tony Judt perhaps best states the political ramifications of this paradigm: And thus, from 1945 until quite recently, ‘Central Europe’ became invisible to the West…Politicians and diplomats in the United States, Britain, and France took notes of the events in the area of Europe that fell under Soviet domination in the years 1945-1949 and watched closely for signs of rebellion, if only as a card to play in the great diplomatic game with the Soviet Union itself…In the Western intellectual and political imagination, reconstructing Europe after 1945 became synonymous with creating economic and diplomatic cohesion among the Western allies and the reconstructed countries of Western Europe…At best Europe became the dream of Jean Monnet and his followers, a sort of reduced Naumannism [this will be explained later], supranational economic union but confined to the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan and consecrated in the Treaty of …The ‘lands between’ entered into cultural limbo and Russian political tutelage. (Quoted in Graubard, 1991, p.26)

43 It should be noted that this last description of Europe refers to NATO and the European Union, while Eastern Europe is cast as “the lands between” the West and the Soviet Union, almost devoid of spatial reference. “At best” Western Europe is seen as a shell of what was pictured in the inter-war era: a purely functional relationship between states but less than Naumann’s (1915) image of a Europe united under German economic and cultural leadership. Eastern Europe, lacking a history of its own, is still mired in Soviet (or Russian) despotism. This artificial division of Europe is the result of four mechanisms (the following is from Davies, 1996, p.25-26). First, European history is reduced to that which appears relevant to current events. The second mechanism, elimination, involved the deletion of all information that contradicts the “history” that is desired. Thirdly there is anachronism, which involves the use of today’s categories and ideas in yesterday’s environment. The final mechanism is the use of emphases in language to promote or demote historical figures, events, and movements. Anachronism is seen by Davies to be the most dangerous of these: By taking transient contemporary divisions, such as the Iron Curtain, as a standing definition of ‘West’ or ‘East’, one is bound to distort any description of Europe in earlier periods. Poland is neatly excised from the Renaissance, Hungary from the , from industrialization, Greece from the Ottoman experience. More seriously, one deprives a large part of Europe of its true historical personality, with immeasurable consequences in the miscalculations of diplomats, business people, and academics. (1996, p.26) Together, these four mechanisms have been used to give the impression that there has always been a vast, inerasable division between the East and the West. This division is portrayed as being natural and inescapable (Radu, 1997). Incorporated in this division is a normative difference as well – the West is fundamentally strong and vibrant while the East is fundamentally weak and stagnant. Historical Metageographies of the West Of course, not everybody agrees that there is no ontological basis for the West. David Gress, a defender of the idea of the West, looks at the idea of the West from a

44 different perspective. He sees two historical Wests: the Old West, a synthesis of Classical, Christian, and Germanic culture, and a New West, characterized by democracy, science, and . These influences merged together and coalesced into the institutions that we have today. This metahistory stands in opposition to the “Grand Narrative”, Gress’s name for the mythology that has grown around the West (Gress, 1998). This mythology revolves around the idea of inexorable progress, eventually leading to the liberty-blessed West that we live in today. The Grand Narrative itself is traced by Gress as an intellectual idea, beginning with its roots in higher education after . The US government requested that elite colleges prepare a course to contribute to the assimilation of returning servicemen and immigrants into American society. They were to be taught the values of Western Civilization so that they could rise above the barbarity of war and become “philosopher-kings”, able to quote Enlightenment figures and American founding fathers (Gress, 1998). The two facets of this Grand Narrative that had the most effect were the Contemporary Civilization course, taught at Columbia College beginning in 1919, and the Great Books curriculum, which was taught at the University of Chicago and emphasized Western thinkers and philosophers (McNeill, 1997). Both of these classes taught Western history as a process whereby superior ideas replaced inferior ideas until we arrived at the enlightened present. Because these classes came into existence at a time when higher education was gaining in popularity in the United States, the classes on Western Civilization proliferated and formed a common curriculum in all fields of study for many years (Gress, 1998). Obviously, there is more to the popular appeal of the Grand Narrative than just a few college courses. For instance, along with these courses came the “Great Books” list, which illustrated a representation of the West by promoting the “key authors and works that are essential for an understanding of Western civilization (Davies, 1996).” These courses and books would serve as the foundation upon which later American worldviews would be built. Since the Grand Narrative was created as a political project by the Unites States government, it is bent towards an Anglo-American conceptualization of the West. For instance, the Great Books list had 49 books out of 151 written by American or English authors. Russians wrote six books and only three

45 were from Eastern Europe. After World War II the Grand Narrative would take on special appeal, dovetailing with the popular spirit of American triumphalism and forming the basis of American and Western identity construction. An example of the intellectual legacy of the Contemporary Civilization course and the Great Books Scheme can be seen in The Rise of the West, a text by William H. McNeill. This book is a world history text, and although factually very comprehensive it can be seen in its title that it has at its root a teleological view of world history. Embodying the idea of progress, The Rise of the West “should be seen as an expression of the postwar imperial mood in the United States. Its scope and conception is a form of intellectual imperialism, for it takes on the world as a whole, and it tries to understand global history on the basis of the concept of cultural diffusion developed among American anthropologists in the 1930s.” (McNeill, 1990, p.1-2) The 1963 McNeill also employed a civilization/barbarian dichotomy. He chooses civilizations as his object of study and operationalized a definition for them because of his focus on cultural diffusion, but clearly the word “civilization”, no matter how defined, has a value attached to it, as does its opposite, “barbarian”. Often, McNeill uses “barbarian” and “savage” interchangeably, as in “definitive destruction of barbarian and savage styles of life in the and in Oceania occurred only in the latter part of the nineteenth century.” (McNeill, 1963, p.724) Certainly though, this does not reflect on McNeill personally as much as it does on the period in which it was written. McNeill (1990) himself claims that the 1950s were a period of unrivalled power for the United States, and many were seeing world history as being a long road beginning with ancient Asian civilizations and culminating inexorably in American hegemony. Although the Grand Narrative fell out of favor among elites during the 1960s for various reasons, it still holds populist appeal. So what exactly is the Grand Narrative? It is an ahistorical view of the West that begins with the Greek invention of liberty, which was passed through and finally to Western Europe. Tied to liberty were the twin buttresses of progress and morality, and these three qualities together defined the West. The critique of this view is twofold (at the very least): the intellectual failure of Western universalism and its selective use of history.

46 Because the West represented progress it was assumed that that progress could be brought to other parts of the world as a part of the much larger agenda of , and in fact this was a Western tenet for many centuries, embodying itself as Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden”. Western liberty, it was assumed, could be brought to the “savage” portions of the earth, and planted like a garden. This was incorporated into the Grand Narrative as well. The fault here, however, is that liberty and democracy are seen in the Grand Narrative as a philosophical construction of the Enlightenment instead of a culturally and historically rooted product of over a thousand years of history. “The modern (or postmodern) West therefore was no abstract universalism based on some imaginary set of multiculturally applicable political ethics, but no more and no less than the institutional and cultural result of over a thousand years of the joint practice of power and liberty (Gress, 1998, p.2).” Gress’s reference to the joint practice of power and liberty may appear confusing to someone raised on the Grand Narrative. It reflects his view that Western democracy was not a creation of either the Greeks or the American/French Revolutionaries, but instead was a rational decision made by medieval leaders in an effort to make their kingdoms more prosperous and competitive. “Rulers competing for power found that the niches of liberty of local communities made their societies stronger and more prosperous, hence more fit to compete (Gress, 1998, p.2).” This acknowledgement of the uniquely Western genealogy of liberty and democracy has only become prevalent in the postmodern era, as universalism has waned. Nevertheless, the West has (and still continues to) invest tremendous energy into exporting its cultural byproducts to other places. The larger critique is one of history. To create the idea of an unstoppable steamroller moving from until the present with democracy and morality in tow is to ignore huge blocks of history. The Grand Narrative is perceived as what Gress refers to as a “series of Magic Moments”, each contributing an essential piece of the Western equation (Gress, 1998, p.39). All of these Magic Moments added together to form a West characterized by democracy, human rights, capitalism, rationalism, science, and religious tolerance.

47 This teleology began in ancient , with as the symbol of the times, perhaps the first liberal. This era includes the victory of the Greeks over the Persians in 480-479 BC, to which Herodotus ascribed this explanation: “Free men fight better than slaves.” (McNeill, 1997) The traditions of democracy and philosophical inquiry then seem to skip several centuries of imperial domination by Eastern powers before reappearing in Republican Rome. Here it joins with before combining with Christianity to form the classical Western synthesis. A division of power between the Pope (with dominion of the spiritual world) and the Roman (and later Holy Roman) Emperor (with dominion of the secular world) characterized the Old West, whereas the Byzantine world evolved into a more unified Caesaropapism with Russia as the prime example. The Old West remains the dominant version of the West according to many conservative Americans, who saw the model society for the United States to follow: a secular imperial hegemon that embodied Christian values (Gress, 1998). At this point the Grand Narrative skips over roughly 1000 years of Germanic influence in the core of the West. This is due in part to the fact that World War I had just been fought prior to the creation of the Grand Narrative at Columbia University and elsewhere (McNeill, 1997), and so including Germans (even ones only vaguely related to the ones in modern Germany) in the advance of Western Civilization would undermine the patriotic element of the courses being taught. These times are referred to as the Dark Ages, specifically insinuating that the light of Western Civilization had gone out, useful only because monks kept the knowledge of Greece and Rome until someone more capable came along to do something with it. In reality, the Germanic contribution to Western civilization is immeasurable. So immeasurable in fact that Gress marks the rise of Germanic Europe as the beginning of the Western identity. The search for more power and empire seen throughout Germanic Europe led indirectly to individualism and democracy, as mentioned before. It is this democracy, and not the pseudo-democracy of the Greeks, that Gress points to as the forefather of the American and French Revolutions. The Grand Narrative, having glossed over Germanic Europe, skips on to the Renaissance and the Age of Exploration, which began a period of rapid growth and introspection for the West. The West became more engagingly universalist, imposing

48 itself on non-Western cultures, and began to define itself against the backdrop of its colonial subjects. At this point the Narrative picks up speed, defining democracy and liberty more thoroughly through Magic Moments such as the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the Atlantic Charter (Gress, 1998). The Grand Narrative tells an impressive story, but as we have seen it has tremendous gaps that do not fit with the precept of inexorable progress. Similarly, its claim to a special morality outside of history is seen as the charade that it is when history is viewed in its entirety. Events such as the Spanish Inquisition, the Crusades, and the Third Reich are often trotted out as examples of Western universalism and morality gone horribly astray, and rightfully so. Events of this horrible magnitude are not unique to the West, but the West is unique it its historical attempt to justify them (Gress, 1998). In fact, those who still believe in the Grand Narrative still overtly back the idea of a special morality for the West, which simultaneously both denies any immorality on the West’s part and demands exemptions to achieve the progress that the West defines itself as. This idea of existing outside history and morality can be seen in one of the current attitudes of some American policymakers and citizens, often described as “American Exceptionalism”. American exceptionalism has a long history, going all the way back to Puritan times, when it was believed that the United States was a “redeemer nation”. The attitude was used later to justify Manifest Destiny and the genocide of the Native Americans (Madsen, 1999). In the 20th century it served as a prop for Cold War Realpolitik and for post-Cold War hegemony. So if the Grand Narrative is a flawed attempt to define the West, what is the West? Gress argues that from the original medieval synthesis of Classical culture, Christianity, and Germanic culture (the “old triad”) emerged a second, modern synthesis: that of democracy, science, and capitalism (the “modern triad”). It can be argued that NATO has come to embody that modern synthesis as the institutional form of “the West”. Although NATO is primarily a military alliance, it was also intended to be and still remains a “community of joint interests and values, dedicated to the principles of the Atlantic Charter - self-determination, open economies, and collective security - and to

49 increased mutual understanding among the democratic societies of its members (Gress, 1998, p.422).” NATO never exactly matched up with the modern triad, but it did serve to reinforce the concept of the West and gave it a concrete political structure for the first time. It committed the US to defend Europe and invest in its survival, providing a boost to Western identity through heightened transatlantic political, economic, and cultural contacts. It forced the Western Europeans to invoke the solidarity of the medieval synthesis embodied in the Carolingian Empire instead of the recent divisions of World War II. This embedding of the old triad within the new is a feature of today’s West (Gress, 1998). The depth of the linkage between NATO and the West in American minds is as yet unknown, although the relationship is clear to some. James Kurth (1997) wrote that “The formation of NATO was closely connected and clearly legitimized with the spread of the idea of Western Civilization (p. 561),” and that NATO is the “defender of the West against the East, or more particularly of Western Civilization against Eastern backwardness, tyranny, even barbarism (p.561).” Further research may be able to uncover its relationship more clearly. It is rooted in the old synthesis or the new? Perhaps it has broken loose from these historic moorings to reflect changing realities. Conceivably, NATO itself is changing those realities. Similarly, although Gress does not specifically mention the European Union, it too is contributing to this changing definition of the West (and/or Europe). Together the EU and NATO, in their professed beliefs, do match up well with Gress’s “modern triad”. The pattern seems to have emerged that the EU follows where NATO has expanded, perhaps using the security guarantee of NATO as reassurance that they will not expand into areas marked by potential instability. Because there is a great deal of overlap between the rosters of NATO and the EU it is not unimaginable that their expansions have been linked at the individual governmental level, if not at the institutional level. Gress poses many interesting and important questions and his expertise in medieval history is significant. Nevertheless he poses an interesting contradiction. He recognizes the contingency of identity formation by rejecting the Grand Narrative (although he never appears to recognize identity formation as a process) yet substitutes

50 his own version of the Western synthesis as being ontologically “correct”. His refusal to deal with identity’s contingency automatically dates his book prematurely. There have been many other conceptualizations of “The West” (see figure 1), and they vary (sometimes quite wildly) from the vision of David Gress, which seems to be at least close to the current configuration of Western identity as commonly expressed. Other definitions include that the West had its fundamental basis in freedom, open spaces, and new starts (McNeill, 1997), that the West is the region that is rooted in classical culture, Christianity, and the Enlightenment (Kurth, 2001), and Gress himself offers two other definitions (which actually contradict his 1998 book). At one point he defines the West as the tension between rationality and faith (1996) and later he defines it as progress and universality (1997). Many of these rival interpretations were common but have since become peripheral. It should be noted however that they still have some currency, as all residual identities do. Historian Norman Davies (1996) has outlined a variety of these incarnations of the West. For example, many commenters still hold that the West is synonymous with the borders of the Roman Empire. Of course, the parts of the Levant and North Africa that were within the Roman Empire are automatically excluded. Other variations on this concept limit the West to the parts of the Roman Empire that are Christian, or even further to the parts that were Catholic before the Reformation but after the schism with the Orthodox Church. Keeping the religious theme, some have restricted the West even further to those areas that are Protestant, seeing the “Protestant Work Ethic” (individualism, frugality, hard work) as the hallmarks of the West and using as justification the decline in power of the eastern Catholic powers following the Reformation. Other conceptions were not religious but ideological, revolving around ideas such as the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the practice of imperialism, Marxism, or on the ideology of whichever state happened to be predominant at the time (like Gress’s construction, which is based on American domination).

51

Figure 1: Map of some East-West divisions in Europe (Davies, 1996, p.18)

Davies concludes his (more extensive) description of these conceptualizations by commenting on the contingency of these metageographies, and it is worthy of quoting at length: From all these examples it appears that Western civilization is essentially an amalgam of intellectual constructs which were designed to further the interests of their authors. It is the product of complex exercises in ideology, of countless identity trips, of sophisticated essays in cultural propaganda. It can be defined by its advocates in almost any way that they think fit. Its elastic geography has been inspired by the distributions of religions, by the demands of liberalism and of imperialism, by the unequal progress of modernization, by the divisive effects of world wars and or the Russian Revolution, and by the self-centred visions of French philosophes, of Prussian historians, and of British and American

52 statesmen and educators, all of whom have had their reasons to neglect or to despise ‘the East’. (1996, p.25) It is to “the East” that we now look to discover how the West has defined its theoretical opposite. Turkey as Europe’s Other Of course, Gress’s discussion of historical triads and syntheses presupposes the existence of the region that he is attempting to justify. The West is being created by foregrounding certain historical facts and backgrounding others. The West (and Europe in particular) does not exist for objective reasons as trotted out by Gress but instead because it reflects the interests of political elites who have contested various definitions and arrived at a (still contested) consensus. This definition of the West or Europe is created through the identification of others who serve as negative images of the self. The most significant of these others historically has been the Turkish presence in the East. The word “Europe” was first included as part of a book title by Pope Pius II (On Europe, written in the mid-1400s), as part of an attempt to marginalize the still significant rift between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity in favor of a renewed crusading vigor against the Turks. (Neumann, 1999) In effect, modern Europe did not exist until the Turkish Empire because there was no relevant other near enough for the Europeans to contrast themselves against. The Ottoman Empire was the only force “outside of Europe” strong enough to influence the European state system that was still in its infancy in the 16th century. From the 1300s until the late 1800s the Ottoman Empire occupied a significant portion of southeastern Europe, even threatening at one point. The strands of European thought about the Turks during the 1500s and 1600s were lifted from Greek thought about the Persians to their east. The Greeks had looked upon the Persians as a futureless state, one without any dynamic change within its borders. Their own states of course, were the future, the center of dynamic change. With this discursive formula in place a rallying cry came from the states of Europe to unify against this outsider. Hence, the rules that applied to Europe did not apply to the Ottomans. For instance, when fell in 1453 the discussion was not of the justness of the reason of state and the geopolitical ramifications of the event as it would

53 be if there had been a shift in the European balance. Instead it was discussion of the atrocities committed by the Turks and why God had afflicted Christianity with the Turkish invaders. (Neumann, 1999) Similarly, Renaissance thinkers often decried the reason of state as one of the causes of the Turks’ progress into Europe because it led to division when there was a clear common enemy. For instance, 16th Century political theorist and geographer Giovanni Botero stated, in opposition to Machiavelli, that Christian principles must be the basis of politics. “I do not know by what justice the reason of state (if something so irrational, not to say bestial, merits the name of reason) has shown itself more hostile to than to Turks and other infidels.” (Botero [1589], quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.47) Nevertheless, the Europeans gradually became more accepting of the Turkish role in European affairs. Relations though were always different than those between two Christian powers - treaties with the Ottomans were not seen as “respectable” by Europeans even if necessary, and in return the Turks viewed treaties as unilateral contracts signed by the Sultan himself. As a result of this disconnect between the states of Christendom and the Turkish Empire, many held that the Ottomans were simply unsuited to the state system forming after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Their idea of religious community as the fundamental political actor was seen as incompatible with the new Christian idea of a secular state as the base unit of political organization. Therefore, William Penn saw the Turks as being capable of being included in the European system, as long as they renounced Islam first. (Neumann, 1999) This is rather prophetic considering the lengths to which Kemal Ataturk would go to secularize Turkey following its re-creation as a republic after World War I. As time passed, the stigma of associating with the Ottoman Empire would lessen but its inclusion in “Europe” was always contested. First, philosophers like considered Europe a commonwealth of Christian nations, explicitly ruling out Turkish membership. Second, Russia in particular discursively moved the Ottomans to the periphery by coining terms like “the sick man of Europe”, which depict the Turks as a stagnant society (inherently a non-European trait) that Europe has to take care of. (Neumann, 1999, p.55) Russia had an interest in this characterization because of its own

54 peripheral role in Europe, which will be discussed later. In essence, by emphasizing the Ottoman otherness the Russians (in the case of the “sick man of Europe” quote, Czar Nicholas I himself, in 1854) hoped to emphasize their own suitability for the European label. Finally, the contributions of practitioners of international law left the Ottoman position in Europe undetermined but certainly different. A “standard of civilization” was created that was used to differentiate between members of the European community and mere members of the international system. (Neumann, 1999, p.56) This standard revolved around the protection of individual rights, the existence of a state bureaucracy, a just court system, and the following of established European policies about slavery, polygamy, etc. A hierarchy was thus established that had European states at the pinnacle, closely followed by European-settled and former colonies, other former colonies, and finally by “limited membership” for countries like China, Persia, Siam, Japan, and of course the Turkish Empire. (Neumann, 1999, p.57) It is through this lens of identity formation that Turkey’s role in NATO and potentially in the EU should be seen. It is particularly useful for understanding the lack of debate in including modern Turkey as a NATO ally (a geopolitical decision made primarily by the US foreign policy establishment) in comparison to the tremendous debate and stonewalling that Turkey has faced in its press for EU membership (a cultural and political/economic affiliation that requires an invitation by French and German political elites). Turkey’s traditional role as a military force in Southeastern Europe led to a rather easy geopolitical decision: it was better to have Turkey as an ally in NATO than as an enemy in the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, admitting Turkey into the European Union raises identity issues for the Europeans. What does it mean to be European if it doesn’t take Christianity as a base requirement? This belief in Christianity as a basic requirement for Europeanness is certainly the view of the head of the EU constitutional committee, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who said that if Turkey joined the EU, "In my opinion, it would be the end of Europe." (Turkey Entry, 2002) Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union was filed in 1987. Initially rejected in 1989 because of the rapidly shifting geopolitical environment (revolving around the demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite system) and because of

55 perceived deficiencies in the Turkish political and economic situation, Turkey was offered a customs union as a step towards accession. Nevertheless, Turkey has watched accession talks begin with the states of eastern and central Europe who applied long after Turkey did. Only recently was Turkey actually given full candidate status, it awaits a review conference in December 2004 to determine if it has passed the human rights requirements for admission. If it is judged to have done so, it will be admitted soon thereafter. Member states of the EU expressed reservations about Turkey’s troubled relationship with Greece and about the status of human rights in Turkey. The banning of Kurdish political parties as well as military interventions in the democratic process accentuate the negative cultural perceptions of Turkey made from the European historical viewpoint. (Preston, 1997) In particular the role of the military in the Turkish democracy is problematic – the military is the self-appointed arbiter of Turkish secular affairs and has intervened in political matters in the past as well as shown a readiness to do so again. These same reservations about Turkish democracy were ignored in the accession process for , , and Greece, who have all had longer periods of non-parliamentary rule since World War II than Turkey has, but nevertheless had a rosier future in regards to military non-interference. (Wood and Yesilada, 1996) A further complication is the Turkish role in Cyprus, another potential member of the EU. (Smith and Timmons, 2000) The application for Cyprus had been accepted but only for the Greek portion of the island: Turkish Cypriots have been offered a seat at the accession table but it remains to be seen what it will take for them to take it. The Turkish role in facilitating those discussions will be significant in easing their transition. Russia as Europe’s Other While certainly the Turkish Empire served as Europe’s historical other, today it only has a small portion of its original power in the European imagination. Today’s European is far more likely to see Russia as his or her other, because it more clearly fits the role that Turkey has vacated. It is an adjacent power, both politically and militarily, which must be taken into account in just about any security arrangement. The uniting feature of just about every Eastern European and Western European states’ foreign policy

56 is resistance to Russian revanchist policies. Certainly during the Cold War, Russia (then the Soviet Union) served as a literal and figurative barbarian at the gates of Vienna, much like the Turks had been several centuries ago. Since then, the threat of imminent invasion from the East has declined significantly, although Russia seems to be a long- term concern for many. Also interesting historically is the already mentioned penchant for both geopolitical rivalry between the Turks and the Russians (especially around the Black Sea) and the rivalry between them over the European imagination. Who was more European, the Turk or the Russian? For their part, the Russians always portrayed the Turks as the outsider, because of the difference in religion. Therefore, Christianity constituted Europe, a common viewpoint at the time. However, the Russians would find that guaranteeing their own “Europeanness” would take more than simply excluding the Turks. From the beginning, the Russians were treated as a “liminar case of European identity”. (Neumann, 1999, p.67) While many included Russia in Europe because of their Christianity, others excluded it on the same basis. For instance, Rabelais said that the Russians did not have “firsthand knowledge of the Holy Scriptures” and therefore were not truly Christian. (Quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.67-68) This lack of scriptural knowledge was caused by the generally illiterate clergy of Russia, and this in turn caused the growth of many heresies within the Russian borders. Although this assault on the Christianity of the Russian people was clearly a swipe at the status of the Russian intellect (a common representation of Slavs documented by Wolff and described earlier in this dissertation) the question of Russia’s Christianity was multifaceted in that not only was their commitment to orthodoxy questioned, but also their commitment to Christianity itself was questioned. For instance, in 18th century travelogues, Russians were often conflated with a great many other groups, some of whom were Muslim. Among these groups were the Tatars, the , the Kalmucks, and even the . (Neumann, 1999) Some of these groups were Muslim, and some were not even in existence. For example, the Scythians were a group said to live on the border between Europe and Asia during the

57 time of the ancient Greeks. Nevertheless, the Russians were often referred to as Scythian despite the complete mismatch in epochs and ethnicities (the Russians did not migrate into the area until much later). At varying times most of the people of Eastern Europe were referred to as Scythians because of the historically distant role that they played in the Greek imagination and the convenience of equating ancient people with contemporary ones. (Wolff, 1994) This phenomenon is more common than just this example of the Scythians, as the English and Americans of English descent are often referred to as Anglo-Saxons and the French are still occasionally referred to as Gallic. It is unique, however, in that Scythian was used to describe the inhabitants of all of Eastern Europe, while Anglo-Saxon and Gallic are generally used to just refer to the inhabitants of the ancient homes of those peoples (or their relatives who have migrated overseas). During the 16th century the Russians were also represented as savages by visitors who reported home, both in language (full of expletives and bodily references) and in action (brutal punishments meted out to even Christian subjects). (Neumann, 1999) This struck to the core of the confusion and contested nature of Russian identity. Russia was at once Christian and also “uncivilized”. To the rest of Europe, this was an oxymoron. A Christian ruler could not be despotic, but nevertheless that described the Czar during the 1500s. In particular, the use of the “knout” came to be associated with Russia. It was a twisted mass of leather and wire, introduced by the Grand Duke Ivan III and used to whip a victim into submission. The rise of Peter the Great begins a revolution in the way Russia was represented. His seeming willingness to “reform” Russia into a European power was translated by later historians as the beginnings of “”. However, much of what Peter did is better interpreted as a shift in focus to the north. St. Petersburg, his “window on the West”, was actually a strategic move to emphasize the Russian role in the Baltic. The phrase “window on the West” itself is a misquoting of Count Algarotti’s statement: “I am at length going to give you some account of this new city, of this great window lately opened in the north thro’ which Russia looks into Europe, (quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.76)”. Certainly this focus on the north was the key to Russia’s seat at the table of Europe (by dominating the Baltic after the Great Northern War it was impossible to

58 ignore Russia) but it predates the East/West bifurcation of Europe. Although many applauded the increase in European manners and knowledge among the Russians, Western commenters such as Voltaire doubted that the essential Asiatic nature of the Russians could change. This is the same stagnation factor that was attributed to the Turks at the same time. Another representation of Russia stemmed from the reform movement launched by Peter the Great. Many European intellectuals saw Russia as an opportunity, a blank slate upon which to write their ideas about forms of government, both legal and administrative. This is the beginning of the idea of Russia as the land of the future – an idea that would persist into the time of the Soviet Union. (Neumann, 1999) This would operate as a framework for thought throughout the Cold War with European leftists advocating the Soviet Union as the rebirth of morality and beyond the corrosive reach of capitalism. (Gress, 1998) This representation was sidelined however by the dominant intellectual mode of anti-Communism that was hegemonic among political elites throughout the West during the Cold War. Still, being questionably linked to Europe does not make Russia necessarily the Other. This Othering of Russia was achieved through the dialogical contrasting of Europe from Russia. Beyond the intellectual dimension (already documented by Wolff earlier) there was also another dimension. According to Russianist Peter Ulf Möller, Russians have been constructed “as body and nature, whereas Europeans were constructed as mind and civilization,” (quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.80). This is perhaps the subtext of the representation of Russia as a bear, something powerful and savage yet somewhat dumb. This subtext becomes clear when presented alongside the aristocratic symbols of the rest of Europe: ’s Lion, Germany’s Eagle, etc. Möller goes on to propose the analogy that Russia is to Europe as nature is to culture. This feeds into many of the predominant representations of Eastern Europe and Slavs in general as being uncultured and ignorant. Although during this time the Russian other took a back seat to the Turkish other in overall significance, the grounding of future representations was already taking place.

59 As the 1800s rolled on the became more and more the “barbarian at the gate” that would come to characterize the 20th century West’s depictions of Russia. With Russian troops in Paris following the defeat of Napoleon there was no more possibility of ignoring Russia’s power. Nevertheless, during the 19th century there were many states suspected of seeking hegemony, and Russia was no more of a concern than these. (Neumann, 1999) Still, by World War I Russia was enough of a military unknown as to strike fear among Western observers (although the performance of the Russian army in WWI temporarily allayed many of those fears). This otherness was enhanced by the inclusion of Muslims within the Russian Empire, and other nationalities of more Mongoloid appearance (often marked by the epicanthic fold near the eye). The creation of the Soviet Union created other opportunities for othering. Beyond the land of the future representation already mentioned, the re-creation of Russian/Soviet identity during the Cold War was historically rooted in the representations already mentioned. Russia was, however, cast out of Europe, and the parts of Eastern Europe occupied by the Soviets were seen as parts of the West subjugated by the Asian superpower (Neumann, 1999). This Asian superpower was seen to have taken advantage of World War II to impose itself on Europe. The barbarians were most certainly at the gate, if they had not already broken through it. Winston Churchill himself said that the barbarians stood in the heart of Europe, referring to the Soviet Union’s march to the Elbe. The choice of the word barbarian is hardly coincidental; to scholars of Russia it clearly contrasts the supposedly nomadic nature of Russia with the sedentary (and therefore civilized) nature of Europe. This is a twist on the original connotation of “barbarians”, which simply meant non-speaker of Greek. Over time, however, this original meaning becomes more generally applied to anyone lacking in “civilization”. An additional attempt at resolving the European identity vis-à- vis Russia was to degrade the Russian national character to more strongly show the advantages of being European, which were being threatened at the height of Soviet power. To accomplish this, Russians were depicted (sometimes aptly) as lazy and drunk, implying their inevitable defeat by the superior moral character of the West.

60 Russia’s current representation however, has less to do with those of the Cold War than it does with those of the earlier Czarist times. Russia is seen as struggling to become more European. The talk is of how to “reform” Russia and how its institutions should be “transformed” into European ones. There has been much discussion of as the analogue to Peter the Great, leading Russia from Asia into Europe. Also analogous is the skepticism that Russians can learn how to be Europeans – it can be heard in the discourse today as it could be heard 250 years ago. Conclusion This chapter’s purpose was to provide the conceptual history that is attached to the value-laden place names and identities that are used throughout this dissertation. Understanding the specific historical contexts in which these identities were first created and how the identities have changed over time can provide insight into how these terms are used today. Furthermore, these histories can provide insight into the political processes that can put these identities in flux.

61

5. OPERATIONALIZING THE IDENTITIES

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to establish concrete linkages between the EU and “Europe”, and also between NATO and “the West”. These linkages are not simply marriages of convenience for the author, but instead are material connections that can be documented in the literature as well as in the newspaper articles that are studied in this dissertation. These linkages are critically important in answering the research questions of this project, as they are the sine qua non of my assertion that NATO and EU expansion represent the political formalization of the collective identity formation process. The EU and European-ness The European Union, at least as described in newspaper articles, serves a significant role in giving an institutional form to European identity. This is visible in the way EU expansion is described; in one Financial Times article [11/14/2001] it was characterized thus: “It will be the biggest single expansion of Europe’s borders since the founding of the Union 50 years ago.” This conflation of the EU’s borders with Europe’s borders is significant, as it seemingly ignores the formal extent of the continent as commonly defined. This is because the EU is seen by many as the formal structure associated with the European federal project, which has a long history in and of itself. This hypothesis is given weight by quotes like this one from The Glasgow Herald [11/10/98]: “Bringing them [candidates from Eastern Europe] within the formal European family of nations will also go some way to guaranteeing their political independence which, in some cases, remains fragile as the aftermath of Russian domination is worked through.” This quote emphasizes the guarantee of independence that is on the ascendance in the EU as union is conceptualized as a Europe of nations and not a nation of Europe. Also, it is described as the “formal” European family of nations, emphasizing that it is possible to be European and still not in the EU. For example, nobody disputes

62 the European status of Norway and despite their non-membership. Indeed, individuals within the EU do not even necessarily self-consciously adopt the “European” identity. In a poll in 2000, 42% of EU citizens thought of themselves as having a joint national/European identity, while 45% of those surveyed rejected the European identity altogether and strictly identified themselves as national citizens only. (Hitchcock, 2003) Nevertheless, the link between European-ness and EU membership is strong, as evidenced by the rhetoric used by applicant countries. European Union expansion can be seen as a process of expanding the formal definition of Europe (the EU) to meet the cultural extent of Europe. It can be perceived, at least by those influenced by newspapers, as the ending of an artificial division of Europe between the “real” Europe and its Russian Other. The end of this artificial division is visible in this Sunday Telegraph [3/15/98] quote: “There is no doubting the desire of the 10 aspirant countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia in the first group; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia in the second – for closer ties with the countries of Western Europe – this for them is the ‘coming home’.” The “coming home” element is key to understanding the dynamic of identity running through discussions of EU expansion. That EU expansion was somehow reuniting Europe goes almost without question in newspaper accounts of the process, giving it a moral weight difficult to rebut. For example, in this quote from The New Times [11/26/2000], a vote against expansion is equated with a vote for some of the most notorious figures of the 20th century: “We must allow Poland into the heart of Europe, lest we accept the legacy of Hitler and Stalin.” It should be noted that in this quote the power to act clearly rests with Western Europe – they would do the reuniting. European reunification was a common theme in these quotes: “Eastern European leaders called yesterday on their EU colleagues at the Nice summit to put aside their divisions and agree on sweeping internal reforms to open the way for a historic reunification of the continent,” [, 12/8/2000] and “From the outset, enlargement has been a project championed by EU leaders who have seen it as a chance to unite the continent after 50 years of division.” [Financial Times, 10/24/1998] Indeed, the connection to World War II and its clear (in retrospect) moral

63 guidelines provides moral punch to the pragmatic arguments for enlargement. Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek was quoted in [12/15/97] to that effect: “After the summit of we can speak not simply about enlargement, but the reunification of Europe. For a man of my generation this is the real end of the Second World War.” As we shall see however, there was a great deal of subtlety and complexity in the way that EU expansion was described in newspaper accounts, much of it not just linguistically adroit, but also historically evocative. In short, there is no monolithic representation of Eastern Europe (as might be expected given the positions of Said and Wolff), but instead many conflicting ones. These will be discussed shortly. NATO and Civilization The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe follows a pattern that is very similar to that described in the previous sub-section. There are many similarities, but also several differences. The first of these differences is the substitution of one metaphor for another. While the European Union was often synonymous with European culture in the previous section, NATO has a different meaning here. NATO is a more general signifier than the EU, as it is a stand-in value for “the West” in many people’s (especially journalists’) minds. This is the sub-text in a great many newspaper articles, while it is directly in the text of some. For instance, in this Boston Globe [5/15/97] quote of political analyst Alexander Minkin the connection is explicitly made: “In people’s minds, NATO is a synonym for the West, and for some 10 years now, the West has been seen as the source of Snickers and Pampers, not Pershing missiles.” Sometimes the connection is made in an off-hand manner, which paradoxically shows the depth of the connection – that it is assumed to be so obvious as to not need explanation, as in this Washington Post [4/30/98] quote: “Senate proponents of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe continued to fight off what they regard as troubling amendments yesterday as the Senate headed towards a vote – as early as today – on admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Western military alliance.” That NATO is the Western military alliance is critical to understanding what NATO is – it is the military defense of the Western way of life. In many cases, it is implied that the Western identity is more desperately sought

64 than the military defense, as in this Daily Telegraph [6/10/97] quote: “The desire to be firmly stamped as Western through membership of its most potent club has already acted as a catalyst, encouraging Hungary and Romania to settle a nagging border dispute.” This desire is subtly different than the desire to be marked as “European” with EU membership. At the very least, Eastern Europe has a cartographic claim to European- ness, based on its location (even if that is not generally seen as enough, it is at least a start). With a term like “the West” that has lost its spatial moorings, there is little prior cartographic claim to being a member of the Western club. Another difference between the discussions of EU expansion and NATO expansion is the significance of the border. In the EU expansion debate the border was important, but mainly because of the cultural and economic power of the EU. The rather esoteric and ephemeral power that the EU represents is significant, but not in the life-or- death way that NATO’s power is represented. The border of NATO is represented as a place of confrontation and conflict as in this Christian Science Monitor [7/8/97] quote: “Furthermore, 300,000 American soldiers and hundreds of nuclear warheads were deployed on the East-West divide to ensure that the US would be the first to tangle with a Soviet onslaught.” Inscribed in this statement is a myriad of metaphors and meanings that also show the cultural power of NATO and its borders. The border is described as the “East-West divide”, invoking all of the power of Orientalist thought and Occidental self-identity. Furthermore, this border is from the Cold War, and so it casts new members (and all potential new members) as refugees from the East hoping to be accepted as Western. They are somehow innately Eastern, but the expansion of NATO to include them can somehow convert them into Western states. The meanings of East and West are obvious even in the single quote given – any conflict would apparently begin with the innately aggressive East, as the war is described as a “Soviet onslaught”. This casts the West into the role of heroic defenders, outnumbered but defending their homes, women, and children. To carry the deconstruction even further, an “onslaught” connotes a mindless assault, savage and brutal. This draws a contrast with those suffering from the onslaughts, which presumably are intellectual and civilized. Indeed, the East is often seen solely as the source of invasions in Western conceptualizations, as in this Baltimore

65 Sun [12/8/94] quote: “There would seem to be two possible functions for the alliance. The first is its classic role: to defend its members against a renewed threat from the East, should that come.” The theme of NATO representing civilization is a major aspect of the newspaper articles that were surveyed. The New York Times [5/11/97] had this to say about Russia’s role in an expanded NATO: “Isolating Russia from the civilized world at this critical juncture can only jeopardize the success of democratic reforms there.” By equating NATO with civilization the writer was participating in a long tradition of intellectual imperialism – especially with Russia as the focus of the non-civilization or barbarity (see Wolff, 1994). The civilization/barbarity dialectic is critical to an understanding of NATO because the same ideas are carried from earlier encounters with outside groups (the Other) and applied to those outside NATO. The earliest Other in the American experience is the American Indian – who was both denied an independent history and culture outside of what the colonists ascribed to them and seen as “culturally virgin, a blank page awaiting the Spanish and Christian inscription (Todorov, 1984, p.36).” From this common ground diverged two views of the indigenous people of America – what historian Tzvetan Todorov calls enslavement ideology and colonialist ideology. Each calls for a different proscription for barbarity – enslavement ideology says that equality is not the norm in human history and it is the duty of the more civilized to subjugate the more barbaric. As the Spanish royal historian Sepúlveda wrote: The greatest philosophers declare that such wars may be undertaken by a very civilized nation against uncivilized people who are more barbarous than can be imagined, for they are absolutely lacking in any knowledge of letters, do not know the use of money, generally go about naked, even the women, and carry burdens on their shoulders and backs like beasts for great distances. Moreover here is the proof of their savage life, like that of wild beasts: their execrable and prodigious immolations of human victims to demons; the fact of devouring human flesh; of burying alive their chieftains’ wives with their dead husband and other similar crimes. (quoted in Campbell, 1992, p.100)

66 The second proscription for the “problem” of the American Indians is to attempt to civilize them, in this case by making them Christian. The Spanish theologian Bartolomé de Las Casas represented this view: The Indians are of such gentleness and decency, that they are more than the other nations of the entire world, supremely fitted and prepared to abandon the worship of idols and to accept, by province and people by people, the word of God and the preaching of the truth…Their rites and customs differ, but they all have in common the traits of simplicity, peacefulness, gentleness, humility, generosity, and of all the sons of Adam, they are without exception the most patient. In addition, they are eminently ready to be brought to the knowledge of their Creator and to the Faith. (quoted in Campbell, 1992, p.101) That these two quotes directly contradict each other is critical to understanding the nature of their dispute. Neither Sepúlveda nor Las Casas had ever been to the New World, and they were both making their arguments with no empirical evidence to prove the situation either way. Both were attempting to produce knowledge in a way that only authority can – in the end Las Casas won within the policy circles of the Spanish court because he was more highly placed and therefore had more authority. The details of their argument are important only in that it gives a great deal of insight into the debate over EU and NATO expansion. Both sides of the debate use contradictory descriptions of Eastern Europe to augment their argument; often both sides are being factual (or have facts to back up their assertions) but are engaging in the selective use of facts to make their case. Both sides mediate their arguments through newspapers, giving the arguments an authority beyond just the titles of those who initially made the arguments. Furthermore, this argument over American barbarity gives us a clue into the way that NATO views its Other. Todorov’s enslavement ideology can be seen as proscribing a buildup of military power to keep the Other (in this case, Russia and other East European states not in NATO) at bay. The colonialist ideology’s analogue would be to extend NATO (and the West) to the likeliest candidates and teach them how to be “civilized”. These two prescriptions should not be seen as being in opposition to each other – they in fact go hand in hand. Since (as mentioned before) there is a limit to

67 the extent that NATO can expand (because of the inviolability of the national veto and also because of the thinning of forces) there must be plans for those that are brought in and for those that are left out. Thus, those that are brought into the alliance must be “taught” how to be “civilized” while those left out must be “subjugated” to the world order imposed by the West. NATO’s Frontier A further extension of the American Indian metaphor to contemporary Eastern Europe is further seen in this quote, from the Los Angeles Times [7/9/97]: “The expansion will give the alliance control of large near the Russian border and will mean that Germany no longer represents the Western military frontier in Europe.” The frontier is a symbol of great importance in the United States and its use implies a great deal. The frontier comes into being as an American at the very beginning of the colonial existence. The English settlers, who rejected the proscriptions of the Spanish as not far-reaching enough, were bent on purifying (the religious meaning of the word is important) the land by removing all essence of the Other from it (Campbell, 1992, p.112). The resulting wars and massacres led to the creation of the frontier, the line on the map that showed the furthest extent of civilization. Often actual physical barriers were created to demark the “pale”, as it came to be known. A large legal barrier was also created, preventing sexual mixing of the races, or even conversation. An analogy could be made between the physical barriers (palisades, forts, walls, etc.) of colonial America with the Berlin Wall, and similarly the vetting process of joining NATO can be seen as a legislated barrier to letting the Other enter civilization. US newspaper accounts of NATO expansion show this frontier mentality: “Kissinger believes that the extended NATO will define the easternmost border of our civilization. No doubt, a noble goal, although it is not clear whether the expansion will stop with Poland or include Ukraine, as Brzezinski seems to suggest; separating grain from chaff is not always easy.” [Washington Post, 2/5/97] This quote is full of insight – besides asserting that NATO expansion is natural since it is bringing NATO’s borders up to our civilization’s boundary, it also makes the Self/good/wheat and Other/bad/chaff

68 value judgment quite clear. The writer says that finding the boundary is not as easy as Kissinger says, but never disputes the boundary’s existence. Of course, the creation of this Self/Other-Civilization/Barbarity dialectic has several material ramifications. It justifies a great deal of violence towards the other (as Sepúlveda argued for), like the Pequot Wars or the eventual elimination of American Indians as an organized polity in the United States, and also creates an idealized identity with which to discipline other “civilized” members of society. It was argued, then and now, that a lack of discipline or obedience to social standards would result in the colonist/civilized person/Westerner turning into an Indian/savage/Oriental. This can be seen in the disciplining of “Bolshevism” in the United States and the prosecution of drug dealers as “un-American” (Campbell, 1992). An American Sphere of Influence While it may seem odd to focus so much on American identity when discussing NATO, it is important to understand the predominance of American power, culture, and decision-making in NATO. Many European members of NATO chafe under American hegemony but see it as a way to keep America involved in Europe. As Charles De Gaulle once famously put it, NATO was founded to “Keep America in, the Germans down, and Russia out.” This representation of NATO as an American-dominated zone has made its way into the newspapers: “And, said Coverdell, using NATO membership to bring Eastern European nations ‘under our [US] sphere of influence’ would help alleviate the dangers presented by a post-Cold War power vacuum in the region.” [Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 5/16/97] Thus, despite the end of the Cold War has not changed the perception of NATO as an American sphere of influence. Indeed, NATO has all of the marks of a sphere of influence – in fact it is often deployed as a signifier of a “zone of democratic stability”. This can best be seen in two quotes from American newspapers: “Though they may be uneasy about US domination of NATO, European governments like NATO expansion because it is a way of growing the continent’s democratic zone of stability without expanding the European Union, a far more cumbersome process that requires much greater sacrifices from both existing and new members, [Washington Post, 2/19/2001]” and “Senator Joseph R. Biden of

69 Delaware, the senior Democrat, said that ‘NATO enlargement is an historic opportunity for the United States, and voting to enlarge NATO now sets a positive course, expanding the zone of stability eastward.’” [New York Times, 3/4/98] Thus, NATO can be seen as a tool of the United States, pacifying an area that has been a problem for the United States in the previous century and allowing its imperial strength to be expended in other directions. This then allows NATO expansion to fit into the general teleological view of American history. The United States has always existed as more than an imagined community, it is a belief system as well. The Puritan experience imbued early America with “an unyielding of the nation’s existence in sacred time, the spiritual dimension [of which] has never been exorcised from American practices (Campbell, 1992, p.133).” Lumped together under the general theme of “Manifest Destiny” (a term coined by newspaper editor John O’Sullivan in 1845), American foreign policy has revolved around a representation of the United States as the chosen country of God, responsible for carrying the banner of goodness in its actions around the world. This goodness was also equated with “civilization” in a way that brought America into a perpetual crusade against barbarity. This is documented in rhetoric involved in the interminable fights against the Indians, the of Florida, the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Vietnam War, and the entire Cold War (Campbell, 1992). It is my belief that NATO expansion can fit into this model. Similarities with EU Expansion It is into this perspective that NATO must be fit – as a construction of the US it reflects America’s self-privileging role in the world. It is seen as progressive and part of the eventual triumph of good/civilization over evil/barbarity. In this it dovetails with EU expansion – which is seen as a historical eventuality (which is, as we have seen, but one of several politically-motivated representations). NATO expansion, similarly to EU expansion, is seen as reunifying Europe. This is visible in the US newspaper articles surveyed: “He sees NATO enlargement providing an American-guaranteed unification of Western with Eastern Europe, comparable in its implications to the Marshall Plan’s underwriting of West Europe’s own unification after the World War II,” [Baltimore Sun, 6/12/97] and “Redrawing the map of Europe is not something to be finessed.” [New York

70 Times, 10/5/97] Clearly the idea of “Europe” is called into play in discussions of NATO as well as EU expansion. Together, these two processes use the rhetoric of “uniting Europe” while necessarily dividing it, only in a different way, as The New York Times [5/28/97] asserts: “The common denominator of NATO expansion and a single European currency is the division of Europe into two camps, the prosperous democracies and those not so strong or fortunate. NATO expansion would give that division political and military form, and the common currency would reinforce it economically. Russia, on all counts, would be left squarely in the excluded camp.” This leaves very little doubt as to the barbarity that is being crusaded against in this process – and portrays Eastern Europe as the redeemed barbarians – the final proof that Las Casas was correct in his argument with Sepúlveda. Differences from EU Expansion There are some interesting differences between the discussions of EU expansion and NATO expansion. As we shall see, they are seen as two related, yet unique processes. There are technical differences between the two expansions, most of which is involved in the institutional processes that each organization has developed. Nevertheless, perhaps the most interesting difference between the two discourses is the way that the candidate countries are described as a group. The candidates were rarely introduced to the reader as simply “the applicant countries” or “the candidate countries.” Instead, the newspapers generally described the applicants as “formerly Communist” or “former Warsaw Pact”. There were occasional variations on this theme, but in the end there were 155 references to “former Warsaw Pact countries” and 126 references to “formerly Communist” countries in the 853 articles reviewed. In newspaper articles discussing NATO expansion, the phrase “former Warsaw Pact” was used (134 references in 412 articles, compared to 28 references to “formerly Communist”) while in EU expansion “formerly Communist” was dominant (98 references in 441 articles in contrast to 21 references to “former Warsaw Pact”). The phrases each indicate the historical Other whose contemporary relevance is being considered. For the EU the Cold War Other was Communism – the polar opposite to Western Europe’s capitalist model. For NATO the Cold War Other was the Warsaw Pact, threatening to roll tanks into Western

71 Europe. None of this should seem too out-of-the-ordinary or groundbreaking, but it is nevertheless fascinating that the discipline of the news journalists should be so rigid. Conclusion This chapter has described the operationalization of the identities that are the subject of this dissertation. Mental maps of “the West” are being enlarged to encompass parts of Central and Eastern Europe that previously were not considered part of the West. Since “the West” is not only a spatial reference but also a collective identity, this involves the reformulation of the collective identity of both “the West” but also of the candidate states. The same can be said of EU expansion – that it involves the reformulation of European identities to include candidate countries to the east that had been previously denied the European label that was nominally their birthright (at least, according to most spatial definitions of Europe, as described earlier). The next several chapters outline the many representations that were found through a content analysis of the newspapers covering NATO and EU expansion.

72

6. CENTRAL EUROPE IN EXPANSION DEBATES

Introduction One of the fundamental questions facing journalists writing about EU and NATO expansion is how to categorize the candidate countries geographically. One dynamic that can be observed in the articles themselves is a certain confusion about spatial divisions. For example, where does Eastern Europe begin? Where is Central Europe? These regions are socially constructed and as such have no natural boundaries. Whereas other socially constructed regions have commonly agreed upon definitions (i.e., South America ends at the - border) these regions of Europe do not. This is complicated by the pejorative context in which Eastern Europe is usually considered. As described in the literature review, Eastern Europe is generally viewed as being backward and authoritarian, among other things. Therefore, places have an interest in seeing themselves described as Central Europe rather than Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, not everyone can be in Central Europe or else the term loses all spatial meaning. There have been attempts to find compromise over the names of regions. This has lead to regions with such ambiguous names as East-Central Europe. If it is difficult to pinpoint Eastern Europe and Central Europe, it is certainly more difficult to find East-Central Europe. Mitteleuropa The ambiguity about Central Europe is nothing new. The idea of Central Europe can be traced back to the German idea of “Mitteleuropa”, which originated in the mid- 1800s but reached its highest significance in Mitteleuropa (1915), which was written by Friedrich Naumann to argue for a tripartite division of Europe. The idea that Europe could be divided into three natural regions (natural regions were still in vogue intellectually during this time) from East to West held a great deal of currency at the time and the effects of the idea of a Central Europe region are still playing out, as can be seen in the newspaper articles dealing with EU expansion. As Michael Heffernan describes in

73 his 1998 book The Meaning of Europe, “Mitteleuropa” originally was used as an economic term denoting a proposed economic space centered on contemporary Germany but including areas farther to the east (generally the areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). This economic space would be distinguished by protectionist tariffs to protect local markets from external domination by the , France, and Russia. The boundaries of this proposed customs union were never defined, which helps to explain the ambiguity in Central Europe’s borders today. Eastern Europe, however, was in this context limited to the areas dominated by Russia and the Ottoman Empire (Kurth, 1997). The economic context of Mitteleuropa changed into a political context as Germany became a unified empire in the 1870s. It had different meanings to people of different political stances. Leftists saw Mitteleuropa as a possible confederation of ethnicities replacing the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and possibly Italy (Kurth, 1997). This was seen as an alternative to the dangerous level of ethnic tension within the region, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was 47% Slavic and not even 50% Austrian or Hungarian. In this way, Mitteleuropa would be distinguished from other geopolitical units because whereas most political actors asserted that they were homogenous nation-states, Mitteleuropa would be distinguished by its diversity. Giving each ethnicity a stake in the government was seen as a way to sidestep the ethnic wars that many (correctly) saw on the horizon (Serb nationalism, along with Croat and other nationalisms, have since justified this concern). Many radicals, particularly Marxist economist Karl Renner, saw this federal structure as a steppingstone on the way to a larger European democratic (Heffernan, 1998). Conservatives, on the other hand, also liked the idea of Mitteleuropa but for different reasons. It was seen as a space for Germany to dominate, finally uniting all of the German-speakers under one government. Other ethnicities would be assimilated into German Kultur. This is clearly stated by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in his declaration of war aims in 1914: We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, , Holland, , - Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, and Norway. This association will

74 not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice it will be under German leadership and must stabilize Germany’s economic dominance over Mitteleuropa (quoted in Stirk, 1996). As militant as this statement seems, it is reasonably representative of the times. Friedrich Naumann, a liberal Reichstag member, thought that German Kultur was incompatible with the “civilization” of the French and English, as well as the “oriental despotism” of Russia. Pre-WWI Mitteleuropa believed itself to be morally superior to the overly rational Atlantic Europe because of its emphasis on classical and Christian morals (Kurth, 2001). The only response to this was to separate the three regions by walling them off from each other and eventually the federal relationship fostered by a benevolent Germany in Mitteleuropa would spread to the other regions (Heffernan, 1998). This was the uniting feature of the Mitteleuropa espoused by the left and the right: that eventually it would lead to a united Europe. The differences were to be found in how dominant Germany would be in the resulting political arrangement. Needless to say, the response of the Allied powers was cool at best – being dominated by Germany was not in their own war goals. They claimed that Central Europe was a fallacy, created to excuse German imperialism in an area that was too diverse in its interests to be governed as one unit except by military power. German influence in Eastern Europe was more than just a rhetorical move – German peoples had begun colonizing Slavic lands in the 10th century and the major movement east had ended by the 14th century. This was the result of population pressure caused by the closure of arable land in the Germanic zone to the West (a need for Lebensraum?). The Germanic tribes brought the heavy plow with them to use on the forested landscape, ousting the Slavic farmers who still used slash-and-burn techniques. The thrust of these settlers was both to the east and southeast, going as far as Silesia and the Oder River in the east and as far as the Sudeten and Erzgebirge Mountains in the southeast (Ponting, 1991, pp.122-123). So it can be seen how discussion of a Germanic presence and destiny in the East fell upon receptive ears, given the pockets of Germanic culture to be found outside as far away as the Volga River.

75 Dissident Geography During the Cold War there was a further use of the Central Europe discourse, mainly by Eastern Bloc dissidents attempting to distinguish their occupied countries from the Soviet Union to their east. The “Central European” movement, however, reached its Cold War zenith in the early 1980s “with the almost simultaneous publication of three works by well-known authors representing the voices of the three countries claiming partnership in the idea: Jenö Szücs, Czeslaw Milosz, and Kundera (Todorova, 1997, p.141).” These essays set out, through different avenues of argument, to establish the Western credentials of a place called Central Europe, of which their were inevitably members. Even then, however, Central Europe meant different things to different people. The use of disparate geopolitical and cultural criteria in order to decide who was in the region and who was not was widespread. During the late 1980s historian Timothy Garton Ash attempted to define Central Europe: For the period before 1914 it may be taken to mean those countries that, while subsumed in one of the three great multinational empires (Austro-Hungarian, Prussian-German, or Russian), nonetheless preserved major elements of Western traditions: for example Western Christianity, the rule of law, some separation of powers, a measure of constitutional government, and something that could be called civil society. The Western Ukraine and the Baltic states are this excluded by the first criterion, while Bulgaria is excluded by the second. Romania is a borderline case (Ash, 1989, p.250). These criteria were not universally accepted – while the German idea of Mitteleuropa quite clearly included Germany (in fact, its very existence was owed to Germany’s geopolitical desires), to many of Germany’s neighbors Central Europe did not. Grzegory Gornicki writes, “The Central Europe discussed in Warsaw, Prague, , and Vienna is, nevertheless, something different. Its measuring rod is geopolitical and it embraces the countries between Russia and Germany,” (Gornicki, 1991, p.57). These views of what constitutes Central Europe differ because they come from different political perspectives, and above all else region building is a political project. The political goal for Eastern bloc dissidents in the 1980s, and for Eastern European

76 national leaders in the 1990s, in deploying the discourse of Central Europe is perhaps best described by political scientist George Schöpflin, who has focused his career on the role of identity in the formation of the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe: Not only does this identity offer a way out of Soviet-type homogenization in emphasizing the European qualities of the local cultures, including above all those of pluralism and democracy, but by offering individuals a second, higher tier of identity, it can help them to escape the thread of reductionism encapsulated in political nationalism. By the same token, despite all the major and minor variations that differentiate Central Europe from the West, the central Europe project is potentially a viable way of Europeanizing the area, of recovering some of the values, ideals, aspirations, solutions and practices that were eliminated by Soviet-type systems (Schöpflin, 1989, p.27). In addition, “Europeanizing the area” would seem to be necessary to seem like a viable country to join the European Union and gain all the economic advantages that come with that. Today’s Relevance The ideas of Central Europe and Mitteleuropa have clearly filtered down to today’s discussions of Europe. In the newspaper discussions of European Union expansion most writers hedged their bets by saying that the candidate countries were in “Central and Eastern Europe” without ever specifying which countries were to be included in each of those two regions. Another common descriptor was just “Eastern Europe”, which is also to be expected given the bipolar division of Europe that lasted throughout the Cold War until 1989-1990. That division was very popular in the West because it mirrored the division that many had already presupposed – the East/West split of Europe that had replaced the north/south division of earlier centuries (Wolff, 1994; Heffernan, 1998). Still, there are examples in the articles associated with EU expansion where the term “Central Europe” comes to be used without “Eastern Europe” immediately following. For a journalist to use this term, they must have had an idea of where they were referring to and must have had an expectation that readers would share that

77 meaning. To understand that shared meaning, it is important to look at the context in which “Central Europe” is used. Invariably, to be Central European was viewed as a positive. For example, countries described as Central European were always seen as virtual shoe-ins for EU membership, and sooner rather than later. They were often denoted as the “reform” countries (at least in comparison to Eastern Europe), and they were seen to already have many of the attributes of the West. For example, they already had high levels of trade with the EU, and were denoted as countries that were a good investment for banks and financiers. The broadest listing of the countries in this group was Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and possibly others including the Baltic States (who were sometimes referred to as their own region), while other commentators limit the region to just Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The more inclusive grouping can be traced back to Mitteleuropa and the three “natural” regions of Europe. The EU can be seen as Western Europe, while Russia is still the feared power in the East. Therefore, all the countries in between can be lumped as Mitteleuropa, or Central Europe. The connection of the EU “probables” to the German idea of Mitteleuropa was explicitly made by one disaffected Turkish official (Turkey had been told it was not on the list) and it was reported in a Financial Times article [3/13/98]: “To accuse Germany of pursuing a Nazi policy of Lebensraum in eastern Europe was about the most wounding thing he could have said. As a former student in Cologne, and fluent German speaker, he [the Turkish official] must have known it.” Another commentator [Financial Times, 6/19/97] referred to the countries likely to join in the first round of expansion as “Grossdeutchland” and Germany’s sphere of influence, while the expansion itself was called “Ostpolitik” and pan-Germanism. Indeed, although the Germans are sensitive to assertions that they are beginning to become expansive again, the German government pushed for a special German role in EU expansion. For example, note this headline in [9/11/99], especially the invocation of the geopolitical gaze: “Germany Turns Its Gaze to Eastern Europe; Nation Aims To ‘Export Stability’ by Taking Lead in Balkans Aid, EU Expansion.” The same article asserted that the plan was “designed to expand Germany’s influence in the region” and that France was suspicious.

78 The confusion about who is in Central Europe and who is not is highlighted by the use of “Central Europe” as a descriptor for the states that are going to get in to the EU, while states that are not going to get into the EU are described as “East European”. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are going to get into the EU because they are Central European, or perhaps they are in Central Europe because they are expected to get into the EU. Similarities between EU and NATO expansions One unity that can be seen between the NATO and EU expansions is the way that they deal with Central Europe. It is sufficient to say that Central Europe is almost always used as a positive descriptor in NATO discourse as well. Generally, the region of potential expansion was known as “Central and Eastern Europe” or alternatively as “Eastern Europe”. However, when a place was described simply as “Central Europe” it inevitably meant that the countries being discussed were temporally, spatially, and culturally closer to the West. For instance, note this quote from the St. Louis Post- Dispatch [4/19/98] that asserts that Central Europe is “naturally” part of the West: “Moreover, Central Europe’s accession to NATO is certain to take. It is wholly natural. The Central European peoples consider themselves part of the West. They have always considered the Soviet occupation of 1945-1989 an aberration. By rejoining the West, they are rejoining their own histories.” This quote also uses the “timeless” East trope to bolster its argument, asserting that by joining the West, Central Europe can rejoin history and progress. In addition, the label is used as a bludgeon to remind Russia of its pure Eastern status. This Daily Telegraph quote [2/21/97] illustrates this phenomenon: “Mrs. Albright is in to present diplomatic sweeteners to help Russia to swallow the forthcoming expansion of Nato to include the Kremlin’s former satellites in eastern Europe which – to emphasize Moscow’s reduced status – is now called central Europe.” NATO expansion is even recognized in the newspaper articles as contributing to the region building of Central Europe, as in this Montreal Gazette [7/11/97] article: All this should not disguise the fact that something very important is happening in Europe. Two years from now, when NATO formally absorbs the three new members who were invited to join in Madrid this week, the alliance’s eastern

79 frontiers will be close to where the eastern borders of the “Central Powers” – Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire, ran in 1914. What has been re- created in Madrid is central Europe. This journalist uses the symbol of the frontier to differentiate between the civilized “ins” and the savage “outs”, and gives a pan-German spin to NATO expansion. In newspaper articles dealing with NATO expansion Central Europe has a German motif to it, although far less so than in EU expansion debates. This is because of the dominant role of the United States in NATO, which colors all policy decisions as in the American interest. Still, enemies of enlargement have occasionally resorted to the accusation of German imperialism to draw attention to their position. For example, General Lebed of Russia referred to NATO expansion as a German attempt to establish a “Fourth Reich”. [Journal of Commerce, 9/26/96] Friends of enlargement argued that American influence in Eastern Europe was preferable to German domination, as in this Houston Chronicle [7/13/97] quote: “Indeed, in attempting to sweeten the prospect of expansion from Moscow’s standpoint, U.S. policy-makers elliptically have suggested that an enlarged NATO is in Russia’s interest precisely because it would keep the lid on Germany and prevent Berlin from re-establishing its power in East Central Europe.” In an interesting contrast to the way that Central Europe was used in EU expansion discussions though, is that Central Europe has an additional meaning attached, that of a historical and geographical oddity. Central Europe is identified as being “awkwardly situated” between two powers, Germany and Russia. This is illustrated in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch [4/19/98] with quotes such as “The point of NATO expansion is to consign to the struggle for Central Europe to the back pages of history – the same pages that contain the stories of such other unfortunately situated territories as Alsace and Lorraine,” and “When Russia regains its strength, however, as one day it undoubtedly will, it might seek to exert similar pressure on its awkwardly situated, relatively weak erstwhile satrapies in Central Europe.” These quotes propose a geographically determined history for Central Europe, comparing it to another region that has been subject to Great Power jostling, Alsace-Lorraine. The first quote is more optimistic about this exchange (from Russia to NATO) being the last than the second quote is, and

80 the second quote also provides a historical twist to the point. By alluding to Central Europe as Russia’s “satrapies” it calls into play an Orientalist image – a was the Persian governor of a province in the Persian Empire and a satrapy was the province itself. This deployment of the East-West metaphor quietly makes value judgments about the Great Powers involved in this struggle. Russia is the inheritor of the Persian despotic mantle from the East, which in turn casts the West in the role of the classic Greeks; beyond doing all of that it place the current struggle between Russia and NATO as being trans-historic, that is part of a larger conflict that has existed in all times. In the same vein as being “awkwardly situated”, Central Europe is represented as being the place where World Wars begin. This is seen in the newspapers discussing NATO expansion: “Why is this a good idea? Because the weakness, instability and unsettled state of Central Europe has been a temptation to its Great Power neighbors for all of this century and a major cause of its great wars.” [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4/19/98] This quote attributes the cause of the World Wars to the very nature of Central Europe rather than to the Great Powers that neighbor it. It is somehow endemic to Central Europe that it should spark conflict; that this place is “a part of the world where U.S. troops have, in this century alone, fought two major wars and stood guard during the Cold War and are spearheading the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.” [Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 5/16/97] The Minneapolis Star- [7/17/97] had this to say: “Power imbalances among the region’s countries and, ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union set the stage ‘for the kind of geopolitical jockeying that had undone Europe several times before.’” Again, the need to expand is attributed to “power imbalances”, ironically not of the Great Powers in the region but of Central Europe. Thus, Central Europe is portrayed as being geographically and historically different – depoliticized and innately dangerous to the West if not controlled. While that would seem to be a negative attribute, it leads to a situation where being in Central Europe is treated as a positive in the NATO expansion derby, as in these two quotes (the first is from The Independent [10/11/96], the second is from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch [4/29/98]): “Nato is expected to hold a summit in the middle of next year at which formal invitations to join will be extended to several Central European

81 countries,” and “It says to the world, and particularly the Russians, that the future of Central Europe is settled. The no man’s land is no more. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are now securely part of the American-allied West. Finis. And if the Russians entertain other ideas, they can forget about it.” Emergence of Central Europe An attempt was made to chart the emergence of the term “Central Europe” by counting references to it in the newspaper articles surveyed and grouping them in six- month increments. This was then compared to the total number of articles published during that time period on each issue because there is obviously going to be a correlation between the two (See figures 2 and 3).

60

50

40

30

20

10 EUTOTAL

0 EUCENT Value 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

DATE

Figure 2: Graph of total EU articles and references to Central Europe therein

82 160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20 NATOTOT

0 NATOCENT Value 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

DATE

Figure 3: Graph of total NATO articles and references to Central Europe therein

This is an imperfect measure because it does not account for the somewhat random factor of how many times a journalist refers to the region in an article; in other words, just because an article mentions “Central Europe” three times instead of once does not necessarily mean that “Central Europe” is a more accepted term. Still, if Central Europe is being mentioned at all it means that the concept is in use, which is important information. The last figure (Figure 4) is the number of articles and references to “Central Europe” in both debates, which gives the best overall picture of the penetration of “Central Europe” into the newspaper accounts. This graph (and indeed, the previous two) indicates a general pattern in which the number of references to “Central Europe” parallels the number of articles on the topic (as would be expected given their causal correlation). Nevertheless, some anomalies can be noticed. The 1997 spike in articles about NATO expansion is not matched by a corresponding spike in references to Central Europe, and in 1999 there is a conspicuous lack of references to Central Europe in the EU expansion coverage. These anomalies, however, are probably due to the aforementioned flaws in this test. The definitive conclusion that can be reached, given the method used, is that “Central Europe” was already in journalistic use by the time that these debates began to be covered in the newspapers in 1993-1994. This was to be

83 expected given that the US State Department’s shifting of nomenclature to “Central Europe” occurred shortly after the end of the Cold War, which allowed plenty of time for the idea to filter to news agencies by 1993-1994 (at least, for news agencies in the US).

200

100

ARTICLES

0 CENTEUR Value 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

DATE

Figure 4: Total articles and references to Central Europe therein

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed history of the idea of “Central Europe” from the mid-19th century until the present. In addition, it has sought to provide an in-depth description of the various meanings ascribed to both the place and the identity of Central Europe. These meanings are connected both to the earlier, Germano-centric version of Mitteleuropa and to the later anti-Soviet constructions of the identity. The usage of “Central Europe” in the newspaper articles covering NATO and EU expansion was charted, and its usage seems to predate the beginning date for the articles surveyed. In every case, however, being “Central European” was viewed as being a big advantage in the NATO and EU expansion derby.

84

7. REPRESENTATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN EU EXPANSION

Introduction Having discussed the contextual differences between the usage of Eastern Europe and Central Europe, it is equally important to discuss the overall depiction of Eastern Europe in the newspaper discussions of EU expansion. It should be noted that Eastern Europe as used here refers to the area known during the Cold War as Eastern Europe, and more recently as Central and Eastern Europe. This area encompasses the entire area that the European Union is expanding into, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta. EU Representation 1: Eastern Europe as the West There are in essence three major representations of Eastern Europe that have been deployed in the newspapers. The first representation is of Eastern Europe as essentially the same as Western Europe, or at least on the way to becoming Western Europe. This representation can be found in 102 of the 557 total quotes found to be representing Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering EU expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). This discourse is a continuation of an ideological movement that says that there is no fundamental difference between the two, only differences created by different dynamics of history, such as the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe over the last half of the 20th century. Western Europe and Eastern Europe together make up Europe; therefore in collective identity terms they are together the “self”. Hungarian economist Laszlo Kiss wrote this, in 1989: “For Hungary, the notion of ‘European identity’ expresses an awareness of Europe as the ‘common cultural ,’ of the fact that Europe is, despite its political division, a single cultural whole, with a diversity of links that not even the Cold War could wholly dissever.” This assertion of a common “self” brought with it a moral burden to Western Europe – that they must let Eastern Europe into the EU because Eastern Europe suffered through the Cold War. In a guilt trip delivered by Vaclav Havel, EU admission would “give nations like ours a signal that

85 the West truly wants us and sees us as part of the Western sphere of civilization,” (quoted in Neumann, 1999). This ideological representation of Eastern Europe can be seen throughout a great many of the articles examined during this research. It takes many different forms, most of which have a triumphalist, paternalistic overtone to them. This is the result of the West’s view that it won the Cold War, and that this represents a victory of its ideology over that of the Communist East. This is reflected in the writing of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, among others. As others have pointed out (Heffernan, 1998) the end of the Cold War really only signaled the collapse of the Soviet system, which is quite independent of the virtue of the West’s capitalist system. Nevertheless, this is how the majority of Western observers have interpreted that event. Therefore, there is a view of many in the West that having Eastern Europe adopt their standards is recognition of their superiority and is a normative good. Because of this, the descriptions used of Eastern Europe are extremely value-laden, with approval being shown to countries that were thought to be making themselves more like the West and moral approbation shown for those who were not. Throughout, the countries of Eastern Europe are shown as supplicants, or children learning from the parental West. Perhaps no quote illustrates all of these dynamics as well as this one, from the Daily Telegraph [3/21/95]: The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet empire marked a singular victory for Western values: democracy, free enterprise and the rule of law. These have now been espoused, in varying degrees, by the old Warsaw Pact members. Those which have traveled furthest, the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe, wish to crown their transformation into civilized nations by membership of the European Union and Nato. This quote has elements of several different discourses, but readers of the previous section will note that when the old Warsaw Pact states were Communist, they were in Eastern Europe, but when they become “civilized” they are in Central Europe. For the purposes of the representation now being discussed, however, the most important aspect of the quote is that it quite clearly shows the triumphalist quality of this type of representation. It says more about Western Europe than it does about Eastern Europe –

86 the East is grudgingly given the status of “civilized” while Western values are touted as universal and superior. Generally newspaper articles adopting this representation (it should be noted that more than one representation could be found in each article) used several different modes of description to convey this representation. The Reform Discourse One mode of description was to chart the “advance” of Eastern European countries on the “path of reform”. It should be noted that this is a very value-laden description already, designating the EU as the destination, one that is advanced and not in need of reform. Nevertheless, this hierarchy-inducing rhetoric was adopted by some Eastern Europeans as well as most Westerners, as seen in this quote by Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Saryusz-Wolski in The Guardian [12/8/2000]: “The Europe of today has to take the opportunity offered by the courageous changes in eastern Europe to unite the continent. We’re making real advances and we should not be kept out in the cold anymore.” It should also be noted that not only is Eastern Europe apparently powerless to unite the continent (“The Europe of today” means only the EU, and therefore only the EU is empowered) but not being in the EU is equated with being “kept out in the cold”. Mark Mobius, who manages an emerging market mutual fund, claimed in The Financial Times [2/16/96] that “they [Eastern Europeans] have opened effective stock exchanges much more quickly than other lower-income countries around the world.” In other words, they may be “lower-income countries” but they still have the quintessential European knack for capitalism. Other commenters in US newspapers noted that Eastern Europe had made “great strides” [Journal of Commerce, 7/17/97] in their economic systems, and that they were “eager to benefit” [Washington Post, 7/16/97]. Indeed, the idea that Eastern Europeans were aspiring to the West is another common theme. As one writer put it in The Financial Times [3/12/97], “the will to join the West is as strong as ever.” This note of Cold War triumphalism was repeated in various guises, such as this from The Independent [12/13/99]: “Over the past decade since 1989 – that extraordinary year of liberation, of velvet revolution, of contested if not exactly free elections – central and eastern Europe has struggled with transition on the assumption that sooner or later it would lead to convergence with the affluent West.”

87 The emphasis on “affluent” is added to show the conflation of the West with the West’s high incomes, which seemed to be the Eastern Europeans’ real goal. For example, from The Guardian [12/8/2000]: “Romania’s president, Emil Constantinescu, highlighted the view in the new democracies that membership of the EU would be a passport to Western- style stability and prosperity.” Similarity to Western Europe Another discursive method of making Eastern Europe seem like Western Europe was to give Eastern Europe attributes that Westerners would recognize as their own. One example of this was to show the cultural links between the two halves of Europe. One writer chided the EU by describing Eastern Europe thus [The Times of London, 6/13/2001]: “If the EU wants to be the institutional voice of the whole of Europe, it has to acknowledge the complexities and frailties of the East – and to accept that it can learn a lesson or two from these culturally sophisticated, free-thinking and self-assertive societies.” Another method of drawing parallels between the two regions was to describe the applicants as “democracies” or as “new democracies”, or to illustrate the economic linkages that already existed between East and West. An example of the latter from The Financial Times [10/24/2000]: “However, given the economic forces pulling together Western and Eastern Europe, it seems only a matter of time before enlargement forces its way to the top of the EU agenda.” A lot has been written in newspapers of Austria’s role in developing links with Eastern Europe. In fact, since the end of the Cold War Austrian sales in Hungary have matched Austria’s sales in perennial trading partner Switzerland, and Slovenia has received almost as much of Austria’s exports as Japan and China combined. This has been used effectively to show the contribution that Eastern Europe could make to EU economies. After all, if they are good enough to trade with Austria, they could be trading with anyone in Western Europe. Another positive comparison of East to West was to show how well Eastern Europe was adopting the “acquis communautaire”, the body of law that must become law in a country before it can join the EU. As The Financial Times described it [3/12/97]: “All the accession candidates have made good progress in putting existing EU regulations on their statute books” and they

88 “are harmonizing their laws with EU directives.” This creates a manifest pressure on the audience to let the countries of Eastern Europe into the EU. Further allusions to the West were offered through descriptions of Eastern Europe as having high educational standards and a skilled workforce. The Singapore Business Times [11/16/2000] asserted that EU officials cited Eastern Europe’s “open societies, modern democracies and functioning market societies” as steps in the right direction. It should be noted that this is an almost exact replica of David Gress’s description of the new Western identity, having replaced the medieval synthesis of classical, Christian, and Germanic culture. In the same vein, a Times of London article [6/13/2001] asserted that Eastern Europe was experiencing “raw dynamic capitalism” which was fundamental to the idea of Europe (even if the EU prefers a more regulated form of capitalism). A moral plea made to the EU is another method of claiming a fundamental commonality with Europe for the East. The description of Eastern Europe as historical victims has a great deal of weight in the West, and it also appeals to the messianic universalism and triumphalism that underlies Western discourse on economics, human rights, and the Cold War. For example, this quote from the Polish premier in The Guardian [9/2/99]: “Some of history’s bills are still open. The war led to the division of Europe. Poland never voted to join the east bloc. There’s a moral responsibility here.” The same newspaper asserted that “It is unjust to the countries most scarred by Europe’s divisions, and very shortsighted, for the EU in effect to keep putting them off,” [7/31/2000] and according to The Financial Times [3/21/2000] if they were to be put off indefinitely “there would be nationalism and anti-Europe extremism and people would say: ‘They cheated us again.’” A further moral argument was made in response to a plan to admit Eastern European countries and not give them the full agricultural subsidies that would be (according to the current system) due to them. The terminology used to fight this movement was that of “second-class citizens” and was a response to the policy (adopted in the end) of withholding full subsidies for seven years after Eastern European countries are admitted. This rhetoric is rooted in what many saw as an unfair offer of entrance, and clearly asserts the fundamental equality of Eastern Europe with Western Europe. The

89 terminology worked well precisely because of its political potency – Westerners did not want to be seen as uncaring about Eastern Europe again (another Yalta – only this time Eastern Europe would be abandoned to poverty instead of the Soviets) and easterners were intent of being seen as a full part of Europe, with all the privileges that come with it. Summary of Representation All things considered, this representation of Eastern Europe is progressive, optimistic, and rooted in the liberal consensus of both modernization theory and the innate value of diversity. As one Glasgow Herald [3/16/1994] editorialist put it, “any definition of Europe which excludes Vienna or Prague seems seriously deficient.” It also embodies the triumphal spirit of the post-Cold War era, as in this article from The Independent [12/9/94]: “Ever since their liberation from the Soviet empire, all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been claiming a place in the European Union, and two of them (Poland and Hungary) have already put in applications.” This discourse places the EU at the top of the hierarchy of countries and tells applicants that if they play their cards right, they can become members too. Simultaneously glossing over real economic differences between East and West while asserting the immorality of leaving Eastern Europe outside the “European family”, this discourse discouraged disagreement by establishing as common knowledge that EU expansion would happen, it was only a question of when and how. Expansion as an end to itself, perhaps the goal all along, is the mark of this discourse. Generally, this discourse revolved around the idea of “unifying Europe” – as illustrated by this Washington Post [12/11/94] quote of retiring EU commissioner Jacques Delors describing his view of a meeting with representatives of the EU and its applicants gathered around a table: “No longer divided into East and West, but sharing the same traditions and culture, [this] was one of the most satisfying images I take away from my job.” EU Representation 2: Eastern Europe as Unchanged The alternative and rival representation to the one just mentioned is that of Eastern Europe as unchanged and/or unchanging. This representation can be found in 127 of the 557 quotes found to be describing Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering EU expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). This representation

90 is a continuation of the Orientalist ideology that constitutes Eastern Europe as Western Europe’s Other. Although there are vast differences between classic Orientalism as described by Said and what is said in conjunction with Eastern Europe, it nevertheless belongs to the same style of identity politics. It is part of the power of Orientalism that it can be stretched and molded to fit the realities of such distant and disparate places as India, China, the Arab world, and Eastern Europe. This discourse follows roughly in the lines of what Larry Wolff describes as the mode of representation used to describe Eastern Europe during the Enlightenment. That is, Eastern Europe is described as the transition zone between the civilization of Western Europe and the barbarity of Russia and the East. It therefore has elements of both regions, although it tends to be like Russia in that the economy is inefficient, rulers must be autocratic, and higher forms of knowledge are lost on the inhabitants. This representation also draws on forms of neo-conservative thought in the post- Cold War era. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis posits that behind the nation-state is another higher level of collective identity – that of the civilization (Huntington, 1993). Huntington claims that the Iron Curtain was just a material embodiment of the “Velvet Curtain of culture”. This Velvet Curtain supposedly came into existence in 1500 (when the civilizations solidified into their current immutable borders) and it separates one civilization from two other civilizations – Western Christianity from the Slavic-Orthodox world and the Islamic civilization. What is important about this idea for the representation is not Huntington’s conclusion (which is eminently weak) but instead his idea of “civilizations.” He describes a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes us from other species.” The ridiculous amount of appeal that Huntington’s thesis had when released is due in part to the popular appeal of the idea of “civilizations”. As Gerard Toal (1996) says “Huntington’s concept of a ‘civilization’ is a curious one that is crucial to his writing of global space. A deterministic totality that is not reducible to either religion, ethnicity, geography, or attitude, his classification gestures to all these factors.” This flexibility of definition allows the designator to create boundaries wherever sought – and it is

91 impossible to argue against because whatever factor is raised does not have to be the one that is determinant for that global space (i.e., Poland is Catholic, should it not be in the Western Christianity sphere? Yes, but they are Slavic). Infinite factors create infinite backdoors for Huntington to create the globe as he sees it. The representation of Eastern Europe as unchanged and/or unchanging predates Huntington’s thesis of course, but they both (the representation and Huntington’s predictions for the geopolitical future) draw on the same idea – that regions are fundamentally the same as they have been for recent history. The details may change (i.e., Hungary may become democratic) but Hungary is still part of a different civilization than Western Europe. Their civilization will always connote backwardness, economic inefficiency, and political barbarity. It should be noted that this directly draws on the idea put forward by Said that Westerners traditionally view the East as being timeless and unchanging while the West is engaged in its own history of progress. Despite similarities in this and the previous representation in their belief in a dividing line between civilizations, this subtext clearly makes this representation the opposite of the “Eastern Europe is like the West” representation, which put forward the idea that Eastern Europe could evolve and modernize into the West. Perhaps the best example of this representation in the newspaper archive of EU expansion is the following quote from The Independent [12/9/94]: “In other words, the 12 are talking about a truly colossal expansion, an enlarged union of 27 states, and an increase in the population from 345 million to around 480 million. Such a union would encompass an extraordinary diversity of geography, history, politics and culture, extremes of riches and poverty, and possibly serious conflicts of economic and political interests.” This quote quite clearly establishes a contrast between the EU of today (actually the EU of yesterday since at the time of the quote the EU only had 12 members) and the potential EU of tomorrow. The EU of tomorrow is “extraordinarily” diverse in “geography, history, politics, and culture” whereas presumably the EU of today is not (or at least far less so). It is suggested that this expansion is unique, whereas previous expansions did not result in the same increase of diversity. Similarly, the EU of tomorrow will possibly

92 have “serious conflicts of economic and political interests” while it is implied that the present EU does not. This quote is a good example of how the discourse of the debate often homogenized and idealized the current EU by implying a unity that is not necessarily there, while asserting a fundamental difference between the current EU and its applicants. This creation of a split between Eastern Europe and Western Europe was accomplished in two major ways. The Explication of Difference The first major method of illustrating the idea that Eastern Europe was unchanged or unchanging was to quite literally assert that Eastern Europe had not caught up to Western Europe nor would they ever really catch up. It should be noted that it does not matter if these assertions are true, as there are many “true” descriptions of Eastern Europe that are not mentioned. In addition, some of these descriptions are more apt for some states than for others. In other words, it is a selective, reductionist description (as any newspaper description inevitably is, mostly because of space restrictions). An example is that one of the complaints registered against Eastern Europe’s entrance into the EU was that their bureaucracy was too small to handle all the paperwork. As one Financial Times article [11/14/2001] put it: “Most [Eastern European] countries are short of trained civil servants and people with expertise in the complex legal technicalities of drawing up and pushing through legislation.” In an earlier article from the same newspaper [6/6/2001]: “There are weaknesses everywhere – even the so-called front- runners – in administrative capacity, the judicial system, in some cases, .” The assertion is that literally Eastern Europe cannot handle being in the EU. By direct implication, Eastern European countries lack trained civil servants and people with legal expertise. Even further, the second quote gets to a more fundamental problem – that Eastern Europe is unfamiliar with the rule of law. This is but one of a whole host of problems that were cited as problems with expansion. For example, from The Guardian [7/20/1997]: “Unlike all earlier applicants, the central and eastern European economies have limited experience of competing in international markets, a poorly developed legal, financial and commercial infrastructure, a small inexperienced entrepreneurial class, and ill-defined labour market institutions.” Further illustration came from Greek foreign

93 minister Theodoros Pangalos, who was quoted in The Financial Times [7/23/1997] describing Eastern Europe thus: “very little experience in democracy, and even less experience of a market economy.” Beyond the experience in a market economy, Mr. Pangalos questioned the candidates’ ability to remain democracies; he was not alone in this. Some terminology, even when used to advocate admission for the applicants, ends up highlighting the differences between East and West. One such term is “fragile democracies”. This was used often, sometimes to point out the dangers of leaving the countries out (as in The Financial Times [12/4/2000] - “the summit will set back enlargement of the European Union and damage the fragile democracies of eastern Europe.”). Even though the speaker quoted (Francis Maude, a British shadow foreign secretary) was advocating expansion, it leads to a line being drawn between the solid democracies of Western Europe and the fragile democracies of Eastern Europe. Alternatively, the phrase was used to purposefully show that same very point. For example, this, from The Independent [12/13/1999]: “The application is full of new or reinvented countries whose democracies are hardly less fragile than their economies.” This quote is rich in rhetoric – asserting that any move towards admission is premature because Eastern Europe is “new or reinvented”. While Western Europe is old, established, and reliable, Eastern Europe is newborn, provisional, and might collapse at any moment. Attached to the idea of a “fragile democracy” in The Washington Post [12/15/96] was the idea of a “questionable” freedom of the press. In the same vein, The Financial Times [11/14/2001] questioned the penal systems of Eastern Europe, claiming that pre-trial detention there was characterized by “excessive duration [of detention], lack of access to lawyers, and in some cases, maltreatment.” As human rights are key to the Western self-identity, this is a substantial black eye for Eastern Europe. Another human rights issue that was raised in the newspaper accounts was that of minority rights. The Independent [11/28/1997] brought up the treatment of the Roma as fundamental, citing reports of refusal of citizenship in the Czech Republic. The Czech government asserts that all Romany are ethnically Slovak. Furthermore, Romany discrimination is rampant in everyday Czech life, with one incident reported revolving

94 around a Romany man who was beaten to death by skinheads in front of his children. Also important to The Independent [4/9/2002] were issues such as the requested “annulment of the Benes Decrees, the Czechoslovak laws under which 2.5 million Germans and about 30,000 Hungarians were deported [from the Sudetenland after World War II]. A brusque response from the Czech premier, Milos Zeman, who said the deportees could have been executed as traitors, provoked a diplomatic spat with Germany.” The “messy historical legacy” [taken from the same article] of Eastern Europe seemed to dog its contemporary relationships. Indeed, articles pointed out that letting some countries in and not others would split nations, such as Hungary, which has significant minority populations in Slovakia and Romania. Also, more general frontier issues and irredentist movements were of concern, eliciting warnings of “explosive minority problems” [Financial Times, 3/12/97]. To add to this critique, the Singapore Business Times [11/16/2000] added that “trafficking in women and children” was a problem in Eastern Europe. Mentioned several times in the newspaper was the labor situation in Eastern Europe, as in “the social institutions on which all Western market economies depend are still undeveloped,” [The Guardian, 7/20/1997] and “a warning that the countries of central and eastern Europe should not be allowed to join the European Union while their workers continue to suffer sweatshop conditions.” [The Guardian, 3/16/95] All of these are major warning signs to Western audiences that this is a place unlike their own. One of the points raised to argue against admission for the candidates was the size of their agricultural sectors. Where Western Europe has a more industrial and post- industrial economy, Eastern Europe is, in proportion, more agricultural. An example can be found in The Times of London [5/26/1999]: “Furthermore, these countries, often with substantially rural-based economies, will change the nature of the Union for all time.” Alternatively, the candidates were described as “farm-intensive” [Financial Times, 3/19/98] or the more derisive “dependent on agriculture” [The Independent, 12/9/94]. This delineation is more significant than just as a cultural identifier (although it is that as well), because a significant portion of the EU budget is spent on the Common Agricultural Policy, which subsidizes production of agricultural goods. Therefore, the

95 admission of highly agricultural societies will mean the outlay of more budget money. Not only does this upset the net contributors to the budget, but also many of the countries that are still net recipients because once the budget formula is recomputed with the new members in it, they will become net contributors as well. All of this spells a real political problem for many member states. Many newspapers remarked on the inefficiency of Eastern European farms and industry. For example, this could be found in The Observer [11/15/98]: “If the European Union expands to take in most of the countries of eastern Europe, large amounts of British taxpayers’ money - which could have been spent on hospitals – will go to prop up the inefficient agricultural and poor industrial practices in the former communist countries.” This clearly highlights the supposed efficiency of Western European farms and industry, and delineates the haves and the have-nots in Europe. In particular, this quote refers to the Structural Adjustment money that is given to improve infrastructure in countries that are significantly below the EU average in GNP. This quote is particularly vociferous in its opposition to enlargement – even threatening that hospital patients will be thrown out of their bunks if expansion occurs. But it contains a bit of ironic truth to it: by paying for infrastructure improvement to Eastern Europe and increasing their efficiency and productivity, the EU (and the taxpayers who pay for it, as the writer points out) will then have to pay them more subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy. Essentially, the EU will be paying them so that they can pay them more later on. In addition, more than the efficiency of East European farms is in question. The Financial Times [4/10/2000] had this to say about East European farm regulations: “The British beef scandal, critics claim, will pale in comparison to the food scares held in store in the east.” The last major delineation made between the Eastern and Western portions of Europe is that of income. Repeated references to the income disparity are made in such a manner as to make them almost as significant a descriptor of the region as “Eastern” itself. Several commenters pointed out that at the time of writing Eastern Europe was actually poorer as a region since the fall of the Berlin Wall because of the economic shift from Soviet domination to free market capitalism. This was illustrated with many

96 statistics: “Including Russia, the region as a whole saw incomes per head fall by an average 4 per cent a year over the past decade, a worse outcome even than in sub- Saharan Africa.” [The Independent, 12/13/99] In a Financial Times article [5/8/98], this was offered: “After four years of recovery only Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic are expected to reach a level of gross domestic product this year higher than in 1989, having overcome the painful economic contraction of the early transition years.” There are many other examples of rhetoric used in favor of expansion that still drew distinctions between East and West. For instance, in this quote regarding an informal poll of voters in : “At the other end of the pub are three men; they split two to one against [expansion]. Donal O’Sullivan, who works in another bar, says he voted ‘yes’ to show solidarity with poorer new members.” [The Guardian, 2/7/2002] Besides giving the impression that expansion is a bad idea (the article was reporting that the national vote went against expansion), the quote serves to further the cognitive distance between Ireland and Eastern Europe. The “solidarity” mentioned is not really solidarity but nostalgia – Ireland has recently boomed into one of Europe’s most dynamic and fastest-growing economies. For many Europeans (or at least the other two men in the straw poll), the difference in wealth between Eastern and Western Europe is important – as illustrated in this Financial Times [6/6/2001] article: “Fervent defenders of enlargement fear that solidarity – extending the EU’s prosperity to the east as was done to Spain, Portugal and Greece in the mid-1980s – has become replaced by national self- interest, underpinned by a reluctance to share financial resources with the poorer regions of an enlarged Europe.” Continually throughout the newspaper articles the candidates are referred to as being “poorer” or “less prosperous” than the current membership of the EU. Some articles quantified the difference: The population of the 10 east European candidates comes to just over 25% of the EU total but their combined GDP is only one-tenth the EU’s. Consumption per head in the EU, expressed in , ranges from 9,277 in Greece to 15,325 in Luxembourg. In the candidates the range is from 3,305 in Bulgaria to 7,850 in Slovenia. Average consumption level is just over two-fifths that of the EU. [The Guardian, 12/1/2000]

97 Other statistical comparisons were also made, many of which compared the wealthiest of the EU against the poorest of the applicants. Some even warned of a hijacking of the EU by the poor: “The 12 ‘poor’ accession candidates will enjoy a ‘blocking minority’ in the Council. If they team up with the two poorest countries in the present EU, they could also block decisions with an absolute majority of member states.” [Financial Times, 7/9/2001] Surely, this represents the worst-case scenario for the net-contributor countries. In any event, the usage of financial comparisons draws a line of distinction between the applicants and the members – leading to the selection of self-interest over solidarity. The Use of Orientalist Description The second of the two major methods of showing the unchanging nature of Eastern Europe was to appeal to older signifiers of Orientalism. This entails describing Eastern Europe in terms that Samuel Huntington would approve of – as a civilization fundamentally different from Western civilization. Many of the examples mentioned above could also fit into this category. For example, there is the assertion that Eastern Europeans are unfamiliar with the rule of law. A Financial Times journalist quoted a European Commission official [3/12/97]: “There are serious questions about their ability to administer and enforce the acquis communautaire.” This is more serious than simply saying that Eastern Europe needs a larger administrative bureaucracy because it hits on a long-standing description of the East. The East has for a long time been represented to Western audiences as being innately despotic – with no rule of law except for the will of the and the elite class (Said, 1978). This image is reinforced by many references in UK newspapers of “endemic corruption” [The Financial Times, 12/14/2001] and widespread “corruption, fraud and economic crime.”[The Independent, 11/9/2000] Descriptions of Eastern European leaders often draw on this imagery of despotism: “There is no lack of unpleasant populists in the East who will champion dangerous policies, exploiting the disappointment and the very real difficulties of political and economic transformation.”[The Guardian, 7/20/1997] Furthermore, it is not just the leaders who are projected as despots – the citizens are often represented as needing or wanting that style of government. This example comes from an letter to the

98 editor, which is another way in which people get their representations of foreign places [Irish Times, 2/1/1999]: “As a citizen of the European Union, I feel morally obliged to ask this question: Is the EU taking an imperialist attitude in its method of enforcing a political regime that may not be suitable to Romania, and Bulgaria, to name but a few?” The letter writer, although well intended and describing an interesting moral dilemma, is asserting that possibly the countries of Eastern Europe are not suited to democracy, but instead perhaps a harsher brand of government than Western Europe. It is an historical representation of Eastern Europe that the citizenry are more accustomed to slavery and absolutist despotism than the Western neighbors, and therefore happier in that state. Similarly, descriptions of Eastern Europe as economically “backward” have a pejorative meaning to them beyond simply expressing a difference in regional GNPs. This term was often inherent to the subtext of newspaper articles, especially those that focused on the large agricultural sectors or the older Soviet-style factories of Eastern Europe. It made its way directly into the text as well, as in this example from The Financial Times [9/20/99]: “Should new members from the outset have the same rights as existing ones, given their relative economic backwardness, or should a long-term waiting room be established?” “Backward” was a common criticism leveled at Eastern Europe throughout the last two centuries (Wolff, 1994), connoting an inability to advance themselves economically as well as a fundamental lack of understanding of “how it works”. This idea is still dominant in many ways. Nevertheless, to designate someone else as “backward” is self-indulgent because by definition it means that you know which way is forward. This manner of thinking about Eastern Europe has only increased since the end of the Cold War, with Western experts giving advice to Eastern Europeans about how to transition their economies to the Western model. In a similar vein, some newspapers characterize Eastern Europe as being chronologically behind Western Europe. For instance, The Guardian [10/14/99] referred to a report that claimed “some of the new candidates must take special measures specifically to improve their performance, and that others have slipped back in the process of modernizing along Western European lines in the last few years.” This quote

99 infers that some states have, in terms of development, regressed or at least failed to progress (“slipped back in the process of modernizing”), and uses Western Europe as the model that they should attempt to conform to. This creates a hierarchy of chronology and development, revolving around the idea of “modernization”. Here, “modernization” is referring to modernization theory, the largely US-led ideology of the post-WWII era that Walter Rostow (1960) advocated. Rostow argued that there were four stages to development, and that all countries could go through them if they took the right steps, emerging fully developed and affluent. The stages and steps, not coincidentally, are the ones that the US went through on its way to global hegemonic stature. This is the result of the US’s projection of its own as the ideal form of politics, economics, and culture (Taylor, 1996). This idealized modernity is then projected to other parts of the world which are then evaluated chronologically as to how well they compare, creating a “hierarchy of spaces defined in terms of their degree of modernity, progress, and development vis-à-vis the ordinary modernity of the hegemon,” (Toal, 1998). The totalizing influence of the hegemon forces the multiplicity of views and histories inherent to the global scale to conform to the hegemonic viewpoint. Thus, inhabitants of other parts of the world internalize images of themselves as being “less modern” than other regions and their histories are submerged beneath the projected saga of progress centered on the hegemon (in this case, the US). The Financial Times [1/26/2002] wrote this: “Given the exotic nature of their languages, enlargement will also test linguistic diversity.” While certainly there is the complicating factor of Cyrillic script versus Roman script, Slavic languages are more closely related to most of the languages of the EU than Finnish (already an EU member). This description of Eastern European language as “exotic” also feeds into older, Orientalist views of the East. It creates a normative view of Western European languages as normal, and easily accessible. Eastern European languages are seen as somewhat mystical and different. By extension, Eastern Europe becomes the same thing – different and exotic. Enlarging into Eastern Europe becomes something different from the earlier expansions into Scandinavia and the . As Edward Said (1978) and Larry Wolff (1994) both argue, the exotic Orient is a romanticized space to be

100 dominated, colonized, and epistemologically held at a distance, not admitted to a club of equals. This re-Orienting of Eastern Europe promotes a view of the region as fundamentally different. Another feature of the debate in newspapers was the implication that allowing free movement of the citizens of Eastern Europe into Western Europe would bring a flood of immigrant workers. While this was a common concern, it has particular potency because it connects with a historical fear of Western Europe: the horde from the East. Stemming primarily from Western identification with the Roman Empire (for reasons outside the scope of this dissertation), this collective fear revolves around the idea that outsiders – Eastern barbarians and savages - may overrun the “civilized” world. Ironically, it is primarily the descendants of the Germanic tribes that overran the Roman Empire that now hold this view, creating a unique inversion of historical perspective. This fear has been reinforced several times, notably by the Turkish siege of Vienna (ending in 1683), the Russian invasion of France that spelled the end of the Napoleonic Era, and the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe after World War II. The Russian invasion of France is particularly interesting because at that time Russia was fighting at the side of “Europe” against France, who was perceived almost universally as the aggressor. Nevertheless, afterwards France was viewed with acceptance (it joined the Concert of Europe in 1818) despite the attempt to conquer all of Europe because of its “insider” European status, while Russia, whose might had been demonstrated, was seen as the barbarian at the gate. Many Europeans then began to argue that much like the Roman Empire had lost its vitality and become susceptible to invasion and collapse, Europe would have the same thing happen to it at the hands of the Russians (Naarden, 1992). This discourse of fear can be found in newspaper articles dealing with the potential influx of workers from Eastern Europe. Rooted in actual material concerns, newspaper rhetoric took the form of these earlier fears of military invasion. For example, there is this quote from The Times of London [6/13/2001] describing a common German attitude through ironic caricature: “the spectre of millions of Slavs entering Austria and Germany to take jobs from honest natives,” which calls to mind the image of a horde (invasions from the East are invariably

101 characterized as hordes) of drones supplanting the civilized workers. Other characterizations include “waves of immigrants”, “massive inflows”, “swamped labor markets”, “a flooding”, “overforeignization”, “mass immigration”, and “large numbers of migrant workers”. The debate around this and many economic issues in the post-Cold War era revolves around geopolitical and military metaphors, as seen in the discourse of geo-economics pioneered by Edward Luttwak (1993). Terms such as “market penetration” and “retaliatory tariffs” give a powerful sense of militarism to economic issues at the level of the state, like this one. Eastern Europe also became a signifier of threat via ways other than economics and immigrants. For instance, this quote from The Guardian [6/9/97] describes the political paranoia caused by the number of applicant states: “But it is the ghostly army of aspiring members from central and eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans who are really writing the agenda for the next stages of .” This quote reflects frustration with the loss of sovereignty that comes with EU expansion – as national votes become diluted and pressure is raised to abandon the national veto; the description of Eastern Europe as a “ghostly army” attributes thinly-veiled threat from the East. The “ghostly army” takes a different form in this quote from The Guardian [6/11/94]: “Across its southern border, the Balkan war rages, inviting refugee influxes. To the north, the reunified German giant stirs. To the east lies the upheaval and uncertainty of post-communist Europe, while prosperous Switzerland to the West remains splendid in its isolation, offering an escapist model. Austria is no longer sure of its bearings.” In this quote, Eastern Europe also symbolizes threat – both in a “ghostly army” of refugees streaming across the border seeking welfare and employment, but also as an incentive for Germany’s remilitarization; Germany’s first military action outside of its borders since World War II was in Bosnia. Eastern European “upheaval and uncertainty” serves as a trigger for the rest of Europe’s problems – the externalization of threat that (according to Campbell, 1992) makes collective identity possible.

102 Summary of Representation This discourse takes form through a multitude of potential descriptions of Eastern Europe, all of which come together to paint a picture of the region as fundamentally unchanged in its status vis-à-vis the EU. Although some change might be seen, it leaves Eastern Europe still fundamentally ill equipped to survive in the economic environment of the European Union. Similarly, some writers asserted that Eastern Europe would never be capable of joining because they are necessarily different. This discourse is, in essence, pessimistic and rooted in a belief in unchanging civilizations. This view is clearly seen in this quote from The Washington Post [8/2/95] of a German official regarding the German-Polish border: “This isn’t just a border between countries. There’s also an economic border, a social border, a language border, a culture border, a border between the European Union and the non-EU.” This quote illustrates that some borders are qualitatively different from other borders. According to this German official, some national borders are more than just national borders. Perhaps borders within the EU are just borders, while the German-Polish border is a Border with a capital “B”. That line is the real place where difference begins, where identity is created. Of course, there are many borders and many conceptualizations of difference. Freudenstein (2000) has described the aforementioned German-Polish border as a border of poverty, but claims that the Polish-Ukrainian border is a border of time. This “Huntingtonian border” (as he calls it) divides the 19th century from the 21st century, evoking the same civilizational imagery as the German official mentioned above. EU Representation 3: Eastern Europe as Economic Space While the first two major representations of Eastern Europe are somewhat identifiable with political positions regarding expansion (although there is quite a lot of crossover), the third major representation of Eastern Europe is more noncommittal and can be found in both the arguments for and against expansion, and often coexisting with the other representations. This representation can be found in 70 of the 557 quotes that describe Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering EU expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). This representation is of Eastern Europe as a purely economic space, almost devoid of cultural, historical, or political life beyond that which directly

103 influences economics. This conceptualization is not unique to Eastern Europe, in fact the entire world is conceived of in these terms at times, reflecting the “objective view of capitalism”. Ideological History and Description The imperative for capitalists to accumulate through geographic expansion in order to survive economically has been well documented in the literature, often referred to as the “spatial fix” (Castells, 1989). This vested interest in the viewing of the world as a space of capital, labor, and market expansion leads to the reduction of social space to what Henri Lefebvre calls the “geometric formant”. This he describes as “that Euclidean space which philosophical thought has treated as 'absolute,' and hence a space (or representation of space) long used as a space of reference” (Lefebvre, 1991). He outlines the geometric formant further: “Euclidean space is defined by its "isotropy" (or homogeneity), a property which guarantees its social and political utility. The reduction of this homogenous Euclidean space, first of nature's space, then of all social space, has conferred a redoubtable power upon it. All the more so since that initial reduction leads easily to another -- namely, the reduction of three-dimensional realities to two dimensions (for example, a "plan," a blank sheet of paper, something drawn on paper, a map, or any kind of graphic representation or projection). (Lefebvre, 1991) The representation can be graphical or not, but in either case the representation carries with it the weight of absolute objectivity. The very perspective of a map is that of a detached observer, floating overhead as if in a panopticon. Derek Gregory calls this “the cartography of objectivism, which claimed to disclose a fundamental and enduring underlying the apparent diversity and heterogeneity of the world (Gregory, 1993).” This attempt to inscribe the globe with a fundamental “geometry” has aided capitalists by allowing them to describe the world according to their needs, and as a result the world can be divided into dynamic areas, stagnant areas, sources of labor, sources of capital, and other similar regions.

104 Capitalist Space In the case of this representation, Eastern Europe is viewed through the rubric of the capitalist worldview. Its (and the individual countries’) characteristics are limited to economics – and the space is divided into regions (and states) with certain positives or negatives associated with them, as viewed from the perspective of the potential investor, employer, or EU commissioner. Culture and history are both generally disregarded as irrelevant unless somehow tangentially related to economic potential. This has been identified by Sidaway and Pryke (2001) as the “geofinancial panopticon”. This representation can be found in many different forms in the newspaper articles surveyed. For instance, many articles discussed Eastern Europe as a source of cheap land. This is a serious issue in Eastern Europe, as can be seen in this Sunday Telegraph [12/19/99]: “EU enlargement eastwards, forcing the Czechs to comply with rules on property, will provide Germans with a golden opportunity to buy into the area cheaply, more than 50 years after many of their relations were forced to leave.” In this quote, a land ownership conflict between Bohemians Germans and Czechs is described. The same article gives a little background: “Czech land prices are one tenth of Germany’s, and a recent poll indicated that 400,000 Germans would wish to return to family homes and , causing uproar on the Czech side of the border.” The article portrays differing histories of Czech land – one with a long-standing German presence (the German community there took root in the 12th century) and another with Nazi conquest at the center (“Many Czechs see such a development [sale of land to Germans] as a betrayal of the generation which fought the Nazis,”). EU expansion is seen as an end to these competing claims to the land because of the required opening of real estate markets: “German attempts to buy back properties and land in the region have been thwarted since 1945 by a complex set of land laws designed to ensure ownership remains in Czech hands.” Another example of this representation is the way that Eastern Europe was often described as an “emerging market”. Smith (2002) has described the term “emerging market” as being critical in the construction of the EU’s enlargement into Eastern Europe. This Daily Telegraph article [12/23/2002] outlines the idea: “From an

105 investment viewpoint, however, financial advisers and specialist fund managers alike stress that the emerging markets of eastern and central Europe could indeed provide potential for investment gains, but only over the long term and at a much greater degree of risk than some investors might care to entertain.” This quote conveys the idea that Eastern Europe is a good, although dangerous investment for Westerners. Eastern Europe is being viewed from the West, as an economic object with no real characteristic except its utility to Western Europe. Similarly, this quote from The Observer [11/15/98] shows the real interest in EU expansion: “Further integration and enlargement will help rapidly growing income in Central and Eastern Europe translate into a continuous rapid growth in the West European export market.” In addition, there is this quote from a Financial Times article [12/20/2000]: “So Mr. Schroder rightly highlighted the potential economic benefits of enlargement to these regions, including their close ties with fast- growing ex-Communist states.” This is a far cry from the moral arguments posed in previous representations. Eastern Europe is represented as an economic space to be dominated through investment and exports. Eastern Europe here has no moral power of its own, only utility to Western Europe. In fact, in some ways Western Europe has already created a neo-colonial relationship with Eastern Europe – as seen in this article from The Christian Science Monitor [6/30/97]: “One of the problems in Eastern Europe is soaring trade deficits, in part the result of association agreements that allow only limited Eastern European exports into the EU. On the other hand, the agreements allow the EU to export freely to the east.” This quote is emblematic of this representation – that an essentialist view of Eastern Europe removes the human factor from decision-making, allowing essentially unfair situations to be created and perpetuated. This is visible in this Financial Times [1/10/2001] quote as well, which also shows that Eastern Europe has been a colonial vassal in a previous era too: “Across central and eastern Europe, enlargement of the EU may cost Russia some export markets, another cause for Russian concern. The EU protects heavily its market for food. But the EU also has strict technical and environmental standards for many manufactured goods. Russia could lose markets for its motor cars, for example, if these are not brought up to EU norms.” The article goes on to

106 explain that during the Cold War, Eastern Europe was a destination for Soviet goods and although Western goods flooded Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall it has still remained a major destination for Russian exports. Another description of Eastern Europe that is symbolic of the capitalist view from the West is that the region is “low wage”. This description creates an incentive for EU expansion, as seen in this quote from The Independent [12/13/99]: “Access to markets in the European Union will accelerate investment in economies where (apart from Slovenia) wage costs are one-fifth or less of the EU average, especially since education standards are high.” This is a good sign for capitalists within the free trade zone because they can position their capital to take advantage of the freedom of movement of goods once Eastern Europe is incorporated. It is not as good for other regions though, who will lose the investment possibilities, as evidenced in this Sunday Telegraph [3/15/98] quote: “Stefan Bottcher, head of European emerging markets at Flemings, argues that Eastern Europe’s lower corporate debt compared with South East Asia, and its combination of a low-cost, skilled and well educated workforce provide compelling attractions.” Similarly, this quote from the Singapore Business Times [11/16/2000] reflects the insecurity felt on the other side of the world as the EU ponders expansion: “Euro-Asian trade relations could get more fraught. In sectors such as textiles, steel, even electronics and agriculture, Eastern Europe already competes successfully with Asia. With easy access to EU funds and technology, Eastern Europe’s industrial and farm sectors could overtake many Asian nations.” This quote illustrates that the newspapers surveyed (generally corporate-owned ) reflect the capitalist class views wherever they are. Here, however, Eastern Europe is not seen as opportunity but as competitor. In the same article further anxiety is felt: “In theory EU expansion will create a larger market of avid consumers of Asian and other goods. In practice, however, the traditionally protectionist eastern bloc members could impede access to the EU market and reduce the influence of free traders like Sweden, Denmark, and the in EU decision-making.” Clearly expansion is viewed differently from different geo-economic viewpoints, but the unifying aspect of all these viewpoints is that they see Eastern Europe in purely economic terms – devoid of

107 cultural reference or history unless it directly impacts the economics, as in the Czech example, where history was a cause for obstructionist land laws. Fundamental to a capitalist view of Eastern Europe is recognition of the disparity between countries in Eastern Europe. While for most Westerners there is no real incentive to distinguish between people who serve as the “Other”, for capitalists there is a financial imperative. As some Eastern European economies become more profitable and others stagnate, capitalists want to know where to put their money. Therefore, the recognition that Eastern Europe is not a homogenous space was significant to the body of newspaper articles, as in this Financial Times article [10/9/97]: “Rising investment is drawing high levels of capital goods imports to the area, but exporters and financiers looking at the region perceive two separate markets.” This quote clearly draws on an objectivist worldview. Western experts “looking at the region” are able to “perceive” the truth about Eastern Europe. As expressed by the previous quote the region was often broken up into “more advanced countries” and “less advanced countries”. It should be noticed that these descriptors partake of the terminology of the teleological modernization theory already mentioned. Alternative labels were “fast track” states and “slow track” states. Generally, the countries that were listed as more advanced were Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. At the margins of this group were Estonia, Slovakia, and Croatia, while most other states were seen to be lagging far behind. Summary of Representation All of these examples are interrelated in that they view Eastern Europe through the binoculars of the Western (or Asian, or global) capitalist class (who own the newspapers and also read them), reducing the region into a purely economic space meant to be taken advantage of by those who surround it. While this usually leads to a dehumanizing representation it ensures also an attentiveness to detail that otherwise might be lacking in a description of Eastern Europe. For example, this representation is the only one of Eastern Europe as a whole to differentiate between different states.

108 Conclusion These three representations together provide insight not only into how Eastern Europe was presented to the readers of the newspaper surveyed, but also into how the members of the EU perceive themselves. Indeed, the representation of “Eastern Europe as the West” demonstrates the criteria that “Europeans” consider prerequisites for membership in their collective identity, such as democratic government, commitment to a free market capitalist economy, and dedication to human rights. The representation of “Eastern Europe as Unchanged” demonstrates the inverse image of what is considered acceptable “European” behavior. For example, the lack of dynamism (both economic and cultural) as well as a general lack of affluence is seen as qualities that restrict the possibility of membership. Finally, the representation of “Eastern Europe as Economic Space” is indicative not of qualities perceived as inherent to Eastern Europe but instead of the way in which “Europe” perceives the world. The EU’s objectification of Eastern Europe as a commodity (“emerging market”) provides insight into what it means to be “European” in a way that the other representations did not. Together these representations provide a contrapuntal view of “European” identity.

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8. REPRESENTATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN NATO EXPANSION

NATO Representation 1: Eastern Europe as Geopolitical Space In an already-cited column, Charles Krauthammer leaves no doubt as to whom his Other is – and he invokes geopolitical terminology to assert Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s Western status. In the St. Louis Post-Dispatch [4/29/98] he writes that: “Nato is expected to hold a summit in the middle of next year at which formal invitations to join will be extended to several Central European countries,” and “It says to the world, and particularly the Russians, that the future of Central Europe is settled. The no man’s land is no more. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are now securely part of the American-allied West. Finis. And if the Russians entertain other ideas, they can forget about it.” In other words, whether a country is Eastern or Western is determined not by cultural traits or history, but by which sphere of influence they are in. This reduction of place is analogous to the representation of Eastern Europe as economic space already discussed. In fact, the representations are very similar – both seek to strip away all subjectivity and leave only “reality” – in the EU’s case, how “advanced” the economies are and in NATO’s case, how “strategic” a country is. This representation can be found in 99 of the 668 quotes that are describing Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). For a good statement of this philosophy, it is possible to look to a quote from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [7/21/97]: “As Susan Eisenhower, chairman of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies and granddaughter of the former president told me, ‘Military alliances are about strategic questions. The guilt that may be felt by some about Yalta and Munich is a different matter entirely.’” Indeed, the ability to ignore guilt in the pursuit of your self- interest is certainly a feature of geopolitical thought:

110 The gap between image and reality in the geopolitical literature creates the suspicion that the purpose is to deaden a sense of guilt or to provide a spurious scientific justification to ourselves and the world for dubious action. The pursuit of power involves acts which most societies customarily condemn. We may attempt to overwhelm the dissonance by clothing naked aggression with maps of territorial imperatives or perils. We seek geographic circumstances which excuse killing, destruction, and bullying. Maps of differences between people in different places distinguish a superior “us” from an inferior “them.” (O’Sullivan, 2001, p.97) Theoretical Underpinnings This is recognition of a long-standing tradition of geopolitics that recognizes geography as a tool for the advancement of the state. It is a very modern view of the world as the global stage upon which states act – eliminating alternative visions. Although geopolitics as applied political geography has existed in various forms for centuries as the Concert of Europe, Realpolitik, or the balance of power, the creation of a discourse using the term “geopolitics” is a uniquely 20th century event. Earlier “geopolitical visions” (such as those of the Middle Kingdom Chinese or the Roman Empire) were not truly global, as they really only had knowledge of the region surrounding their empire (O’Sullivan, 2001). The word “geopolitics” was first used in 1899 but really comes into its own as a word used to describe the efforts of Karl Haushofer (Geopolitik) in the inter-war period and the Allied scholars who sought to understand his work afterwards (Toal, 1996). This style of geography is inherent in the realist and neo-realist theories of international relations, and those theory names are indicative of the impression that the practitioners of this style of geography seek to deliver. Realist and neo-realist theorists seek to assert an understanding of fundamental natural laws of state behavior. These laws are delivered to the eminent scholars of the field (such as Mackinder, Haushofer, Kissinger, and others) who then hand them down to the practitioners of statecraft as policy proscriptions. To buttress their authority scholars of this school would describe their ideas as “realistic”, “hard-headed”, or “grounded in the facts”. This characterization makes dissenters the opposite of those terms, namely

111 “unrealistic”, “soft-headed”, and “in denial”. In addition, realism is uniformly portrayed as masculine and full of action, while alternative ideas are seen as feminine and weak. Geopolitics is based on the idea that the world is both concrete and knowable, and therefore the world can be perceived by experts capable of interpreting the events that take place “out there”. The expert is believed to be both objective and to have perfect information, in a version of the panopticon already mentioned in the section on Eastern Europe as economic space. This is easily seen in the key tool of the practitioner of geopolitics, the map. At its most extreme (and caricatured) the geo-politician can look at a map and tell you a state’s “natural” orientation, enemies, and geopolitical imperatives. Indeed, “there is a grave temptation to fall prey to the simplicity of environmental determinism when trying to rationalize the strategic stances which states adopt.” (O’Sullivan, 2001) Perhaps the earliest, and one of the most influential, examples of this type of scholarship is Halford Mackinder’s “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904), which (in a much simplified version) asserted that the “Heartland” of Eurasia was the most critical space on earth, and whoever controlled that would control the world. Mackinder and others of his era saw the end of geography as the discipline involved in the discovery of the world, and the niche that they saw for geography in the future was as the tool of the state in the new “geopolitical era” when the colonial frontier had closed. With that event territorial expansion became a zero-sum game for the Great Powers, and it was the role of the practitioner of geopolitics to tell the panoramic story using his global gaze (Toal, 1996). This gaze is powerful in its ability to survey the globe and indeed its function was one of surveillance in the reactionary sense of the word: its basic goal being the protection of the imperial (and neo-imperial) way of life, by keeping other Great Powers at bay and re-subjugating local colonized peoples. Current Application The idea of geopolitics is still very dominant in many current discussions of foreign policy and current events, and many news shows currently employ “talking heads” to fulfill the role that Halford Mackinder set out for himself almost 100 years ago. Indeed, this is the way this century’s worth of geopolitical knowledge comes to be applied to the current debate about NATO expansion – even journalists are becoming

112 authorities on world order, often backed up with quotes from retired generals and other authority figures. The representation of Eastern Europe as geopolitical space that emerges through this discourse is depoliticized and rooted in imperial order. In addition the state is not problematized as a contested identity or as a social construction. Gerard Toal builds on these ideas: The geopolitical gaze triangulates the world political map from a Western imperial vantage point, measures it using Western conceptual systems of identity/difference, and records it in order to bring it within the scope of Western imaginings. Geopolitics depluralizes the surface of the earth by organizing it into essential zones (middle strip, heartland, rimland, New World, Old World, Eurasia), identities (continental, oceanic), and perspectives (the seaman’s point of view, the landsman’s point of view). In sighting a world within the terms of Western forms of knowledge, geopolitics is siting it within the desires and fantasies of a privileged community of “wise men” and also citing it within the textual tropes and discursive contours of hegemonic centers of knowledge and learning. (1996) In addition to these ideas, it should be noted that the discourse of geopolitics assumes a world of endless conflict with some states inevitably gaining over others. Mackinder himself created a meta-struggle of East versus West and sea power versus land power (a format into which the Cold War was scripted). Similarly, Nicholas Spykman asserted that fundamental geographic inequality caused conflict when he wrote that “at the door of geography may be laid the blame for many age-long struggles which run persistently through history while governments and dynasties rise and fall (Spykman, 1938, p.29).” This aura of inevitable change that is produced by geopolitical discourse naturalizes the shifting “spheres of influence” that come from conflict between Great Powers. Thus, the absorption of Eastern Europe by NATO is the only possible result of the end of the Cold War. This is acknowledged by the “losers” of the Cold War in this Washington Post [5/15/97] quote: “President Boris Yeltsin, who had vigorously opposed the prospect of eastward NATO expansion, said in a televised interview broadcast tonight that, in view of ‘historical’ and ‘practical realities’, Russia will ‘have to reckon’ with the

113 broader alliance.” This is a fundamental justification of power politics as a method of gaining influence globally, claiming a Hobbesian world system that requires such behavior. Economics in Geopolitics Of course, this representation of Eastern Europe as geopolitical space cannot be divorced from the world system in which geopolitics itself has arisen. As we have seen the idea of geopolitics originated in the colonial era – as some states sought (successfully) to privilege themselves over other states in an economic hierarchy. Geopolitics was one tool in this imperial project – simultaneously presenting a geographical plan for national supremacy and also giving moral justification (under the rubric of the zero sum game of “realism”) for expansion into what would become the Third World in order to carve out markets for the colonial power. Elements of this can be seen in newspaper articles regarding NATO expansion – many cynics note that all the high-minded moralizing and hardheaded strategic discourse is just a cover for the creation of new markets for the American weapons industry. The journalists themselves perhaps describe this best, as in this St. Louis Post-Dispatch [3/31/98] article: Under NATO rules, new members are required to upgrade their militaries and make them compatible with those of the Western military alliance, which oversees the most sophisticated weapons and communication systems in the world. The companies that win the contracts to provide that ‘inter-operability’ to the aging Soviet-made systems in Eastern Europe will benefit enormously from NATO’s eastward expansion. Indeed, some newspaper articles paint a picture of NATO expansion as a “boondoggle for American weapons manufacturers” and the whole debate as a charade that misses the real (economic) point, that expansion has little to do with spheres of influence or a new Europe but everything to do with a subsidy for the American weapons industry. The whole thing is portrayed as something of a joke: “Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, said the lobbyists had been so effective that the expansion amounted to ‘a Marshall Plan for defense contractors who are chomping at the bit to sell weapons and make profits.’ A top Republican aide in the Senate joked that the arms makers were so eager for NATO

114 expansion that ‘we’ll probably be giving landlocked Hungary a new navy.” [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3/31/98] The use of the term Marshall Plan is significant – it symbolizes a government intervention in foreign markets to prepare them for exploitation by national companies. In other words, the expansion of NATO would not lead to a free market in weapons – it would heavily weight Eastern European imports towards American and West European weapons systems. Theoretically, even knowing that NATO might be expanded has this effect – countries that want to be seen as potential allies want to move as close towards interoperability as possible so as to look like viable partners. Actually being in NATO though means that there is a limitation on what kinds of weapons you can use. The complicity and role of the US government in this is analogized to that of a drug dealer in this Baltimore Sun [3/8/98] quote, which also shows the linkages between the NATO expansion lobby and the weapons industry: Finally, U.S. defense contractors and their allies in military services are likely to drive up NATO expansion by pushing for high-tech arms sales. The Navy and Air Force recently offered low-cost leases of F-18 and F-16 fighters to the Czech Republic as a way to get Czech forces hooked on U.S. technology. Last April, former Lockheed Martin CEO Norman Augustine made a whirlwind tour of Eastern and Central Europe during which he alternated pitches for weapons sales with promises to fight for the ‘widest possible expansion’ of NATO. And Lockheed Martin Vice President Bruce L. Jackson has been moonlighting as president of the U.S. Committee To Expand NATO. If the arms lobby is successful in helping the Clinton administration sell NATO expansion to Congress, it will have considerable influence in shaping its content to include more U.S. subsidies for expensive weapons systems. The last part of the quote alludes to another important aspect of this view of NATO expansion. This is the incestuous nature of U.S. aid to the candidate countries that are approved as new members of NATO. “The expansion project will fund the modernization of the new members’ militaries, including assistance to purchase fighter jets, air bases and infrastructure. Most of the money will be spent on U.S. equipment,

115 producing a net drain on the cash resources of the new democracies of Eastern Europe.” [Cleveland Plain-Dealer, 5/26/97] American tax dollars are sent to the new NATO states, which then add in their own tax funds (desperately needed for other purposes, according to some journalists) and send the whole bundle back to “help the paychecks of defense workers from Texas to California, whose factories could sell U.S. tanks and jets to the new NATO partners.” [Houston Chronicle, 4/30/98] These are certainly colonial terms of trade – the new NATO states get finished goods that they do not necessarily need and becomes dependent on further use of these expensive weapons while the US government gets to indirectly subsidize the US weapons industry, which it could not directly do for political reasons. US taxpayer dollars are here used as an incentive to get hooked on an initial purchase of American weapons (will there be help buying the next generation of weapons? Probably not – but by then interoperability will dictate the purchase anyway) and in addition “U.S. taxpayers are already paying the promotional costs as the Air Force helps Lockheed Martin sell the F- 16 in competition with the Navy’s support for the McDonnell Douglas F-18.” [Los Angeles Times, 7/2/97] In effect, this is government subsidy for American industry – a restraint on free trade but since when is colonialism about global free trade? The role of the US government in promoting its aerospace industry is again referenced like that of a drug kingpin, this time in The Guardian [7/9/97]: “Last December the Pentagon provided indirect support by adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to an export loan guarantee scheme which underwrites the sale or lease of US equipment. The aircraft salesmen have a common strategy: get a few products into service in eastern Europe, if necessary by initially almost giving them away, to create a longer-term dependence.” The negative effects of NATO’s colonial grab are visible to a limited extent in NATO’s European membership – who can sell hardware to the Eastern Europeans too but lack the hegemonic resources and power of the United States to promote their Eurofighter and other weapons systems. While making some money on NATO expansion, they are mostly left with the short end of the stick. While Eastern Europe prepares to buy American fighters, European companies get the smaller contracts, like this one, reported in The Financial Times [3/10/99]: “In February it [Poland] signed a

116 contract with Daimler-Chrysler Aerospace (Dasa) to upgrade 22 MiG-29 aircraft to NATO standards. Dasa has already done the same to 23 Mig29s inherited by the Luftwaffe from East Germany, and is in talks with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia for similar deals – the Czechs have sold their MiG-29s.” While this is good money for the German company, it pales in comparison to the “billion-dollar deal” to sell American helicopters to Romania (who did not even get into NATO in the first expansion). The real losers however, are the Russians. As noted in these American newspaper quotes, they are having their economic zone dismantled by the West: “This week, Vladimir Shumeiko, chairman of Russia’s Federation Council, warned that NATO membership for East European nations would deprive his country of markets for its military exports,” [Journal of Commerce, 10/16/95] and “New members too would have to make their forces compatible with NATO. That means buying Western arms – a bonanza for U.S. defense contractors but a cause of considerable dismay to the Russians and something the struggling economies of Central and Eastern Europe can ill afford.” [Denver Rocky Mountain News, 10/10/95] British newspapers describe this scenario in more detail: “The third reason [for Russian opposition to NATO expansion] is Russia’s loss of eastern Europe as an arms market, which would turn to the West. Russia is trying to make good the loss as best it can, by selling anti-aircraft rockets to the Greek Cypriots or to India, China, and the ‘rogue’ states of Iraq, Iran, and ,” [The Guardian, 1/6/97] and “But Mr. Kokoshin angrily stressed that Moscow saw NATO as a predator preying on lucrative arms markets where the Soviet military machine once enjoyed a monopoly.” [The Guardian, 2/5/96] In any event, this is but one way in which economics is implicit in the discourse of geopolitics. Generally geopolitical rhetoric gives no mention of economic incentives for decisions – instead seeking to project objectivity and purity of thought as the hallmarks of geopolitical decision-making. Where economics does creep in it is not in the usual capitalist fashion but as a measure of national power, as in the strategic control of Romania’s oil fields, for example. In general, though, NATO expansion is not couched in economic terms.

117 Geopolitics in the Newspapers There are many ways in which Eastern Europe is represented as a geopolitical space. One way to create the appearance of a national imperative to expand NATO is to portray Eastern Europe as being “insecure”, or vulnerable to Russian expansion. For instance, shortly after gaining office George W. Bush was quoted as saying that by making Russia feel part of Europe it would not “need a buffer zone of insecure states separating it from Europe.” [Newsday, 6/16/2001] It should be noted that this quote has the additional impact of asserting that Eastern Europe is not part of Europe. The Baltimore Sun [5/1/97] called Eastern Europe the “new, potentially unstable ‘gray zone’ of insecure unaligned nations.” The “gray zone” reference originated with President Clinton (or his speechwriters). A quote from The Atlanta Journal and Constitution [8/30/98] shows the “insecure” nature of Eastern Europe: “The rebirth of a totalitarian government [in Russia] could bring instability to Eastern Europe. Germans are watching Russia warily as Yeltsin careens from one failed government shake-up to the next. A diminished Russia is still dangerous, in some ways even more dangerous than the former Soviet Union had been at the height of its power.” The threat to Eastern Europe’s security is not just from without, however. It is Eastern Europe’s internal faults that create this situation. This idea is apparent in American newspapers: “Because history has taught the Russians, perhaps better than us, the threat posed when instability reigns in Eastern and Central Europe,” [Newsday, 3/24/98] and “Central and eastern European instability, which in this century helped spark two world wars and the Cold War, has not been extinguished.” [USA Today, 10/7/97] This rather nebulous charge leads the geopolitical strategist to recommend one possible course of action: the creation of stability through NATO expansion to prevent another world war. In other words, stability only comes through knowing which Great Power will dominate the region. Another similar example of geopolitical discourse about Eastern Europe is that of a “power vacuum”. This can be found in numerous newspaper quotes from the United States, such as this one from The Atlanta Journal and Constitution [4/30/98]:“Coverdell said the demise of the former Soviet Union has created a power vacuum in central and eastern Europe. ‘I think it’s important not to leave that vacuum,’ Coverdell said. ‘And

118 number two, I don’t accept the idea that Soviets should dictate to us how we interact with Eastern Europe, or that we’ll somehow rile the bear.” Similarly, other journalists referred to a “dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe” [Washington Post, 8/19/97] that could “lead to untold consequences” [St. Petersburg Times, 7/9/97] or “a renewal of regional and ethnic conflicts.” [Boston Globe, 10/19/97] Again, this leads to only one possible response – the expansion of “our sphere of influence” [Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 5/16/97] into Eastern Europe. It masks this beneficial event for the United States (in the eyes of geo-strategists) as a reluctant act of charity to keep Eastern Europe from self-destructing or having Russia re-occupy it. This feeling is particularly acute because of the use of the word vacuum. It implies that someone must take it, because “nature abhors a vacuum”, so it might as well be the West. The power of that cliché is responsible for a wide variety of possibly outcomes should NATO not add Eastern Europe to its sphere of influence: “If East Europeans are denied the mostly symbolic protection of NATO, they could be seduced to allow the Chinese military to fill the vacuum.” [Seattle Times, 3/18/97] This rather bizarre spin clearly illustrates the heterogeneity of judgments that can be derived from the same perceptions. Contested Analyses A rival geopolitical interpretation of the situation in Eastern Europe is that the countries of the region are safe without NATO. Some even questioned the geopolitical need for NATO to continue at all as an organization. “Without threat of a massive Soviet invasion, they argue, nations in Western Europe should pay the costs of defending their national security.” [Omaha World-Herald, 11/8/2001] This translates into an argument against NATO expansion: “With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the states of Central and Eastern Europe face no imminent threat from an expansionist superpower,” [Boston Globe, 3/18/98] and “The idea that the would (or even could) cross neighboring states to invade NATO or its new Eastern partners is not only ridiculous on its face, it is also detached from any sort of credible political scenario under which such a strategy makes sense to Moscow.” [Boston Globe, 12/19/97] The Los Angeles Times [7/2/97] also described the threat from the East as being nonexistent: “There is no Russian threat. According to NATO insiders, the Russian Army no longer

119 can be considered a fighting force and would take decades to rebuild even if work started now. In contrast, in the next war, U.S. planes would be able to hit 1,500 targets in the first hour.” This is again the voice of authority (“NATO insiders”) giving legitimacy to their assessment. It contradicts the established views of other authorities, so the debate can only be decided by a race to establish a more authoritative sounding estimate of the threat level. Another way to argue against the expansion of NATO using geopolitical terminology is to assert that it is “Russia’s sphere of influence.” This rhetorical device is widely used, and it creates the impression that Eastern Europe is naturally in Russia’s domain and to expand there would be possible given Russia’s current weakness but would cause problems down the road. Consider these two St. Louis Post-Dispatch quotes: “This does not mean that the Russians are bad or that Czar Boris runs an evil empire. On the contrary. Russia is simply doing what comes naturally to a Great Power: pursuing its own interests in its region,” [4/19/98] and “It [approval for expansion] should not be given lightly, especially if you agree with Krauthammer that Russia may no longer be communist but is still a major power that will seek to dominate its own region.” [4/29/98] Both of these quotes describe Eastern Europe as “its” [Russia’s] region. In other words, the material realities of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe over the last half century are cast backward in time to claim that Eastern Europe is innately a Russian zone. This fits with the Western conception of the Cold War as an extension of a trans- historical East-West struggle, which now continues with Russia taking the place of the Soviet Union. Other references to “Russia’s sphere of influence” seek to show the possible negative effects of NATO expansion. For example, these US newspapers provide illustrations: “The logical response to NATO expansion would likely be consolidation of its sphere of influence and an attempt to achieve a balance with NATO,” [St. Louis Post- Dispatch, 4/29/98] and “For instance, what happens if NATO takes in just the three nations and then stops expanding, as some senators have suggested. Won’t that result in a new division of Europe? Wouldn’t it be a tacit signal that those not part of NATO are within a Russian sphere of influence?” [Newsday, 3/15/98] Both of these quotes use the

120 idea of Russia’s sphere of influence in a different way than the previous two quotes – here it is asserted that there will be a strengthening of Russia’s hold over non-NATO states out of reaction to NATO expansion. Again, it is impossible to see whose geopolitical perspective is the correct one, because they all look at the same information and draw different conclusions. Another term that has been used, both in favor of and in opposition to expansion, is “buffer zone” – as in this Toronto Star [12/2/96] quote: “Chretien has his work cut out for him. Russia has long opposed the expansion of NATO, fearing the alliance will bring Western military might to its borders and deprive it of an eastern buffer zone.” Those geo-strategists who are in favor of NATO expansion use it to argue that Russia no longer needs (theoretically) neutral states in between it and a West that Russia perceives as aggressive. For example, there are these two American newspaper quotes (the first of which has already been mentioned – Newsday, 6/16/2001): “By making Russia feel part of Europe, it would not ‘need a buffer zone of insecure states separating it from Europe,’ Bush said, trying to end Moscow’s opposition to expansion of the Atlantic alliance,” as well as “And what about the wishes of those countries themselves? Certainly they are worried about Russia. They are all too cognizant of the dangers of being a buffer zone.” [New York Times, 5/15/95] These two arguments assert that Russia does not need the buffer zone anymore (a view the Russian government does not seem to agree with – perhaps their geo-strategists are not as good as ours?) and that those states do not want to be part of a buffer zone anyhow, probably because the whole point of a being a buffer zone is to have other countries fight on your territory. The idea of a buffer zone can also be used to argue against expansion in the same way that “sphere of influence” was used ambiguously. The assertion that NATO expansion would lead to a new buffer zone farther East was rather widely used, as in these quotes: “The NATO issue has also apparently aggravated tension over Russia’s campaign to recapture its influence over other former Soviet republics, whose strategic importance to Moscow may be heightened as a buffer or second front,” [Journal of Commerce, 11/19/96] and “It [NATO expansion] would give more security to the new NATO members while leaving other nations – notably the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus

121 and Moldova – to form a tense buffer zone between the enlarged NATO and an angrier, more aggressive Russia.” [Washington Post, 7/3/96] Thus, not only would there be a new buffer zone but it would be a more close-knit group than currently, kept in line by Russian insecurities. Interestingly, most newspaper articles seem to approve of Russia’s search for a sphere of influence instead of characterizing it as aggression, as the Soviet Union’s role in Eastern Europe has traditionally been portrayed – perhaps recognizing that turnabout is fair play since NATO is in effect the sphere of influence of the United States. Take, for instance, this Montreal Gazette [7/28/2001] quote: “Just as the United States views the Western hemisphere as its own back yard, Moscow views the Baltic states and Ukraine as within its sphere of influence.” It borders on apologetic, seeking to maintain the level of objectivity that the image of geopolitical authority requires. Defensibility The final way in which Eastern Europe is described using geopolitical rhetoric is to give positive or negative assessments of how “defensible” a place is. A quote from The Daily Yomiuri [7/3/96] gives an example: “In practice, the Czech Republic and Hungary are perfectly defensible, while their fellow applicants Poland is not; equally, in the next batch of eager applicants, Slovenia next door to Italy and very far from Russia is certainly defensible while Romania as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not, and so it goes down the list.” In this dubious policy proscription it is proximity to Russia that equals defensibility – no mention of topography is made although it certainly is relevant. This “realist” view of the region is a supposedly hardheaded assessment of the military geography of Eastern Europe – in reality it is a political statement asserting the peripheral nature of parts of Eastern Europe to the interests of the West. A prime example of this mode of description is also from The Daily Yomiuri [4/15/97], and although it is long it is worth quoting. It should be noted that this quote never actually calls upon physical topography as justification for its stance, only on an imaginary landscape: Poland, as it happens, still shares a border with Russia, facing the Kaliningrad enclave, and a much longer border with Belarus, Russia’s close ally (which may or may not join the Russian Federation). What happens if there are border incidents or any other tensions? That is not an unlikely prospect, given the long

122 history of Russo-Polish hostility, and the distinct possibility that NATO membership will embolden the Poles to act less cautiously than they might do otherwise. At that point, if Poland is by then a NATO member, reinforcements are supposed to be sent, if only by way of a symbolic ACE-type force. But which country in Europe would allow its troops to go to Poland’s eastern extremities to face the Russians? Germany and Italy can both be ruled out – they have been there, they have done it before. Will France, traditionally Russia’s ally? Hardly. Will the United States – thereby automatically escalating the crisis? U.S. military chiefs would certainly oppose any such move, because U.S. troops would be highly exposed very far from their bases, themselves indefensible without a further escalation. In practice, Poland could not be reinforced. With that, NATO would cease to be an effective security system – it would cease to be the NATO that we have always known. This is a classic example of geopolitical judgment bordering on caricature. It hides its political goals behind a series of “facts” that are selected by the writer to prove his point. Then, a terrible conclusion is reached should the author’s opinion not be followed. Conclusion The Financial Times [7/4/97] belittled Russian foreign policy by saying “In Moscow, old thinking – such as spheres of influence, or ‘near abroad’ in post-Soviet terminology, and buffer zones – is not yet out of fashion.” Yet, even this is a political statement, meant to convince readers not only of their own country’s sophistication vis-à- vis Russia, but also that Russia was old-fashioned to oppose the post-Cold War reality of NATO expansion. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the West’s newspapers (especially those of the United States) have a huge chorus of geopolitical discourse running through its articles using exactly those terms. The power of geopolitical discourse is vast and this type of representation has a lot of clout in the United States and elsewhere. The representation of Eastern Europe as a geopolitical space is not necessarily in opposition to any of the other representations that are about to be discussed – in fact often it peacefully coexists with other representations in the same newspaper article.

123 NATO Representation 2: Eastern Europe as Sympathetic Victim The next representation of Eastern Europe bears some similarity to the previously mentioned representation of “Eastern Europe as the West” in the European Union expansion debates. There is, indeed, a great deal of overlap. However, where “Eastern Europe as the West” focused on Eastern Europe as being ontologically the same as the West and only needing economic and political reform to catch up, this representation seeks to establish a sympathetic link from the Western newspaper audience to the Eastern European population. This is done by showing the similarities between the two regions (as in the EU representation) but also by emphasizing the difficult history that Eastern Europe has had in the last 60 years (or longer, in come cases). In other words, the representations share common ideology but have a shift in focus – The EU discourse focuses on economic and political similarities and this one focuses on historical injustices. This representation can be found in 131 of the 668 quotes that are describing Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). Distancing From Russia One of the ways in which this was accomplished is through a distancing of Eastern Europe from Russia. This is in fact the opposite of Peter the Great’s practice. That czar struggled to assert a European identity for Russia with various reforms and afterwards Russia asserted a pan-Slavic link with much of Eastern Europe. For Eastern Europe, the link with the Russians was not necessarily good for their European identity – the grouping known as “Slavs” generally has held a negative association for Westerners. It is the word that the English word “slave” is derived from, and that is but one of a whole host of negative meanings. 18th century historian Edward Gibbon had this to say about the ancient Slavs: But the same race of Sclavonians [Slavs] appears to have maintained, in every age, the possession of the same countries. Their numerous tribes, however distant or adverse, used one common language (it was harsh and irregular), and were known by the resemblance of their form, which deviated from the swarthy Tartar, and approached without attaining the lofty stature and fair complexion of the

124 German. Four thousand six hundred were scattered over the of Russia and Poland, and their huts were hastily built of rough timber in a country deficient both in stone and iron. Erected, or rather concealed, in the depth of forests, on the banks of rivers, or the edge of morasses, we may not perhaps, without flattery, compare them to the of the beaver, which they resembled in a double issue, to the land and water, for the escape of the savage inhabitant, an animal less cleanly, less diligent, and less social, than that marvelous quadruped. The fertility of the soil, rather than the labour of the natives, supplied the rustic plenty of the Sclavonians [Slavs]. (Gibbon, 1782, p.591) This quote indulges in many of the stylistic degradations of the Enlightenment – it established a racial hierarchy, with European civilization ranking above the settled Slavs, which only outrank the Tartars because of their nomadic nature. They are a homogenous group; they are technologically unskilled (rough timber huts), lazy (soil fertility explains their existence in the face of their slothfulness), and they have an element of Oriental sneakiness (the concealed homes). To top it all off Slavs are unfavorably compared to an animal. While certainly most contemporary people would not claim that they have their impression of Eastern Europe derived from The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the impressions made by scholarship such as that has had a lasting cultural impression by influencing future research and in other ways previously described in this dissertation. So one way to gain a sympathetic view from the West was to distance yourself from Russia – some journalists did this very bluntly, such as in this Minneapolis Star- Tribune [7/17/97] quote: “The east central region ‘was an integral part of Europe’s culture and politics throughout the centuries before World War II, and it was not controlled by Russia.’” Very clearly this is an assertion of difference from Russia and similarity to “Europe”. The unity of the Slavs that Gibbon describes is absent. Similarly, this New Orleans Times-Picayune [5/1/98] quote illustrates the non-Russian status of Eastern Europe: “At Yalta, over the objections of Britain, the United States gave to the Soviet Union what did not belong to it, namely, Central and Eastern Europe.” This is a far cry from the description of Eastern Europe as Russia’s historic sphere of influence.

125 As we saw in the discussion of the EU, this desire to “reunite Europe” or “come home” is also currently the consensus view in Eastern Europe. This comes through in the articles about NATO as well: “He [the Czech defense minister] said Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus will soon launch a campaign to whip up enthusiasm and convince his countrymen that NATO would provide the best gateway for Czechs to rejoin the West.” [Washington Post, 10/3/97] These articles assert a fundamentally non-Russian identity for Eastern Europe. In addition to being seen as non-Russian, the element of sympathy is elicited by discussing the treatment of Eastern Europe at the hands of the Soviets. This is found in a wide range of newspaper quotes, such as “But to economize, I would rather close unneeded military bases than abandon the long-suffering nations of Eastern Europe,” [USA Today, 12/5/97] and “The result is that NATO membership seems like a good- conduct medal instead of a way of responding to the security fears of democratic nations that have long been the victims of geography and history.” [USA Today, 12/5/97] The suffering of Eastern Europe is even projected beyond the Soviet occupation as in this Daily Telegraph [9/25/96] quote: “In that way lies the stability of a region cruelly used by Nazism and Communism for the most part of this century.” Using that timeframe, there is not an Eastern European alive today who has not suffered for his or her whole life. The suffering of the past is then foreshadowed again in current politics. This bridge from the past to the present/future is visible in this quote from The Independent [7/8/94]: “Polish anxieties over Russian intentions are grounded in historical fact and alarm at the popular support enjoyed by the extreme right-wing Russian politician, Vladimir Zhirinovsky.” This description of suffering is then transformed into a moral cause for action on the part of the West, which is held accountable for perceived historical injustices, as in these newspaper quotes: “The people of Eastern Europe must never again be subjected to the conditions they were forced to endure under Soviet rule.” [Milwaukee Journal- Sentinel, 4/19/98] This moral calling becomes justification for action: “Equally as important, NATO’s growth should rectify some of the West’s past failures of resolve in standing up for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the face of Nazi or

126 Communist aggression. As every schoolchild knows, the West’s acceptance of Hitler’s occupation of a good part of Czechoslovakia in 1938 convinced the tyrant that he could continue his wildest ambitions.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 5/19/97] Although I find the assessment of America’s educational system in the last sentence dubious, it is clear that this moral claim is the heart of the “sympathetic victim” representation. The guilt for the last 60 years is attached to a previous generation of Western leaders, allowing current ones to feel especially virtuous in setting these wrongs right: “But Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) recalled that as a teenager in 1956 she reacted in horror as Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, crushing an attempt by Hungary to break free of domination from Moscow. ‘I am proud that now I can do something to make sure this does not happen again,’ she said.” [Los Angeles Times, 4/30/98] Even if a country does not blame itself for the travails of Eastern Europe, there is still a perceived moral claim to be had, as in this quote from The Independent [10/11/96] of a Danish official: “If new democracies emerge in Central and Eastern Europe, I have a moral problem denying them the same security guarantees that we Danes had in the Cold War.” Much of the description of Eastern Europe as historical victim is centered on events during the Cold War, such as the Hungarian rebellion mentioned above. Generally the stigma for that event and the Prague Spring are directed at the Soviets, as in these newspaper quotes: “They [the Eastern Europeans] worry that Russia may at some point want to retake its empire and look in their direction. Their concern is rooted in recent history: the brutally suppressed Hungarian rebellion in 1956; the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and the imposition of law in Poland in 1980, defended by some Polish communists as an alternative to Soviet tanks,” [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 12/16/96] and “’All you have to do is talk to the Hungarians and the Czechs to find out how much they want NATO membership,’ said Nicholas Daniloff, a Russia expert and director of the Northeastern University School of Journalism. ‘The memories of 1956 and 1968 have not gone away,’ he said, speaking of Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.” [Journal of Commerce, 10/16/95] It is perhaps no coincidence that the three states admitted in 1999 are also the three who faced the most overt control by the Soviets. Their image as historical victims is more defined for Western audiences, who

127 have a direct sympathetic link through the Soviet invasions, unlike a country like Bulgaria for which there is no real Cold War crisis that focused Western attention on them. In addition, the Soviets and Russians are used as a rather unambiguous signifier of threat and historic villainy to elicit sympathy. Eastern Europeans are described as righteously angry at the region’s treatment at the hands of their neighbors to the east. Even Eastern European émigrés are described thusly, as in this Daily Telegraph [2/21/97] article: “The Kremlin knows from its experience of the Polish-born ultra-hawk Zbygniew Brzezinski, the US National Security Advisor under Jimmy Carter, that there is no fiercer beast in the Washington jungle than one born in what was Eastern Europe.” For a further example, this Montreal Gazette [3/30/97] quote illustrates the long memory of injustice in Eastern Europe: “As far as the Russians’ fear of NATO expansion is concerned, does anybody remember ’s Karelia? Or does anybody know or care about the borders of other east European countries having been shifted westward years ago?” Similarly, this same newspaper article posits a parallel history playing out with today’s weakened Russia poised to pounce on Eastern Europe: Somehow, this Russia, enfeebled as she was in 1917, managed to develop an immense war machine. Its wheels first rolled over eastern Europe in 1940, after the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Estonia also had a non-aggression pact with Russia, while being persuaded to grant her bases, as the historic window to the west. Obviously, signed documents are worthless when it is might that makes right. Talk about betrayal! This author has relegated Russia to the East (or else why need a window to the west?). Simultaneous to this anthropomorphizing of Russia (as “she” – a common convention), the war machine imagery strips Russia of its humanity – it is but an aggressive machine rolling over Eastern Europe. Estonia (and the rest of Eastern Europe) is seen firstly as Western (like us) and secondly as a betrayed victim. There is a definite moral call for action to prevent this from happening again. While there is a great deal of sympathy elicited for Eastern Europe as a result of Soviet behavior, especially during the Cold War, perhaps the strongest evocation of

128 sympathy comes from Western behavior following World War II. The attribution of fault for Eastern Europe’s time under the Soviet umbrella to the deal made at Yalta has a strong resonance with Western audiences because NATO expansion is seen as an opportunity to make it up to the people who were consigned to the Soviet sphere for 50 years. Consequently, the decision is seen as a “second Yalta”, or a “new Yalta”, as in these quotes: “Rejection would highlight the fears that the Partnership [for Peace] is but a new Yalta, shorthand for a post-World War II arrangement in which the West acquiesced in consigning Eastern Europe to the Soviet orbit,” [Houston Chronicle, 1/2/94] and “’The smell of Yalta is always with us,’ said Andrzej Karkoszka, Poland’s deputy defense minister, referring to the place where the anti-Nazi powers decided in 1945 to divide postwar Europe into what became rival spheres of influence that lasted half a century.” [Washington Post, 3/17/97] The second quote is particularly powerful, coming from a Polish official. Referring to Yalta in terms of stench evokes the image of a dirty betrayal – and calls for action to remedy the smell. Minor Descriptors – Democracy, Free Markets, and Independence This representation is particularly powerful because of its use of minor descriptors to enhance the image of Eastern Europe as a sympathetic victim. These phrases are used in passing as a way to refer to the candidate countries, but in the aggregate they paint a picture of the region. A good example of this phenomenon can be seen in this Atlanta Journal and Constitution [4/30/98] quote: “But Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has argued that the expansion is necessary to minimize the likelihood of regional conflict in central Europe and promote democracy in the newly independent nations of the former Soviet bloc.” This quote describes the candidate countries as “newly independent”, giving them an aura of innocence and calling to mind the independence of the United States, which is so valued by its citizens (who are also the readers of the newspaper). This may seem to be a value-free statement, but in fact it is laden with meaning. The journalist is designating some countries “newly independent” which have existed for many years, and in some cases they have existed for centuries (like Poland). The implication is that by escaping the “Soviet bloc” they have achieved independence. While to a certain extent this is valid, the journalist is ignoring other

129 possible interpretations of the Cold War – it is doubtful that any English-language newspaper would imply that Cuba became “newly independent” in 1959, for instance. Thus, this usage is a marker for the “sympathetic victim” representation. There are other similar terms, such as “newly emerging” and “newly liberated”, as used in these newspaper quotes: “The way to help the newly emerging states is to make them part of the European Union and improve their economies. Getting them addicted to weapons does not help their economies,” [Boston Globe, 4/30/98] and “Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, the only witness before the committee, argued that NATO has been a political as well as military organization that encouraged democracy and political stability among members, and that it should play that role in the newly liberated countries of central and eastern Europe.” [Washington Post, 10/8/97] All of these phrases are significant for portraying Eastern Europe as a “sympathetic victim. Many of the other “sympathetic victim” phrases use democracy as a keystone upon which to build a relationship between Eastern Europe and the West. This represents a journalistic entry into an already-existing academic discourse, that of “political culture”. Although the study of political culture has been around for a long time, recent critiques have begun to erode support for the idea. The comparative study of political culture is but one part of the already-mentioned modernization theory, which employs a teleological view of progress. “The formal study of political culture makes possible the construction of ‘collective national subjectivities’ and the significance of their boundaries. Within academic analyses, the comparisons at the basis of political culture focus on the quality of modernization, democracy, and participation with regard to a predetermined referent, normally that of the USA (Bonura, 1998, p.102).” In other words, a great deal of effort is made to assess “how far along” these countries have come on their way to becoming “Western”. Political scientist Carlo Bonura, Jr. describes this in more depth: …The study of civic culture has also been a dominant element in new scholarship on societal transformations in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, comprising a political and cultural geography of ‘transition’. The great mobilization of academic, political, and economic resources in response to the

130 political transformations of Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union demonstrates how the future quality of political cultures often becomes the object of discourses of international politics. Continual discussions within US foreign policy concerning international aid programs to ‘foster democracy’, especially in areas that have come to represent political instability, depend upon certain expectations and conceptualizations of political culture. That these understandings are at times vague or in other cases simply reiterate basic arguments within the study of political culture only stresses the importance of questioning how this category has become such a constitutive part of the imaginary of international relations. (1998, pp.102-103) So when journalists engage in this sort of analysis or description they are engaging in a larger practice than just assessing what politics is like in Eastern Europe. They are using and re-creating an analytical framework that puts the United States at the top of a hierarchy of “political development”. This casts the United States (and Western Europe as well) as the “norm” and other forms of political development as aberrant. These USA Today quotes illustrate this idea, that the more a country resembles the United States, the better it is: “Eight years ago, these three nations were reluctant members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. Now, after their stirring transition to democracy and free markets, they are being rewarded with membership in the world’s most exclusive military alliance,” [12/5/97] and “Aspiring countries have strengthened democratic institutions, resolved potentially dangerous disputes with their neighbors and made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, not the other way around.” [10/7/97] These quotes are designed to show the similarities between Eastern Europe and the United States – they describe the candidates as democratic (with solid institutions backing the process), capitalist and free market-oriented, and also firmly in control of their militaries. The implication is that these are countries that we can be comfortable with, because they are like us. Often, this similarity becomes to focus on a moral call, as in “If we were to freeze NATO at its Cold War membership, we would lock out a group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will,

131 members of the Warsaw Pact.” [USA Today, 10/7/97] Similarity, in other words, necessitates a different relationship – one with a moral claim on its participants. Another way to show the similarity of Eastern European political systems to Western political systems is to describe the applicant countries as “new democracies”. This is a very common practice, and it exerts a special moral claim by asserting that there is no difference between NATO and the applicants, since NATO claims to be the community of democracy and stability. This claim is evident in these Newsday quotes: “All of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe’s old democracies have,” [6/16/2001] and “Still another factor is a belief by some that the only way to maintain the U.S. military presence in Europe and bring stability to Eastern Europe’s new democracies is to expand NATO’s security blanket there.” [3/15/98] A similar deployment of this mode of representation is to describe Eastern Europe as “emerging democracies”. This phrase and ones like it give the impression that these countries could be democratic, but are going through a tenuous time. This creates even more of a moral calling because it is Western power that could give them the boost that they need “to get over the hump” and become truly Western countries. This is clear from these Christian Science Monitor quotes: “The Clinton administration has pushed hard for the move, saying it would ensure stability in the region and help cement the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe into the larger Western world,” [4/28/98] and “The House of Representatives, never slow to respond to ethnic interests, has passed legislation endorsing inclusion of all the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.” [7/3/97] This clearly demonstrates the sympathetic part of the “sympathetic victim” representation, as do other forms of the same idea. These include describing Eastern European applicants as “embryonic democracies” and “nascent”. A similar impression is given from journalists who use the same terminology in regard to Eastern Europe’s economic systems. Instead of “emerging democracies” we hear about “fledgling free markets” as in these quotes: “All to the good, the critics say, but what of the argument that the fledgling free market states of Eastern and Central

132 Europe should first become members of the European Union,” [Newsday, 3/24/98] and “NATO’s success clearly demonstrates the interactive relationship between security, democracy, and prosperity. The still-developing free-market economies in Eastern and Central Europe – growing markets for U.S. exports – will attract greater foreign investment and promote greater consumer spending if there is confidence about regional stability.” [Washington Post, 8/19/97] Both of these quotes cite the need to intervene to protect the “progress” that has been made in these countries (albeit, one of them calls for EU intervention instead of NATO intervention). Summary of Representation The representation of Eastern Europe as a sympathetic victim is above all based on a reduction of barriers between “us” and “them”. Its methods consist of three fundamental modes of description. First, Eastern Europe is described as being inherently non-Russian. Eastern Europe is represented as being a kidnapped part of the West, held under the sway of a tyrannical outsider for the past 50 years. By contrasting themselves with Russia, Eastern Europeans adopt the same technique that the Ottoman Turks used several centuries ago: as outsiders (at least for the last 50 years) from Western Europe, they push for their inclusion by contrasting themselves with the ultimate outsider, Russia. A literary example of this can be found in a Milan Kundera polemic from 1984: “Russia is not just one more European power but as a singular civilization, an other civilization…totalitarian Russian civilization is the radical negation of the modern West.” The creation of social and cultural distance from Russia is an attempt to create social and cultural proximity with the West. The second method for representing Eastern Europe as a sympathetic victim is to discuss the region’s historical problems, especially the occupations of the Nazis and the Soviets. Readers are asked to put themselves in the shoes of the Eastern Europeans as Hitler and Stalin did their worst to the region. This move is predicated on the creation of a sympathetic perspective for Western audiences as attempted in the first method already mentioned. If Westerners cannot empathize with Eastern Europeans, then there will be very little linkage of identities. The severity of the era “book ended” by Hitler’s invasion and the fall of Communism is used to create a moral claim on the reader. An extension

133 of the “never again” discourse associated with the Holocaust is used to convince readers that “never again” should Eastern Europeans be used as a pawn between Russia and Germany (mostly Russia). In case that is not enough, there is an additional moral claim based on guilt – that the West in part caused that occupation which is now reviled. This is attributed to either the appeasement of Hitler prior to World War II or the agreement at Yalta that put Eastern Europe in the Soviet orbit. A third method for representing Eastern Europe as a sympathetic victim comes from the of the terminology used to collectively name the states that are applicants for NATO. These collective terms are used to make the applicants sound Western or at least sound like they have Western attributes. Terms like “new democracies” are used often, as are phrases like “newly independent” and “newly liberated”. These terms carry emotional charges as well as additional connotations. This baggage (although unavoidable – any terminology would have political consequences) has weight to it that affirms their cultural and emotional linkages with the West as well as the positive normative value of the West itself. To add to the moral claim that Eastern Europe has on Western Europe the applicants are often described collectively with terminology that makes it sound as if they are vulnerable. These terms include “nascent democracies”, “emerging democracies”, “embryonic democracies”, or “fledgling free markets”. By emphasizing the vulnerability of the transformation in these states it becomes a duty of the West to intervene on their behalf, namely with NATO memberships. Typically this representation is used to advocate NATO entry for Eastern Europeans, but not necessarily. Often those who express themselves using this representation (journalists or people being quoted by journalists) are arguing against NATO expansion on a basis other than the cultural level that this representation appeals to. In other words, it would be possible to agree that it is terrible what happened to Eastern Europe and that they are “like us”, but find that the “geopolitical facts” are enough to tip the balance away from NATO expansion. Still, the “sympathetic victim” representation tends to close the cultural distance between the West and Eastern Europe, which generally leads to a moral argument in favor of NATO expansion.

134 NATO Representation 3: Eastern Europe as the Orient The NATO representation of “Eastern Europe as the Orient” parallels its EU cognate, “Eastern Europe as unchanged”, much as the NATO representation of “Eastern Europe as sympathetic victim” parallels the EU representation of “Eastern Europe as the West”. This representation can be found in 146 of the 668 quotes that are describing Eastern Europe in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “B” for a further breakdown). As mentioned before, these are not exact replicas of the EU representations, although they are similar. The NATO representation of “Eastern Europe as the Orient” does imply that Eastern Europe is unchanging, but where the EU version was centered on the fundamental immutable difference between the dynamic West and the stagnant East, the NATO version is focused on other characteristics of the East, such as a tendency towards despotism and savagery. Again, there is a great deal of overlap between these representations. They, like the other EU-NATO pairing, have much in common but have different emphases. A similar parallel exists between the representations of Eastern Europe as economic space and as geopolitical space. They are both abstracted representations that seek objective truth through a more scientific Cartesian perspective. Therefore, each major representation of Eastern Europe in newspapers covering EU expansion can be seen to have a parallel representation in articles describing NATO. Historical Processes The division of Europe into Occident and Orient was a long process, and the division replaced the earlier North-South division that was inherited from the Roman Empire and lasted for much longer than the empire itself. This division created two zones, one the area of Roman influence (the south) and one the area of “barbarian” influence (the north), with the border in the , or alternatively with the River and Danube River. The interaction of these two areas would later turn into interdependence that would still later coalesce into the pre-European idea of Christendom, as already described (Davies, 1996, p.213). However, the unity of Christendom belied the significant divisions that were seen between the north and the south all the way through the Renaissance. From the Roman view, the Empire

135 represented civilization while the “barbarians” lacked the organized government that true civilization required. Once this division became secondary to the East-West division it still remained but only as a less significant chasm, and can be seen in contemporary EU politics. The replacement of the North/South division was gradual and began sometime after the end of the Renaissance, with the East/West division becoming dominant through the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Policy-makers, journalists, and virtually everyone else have reified the idea of an East-West division of Europe (and indeed, in the world). The contributions of journalists are clearly visible in the record. For example, note this example from the St. Petersburg Times [10/12/97]: “And it’s not that the public hasn’t been told over and over again just how important a decision this is – that it could shape East-West relations for decades to come.” This quote from the Hartford Courant [7/19/97] attributed to George Kennan also shows the reification: “Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the Cold War, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom, and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?” Both of these quotes imply that there is something called “East-West relations”, which is different than US-Russian relations, or NATO-Warsaw Pact relations. The groups involved are but ambassadors of their own civilizations, or regions, or however the East and the West are defined. The shift from North/South to East/West was precipitated by Russia’s victory in the Great Northern War against Sweden. The retreat of Swedish territory into the Scandinavian Peninsula left Russia in sole possession of the Baltic coast. This separation of Russia/Poland and Sweden into discrete territorial units spurred a shifting of the cognitive regions through which Europe was understood (Neumann, 1998). As Russia became dominant in the Baltic area, it was seen as a potential threat, which facilitated the creation of a framework where Russia was not dominant in its region in order to downplay its power (because the Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans were also seen as being in the “East”). Also, when it was seen as a northern country it was in the same grouping as England, France, and the . To put them in cultural opposition required a shifting of borders so that they could be effectively Othered. Still,

136 Russia was not seen as threatening as it would be in later eras, such as after Napoleon’s final defeat. This East-West divide in Europe is more than just one border – as mentioned previously it can be (and has been) drawn in a multitude of different locations, each of which is valid from a certain perspective. Indeed it seems that for Europe the East exists as a “social signifier cut loose from its geographical moorings. If a human collective wants to represent a “Western” or “European” self, it needs an “Eastern” or “Asiatic” shadow, but that shadow need not fall to the geographical east (Neumann, 1998, p.206).” This division of Europe found the values to attach to each side in the Romantics’ study of classical Greece. The obsession of the Romantics with classical Greek culture led to a permanent association of the West with the Greeks. This self-promoting conflation has led to a multitude of historical inaccuracies and anachronisms as Western culture has ascribed much of its contemporary culture to the developments of the Greek city-states, in particular Athens (which serves as a micro-predecessor to the West through selective use of history). For the purpose of this dissertation, the most relevant part of ancient Greek tradition that was adopted was the identity of the Greek city-states as “the Glorious West”, the “Land of Liberty”, and the “home of Beauty and Wisdom”. The Persian Wars led to the Othering of the East and the production of the knowledge that “the East was the seat of slavery, brutality, ignorance (Davies, 1996, p.100).” In Aeschylus’s tragedy The Persians, this dialogue takes place between the Queen of Persia and the chorus regarding her son’s defeat at the hands of the Athenians (quoted in Davies, 1996): QUEEN: My friends, where is this Athens said to be? CHORUS: Far toward the dying flames of the sun. QUEEN: Yet my son lusts to track it down. CHORUS: Then all of would be subject to the king. QUEEN: So rich in numbers are they? CHORUS: So great a host as dealt to the Persians many woes. QUEEN: Who commands them? Who is shepherd to their host? CHORUS: They are slaves to none, neither are they subject.

137 The impression taken from literary works like this and other findings from classical Greece is that “Europe” and “the West” are the homes of freedom and civilization, and the East is the home of servility and barbarity. For instance, the famed “Father of History”, Herodotus of Helicarnassus, wrote his nine historical tomes using a framework of East versus West, in this case focusing on the epic struggle between Europe and Asia. He opened the door for the later Othering of the Ottoman Turks (through their Oriental association with the Persians) but also for the later Othering of the Russians. The Russians have often been equated (or confused with) the Scythians, whom François Hartog (1988) has asserted were the best Other for the Greeks to adopt. Herodotus described them as savage warriors who murdered their prisoners and drank the blood of their enemies, who coincidentally were the Persians. They also existed in the margins of Europe and Asia, much like the Russians. The Europe/Asia incarnation of the East/West theme in particular will resonate in our discussion of Eastern Europe as the Orient. Eastern Europe occupies a unique position in that it was seen during the Enlightenment era as a safe area for Christians to experience “the Orient”. The Marquis of Salaberry traveled from Paris to Constantinople in 1790-1791. In Budapest Salaberry discovered the “first monuments [he] encountered of Turkish religion, arts, and manners (this and the following, quoted in Wolff, 1994, p.47).” In he found his “first sample of Oriental manners,” and this was all a precursor to his arrival in Constantinople, where he found “a taste of Persia”. This mirrored the experience of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, a poet and scholar, who while touring Eastern Europe 75 years prior to Salaberry, discovered her first camel. “They were heralds of the Orient, already to be seen in Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994, p.47).” Thus, it can be seen that the classical Greek division between Asia and Europe has become blurred over the 2000 years since the fall of Athens. The Oriental association of Asia has broken loose and is encroaching on that of Occidental Europe, as symbolized by these sightings of camels and Turkish manners. Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur, already mentioned in the EU “representation of Poland” section of this dissertation, also cued into the Greek/West versus Persian/East opposition. Traveling at roughly the same time as the Marquis of Salaberry, he made his way to the Crimea with Catherine the Great’s court, to which he was attached in his role

138 as French ambassador. When they spent the night at the palace of the former khanate they “could believe ourselves veritably transported to a in Turkey or Persia, with the only difference being that we had the leisure to examine everything without having to fear any of those humiliations to which Christians are forced to submit in the Orient (this and the following, quoted in Wolff, 1994, p.135-138).” One of the Count’s traveling companions, the Prince de Ligne, described the same palace as “Moorish, Arab, Chinese, and Turkish”, and then proclaimed that “I don’t know anymore where I am or in what century I am,” giving voice to the homogeneity and timelessness of the Orient. The Prince also “saw moving mountains that turned out to be the humps of dromedaries in the distance, and wondered if he was with the three kings on the way to Bethlehem. He saw young princes from the Caucasus on white horses, covered with silver, armed with bows and arrows, and thought he must have slipped into the ancient Persia of Cyrus the Great.” While de Ligne’s trip to the Crimea may exceed the boundaries of today’s NATO candidates, it provides insight into the conceptualization of the East and Eastern Europe’s role in that. Again, to be in Eastern Europe is to be separate from the restraints of history and geographic location. This very idea of the East can be seen in a recent American newspaper quote: “For many East Europeans, admission to NATO has perhaps as much to do with national pride as with national security. It would represent, in their view, acceptance in the broad Western family after years of seclusion in the East.” The idea of seclusion is a strong indicator of an Oriental nature – seclusion denotes a withdrawal from the dynamism of regular life. It is timeless because you are no longer involved in progress, and it implies that you could be anywhere – you have no defined location or time. To further show the creeping growth of the Orient in Eastern Europe it is useful to look to some of the Enlightenment philosophers’ literary works. Montesquieu’s Persian Letters in 1721 used a mythical Persian traveler to critique life in France. The idea was wildly successful, and was predicated on the outsider perspective that the Persian supposedly brought. The inside/outside dualism is unquestioned – only someone Oriental could look at France from an impartial perspective. An Englishman or a Venetian would not be able to escape the certain sympathy that comes from his or her

139 own Occidental identity. 50 years later Marat used the same idea to criticize the entire West in his two-volume unpublished (until the 20th century) work Polish Letters. Marat, a less able (and entirely unsuccessful) writer, fails to adequately divest himself of his Frenchness and writes the main character, Kamia, as if he were Marat himself (Wolff, 1994). Kamia focused most of his critique on countries other than France, and in the end comes to realize how “backward” his own country is. Then, miraculously, he discovers that he is a prince of Poland, and he is sent back to rule with these words from another philosopher: “The constitution of your country is very faulty; it is a remnant of barbarism which shames humanity. When the people are groaning under so hard a yoke, how very fortunate for them to get a good and enlightened prince…By the gentleness of your government let your subjects find themselves free, their hideous chains of slavery being broken (quoted in Wolff, 1994, p.100).” The first point to be made is that Montesquieu was required to have his imaginary traveler come all the way from Persia for a truly different and Oriental viewpoint. Fifty years later, it was only necessary for Marat to go to Poland to get that. This illustrates the growth of the Orient into Eastern Europe during the Enlightenment. Second, it illustrates the nature of the Occidental gaze into the Orient. Marat/Kamia, having become trained by Enlightenment philosophers, views with disdain the government of Poland (and by extension, that of all Eastern Europe) because it is based on an authoritarian system. Nevertheless, Marat/Kamia is left with no viable alternative – after all Eastern Europe is not seen as fit for democracy, the Poles need the strong enlightened hand of a monarchy to lift them up from their backwardness. This is the early predecessor of such sentiments as the “White Man’s Burden”, and it reflects the perceived civilizational schism between Orient and Occident that had come to exist in Marat’s time but not in Montesquieu’s day. Contemporary Evidence of the East As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the representation of Eastern Europe as the Orient emphasizes the alleged existence of a fundamental difference between Western Europe and Eastern Europe that is very much wrapped up in a larger West-East dialectic. That there is a perceived difference between these regions is

140 apparent in this Minneapolis Star-Tribune [7/17/97] quote: “Enlargement also ‘is a product of idealist motives. It reflects an ambitious and visionary effort not only to bond East Central Europe to Western Europe, but also to establish Western values in that region.’” Clearly this conveys the “white man’s burden” being applied to Eastern Europe. This statement not only establishes the hierarchy between those two regions but also engages in self-congratulation by describing enlargement as “ambitious and visionary”, like a Christian missionary going to live with an African . The East itself is seen as having innately non-Western values, as Persia was innately non-Greek. The East is still a source of invasion: “There would seem to be two possible functions for the alliance. The first is its classic role: to defend its members against a renewed threat from the East, should that come.” [Baltimore Sun, 12/8/94] NATO is seen as a counter to the perpetual threat from the East. The East’s values are different than that of the West: “It [NATO expansion] will draw closer to democracy the countries farther to the East.” [New York Times, 12/17/96] These quotes show the spatial connection – the further to the East that a nation is (or is perceived to be), the less democratic, the more dangerous they are. The threat from the East is an older phenomenon than threats from Russia and Turkey – as this Ottawa Citizen [3/19/99] article attests: “…the emergence of plague- bearing rodents in Central Asia…turned the former source of Huns, Vandals and Mongols into quiet grasslands.” Later in the same column the author adds “Churchill certainly understood the problems of Germanic tribes being pushing into war by pressure from barbarians on the steppes.” This author is a classic example of the Orientalist perspective. The elision of temporality and contingency is endless – as the last quote illustrates. The author simultaneously merges the 20th Century Nazis with the 5th Century Vandals, Goths, and other tribes. Mirroring popular Western convention, the author also turns Churchill and the British into the successor civilization of the Roman Empire. The specific causes of each of those events are hidden behind an ahistorical aggressive force from the East (the nameless, faceless barbarians on the steppes). The author adopts a unique position – history is all-important and at the same time frozen. What a place was like almost two millennia ago is determinative of its current status. Take, for example this quote by the

141 same Canadian columnist: “For as Thomas Sowell wrote in Conquests and Cultures, ‘The cultural division of Europe in the 20th century reflects fault lines going back to the days of the Roman Empire, when Western Europe was for centuries part of a literate and technologically advanced Roman culture, and much of Eastern Europe was not.” While not denying that there are cultural differences between the parts of Europe that were in the Roman Empire and those that were not, this statement borders on the absurd. It both exaggerates the literacy and technology of the Roman Empire and demeans that of the non-Romans. Furthermore, by attributing developmental differences between Eastern and Western Europe to the Roman heritage it ignores the divisions within those regions (i.e., Poland’s relative affluence in comparison to Romania – otherwise known as the former Roman province of ). Soon, however, we see the real thrust of the author’s argument – being Eastern is innately corrupting: “The Eastern Empire was always rendered, well, Byzantine by Eastern influences even before its conquest by Islam, right down to its Christianity. To this day, the ‘open societies’ are largely coextensive with the and those colonial nations that sprang from it.” Any exceptions to his rule are explainable in civilizational terms: “But Islam turned the Mediterranean from a highway into a wall, deRomanized much of Eastern Europe, and by its long occupation gave Spanish despotism an oriental flavour quite different from that of France.” Here it is clear that “Eastern influences” are the source of a disruption to the norm, which has to be the West; and while the West is “open” the East must be closed, or secluded. This is evident from the author’s assertion that Islam turned the Mediterranean “from a highway into a wall”, which besides being historically inaccurate puts the onus on Islam, while there are two sides to a wall. While Islam did conquer North Africa, that did not need to put an end to cultural and economic exchange. The columnist continues by linking Christianity with progress: “Sowell notes that pockets of paganism in early medieval Europe are also pockets of backwardness: Coins were minted in Rome, but not east of the Rhine before the 10th century, nor in pagan or Denmark.” The implication is that Christianity breeds technology, freedom, and everything else good in the world.

142 The linkage between East/Asia and West/Europe is clear to this Canadian author, as is the exact boundary (which not coincidentally, is the old border of the Roman Empire): “As Konrad Adenauer knew all too well, the closed, militaristic side of Germany came from east of the Elbe, from Prussia (which he called ‘Asia’).” There are two interesting points to this last quote. First, that the East is represented as closed and militaristic (again, the secluded threat). Second, that the author felt that by mentioning that Adenauer thought Asia began at the Elbe would help us to understand the reference to a closed, militaristic society. In other words, he expected there to be a shared meaning – Asia to everyone (everyone reading his newspaper, anyway) would mean closed and militaristic, while Europe presumably means open and peaceful. It is to these shared meanings that we now turn – although most newspaper articles are not as open with their Orientalist leanings as this Canadian author was, it sometimes still lies there under the surface (often not very far). Fundamental Differences At the heart of Orientalist description is a sense of difference between the East and the West. There is more to it than that, as there are certain values that are attributed to each side, but at its core it is about Othering, identity, and difference. Even those arguing in favor of NATO expansion show that fundamental difference. This is clear in this quote from a Boston Globe [10/21/97] article: “Richard Lugar, an ardent advocate of NATO expansion, argues that ‘there can be no lasting security at the center without security at the periphery.” The inference is that Eastern Europe is the periphery while Western Europe is the center – illustrating a difference in the way that each region is thought of. One wonders how reassured Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are by the knowledge that their allies view them as peripheral. This peripheral status is further visible in the “continental orphan” metaphor found in this Washington Post [1/1/94] quote: “The unwillingness of Europe and the United States to intervene firmly in the Balkans nourished the perception that Eastern Europe is a continental orphan.” The Montreal Gazette [7/28/2001] hit the same point: “The recent painful experience of the Vietnam War should have taught the dangers of underwriting the security of countries in far-off corners of the globe that are peripheral to U.S. national interests.” It is

143 particularly interesting that this author should describe Eastern Europe as a “far-off corner of the world”. This is a clear attempt to create geopolitical distance between the US and Eastern Europe, but it is a real stretch, similar to (but the inverse of) when President Reagan asserted that ’s army was only a three-day march from Texas. A common theme within the newspaper accounts of NATO expansion is the continuation of this projection of geopolitical distance between the United States and Eastern Europe. One New Orleans Times-Picayune columnist amusingly draws attention to the historical antipathy of the United States to Eastern Europe with this anecdote [4/11/95]: “My daddy always said to me: ‘Son, never go into a thermo-nuclear war to protect a country you can’t find on the map.’” Given the state of education in America, this advice could replace Mutually Assured Destruction as the world’s savior from a nuclear winter. The same columnist also wrote: “I would bet serious money that of the members of Congress who voted to bring Slovakia into NATO there aren’t 10 who could name its capital or the countries that border it.” Another article made the same point by quoting Senator Joe Biden: “Right now, if I stand up and start talking with my constituents about the price, if I tell them ‘We are about to extend our nuclear umbrella to Slovakia,’ I wonder how many people in Dagsboro, Del., are going to say, ‘Hey, that’s a great idea.’” [New York Times, 1/22/97] Of course, the rebuttal to this argument is also found in The New York Times [5/15/95], but it does not argue the point that Eastern Europe is a far-off land: “This smacks all too familiarly of Neville Chamberlain’s reference to Czechoslovakia as a country not worth defending because of its remoteness. Is it really wise to consign the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to Russia’s sphere of influence the way the West yielded Czechoslovakia to Germany in 1938?” In other words, the pro-expansion argument isn’t that they aren’t far away and different, but that they are still important to American security. As previously mentioned, traditional Orientalist thought attributes a tendency to despotism to the East, and democracy is seen as intrinsically un-Eastern. In the newspapers describing Eastern Europe this is illustrated in several different ways. First, some doubt that democracy can even be planted in Eastern soil, as in this Christian Science Monitor [6/18/96] quote: “Another major concern among many experts is the

144 lack of progress by Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest in instituting Western-style civilian control over their militaries. Their commanders retain considerable political power and their parliaments still have little or no authority over defense budgets and policymaking, experts say.” That quote makes it clear that the democratic control of the military is a “Western-style” characteristic, emphasizing the despotic militarism associated with the East. Other journalists offer forth the idea that democracy is progressing, but that Eastern Europe’s political development could very well collapse back into its original, less democratic tradition. This is illustrated by these Washington Post quotes: “If West European governments are worried by the opening moves of the Bush administration - and they are – then imagine the view across the Atlantic these days from the less stable, less secure, less firmly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” [2/19/2001] and “But Pentagon officials worry, for example, that a country admitted too soon might revert to authoritarian or communist leadership, or perhaps provoke ethnic conflict, saddling the West with the task of defending a government with ignoble aims.” [11/6/94] Not only does this display the concern about “backsliding” but it also attaches a negative association to authoritarian and communist governments. They are seen as leading to “ignoble aims”, which means that the Western style of government is well intentioned at all times. A similar spin is put on the political arrangements in Eastern Europe when it is implied that they may be participating in secret alliances. The Orientalist tendency to seclusion and secrecy is closely related to the assertions of despotism. Both are seen as the opposite of Western government, which is supposed to be held in the open. This is a minor theme in the newspapers, but is notable, especially in these Montreal Gazette quotes: “The NATO guarantee frees Moscow’s former Warsaw Pact satellites from the need to form destabilizing secret alliances among themselves in order to contain possible Russian military pressures in the future,” [6/11/97] and “In private, Western diplomats point out to their Russian counterparts that it is safer to bring the eastern Europeans into NATO, because otherwise their fear of Russia would have them making secret alliances that might even extend to include the Baltic states and Ukraine. But you can’t say that in public.” [3/18/97] The fear here seems to be that the West should lose control because of

145 special arrangements made by the Easterners. This duplicitous Oriental state of affairs is seen as anathema to the modern West. Ethnic Conflict The last quote is also interesting because it brings in a late 20th century spin on the old civilization/barbarity dialectic: that of ethnic conflict. The description of a conflict, whether in Eastern Europe or Africa, or any other place that is deemed “uncivilized” by the West, as ethnic is deceiving. It implies that the conflict is based on the hatred of rival ethnic groups, and this is deemed irrational by Western authorities. This allows the West to metaphorically shake its head at the mindless violence of the ethnicities. Western violence, even between ethnic groups, is never referred to in this manner. For example, the Franco-Prussian war is not seen as “ethnic conflict” although the battle lines are quite clearly formed upon ethnic lines. The only difference is that those ethnicities are surrounded by the power of sovereignty, a Western creation that legitimates violence. In addition, there is much more attention given to the causes, purposes, and goals of each group. In other words, the political nature is highlighted – that there is a contested territory or policy from which one group gains at the expense of another. This is in direct contrast to the way that “ethnic conflict” is described. In ethnic conflict the goals of each side are generally ignored and the conflict is portrayed as being rooted in long-standing hatred. It is timeless, savage, and quintessentially Oriental. This description is often attributed to Eastern Europe in the newspaper accounts of NATO expansion. Conflict, even between states in Eastern Europe, is described this way in a manner that would never be attributed to Western Europe. Take, for example, this quote from Newsday [3/24/98]: “Certainly, they see that the potential flash points of ethnic and religious strife in the region more likely will be managed – and perhaps even managed out of existence – in the presence rather than the absence of NATO.” The quote is useful because of the way that Western influence is seen to automatically reduce the possibility of conflict. In addition, it alludes to religious conflict – which is even more stigmatized in the Western view than ethnic conflict. To the secular modern states of

146 Western Europe the idea of going to war over religious issues is extremely old-fashioned. It gives the impression of Eastern Europe as a region of zealots. Often, however, what seems to be religiously based violence (or ethnic, etc.) is in fact resource conflict between groups that have crystallized around a religious (or ethnic) identity. This misunderstanding is clearly visible in this Los Angeles Times [2/5/95] quote: “However, the collapse of communism and the proliferation of messy, little- understood ethnic conflicts such as the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina have reduced American enthusiasm about becoming involved in European problems that seem to have little to do with U.S. strategic interests.” In that quote, the author even acknowledges that the West does not understand – but what it leaves unsaid is that it is because it is trying to view the conflicts through an ethnic lens when in fact that does not do justice to the positions of either side in an “ethnic conflict”. Another interesting quote in the same vein from The Christian Science Monitor [4/28/98] is “Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the conservative Eagle , opposes NATO expansion because she fears it would enmesh the US in Eastern Europe’s internal animosities.” This is a good example of the homogenization of space that occurs in descriptions of Eastern Europe – the “internal animosities” that Schlafly is describing are only found (according to US foreign policy) in the Balkans, yet they are attributed to the entire region. The fear of getting “enmeshed” in them is related to the after effects of Vietnam syndrome in the United States. Other symbols of this fear are words such as “quagmire” or “whirlpool”. This fear can be characterized as a Samson complex – the fear that a woman (the ethnic conflict is portrayed as irrational, a negative stereotype associated with women) that will sap the strength of the hero. This feminization of Eastern Europe is in keeping with classic Orientalist thought – which feminizes the Orient and masculinizes the West. Thus, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe can be seen to be bringing an irrational (because of the ethnic conflict) woman into the all-men’s club of the alliance, whose military “hardware” and “prowess” is thoroughly masculine. Another type of reference to ethnic conflict is not as severe, because it allows that Western Europe has had its fair share. Nevertheless, it employs a teleological view of history, which, as we have seen, always culminates in the description of non-Western

147 parts of the world as being “backward” or behind the pace set by the West. This quote from The Singapore Straits Times [2/27/97] serves as a good example: “She believes that the new Nato would do for eastern Europe what it did for Western Europe 50 years ago: bury old hatreds, deter conflict, integrate new democracies and provide confidence in economic recovery.” This quote gives us the impression that Western Europe has finally solved its age-old hatreds (which certainly have been sublimated) and that if Eastern Europe does what NATO tells them, they will be able to rise above their petty ethnic wars and hatreds. This follows the theoretical footsteps of modernization theory and all the other (West) Eurocentric paradigms of history (and economics, political science, etc.). Closely related to the “ethnic conflict” aspect of these newspaper descriptions is that description of the region as innately conflict-ridden. The emphasis here is not on the nature of the conflict (as in the previous section) but on the seemingly endless duration. This representation is the exact opposite of the previous one because the “Eastern Europe as sympathetic victim” representation sees Eastern Europe as having conflict imposed from outside (Germany or Russia, typically). This is part of another East/West dialectic that focuses on the innate peace-loving nature of the West (despite its rocky history in that regard) and contrasts with the warlike barbarians to the East. While this is clearly a selective use of history, it nevertheless features heavily in newspapers discussing NATO expansion. Take, for example, these two American newspaper quotes: “Despite concerns about ruffling Russian feathers and financial costs, the driving force in the Senate vote was the urge for stability and democracy in an area that has seen centuries of war,” [Baltimore Sun, 5/2/98] and “None of the prospective members are reliable enough to be entrusted with that [NATO membership]. They won’t for decades to come. Their problems run too deep, and so do their historical disputes with one another and with Russia. They would face irresistible domestic pressures to use their vetoes in NATO to settle scores.” [Christian Science Monitor, 7/11/97] The second quote is particularly interesting – it again asserts the teleological perspective, and again it posits that Eastern Europe is decades behind the West. Only this time it is not just 50 years of history is lacking (as in the quote at the end of the section on “ethnic conflict”)

148 but seemingly 50 years of maturity. This maturity is not just for the leaders, but seemingly for the people, who are portrayed as wrapped up in their “historical disputes”. The applicants are viewed as children, lacking in maturity and unable to be trusted. This dovetails nicely with the paternal image of the US Senate in the first quote of the pair. The image again is of a fundamental split between East and West. The West is more developed, more mature, trustworthier, and more rational. The flip side is the Eastern Europe is not ready for NATO, less mature, not reliable, and hung up on past grudges. Policy Proscription American foreign policy experts internalize this view in their geopolitical decision-making process, and might well agree with this quote from the St. Louis Post- Dispatch [5/26/96]: “Eastern Europe has a history of political instability and uncertain borders and is a region in which the United States has no strong influence.” The Washington Post [1/9/94] put Eastern Europe’s innate tendency to conflict into a global perspective: “Neither the American public nor the alliance itself is prepared for the extension of defense commitments to cover one of the world’s most dangerous and turbulent regions.” For some the “danger”, “instability”, and “turbulence” of Eastern Europe is a reason to not be involved. For others, those are reasons to intervene (through NATO expansion). They see this outside Oriental influence within the European body and they translate it into the medical discourse described by David Campbell. This is the strategy (already mentioned) that uses allusions to cancers and other medical conditions as a call to action much as a doctor is called to do something in the case of a malignant tumor. A tumor is the perfect example of the outside Other brought inside the body. Thus, when the Chicago Sun-Times [10/8/93] writes “The alternative would be to leave eastern nations festering and unstable,” the course of action is no longer debatable – the infection (the Orient) must be excised from the body politic (Europe). Another invasion of the body politic can be found in the resurgence of communism or of former communist leaders in Eastern Europe. Western journalists view this as a negative event in the transformation of Eastern Europe. It is viewed using the same medical discourse as the “hatreds of the past”, and it has the same proscription. It is hoped that eventually the leaders will go by the wayside and a new group of leaders

149 untainted by the Oriental association of communism will come into their own. Often this subtext is complicated for the journalists and government representatives making the policy proscription by the relative progress made under the rule of the former communists. Even this has a touch of Orientalism to it – while journalists are quite likely to understand and write about how Western politicians shift their positions to stay in power, somehow politicians in Eastern Europe are more primal and their positions are ingrained. In other words, they are as external to historical development as Eastern Europe itself. This suspicion of Eastern European politicians can be found in this Christian Science Monitor [6/18/96] quote: “The main issue is whether Europe’s nascent democracies, especially those that have returned former communists to power, have the political will and stability to complete the difficult, far-reaching reforms required for NATO membership.” Furthermore, a concern is that Eastern European states are still under the thumb of the Russians because of their former Communist leaders. This Ottawa Citizen [2/23/97] quote discussed an alleged plan by Russian intelligence to blackmail post-communist leaders with evidence of their crimes from the past: “Russian officials were preparing ‘provocations’, said the security chief [of Poland], Zbigniew Siemiatkiwski. ‘They will show that countries aspiring to NATO have unreliable elites – corrupt in the one side and loyal to their former bosses on the other.’ ‘We told you so,’ the government’s non-communist critics might have been tempted to chorus.” For some, the very existence of Eastern Europeans within “Europe” is seen as problematic. This can be seen in earlier discussions of the EU where Germany was concerned with a flood of East European immigrants pouring in and taking jobs. It even finds its way into debates about NATO: “What threatens them [West Europeans] now are all those new East European free-market democracies, whose factories and farmers want to export to Western Europe at prices that will undercut the West Europeans and whose workers all want to flock to Western Europe for job, which would drive down wages.” [New York Times, 1/21/97] Even further, some describe the East itself as the source of “undesirables”, such as this Washington Post [8/2/95] quote: “The Schengen agreement abolishes passport requirements and other travel restrictions between Western European

150 nations – while beefing up border controls along the Union’s eastern perimeter and erecting other barricades to screen out undesirables.” Civilizational Bias Yet another way that Eastern Europe is represented as the Orient is by directly (or indirectly) questioning its level of civilization. For the Romans “civilization” meant orderly government (Davies, 1996), and since then it has taken on a wide variety of other meanings, including the rule of law, a developed arts and education infrastructure, etc. In fact, it is the flexibility of the idea of civilization that makes it such a strong marker of the Self and the Other. Almost invariably, the Self is associated with civilization (at least for self-styled Europeans) and there are a variety of ways that one can claim to be civilized and a similar variety of ways to claim that the Other is not. In this framework, Eastern Europe is often portrayed as not being “civilized”, as in this quote from The Houston Chronicle [7/7/97] of Jack Mendelsohn, who at the time of the quote was the deputy director of the Arms Control Association in Washington: “What is NATO? Is it a defensive alliance or is it a Boy Scout club in which we will democratize, marketize, and civilize the countries that join?” This quote uses irony to argue against expansion, but more importantly it draws a line between the United States and Eastern Europe and attributes civilization to one side and not the other. This is a very fundamental distinction – more important than the difference of democracy and market economy that Mendelsohn also mentions. In addition, Mendelsohn does not operationalize “civilization” to any degree. It remains a nebulous concept – so one does not know whether or not NATO could civilize Eastern Europe or not. Similarly, Eastern Europe is portrayed as being less than modern. This is related to the Orientalist idea of Eastern Europe being outside the bounds of history but it is also related to degrading the level of civilization that can be found there. To show opposition to the post-Fordist disposable consumerism of the West, the East must be represented as belonging to an earlier civilization. This quote from The Washington Post [2/5/97], for example, snipes at the affluence (or lack thereof) of Eastern Europe: “For God’s sake, stop pretending that bringing into NATO impoverished states of Eastern Europe would somehow make the United States a safer place to live.” The Denver Rocky Mountain

151 News [10/10/95] represents Eastern Europe as part of macro-scale feudalism: “Although the Soviet empire has crumbled, Moscow’s vassals still fear the Russian monolith.” This dates Eastern European civilization as being pre-modern in a very literal way. A similar quote from a previous section described Eastern Europe as Russia’s satrapies. This is a somewhat common theme. Summary of Representation The representation of Eastern Europe as the Orient is an important one for the NATO expansion debate, especially in the United States. This is possibly because so much of the debate revolved around national security, and this is an area in which American education is particularly weak. As citizens of an imperial power with a global reach many Americans find themselves unable to cope with the complexity of the myriad peoples, places, and events that exist within the scope of American power. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable to maxims and folk knowledge produced about places regardless of when it originally applied. This problem has become compounded as more members of the Fourth Estate attempt to pass themselves off as geopolitical authorities and as various politicians seek to bring public opinion around to their point of view, using various Orientalist metaphors because of their strong evocation of common meaning. Simply by the quick use of a few words it is possible to connect with a long history of Otherness in the outlook of Western Europe and the United States towards the rest of the world. By evoking imagines of despotism, ethnic conflict, and a lack of civilization many participants in the NATO expansion debate argued for the inclusion of Eastern Europe, although the majority used the same imagery to condemn such a move. According to Russian public opinion polls, many Russians agree with this quote from The Daily Yomiuri [10/30/95]: More and more, they [the Russian people] come to believe the nationalist, ‘Slavophile’ politicians who, like the 19th century Russian philosopher Nikolai Danilevsky, hold that ‘Europe regards Russia and the Slavs as something alien and hostile to it’ and that this animosity is not something temporary but represents a profound, historic divide between the two civilizations.

152 Indeed, this representation revolves around fundamental differences, much like the representation of Eastern Europe as unchanged revolved around fundamental differences. Huntington’s idea of a “Clash of Civilizations” fits in well with the idea stated in the quote above – only in this quote the onus is placed on the Russians. They are the ones that are the problem; they are the ones that are immature about the relationship between “Europe” and “Russia and the Slavs”. The categories used are interesting – Europe is separated from the Slavs. The implication is clear – the journalist has adopted Danilevsky’s categories. Nevertheless, the author did not problematize it; it is a part of the shared understanding of Westerners that defines the West itself. While most maps include predominantly Slavic areas in Europe, newspaper articles that incorporate this representation often utilize a different meaning of Europe than that found on the map, and that meaning excludes the Slavs because they are perceived as un-European. They are prone to despotism, they are corrupt, and they are “backwards” in a teleological sense in comparison to Western Europe. Conclusion Similarly to what was described for the representations found in the EU debates, these representations collectively give insight into what it means to be “Western”. The representation of “Eastern Europe as Sympathetic Victim” demonstrates the qualities that are felt to establish a moral link to “the West”, such as an aversion to Russian imperialism and a common history. The representation of “Eastern Europe as the Orient” provides an inverse image of “Westernness”. In that representation, Eastern Europe was portrayed as the “Other” by characterizing it as undeniably foreign, as in when it was described as prone to authoritarianism, militarism, and a lack of civilized habits. Therefore, the West can be seen to be the opposite of those things – democratic, peace loving, and civilized, among other things. The representation of Eastern Europe as Geopolitical Space highlighted the West’s mode of perception. In that representation the world was seen as an object to be manipulated, stripped of any human/cultural elements. This perception of the world has been an integral part of the West’s ability to dominate the world militarily. While some geopolitical information can be derived from this representation, it is more useful to this dissertation instead as a reflection of Western

153 identity. In other words, the ability of that representation to describe Estonia as defensible or indefensible is less important than the way in which that opinion was derived. The West’s position as the most powerful group of states in the world has been historically constructed through its ability to act on “foreign” parts of the world in a manner that is only possible when viewed through the lens of “realism”, devoid of qualms that might arise were the places acted upon viewed as the homes of people and culture. Together these three representations provide a contrapuntal perspective of what it means to be “Western”.

154

9. RUSSIA

Introduction Unique among the countries discussed in the newspapers, Russia served multiple roles. Russia is the historical Other against which NATO was formed, and that role is still clearly relevant to many who were writing about the issue over the past decade. In addition, Russia serves as a potential (if distant) candidate for both NATO and the EU. In both debates, Russia serves both of these seemingly contradictory roles: as an incentive for preemptive expansion and also as a potential candidate for the expansions that it, at least in part, causes. This chapter will outline the various ways that Russia is represented in both the NATO and the EU expansion debates. Russia in NATO Expansion Russia features very heavily in discussions of NATO expansion, quite possibly more than the actual candidate countries of Eastern Europe collectively are discussed and therefore has been given its own chapter in this dissertation. This preoccupation with Russia is very significant, because it shows the extent to which NATO is still dependent on Russia as its Other. While discussion often hinged on how Russia would react to a potential expansion, it also carries beneath the surface a more philosophical question. If Russia has changed to become Western since shedding its Soviet Union identity, as many commenters posit, then what is NATO? We have seen before how NATO’s identity as the Western alliance has been key in its historical development, so it should be clear that without a concrete Other to be defending against, NATO’s identity is called into question. What does it stand for, and what does it stand against? Thus, Russia’s “nature” determines a great deal for NATO. While a few commenters seem to believe that NATO should disappear entirely, the overwhelming majority of columns and articles suggest that NATO is formulated to resist one of two “Oriental” threats. The traditionalists see NATO as still functioning as a bulwark against Russia, the eternal Other of the West.

155 The revisionists see NATO as still functioning as a bulwark against Oriental influence in the West, but they see Russia as a threat in decline (or indeed, a candidate for NATO in the future) and instead substitute terrorism, ethnic conflict, and Arab oil nationalism as their polar Oriental opposite. Westernizers The historical development of Russia as the West’s Other has been dealt with earlier in this dissertation, but since post-Cold War Russia is struggling with identity, it is worth discussing the two predominant views of Russian identity because the way that the West views Russia is very much tied to how Russia views itself (and vice-versa). This reciprocation of identity is very much a part of the advanced Hegelian “dialogic” style of identity formation. To reiterate, in dialogic identity formation “Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” (Hegel, 1977, p.112) Sociologist Mikhail Bakhtin asserts that this is distinct from the dialectical mode that is usually attributed to Hegel in that the Other has both ontological and epistemological status, whereas in dialectics the Other simply is, and has no epistemological position. Neumann claims that Russians can be divided into two groups, the Westernizers and the Nationalists. The Westernizers are the group that is broadly committed to a political, economic, and cultural integration with the rest of Europe. Coming out of the Cold War this was visible in the efforts to increase pluralism and capitalism in the Soviet Union (and later Russia). Both of these goals were facilitated by the reassertion of “liberal ideas about the integrity of the individual and the limited rights of the state vis-à- vis the citizen as the common political goals of all mankind (Neumann, 1998, p.164).” In this framework Russia is seen as a full-fledged member of the European community but one with plenty of improvement possible. Often the viewpoints of Westernizers are expressed in ways that emphasize Russia’s disjuncture from “civilization”. In order to rejoin that civilization it is necessary for Russia to develop a sense of “democratic consciousness” that is currently lacking.

156 Often these “liberal” Russians hold the majority of their own countrymen in contempt as the source of their national “backwardness”. This seems to be more than just the typical disdain for the masses typically exhibited by the intelligentsia internationally; it is an expression of national shame. Here is an example of this point of view by dissident author Andrey Novikov: Today the question of “Westernization” is very much in vogue. How can we become Europe in the course of three Five-Year Plans? How can we cover the path which the West spent five hundred years traversing? The answer is self- evident – not in any way. If a liberal consciousness were not able to take hold during the nineteenth century, how is should it be able to do so today? And if there is no liberal consciousness, can there be any liberal democratic institutions? And if so, what are the chances for a “return” to the lap of world civilization envisioned by those who talk about “new thinking” and the end of the Cold War? Will it take the shape of crowds of wild barbarians who, passports in hand, storm the Soviet-Polish border in order to sell of for a hundred dollars? No, the wall will not be built by us, but by the West, a wall similar to the one which the Americans have built along their border with Mexico (quoted in Neumann, 1998). This quote is interesting because it shows the awareness of these Russians of how others (or perhaps Others?) see them. The internalization of Western views of the East is apparent. Furthermore, often these Russians feel themselves as the beleaguered defenders of Russia’s European status. Novikov himself believes (although it is not stated in the previous quote) that Russia does not deserve to be part of Europe because of its many non-European parts. A further extension of this point of view is that Russia is of Europe, but also of Asia. Its unique “Eurasian” identity could allow a Russian identity to be built on a special relationship with both Europe and East Asia (Neumann, 1998). This is a powerful proposed geography because it harnesses the population’s sense of special Russian destiny and allows it to proceed with European (and Asian) integration. This was the representation that was adopted by Lenin and Stalin; however the goal of the

157 Westernizers is clearly to rejoin the West. The East Asian connection is a means to an end, or at the most recognition of the economic power of the region. Nationalists While the viewpoint of the Westernizers was predominant in the early 1990s, especially throughout Boris Yeltsin’s reign, there was always a strong countercurrent of Nationalism. Broadly populist, this formulation of Russian identity asserted the “Russian exceptionalism” to which the Westernizers were reacting with their push for a “Eurasian” identity. This view held the Westernizers in disdain as hand wringing Europeanists consumed with guilt for the Soviet Union’s corruption and abuse. The Nationalists viewed all of the excesses of the Soviet era as the effects of interaction with the West. Marxism, totalitarianism, , and all other things associated with Russia were never originally Russian at all. Nevzorov, a Russian TV journalist had this to say: There is no future for perestroika, because it is too much of a Western idea. But the West cannot suppress the Russian soul. That people is yet able to work miracles, such as the Great Patriotic War. Russians fight against the enemy, be they hungry and empty-handed. The existence of the Russian people is not appreciated by everybody. That is why we must protect the culture and the Orthodox church with tanks. Otherwise they will be suppressed. We need to save our beloved fatherland. We have to do away with the democrats. Otherwise they will rob Russia (quoted in Neumann, 1998). This quote has clearly religious overtones (“yet able to work miracles”) that connote the viewpoint of Russia as a chosen people. Other Russian thinkers have claimed that the special role of Russia is to be the bridge between East and West and therefore serve as the focal point of world civilization. It is ironic that the Nationalists and Westernizers both formulate the same role, but for different reasons (and with unique qualities to each side’s plan). The Nationalists’ view of Russia’s relationship with Europe is the point of clearest divergence from the Westernizers. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, a Nationalist author, outlined the viewpoint this way:

158 Russia cannot return to Europe because it never belonged to it. Russia cannot join it because it is part of another type of civilization, another cultural and religious type…Any attempt to make us common with Western civilization and even to force us to join it undertaken in the past resulted in superficial borrowings, deceptive reforms, useless luxury and moral lapses…in nature there does not exist such a thing as a “Common Civilization.” The term in fact denotes the pretension of Western European civilization to the exclusive rights to universal significance (quoted in Neumann, 1998). The railing against “useless luxury and moral lapses” dovetails with Alexandr Solzhenitsyn’s call for Russia to focus on rejuvenating the Russian spirit. The call of Russian exceptionalism is very strong in most Nationalist writing. Over the span of the 1990s, both the Westernizers and the Nationalists tempered their claims and found a broad space of commonality, but their previous positions are useful for analyzing Western newspaper accounts of NATO expansion. Russia is often portrayed as being caught between the Nationalists and the Westernizers, with the West’s interest being to promote the ascendancy of the Westernizers, as in this quote from an American newspaper: “Opponents fear expanding NATO to the will strengthen the hands of Communist and nationalist hard-liners in Moscow, who call NATO enlargement a military provocation”. It is ironic that the ultimate failure of the Westernizers to make their view of Russia hegemonic is rooted in the failure of the West to accept Russia with open arms as it more or less did the rest of Eastern Europe (Neumann, 1998, p.169). In newspaper accounts of NATO expansion the two viewpoints mirror those of the internal debate in Russia. There is a theoretical basis for this phenomenon – as Hegel (1977), Cornell, and Hartmann (1998) among others have noted identity is formed through a reciprocal relationship of the Self and the Other. As historian Hans Kohn wrote (1944, p.13): “Nationalities are products of the living forces of history, and therefore always fluctuating, never rigid…They defy exact definition.” In some circumstances however it makes sense for the identities to form a synthesis of commonly accepted knowledge about who and what a group of people are. This is still contested,

159 and there may be variations on the commonly accepted identity, but there is still common ground between the Self and the Other. Thus, there are similarities between the viewpoints of the Russian Nationalists with the Western Orientalists as well as between the Russian Westernizers and the Western Russophiles. The Nationalists and Orientalists presuppose a civilizational (or just fundamental identity) difference between Russia and the West while the Westernizers and the Russophiles do not. Russia as European The contingency of Russia’s relationship within/outside Europe is visible in the myriad ways that the relationship is expressed. For instance, one journalist quoted a Russian official as saying this about NATO expansion: “…Principles of all-European security are being prepared. Russia was not invited. So is Russia not Europe? It has been Europe for thousands of years! Not like some, for only a few years.” [Washington Post, 9/9/95] This official is arguing that Russia has always been European but now is being excluded. This idea is mirrored in another article [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3/19/97] that claimed “NATO enlargement will shut Russia out from its rightful place in Europe, thereby undercutting Russia’s nascent democracy and its security cooperation with the West.” These journalists see Russia as definitively European. The Los Angeles Times [5/28/95] adopted a more ambiguous position: “No matter how the new Europe defines its boundaries, Russia will always be part of the European security equation.” A Washington Post quote [3/20/97] hedges the bet entirely: “Even if Russia had not changed an iota, the country has a legitimate right to be concerned about European security; it is, after all, a European country as well as an Asian one.” The representation of Russia as European has a great deal of influence, and it is broadly similar to the representation already described of Eastern Europe as the West. Both reject the idea of “civilizations” that are fundamental to differentiate between different peoples. This is similar to the ideas of the Russian Westernizers, who have internalized many of the values of the West. It is the view of both groups that Russia can be fully integrated into Europe/the West if it makes some efforts to reform. This representation is found in 167 of the 586 quotes that describe Russia in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “C” for a breakdown). Broadly the

160 subgroup of Western journalists within this larger group portrays Russia as not inherently aggressive, and even a potential member of NATO in the future, as seen in this Newsday [6/28/2001] quote: “One of his [the President’s] more revealing comments came on the subject of NATO expansion to include not only the Baltic states that border Russia but also the possibility that Russia itself one day might became part of NATO.” Proponents of this representation believe that Russia/the Soviet Union’s history is a product of historical contingency and therefore Russia’s future is not predetermined. Thus, they also believe that Russia is not “naturally” expansionist. This representation of Russia often puts a “human” face on Russia. It grants them an epistemological stance similar to the West, and seeks to understand their point of view. For instance, several American newspapers portrayed NATO expansion as an antagonizing or threatening gesture towards Russia. Regardless of its motives, this viewpoint seeks to understand how Russia would interpret the event. For example, The New York Times [4/29/98] wrote that “It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile,” and Newsday [4/29/98] wrote that “[Senator Joe] Biden should at least be honest and admit NATO expansion is an ‘in your face’ gesture to Moscow.” Quotes similar to these help to promote the idea that Russians react to stimuli similarly to the way Westerners react to stimuli, that is to say, from their viewpoint. This is a holdover from the Cold War, when the USA and the Soviet Union were forced to seek to understand each other’s point of view because each side had the power to influence the international situation with its enormous military and nuclear power. A similar form of “humanizing” influence can be found in the way that a sympathetic link is created between the reader and Russians through descriptions of Russia as “excluded” or “deceived”. The idea that Russia is “excluded” is often used to foreshadow a grave harm to the international system should that exclusion become permanent. For instance, The New York Times [4/27/98] argues against a permanent exclusion: “Why exclude the Russians? One of the few propositions on which historians tend to agree is that peace settlements work best when they include rather than exclude former adversaries.” Therefore, it is in the West’s interest not to provoke Russia by

161 excluding it. The end point for the Russians is obvious – Russia excluded from NATO is inevitably excluded from Europe. These American newspaper quotes bear this out: “Baker, et al, want, ultimately, a NATO containing all of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe up to the Russian borders. Its target is unmistakable: Russia. It tells Russia in clear terms that it remains excluded from the community of Western nations,” [St. Petersburg Times, 2/23/98] and “The expansion of NATO, however, excludes Russia at the same time it moves NATO borders 300 miles eastward – the recent pact providing for regular NATO-Russia consultation not withstanding.” [Los Angeles Times, 7/7/97] Other commenters pointed out that the end result is not the exclusion of Russia from Europe, but the division of Europe into two groupings. This alternate definition of Europe is best expressed here: “The common denominator of NATO expansion and a single European currency is the division of Europe into two camps, the prosperous democracies and those not so strong or fortunate. NATO expansion would give that division political and military form, and the common currency would reinforce it economically. Russia, on all counts, would be left squarely in the excluded camp.” [New York Times, 5/28/97] These quotes, despite their small differences in form, all put the Russian perspective first. Similarly, some newspapers cite the sense of betrayal felt by Russians. They feel generally as if the US is taking advantage of Russia’s weakened state, and more specifically they feel like NATO expansion into Eastern Europe is a direct abrogation of the promise made to Gorbachev by George Bush to not expand NATO into Eastern Europe. This was the price that the US paid to facilitate the reunion of the two Germanies, and the US has now reneged on that bill. This is described by this Newsday quote: You also have to wonder if Bush recalls that it was his father’s administration that made a commitment to then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not extend its military forces into former Warsaw Pact countries, let alone parts of the USSR, in exchange for a peaceful reunification of Germany, and an orderly Soviet exit from Eastern Europe. Does Bush have any appreciation for the sense of betrayal here? [6/28/2001]

162 Other journalists described this same situation as a “humiliation”, “the reneging of a promise”, and “unjustified”. Some directly blamed the West for its treatment of Russia instead of implying that the agreement was just forgotten. For instance, this Washington Post [3/20/97] quote shows the degree of duplicity in the deal to unify Germany: The spirit of the Two Plus Four Treaty, which unified Germany, implied that eastward expansion of the Western alliance would stop there. As the Warsaw Pact was still in place at that time, the Soviets did not think to seek further assurances. The Russians now know, to their chagrin, that agreements with the West are worth nothing unless every contingency is spelled out in writing. Other journalists equate the Russian view with diplomatic pouting: “There is a widespread feeling that Russia has been dealt ‘an historical injustice’ by allowing German unification and the peaceful dissolution of the Warsaw Pact without receiving appropriate concessions from the West.” [Washington Post, 2/4/96] One journalist described the reaction in the West to this as “outrage” [Montreal Gazette, 3/18/97]. In either event, the Russians are humanized and given a perspective of their own. In a separate situation, a British journalist points out that the Russians are upset as well because the forces that were allocated to them under the Cold War-era Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty are now in the hands of NATO via Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s reversal of alliances. This also reinforces the perspective of the Russians. Other journalists highlighted the humanity of the Russians in similar ways. For instance, this Newsday article [11/11/2001] showed one way in which the Americans have victimized the Russians: “Specifically, Putin wants a better trading relationship with the United States. Just doing away with the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik amendment would be a help. That legislation, which withholds normal trading status, was designed in the 1970s to punish the Soviet Union for not allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate. It’s amazing that it’s still on the books more than a decade after the Berlin Wall fell.” Other journalists highlighted the humiliation that is endemic to the way the US treats Russia in this time of just one superpower. Newsday [3/15/98] wrote that “Russia simply isn’t in a position to stop the West from strutting,” while another Newsday article [2/25/99] had

163 this to say about NATO expansion: “The Russians, of course, see bringing these nations into NATO – states on its borders, many of which had been part of the Soviet Union – as a direct challenge to their long-term security interests and a deliberate humiliation.” In a similar vein, a journalist for the Los Angeles Times wrote that “Yeltsin’s critics in Russia have cast his acceptance of the charter as capitulation to the Western alliance and as a humiliating reminder of which side won the Cold War,” [5/27/97] and in another article [3/12/98] forecast that “Humiliating a former adversary is a dangerous thing for a great power to do, and we may pay dearly for our arrogance.” Some journalists claim that the rumblings of Russian humiliation can already be heard: “Isolation and wounded pride produce poor decisions, and the Duma’s support of Iraq (like its ongoing refusal to ratify the START II Treaty) is just one of many such decisions that have come from the angry chambers of Russia’s Parliament.” [Boston Globe, 12/19/97] The Russian perspective is also available in discussions of the Russian geopolitical view. This uniformly portrays the Russians as afraid of being surrounded and highly alarmed. The Russian perspective is directly invoked in this quote from the Hartford Courant [7/13/97]: “Ask also the Russians, who are convinced that NATO aims to encircle their country and prevent its re-emergence as a major player in the world [what they think of NATO expansion].” The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel [5/4/98] cited the long historical perspective of the Russians: “For historical and other reasons, the Russians see NATO enlargement as a threat. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is not only provocative in itself; it also sets the stage for an even more drastic provocation: the inclusion of other new members, notably the three Baltic countries that border Russia.” The inclusion of geopolitical perspective is interesting because it highlights the rival visions of the geopolitical realm that can come from different perspectives. For example, in this Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [7/21/97] quote the Russian perspective is minimized by putting it in quotation marks: “Their [Senators] concerns focus on the long-term impact of expanding NATO on Russia, always fearful of ‘encirclement,’ and on the effect of enlargement on the cohesion of NATO itself.” Another way to demonstrate the humanity of the Russian people is to directly refute the claim that there are any Nationalists at all. One journalist for The New York

164 Times [5/2/98] took up this charge: “In short, Russians have stubbornly refused to live up to the caricature foisted on them by some Western commentators: embittered nationalists ready to lash out at the West at the first opportunity.” This is a clear attempt to draw a parallel between the Russian people and the populations of the West. All of these factors combine to paint a portrait of Russians as human, or at least intelligible to the readers in the West, rather than just a monolithic Other to which morality does not apply. This is not the only way that Russia was portrayed as European in newspaper articles. Additionally, some journalists attempted to convince the audience that Russia is no longer a threat. Often their tactic for this was to ascribe Western attributes to Russia. First and foremost among these assertions was that Russia is democratic. This is at the heart of what it means to be European in modern day parlance. For instance, The Denver Post [4/29/98] argued against NATO expansion by making this connection: “[Defense Secretary] Cohen is asking the only relevant question: Why would the United States expand a Cold War alliance against a democratic Russia that wants to be part of Western Europe, when those resources and energies could be used at home and abroad so much more productively?” The journalist is getting at the heart of the issue – were Russia not democratic, expansion might make sense. This is because in this view, democracy along with a desire to become “part of Western Europe” means that Russia is a rational actor (i.e., they want to be like us) and therefore something that we understand and is not a threat. The assertion of democracy was backed up with facts such as “Russia successfully held parliamentary and presidential elections,” [New York Times, 5/11/97] and “…the Russians have peacefully withdrawn their troops from Eastern Europe, abandoned Communism, established democratic rule, disbanded the Soviet Union and agreed to conventional and nuclear arms reduction treaties, in which they gave up more than we did.” [Denver Post, 4/29/98] All of this is intended to show that they have adopted wholesale our hegemonic view of the world and how it should be run. Many journalists in fact portrayed the threat as coming from NATO because Russian democracy was seen as fragile. The fear that was explicitly stated was that the Nationalists would take over. This can be seen in these newspaper quotes: “Most of all, they fear that moving NATO’s forward line of defense too close to the Russian frontier

165 will embolden the nation’s militarists – be they communist or fascist – to crush what’s left of Moscow’s fragile democracy movement,” [St. Petersburg Times, 3/8/98] and “Given the tenuous nature of Russian democracy, the expansion of NATO, in Mr. Kennan’s view, is guaranteed to inflame ‘the nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” [Hartford Courant, 7/13/97] Both of these quotes show the valorization of the Westernization movement and the importance of that group to NATO. Other journalists described the larger transformation that Russia is undergoing, which includes but is not limited to democratic reform. For instance, the peaceful attitude of the Russians was the focus of much journalistic writing. The Los Angeles Times [7/2/97] wrote that “there is no Russian threat, nor will there be in the foreseeable future. The idea that the Russian armed forces would (or even could) cross neighboring states to invade NATO or its new Eastern partners is not only ridiculous on its face, it is also detached from any sort of credible political scenario under which such a strategy makes some sense to Moscow.” This quote asserts both that Russia is incapable of, and unwilling, to make the kind of militaristic moves that NATO is counteracting. Another less charitable journalist at Newsday [2/25/99] put it this way: “As the continues to deteriorate, does it really make any sense to continue to challenge a Russia that is not now and cannot be for years a military threat to its neighbors?” In another article Newsday [3/15/98] said that Russia could not be a threat for “seven to 10 years” and the Los Angeles Times [7/2/97] asserted that “the Russian Army no longer can be considered a fighting force and would take decades to rebuild even if work started now.” Whether a journalist thinks Russia will not attack for moral reasons (now more pacifist) or for pragmatic reasons (collapsed military), it is commonly held that Russia is no longer a threat. This takes away a psychological impetus for Othering the Russians. Of course, the Other does not necessarily need to be a threat, but it certainly strengthens the Othering process. The less powerful the urge to Other the Russians, the more European they will seem. Russia is also portrayed as a partner to the West – especially since the beginning of the so-called War on Terrorism. For example, this Boston Globe journalist portrays

166 Russia in this manner: “Putin thanked Bush for what he described as an unexpectedly ‘open, frank dialogue, confidential dialogue,’ expressing gratitude for Bush’s commitment to treating Russia as a ‘friend’.” [6/17/2001] As mentioned earlier, many journalists also mention the possibility of Russia joining NATO. These mentions range from the optimistic to the dour, as in these two examples: “Even Russia could attain full NATO membership without being in a position to exert undue influence. If Russia were a full member under such a system…it would have no prospect of blocking the admission of a deserving prospective member, even if that nation happened to have a name like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or Ukraine!” [Christian Science Monitor, 7/21/97], and “Clinton continues to hold out the prospect that even Russia could eventually join NATO, a possibility that many analysts, including some Clinton administration officials, describe as a diplomatic fiction.” [Houston Chronicle, 7/13/97] Another way that Russia is given characteristics similar to Europe or the West is to discuss the transition taking place in the economy. This is intended to show that Russia is now capitalist, and as such it has abandoned the communist centrally-planned economy that marked it as the Other to Western capitalists, the media, and those the media influence. This is expressed in many different ways, such as “Yeltsin...presses on with his own sometimes faltering program of economic democratization at home.” This one is particularly interesting because of the conflation of democracy and free market capitalism into “economic democratization” [Houston Chronicle, 6/1/97]. This is an odd mixture, and the net effect of this term might be to damp down opposition to free markets, which can be unpopular among the poor who benefit the least and suffer the most. Democracy, however, is more universally appreciated and therefore is draped over the free market to make it more palatable. The Houston Chronicle [6/1/97] described how “the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reached an agreement with Russia to help develop its fledgling free-market economy.” Russia is portrayed as having an economy similar to its democracy – “nascent”, “struggling”, and “anemic,” and therefore in need of assistance. The weakness of Russia’s economy and democracy should not be seen as creating a schism between Russia and the West – it is the nature of their institutions, not the strength of them that is important in establishing

167 similarity, as in this quote from The New Orleans Times-Picayune [7/16/96]: “Paradoxically, as Russia becomes more like America – that is, democratic and inward- looking, with real political parties, interest groups, lobbies, and a free press all tugging at decision makers – it becomes harder for Washington to predict or control Russian behavior.” Cultural colonization has also made Russia resemble the United States. This can be seen in a “landslide of B-rated American [that] ousted national films” and “American evangelists knocking on the Russian soul, via interpreters, on three Moscow TV channels.” [Washington Post, 12/6/94] Additionally, “Macdonald’s Big Mac has been proclaimed as well-nigh the elder brother of borscht.” [Ibid] In all of these ways Russia is portrayed as being European or Western – through the attempt to humanize the population, through downplaying the threat to Europe from Russia, and through the attempt to ascribe characteristics of Russia that are familiar to Europe and the West. All of these combine to describe Russia in a way that is similar to the representation of “Eastern Europe as the West”. For example, this quote from the St. Petersburg Times [2/23/98] both humanizes the Russian people and portrays them as similar to those of the West: “Russia is now weak and disorganized; it will not be so forever. It is a huge country, with immense natural resources and a large, gifted and educated nation. It will again be powerful, and if not denied its place in the West, it will remember, and sooner or later react.” This quote is powerful – it describes Russia and the Russians in ways that the people of the West like to think of themselves: “powerful”, as well as “gifted and educated.” Furthermore, it asserts silently that Russia is of the West – or else why would Russia react to not being included? All that is needed, as in the representation of “Eastern Europe as the West”, is time. A Washington Post [2/24/97] quote shows the internalized value given to Western-ness in this teleological view of Russia: “Much of the younger generation wants Russia to evolve as a ‘normal country’ – a peaceful prospering nation where they can make money and get on with their lives and not bother anyone else.” A similar vision can be found in this Newsday [11/7/93] quote: “When will it [Russia] become a normal state, one that cooperates with and does not dominate its neighbors?” This quote shows the goals that are associated with Europeanization. In this view, though, Europeanization is in fact possible; there is

168 no civilizational difference between the two sides. This representation serves as the polar opposite of the description of Russia as the Orient. Russia as the Orient It is perhaps best to begin this section with a quote from The Washington Post [12/6/94] that best explains this representation: “[Russian Prime Minister] Kozyrev’s political advisor, Galina Sidorova, complained in an article Saturday of this Western tendency of simultaneously accelerating and braking its partnership with Russia. She said that the West’s reservations are based on a generally unspoken sense of Russia’s ‘peculiarity’ as a nation with ‘an allegedly eternal incompatibility with the surrounding world’.” It is this section’s purpose to outline that if that view of Russia is unspoken, it is most certainly not unwritten among both Russians and those in the West. The view of those who hold this representation in their minds is that Russia is fundamentally non- European, and non-Western in a way that is similar to the way that Eastern Europe was represented as Oriental. This representation is found in 153 of the 586 quotes that describe Russia in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “C” for a breakdown). For instance, this view is expressed in a Glasgow Herald [2/5/96] quote of Helmut Kohl that “the desire of eastern European neighbors to join Nato ‘is supported by the democratic nations in Europe.’” Since Russia does not feel positively towards NATO expansion, it can be assumed that Russia is not European. The representation of Russia as the Orient is strong in the West, and is reflected reciprocally in . Both of these perspectives see Russia as fundamentally different than the West. One Financial Times [7/4/97] article described the Russian position on NATO expansion as this: “Knowledgeable Russians disclaim any fear of Western military strength and, indeed, their objections to Nato’s expansion are of a more fundamental kind – in fact more psychological than strategic. They feel excluded from Europe and pushed back into the Eurasian steppe.” This exclusion from Europe is critical to the understanding of this representation. Because it has been Othered, Russia feels rejected – as can be seen in this Daily Yomiuri [10/30/95] quote: “A nation that was practically unanimous and enthusiastic in its willingness to rejoin the international community, now feels spurned and deeply insulted.” The “spurning” stems from the lack

169 of inclusion that Russia felt after modifying its systems of government and economy to more closely approximate those of the West. Instead of acceptance, however, they were still portrayed in an Orientalist manner that resonated with the views of the Nationalists as described earlier. A very common Orientalist theme in the newspapers is the metaphor of the bear as a representative of the Russian nation. For example, Newsday [2/25/99] wrote that “While there will be plenty of back slapping about how the Cold War was won, there is also going to be a bunch of Eastern Europe leaders knocking at the door, saying: It’s our turn now. And a seriously wounded but wary Russian bear will be watching.” The bear is a substitute for Russia, and this carries with it some very iconic qualities. For example, as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the bear metaphor portrays Russia as being physical and brutish while consequently portraying Europe as the opposite of that: aristocratic (as in the British lion and the German eagle). In newspapers though, the bear metaphor becomes more multifaceted. One additional meaning that can be derived is the sense of danger that bears cause in humans. This is manifest in The Financial Times [1/7/97] headline “Russia bares claws over Nato expansion plans,” and in a Newsday [11/11/2001] article cautioning that “the Russian bear will growl again.” Similarly, these Denver Post quotes directly associate the bear with aggression: “Oh, but you don’t understand Russia, the NATO expanders say. It’s as much a bear as the Soviet Union. It will re-occupy Eastern Europe as soon as it’s strong enough,” [4/29/98] and “They know that if Russia should turn into a bear again, there’s ample time to deter it.” [Ibid] In other words, Russia is only a bear if it is aggressive. More unusual references to the bear metaphor include this rather disturbingly erotic Financial Times [7/4/97] quote: “However, to watch the US over-extend itself strategically would be as undesirable as to see it become too intimate with the bear.” In contrast to the portrayal of the Russian bear as fundamentally aggressive, sometimes the Russian bear is often seen as reacting mindlessly to Western actions. It is expected to behave like a passive recipient of Western impetus, as in newspaper references to “riling the bear” [Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 4/30/98], “baiting the bear” [Washington Post, 7/18/95], or “offending the bear”. [St. Louis Star-Dispatch, 4/19/98]

170 Newspapers continue this theme when they describe Russia and Russians as fundamentally mindless or irrational. For instance, newspapers have characterized the Russians as paranoid and alarmist. This can be seen in these two quotes: “In both cases, the Americans will see the need to compensate the Russians and respect their perceived interests – even their paranoia,” [Financial Times, 7/4/97] and “The Russians have always been a paranoid people.” [Glasgow Herald, 11/20/96] Both of these quotes refer to the essential differences in geopolitical perspective between the West and Russia. A Newsday [12/11/96] headline achieved the same effect: “Dangerous expansion: Opening NATO to former Warsaw Pact nations plays right into Moscow’s paranoia.” The Russians, with over 20 million casualties in the 20th century, are less than assured by the West’s promises of non-aggression. Therefore, they are portrayed as paranoid in an attempt to devalue their opinion. Similar descriptions of Russia also play off of the “less than rational” view of its behavior: “Russian responses have ranged from the hysterical to the absurd,” [Journal of Commerce, 10/16/95] and “The goal of a pan-European collective security system is too important to be held hostage to Russia’s phobias.” [Singapore Straits Times, 2/27/97] Another of the bear metaphor’s cognates is that Russia is stupid, or dumb like a bear. This is also validates in non-bear-related quotes, such as this quote from The Financial Times [7/4/97]: “In theory, an enlightened Russia might conclude that a new era is dawning that will end centuries of uncertainty, during which it had been threatened by Poles, Swedes, the French, Germans, and others.” The implication is that Russians are not smart enough to see their own “national interest.” All of these contribute to draw a distinction between the West and Russia, from the implication of irrationality to the attribution of stupidity and paranoia. The question of Russia’s level of civilization has been at issue for centuries. As mentioned earlier, the Self/Other nexus has often been located on the border between “Europe” and Russia, using the civilization/barbarity division as a convenient issue for the split to crystallize on. That this is still an issue is visible in newspaper quotes, such as this contribution from The Guardian [1/6/96]: “He [Foreign Minister Kozyrev] renounced interest in Russia’s backyard and said Russia’s first duty was to rejoin the community of ‘civilized’ Western countries.” That quote is interesting because it shows again the way

171 that the West’s view has been internalized in Russia. The civilization question is directly addressed as well by Americans, such as Philip Merrill (the American former assistant Secretary-General of NATO): “the first [thing the US should be doing after the end of the Cold War] is to integrate Russia into the community of civilized nations.” Other journalists argued (subtly or otherwise) that Russia was neither of the West nor of Europe, like in these quotes: “The best thing we can do for these countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – is to bring Russia into the West so that they will not be in the middle of another confrontation between the United States and Russia,” [Boston Globe, 4/30/98] and “Some critics contend Albright has been so focused on Europe that she has paid too little attention to other critical parts of the world, such as Russia.” [Baltimore Sun, 7/20/98] Both of these assert that there is a fundamental division between the West/Europe and Russia. This is even more strongly asserted in this quote from The New York Times [4/27/98]: “NATO expansion, they [leading figures in a candidate country] boasted, will demonstrate once and for all that the Russians never have been and never will be part of European civilization.” Taken by themselves, these quotes would indicate that there is a civilizational difference between Russia and the West like the one proposed by Samuel Huntington. Much of the rhetoric in the newspapers about Russia defines Russia as a threat. The process being undergone here is the opposite of the process that took place in the representation of Russia as European. By giving Russia the designation of enemy the newspapers provide a strong justification for Othering Russia. Often this delineation of a threat uses Orientalist characterizations of the East as the source of invasion to provide the cultural context for the threat. An Ottawa Citizen [3/19/99] reference to the “barbarians on the steppes” sets the stage for more of the same. The assertion that Russia is somehow “historically” aggressive and invasive is made in newspaper quotes such as “Russia’s history gives Poland, the three Baltic republics and other neighbors good reason to seek protection, and the resurgent politics of resentment here only confirms their fears,” [Washington Post, 12/6/94] and “…[US Assistant Secretary of State] Talbott wrote that NATO must be prepared for the possibility that ‘Russia will abandon democracy and return to the threatening patterns of international behavior that have

172 sometimes characterized its history.” [Baltimore Sun, 5/1/97] That Russian history is characterized by aggression and expansion is not disputed by this journalist, but the element of irrationality is added (the meaning of which has already been mentioned): “Such irrational opposition [to NATO expansion], from democrats and antidemocrats alike, suggests that 300-year-old imperialist habits are alive and well in Russia.” [Newsday, 11/7/93] The truth of these statements is rarely questioned, but is often elaborated on at length. One American quote is especially worthy of quoting at length: Expansionism is in Russia’s national DNA. Richard Pipes, the Harvard historian, calculates that for approximately 150 years, from the middle of the 16th century to the end of the 17th, the Muscovite state’s territorial acquisitions year by year averaged an area equal in size to modern Holland. “Others have built empires,” says Pipes, “but no country has expanded so relentlessly and held on so tenaciously to its conquests as has Russia.” Henry Kissinger notes that a nation spanning, as even post-Soviet Russia does, 11 time zones (St. Petersburg is closer to New York than to Vladivostok, which is closer to Seattle than to Moscow) should not feel claustrophobic, yet Russia still manifests “creeping expansionism”, exemplified by the two Russian divisions in Georgia. [New Orleans Times-Picayune, 6/13/96] This quote is interesting because it attributes Russia’s behavior to its DNA – implying that it is a natural division between “us” and “them”. “We” do not want to expand, while “they” cannot help it. It again is a manifestation of the civilizational differences. It also uses broad historical generalities to make contemporary statements about the nature of Russia. The trans-historical nature of Oriental Russia allows the scholars and journalists to make that statement. Further attempts to give historical justification for the exclusion of Russia can be found in other newspaper accounts of NATO expansion, which described Russia as “historically malevolent” [Hartford Courant, 7/13/97] and “working aggressively to re- establish Moscow’s political dominion.” [Washington Post, 2/19/2001] The trans- historical expansionist nature of Russia is again invoked in this New Orleans Times- Picayune [5/1/98] quote, which skips across centuries of history in a single paragraph

173 while seeking to have the audience identify with Russia’s victims in a clear attempt to create the Self and the Other: From the dawn of its history, when the Mongol Horde mysteriously receded at the end of the 15th century, Muscovy (the predecessor of Russia) has subjugated surrounding peoples, pushing its boundaries west. First to fall was the Republic of Novgorod, a democracy that sought to align itself with the Polish Commonwealth. Ivan the Terrible exterminated its citizens in reprisal. This is how Russia was born. Let’s skip to the 20th century. Lenin, to gain some respite, proclaimed the sovereignty and independence of nations following the Bolshevik Revolution. By 1924, he had subverted all the fledgling nations in Eastern Europe save for Poland and the Baltic States; those Russia chose to invade together with Adolf Hitler. None of these (rather indisputable) facts are put into context, and the alternate vision of Russia as a European nation conquering and colonizing Asia (where far more expansionism took place) is not mentioned (perhaps the reason for the skipping of five centuries worth of history). The lesson to be learned from all this selective history is summed up in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch [4/19/98]: “A country that expanded at the rate of one Belgium every two years for three centuries, does not easily learn the virtues of self-containment.” Russia is bound to be expansionist, and that growth will be an Oriental incursion into Western soil. Similar ideas are used in this Denver Rocky Mountain News [10/10/95] quote: “Although the Soviet empire has crumbled, Moscow’s former vassals still fear the Russian monolith.” This quote is quite evocative; it simultaneously homogenizes and dramatizes Russia (“the monolith”) and also addresses Eastern Europe using the language of feudalism. The inevitable expansion of Russia is often combined rhetorically with reference to Russia’s geographic size as a means of portraying Russia as the bulky and dangerous signifier of the “body” to contrast with the West’s “mind” (as mentioned previously in reference to the bear metaphor). For instance, The Montreal Gazette [3/30/97] wrote that “one has to live next door to a giant, even a sleeping one, to understand the feeling of fear.” The St. Louis Post-Dispatch [4/19/98] called on the image of Russia as huge to

174 refer to it as a “bully”: “For now, it [Russia] is restricting its bullying just to near neighbors, the colonies it ruled during the Soviet era.” The same article described Russia as “the largest country on the planet” and the Los Angeles Times [3/12/98] referred to it as a “vast and important country.” Sometimes the bully imagery is mixed with the “threat from the East” rhetoric, as in this Washington Post [7/7/95] quote: “When after Yeltsin’s objections, the administration initially backed off support for NATO expansion in mid-1994, Russia proceeded with a barrage of aggressive behavior in neighboring republics, threatened Ukraine with economic blackmail, acted as a bully at international forums, wooed Iran and Iraq, tried to topple Azerbaijan’s president and launched a war against Chechnya.” Russia is portrayed as an aggressive and enormous bully, which is not set into any context such as another country’s behavior. A further extension of the Oriental imagery in regard to Russia can be found in discussions of Russia’s democracy. While generally the progress of Russian democracy is touted it is often given the caveat that it may unravel at any moment due to some natural tendency of Russia towards authoritarianism. This is not unlike how Eastern Europe was portrayed, as this quote from The Washington Post [1/9/94] makes clear: “To make matters worse, the embryonic democracies in Eastern Europe are noticeably fragile and unstable. Russia is not the only Eastern country vulnerable to a takeover by rabidly authoritarian political elements.” The historical nature of Russia’s authoritarian streak is clearly visible in another New York Times [5/8/95] quote: “Mr. Yeltsin, who looks and acts more like a party general secretary or czar these days than a populist democrat – perhaps inevitable given Russia’s culture and history – remains the final arbiter, though sometimes even his orders and decrees are ignored.” The inevitability of Russia’s desire to have a single titular ruler is apparently only rivaled by its disdain for democratically elected rulers. In addition, the leadership in Russia is described as being poor and corrupt. The Daily Telegraph [2/21/97], in describing an American mission to Moscow, had this to say: “Aside from the usual diplomatic courtesies, Mrs. Albright could have passed for a Wild West gunslinger trying to bring order to a town run by outlaws.” This fundamental

175 lack of respect for the law is a trademark attributed to an Oriental-style government (in this case, Boris Yeltsen’s): He works relatively short hours, ducks in and out of issues, sometimes make decrees that contradict the policy of his Government and sees very few outsiders or foreign ambassadors. He is heavily reliant on a group of aides with narrow experience and conservative views who have proven their devotion to him. These loyalists are based within the huge presidential bureaucracy and control the unelected National Security Council, a kind of personal politburo that is dominant on military, security, and sometimes economic issues. [New York Times, 5/8/95] The corruption in Russia is not seen as limited to government; Russia is seemingly rife with crony capitalism: “Private investment in Russia is limited by corruption, extortion and a lack of laws protecting investors from arbitrary government action.” [Denver Rocky Mountain News, 4/23/97] Through all of these references Russia is created as an Oriental space of despotism, lawlessness, and corruption. A sense of difference is also cultivated through describing Russia as Asian or Slavic. While both of these are true they are but two of several possible descriptors that could be used. Alternatives include Orthodox, European, Indo-European, Christian, and a myriad of others, which all have different connotations to them. Asian and Slavic though are used to distinguish between “us” and “them” in a way that is very culturally specific. For instance, the Los Angeles Times [1/14/97] described a treaty of economic union between Russia and Belarus thus: “The two Slavic neighbors signed a union treaty in April at the initiative of Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, but the goal of political and economic integration was shelved in Moscow after Yeltsin’s reelection in July.” The description as Slavic is supposed to give some sort of “natural” explanation for the treaty, and the subtext is that Slavic countries are linked in some genetic way. Similarly, Russian Slavocentrism has been attributed to the Balkans in such a way that Russia is associated with the worst despots of that region. For example, these two newspaper quotes show how Russian sympathies with the Serbs are troublesome for the West: “The war in Bosnia has been adding to the strain. The Russians, historic allies of the Serbs, have tried to resist Western-led efforts to punish the Serbs for their aggressions against

176 Bosnian Muslims,” [Baltimore Sun, 12/7/94] and “Before NATO expansion came along, the nationalists had other issues – US oil companies’ plot to turn Russia into a ‘raw materials of the West’ for example, or the West’s conspiracy against Russia’s Slavic brothers in – and after the NATO issue subsides they will find others.” [Washington Post, 2/24/97] Portrayed as having allegiances to some place other than the West, Russia is also seen as pre-modern in its alleged preoccupation with ethnic ties. The representation of Russia as the Orient harnesses the cultural power of a very successful discourse (Orientalism) and uses it to explain Russia and how Russia fits into the NATO expansion picture. This is particularly important because expansion becomes more and more important as NATO moves east. If Russia continues to be seen as the Oriental power that NATO is designed to contain, then it will never be allowed in and tension will rise as the border moves closer to Russia’s heartland. No amount of reform on Russia’s part will be able to shake the split between Self/Other that dominates NATO identity (and all identities). The very longevity of the Oriental perspective gives it weight and significance. Russia as Geopolitical Rival The representation of Russia as geopolitical rival bears a certain amount of similarity to the representation of Eastern Europe as geopolitical space. Both representations use the supposedly objective study of geopolitical facts to render judgments about policy. In Russia’s case, this boils down to two questions that are also related to the first two representations of Russia. The first question the journalists ask is, does Russia want to attack? The second question then is, how powerful are they? These are the “value-free” questions that the journalistic practitioners of geopolitics ask very often in the newspaper debate. The objective answer, of course, varies greatly from one person to another because the answer an “expert” gives is highly prejudiced by their view of Russia as either Oriental or European (or some combination of both). Because of this, there is a greater amount of overlap between this representation and other representations of Russia. The other representations often utilize the geopolitical discourse as a means of justifying their stance, while practitioners of geopolitics often use cultural claims as a basis for their decisions (although they would deny it). This representation is found in

177 161 of the 586 quotes that describe Russia in newspaper articles covering NATO expansion (see appendix “C” for a breakdown). There are essentially three camps within this representation. The first group holds that Russia is now a satisfied state and no longer has any imperial ambitions. An example of this position can be found in a quote from The Montreal Gazette [7/11/97]: “Why risk annoying the Russians at all, when nobody believes that Moscow wants to or could attack westward anyway?” The Guardian [10/29/97] added to the sense of security in regards to Russia by writing that “They [NATO financial planners] also assume that as Russia poses no immediate military threat, the largest reinforcement Nato would need to deploy into Eastern Europe for ‘crisis management’ would be a corps of several divisions – which the rapid reaction headquarters that went to Bosnia could already handle.” The New York Times [10/16/97] made the same type of remark: “Russia no longer presents a military or political threat to Europe. It is a nascent democracy with a struggling market economy and a hollow conventional military force.” Proponents of this type of view hold that Russia’s days as an imperial power are over with, and that eventually (if not now) Russia will become a Westernized, Europeanized country, with no outstanding territorial ambitions. This argument quite obviously jibes best with the representation of Russia as European. The second group believes that Russia is a Great Power and has some ambitions, but a very limited (or non-existent) ability to pursue them. The term Great Power is particularly interesting because it signals a return to the pre-superpower era for Russia and possibly the world. “Great Power” has historically referred to one of a group of states that each had a sphere of influence. The goal of the “Great Powers” was ostensibly to coordinate their spheres so as to avoid conflict, but Realpolitik dictated that they seek to maximize their own interests. This time period, prior to World War II, was the prime era for geopolitical thinking. Many journalists described Russia as a Great Power, thus proscribing a role for it in the international system. For instance, newspapers described Russia’s situation with these quotes: “Any great power would chafe at such constraints and the subordination they symbolize,” [Newsday, 2/23/97] and “For great powers, after all, it feels like a surrender to offer to join the alliance of their former enemies.”

178 [Washington Post, 12/31/96] The Daily Telegraph added that “Russia feels happy with the new reality. It demands a special status ‘as a great power’ within Europe’s security structures,” [4/29/95] and “Nato is putting together a comprehensive package of sweeteners for Moscow, including a Nato-Russia charter, which the Russians have demanded as a way of underlining their status as a great power.” [2/21/97] As a Great Power, Russia is expected to defend its local interests but is largely dismissed as a threat to American global (and European) hegemony. The Wellington Dominion [7/8/97] shows the ephemeral nature of Russian military power: “He says Russia’s military is in a state of crisis with, for example, fewer than half having the warm hats they need in winter and only 10 percent having full uniforms.” The Guardian [2/7/97] added that “Russia’s armed forces are in such a ‘horrifying state’ that the reliability of its nuclear weapons is in doubt.” This representation serves as a middle ground in the representations of Russia’s international geopolitical role. It serves to bolster the representation of Russia as European as well – for there are few things so European as a Great Power. The third group believes that Russia is a “sleeping giant” and even if Russia is weak now it will soon resume its imperial challenge to the West. This quite clearly points toward the representation of Russia as the Orient. The never-ending challenge to the West is the hallmark of the Oriental view of Russia. The timelessness of the antagonism and the fundamental aggression inherent to the East signify a clash of civilizations like the one Huntington asserts. The Times of London [5/10/95] provides an example: “Particularly alarming, according to many Western observers, have been Moscow’s attempts to restore Russia’s hegemony over much of the former Soviet Union, its willingness to sell arms and nuclear technology to enemies of the West, and the military ruthlessness it has revealed in prosecuting the war in Chechenia.” This example portrays Russia as being motivated to expand. The Houston Chronicle [4/30/98] documents the Russian ability to do so: “Many analysts believe it [NATO expansion] is a strategically smart move. Noting that Russia remains a potent nuclear military power even if it is no longer communist, Annelise Anderson, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, called NATO expansion ‘the right policy’.” It is this fear of a revanchist Russia that motivates those who hold this view. As can be

179 seen from the previous quote, the idea that NATO must expand is usually (but not always) the cornerstone of the plans of those policymakers that adopt this view. “William Safire ([in his] column, May 7) argues that the real reason for NATO expansion it to protect the nations of Eastern Europe from Russia, which ‘with its resources and educated population, will rise again’ and ‘will threaten again’”. [New York Times, 5/11/97] It is only a matter of time, for those who hold this view. Summary of Russia in NATO Russia is portrayed in newspaper accounts of NATO expansion in a manner that parallels closely the views of Eastern Europe. Still, for those involved in the debate Russia is perhaps more critical in decisions of expansion than Eastern Europe itself. The geopolitical discourse leaves a great mark here – with journalists, government officials, and lobbyists each claiming to have the objective view of the region. Nevertheless, each is colored by their own views of , the Russian military, the Russian mind, etc. which are all mere snapshots and representations of the “reality”. The preoccupation of these people with Russia’s intentions, capabilities, and history all illustrate the centrality of Russia to the construction of NATO. While the “nature” of Eastern Europe would logically be more important to NATO’s identity because they are actually to be included, instead the debate centers on Russia (although it does not dominate all discussion). Russia in EU Expansion That Russia is somehow different than the rest of Eastern Europe, at least in the minds of Western journalists, is clear from the newspaper record. The sense of discontinuity that is perceived in mental maps as one crosses the imaginary border between the rest of Eastern Europe and Russia is extremely palpable and is linguistically marked in this Daily Telegraph quote [2/23/2002]: “Other central and eastern European countries to signal their interest in signing up to the EU, possibly by 2010, include Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Slovak Republic. Then, of course, there is Russia itself.” Russia in this quote is separated from the rest of the group and given its own sentence to emphasize its uniqueness and weight. Nevertheless, there is a perceived inextricable relationship between Russia and the rest of Eastern

180 Europe, perhaps due to the enormous impact that the Soviet Union had on Eastern Europe over 50 years of domination. This is denoted by the addition of “itself” to “Russia”; implying that the previously mentioned applicants are all tinged with Russian-ness. Russian elites, however, view Russia as European and aspire to EU membership: “The Russian prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, spelt out yesterday Russia’s ambition to become a full member of the European Union as part of its strategy for global economic integration and closer co-operation with the West.” [The Guardian, 7/19/1997] Later, Chernomyrdin is quoted as saying that “I think that Russia should be in the European Union with all the implications and consequences, not all of which will be easy for us.” This statement is a normative one, saying that Russia “should” be in the EU. The difficulties Chernomyrdin cites are meant to be pragmatic economic ones, not cultural exclusion. In effect, Russia is asserting that the only thing preventing their membership is the state of their economy. This is not how many in the EU view the situation. In the same article the impression is given that Russia will never be allowed to join: “In private, however, senior EU officials expressed skepticism that Russia would ever be considered for full membership, not least because of its status as a European and an Asian power.” Later on, an unnamed diplomat expresses the limits of EU-Russian relations: “Russia is a hugely important partner and our new agreement holds out the prospect of an eventual full customs union between Russia and the Union.” In a different article [The Guardian, 11/5/94] one journalist outlined the “overlapping big ideas” that have been guiding post- Cold War EU policy. Significantly, the last of them is “the enlargement of the Union to take in all nation states, of whatever size, west of the Russian border.” At other points the newspaper writers treat this as common knowledge: “Lithuania being inside the EU and Russia permanently outside changes the politics of the Eastern Baltics.” It seems that Russia is the limit, beyond which Europe ceases to be Europe. The question of Russia’s European-ness is hardly a new one. As described elsewhere in this dissertation Russia’s use as Europe’s Other is well documented. The mismatch between the formal and perceived cultural border was also previously described as the imposition of Peter the Great’s court geographer, Vassily Tatishchev,

181 who moved the border from the generally accepted Don River to the Ural Mountains further east - the southernmost part of the boundary was later moved by Philipp-Johann von Strahlenberg to the Volga River and the Don River because the Urals do not completely sever the continents (Bassin, 1991). However, this was only part of the reason that Russia has been formally accepted as European while still held in disdain by most European states. During the Enlightenment, “civilization” came to be identified with the idea of progress – France and Europe were seen as chronologically more advanced than the incredibly un-modern America (Heffernan, 1998). Civilization thus became a word that could be politically empowering; the collective identity of nations really came into existence in Europe for the first time. These identities were constructed with the political elites as only a part of the equation – whereas before the only thing that mattered was the military force that elites could bring to bear, now there was a hierarchical measure of the population that also led to power. The cultural practices of the population, the size of the population, their national wealth, and their level of satisfaction all came to be descriptors of national power. Michel Foucault (1991) argues that the Enlightenment marks the beginning of population as an object of inquiry. From that point on power would be held in a complex relationship between elites and citizens. How does this impact Russia’s role in Europe? The changes in political philosophy worked their way into the internal . It no longer is possible to assert your European-ness with a series of signposts at the base of the Ural Mountains – it must be reflected in your population. This background puts Peter the Great’s reform movement into an historical context. The shaving of beards, the introduction of Western scientific principles, and other moves are attempts to change the very constitution of the Russian population. The perceived need to change the conceptualization of Russia’s population to be seen as truly European is virtually unquestionable. Only fringe groups such as the Quakers accepted a Russian role in the European balance of power. William Penn created a plan for a European Diet, in which Russia would have 10 votes (as many as France) “as seems but fit and just” (quoted in Heffernan, 1998, p.30). Penn though would soon flee Europe for new estates granted to him by the English Crown in North

182 America. His pragmatism was rare however. Most views were that Russia had a lower level of civilization. This can be seen in this quote from the Duc de Sully, who had sought a scientific partition of Europe that would leave no state unsettled. He centered his reasoning on cultural (civilizational) grounds: I say nothing of Muscovy and Russia…[the people of] these vast countries…being in part still idolators, and in part schismatics, such as Greeks and Armenians, have introduced so many superstitious practices in their worship, that there scarce remains any conformity with us among them; besides they belong to Asia at least as much as to Europe. We may indeed almost consider them as a barbarous country, and place them in the same class as Turkey, though for these five hundred years, we have ranked them among the Christian powers. (quoted in Heffernan, 1998, p.23) The significance of this quote is doubled when it is compared to an already-mentioned newspaper quote from over 350 years later: “In private, however, senior EU officials expressed skepticism that Russia would ever be considered for full membership, not least because of its status as a European and an Asian power.” This assertion of Russia’s Other-ness based on its identity as an Asian power still carries weight and explanatory value after several centuries. In fact, in the later quote it is such a strong connection as to not need follow-up explanation – it is enough to know that Russia is part Asian. The Duc de Sully was happy to elaborate though. To him, being an Asian power meant that Russia was almost a “barbarous country”. In addition to the reputation of being “barbarous”, Russia’s European credentials were in decline as Enlightenment-era Europe became more secular in its conception of the global order and the European role in it. Therefore, it was no longer enough to be part of the Respublica Christiana. The last treaty reference to this formulation of Europe was the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht (Outram, 1995, p.65). With all of these factors pushing Russia out of Europe, it became important to find another claim to European-ness. This same treaty established Russia as one of the five great powers of Europe. Nevertheless, Russia was increasingly pushed out of Europe in cultural discourse. Peter the Great strove to cast the Siberian part of Russia into the role of a colonial empire, which just

183 happened to be adjacent to the Russian homeland. This discursive move attempted to create an allusion to other empires, which had a national heartland (in the Russian case, the area west of the Urals) and a colonial periphery – in this case, (Bassin, 1991). This assertion of a European core for Russia and an Asian colonial empire found a few Western converts, but largely failed due to the decline of the Ottoman Turks as a significant threat around which to organize European identity. This required a new threat, a new Other, for Europe to conceive of itself in opposition. This historical background to Russia’s exclusion from EU consideration helps to put it in context. In the newspaper accounts of EU expansion there were very few references to Russia beyond those casting them beyond the pale of enlargement. Of those, a small minority described Russia in optimistic terms. Russia was sometimes referred to as a “developing democracy” that is no longer a geopolitical threat. There was also a small minority of articles addressing Russia in negative terms, often of human rights abuses in Chechnya. Most often, however, Russia was described using the discourse already described in the section on Eastern Europe as “economic space”. These articles varied in their prognosis for the Russian economy, often depending on the ups and downs of the Russian economy but just as often depending on the author’s optimism or pessimism in regards to Russia. Articles published contemporaneously could have radically differing visions of Russia’s future. One such contrast could be found in discussions of the speed of Russia’s reform. These varied from “I have every confidence that the reforms already started by the Russian authorities will bear fruit,” [The Guardian, 7/19/97] to the less glowing “the country is still far from having a solid, well capitalized banking system.” [The Financial Times, 5/8/98] Generally, however, newspaper writers and those they quoted were positive about eventual growth in the economy: “As far as the Russian stock market is concerned, Russia has been growing at an average of more than 5% for the past three years and there is no sign of it slowing down. Since the currency devaluation is 1998, the country has transformed itself. In natural resources alone, it has the third or fourth-largest reserves of oil globally.” [Daily Telegraph, 2/23/98] Not all the news of Russia’s emerging market was so good: “ By and large the region [Eastern Europe] has survived fears that investors

184 might withdraw capital from emerging markets in general. But countries such as Russia and Ukraine, that depend on foreign portfolio investors to finance structural budget deficits, remain most vulnerable to a possible withdrawal of foreign capital.” [The Financial Times, 5/8/98] Should foreign investors become spooked, Russia’s economy could collapse and the political system could unravel, leading back into the less-than- democratic past. Conclusion Russia serves as an important marker in the debate over EU and NATO expansion. In effect, the debate over Russia was a microcosm of the debate over Eastern Europe. The difference between those debates lies in the fact that the good things that were said about Eastern Europe were seen as, at best, marginally applicable to Russia and the negative things ascribed to Eastern Europe were doubly negative for Russia. In these debates Russia serves a dual role – it is both the incentive for many candidate countries and it is on the margins of the group that could potentially join those organizations.

185

10. REGIONS IN EU AND NATO EXPANSION

Introduction While many newspaper articles dealt only with Eastern Europe as a whole, some described various metageographies (i.e., divisions of geographic space) at a smaller scale. Indeed, just as Eastern Europe has become “common knowledge”, so too have other regions within Eastern Europe. These regions are unproblematically incorporated into discussions of Eastern Europe and the newspaper articles describing that process. Just as Eastern Europe is created and re-created in people’s minds through newspaper stories that are published about NATO and EU expansion, so are these smaller regions that are part of the overall image of Eastern Europe. These regions are generally explicit in their borders because they exist as combinations of states. This is most likely the result of the establishment of the state as the base unit of international affairs. Journalists often construct and/or harness these regions as a way to contribute “expert” knowledge of foreign affairs to their articles. By simplifying the multitude of states into several blocs it becomes possible not only to appear like an insider by knowing the groupings but also to report on NATO or EU expansion with a less detailed understanding. The first and most important of these, given the definition of Eastern Europe (somewhat arbitrarily) used by this dissertation is the already-discussed Central Europe. However, since understanding that region is so integral to understanding the parameters of this research, it was dealt with prior to discussing Eastern Europe as a whole. This section will attempt to deal with how regions that are generally encompassed within Eastern Europe (as opposed to Central Europe, which is an attempt to break away from Eastern Europe) were represented by newspaper accounts of EU and NATO expansion. The Baltic States in EU Expansion The first region to be discussed is that of the Baltic States. More so than any other region, the idea of the Baltic States figures prominently in the EU expansion

186 debate, as the admission of some or all is a topic of contention. There appears to be a high amount of commonly understood meaning to the term, in contrast to a term like Central Europe, which was perhaps so potent because it was so flexible. The Baltic States are generally understood to be Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. What is interesting about this region in particular is that the Baltic States are not generally discussed as a collection of states, but instead as a unit. This phenomenon is perhaps best seen in this quote from The Financial Times [11/19/2001]: “The advanced candidates [for EU membership] are the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, the Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia.” The Baltic States are entered as one candidate. This is particularly ironic considering the low amount of actual integration and cooperation between the Baltic States (Neumann, 1999). Their success in this region building process is attributable to their ability to cast Russia in a negative light as their Other (Jaeger, 1997). These three very different states share relatively few things: a common history of subjugation by the Soviet Union, a similar climate, and a border on the Baltic Sea. Which brings us to the another confusing aspect of this region-building project: that these three, out of all the other states that border the Baltic Sea, should get the title of “the Baltic States”. Indeed, the Baltic Sea has been the focus of a larger region-building project since the end of the Cold War. This project has many different forms, and goes by many different names, such as “Mare Balticum”, “the new Hanse”, and the “Euro-Baltic Region” (Neumann, 1999, p.132). Dovetailing with the earlier romantic ideas of Scandinavia, and encouraged by the end of Cold War bipolar relations, this region is the product of a small group’s production of knowledge. These intellectuals and foreign policy experts assert that it is a “natural region” that only now can be discerned because of the reduction of tension at the end of the Cold War. This region, however, serves a political purpose (as all do) – it is an attempt to pull Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the orbit of all the regional powers. Toomis Käbin, who works for the Swedish Export Council, had this to say to a Swedish newspaper: “In the same way as West Germany is now in charge of what was once East Germany, it seems natural that Sweden takes over responsibility for Estonia and its development (quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.133).”

187 Northern Germans argued for the same opportunity to participate in Baltic affairs, led by Social Democrat Bjorn Engholm: The close ties between the peoples [of the Baltic Sea region] are bound by the social standards, temperaments and social characteristics which in the last instance stem from the living conditions of the North: The landscape, the climate, the maritime environment and the settlement patterns. We have a stable temperament, we are not gregarious, rather a bit inaccessible, yet reliable. Our sense of social justice is well advanced. (Quoted in Neumann, 1999, p.133)” This evocation of an organic, indeed environmentally determined Baltic spirit is quite clearly a social construction (the Baltic Region) masquerading as a natural region. The Russians are the final regional power to attempt to produce a region for them to dominate. Their call for regional cooperation in the Baltic area would include the Scandinavian states, the so-called Baltic States, and the Russian federal states bordering on the Baltic. Notably excluded from this regional cooperation would be competitors Poland and Germany. This is a regional arrangement tailor-made for Russian hegemony, an attempt to re-exert power over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania while projecting influence into Scandinavia. It is in this context that the construction of the “Baltic States” region must be evaluated. It is but one of many competing region-building efforts. This one, however, is aimed at maintaining independence instead of becoming subsumed into a larger sphere of influence (the Baltic Region, the Commonwealth of Independent States, etc.). The attempt to create the “Baltic States” region is only 15-20 years old. Early attempts to map Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as Western and link to their subjugation by the Soviets found a willing audience in a Western audience that was contemporaneously hearing the Soviet Union referred to as the Evil Empire. The vocal protestations of self- identifying Baltic exiles in Sweden contributed much to the moral argument for special treatment of the “Baltic States” even before the fall of the Soviet system. Since the end of the Cold War though all real functional cooperation between the “Baltic States” has come to a standstill. Estonian involvement in region-building activities in the “Nordic” region is partly to be blamed. Seen as ethnically and culturally

188 very similar to Finland (same language, common history) Estonia has been more successful at projecting itself as an advanced, European state because of its Nordic links. This has caused it to spurn its fellow “Baltic States” as a possible anchor in the European integration process, as could be seen when Latvia and Lithuania asked Estonia to be part of a joint application to the Nordic Council. This overture was rejected. Despite the lack of real cooperation since the end of the Cold War, the “Baltic States” label has been perpetuated in media sources like the newspapers analyzed in this project. The Baltic States were represented in a multitude of ways. First, it was represented as “fast-growing” economically, privatizing better than most ex-communist states, drawing in foreign investment, and are generally in the group of nations in the forefront of economic transformation and EU expansion. This idea was bolstered with quotes such as: “The three little Baltic republics are still poor, and held back by the miserable weakness of the Russian market, but (with Estonia clearly in the lead) they are remarkably high up the learning curve for countries that have been independent for less than a decade.” [The Independent, 12/13/99] This quote paints an image of the Baltic States as children with the West as their proud parents. Furthermore, they are threatened by Russia but outdistancing their Eastern European neighbors in “learning” how to be Western. The Baltic States (or often just “the Baltics”) are in particular threatened by a Russian population living within their borders. Citizenship issues have been key, especially in Latvia, as these large Russian populations have caused a crisis of identity for these nations. Any pretext for Russian intervention has been studiously at issue, as in this issue of The Financial Times [1/10/2001]: “He [Russian President Putin] said Russia also wanted the EU to help ensure better treatment of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic candidate countries. The EU position is that the Baltic countries already meet the political norms for membership, including the fair treatment of minorities.” An interesting aspect of the case of the Baltics is the ambiguity of its orientation in Europe. There is no clear consensus about whether the Baltic States are in Eastern Europe or outside of it. The default status seems to be that it is in Eastern Europe, as seen in this Journal of Commerce [2/26/96] quote: “Adhesion of 10 Eastern European countries, including the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, would increase the

189 EU’s population by almost 30 percent to 476 million people.” In that quote, Eastern Europe explicitly contains the Baltic States. Nevertheless, in another issue of the Journal of Commerce [6/17/97] the implication was the opposite: “A positive result in Amsterdam would provide a shot of urgently needed adrenaline to the capitals of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states putting them finally in sight of their shared holy grail: EU membership.” Here, the Baltics are explicitly left outside of Eastern Europe. This spatial confusion can be interpreted in the context of the way that the “Baltic States” region was created. The expressed unity of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with the West, and in particular the Nordic realm, perhaps constructed those three states as uniquely Western in the region. While the rest of Eastern Europe had a long history of being portrayed as backward and despotic, the image projected by Baltic exiles of their little-known homelands had few rival representations. The Baltic States in NATO Expansion The region-building efforts of the various members of the Baltic States were documented in the previous section, and it will not be recounted here. However, the Baltic States of NATO expansion are represented slightly differently than the Baltic States of EU expansion. To be one of the Baltic States in EU expansion was almost uniformly a good thing – it signified a Nordic/European link and a sympathetic link to the West. In NATO expansion, the Baltic States suffer from an identity crisis. At once they are the Baltic States previous described, but also the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This quote from the Hindu [7/19/97] encapsulates the problem: In another snub to Moscow, the U.S. Secretary of State, Ms. Madeleine Albright, reiterated last weekend during visits to St. Petersburg and , the capital of Lithuania, that the door to NATO membership remained open to all European nations, including the new Baltic States. Russia bristles at the talk of ever allowing any former Soviet Republics to join the Atlantic Alliance and President Yeltsin said only last week that Moscow would view invitations to the Baltic States as ‘dangerous’.

190 These twin descriptors of “Baltic States” and “former Soviet Republics” neatly encapsulate the discourse on the Baltic States in regards to NATO expansion. When regarded as the “Baltic States”, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are viewed in a positive light. For instance, in this Los Angeles Times [7/9/97] quote there is no ambiguity about their status with the West: “The communiqué also praised Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – the tiny Baltic republics that were annexed by the Soviet Union – for making progress toward ‘greater stability and cooperation’ that could later qualify them for membership.” The depth of the historical injustice felt by these states is also acknowledged: “Among the most ardent applicants are the three Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – which were forced into the Soviet Union at the start of World War II.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/27/97] The summation of this view can be found in another quote in the same article from an American official that said “We’ve shown that we want the Baltics oriented toward Western institutions.” This is nothing that we did not see in the section on the Baltics in the European Union. But that last quote also shows that when it comes to NATO, desire for a country to join may not be enough. The geostrategic implications of being described as a “former Soviet republic” are powerful. While NATO has asserted that any European democracy is a potential member, that statement must be sifted through the comments of officials who also claim that there must be efforts made to not upset Russia. Therefore, expanding into former Soviet territory, like the Baltic States, becomes unlikely. A quote from The Independent [6/6/96] illustrates this point: “Although committed to the Baltic states’ independence many Western governments privately regard the three countries as unsuitable candidates for Nato. Despite their desperation to join, they are seen as so small and close to Russia that they are virtually impossible to defend. Estonia and Latvia have difficult relations with Russia, partly because both contain large ethnic Russian minorities.” Newsday [6/28/2001] makes the same point: “That [NATO membership for the Baltics] means that NATO would come to the defense of Latvia if attacked by the Russians. But, short of using nuclear weapons, Latvia is not defensible.” Therefore, being a Baltic State is not as advantageous in NATO expansion as it is in EU expansion. Nevertheless, the negatives attached to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia

191 are not strictly attached to the Baltic States label, but instead to the stigma of being a former Soviet republic. For example, the Ukraine has a similar stigma attached to it. The Baltic States though emerge as a tainted signifier – to the Western audience they denote danger as well as Western-ness. Still, most objections to the admission of the Baltics have withered in the post-September 11th environment as relations with Russia have improved. These states are widely believed to be front-runners for admission to NATO. The Balkans in EU Expansion Another region mentioned in the newspaper archive of EU expansion is “the Balkans”. Although not featuring as significantly in the discourse as “the Baltic States”, “the Balkans” still deserves mention. Unlike the “Baltic States” region there seems to be no common definition of which states are in “the Balkans”. This reflects a long standing geographical confusion about the extent of the Balkan mountain chain – “In fact, for over two millennia geographers reproduced the dominant ancient Greek belief that the Haemus [Balkans] was a majestic mountain chain linking the Adriatic and the Black Sea, with a dominant position in the peninsula, serving as its northern border (Todorova, 1997, p.25).” Nor does there seem to be any real effort to put forth contending definitions in the newspaper. Most newspaper discussions of “the Balkans” refer exclusively to events in the former Yugoslavia, and other possible parts of the region such as Bulgaria and Romania are never mentioned. Therefore, it is not clear whether “the Balkans” refers exclusively to the former Yugoslavia or something more. Instead of being a region with explicit borders it seems to be an all-purpose signifier of several attributes. “The Balkans” is a region, first and foremost, of war. This is clear from this quote from The Financial Times [10/24/2000]: “Also, following the three Balkan wars of the 1990s, the EU is far more concerned about events on its eastern marches than it was in the past. It no longer takes stability for granted but seeks ways of promoting it.” In addition to being a region of war, it is an area of growth constrained by that war. From a Financial Times article [4/19/2002] comes this quote: “In spite of constraints on growth imposed by the Yugoslav wars, the Leventis [a wealthy family in business] also invested heavily in setting up distribution networks throughout the

192 Balkans, introducing cans and plastic bottles and equipping new points of sale with soft- drinks coolers.” From a Financial Times article [4/15/2002], this quote posits a positive future for “the Balkans” now that the wars are over: “The Balkans is the region where we will have the greatest competitive advantage. Also, the region is emerging from a major war and has good prospects for growth in demand for energy and fuel.” Interestingly, both of these quotes assert that growth is the natural state for “the Balkans”, and that the war was an artificial constraint on it. Since economic growth is generally the exception rather than the rule historically, and since Europe has been modeled as being dynamism and change while the rest of the world is stagnant, it can be inferred from these statements that during the post-Cold War era “the Balkans” are having their European- ness asserted on their behalf. This is visible elsewhere as well – such as this quote in the Singapore Business Times [11/16/2000]: “The Balkan states are also increasingly acknowledged as belonging to the European ‘family’, with EU membership clearly a long-term goal.” Indeed, many newspapers posited that EU membership is possible for the region as long as they can remain peaceful. For example, there is this quote from the same article as above: “African and Middle Eastern nations are worried that aid once earmarked for their regions will be diverted to Serbia, Croatia and other Balkan states – now also informally recognized as future candidates for EU membership.” The newspapers also show the internal dissension within “the Balkans”. This quote comes from The Guardian [10/14/99]: “But officials made clear that the proposals do open out the prospect that the Balkan states could be offered the prospect of EU membership once their antagonisms are laid aside.” What is interesting about the representation of “the Balkans” as European and possible EU members is the magnitude of turnaround in this representation. Many Europeans were raised with the history of Balkan fragmentation as part of their lessons, but most Americans had little in the way of a Cold War representation to overcome due to Yugoslavia’s ambiguous geopolitical positioning during that time and the Cold War’s dominance of geographical representation, the first impression that most Americans had of “the Balkans” was the conflict in Bosnia, which began in 1991. With this conflict,

193 much of the historic (19th century) characterization of the Balkans as a place of ethnic fragmentation resurfaced (the same characterization as in European history books). As Gerard Toal (1996, p.191) puts it, “Bosnia is one of a number of competing paradigmatic signs of post-Cold War world disorder, a place characterized by ethnic fragmentation, a bloody territorial war, and the uncontrolled flow of refugees. As a site of an uncontrollable irruption of violence and chaos, ‘Bosnia’ is like many other disorderly places in the world.” Toal goes on to chart the competing representations of Bosnia in that conflict – the first as a Holocaust requiring US and European intervention and the second as a “morass”, “vortex”, “whirlpool”, or “sinkhole” (US policymakers quoted in Toal, 1996) defying attempts to intervene. He argues that the overall representation from US policy circles of Bosnia emerged “as a ‘faraway place’ that required ‘humanitarian aid’ but ultimately was beyond the United States’ universe of obligation (Toal, 1996, p.195). Serbian and Croatian commentators encouraged this by claiming that the war was inevitable due to the geographic confusion and historical animosity that was inherent to the region (Dobbs, 1998, p.176). US senator John McCain described Bosnia as a “centuries-old, since-the-Middle-Ages, ethnic conflict” mirroring the description given by those with most to gain in the dismembering of Bosnia (quoted in Toal, 1996, p.210). Likewise, Robert Kaplan, whose book Balkan Ghosts was very influential with Western leaders such as President Bill Clinton during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, described Croatia as a place where “history has not moved” and ethnic relations have layers upon layers that an outsider cannot understand (Kaplan, 1994, p.6). To contrast with the official US line, other geopolitical actors sought to create a different image of Bosnia. Salman Rushdie attempted to do so with this: “There is a Sarajevo of the mind, an imagined Sarajevo of whose ruination and torment exiles us all. That Sarajevo represents something like an ideal, a city in which the values of pluralism, tolerance, and co-existence have created a unique and resilient culture (Rushdie, 1994, pp.17-18).” Indeed, images of Sarajevo and genocide brought into the homes of Western audiences through newspaper editorials and columns, political cartoons, television reporting, and documentaries awakened a new geopolitical proximity in the minds of

194 many Westerners (Dobbs, 1998). This pressure led to a reluctant move by governments in the EU as well as that of the US to intervene and impose a cease-fire. Despite their previous studied earlier indifference to events in Bosnia, Western governments belatedly rallied around the representation of Bosnia as another Holocaust after the war was already over. The Guardian referred to Bosnia [11/21/96] as a “disaster” that “has added to Germany’s resolve”. Perhaps this “never again” attitude (taken belatedly) explains the EU’s tentative embracing of “the Balkans” in the expansion process. It is seemingly not a moral act though but a preventative, self-serving one (The Financial Times [12/9/94] described “the impotence of the EU in the face of a crisis in its own backyard [and] its apparent indifference to the destruction of a multi- ethnic state recognized by the international community”). Europe’s image and security are seen as being on the line. This is reflected in the way “the Balkans” is discussed in newspaper stories about EU expansion. The representation of “the Balkans” as a threat to the EU is given through its geopolitical proximity: “Following the three Balkan wars of the 1990s, the EU is far more concerned about events on its eastern marches than it was in the past. It no longer takes stability for granted but seeks ways of promoting it.” [The Financial Times, 10/24/2000] In this Financial Times [9/13/99] quote, the description of the Balkans as “troubled” presents a symbolic space for intervention: “At the same time, the EU is a prime mover behind plans to support Balkan states through the South-east Europe Stability Pact, which envisages closer ties with the EU for these troubled states.” Western European governments do not pose this as economic assistance similar to what was given to other Eastern European applicants. It is a “Stability Pact”, which perhaps gives insight into its real purpose. Also, here the negative signifier of “the Balkans” is not used; instead referring to the region as “South-east Europe” emphasizes the European-ness of the Balkans. This optimistic, self-serving embracing of “the Balkans” is an attempt to change not just the rhetoric describing the region but also the actuality of it, because the EU does not confuse the rhetoric about the place with the actuality of the place. When it is their security they are protecting, the EU member governments will seek real “stability” and not just rhetorical stability. The Balkans in NATO Expansion

195 “The Balkans” in NATO expansion debates reflects a similar image to that of “the Balkans” of EU expansion. There is little detail to attribute to this signifier, including its boundaries. While in the EU “the Balkans” referred generally to the former Yugoslavia, in NATO expansion there is very little detail in that regard. It is expressed that they (the states of the Balkans) aspire to NATO, and the Nordic members of NATO, according to Canadian newspapers, back them. The few mentions of the Balkans that do occur refer to the Balkans as a place of never-ending problems. For instance, there is this Montreal Gazette [7/9/97] quote: “That reality was underlined when the leaders spent a working lunch trying once again to come to grips with the never-ending problems in Bosnia.” Newsday [6/16/2001] made the same point: “Bush also said European integration should include ultimately the troubled countries of the Balkans, as well as Russia’s and Poland’s neighbor Ukraine, which has struggled to keep its reform program on course.” The meaning of “troubled” in that quote is explicated in other newspapers. The Montreal Gazette [7/11/97] wrote that “The Balkans is a different world, where tyranny still clings on and gun-rule and ethnic violence are endemic.” Additionally, “the Balkans” is signified as a small and far-away place with little geopolitical importance. This comes out in the Hartford Courant [7/13/97]: “Should this nuclear-powered organization be responsible for putting out brush fires in small countries? Was it able to prevent a bloodbath in the former Yugoslavia?” These brushfires though are contested in their importance – this USA Today [10/7/97] quote makes it sound more like a forest fire: “In fact, due mostly to wars in the Balkans, more Europeans have died violently since the end of the Cold War than in the four decades it encompassed.” This, though, is the only major division in the representation of the Balkans in the NATO expansion debate. Otherwise, it is rather uniform and not terribly different from that of the European Union. Visegrád 3(or 4) in NATO Expansion The most important region for understanding NATO expansion is the Visegrád Group. The Visegrád Group is related to the region-building project of Central Europe that was discussed earlier in this dissertation. The group serves as an institutional incarnation of Central Europe (or, at least, of the states who are somewhat uncontested in their claim to that identity). In their own words:

196 The Visegrad Group reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest within all- European integration. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been part of one civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots of religious traditions which they wish to preserve and further strengthen. (Visegrád Group home page, 2002) The assertion of “one civilization” for the Visegrád Group is clearly part of a region building process. Although the group’s overall mission is broadly stated: “All the activities of the Visegrad Group are aimed at strengthening stability in the Central European region,” (Visegrád Group home page, 2002), it does not take much probing to see that the stated goal of this group is entrance into the EU (several of them already having gotten into NATO in 1997). “The participating countries perceive their cooperation as a challenge and its success as the best proof of their ability to integrate also into such structures as is e.g. the European Union (Visegrád Group home page, 2002)”. Nevertheless, the European Union’s policy of rolling admissions has minimized the impact of being affiliated with a group in regards to admission. NATO, on the other hand, admits new members in groups, and it is here that the Visegrád Group has been most noticeable in its impact. It is both a factor in the way the Visegrád Group represents itself - “The V4 Group wishes to contribute towards building the European security architecture based on effective, functionally complementary and mutually reinforcing cooperation and coordination within existing European and transatlantic institutions, (Visegrád Group home page, 2002)” - and in the way that the member states are discussed in newspaper accounts of NATO expansion.

The Visegrád Group is also known as the Visegrád 4 in early mentions in newspapers, but as Slovakia fell behind in the race for NATO entry the group seemingly closed ranks and became known as the Visegrád 3. What is perhaps most interesting about this grouping is that at no time in any newspaper is any context given to what the Visegrád 3 (or 4) is. The name is simply dropped into the debate, and while the members’ names may be mentioned (or not), the actual institutional meaning of the

197 Visegrád Group is left out. Therefore, while a region like “the Baltic States” refers to a geographic grouping, which then takes on symbolic meaning, the “Visegrád 3” refers directly to the symbolic meaning. There is no intermediary for anyone who gains his or her information from only the newspapers. This symbolic meaning is clear for anyone reading these newspapers – the members of the Visegrád 3 are the elites. Any good thing said about Eastern Europe in regard to NATO expansion is doubly true for the Visegrád 3 and anything negative said about Eastern Europe is only marginally true for the Visegrád 3. For instance, the Visegrád 3 are portrayed as being those who suffered the worst against the Soviets and were the staunchest rebels against Soviet domination. This quote from The Washington Post [3/8/98] illustrates the general American attitude towards the Visegrád 3: “Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were also easy to accept, lawmakers and policy analysts said, because they have strong U.S. domestic constituencies, charismatic leaders and a history of courageous resistance to communist rule.” As this quote also alludes to, there is also a certain demographic affinity with these states that American politicians are quick to latch on to. This was trumpeted by the media, who showed the political bases of ostensibly geopolitical moves: “Critic Richard Pipes, a history professor at Harvard and respected expert on Russia, baldly asserts, for example, that the NATO expansion was ‘conceived as a campaign gimmick by Clinton advisers anxious to gain their candidate the Polish vote.” [Minneapolis Star-Tribune, 7/17/97] This more cynical view, however, did not dominate discussion. Politicians and the applicants themselves highlighted the historical links of the Visegrád 3 to the West: “NATO’s move to the east restores military ties that date back for centuries. Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., recited the names of Polish patriots who aided the colonists during the American Revolution.” [USA Today, 5/1/98] While the previous quote from a Polish-American senator can only justify the cynics’ concerns, another newspaper put the same information into a more palatable form: “These nations participated in and contributed to the development of Western civilization and culture. Kosciuszko and Pulaski, both Poles, commanded our troops during the Revolutionary War. The U.S. Constitution, the first written national charter, was followed in short order by the Polish

198 Constitution, which took much inspiration from the former document.” [New Orleans Times-Picayune, 5/1/98] Beyond the historical linkages between the Visegrád 3 and the West, there is also the attribution of Western characteristics to the Visegrád 3. In just about every category the Visegrád 3 outpaces the other candidate countries, according to the newspapers. “In assessing applications for membership last year, NATO settled on largely political criteria. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited primarily because of the progress they had made on creating stable democracies and instituting market reforms.” [Washington Post, 3/18/98] In other words, they were the most democratic and the most capitalist. Indeed, their commitment to democracy and Western values is seen as their strongest selling point. This can be seen in several quotes from USA Today [10/7/97]: “These nations know what it means to lose their freedom and are ready to stand with us to defend the freedom of all NATO democracies,” and “Whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are committed to contribute to NATO today.” From these quotes, it can be seen that the Visegrád 3 are seen as the most advanced and most Western of the applicants. This is not to say that there are no critiques leveled against the Visegrád 3. For instance, often they were mentioned as having poorly performing economies: “The economies of the three proposed members are much less viable than those of current NATO members,” and “The countries have neither the money nor the military forces to make a meaningful contribution to such operations.” [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4/29/98] Other newspapers criticized their democratic institutions: “The Czech Republic has some claim to be a democracy. Poland and Hungary have made progress toward a democratic constitution, but it takes decade to build a real democracy.” [Seattle Times, 10/8/97] Finally, criticism was leveled at their militaries, as in The Guardian [7/9/97]: “Nato’s confidential military assessment of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic suggests that basic structural reforms to reverse decades of subservience to the Russian-dominated Warsaw Pact will take longer than expected.” In general however, it should be noted that the criticisms that were made of the Visegrád 3 were also made of Eastern Europe as a

199 whole – so it would be illogical to attribute them to just the Group itself. Because of this, the symbolism of the Visegrád 3 is fairly clear – to be a member is to be advanced in reform, and to be tied to the West. In essence, it is to be Central European. Conclusion This chapter has outlined the representations of regions within Eastern Europe that are found within the debates of NATO and EU expansion. These representations are individually interesting, but also useful because they demonstrate the multiple scales at which place-dependent identities are forged. These representations do not exist in a vacuum, but instead influence each other. For example, the representation of Eastern Europe as a whole was heavily influenced by descriptions of the Balkans as a place of war, ethnic strife, and conflict. These influences are multi-faceted and recursive, with a change in one representation potentially changing representations at all scales. It is to the smallest scale studied, that of the state, that we now turn our attention.

200

11. OTHER COUNTRIES IN NATO AND EU EXPANSION

Introduction In the course of discussing EU and NATO expansion, journalists often create representations not just of regions, but also of individual states. This adds to the complexity of representations of Eastern Europe as a whole – the aggregate is a sum of competing representations of a homogenized region, smaller regions within Eastern Europe, and various individual states. These individual representations are skewed, however, as for the front-runners criticism is generally the same that is applied to the Eastern Europe as a whole (as was seen in the Visegrád 3 representation). For countries that were not seen as likely to get in, criticism was generally given as the reason for exclusion. Other countries were often described who were not even candidates for NATO or the EU. Poland in EU Expansion Poland is far and away the Eastern European state most often referred to in newspaper discourse related to EU expansion. In many ways it is a substitute for Eastern Europe as a whole – and its representations borrow heavily from those of the region. Of course, the alternative is also a possibility – that journalists picture Poland and extrapolate the results to the whole region. In either event, Poland definitely serves as the flagship state around which debate crystallized. The merits of Poland as a potential EU member were seen as the merits of Eastern Europe as a whole and likewise with its flaws. Poland’s position in the debate is perhaps derived from its status as the “biggest candidate country”, a designation repeatedly referred to by journalists. Therefore, the biggest contribution to the EU would ostensibly come from Poland, as would the biggest drain in budget money. This is reflected in twin quotes from British newspapers: “Moreover, as the largest applicant to join the European Union, Poland is pivotal to the

201 success of the entire EU enlargement process,” [The Financial Times, 8/28/2000] and “Neither the common agricultural policy nor the EU’s regional funding programmes can be stretched to cover large poor countries such as Poland without root and branch reform.” [The Daily Telegraph, 12/6/97] Other articles additionally point out that Poland also has the largest farm sector out of the applicant countries – about 20% of the population works in agriculture. Most of the newspaper references to Poland reflect these twin sentiments about the country – either optimistic or pessimistic. The one thing that both sides agree on is the pivotal nature of Poland in the debate: “The state of Polish industry is of deep interest to the EU. With a third of the 12 candidate countries’ population and 40 per cent of their GDP, an expanded EU will flourish or falter on Poland’s ability to pull its weight.” [The Financial Times, 8/28/2000] Clearly one of the main issues related to Poland’s size is its impact on the Common Agricultural Policy. Similarly, when Germany expresses its fear of a horde of workers from the East, it is Poland that they are discussing, even if it goes unsaid. “Tackling fears that Poland’s four million farms would destroy the Common Agricultural Policy and that a flood of cheap workers would sweep into Western European jobs, Mr. Kwasniewski said Poland would be ready for full membership within four years and would hope to join the single currency by 2007.” [The Guardian, 11/19/98] However, Poland has fears that parallel Germany’s fears – that German elites will end up “buying Polish estates on the cheap”. [The Guardian, 11/4/98] The optimistic view emphasizes the European-ness of Poland in a way similar to that which was described earlier for Eastern Europe as a whole while also trying to downplay arguments of the pessimistic camp. For example, arguing that “Poland’s four million farmers would not destabilize the CAP, since half of those farms did not produce for the market” [The Guardian, 11/19/98] rebuts the issue of overextending the Common Agricultural Policy. In addition, the connection to the West is made by showing Poland’s opposition to the Soviets: “Disagreement runs deep over the extent to which the EU will subsidize inefficient agricultural sectors, particularly in Poland, a land of small farms that resisted communist-era collectivization.” [The Guardian, 7/31/2000]

202 Indeed, asserting the commonalities between Poland and the West was a common tactic. One touchstone for both the West and Poland is aversion to Russia. This quote from The Financial Times [4/15/2002] refers to a Russian company: “It has concentrated investments in the Balkans, where Russian companies have traditionally found a warmer welcome than in Poland, for example, where memories of past conflicts run deep.” Similarly, Poland’s newly won freedom from the Soviets reverberates a sympathetic chord in the West, as in this quote from The Guardian [12/8/2000]: “Do you actually suppose that a country like Poland, a proud, independent country which fought for its own sovereignty, wants to join the European Union in order to lose that sovereignty?” In case anti-Russian sentiment isn’t enough, there was always the assertion of European- ness to fall back on. As it worked as a strategy for all of Eastern Europe, so could it be used for Poland, as in this quote from The Financial Times [4/10/2000]: “Anyone who has traveled to Poland, and has spoken to its people, must admit that it is firmly placed within Europe. It should be treated accordingly.” This quote again makes the connection between the EU’s borders and the borders of Europe as already described in a previous section. Other signs of Poland’s worthiness include a strong economic performance (7% GDP growth for three straight years, according to The Guardian of November 4, 1998) that it was implied would dull the impact of Poland on the EU: “For several years now we have recorded one of the highest growth rates in Europe. Unemployment is falling and is now lower than in many EU countries, so Poles increasingly satisfy their material aspirations at home – and we have no interest in an outflow of a qualified labour force.” [The Guardian, 11/19/98] One Irish journalist went so far as to refer to Poland as the “Baltic tiger”. [Irish Times, 9/24/99] Also, this “spectacular economic growth” is linked to “stable political development” – another key element of EU membership according to the Copenhagen criteria. Of course, Poland’s readiness for EU membership is essentially contested. The pessimistic viewpoint also had a significant voice in the newspapers, and it hit upon many of the points made about Eastern Europe earlier. First, there were the aforementioned remarks about Poland’s agricultural base being too large to be

203 accommodated by the Common Agricultural Policy, Poland’s surplus workers flooding Western Europe, and in addition there was criticism of Poland’s pace of reform. For example, UK newspapers mentioned that “In the past year, concerns have mounted about Poland’s readiness, given its big population of 39m, its large agricultural sector and wide disparities between regions,” [The Financial Times, 10/24/2000] and “Moreover, Poland has lagged behind other candidates in adopting EU rules and regulations.” [The Financial Times, 4/10/2000] Also, in direct contradiction of previous discussion of Poland’s “spectacular economic growth”, it is asserted that Poland is just too weak economically to join the EU: “But business groups say the [labor] law will burden employers and increase unemployment, which has risen above 13 per cent. ‘Poland is a poor country, and can’t afford the West’s most generous labour law,’ says Henryka Bochniarz of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers.” [The Financial Times, 8/28/2000] This disavowal of Western labor practices certainly does not reflect well on Poland’s chances to be integrated into a common labor market. Other somewhat derisive descriptors of Poland that were used were “free, proud, and poor” as well as Germany’s “poor country cousins”. [Washington Post, 8/2/95] One critique of Poland amusingly links the country to Western Europe, but not in a flattering way. This quote is quintessentially British: “Indeed, the Poles have displayed a combination of high expectations, arrogance, and selfishness reminiscent of the French.” [The Financial Times, 4/10/2000] While all of this seems very similar to the way Eastern Europe was discussed, there were a few descriptions of Poland that were very different than those made of Eastern Europe. First, it was pointed out that Poland was environmentally active, while the rest of Eastern Europe is typically depicted as an environmentalist’s nightmare. The Guardian [11/19/98] had this to say: “Nor was it true to say that Europe could not afford to help clean up Poland’s environmental mess, he maintained. Poland was cleaning itself up, with 10 per cent of investment and nearly 2 per cent of national income devoted to ecological protection – ‘more than most members of the EU are spending’.” Also, while still significantly lower that Western European wages, Polish wages are the highest in Eastern Europe – a result of some very European taxes: “Poland has eastern Europe’s most expensive labour. The state charges employers about 49 per cent of workers’ gross

204 salaries in social security, healthcare, a fund for handicapped workers, and other wage add-ons.” [The Financial Times, 9/28/2000] An interesting and important metaphor for the confusion about Poland is the ambiguity of its geopolitical proximity. While Poland’s spatial extent and location are not in question, there is a wealth of different ideas about its relative closeness to “Europe”. While a previously mentioned British quote put Poland “in the heart of Europe”, A Washington Post quote [8/2/95] about Poland said: “Despite platitudes from Brussels and Bonn about the inevitable fusion of Western and Eastern Europe through European Union and NATO expansion, this remote corner of the continent suggests that disparities will grow wider before they narrow.” Splitting the difference, another American journalist quoted businessmen in the Journal of Commerce [8/7/96] saying that Poland served as an East-West bridge: “Poland is an attractive site because of its burgeoning market-driven economy, its expected entry into the European Union and its strategic location right in between Western markets and the developing East.” From the heart of Europe, to a bridge between East and West, to a remote corner of the continent – Poland’s sense of dislocation is nothing new. The mayor of the German town of Goerlitz near the Polish border had this to say in The Washington Post [8/2/95]: “Although it only takes three minutes to walk from Goerlitz to Zgorzelec [a Polish town], it has the same feeling that it would for a Spaniard traveling to Russia.” He continues: “Prosperity has risen here in Goerlitz enormously in contrast to Poland. There’s also a social gradient and, of course, there’s envy from the Polish side.” The hypothetical trip taken by the mayor parallels the trip made by Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur, a French ambassador sent by Louis XVI to the Russian court via land in 1784. He described the 500-mile trek from Berlin to Warsaw with this quote, taken from Larry Wolff’s Inventing Eastern Europe [1994]: In traversing the eastern part of the estates of the king of Prussia, it seems that one leaves the theatre where there reigns a nature embellished by the efforts of and a perfected civilization. The eye is already saddened by arid lands, by vast forests. But when one enters Poland, one believes one has left Europe entirely, and the gaze is struck by a new spectacle: an immense country almost entirely

205 covered with fir trees always green, but always sad, interrupted at long intervals by some cultivated plains, like scattered on the ocean; a poor population, enslaved; dirty villages; cottages little different from savage huts; everything makes one think one has been moved back ten centuries, and that one finds oneself amid hordes of Huns, Scythians, Veneti, Slavs, and . These two trips across the German-Polish border (albeit, in different incarnations and locations) from different eras show that the border between Germany and Poland is more than just a national border. It is the point where West meets East, where “civilization” meets “barbarity”, and where wealth meets envy. Therefore, in the European mind (either Ségur’s or the mayor’s), Poland serves as the intermediate transitional area between Western Europe and Eastern Europe in the same way that Eastern Europe serves as the transitional area between “Europe” and Russia. This is the key to understanding how Poland can be discussed as at “the heart of Europe”, as a bridge between East and West, and as a “remote corner of the continent”. It all depends on which definition of Europe you adopt. Using any definition, however, Poland is seen as the gateway to Eastern Europe, as this 18th century quote by Ségur attests: Poland is an “inconceivable mélange of ancient centuries and modern centuries, of monarchical spirit and republican spirit, of feudal pride and equality, of poverty and riches (Wolff, 1994, p.20).” Poland is portrayed as neither eastern timelessness nor Western progress; neither eastern despotism nor Western democracy; neither eastern peasantry nor Western . Instead, it is portrayed as all of these things at once, illustrating its role as a borderland in the competing representations of East and West. Poland in NATO Expansion Poland does not dominate the discussion in NATO expansion as it did in the EU expansion debate. When Poland was mentioned singly it often was in the context of a historical victim, as in these quotes: “Mr. Jazwinski referred to historical injustices deal to Poland. There have been many of these and have been done not only by Russia but also by Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire,” [New Orleans Times- Picayune, 5/25/98] and “A few days later, I attended a briefing where Undersecretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat added that Poland had felt ‘betrayed’ by the Yalta agreement at

206 the end of World War II, in which the Allies allowed Soviet troops to occupy all of Eastern Europe, and now was being restored to the West.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7/21/97] Indeed, this theme of being “restored to the West” is common for Poland. It is perhaps seen as the most Western and the most important of the candidates: “Since the fall of communism, Poland has been cited as the best argument for NATO’s eastward expansion because of its size and strategic location in the heart of Europe.” [Washington Post, 3/18/98] It is unusual for Poland to be described as “in the heart of Europe”, but that is the general consensus. This spatial dislocation is the subject of a Ottawa Citizen [3/19/99] columnist’s musings: “Poor Poland, never part of the [Roman] Empire, has always tried to be more European than its location, to the point of choosing a Latin script rather than Cyrillic or even the odd semi-Latin script of semi-Roman Germany. It finally made it.” Other commenters focused on economic and military issues, like this journalist from The Guardian [12/10/96]: “Of the new Nato trio, Poland is the key strategic consideration – an asset for the West and the main reason for Russian opposition to expansion. It is by far the biggest country of the three, has the biggest army, and occupies the ideal tank country of the north European plain between Germany and Russia.” Furthermore, “The Polish army is large and professional, and already serving alongside Nato in Bosnia.” [Daily Telegraph, 7/10/97] Critics noted that Poland was incredibly poor in comparison to the current members of NATO, but this was a general criticism of the whole region. A journalist from The Boston Globe who was more optimistic considered Poland’s economy to be “one of the most promising emerging economies in the world today.” [1/20/98] All in all, Poland was positively described but was not mentioned inordinately often in the newspaper on its own. Hungary in EU Expansion Hungary was often described with Poland as a pair in discussions of EU expansion because they both seemed in the debate to be the first and most likely entrants. The linkage is mainly economic, as can be seen in these two UK newspaper quotes: “Hungary has led the privatization race, sufficiently successfully to draw in substantial private investment; Poland and the Baltics have scored well here too,” [The Independent,

207 12/13/99] and “Countries such as Hungary and Poland where the drive for bank privatization and the development of capital market reforms has been strongest – they are also leading the way in pension and social benefit reform – are already reaping the benefits.” [The Financial Times, 5/8/98] However, Hungary does not have nearly the number of mentions in the newspaper as Poland does, probably because it does not occupy the border position that Poland does in East-West discourse, and also because it is smaller, and therefore deemed less important in the overall success or failure of EU expansion. Hungary and Poland are described as being historically more Western, which has led to today’s scenario where they are leading the pack to EU membership. This is visible in this quote from the Daily Telegraph [2/23/2002]: “In the first wave of potential EU enlargement, applicants are likely to be Poland, Hungary – home in the 1920s to two of Europe’s busiest stock exchanges – and the Czech Republic.” In the newspapers Hungary (and most other applicant countries) lives in the shadow of Poland, which dominated the discussion. Nevertheless, Hungary did have a (very) few mentions by itself. Generally, Hungary was represented as being firm on its course in regards to economic and foreign policy despite “initial reservations that the return to power last year of the former communists in Hungary might bring a power shift.” [The Guardian, 1/26/95] Furthermore, Hungary was seen as “one of Eastern Europe’s star economies”. [The Independent, 4/9/2002] It is telling that a country that is almost universally seen as at the forefront of the expansion derby received so little press on its own during the timeframe of this study – but instead only received mentions when twinned with the iconic Poland. Czech Republic in EU Expansion The Czech Republic, often lumped with Poland and Hungary, received an equally small amount of press given its “fast track” status. However, it is almost the exact opposite of Estonia and Slovenia (as we shall see) because despite it’s seemingly strong economic performance, most reports of the Czech Republic (by itself) were focused on the slowing down of country’s progress. This quote from The Independent [12/13/99] illustrates this paradox: “On the other hand, the Czechs may be richer than the Poles or

208 even the Hungarians, but have stumbled behind them in the transformation race.” This idea is further illustrated in The Christian Science Monitor [6/30/97]: “The Czech Republic, once the golden boy of EU aspirants, has seen its reputation – and economic performance – considerably dimmed recently.” This failure has hung about the Czech Republic’s representation like a damp mist – chilling an otherwise exceptional performance. This was attributable to poor reforming attempts by The Irish Times [9/24/99]: “The Czechs, for example, despite a GDP per capita as much as 64 per cent of the EU average, saw GDP decline last year by 2.7 per cent, in part the result of the unwieldy form of privatization chosen by the government which has contributed to holding up restructuring in many firms.” Every newspaper account views the Czech Republic’s fall from grace with the perspective of a capitalist society (not surprisingly). The only acceptable reason for the Czech Republic’s slowdown is that it is not reforming itself properly. The onus has been put on the Czechs – as seen in this quote from The Financial Times [5/8/98]: The Czech Republic’s belated move to sell of the large state stakes remaining in the country’s leading banks has been held up by the prolonged political crisis triggered by the collapse of the country’s center-right government late last year. Most polls suggest ominously that next month’s election will fail to provide a clear victor, and political wrangling will most probably cause a further postponement of bank privatization. Some reforms have been carried out despite the political upheaval, however, and the long-awaited establishment of a securities and exchange commission should go some way to answering investors’ concerns about the lack of transparency and the poor liquidity of the Czech stock market. This view holds that flaws in progress are not the flaws of the prescription, but in the patient. This ignores the point made by world systems theorists who have shown that neo-liberal development strategies are not undertaken in a vacuum, but instead have many variables that enter into the outcome of development (Wallerstein, 1979; Rodney, 1981; Stewart and Berry, 1999). Recession and trauma are characteristic of almost all economies undergoing the same process as the Czech Republic, as has been witnessed in

209 Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and others. Often the “cure” has caused a significant human and social cost. This is alluded to in a quote in The Irish Times [9/24/99]: “Mr. Pavel Telicka [Czech negotiator with the EU] acknowledged recently to the Economist that the country [the Czech Republic] must overcome a backlash after its early reform efforts soured: ‘We were beating our chests in the early ‘90s real hard…(but the boasting) was never really justified, was it?’” The backlash that he refers to is more than just political opposition, it is political opposition mobilized because of a tangible reduction in quality of life. It is an element of the rhetoric of “transition” and “reform” that these complaints must be ignored as transitory and in defiance of the “national interest”. Hungary and Czech Republic in NATO Expansion Interestingly, Hungary and the Czech Republic were mentioned only extremely rarely in the newspapers, despite their frontrunner status and eventual integration with NATO in 1997. Any mentions of them were generally negative. Hungary seemed to be the punching bag for journalists who wanted to draw a civilizational distinction between East and West. Note, for example, this Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [7/21/97] quote: “We are being asked to remake the most successful military alliance in history, to extend our defense perimeter to the borders of the old Soviet Union and to pledge to protect Budapest as we would Brooklyn.” Despite their Anglicization, words like “Budapest” were used as a shorthand way of illustrating geopolitical distance, as if the word alone was significant enough to make an argument against expansion. Other mentions of the Czech Republic and Hungary described them as places with no money, armies that are “badly funded and demoralized” [Daily Telegraph, 7/10/97], and border disputes. It is a mystery why places that were almost unquestioned from a political view as a frontrunner should get such shoddy treatment by the press. The only explanation available seems to be that they were lumped together with Poland so much as the Visegrád 3 that individual merit was not considered. Bulgaria and Romania in EU Expansion Bulgaria and Romania are described here together because neither received very much attention and they were described in very similar terms. Both were described as

210 being about as far from joining the EU as an applicant can be. Nevertheless, they were described as potential members, so they serve an important function: they mark the extent of Europe that it is currently possible to contemplate as EU members in the foreseeable future. Still, newspapers painted a dark future for these countries in their relations with the EU: “Romania may not even gain membership if it elects one of two extremist candidates as its President on Saturday,” [The Times of London, 12/8/2000] and “Romania will not be allowed to start talks until it has reformed and adequately funded its childcare institutions and orphanages.” [The Guardian, 10/14/99] These countries are still in fact candidates, but they did miss out on the bulk admission of the ten candidates in December 2002. Bulgaria and Romania both suffer from immense need for economic reform according to newspaper pundits. For example, The Guardian [10/14/97] says that Bulgaria faces environmental and economic strife: “Bulgaria is to be told to accelerate the closure of its unsafe nuclear power station at Kozloduy and speed up its economic reforms.” Romania seems to have similar hurdles to leap: “The biggest problem is in Romania, where the Petrotel refinery has consistently lost money because the market remains regulated with low prices and dominant state-owned companies. Mr. Fedoun says the government failed to fulfill its privatization plans.” [The Financial Times, 4/15/2002] Generally, Bulgaria and Romania are seen as the outer fringe of what the consensus border of Europe is, at least for those within the EU. Romania in NATO Expansion Romania is described in various different ways in newspapers, which prevents an overall picture from being formed. One picture is of Romania as a leading candidate for expansion, a country that is, according to The Guardian [12/10/96], “strategically important. Its recent peaceful and democratic change of government away from the former communists who replaced the Ceausescu tyranny, the prospects of better relations with neighbouring Hungary, and hopes for resolved ethnic tension with Hungarians, are boosting Bucharest’s chances of eventual entry.” The Baltimore Sun [6/4/97] added that “the democratic Romanian government has normalized relations with Kiev despite disagreements about potentially oil-rich waters around Serpent Island.”

211 Alternatively, Romania is described as having a poor economy that would not mesh with the NATO alliance burden. In general, criticism of Romania is vague, as in these newspaper quotes: “President Clinton said they [the Romanians] weren’t ready, yet,” [USA Today, 7/9/97] and “On Friday, Roth said that economic difficulties diminished the sheen of Romania’s candidacy.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/7/98] Romania, when seen from the perspective of the newspapers, is a country jilted by NATO, as this Montreal Gazette [7/11/97] quote illustrates: “That much is understandable, but Washington even vetoed Romania and Slovenia, countries with sound democratic credentials and more professional military forces than either Hungary or the Czech Republic (where the army has more colonels than privates).” The press is left somewhat confused by this move, and by extension so is the reader. The American argument for the veto was that “it [Romania] would be expensive to defend and had only recently begun wide-ranging reform.” [Financial Times, 7/10/97] Recently however (more recently than the scope of the data collected), Romania has been seen as a lock for the next round of expansion. Bulgaria in NATO Expansion Bulgaria is only very occasionally referred to as an individual country in the NATO expansion debate. It is described as undemocratic, a “non-starter” [The Guardian, 12/10/96], and as Russia’s “oldest ally” [The Guardian, 2/21/97]. Despite that, there is a glimmer of long-term hope. Perhaps the best way to begin and conclude the discussion of Bulgaria is with this quote from The Guardian [5/17/97]: “There is particular concern about the need to work out a framework for countries like Bulgaria which have no immediate prospect of joining.” In the time since the data were collected, Bulgaria has moved into the “yes” column for probable admission. Slovenia in NATO Expansion Romania’s companion in this plight is Slovenia, who was often linked with Romania by the press. American opposition seemed to be the death knell for their inclusion in the first round, despite French support for both: “Chirac argued that Slovenia and Romania also met all of the criteria for membership and that including them ‘is just, politically and morally.’” [Los Angeles Times, 7/9/97] France’s view seems to be the

212 norm in the press, even in the US, which vetoed Slovenia’s entry: “In addition to impressive credentials that include the highest per capita gross domestic product in Central and Eastern Europe and a small but impressive armed forces, Slovenia has other attributes. Its size makes it cheap and easy for NATO to integrate, while both its size and location tend to diminish any potential confrontation with Russia over its membership.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/7/98] The US was equally enthusiastic about Slovenia, but only after the first round of expansion: “Albright flew from Slovenia, where she told leaders there was ‘no stronger candidate’ than the small Alpine state for NATO’s next round of enlargement even though it was left out in the first round announced this week.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7/13/97] Slovenia’s suitability for NATO does not even seem to be in question: “’It’s critically important for the summit to reinforce the credibility of NATO’s open door policy,’ Roth said. ‘Slovenia matches, and in some cases surpasses, standards set by the three current invitees.’” [Los Angeles Times, 11/7/98] The only reason apparent for NATO’s rejection of Slovenia is a cultural fear among politicians (especially in the US) stemming from geographic ignorance. As a result, Slovenia is sometimes used in the newspaper as an example of a distant, foreign place. For example, there is this Washington Post [2/19/2001] quote: “There are also the neo-isolationists in Congress, who will demand to know why U.S. soldiers may, in theory at least, be committed to the defense of capitals such as Ljubljana and Bratislava.” The place names “Ljubljana” and “Slovenia” seem to strike a chord with the American people as a place of excessive Eastern European-ness, of Oriental foreignness. Therefore, perhaps the politicians were afraid to put Slovenia “on the ballot” so to speak. Nevertheless, like Romania, Slovenia is seen as a shoe-in for the next round of expansion. Slovenia in EU Expansion Slovenia occupies a niche very similar to that of Estonia within the EU expansion discourse. Nothing negative is ever said about Slovenia in any newspaper throughout the discussion of EU expansion. Slovenia, like Estonia, is an palatable choice for the European Union because it is small (see abi and Brglez, 2002) and has a fairly “advanced” transition, which can be seen in this quote in The Christian Science Monitor [6/30/97]: “There’s a strong case for Slovenia. It’s by far the most advanced of the

213 prospective new members. It’s small, it’s digestible”. In addition to that, much was written about the nearness of the Slovenian per capita income to the EU average: “Only the Slovenes are currently within spitting distance of the EU’s income range; Bulgaria and Romania are right off the scale.” [The Independent, 12/13/99] Newspapers illustrated this with statistics – Slovenian per capita income was roughly twice that of Hungary and the Czech Republic, and six times that of Romania and Bulgaria. Along with this comes the knowledge that there will not be a massive flood of Slovenian labor entering Western Europe nor will there be the establishment of a neo-colonial relationship should they be admitted, as witnessed in this quote from The Independent [12/13/99]: “Access to markets in the European Union will accelerate investment in economies where (apart from Slovenia) wage costs are one-fifth or less of the EU average, especially since education standards are high.” The comparison to the West is particularly effective with Slovenia, where it was also noted that when it comes to privatization, “Slovenia has probably been the most successful of the group, having sold off some 300 companies and giving preliminary approval for another 600 privatizations.” [The Financial Times, 2/16/96] Perhaps because Slovenia is seen as “the most ready to join” it receives only passing mention in discussion, while more controversial and less “digestible” countries like Poland dominate the debate. Estonia in EU Expansion Also mentioned often as a front-runner yet not given much space in the newspapers is Estonia. The very fact that Estonia is mentioned on its own shows the numerous levels of geographic imagination that Estonia co-exists in. Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia’s fellow “Baltic States”, are not mentioned at all outside of the “Baltic States” context. Estonia is often brought out as a “Golden Child” for Western Europe to applaud and for Eastern Europe to emulate. The Financial Times brags about Estonia’s “bold free-market reforming economy” [10/24/97] and note that “Bank privatization is incomplete in all countries of the region except in Hungary and Estonia.” [5/8/98] These quotes illustrate the way that Eastern European countries have been expected to reform themselves. It has followed in the footsteps of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment plans, which require debtor states to drastically cut social spending

214 and create a haven for foreign investment. This quote illustrates the parallels: “Estonia, in particular, is catching the investing world’s eye – taxes are low and the state’s share of GDP is less than 33 per cent.” [The Sunday Telegraph, 3/15/98] Slovakia in NATO Expansion As mentioned in the previous discussion of Slovenia, Slovakia also seems to fit the criteria for excessive foreign-ness among the American people. There is, again, the previously-cited Washington Post [2/19/2001] quote: “There are also the neo-isolationists in Congress, who will demand to know why U.S. soldiers may, in theory at least, be committed to the defense of capitals such as Ljubljana and Bratislava.” Slovakia also seems to share the journalists’ assumption that it will make it in the second round: “Most governments agree about Slovenia and Slovakia, for example, but some have questions about the Baltic states because their status as former Soviet republics may inspire greater ire in Moscow.” [Washington Post, 2/19/2001] Slovakia received very little individual attention in the American press, but much more in the British press. The American press seems to have abandoned it after some early articles that described it as having “fallen short in its tolerance of diverse opinions and support for constitutional rights.” [Journal of Commerce, 9/27/95] The British press, after having criticized it early (“failing the test of democracy” [The Guardian, 2/7/97], “Slovakia’s commitment to democracy is seen as questionable” [The Guardian, 12/10/96]), sees it as a frontrunner in the second round of expansion. For instance, its military was seen as “one of the best armed forces among the new applicants, but a report last year by retired US general Joseph Garrett highlighted the low level of professionals and the poor planning and bad distribution of defence resources.” [Financial Times, 5/22/2001] In other departments, the same article points out that Slovakia has made even better advances: Slovakia sees itself as the leader of the aspirants because it was only left out of the first enlargement wave in 1997 because of the authoritarian policies of Vladimir Meciar, its leader for most of the 100-s. Geographically, Slovakia is important for Nato as it borders the three new members – the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Indeed without Slovakia, Hungary is separated from the

215 rest of the alliance. Transit through Slovakia was vital – and readily permitted – during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. Slovakia, like Slovenia, is seen as very likely to make it into NATO in the second round. Slovakia in EU Expansion Slovakia’s image in the EU expansion race was generally poor, although the negative view of Slovakia changed over the decade while still remaining negative. Early in the debate, Slovakia was almost universally portrayed as poor on the issue of human rights. For instance, The Financial Times [9/15/97] reported that “Sweden is pressing its EU partners to broaden the list to include Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania – but not Slovakia, excluded because of its poor human rights record.” This is a pretty serious allegation, because Latvia had also been accused of violating the human rights of its Russian minority, as discussed earlier. So to include Latvia but exclude Slovakia says something about the stigma that Slovakia has (and also of Sweden’s commitment to Baltic solidarity). The next day’s Financial Times asserted that “Slovakia falls short because of its poor human rights record and lack of respect for the rule of law.” Generally there was little mention of Slovakia’s economy, which was generally seen as very agricultural but acceptable: “Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania were deemed not to have made sufficient economic progress, while Slovakia fell by the wayside because of its poor human rights record.” [The Financial Times, 10/24/97] More specific critiques of Slovakia’s human rights record seemed to revolve around the nature of democracy there: “Slovakia is told bluntly that its violations of democracy and human rights rule it out at present,” [The Guardian, 6/17/97] and “Slovakia is ruled out because its political system has not been sufficiently democratized.” [The Daily Telegraph, 6/17/97] No details of the lack of democracy are provided, although concrete criticism of the results of elections is available: “In Slovakia, where a coalition has been formed including anti-Western extreme right nationalists and the hard left, the commitment to EU and Nato membership may be diluted in the months and years to come.” [The Guardian, 1/26/95] This quote charges a fundamental problem with the choice of government in Slovakia – that it is “anti-Western”. Indeed, in the same newspaper article Slovakia is viewed as a state reverting to its barbarian Slavic past:

216 The new Slovak foreign minister, Jurak Schenk, is an unknown sociologist with no foreign affairs experience. The new defense minister is Jan Sitak of the Slovak National Party which is pan-Slav, pro-Russian, and anti-Western. Jozef Kalman, a former communist trades union leader and leading light in the Workers’ Party which is anti-International Monetary Fund and suspicious of the West, has been made deputy prime minister in charge of relations and negotiations with the EU. “It’s a bit of a strange choice. Kalman does not speak English, but he speaks Russian,” a Western diplomat in Bratislava said. This quote is rich in terminology that is meant to alarm Western audiences. Words like “pan-Slav, pro-Russian, and anti-Western” are symbols of the Other for Europe, harkening back Russian plots for hegemony in the East. A series of pan-Slavic conferences were held in 1848, 1858, and 1867, each promoting the idea that Slavs were a more youthful race than the people Western Europe (O’Laughlin and Kolossov, 2002). The conferences amounted to little in concrete political action, but there still remains a pan-Slavic sentiment in Russia. Furthermore, description of the deputy prime minister is rife with words that evoke fears of a return to Stalinist modes of government. Later, Slovakia’s democracy would remarkably become valid in the eyes of the newspaper journalists (“Mr. Dzurinda has improved the country’s democratic credentials” [The Financial Times, 5/22/2001]), after this coalition left power. Then, however, the negative description of Slovakia shifted to economics, albeit still with a concern for minority rights [The Guardian, 3/3/94]: “Although all four Visegrad states have been promised eventual membership, enthusiasm for closer links with Slovakia has wavered in recent months. This is partly because of the Bratislava government’s go-slow policy on economic reform and partly because of unresolved tensions between the Slovak government and its large Hungarian majority.” Slovakia’s representation in the newspapers can be seen to improve slightly through the timeframe of this study, with Slovakia’s improvement culminating with its inclusion in the bulk admission of applicants in December 2002. Turkey in EU Expansion

217 Turkey, although technically in the applicant pool, is not eligible for review until December 2004 and it remains to be seen if they will be viewed as admissible then because the creation of a 2004 evaluation date was largely the result of American pressure and Turkish indignation. For that reason Turkey is discussed in this section, that of states beyond the pale of EU expansion. Although not generally considered to be in the region of Eastern Europe, especially considering its pro-Western stance in the Cold War, and therefore beyond the general scope of this dissertation, its Balkan territory and historical stake in Europe is quintessentially “eastern” and an understanding of Turkey’s role in Europe is pivotal to understanding Eastern Europe itself. Despite initially applying in 1987 Turkey has seen over ten states pass it on the path to EU membership. Turkey was only recently accepted as a full candidate for admission, which is no guarantee of actually getting in. Based on the early attempt at membership and the extended filibuster-like treatment of Turkish applications (the first was rejected in 1989) there is a severe mismatch between European definitions of self- identity and Turkish conceptualizations of how they fit in. As a Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, was quoted as saying in the Australian Financial Review [12/13/99] upon hearing of his country’s pseudo-acceptance, “It is now understood that there can be no Europe without Turkey and no Turkey without Europe.” He was more correct than he knows – historically the Turks have served as the Other against which early formulations of “Europe” crystallized, as mentioned in a previous section of this dissertation. Turkey is often described in newspaper reports as being weak in its democracy, in particular because of concerns of military interference in the Turkish constitutional system. Turkey is criticized in The Washington Post [12/15/96] for its “lack of democracy” and its poor economy, which was summarized with “not enough economic reform”. The Financial Times [3/13/98] outlined its economy as a “shambles” and as uniquely volatile: “As for the economy, it boasts an unstable combination of rampant inflation – running at 99.3 per cent a year – and rapid annual growth of around 6 per cent.” Indeed, nobody in Europe seems to know what to do in regards to Turkey. They see Turkey as un-European but nevertheless are anxious to keep it ambiguously in their orbit. This is expressed by the Daily Telegraph [6/17/98]: “The worry among more pro-

218 Turkey nations in Europe is that will turn its attentions eastwards and ‘orientalise’ with enormous geopolitical implications for the balance of power between the West and the emerging Muslim nations.” In other words, the West is stuck with an ally it does not truly want and will not embrace, yet does not want to see revert to its “natural” Oriental nature. This is further illustrated by this Financial Times [12/11/97] quote: “On the other side, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Austria are all anxious to placate Turkey as far as possible, not because they actively desire Turkish membership but because they fear the consequences of leaving Turkey resentful and ill-disposed towards the EU. One concern is that this could strengthen the ‘fundamentalist’ forces opposed to the West in Turkey’s domestic politics.” This concern has been validated to a certain extent by the November 2002 parliamentary gains by the Islamic party in the wake of the EU’s recent snub. The existence of Turkey has always been an ambiguous one for Westerners. “The paradox of ‘Turquie d’Europe’, in Europe but of the Orient, was essential to the emerging idea of Eastern Europe, and Habsburg ambitions, whatever the extent of military and political realization, contributed to the elaboration of that idea (Wolff, 1994, p.165).” The peak of Ottoman influence in Europe pre-dates the shift from Respublica Christiana to secular society dominated by Enlightenment principles. In fact, it may have been the recession of Ottoman influence from about 1700 onward that allowed European collective identity to change, seeking a new Other that was not based on religion. Despite this fundamental shift to secularism, Christian identity has remained wedded to European collective identity, as Turkey has found to its dismay in its attempts to join the EU. This is acknowledged in the newspaper accounts relating to expansion, which have characterized Turkey as big, needy, and Muslim. This is embodied in this Financial Times [1/20/97] quote: “The EU has long viewed the idea of opening its doors to Turkey as unrealistic, citing its size, poverty, and less publicly, its Moslem tradition.” For Islam to be included as one of the factors that it is “unrealistic” to think could be admitted to the EU shows the depth of the connection between Christianity and Europe, despite centuries of secularization by Europe and 50 years of secularization of Turkey.

219 The secularization of Turkey was a step towards placating Western viewers of Turkey, towards entering Europe. William Penn had called for it several hundred years earlier as a prerequisite for joining in the European Diet (Turkey would get the same number of votes as Russia), and after World War I it was likewise made a prerequisite, only this time the power structure was shaken up and fundamental change of that sort was possible. After the creation of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey’s representation was changed from the “Sick Man of Europe” to that of the “Young Turk”. This rebirth was symbolic of Turkey’s supposed baptism into the Europe. Turkey was given membership in NATO, but views on Turkey failed to change as the years went by. In 1990 Edward Mortimer wrote an article for The Financial Times of April 3, 1990 discussing this: Educated Turks especially, heirs to the militant secularism of Kemal Ataturk, are shocked to find their European identity judged by religious criteria. Yet the success of Ataturk’s revolution looks far less certain today than it did a generation ago: almost every day brings new evidence of the strength of Islam in Turkey, not as a set of private religious beliefs but as a public phenomenon, moulding people’s behaviour in the political and social arena. Nor in fact has it ever ceased to be the state religion in Turkey, in the sense that its institutions, unlike those of other religions, are financed and directly controlled by the state. Few Christians nowadays would wish to see Christianity reinstated as the established religion of Europe in that sense. But for good or ill the Christian religion remains a key component of European identity. That is bound to affect the argument over where Europe’s border should be drawn, and its relations with Moslem communities both inside that border and beyond. (quoted in Neumann, 1998) Therefore, the double standard is intact: while Turkey is judged on its ability to eradicate Islam from its government and found wanting, Europe is able to screen out EU applicants based on its own Christian perspective and identity. Another continuation of a theme from the past in regards to Turkey is that of human rights abuses. This appears in various forms throughout the newspaper reports on Turkey’s application from “Turkey was also incensed that the EU did not drop previous

220 demands for it to improve its human rights record before it could be considered as a candidate,” [Daily Telegraph, 6/17/98] to: Despite some recent human rights initiatives towards matching the so-called Copenhagen criteria of human rights and basic political standards, the paper still painted a damning picture. “Compared to last year, the situation on the ground has hardly improved,” it argued. “Torture and ill-treatment are far from being eradicated, even though the matter is taken seriously by the authorities and the parliament.” [The Independent, 11/9/2000] Indeed, human rights dominate the newspapers to a much greater extent than either religious or economic issues. This is a historical critique of Turkey, and in fact of all “Oriental” states and empires. In 1768 Voltaire wrote to Catherine the Great who was currently at war with the Ottoman Turks: On one side she [Catherine the Great] forces the Poles to be tolerant and happy, in spite of the papal nuncio; and on the other side she seems to deal with the Moslems, in spite of Mohammed. If they make war on you, madame, there could well come about that which Peter the Great once had in view, which was to make Constantinople the capital of the Russian empire. These barbarians deserve to be punished by a heroine, for the lack of consideration they have shown till now for ladies. It is clear that people who neglect all the fine arts, and who shut up women, deserve to be exterminated…” Even then the difference between the “barbarians” and the Europeans was their treatment of women. Since the creation of present-day Turkey involved quite explicitly a women’s emancipation program to help with the process of nation building, this is no longer an authentic critique (Rygiel, 1998). The modernist and Enlightenment ideology inherent in Turkey’s adoption of the European “cure” for its “sickness” can be seen in this quote from Kemal Ataturk, the first leader of the modern state of Turkey: “A civilization where one sex is supreme can be condemned, there and then, as crippled. A people which has decided to go forward and progress must realize this as quickly as possible. (quoted in Moghadam, 1993, p.82)” This acknowledgement of the need to “go forward and

221 progress” is a wholesale adoption of the Western viewpoint – that Turkey has been timeless and stagnant. Nevertheless, the Orientalist perspective informs the critique of Turkey today, as human rights are still a dominant complaint. Much of this criticism, and rightly so, is of the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, as evidenced by this quote from The Independent [11/9/2000]: “A formal document from the European Commission also called on Turkey to transform its human rights record by eradicating torture and improving the position of its Kurdish population before it can start formal talks on membership.” The same newspaper article later described the situation as a “damning picture.” An EU document quoted in the newspaper said that “Compared to last year, the situation on the ground has hardly improved. Torture and ill treatment are far from being eradicated, even though the matter is taken seriously by the authorities and the parliament.” There have been some recent moves to comply with EU Human Rights legislation, such as the legalization of Kurdish-language newspapers, but still human rights remain a problem in Turkey. These real, and devastating, critiques of the actions of the Turkish government in response to Kurdish nationalism are rooted in actual incidents and everyday policy. For example, an anti-torture law has yet to be passed, and still whole villages of Kurds are evacuated so that the nationalist movement can be suppressed. The leader of the party in power, Tayyip Erdogan, currently is incapable of being the Prime Minister because he was convicted for non-violent expression of opinion. These are real and material violations of human rights. The issue of corporal and excessive punishment has been for a long time at the crux of the Western definition of barbarity. In Orientalist thought this was inherent to the nature of Islam – what Edward Said has referred to as “the usual clichés about ‘Islam’, violence, sensuality, and so forth (Said, 1994, p.374).” Baron François de Tott, a Frenchman serving as an advisor to the Ottoman army in the 1770s, told of his experience with Turkish authorities in his autobiography. This exchange is offered as an example of how Turkish government, here represented by Ali-Aga, the man assigned to him by the Sultan, treated its people in a way offensive to “civilized” Europe:

222 Le Baron: Your dexterity in the passage of the Prut, and the good food that you provide for us, would leave me nothing to desire, my dear Ali-Aga, if you would only beat less these unfortunate Moldavians, or if you would beat them only when they disobey you. Ali-Aga: What does it matter to them, if it’s before or after, when it is necessary to beat them; isn’t it better to finish instead of wasting time? Le Baron: Wasting time! Is it then a good use of time to beat without reason these unfortunates, whose good will, strength, and submission execute the impossible? Ali-Aga: Monsieur, how is it that you speak Turkish, you have lived in Constantinople, you know the Greeks, and yet you do now know that the Moldavians won’t do anything until they’ve been bludgeoned? (quoted in Wolff, 1994, p.71) When Tott offered to pay for the food he ate, Ali-Aga replied that “You won’t have any I tell you; I know the Moldavians, they want to be beaten. (quoted in Wolff, 1994, p.72)” This is not to imply that human rights violations in modern day Turkey are non- existent, but instead to show that all representations of individual states are shaped by ideology and prejudice; in this way some facts are placed in the foreground and others are placed in the background. Albania in NATO Expansion Although not really a candidate country, Albania merited attention in the press; although probably not any attention that the government would like. It was uniformly described as a place of violence, as in this Ottawa Citizen [3/5/97] quote: “Mr. Solana said that Albania, which is not a NATO member, needed a political and diplomatic solution to the violence. ‘It’s not for any military operation by NATO or anybody else.’” A journalist for the Hartford Courant [7/13/97] echoed the aversion that NATO feels to Albania: “Before long, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, and even strife-ridden Albania will apply.” The violent description of Albania carries over into descriptions of its poverty and anarchy: “The key to social stability is economic stability and vice-versa, as events in Albania have shows all too clearly. The challenge of restabilizing societies

223 that have degenerated into anarchic-like conditions, including Albania, is immensely greater than those needed to prevent disintegration,” [Cleveland Plain Dealer, 5/26/97] and “He told reporters yesterday that NATO isn’t the world’s policeman and isn’t the institution to halt the growing crisis in Europe’s poorest state.” [Ottawa Citizen, 3/5/97] Despite the general veracity of these claims, it must be noted that the impact of Albania on the discourse of expansion is a negative one – it is a one-country signifier of all that is “wrong” with Eastern Europe. Bosnia in NATO Expansion Bosnia fulfills the same role that was just described for Albania. As a signifier it reaches beyond its own boundaries and colors those of all of Eastern Europe. This American quote shows the connection explicitly: “In a separate action, the House has also voted to cut off funds for US troops on the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. If the House doesn’t want to be involved in Bosnia, it had better think again about getting further involved in Poland.” [Christian Science Monitor, 7/3/97] The Orientalist view here is obvious – Eastern Europe is all a quagmire of ethnic hatred and warfare. Bosnia was also seen in The New York Times as the “source of instability on the Continent” [4/29/98] and “unstable and essentially ungovernable” [10/5/97]. Bosnia is clearly another highlight, like Albania, in the speeches of those opposed to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. Belarus in NATO Expansion Belarus serves as a different role in the Orientalist play. Just as in the EU discourse, Belarus is portrayed as a throwback Stalinist Other. The difference between this and the Orientalism associated with Albania and Bosnia is that here the Other is portrayed as somewhat laughable. To the West, Belarus is the country that did not realize it lost the Cold War. This quote from The Atlanta Journal and Constitution [8/16/98] serves as an illustration: “The autocratic president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has jailed opponents, muted the press and propped up a languishing, state- run economy, even as the emerging markets of Eastern Europe neighbors blossom around him.” This president is widely portrayed as an oddity, as in the same article:

224 A former collective farm director who speaks plainly and acts forcefully, Lukashenko has cultivated an image as champion of the Slavic world, loath to grovel for Western aid or world acceptance. He appeals to the small farmers and factory workers of Belarus. He has spoken with admiration of Josef Stalin. He has warned his people of the dangers of NATO expansion to their borders. In the most recent example of Soviet-speak, he went on television to urge the population to gather this month to assist in harvesting crops, saying “it is necessary to have bread” to defend the country. When Lukashenko is described in that way, it creates an image of him as the post-Cold War Stalin. Lukashenko is not the only one to be portrayed as extreme. Belarus is portrayed by The Times of London [3/29/97] as “one of the most backward economies in Eastern Europe” and as a likely ally of Russia. This alliance is seen as a natural linkage between these two “Slavic neighbors” [Los Angeles Times, 1/14/97]. For example, note how the alliance is described in this quote from The Independent [1/14/97]: “Although details were lacking, Mr. Yeltsin appears to be contemplating a close marriage with his Slavic neighbors.” Both of these references were written (or at least, published) on the same day by two different authors. In fact, Belarus is the only state mentioned in the NATO debate (except Russia) to be referred to as “Slavic”, and it happens relatively often. The subtext seems to be that this is a “natural” Oriental alliance, but it ignores the divisions throughout the Slavic world (isn’t Poland Slavic?), which would put the lie to the idea that Slavs are “naturally” bound to each other. To compound the problems of representing Belarus, it is sometimes referred to as “Belorussia” [for example, The Times of London, 5/15/96], its former name in the Soviet Union. This name highlights the connections to Russia. In conclusion, the Western press represents Belarus very negatively. Belarus in EU Expansion Belarus does not feature much in the discussion of EU expansion, and warrants only 5 total citations. Belarus is almost uniformly described in Soviet terms. Belarus serves as the universal Other, as the worst-case scenario for “transitioning” states. In

225 fact, much as was witnessed in the NATO expansion debate, it is seen as the state that has decided not to transition, but instead to plow forward as if the Soviet Union still existed. Belarus is described as completely beyond the pale of EU enlargement, and does not even seem to qualify for the “special relationship” that even Russia is offered. Fundamental to the representation of Belarus is the retroactive nature of time there – Belarus (or at least its leaders) wishes to turn back the clock, re-forming the Soviet Union as much as possible and pretending that Stalinist communism still is viable. For instance, this quote from The Christian Science Monitor [12/21/95] is constructive: “Belarus, which unlike Ukraine has no history of independence, is another story. Its economy is in shambles while President Alexander Lukashenko does all he can to thwart parliament and impose personal rule. His neighbors see him as an opportunist who will do anything to stay in power, including merging with Russia if it serves his personal purposes.” Lukashenko is seen as a second coming of Stalin, an old-time tyrant in an era of democracy. This willingness to join with Russia is seen as the ultimate sin, proof of Belarus’ formidable Otherness. Ukraine in NATO Expansion Ukraine, another post-Soviet republic, has a very different image than Belarus does. Ukraine benefits from the sympathetic view of the West, which sees Ukraine as repressed by the Russians historically and as a generally Western-cultured country. For example, this American quote set out the historical domination by Russia: “Westerners regard the continued existence of Ukraine – which with temporary exceptions was ruled from Moscow for the three centuries before 1991 – as the best single guarantee against any return of Russian imperialism.” [Baltimore Sun, 6/4/97] Its Western tilt is also apparent in this quote from the same article: “In cooperation with the Poles and the Americans in particular, they have worked hard to ensure that the terms of NATO enlargement would not draw a new dividing line in Europe shutting them out, but would also project stability eastward beyond NATO’s new members of (probably) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.” Ukraine is also described as a shaky democracy – one that has “struggled to keep its reform program on course” [Newsday, 6/16/2001] and

226 whose politics are “high stakes”. [Ottawa Citizen, 6/11/96] It is generally appreciated that the West would like to link to Ukraine. Equally clear in the newspapers though is that Ukraine suffers from the same geopolitical leprosy that the Baltic States suffer from. They are deemed too “ex-Soviet” to incorporate into NATO. This article from The Guardian [3/13/97] shows the tacit understanding that is incorporated into the geopolitical discourse: “The outstanding issue of Ukraine, which is also to be offered its own charter with Nato rather than membership, remains a potential hurdle. Unlike the Baltic states, forcibly merged into the Soviet Union during the Second World War, Ukraine has been Russian territory since the early 18th century, and its status presents Russia with acute security problems.” Essentially, Ukraine is falling victim to the geopolitics of “Great Powers”, with Russia being tacitly assigned Ukraine as its sphere of influence, despite the West’s affinity for the Ukrainians. The feeling is that there is no other choice, as in this Montreal Gazette [11/28/96] quote: “Its [NATO expansion’s] advocates insist it can be done without disrupting relations with Russia or orphaning those Europeans, like the Balts and Ukrainians, who will be left out. Well, let’s see.” Ukraine in EU Expansion In the reports of EU expansion, Ukraine is seen in a more positive light than Belarus, although it too is seen as beyond the boundaries of possible expansion – also only netting five citations. It gains a certain sympathy from the journalists, as seen in this Christian Science Monitor [12/21/95] quote: “In Ukraine, President Leonid Kuchma has done a remarkable job of staving off collapse and turning the economy around.” This ability to change, to be dynamic, is distinctively un-Oriental, and makes one believe that there is an element of Western-ness in Ukraine. However, geography is the enemy of the Ukraine – and since it is “in Russia’s shadow”, union with it is deemed impossible. Further, expansion of the EU to the East will further cast Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence, as seen in this quote from The Times of London [6/13/2001]: “Poland will be required, under the Schengen agreement, to close its frontier with Ukraine, making it harder to keep Kiev from a pro-Russian path.” It seems from the newspapers that Ukraine is the tragic victim of the greater good, as represented by EU expansion.

227 Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated the full range of individual state representations that are given through the newspapers that are describing NATO and EU expansion. Collectively, these representations range from the most optimistic views of Eastern Europe (i.e., Poland, Hungary) to the most pessimistic (i.e., Belarus, Bosnia). These individual representations can be situated along a linear spectrum of potential inclusion in NATO or the EU. However, these representations are not simply reducible to this proposed spectrum. These representations are very detailed, with some countries being more “advanced” in some areas than others, and those same countries being less “advanced” in others. These individual representations are integral parts of the regional representations already described in the previous chapter, and they play a role in the representation of Eastern (and Central) Europe as well. Although some countries are relatively non-integral to this overall representation, others have achieved an iconic status through their usage in the press. For example, Poland is seen as emblematic of Eastern Europe in the EU expansion debate, perhaps because its large agricultural sector represents the largest obstacle to economic integration with the pre-expansion EU. Similarly, Belarus represents everything that is perceived as negative about Eastern Europe, from its authoritarian style of government to its “backward” Soviet-style economy. In short, these individual representations offer insight into which states of Eastern Europe gain prominence in the public’s mind as a result of the debate over EU and NATO expansion.

228

12. PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEDIA

Introduction Thus far, the newspaper articles describing NATO and EU expansion have been rather unproblematically incorporated into this research. This chapter is intended to break up the impression of the press as a monolithic entity that objectively mediates the facts from experts to the public. The first portion of this chapter deals with the geopolitical perspective that is inherent to individual newspapers based on their shared identity with a state. The second portion of the chapter deals with the other structural factors that can affect the perspective of the media. Geopolitical Perspective Up until this point, the newspaper articles concerned with EU and NATO expansion that have been reviewed have been treated more or less as coming from a homogenous Western viewpoint. Nevertheless, these newspapers do not all represent the same geopolitical perspective. For the purposes of organization, the newspaper articles in this section were grouped by national origin with a few exceptions. For the analysis of EU expansion, Canadian newspaper articles were lumped with those of the United States, because they had published too few articles (six, to be exact) to be representative of a national viewpoint on European Union expansion. Similarly, all articles from English language newspapers in Asia and were lumped together and although used for the previous sections they will not be included in this section as there are too few articles from each country (see below) to represent a national perspective and collectively they cannot represent a common “Asian and Australian perspective” as it is ludicrous to believe that countries as diverse as Australia (six articles), Singapore (five articles), and India (one article) have a single view of the world given their disparate geopolitical positions.

229 In the analysis of national discourses in NATO expansion, in contrast to the EU expansion discourses, the United States and Canada were separated and given their own national discourse, as they are both are members of NATO and have been known to disagree, sometimes quite vehemently on foreign policy issues. This is due to their markedly different national perspectives: The United States is the world’s sole superpower (or hyperpower, as some would describe it) with global interests and reach. Canada, on the other hand, generally prides itself on being more humanitarian than their American counterparts, focusing on human rights in particular. In this section Irish publications are collapsed into the British group, not because there is any real similarity in geopolitical perspective there, but because the number of Irish newspaper articles about NATO expansion is incredibly small (less than 5 – probably because Ireland is not a NATO member). Again, all Asian newspapers were lumped together for the previous analysis but will be omitted here because there were so few from each country as to be useless and an “Asian” category would be a mishmash of differing perspectives. It should be mentioned here as well that the state is not necessarily the best level of analysis from which to evaluate coverage. Different newspapers will have different coverage, and very seldom is there a uniformity of representation at the national level that is sufficient to make conclusions about. The following is simply a list of general impressions. Indeed, the differences between national media outlets are substantial, as they are “influenced by differential material support, dependence on the market, political backing, type of produce and intended audience, amongst other things (Sharp, 1998, p.155).” Indeed, the “intended audience” is perhaps the most important factor for a news media outlet – as Edward Said noted (1997) not only does the media outlet have to keep the intended audience tuned in by providing a spectacle, but typically the reporters and editors are also from that audience (in the case of this dissertation, a member of that nationality) and see global events from their own national viewpoint. Furthermore, news media outlets also typically use as sources members of their own government, who will clearly represent the “national” interest. An example of this phenomenon is Time Magazine’s inscription of the Persian Gulf as the “Crescent of Crisis” in January 1979, as documented by James Sidaway (1998). It is unlikely that a newspaper or magazine in the

230 Persian Gulf region would refer to its own region that way. Therefore, it is fruitful to compare how the different national media viewed the same region differently. It should be noted, however, that it can be assumed that there is a great deal of heterogeneity within the different national media. But what is being foregrounded here is how geopolitical proximity is affected at a national scale by differences in the media. United Kingdom press and EU Expansion The United Kingdom was by far the most concerned with the issue of EU expansion. It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom had over five times as many articles meeting the search criteria (314 of the total) than the United States and Canada combined (57). This is especially noteworthy because of the difference in total numbers of newspapers in the Lexis-Nexis search – even if the North American newspapers were devoting as many pages to the issue as British newspapers were, they would still come out far ahead in total volume as a result of the weighting of Lexis-Nexis towards American newspapers. Of course, this can generally be explained with the idea of geopolitical proximity – the United Kingdom is a member of the European Union and its citizens are therefore more plugged in to the issue than American or Canadian citizens. Citizens in the UK vote for Members of the , they pay a portion of their taxes as dues to the organization, and the news about the European Union directly affects them. While the EU affects Americans and , it is generally only a secondary effect and many Americans and Canadians are generally unaware of the purpose, organization, events, and quite possibly the existence of the EU. Speaking in very general terms, the newspapers from the United Kingdom are more skeptical of EU expansion than those of other countries studied. This is visible in the higher proportion of articles that are concerned with the economic costs of expansion. The newspapers of the United Kingdom seem to be substantially concerned with the costs of expansion – especially since there has been a large public debate about whether the UK is over-taxed in regard to the EU. Margaret Thatcher negotiated a rebate in EU dues in 1984 as a response to a perceived shortfall in immediate gains for the UK as a result of the enormous amount of money that the EU spent on the Common Agricultural Policy, which Thatcher argued did not benefit the UK (Heffernan, 1998, p.218).

231 The rebate that Margaret Thatcher negotiated was put on the table as one of a number of reforms proposed to ease the cost of expansion, but was steadfastly defended by the British government, which, since this was an area in which the national veto could be used, meant that it was preserved. The amount of news coverage devoted to this debate was not large, but neither was it insignificant. Similarly, while the original rebate probably did not create the high level of concern about EU cost, yet symbolized the UK’s concerns, the debate about retracting the rebate symbolizes the United Kingdom’s priorities during this expansion: while much of the United Kingdom’s policy is wrapped around expanding the EU eastwards so that it becomes more difficult to “deepen” the Union, there is still a preoccupation in the news about the economic cost of expansion. Therefore a trend can be seen in UK newspapers of championing the moral arguments inherent in the “Eastern Europe as the same as Western Europe” representation while making criticisms of how expensive expansion will be. Again, this is a broad generalization – rhetoric can be found in UK newspapers that is both pro-expansion and anti-expansion, often in the same article. This reflects the division among the British populace regarding the EU – there are splits within each party and within each economic class. Irish Press and EU Expansion One of the most interesting things about this breakdown of the articles into national discourses is how small the contribution of Ireland is. Because Ireland is a country that is an EU member and is generally one of the most pro-Europe of states (although not all the time, as we shall see) it would be expected that there would be a great deal of articles about one of the most important issues facing the Union. This is not the case. Of course, this is at least partially explained by the fact that only one Irish newspaper, The Irish Times, makes the list used by Lexis-Nexis. The Irish Times is perceived as the press that reflects the remnants of pro-British sentiment in the . Still, there are huge gaps in the coverage where according to other newspapers significant events were taking place and nothing is reported in The Irish Times. This is perhaps explainable as a result of methodology – the articles were culled by using a search based on certain terms (a search for articles that included the phrases

232 “Eastern Europe”, “European Union”, and either “expansion” or “enlargement” in the headline or lead paragraph), and it is possible that for some reason some Irish articles did not meet those criteria. Nevertheless, the search criteria seemingly made comprehensive lists of articles for the other regions; there is no theoretical reason why it should be different for Ireland.

Much of Ireland’s coverage of the expansion project revolved around how local issues impacted European politics, or how European issues impacted local life. The best example of this was the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice. This completely unexpected rejection by Irish referendum of a treaty deemed necessary to expansion shocked Europe and seemingly shook the Times out of its silence. Consequently, much of the coverage discussed the reasons for expansion, as the Irish government’s response to the rejection was a rededication to communication with the Irish people. The newspaper, adopting the geopolitical position of the government, conveyed the government’s position. This is not to say that the paper adopted a position on the issue (beyond its editorial line), but that it mediated the government’s message in a dominant fashion. Even then, though, the amount of coverage was small in comparison to that of the United Kingdom, which in some cases covered the Irish referendum better than The Irish Times did. United Kingdom (and Irish) Press and NATO Expansion British newspapers took perhaps the most sympathetic view of Russia of all the discourses analyzed (with the exception of a couple of articles by Russians in the Asian section). Much of the discourse discussed how weak Russia had become, how humiliated they were by NATO’s expansion into their sphere of influence, and how betrayed they had been by the West. The British highlight the Russians’ exclusion from the international circles of power – but their coverage is not only sympathetic to the Russians. British coverage also described the insecurity of the Eastern Europeans and the fragility of their institutions. The Russians also feature in the UK newspapers as much of the cause of Eastern European historical difficulty. Very generally speaking, the British press seemed to refrain from Orientalist coverage more than the other countries.

233 North American Press and EU Expansion Together US and Canadian newspapers provided a much smaller body of articles about EU expansion than the UK did. This is to be expected, given the peripheral nature of EU expansion to the direct perceived interests of these countries. It is tangential except in that it forms a clear indication of the end of the Cold War, which is a popular topic because of the feelings of triumphalism that it evokes, in particular for the United States. Nevertheless, the level of detail that was found in articles from the United Kingdom is lacking, and articles mostly revolve around significant events of the expansion process, such as new treaties or the publishing of candidate lists. North American newspapers are generally less concerned with the cost of expansion and are more optimistic about enlargement as a whole. This is perhaps due to the uniquely American (American newspapers dominate the Lexis-Nexis list) view of history as teleological and progress-oriented. Also, Orientalism is not quite as rooted in American culture as it is in that of the British, whose attitudes Said was describing when he coined the term. The idea of a large federal union is not as foreign to Americans and Canadians as it is to the citizens of Europe themselves. Therefore, European Union expansion is treated as the inevitable result of the Cold War, and it taps into the “we won the Cold War” mentality that is so prevalent in North America. Also, since neither country is a member of the EU, it can be viewed from a distance in this way – the details of negotiation and cost are seen as naught but bumps on the road of progress. The United States Press and NATO Expansion The attention paid to NATO expansion in American newspapers is particularly impressive considering how many pundits regarded it as under-covered by the media in the time leading up to the Senate vote in 1997. American newspapers predominated in the amount of coverage, although that is statistically to be expected because of the makeup of the Lexis-Nexis list of newspapers. American journalists were some of the most likely to ascribe to “geopolitical” analyses of Eastern Europe. The “hardheaded” and “objective” view of the situation is not surprising, given that the foreign policy establishment of the United States had been frustrated by the Clinton-era foreign policy of the United States, which lacked the clear dichotomy of East/West and us/them of the

234 Cold War. Still, mixed in with that type of analysis is a strong element of the post-Cold War triumphalism. American newspaper coverage seemed generally to peak in the weeks prior to the 1997 vote, with significantly less coverage before and after. Canadian Press and NATO Expansion Canadian newspapers mirrored their American counterparts in a great many ways, although interestingly, they showed a more cynical view of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Employing a great many Orientalist images of Eastern Europe and Russia, the news establishment seemed to push against expansion. Canadian newspapers seemed to emphasize the foreignness of Eastern Europe – although the reason for this bias is not clear. Canadian coverage seemed relatively uniform, not focusing on any one part of the expansion process. Hungarian Press and NATO Expansion In an effort to augment the findings of this dissertation by broadening the sample, an additional effort was made to search the archive of the Budapest Sun, a weekly English language newspaper that is not found in the Lexis-Nexis database. The archive is not as deep as the Lexis-Nexis database, with the archive beginning on 9/10/98 (shortly after Hungary’s accession to NATO membership) and continuing through the search date of 12/12/02. The conclusion to be reached from this particular avenue of research is not clear. While certainly reporting the news that is relevant to people in Budapest, the newspaper’s major stockholder is Associated Newspapers of Great Britain, which in turn is owned by the Harmsworth family (an aristocratic family from the UK). The newspaper caters to American (and other English-speaking) businessmen. Therefore, the geopolitical positioning of the newspaper is somewhat confusing. Does it relay news from the Hungarian perspective? Or does it relay news from a British/American perspective? Certainly, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the newspaper cannot be taken to speak for the views of the Hungarian man-on-the-street (indeed, there is a danger in assuming that about any newspaper). In the vein of the “Eastern Europe as Sympathetic Victim” representation mentioned earlier, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is quoted [3/18/99] as saying that NATO membership “marked the end of the old order in Europe”, one dominated by

235 the Soviets/Russians. Furthermore, the sympathetic and moral relationship between the West and the applicants is explicated by describing NATO expansion as "historical justice" [5/24/2001] for Eastern and Central Europe. In a later article, the Budapest Sun [6/7/2001] quoted Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: "It is a moral duty for Hungary as well as a well-perceived security policy interest to contribute to the continuation of the enlargement process by admitting those countries prepared and ripe for membership." Following the “Eastern Europe as the Orient” representation described earlier in this dissertation, the newspaper also documents the threat that comes from the East. In fact, the Budapest Sun [2/10/2000] devoted an entire article to the increasing number of spies from Russia that are seeking to use the contacts they had dating to the Warsaw Pact days in order to obtain intelligence information about today’s NATO. Otherwise, this representation was fairly dormant in this newspaper. It is probably relevant that the only Orientalist imagery to be found was in reference to Russia, not to the actual candidate countries. It should also be noted that throughout discussions of NATO (and EU) expansion, Hungary is referred to as “Central Europe” (as is the Czech Republic and occasionally others) while the candidate countries are said to come from “Central and Eastern Europe.” The invocation of the “Eastern Europe as Geopolitical Space” representation occurs quote often, as in this article [5/24/2001] that uses the concept of a “sphere of influence” to describe a further round of NATO expansion that did not include the Baltic States as giving Russia “a de facto veto over NATO decisions and acknowledging a

Russian sphere of influence where it deserves none.” Similarly, geopolitical logic was invoked in the Budapest Sun [6/14/2001] when further expansion was described as required because of “Hungary’s current geographical isolation within NATO as the only member not directly bordering another.” One dynamic that was apparent in discussions of NATO expansion (given that the archive post-dates Hungary’s accession) was Hungary’s preparation for formal and technical inclusion. For example, one news story [12/10/98] documented the military and constitutional issues that arose as a result of membership. Namely, these included

236 the purchase of Western aircraft and weaponry, conversion of the Hungarian military from Russian standards to Western, and the removal of constitutional restrictions on the deployment of foreign troops within Hungary. Other articles detailed the politics of continuing enlargement. In these articles, other regional groupings are visible in the Budapest Sun that did not become popular in the other newspapers studies. For instance, the group of candidates for the second wave of expansion in Eastern Europe was known as the “Vilnius Nine”, as in this article [6/14/2001]: “America has also given its clear backing, said [Bulgarian Ambassador to Hungary] Panov. ‘Delegations from the candidate countries, ‘The Vilnius Nine’ as they are known, met with US Secretary of State Colin Powell here in Budapest," said Panov. "He sent a very positive message with regard to our preparations and also mentioned that President George W Bush remains fully committed to NATO expansion.’” While the regional grouping may not have become common parlance here in the press as the Visegrad 3 did, it nevertheless had the same effect as all of the Vilnius Nine were in fact offered membership. Hungarian Press and EU Expansion EU expansion was much a much hotter topic in the Budapest Sun over the time span studied. In fact, there were nine times as many articles printed about EU expansion as there were about NATO expansion. This would seem to be the obvious result of Hungary’s inclusion in NATO in 1998 and still pending candidacy for the EU. In fact, Hungary did not gain approval to join the EU until December of 2002, only a week or two after the scope of this search. Many of the articles dealt with updates on the path to accession. For instance, one article [10/29/98] told of a Eurobarometer survey that showed a majority of EU citizens favoring expansion to the East, including Hungary. Hungary in fact had the highest “yes” percentage. Other articles predicted varying accession dates to be possible. The date predicted seemed more specific and accurate than was given in the other newspapers surveyed. For instance, in the 1/14/99 issue of the Sun, the German foreign minister predicts 2003 as the likely accession date – and indeed, given the Dec. 2002 announcement of who is to be included, 2003 seems to be the year the decision will be formalized. Hungarian authorities put other dates forward, but they were less accurate.

237 For example, in a 7/22/99 issue the Hungarian foreign minister predicted that Hungary would join the EU by January 2002, and a 7/13/2000 article also claimed that 2002 would be the year for accession. An article from 4/12/2001 argues that 2004 would be difficult but possible as a date for Hungarian accession. A rather short-lived theme can be witnessed in articles about EU expansion in the Budapest Sun, namely the impact of Austrian right-wing leader Jörg Haider on Hungary’s chances for admission. In several articles [2/3/2000; 2/10/2000; 9/21/2000] the difficult position of the Hungarian government was outlined: they could not comment on the anti-immigrant positions of Haider and his party because Austria could veto their admission to the EU. Another article [3/16/2000] compared a right-wing “extremist” party in Hungary with that of Haider, and illustrated its disproportionate influence on the media. Several months later [7/13/2000], Jörg Haider explicitly connected the lifting of diplomatic sanctions by the other EU members with EU expansion, causing quite a stir in the Sun: “‘Now that France has said that nothing will change during the French Presidency (of the EU), we say quite bluntly that nothing will move either,’ said Haider during an interview on Austrian radio.” A similar flurry of articles surrounded the 2001 Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice, which effectively shelved expansion until the referendum could be held again. Likewise, the 2002 Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice caused excitement of a much more positive nature. In particular, the “letters to the editor” section of the Sun from 10/17/2002 is dominated by the referendum, with one letter by a former Prime Minister of Ireland and another by the leader of the Irish Worker’s Party. There were several examples of the representation of Eastern Europe as Economic Space, as in this article [6/27/2002]: “The Government aimed, as a minimum, to ensure next year’s budget deficit (in terms of percentage of GDP) will not exceed that of this year. ‘Hungary has to increase its ability to absorb capital, both to attract foreign investors and to be able to absorb increased EU funding,’ he said. [Hungarian Prime Minister Medgyessy said EU expansion was in the interests of both the accession countries as well as current member states, which needed the larger markets for the sake of global competitiveness.” Similarly, the representation of Eastern Europe as the West

238 was made primarily through assertions of economic equality, as in this example from a 12/12/2002 editorial: “While the EU has often stood strong for fair competition, it has not always been consistent in applying those rules (think of France and its power markets). And it has always been argued that part of the drive behind EU expansion has been to create a stronger European market. You can’t do that by crippling the newest members from day one.” The moral arguments for expansion were largely missing in the Budapest Sun, unlike in the NATO debate, and were replaced by primarily economic arguments. The only examples of the Eastern Europe as Unchanging/Unchanged representation were of the Orientalist variety, although these were written only when referring to a member-state’s concerns about expansion. For example, one article [9/14/2000] outlines Germany’s concerns, namely crime: “Germany has raised the issue of crime in the fast track applicant countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) and shown concern about an influx of cheap labor.” Media Positioning In addition to the geopolitical perspective that becomes innate to a newspaper’s reporting due to the governmental access inherent to its national “citizenship”, the differing constituencies and ownership interests of newspapers lead to differing perspectives on the same events. To simplify, the preceding part of this chapter emphasized the different ways that national media described NATO and EU expansion. The upcoming section will discuss these other factors that shaped the discourse in unique ways below the national scale. Most newspapers are marketed for, and intended to be read by, a certain subset of the population. In this instance, the newspapers’ editorial lines are shaped to be within the bounds of their constituencies’ perceived political limits while still attempting to exert some influence. Research has shown that a newspaper’s editorial line is extremely influential in influencing public opinion (McCleneghan and Ragland, 2002). This has led to a mass of politically inspired writings about which way the media bias goes, to the left or the right (see Alterman, 2003; Goldberg, 2001). An example of the relationship between the readership and editorial line is the New York Times. The New York Times is often perceived as being a national newspaper with a liberal editorial line. Its readers

239 are often left leaning, and that is both a cause and an effect of the editorial line (see Koch, 1994). A self-sustaining cycle can be identified in which the readership and the editorial line reproduce each other in a positive feedback cycle. The readers are liberal because the editorial line and news reporting is left leaning, and the editorial line and news reporting is left leaning because the readership is liberal. The same can be said of , a national newspaper with a generally conservative editorial line. Its readership is generally the capitalist class, and its views (and shaping of the discourse) reflect that. Often, this linkage to a certain constituency and market is linked to the ownership of the newspaper. For example, Rupert Murdoch, a well-known backer of many conservative views, owns the Washington Times. Thus, newspapers are often launched to fulfill the personal goals of the ownership. Less obvious than that, a newspaper that is owned by a large corporation may reflect that corporate culture by tilting in favor of private enterprise in general, and the capitalist class in particular. These observations are far from a rule, however. For example, Rupert Murdoch also owns the Sun, a British tabloid that has cozied up to Tony Blair’s (slightly) left leaning Labour Party over the past several years. In addition, the New York Times is owned by The New York Times Company, a large corporation that owns 19 newspapers, eight television stations and two radio stations. Nevertheless, the New York Times was one of the leading voices in uncovering the instances of corporate corruption in late 2001/early 2002. The only conclusion to be reached is that none of these factors (ownership, readership, etc.) conclusively determines the type or slant of articles that are published by a newspaper. This lack of clear signposts for newspapers’ ideological predispositions is further complicated by the nature of the NATO and EU debates. Both debates are not clear left/right issues, with conservatives lining up on one side of the debate and liberals on the other. Instead the pro-expansion group for both debates included members of the “New Democrat”/”New Labour” center-left and business-oriented conservatives. The anti- expansion group included a complex coalition of liberal anti-imperialists and conservative isolationists. For example, members of an anti-NATO expansion lobbying

240 group in the United States ranged “from the libertarian Cato Institute to the liberal Council for a Livable World.” [Christian Science Monitor, 4/28/98] Nevertheless, there are differences between these newspapers in the way that they describe events. While a long-term content comparison of the various newspapers would be too large for this current project, a snapshot may be useful. To this end, an article from the Houston Chronicle and an article from the Chicago Sun-Times from July 10, 1997 have been selected for comparison. Both newspapers are regionally significant and are owned by the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company and the Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., respectively. Because both articles were published on the same day, it is assumed that the authors were dealing with the same information and the same day’s events. The Chicago Sun-Times article is titled “Senators question move to add 3 nations; NATO expansion raises doubts”, and it centered on the arguments of those opposed to NATO expansion, in particular Senators Helms (R-NC) and Harkin (D-IA). It then outlined the process for admission, noting the steps that had already been taken, and culminated in a quote from Senator Lott (R-MS) about the virtual inevitability of admission. The Houston Chronicle article is titled “France, Germany debate costs of NATO expansion”, and as its title would lead you to believe, it focuses on foreign opposition to the expansion process. The focal point of the article is President Clinton, who makes arguments for expansion and claims that its price will be lower than anticipated. His foils are President Chirac of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany, who complained loudly about cost estimates for expansion. The domestic opposition to expansion is mentioned, using exactly the same quotes as in the Chicago Sun-Times, but they are buried in the 18th through 22nd paragraphs of the article. The point of this snapshot is not that one newspaper is wrong and another right, or even that the news is skewed in one political direction or another. Instead, it is to show that the same events can be portrayed in different ways, which may have discursive effects for the reader. For example, one possible outcome of these articles is that the reader of the Chicago Sun-Times article would be more apt to question the wisdom of expansion. This is because the Sun-Times article portrays the issue as a domestic one,

241 and in particular a non-partisan one. An opponent of expansion from each party is quoted, signaling to the reader that they do not have a partisan allegiance either for or against expansion. In addition, the only quote from a proponent of expansion comes from the Senate majority leader, who somewhat smugly proclaims, "I think if we voted today, we possibly would have a two-thirds vote". Opponents give the only arguments about the merit of expansion, and the article is structured so as to make the opposition seem like the underdog. In contrast, the Houston Chronicle article portrays the debate as being one between countries, with any sign of domestic debate being crammed in at the end. The article is phrased in a way that makes France and Germany seem petty, as in this opening sentence: “While President Clinton hailed a new era for the U.S.-European alliance Wednesday, France and Germany questioned U.S. estimates on the cost of expanding NATO to three former Soviet bloc nations.” The impression is furthered with the statement that France is no longer willing to “pay its share” for expansion. All of this leads to an “us” versus “them” mentality that externalizes opposition to expansion. The same story is covered in both articles, but the different emphases and structures of the stories lead to different outcome upon the reading. There is nothing innately nefarious about this, but it must be noted for a full understanding of the way places and geopolitical information are mediated to the public through newspapers. Conclusion This chapter has broken up the previously monolithic representation of the press and shown the myriad ways in which individual newspapers have differences in viewpoint from other newspapers. These differences can come from a variety of different sources, such as geopolitical positioning, owners’ political bent, and constituency. These differences of perspective can cause the same events to be viewed differently by readers of different newspapers, even when there is no intent to deceive, as we saw in the example of the Chicago Sun-Times and the Houston Chronicle. These differences of perspective are also hard to pin down, because they can be extremely multi-faceted. This was demonstrated in the example of the Budapest Sun, which was a Central European newspaper with British owners catering to American readers. To further add to the

242 confusion, the debates of NATO and EU expansion are not necessarily amenable to a simple left/right analysis, even if the overall political cant of a newspaper could be determined. All of this is not to imply that the issue of media positioning should be ignored, but instead it must be carefully watched lest the media resume a monolithic appearance while conducting analysis.

243

13. CONCLUSION

The previous several chapters of this dissertation have been primarily results- oriented; they have focused on enumerating and describing the various representations that were visible in the content analysis. These chapters have outlined representations of Eastern Europe at all scales – from the macro-region itself to its sub-regions and the states that form the smallest basis for representation in the newspapers that were studied. However, documenting these representations is not an end unto itself – although understanding the various ways in which places are represented is useful. The questions originally asked by this dissertation were: What does it mean to be European? What does it mean to be a Westerner? How are those identities (and places) created in relation to their neighbors (and/or Others) in Eastern Europe? What role does NATO and EU expansion play in this process? To answer those questions, NATO and the EU were used as institutional stand-ins for the regions/identities of “the West” and “Europe”, respectively. As we saw, there is ample evidence for these connections to be made. Thus, the expansion of those two organizations could be used as a formal political process leading to the incorporation of new territories and people under the rubric of “the West” and “Europe”. The debate over expansion thus can be said to be a debate over the “true” identity of the candidates. Candidate states seek to portray themselves as “Western” and “European” while the political elites who are actually making the decisions for the applicants ponder and dispute the evidence that is given to them. This process, mediated to the population through newspaper coverage, is very revealing about the identities that are in question, in particular those that our original inquiry was about – “Westerner” and “European”. The discourse on “Central Europe” is key to understanding what it means to be “Western” or “European”. Quite literally, Central Europe is a spatially based region that

244 arose from nothing. Twenty years ago there was no Central Europe, only Eastern and Western Europe. Thus, its very existence can be traced to a change in the representation of places within Europe. States previously identified as Eastern were becoming Central, that is to say – moving to the West. This spatial metaphor signifies a change in the perception of place; the countries of the new Central Europe were seen to be “advancing” faster than other states. Therefore, the ways in which they were more “advanced” than their neighbors to the east can be identified as key attributes of a “Western” or “European” society because being identified as “Central European” generally denoted that a state was already in NATO and the EU or was about to get in during the next possible expansion. Thus, the impression that a state is more central than eastern is a cognitive step that reflects the perceived increase in similarities since the end of the Cold War. Central Europe was universally perceived as temporally, spatially, and culturally closer to the West (and/or Western Europe). The qualities that made Central Europe more “central” are the same qualities that were used when portraying Eastern Europe as “the West” or as a “sympathetic victim”. Thus, these representations serve as variations on the West’s and Europe’s self- perception. These representations do not pretend that there is no civilizational border between East and West, but instead (generally) move that border to be congruent with the border of Russia. Thus, the candidate states of Eastern Europe are identified as being of the same civilization as those that are doing the categorizing, namely government officials, academics, and journalists from Western Europe and the US. The qualities that mark this civilization are given in the newspapers as the attributes that allow the candidates to be suitable for inclusion in NATO and the EU. Qualities that were prominently mentioned include democratic political systems, growing economies, cultural sophistication, significant levels of education, and capitalist economies, among others. The restructuring of economic and political systems following the end of the Cold War is put into a discourse of “reform”, which attaches a pejorative meaning to the former Communist systems and projects the Western/European political and economic systems as a normative good. This reform discourse inspires the reader to envisage a linear path of development upon which some states were more “advanced” than others,

245 paralleling the spatial metaphor of Central Europe, in which some states are more “Western/Central” than others in their progress from the East to the West. The qualities mentioned above reflexively create the identity of “the West” and “Europe” by saying that these qualities of Eastern Europe are the ones that make them like “us”. This identity was simultaneously constructed by distancing both “The West” and “Europe” (both Eastern and Western) from Russia. This was accomplished both by explicitly distancing Eastern Europe from Russia (culturally, politically, economically, and spatially) and by appealing to the public’s sympathy towards those who have been historically wronged by the Russians/Soviets. A moral claim is made on the reader – that “we” now have an opportunity to protect the people of the candidate states in a historic way that previous generations failed to do. Thus, Yalta, Munich, the Prague Spring, and Hungarian uprising in 1956 are all brought forth as reasons for reasons for expansion. “We” should treat these candidates in the way that “we” would like to be treated, because “they” are fundamentally like “us”. Furthermore, they are like us because they have the qualities that mark our civilization, as described earlier. Therefore, this representation provides information about which qualities are “Western” or “European”. The mirror image of “the West” and “Europe” can be seen in the representations of “Eastern Europe as the Orient” and “Eastern Europe as Unchanging”. These representations hold that the civilizational divide lies somewhere between the current members of NATO/EU and some, if not all, of the applicant states. Thus, what can be defined as “us” can be seen in the expansion debates as the reasons that Eastern Europe is not suitable for inclusion in NATO or the EU (depending on the debate in question). These characteristics often take the form of the Orientalist discourse, engaging in generalizations that are not just applicable to Eastern Europe but also to other parts of the world that have been marked historically as “the East”. These include a tendency towards authoritarianism and despotism, some form of backwardness (especially in economic matters), a lack of respect for human rights, a lack of civilian control over the military, a lack of respect for the law, and other similar concepts. The division between Western and Eastern Europe was also signified through a contrast of the progress made in the West to the perceived stagnation in the East. Much

246 of this was described in the newspaper articles covering NATO and EU expansion through a comparison of national economies. Much was made of the difference in per capita GDP between Eastern and Western Europe, and also attention was paid to the difference in economic activity, with the West being symbolic of industrial activity and services, and with Eastern Europe being described as primarily agricultural. In addition, Eastern Europe was described as being administratively incapable of admission to NATO and the EU, with corruption rampant and inexperienced bureaucracies. In every example, the use of Orientalist discourse is used to create a sense of geopolitical distance between the reader and the citizen of the applicant state. Thus, the security or prosperity of Poland (for example) was not linked to the security or prosperity of the reader, and furthermore the level of sympathy for the Poles as people whose situation could easily be your own is reduced. The introduction of a civilizational difference renders their situation completely foreign to the reader’s own situation. To tie this representation into the original research questions requires an inversion process. Any critique of Eastern Europe as unsuited to NATO or EU membership involves the elevation of certain traits or characteristics to a pivotal status that denotes the boundaries of acceptability. These traits then, must be inverted to determine our self- identity. Therefore, the Orientalist image of Eastern Europe as corrupt, authoritarian, savage, uncivilized, militaristic, and irrational in turn mean that the countries of NATO and the EU (or “the West” and “Europe”) are by definition law-abiding, democratic, peace-loving emblems of civilization. Furthermore, the descriptions of significant differences between Eastern Europe and the current member-states of the two organizations serve to illustrate the “advanced” nature of life in the EU and NATO. Using the logic of development theory and the teleological idea of “progress”, the West and Europe are held up as models for the rest of the world. This reflects the Western/European self-identification with the top of the global hierarchy. This identity as the pinnacle of development ties the next representation into the other two representations of Eastern Europe that were just described. The representation of “Eastern Europe as Geopolitical Space” described Eastern Europe in non-cultural terms. In this representation Eastern Europe is stripped of its human elements and is seen

247 as a space to be acted on and through. Descriptions of Eastern Europe as “defensible” or “indefensible” are the most obvious of these representations. Similarly, the carving up of Eastern Europe into “spheres of influence” illustrates the way in which decisions about NATO expansion are based on decisions rendered by experts that “see” natural patterns on the map. Indeed, this representation is very visual, and relies on the viewing of the world through the lens of a panopticon. It is through this description that this representation connects to the original research questions. It defines the West not through the descriptions ascribed to Eastern Europe but through the very manner in which Eastern Europe is described. It is so ingrained in the Western consciousness to act in a global manner that the shift from cultural description to geopolitical description is done without any notice being made in the press. It is the ability to leap from one form of description to another that allowed the West to achieve its self-ascribed global supremacy. The process of colonization led to the harnessing of the globe’s natural resources for the economic benefit of what would become known as “the West”. The ability to harness those resources was dependent on the ability to militarily dominate the globe. Thus, the geopolitical perspective was both an enabler of, and product of, the larger process of colonization. This is an integral part of what it means to be part of the West – the identity is contingent upon a perception of separation from (and above) the rest of the world. The world is an object to be manipulated and acted upon. This concept is followed up on in our discussion of the last representation of Eastern Europe – “Eastern Europe as Economic Space”. In that representation, Eastern Europe is also stripped of its human and cultural elements, except as they relate to perceived economic bonuses and costs. This was accomplished through the use of the “geofinancial panopticon” to render Eastern Europe known to EU investors. Thus, investors can make rational decisions about how useful a place within Eastern Europe would be to them. For example, individual states could be designated as “emerging markets” or as sources of highly educated, low cost labor. In much the same way as the representation of “Eastern Europe as Geopolitical Space”, it is not the actual representation that says something about “Europe” and “the West” but instead it is the manner in which the representation is created. The ability to

248 strip a place of its human elements and instead view it as a resource to be harnessed is one of the intellectual steps necessary for colonialism. Thus, the very poverty that is often ascribed to Eastern Europe in this representation is (in part) a product of the representation itself, and the uneven development that the colonial project created. Therefore, these representations of Eastern Europe provide, in the aggregate, a portrait of what it means to be of the West, or European. However, the conclusions of this dissertation are not limited to identifying these elements of Western or European identity. This dissertation was also seeking to identify the role of NATO and EU expansion in the formulation or contestation of these identities. To that end, I believe some generalizations can be made. While much has been written about identity formation, this literature emphasizes the post-facto agency that seems to be wrapped around political issues. For example, Munasinghi (2002), the creation of a “national identity” for Trinidad was a project pursued after the political independence of Trinidad. Likewise, Sharp (2000) gives “identity formation” agency to Reader’s Digest and its editorial staff, but that staff is largely reacting to political events beyond its control (i.e., the Cold War). Accounts such as these are fascinating studies of efforts made to reformulate identities by political (or, in the case of Sharp, publishing/corporate) elites. What is missing in these accounts is an active role for the immediate mediation of political events. In other words, nothing is written about the role of place creation and representation in everyday media accounts of political events in “foreign” parts of the world. Therefore, one of the goals of this dissertation has been to fill in this void. This dissertation fills this void in the literature by showing the linkage between formal political processes, such as expansion of NATO and the EU, and identity formation. Thus, in this case, NATO and EU expansion embody the process of identity formation because those organizations are already established in the public’s mind as embodiments of the West and Europe. The superimposition of mental of maps of “Europe” and “the West” with maps of Eastern Europe relies on the formation of a common identity. While elites are still doing the identity construction, as in Sharp (2000) and Munasinghi (2002), they are doing it as part of the formal expansion process –

249 contesting the identities of the candidates and hearing assertions of “Westernness” and “Europeanness” from political elites in the candidate countries. While many identity theorists (e.g., Wilson, 1996; Smith, 1996) have pointed out that nations have historically been more often born from states than the other way around (i.e., the aforementioned post-facto agency), this dissertation has documented that the re-construction of a place- based identity can occur over a period of several years concurrent to the political processes that embody the change in identity.

250

APPENDIX A: NEWSPAPERS SEARCHED IN THIS DISSERTATION (4/17/91 – 4/19/02)

• Asian Wall Street Journal • Atlanta Journal and Constitution, The • Australian Financial Review • Baltimore Sun, The • Boston Globe, The • Boston Herald, The • Buffalo News, The • Chicago Sun-Times • Christian Science Monitor, The • Columbus Dispatch, The • Daily News (New York) • Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), The • Daily/Sunday Telegraph (London), The • Denver Post, The • Dominion (Wellington), The • Evening Post (Wellington), The • Financial Times (London) • Gazeta Mercantil Online • Gazette (Montreal), The • Guardian (London), The • Herald (Glasgow), The • Houston Chronicle, The • Independent and Independent on Sunday (London), The • Irish Times, The • Jerusalem Post, The • Journal of Commerce • Los Angeles Times • Miami Herald • New Straits Times (Malaysia) • New York Times, The • Observer, The • Omaha World Herald • Ottawa Citizen • Plain Dealer, The • San Diego Union-Tribune • San Francisco Chronicle, The

251 • Scotsman & Scotland on Sunday, The • Seattle Times, The • South China Morning Post • Southland Times (), The • St. Louis Post-Dispatch • St. Petersburg Times • Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) • Straits Times (Singapore), The • Tampa Tribune, The • Times and Sunday Times (London), The • Times-Picayune, The • Toronto Star, The • Washington Post, The

252

APPENDIX B: TABLES INDICATING NUMBER OF QUOTES SUPPORTING EACH REPRESENTATION OF EASTERN EUROPE FOR EACH DEBATE

EU EXPANSION Irelan UK US/Canada Asia Total d Unchanging 89 29 4 5 127 The West 74 20 0 8 102 Economic Space 51 13 2 4 70 Total Quotes 400 107 17 33

NATO EXPANSION US Canada UK/Irelan Asia Total d The Orient 101 24 21 0 146 Sympathetic Victim 81 20 30 0 131 Geopolitical Space 71 12 16 0 99 Total Quotes 426 98 144 0

253

APPENDIX C: TABLE INDICATING NUMBER OF QUOTES SUPPORTING EACH REPRESENTATION OF RUSSIA IN THE NATO DEBATE

RUSSIA US Canada UK/Irelan Asia Total d European 131 6 28 2 167 The Orient 104 10 34 5 153 Geopolitical 94 18 43 6 161 Space Total Quotes 398 37 130 21

254

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Wittfogel, Karl; Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power Random House; New York, NY; 1957

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Wood, David M., and Yesilada, Birol A.; The Emerging European Union; Longman Publishers; White Plains, NY; 1996

Zelikow, Philip; “The Masque of Institutions,” published in NATO’s Transformation, Edited by Philip H. Gordon; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Lanham, MD; 1997

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jason Dittmer was born in Jacksonville, Florida in 1976. He also attended high school in Jacksonville at Episcopal High School.

HIGHER EDUCATION:

2003 Anticipated graduation with PhD in Geography Committee: Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan (Advisor), Dr. Jonathan Leib, Dr. Jan Kodras, and Dr. Jonathan Grant

2001 Achieved PhD candidacy in Geography Florida State University Advisor: Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan

1999 MA in International Affairs Florida State University Committee: Dr. Dale Smith, Dr. Burt Atkins, and Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan

1998 BA in Political Science and International Studies Jacksonville University Cum Laude

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