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Une Étude Détaillée De La Privatisation Des Banques D'état Iraniennes: Les

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Une Étude Détaillée De La Privatisation Des Banques D'état Iraniennes: Les UNIVERSITE MONTESQUIEU – BORDEAUX IV ECOLE DOCTORALE ENTREPRISE ECONOMIE SOCIETE (E.D. 42) DOCTORAT en SCIENCES DE GESTION Chahla ANSARI AZARBAYJANI A STUDY ACROSS OF IRAN STATE-OWNED BANKS PRIVATIZATION: CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS FOR PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED BANKS AND CONTINUATION OF PRIVATE BANKING IN IRAN Thèse dirigée par Madame Corynne JAFFEUX, Professeur des Universités Soutenue le 12 September, 2011 Jury (par ordre alphabétique) : Monsieur Pedro ARBULU Maître de Conférences Suffragant Monsieur Serge EVRAERT Professeur des Universités President Monsieur Jean-Fabrice LEBRATY Professeur des Universités Rapportteur Monsieur Jean-Pierre NEVEU Professeur des Universités Rapportteur 1 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................................................. 12 RÉSUMÉ ................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................................................ 15 MOTS‐ CLÉS .............................................................................................................................................................................. 16 KEYWORDS............................................................................................................................................................................... 16 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17 PART 1 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 1.1. CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION ................................................................................................. 21 1.1.1. The History and Definition of Privatization ...................................................................................................... 21 1.1.2. Distinction between the Concept of Public and Private .................................................................................. 28 1.1.3. Theoretical Framework of Privatization ........................................................................................................... 30 1.1.4. Major Consideration for Privatization ............................................................................................................. 38 1.1.4.1. Restructuring Prior to Privatization ......................................................................................................................... 38 1.1.4.2. Complementarities and Sequencing ........................................................................................................................ 39 1.1.4.3. Speed of the Privatization Process .......................................................................................................................... 40 1.1.4.4. Sale Policy ................................................................................................................................................................ 42 1.1.4.5. Sale Methods ........................................................................................................................................................... 44 2 1.1.4.5.1. Sale to Private Investor ...................................................................................................................................... 46 1.1.4.5.2. Sale to the Public or Companies‐ Share Issue Privatization ................................................................................ 47 1.1.4.5.3. Sale to the Citizens by Voucher/Mass Privatization ........................................................................................... 51 1.1.4.5.4. Sale to the Managers and Employees of the Firms‐Internal Buy‐Out ................................................................ 53 1.1.4.5.5. Sale to the Original Owner‐Restitution .............................................................................................................. 54 1.1.4.5.6. Sale to the Foreigner .......................................................................................................................................... 54 1.1.4.6. Investor’s Returns .................................................................................................................................................... 56 1.1.4.7. Effective Status of Democracy on Privatization ....................................................................................................... 57 1.1.5. Data and Records ............................................................................................................................................. 62 1.1.6. Justification of State‐Owned Enterprise VS its Inefficiency ............................................................................. 64 1.1.6.1. Inefficiency of SOEs due to Weak or Adverse Incentives ......................................................................................... 66 1.1.6.2. Inefficiency due to Inadequate Monitoring ............................................................................................................. 68 1.1.6.3. Inefficiency due to the Soft Budget Constraints ...................................................................................................... 69 1.1.6.4. Inefficiency due to Partial State Ownership ............................................................................................................ 72 1.1.6.5. Inefficiency due to Pursue Non‐economic Objectives ............................................................................................. 73 1.1.7. Designing the Strategic Privatization Program ................................................................................................ 73 1.1.7.1. Key Questions at Pre‐design Stage .......................................................................................................................... 73 1.1.7.2. Optimal Design ........................................................................................................................................................ 75 1.1.7.3. The Constraints ........................................................................................................................................................ 77 1.1.8. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................................................ 79 1.2. CHAPTER TWO: PRIVATIZATION: INTERACTIONS‐ REFORMATIVE IMPACTS‐ EXPERIENCES ............................................. 81 3 1.2.1. Chapter Summery ............................................................................................................................................ 81 1.2.2. Interaction of Privatization with Political Economy ......................................................................................... 81 1.2.2.1. Political Argument ................................................................................................................................................... 81 1.2.2.2. Economical Argument ............................................................................................................................................. 85 1.2.3. Reformative Approach of Privatization ............................................................................................................ 89 1.2.3.1. The Policy Debate on Privatization .......................................................................................................................... 89 1.2.3.2. Privatization as a Part of Reform Program .............................................................................................................. 90 1.2.3.3. Corporate Governance ............................................................................................................................................ 91 1.2.3.3.1. Interaction between Privatization and Corporate Governance.......................................................................... 91 1.2.3.3.2. Development of Effective Corporate Governance System ................................................................................. 94 1.2.4. Capital Market ................................................................................................................................................. 99 1.2.4.1. Privatization versus Market Debate ........................................................................................................................ 99 1.2.4.2. Capital Market and National Legal Systems ............................................................................................................ 99 1.2.4.3. Financial Market .................................................................................................................................................... 101 1.2.4.4. Market
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