i
Title Page
NIGERIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN SIERRA LEONE, 1995-2005
BY
BELLO KEHINDE OREOLUWA PG/M.Sc./10/57711
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
JULY, 2012
ii
Approval Page
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA.
BY
------PROF OBASI IGWE PROF OBASI IGWE SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
------EXTERNAL EXAMINER
iii
Dedication
To the glory of God. To my husband, Engr. Lanre Daniyan, whom I cherish. To my parents, Mr and Mrs T. A. Bello, and Mr and Mrs Daniyan, who are lovers and givers of sound education.
iv
Acknowledgement
I indeed appreciate my supervisor, Prof Obasi Igwe, who has being a great source of inspiration to me. Your love, your passion for good work, your pleasant criticisms, your corrections, your counsels, all have brought this work to completion. I appreciate you sir.
To my best friend and husband, Engr. Lanre Daniyan, I sincerely appreciate your love, encouragements, contributions, support, kindness, criticisms, and sacrifices in seeing this work progress to completion.
I indeed appreciate my parents, Mr and Mrs T.A. Bello, and Mr and Mrs Daniyan who constantly ask to know how this programme has been progressing. I thank all my siblings – Abayomi, Tayo and my twin sister Taiwo for their moral support.
I appreciate Uncle Ayo and Uncle Sanmi Daniyan for their support.
To my lovely baby, Damilola Mitchell Daniyan, I appreciate your motivation and endurance when you are out of your comfort zones, in the course of this programme.
v
Table of Contents Title Page i Approval Page ii Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v Abstract vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.0 Background to the Study 1 1.1 Statement of Problem 4 1.2 Objectives of Study 5 1.3 Significance of Study 5 1.4 Literature Review 6 1.5 Theoretical Framework 8 1.6 Hypotheses 10 1.7 Method of Data Collection 11
CHAPTER TWO: PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SIERRA-LEONE BEFORE AND AFTER 1995 2.0 Historical background 13 2.1 Problems of democratization in Sierra-Leone 19 2.2 History and government of Sierra-Leone from the colonial administration through the civil war 28 2.3 Summary of the bloody civil war in Sierra-Leone 46
CHAPTER THREE: CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF NIGERIA’S INTERVENTION BETWEEN 1995 AND 2005
3.0 Introduction 50 3.1 ECOWAS 55 3.2 ECOMOG 55 3.3 Impact of the Conflict on Development Outcome 61 3.4 Achievements and the Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Interventionist Role in Sierra-Leone 69 3.5 Similarities of the Sierra-Leone Conflict with Vietnam 72 vi
3.6 Development Planning Achievements in Sierra-Leone 76
CHAPTER FOUR: SIERRA LEONE AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY
4.0 Introduction 82 4.1 The Political Events in Sierra Leone between 1787-1945 84 4.2 The Slater Constitution of 1924 85 4.3 The Stevenson or Beresford-Stooke Constitution of 1951 87 4.4 The 1957 Constitution 89 4.5 The General Election of 1957 90 4.6 The 1958 Constitution 91 4.7 The London Constitutional Conference of 1960 91 4.8 Sierra Leone 1961 – 1969 92 4.9 Political and Constitutional Developments between 1967 and 1971 105 4.10 Hope for the Future in Sierra Leone 114
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
5.0 Summary 116 5.1 Applications in Support of Democracy 119 5.2 Conclusion 126 5.3 Recommendation 146 5.4 Bibliography 151
vii
Abstract
This study problematizes the issues of good neighbourliness and democratization in Africa, and analyses the effects of Nigeria’s economy on these. Focusing on the relationship between Nigeria’s foreign policy and the democratization process in Sierra Leone, the study examines the challenges Nigeria faced in trying to achieve her foreign policy goals as she spearhead conflict resolution in the sub-region. Utilizing dominant approach of conflict resolution theory as our explanatory framework, observational technique and content analysis as our method of data collection and analysis respectively, the study evaluates the role Nigeria played under the auspices of the ECOMOG, and the sacrifices made to restore peace in Sierra Leone and contends that generally, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been the driving force behind every peacekeeping operation in West Africa and that Nigeria deployed both her material and human resources to restore a democratically elected government in Sierra-Leone in particular.
viii
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY No doubt, Nigeria’s foreign policy has had great impact on both Sierra Leone as a country and Africa as a continent. But there is an ongoing debate about why Nigeria took so much interest in the democratization of African states especially Sierra Leone where she lost so many soldiers and still continued in the struggle. Secondly, was Nigeria’s economy buoyant enough to have carried out the peacekeeping process all alone? In 1960, the then Prime Minister Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa made Africa the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In his words, “we belong to Africa and Africa must claim first attention in our external relations”. (Omotere, 2011:2). Thus successive government have had to carve out their foreign policies (although, with focus on Africa). The government of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) which coincided with period of political crisis in Sierra Leone demonstrated this. “Foreign policy is the coordinated application of the elements of national power for the promotion of the national interest. The interrelated, interdependent components of grand strategy or elements of national power, used selectively or in combinations in inter-state and other external relations, include economic power and resources, socio-cultural resources (such as language, race, religion, entertainment), population or the human potentials…” (Obasi, 2007:158). Again, according to Okolie (2009:9) “Nigeria foreign policy, like other countries’ foreign policies is formulated in a highly complex and dynamic environment”. In his own view, Saliu (2006:4), maintain that “Among the important factors that influence the external policy of a state are the strength of the economy, national sentiments and aspiration, the level and quality of information at the disposed of the government, leadership perception etc” . Nigeria’s foreign policy making and implementation started right at independent on 1st October, 1960. This was evident in 1960 when Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa the then Prime Minister, made Africa the centerpiece of Nigerian foreign policy. In his words, “we belong to Africa and Africa must claim first attention in our external relations”. He summarized the principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy as follows: • The sovereign equality of all African states; • The respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African states; • Non –interference in internal affairs of other African states; ix
• Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity; • Total eradication of racism and colonialism from African (Agbu, 2008:6). Thus, successive government have had to carve out their foreign policies (based on the above principles) making the foreign policy of Nigeria a unique and dynamic one. Critics have asked why Nigeria should spend the huge resources in money and blood over Sierra Leone’s internal political problem. The answers lie first in Nigeria’s foreign policy goal and second, the sub-regional and regional interest. On the first, Nigeria is economically, politically and strategically interested in protecting and defending the lives and economic interests of her citizens in Sierra Leone, in particular, and to posture its strategic interests in West Africa and Africa at large. The Nigerian government is aware of the fact that many Nigerian people live in the Diaspora especially African countries which include Sierra Leone and it is their duty to protect them both home and aboard. Joy Ogwu averts that it would amount to political naivety for Nigeria to sit at the fence and watch others steal the initiative of seeking peace in Sierra Leone only to reap the farm, where they did not sow. Nigeria’s leadership in West African was, therefore, called to duty. Ibrahim Gambari attests strongly to this: Nigerians and their well-wishers aboard expect the country to be a truly great nation, and pride of Africa and black race, and a key player in global affairs. This is the ultimate challenge facing Nigeria. (Onyemaechi, 2009:103).
“Action speaks louder than words”. This, Nigeria wants to show to the world as a regional power in West Africa by demonstrating that she is ready to back up her diplomacy with her military might. And attempt to do this will include the sacrifice of both money and blood. Justifying Nigerian participation in ECOMOG former President of Nigeria, President Ibrahim Babangida observed: Nigeria has evolved to the point of acceptance of the fact and reality that the conduct of our international relations and foreign policy may at time involve certain contractual military and other obligations beyond borders (Onyemaechi, 2009:103).
The United Nations too gave some kind support to Nigeria and other countries that are willing to join them both locally, regionally continentally and globally to restore peace and security to the international community at large. This gave Nigeria a green light to manifest her hidden potentials. Under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, Nigeria assumed the leadership x arrangement in cognizance with the objective of securing international peace and security. Article 52 states that: Nothing in this charter precludes the existence of a regional arrangement and agencies for dealing with matters relating to international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Onyemaechi 2009:104).
This article justified Nigeria’s peacekeeping operations under ECOMOG initiative in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone president without mincing words praise Nigeria’s active involvement and success she achieved in restoring peace back to Sierra Leone and even went further to say Nigeria is playing a big –brother role in West Africa. Nigeria can’t sit by and see things go wrong in Sierra Leone and not show concern. Fortunately, Nigeria occupies this very noble and prestigious position of being a leader not only in the sub- region but also in Africa. And quite honestly, I am happy because it is always a good thing to have a big brother…this problem started in Liberia and now we are feeling the spillover effect. If it is not stopped immediately, there is fear that it will spread right across the region. This is where Nigeria really has to assert leadership role and make sure that this nonsense is stopped. For Nigeria, it will be a slap on the face of ECOWAS for us to sit down and allow the situation to deteriorate. (Onyemaechi, 2009:106).
Against the foregoing background, this study examines the link between Nigeria’s foreign policy and democratization of Sierra Leone. It also investigates how Nigeria’s economy affects the democratization process in Sierra Leone.
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The role Nigeria has played in conflict resolution and peacekeeping within and outside Africa must necessarily be situated historically and within the context of its foreign policy objectives. Although these objectives have themselves evolved over time and that an independent, anti –colonial and democratic foreign policy became increasingly evident during and in the aftermath of Nigeria’s democratization process in Sierra Leone 1995-2005, it seems that the dominant approach to conflict resolution could be located in the notion of the three “concentric circles” of national interest. At the core of these circles lies a concern with Nigeria’s own security predicated on the cultivation of good neighbourly relations especially with our immediate xi neighbour. This is in recognition that our security is inextricably tied to the security of West Africa, and it is for this reason that the second circle expands to include the whole West African region. Continental Africa then constitutes the third circle, and just like in the previous two circles, the major focus is the promotion of peace, development, the fight against all forms of colonial domination, and the fight against anti-democratic regimes. However, despite the ailing economic condition of Nigeria, Nigeria’s oil resource revenue made it possible for the achievement of her foreign policy objectives in West Africa sub-region, Africa and the international community at large. “It was recorded that Nigeria alone contributed as much as 7000 out of the 8000 troops and spent about N250 billion into the Sierra Leone crisis despite her $28.72 billion debt overhang” (Julius, 1999:50). The oil boom reserves of the 1970s affected Nigeria’s foreign policy during the period, although it was few years later but Nigeria made her stand by not allowing her debt hinder her foreign policy goal. Nigeria’s economy was a major challenge to her; nevertheless, Nigeria achieved the credibility of restoring peace in Sierra Leone. The costly venture was undertaken single-handedly by the Nigerian government, it seemed, to provide security for the numerous Nigerians in Sierra Leone, protect the economic interests of Nigerian businessmen in Sierra Leone, and helped install a democratic government, in Freetown that would be as friendly to, and respectful of, the Nigerian leadership, as the administration of president Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1998. In addition to the peace process, Nigeria also contributed positively to national development programmes of Sierra Leone in education, health, judiciary and rehabilitating most trades and vandalized schools and homes, basic infrastructure and amenities that were affected during the crisis. In addtion She engaged in the rehabilitation of schools, provision of school materials such as books and chairs. In the light of the foregoing, this study examines the following research question: 1. Did Nigeria’s foreign policy actually led to the democratization of Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005? 2. Did Nigeria’s economy affect democratization process in Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005? 3. Is Nigeria likely to become more involved in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in West Africa and Africa based on her economy?
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY xii
The success achieved by Nigeria in restoring peace back to Sierra Leone during the crisis that seemed irresolvable and long-lasting, has in deed opened a serious and endless debate among scholars about why Nigeria took so much interest in Sierra Leone’s internal political crisis. Thus, the broad objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between Nigeria’s foreign policy and the democratization process in Sierra Leone (1995-2005), how the conflict was resolved and the peacekeeping process. The specific objectives are as follows: (i) To ascertain whether Nigeria’s foreign policy actually led to the democratization of Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005 (ii) To examine if Nigeria’s economy affected democratization process in Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005. (iii) To ascertain whether Nigeria is likely to become more involved in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in West Africa and Africa based on her economy.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY The significance of study of this paper is two folds: theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level it shows how Nigeria’s foreign policy drives her in achieving peace in Sierra Leone as a country and West Africa and Africa at large. In addition, the findings of this paper will enrich the existing literatures of scholars on the peacekeeping process in Sierra Leone and Nigeria’s foreign policy that led to the democratization of Sierra Leone. And therefore, will serve as a source of reference material or data to scholars whose interest would eventually be aroused by it to undertake further studies in this area. Also potential students in this field could make references to it. At the practical level, it will be of interest to both the Sierra Leoneans and Nigerians, especially as a bond between the two countries. And Sierra Leoneans will forever be grateful to Nigerians for restoring long lasting peace to their famous country that was facing a situation of hopelessness at the time. It will to an extent bring respect to Nigeria as a true big brother in Africa. Finally, the issue discussed will enhance understanding the crisis, but will also provide valuable information that will assist Nigeria in formulation foreign policies that will bring Glory to Nigeria.
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW The thrust of this literature review is to ascertain how scholars have tried to examine the link between Nigeria’s foreign policy and democratization in Sierra Leone. This is with a view to xiii establishing a gap in the literature. The implication, therefore, is that the review of the extant literature was strictly guided by our research questions:
Did Nigeria’s foreign policy actually led to the democratization of Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005?
According to (Saidu, 2007:7), he said “if there is any aspect of Nigerian existence where few great blunders have been made, it is their relationship with other African countries”. It is not clear why this is so, but in his suspicion, it may have probably resulted from the tone set by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa when he made his first foreign policy speech to the Nigerian House of representatives in August 1960. Against this background, the Nigerian gocvenrment and its people have proven it in Sierra Leone where they worked in the country during its sad chapter of history. Abdullah and Muana (1998:14) also remark that “ECOMOG was made up of the 16 countries forming ECOWAS but Nigeria committed more personnel to the peacekeeping force than any other”. In fact they even went to the extent of supporting other poor nation’s participation at the peace mission. The military strength of ECOMOG at that time was 1000 soldiers with Nigeria accounting for about 700 of those personnel; the ambition of Nigeria was to restore peace and stability in Sierra Leone and reinstate the legitimate government and president ousted by the combine RUF and AFRC forces. ECOMOG had solely depended on Nigeria to finance its mission and the 1998 intervention to beat-off the AFRC/ RUF rebels from the capital was a dangerous venture that could only be undertaken by Nigeria. This was how this great West African Power contributed to stabilizing Sierra Leone by helping the nation free itself from the evil claws of the marauding rebels. About 800 Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers were said to have lost their lives in Sierra Leone conflict. The Nigerian government was also reported to have spent a whopping $5 billion to sustain the ECOMOG troops in the country, that also comprise troops from other West African State. When Sierra Leone needed help, Nigeria came to her rescue. Nigerians were not familiar with Sierra Leonean terrain but made relentless sacrifices to free innocent and defenseless civilians from the dreaded rebels.
Did Nigeria’s economy affect democratization process in Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005?
Scholars, however, do not have a consensus on the actual meaning of foreign policy. But all of them seem to agree that it is the compass of states in the global wilderness. Its major aim is xiv to safeguard the interest of each state as it ineluctably relates with other states. Little wonder, Akindele (2001:61) describes foreign policy as “both a series of domestically inspired demands a nation- state makes on other states and a series of responses a nation- state offers to the demands from other states.” In other words, foreign policy is a means of protecting and advancing the domestic, if you wish national interests of a nation- state in its transaction with other states in the global Arena (Okolie, 2009:46). To Dilichukwu (2009) as a defining attribute to statehood, Nigeria at independence outlined its own foreign policy goals different from the foreign policy of its ex-colonial power-the Great Britain. In his ministerial statement in the House of Representatives on the conduct of Foreign Affairs, Sir Alhaji Tafawa Balewa declared inter alia; that In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs, the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interest of the Federation and is citizens. We have already declared our intention of a plan to join both the commonwealth and the United Nations. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs…very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa…. Boundary created artificially by the European powers should be respected and in the interest of peace must remain the recognized boundaries… In the United Nations and in any other way possible we shall direct our energies and influence to helping to reach solutions which will contribute to the peace of the nations and well being of mankind (House of Representatives Debate, 20 August 1960). (Okolie 2009:47).
To Asobie (1991:22), “Nigeria has been spending huge sum of money to keep it contingent as part of the interventionist force”. According to one source, the Nigerian government budgeted for daily allowances to the 3,500 Nigerian soldiers who served in ECOMOG for all the period spent an estimate of about $10 per solider, per day. In summary Onyemaechi (2009:107) recorded that “Nigeria in addition to providing arms, ammunitions, food, transport and communication to her troops, however provided the entire force with petrol, oil and lubricant”. He also remarked that under the ECOMOG arrangement, “Nigeria bore the heavy financial and logistic burden of maintaining not only its 7000 troops but in assisting other member- states to hold on to the formation”. Nigeria avoided being under time pressure and persisted until normalcy was returned to Sierra Leone. With the involvement of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, about 13,400 troops with the aid of the xv
Nigerian-led ECOMOG, UNAMSIL became the largest peacekeeping force in the world carrying out the overseeing of disarming soldiers and rebels and monitoring the ceasefire.
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In view of the relevance of theoretical framework to empirical research, this paper is principally anchored on the dominant approach of conflict resolution theory. Conflict resolution as a discipline diverged from power-based conflict theory, which dominated and still dominates political science, and international relations; and converged from psychology and sociology, which was interested in group dynamics, motivation and relationships between institutional structures. The foundations of this discipline have their origins in the Judeo- Christian culture that developed in Europe and North America and were particularly shaped in the twentieth century by the first and second world wars. Principal antecedents of conflict resolution included philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1914) and Gestalt (influential on social psychology) psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947). Modern conflict resolution scholars, often quote Georg Simmel, for his contribution to the field for his book conflict, published posthumously in English in 1955. Conflict was originally a chapter of simmel’s book Sociologies published in German in 1908. Simmel, perceived conflict (Kampf) as “designed to resolve divergent dualisms”, that is conflict was designed to resolve two different set of principles. He saw conflict as “way of achieving some kind of unity”, as such Simmel took an optimistic view of conflict. However, despite this optimism, what is often not discussed in standard treatments of Simmel is his perception that this unity may be obtained “even if it be through the amihilation of one of the conflicting parties. Kurt Lewn’s contribution to conflict resolution was his emphasis on the role of social context in an individual’s development of perception, values and beliefs. This was in contrast to the normative theory of psychology prior to the 1930s, which still heavily favoured biological determinism. Lewin saw conflict as a situation of “tension” which was caused by a number of factors including the degree to which the needs of a person were in a “state of hunger or satisfaction”. Morton Deutsch followed in Lewis footsteps ideas and teaching institutions (they both taught at Massachusetts Institute of Technology) continued research on co-operation-competition systems. Deutsch contribution was highlighting the role of perception and the existence of conflict. xvi
The American sociologist Lewis Coser followed Simmel in identifying positive aspects of conflict as expressed in the functions of Social conflict 1956. Coser felt the need to correct the balance of analysis, which tended to focus on the “dysfunction” of conflict rather than the potential positive aspects of conflict. Coser provisionally defined conflict as “a struggle over claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize or eliminate their rivals” later he defined conflict as a “Clash of values and interests”. Conflict resolution came of age in the United States in 1957 with the founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution by Kenneth Boulding (1910-1995), Anatol Rapoport (1911-) and Herb Kelman (1920s-) among others. Galtung, for the purposes of identifying steps to peace, introduced a broader notion of violence which encompasses those “avoidable insults to basic human needs”. The basic needs included security and identity. Galtung goes on to categorize violence into two forms: direct violence and structural violence. The former includes the everyday notion of violence, whereby an individual or group suffers physical or emotional pain as the result of direct action. Structural violence is caused by the institutions and structures of society which result in inequality or “oppression” among individuals. Similarly, Galtung classified peace into two forms: ‘positive peace and negative peace’. Negative peace, according to Galtung, fits essentially the colloquial perception of peace as an end to war. Positive peace includes not only the absence of war, but the absence of structural violence. That is positive peace is the absence of violence, in all its forms and as such has greater value in the long-term as it removes the factors which lead to direct violence. This was Galtung’s genius to merge his dual definition of violence with his dual concept of peace. However, critics of Galtung, such as Kenneth Bailding complain of his overly “taxanomical” approach and his “constant” use of “dichotomies”.
1.6 HYPOTHESES 1. Nigeria’s foreign policy actually led to the democratization of Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005. 2. Nigeria’s economy affected democratization process in Sierra Leone, between 1995 and 2005. 3. Nigeria is likely to become more involved in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in West Africa and Africa based on her economy.
1.7 METHODOLOGY
xvii
1.7.0 Methods of Data Collection We relied heavily on observation as a method of generating our data. “Observation is defined as a purposefully planned and systematically executed act of watching or looking of the occurrence of events activities and behaviours which constitute the subject of focus of research study” (Obasi, 1999:303). Selltiz et al maintain that the relevance of observation technique in scientific study such as our present study lies on yielding data that perform directly typically behavioural situation; assuming, of course, that they are applied to such situation. Observation aids in the watching of political event, phenomenon, accurate description and better explanation of such situation. It equally helps in determining the variables under study. The nature of our study informs the resolve to utilize secondary source of data in interrogating our hypothesis. Secondary source of data refers to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, “usually data from the available array of data, achieves either in form of document or survey results and code books collected for a purpose other than the present one” (White, 1983:11). The advantages of secondary source of data lie in the obvious fact that information of this sort is collected periodically. This makes the establishment of trends and consistent pattern over time possible. In addition, the gathering of information from such sources does not require the cooperation or assistance of the individual about whom information is being sought. As expected, this study depends on institutional and official documents such as the reports of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. These are supported by other sources such as textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, articles and internet materials.
1.7.1 Research Design Research design is like blueprint that leads to researcher to plausible answers to research problems by enabling him to determine how much of the observed variance of the dependent variable can be attributed to the independent variable and how much can be attributed to other substantives (ie extrinsic effect) (Leege and Francis, 1974:24). According to Nwana (1981), “research design is a term used to described a number of decisions which need to be taken regarding the collection of data before over the data are colleted. To this effect, Obasi (1999:383) identified two main types of research design namely; survey research design and experimental research design”, while the former is divided into descriptive research and ex-post facto research. In this study however, we adopted ex-post factor (or historical research) design, in which there are series of pre-measurement and establishing causal relationships or cause-effort relationship; 01 02 03 04 x 05 06 07. xviii
There are series of pre-measurement and post measurement, but the change between 04 and 05 is the principal focus to measure the effect of the quasi-experimental treatment, that is, the effect of Nigeria’s economy on the democratization process in Sierra Leone 1995-2005.
In other words, the difference in score (ie political violence) from 04 and 05 is attributed to the causal event (ie zoning the presidency). The design, despite its lack of control group, to overcome a wide variety of threat to internal validity, however, the principle threat to the design is history. The series of before observations form 01 to 03 and after observations from 06 to 08 will be used to control for the interactive effects of history.
1.7.2 Methods of Data Analysis Our method of data analysis is anchored on content analysis. “Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and qualitative description of manifest content” (Berelson, 1952:7). Dane (1990:13) defines content analysis as “a research method to make objective and systematic inferences about theoretically relevant message”. Our adoption of this technique is informed by the fact that the study relies principal on secondary data. Aware of some limitations inherent in secondary data, we are going to be circumspect in selecting those that will be representative enough for our research. xix
CHAPTER TWO PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SIERRA LEONE BEFORE AND AFTER 1995
2.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, the British left behind a country that it had ruled officially as a Crown Colony since 1808. British colonial rule was characterized by direct and dominant administrative rule over Freetown and its environs, and indirect rule via local paramount chiefs over the countryside. Negative aspects of the colonial period lingered on, especially as to ethnic rivalries. “The British had favored the Krio ethnic group, which amount to about 10% of the population, by offering Krios access to the best schools and business opportunities. Krios became dominant among civil servants in the colonial administration but given their small numbers, became less influential in the civil and professional services after independence” (Koroma, 2004:6). Other ethnic groups, including the Mende in the South and the Temne and Limba in the North, had coexisted fairly peacefully before independence. However, post-independence politicians incited ethnic differences which then became a major contributor to subsequent state collapse. Smillie confirms that: As political parties have for the most part remained along ethnic and geographic lines, such differences retain the potential to be sources of future friction. Corruption also developed during colonial rule, stemming from attempts to gain private benefit from the diamond-mining industry (Smillie, 2000:5).
Finally, the British left behind a state with barely functional political institutions and administration. Both corruption and the low capacity of the state have haunted Sierra Leone from the colonial period to this day. From its start as an independent nation, there were dysfunctional signs. The first Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, was Mende and democratically elected with support of his ethnic group and Krio elites. Margai was part of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), which was formed in 1949 (during colonial rule) and was composed mainly of Mende from the South (the SLPP is still predominately Mende today) Bankole (1997) observed. Upon his death in 1964 Milton’s brother, Albert, assumed the reins, and proceeded to lead a corrupt regime and attempted to amend the constitution to create a one-party SLPP-run state. Albert Margai also heavily stocked his government with Mende officials, leading Krio supporters of the SLPP to defect to the All People’s Congress (APC), a party whose supporters consisted mainly of northerners, especially xx the Limba and Temne (and still does to this day). Albert Margai ultimately lost the 1967 presidential election to Siaka Stevens, who was leader of the APC. Siaka Stevens ruled for 17 years despite being initially overthrown by a coup in 1967 only to be reinstated through a countercoup in 1968. He subsequently proceeded to oversee the utter destruction and corrupting of the country as well as a move to one-party rule for the APC in 1978. Stevens ensured dominance by the Limba and Tembe through ethnic favoritism in the security forces. Additionally, by the early 1980s nearly all of Sierra Leone’s major exports were controlled by one businessman, who happened to be one of Stevens’ cronies. Former American Ambassador John Hirsch has noted: “Resident diplomats did not raise a hue and cry about these developments, which were regarded as internal problems of little consequence to the economic interests of the British, Americans, or others.” (Beah, 2007:7). Stevens handed power in 1985 to his hand- selected, northern-born successor, Major General Joseph Momoh, who led an already nearly stateless country even further into economic and financial ruin. Civil servants, educators, and paramount chiefs often went unpaid. Politically Momoh was very weak, and Siaka Stevens remained head of the APC and in control of much of Sierra Leonean commerce, including the richly lucrative diamond industry. Indeed, Stevens had chosen Momoh knowing he was loyal but not highly effective as a politician, a combination that enabled Stevens’ significant political and economic influence to continue. Stevens had built an extensive patronage network during his years as president, which therefore continued throughout the Momoh years. …Diamond profits, for instance, had brought in about $200 million prior to Stevens’ reign. Yet, by 1987 profits through the formal diamond industry dwindled to $100,000, with sales conducted almost exclusively on the black market. Stevens and his allies took much of the rest. (Gberie, 2005:12)
Momoh even fought off a coup attempt by Stevens’ associates in 1987. In the late 1980s Momoh’s government, after receiving significant loan assistance from the IMF, came under pressure to introduce major economic reforms. Though the reforms achieved liberalization of trade and exchange rates and slight improvements in tax collection, real progress remained elusive and consequently Sierra Leone continued to suffer severe fiscal difficulties. It is worth noting that the pressure for reform took place at the end of the Cold War, when for the first time western policies began to have some sort of focus on good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Upon the recommendation of a constitutional review commission established by Momoh, in October 1991, a new constitution was adopted, resulting in the restoration of the multi-party system. The time for major political reform, however, had past. A group of rebels from the Revolutionary United Front xxi
(RUF), which included Sierra Leoneans, Liberians loyal to Charles Taylor, as well as mercenaries from neighboring Burkina Faso, had invaded eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia in March of the same year, marking the beginning of the horrific civil war. The root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone are often reduced to a war over diamonds, but this is overly simplistic. While Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor and Libyan head of state Muammar Gaddafi certainly had a strong interest in Sierra Leone’s diamonds and played important roles in the conflict, history of personal relationships between Taylor, RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and Gaddafi was of even greater initial significance. Taylor and Sankoh met and became friends in 1980s in Libya at a revolutionary training camp run by Gaddafi. Gaddafi also provided enormous support to both the RUF and to Taylor’s rebel group, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), via training, arms, and financial resources In 1989, Taylor wanted to launch his NPFL invasion of Liberia from Sierra Leone, but the Momoh government refused. Momoh then allowed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops to use the main airport in Sierra Leone as a base of operations from which they launched attacks on the NPFL in Liberia and also sent Sierra Leonean troops into Liberia to join the ECOMOG forces. Taylor therefore had a keen interest in taking revenge on the Momoh government and supporting his friend Sankoh’s rebel movement. Over time, diamonds did come to play an increasingly more important role as a means to finance the RUF and enrich Taylor, Gaddafi, and their cronies. But they should not be seen as the root cause of the war. Foday Sankoh’s RUF was able to recruit a multitude of young Sierra Leonean men who felt severely alienated because of government corruption (at both the national and paramount chief levels) and lack of economic opportunity. Sankoh was also supported by a number of government officials in Freetown frustrated with the Momoh government and initially saw the RUF as a legitimate political alternative. The role of the military in Sierra Leone since independence is another causal factor of the war. Each of Sierra Leone’s rulers from independence until the civil war politicized the military and asserted increasing political and personal control over the armed forces. Soldier loyalty was thus to political parties rather than to the country. Military professionalism was sacrificed at the expense of using the military for the ruler’s political survival. In such an atmosphere, military corruption was rampant and private armed groups were created to protect political factions. When the military was finally put to the test, it was incapable of responding. Throughout the civil war, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) did not have adequate supplies of weaponry, lacked technical capacity, and was not loyal to the state. As evidence of disloyalty among the rank and file, many SLA soldiers became known as ‘sobels’, meaning soldier by day, rebel by night. The myriad xxii problems with the SLA also led Kabbah and his deputy defense minister, Hinga Norman, to create Civil Defense Forces (known as Kamajors), which were armed local units, mainly comprised of youths, that fought on the government side and were known for committing abuses against civilians similar to the RUF (though not to the same extent; for RUF abuses). Additional underlying causes of the conflict include a history of extremely poor governance and manipulation of ethnicity for political ends. “Between 1991 and 2002, Sierra Leone was thus engulfed in chaos that led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans, with at least a quarter of the population being displaced from their homes during the conflict” (Ayittey, 2010:55). The widespread practices of amputating limbs of civilians, brutal killings, and the conscription of child soldiers into armed forces undertaken by the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (which was closely aligned to the RUF), the Sierra Leonean Army, and the Kamajors gained international attention. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were closely interrelated from the beginning, and throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone the RUF, Charles Taylor and Muammar Gaddafi benefited from controlling much of the diamond trade. In 1992, a year after the RUF had begun the war, a group of junior officers in the SLA orchestrated a bloodless coup and deposed President Momoh. Captain Valentine Strasser was chosen as head of the newly formed National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which ruled the country until 1996. During the period under NPRC rule, the RUF continued fighting and advanced across the country (the RUF was within 40 kilometers of Freetown by early 1995), while the NPRC sought unsuccessfully to bring the RUF to the negotiating table, even by offering amnesty to the RUF in 1995. The government relied on private security forces (first from Gurkha Security Group, made up of Nepalese Ghurkas who formerly served in the British Army, and then from Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm) to repel the RUF, as well as an ECOMOG contingent composed of 2,000 Nigerian troops based in Freetown. (Onyemeachi, 2009:103)
Civil society spoke up in 1995 to push for elections. A number of civil society groups met at the Bintumani Conference to decide how and when elections would be held. Women’s groups and key women leaders such as Amy Smythe and Zainab Bangura led this massive civil society movement. It has been given credit for the subsequent elections that were successfully held in 1996, in which Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was elected as president amid high voter turnout. The elections took place against a backdrop of ongoing fighting. Brutal attacks by the RUF targeting civilians were intensified between the first round and the runoff. The international xxiii community, Nigeria, with the UK and US in the lead, also supported these elections by devoting significant political and financial resources that both allowed the elections to take place and provided legitimacy to the process and outcome. British High Commissioner Peter Penfold and American Ambassador John Hirsch were both instrumental in the organization of this election. Even the election was marred by irregularities, observers still pronounced the election free and fair. After the 1996 election the government and the RUF negotiated on and off for six months before a peace agreement were finally signed in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The agreement provided amnesty for RUF fighters and dictated that a mercenary outfit, Executive Outcomes, which had been brought in by the government to protect the diamond fields and fight the RUF, had to leave Sierra Leone. But the Abidjan Accord, for which the OAU, Côte d’Ivoire, and ECOWAS served as guarantors, suffered from a lack of close follow-up and implementation. Two months after the accord was signed fighting broke out once again. A year later, in May 1997, President Kabbah was forced to flee to Guinea following a coup by junior military officers, led by Johnny Paul Koroma who was installed as head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and immediately invited the RUF to join the AFRC in ruling the country. The AFRC/RUF coalition controlled Freetown and the rest of the country for nearly 10 months before Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998 following Nigerian/ECOMOG troop advances in Freetown. The conflict continued. The government and RUF returned to the negotiating table in Lomé in mid-1999, and the two sides signed the Lomé Peace Accord in July. Many civil society actors were present as observers at the negotiations and also played an informal mediating role between the RUF and the government. According to Jalloh, (2001) Civil society actors involved in these negotiations include the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, the Human Rights Forum, the Women’s Forum, and the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, the Civil Society Movement of Sierra Leone (a consortium of labor unions), among others. The Lomé agreement provided amnesty for the RUF (as the Abidjan Agreement had also done), gave a number of ministerial positions to the RUF, created a position for Sankoh as chairman of the to- be-created Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and established the principle of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Although the Lomé Accord contained a greater number of oversight mechanisms than Abidjan (periodic reviews were built in, some of which took place), the Lomé Accord still suffered from insufficient oversight and implementation, as well as a sentiment that the RUF acted in bad faith and gained more from the accord than the government. After Lomé, the RUF indeed proceeded to violate a number of provisions of the accord, as they resisted disarmament efforts, and took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage in May xxiv
2000. This action was protested vehemently by civil society, as tens of thousands of people marched to Foday Sankoh’s house to demand the release of the seized UN peacekeepers. When Sankoh’s men opened fire on the protestors, killing about 20 of them, the crowd stormed his house and had him arrested. This strong show of support in favor of the UN Peacekeeping force and against the RUF and their leader Foday Sankoh revealed the extent of popular disapproval for the RUF at this stage in the war. The arrest of Sankoh also led to Isa Sesay taking over as head of the RUF. Sesay later proved to be cooperative in the peace process. The bold move by the RUF to take hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage finally prompted far more robust involvement by the international community, led by Britain. International attention on Sierra Leone had been mounting since the mid-1990s. The UN had sent a Special Representative to Sierra Leone in 1995 and approved an international peacekeeping force in 1999. Yet prior to May 2000 the Security Council had not provided sufficient resources or a strong enough mandate to the peacekeeping force. As noted by Woods: Following the UK and UN response to the RUF aggression, two peace agreements were eventually signed in Abuja in November 2000 and May 2001 that finally put an end to the conflict. (Woods, 2008:50).
2.1 PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SIERRA LEONE
In the years following the death of Sierra Leone’s first prime minister Sir Milton Margai in 1964, politics in the country was increasingly characterized by corruption, mismanagement, and electoral violence that led to a weak civil society, the collapse of the education system, and, by 1991, an entire generation of dissatisfied youth, members of which were attracted to the rebellious message of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Albert Margai, unlike his half-brother Milton, did not see the state as a steward of the public, but instead as a tool for personal gain and self- aggrandizement and even used the military to suppress multi-party elections that threatened to end his rule. When Siaka Stevens entered into politics in 1968 Sierra Leone was a constitutional democracy. When he stepped down, seventeen years later, Sierra Leone was a one-party state. Stevens' rule, sometimes called ‘the 17 year plague of locusts’, saw the destruction and perversion of every state institution. Parliament was undermined, judges were bribed, and the treasury was bankrupted to finance pet projects that supported insiders. When Stevens failed to co-opt his opponents, he often resorted to state sanctioned executions or exile. xxv
In 1985, Stevens stepped down, and handed the nation’s preeminent position to Major General Joseph Momoh, a notoriously inept leader who maintained the status quo. During his seven year tenure, Momoh welcomed the spread of unchecked corruption and complete economic collapse. With the state unable to pay its civil servants, those desperate enough ransacked and looted government offices and property. Even in Freetown, important commodities like gasoline were scarce. But the government hit rock bottom when it could no longer pay school teachers and the education system collapsed. Since only wealthy families could afford to pay private tutors, the bulk of Sierra Leone’s youth during the late 1980s roamed the streets aimless. As infrastructure and public ethics deteriorated in tandem, much of Sierra Leone’s professional class fled the country. By 1991, “Sierra Leone was ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, even though it benefited from ample natural resources including diamonds, gold, bauxite, rutile, iron ore, fish, coffee, and cocoa”. (Gberie, 2005:12) Another major problem of democratization in Sierra Leone before 1995 was diamonds popularly known as the "Resource Curse". The Eastern and Southern districts in Sierra Leone, most notably the Kono and Kenema districts, are rich in alluvial diamonds, and more importantly, are easily accessible by anyone with a shovel, sieve, and transport. Since their discovery in the early 1930s, diamonds have been critical in financing the continuing pattern of corruption and personal aggrandizement at the expense of needed public services, institutions, and infrastructure. The phenomenon whereby countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to nonetheless be characterized by lower levels of economic development is known as the "resource curse". The presence of diamonds in Sierra Leone invited and led to the civil war in several ways. First, the highly unequal benefits resulting from diamond mining made ordinary Sierra Leoneans frustrated. Under the Stevens government, revenues from the National Diamond Mining Corporation (known as DIMINCO) – a joint government/DeBeers venture – were used for the personal enrichment of Stevens and of members of the government and business elite who were close to him. When DeBeers pulled out of the venture in 1984, the government lost direct control of the diamond mining areas. As Bankole remarked: By the late 1980s, almost all of Sierra Leone's diamonds were being smuggled and traded illicitly, with revenues going directly into the hands of private investors. In this period the diamond trade was dominated by Lebanese traders and later (after a shift in favor on the part of the Momoh government) by Israelis with connections to the international diamond markets in Antwerp. Momoh made some efforts to reduce smuggling and corruption in the diamond mining sector, but he lacked the political clout to enforce the law Even after the National Provisional Ruling xxvi
Council (NPRC) took power in 1992, ostensibly with the goal of reducing corruption and returning revenues to the state, high-ranking members of the government sold diamonds for their personal gain and lived extravagantly off the proceeds. (Bankole, 1997:53).
Diamonds also helped to arm the Revolutionary United Front rebels. The RUF used funds harvested from the alluvial diamond mines to purchase weapons and ammunition from neighboring Guinea, Liberia, and even SLA soldiers. But the most significant connection between diamonds and war is that the presence of easily extractable diamonds provided an incentive for violence. To maintain control of important mining districts like Kono, thousands of civilians were expelled and kept away from these important economic centers. Although diamonds were a significant motivating and sustaining factor, there were other means of profiting from the Sierra Leone civil war. For instance, gold mining was prominent in some regions. Even more common was cash crop farming through the use of forced labor. Looting during the Sierra Leone civil war did not just center on diamonds, but also included that of currency, household items, food, livestock, cars, and international aid shipments. For Sierra Leoneans who did not have access to arable land, joining the rebel cause was an opportunity to seize property through the use of deadly force. But the most important reason why the civil war should not be entirely attributed to conflict over the economic benefits incurred from the alluvial diamond mines is that the pre-war frustrations and grievances did not just concern that of the diamond sector. More than twenty years of poor governance, poverty, corruption and oppression created the circumstances for the rise of the RUF, as ordinary people yearned for change. Another problem of democratization in Sierra Leone before 1995 was the external environment. Sierra Leone was dysfunctional from independence, but it remained below the radar of the international community from the 1960s through much of the 1990s. Even in the context of the Cold War, Sierra Leone was not a major factor, unlike neighboring Liberia, which served as a Cold War base for the Americans in West Africa. The UK also generally neglected its former colony, as illustrated for example by the British refusal of President Momoh’s request for military advisers, communications, and intelligence capacity in 1991 just after the start of the civil war.
2.1.0 The Role of Regional Actors Though under-equipped and under-funded, ECOWAS can be credited for preventing Sierra Leone from descending deeper into chaos and protracted conflict. During the early years of the civil war when the international community was reluctant to get involved, ECOWAS, under Nigerian leader General Sani Abacha, played the main role in the attempt to end the conflict. xxvii
Analysts have noted the irony in a dictator working to restore a democratically-elected government, yet Abacha was concerned about maintaining Nigeria’s role as the most influential state, within ECOWAS as well as with the potential ramifications of the pan-African revolutionary goals of influential government and rebel leaders such as Gaddafi, Taylor, Sankoh, and Burkinabé President Blaise Campaoré. Adebanjo attests to this: …Abacha feared that successful revolutions in Sierra Leone and Liberia could feed revolutionary fervor in Nigeria. Abacha took further interest in Sierra Leone as Nigerian forces were already fighting the NPFL in Liberia as part of the ECOMOG contingent, and using Sierra Leone as a base of operation. Therefore the regional and internal political dynamics within ECOWAS specifically and more broadly in West Africa had a significant impact on Nigerian and subsequently ECOWAS policy towards Sierra Leone. (Adebanjo, 2002:18)
ECOWAS pushed for an end to the civil war through the active promotion of peace negotiations as well as providing regional ECOMOG military forces in efforts to maintain control of Freetown. ECOWAS also played a critical role in peace talks – in 1997 in Côte d’Ivoire under Ivorian leadership, in 1999 in Lomé under Togolese leadership, and in 2000 and 2001 in Abuja under Nigerian leadership. As noted above, ECOMOG’s military offensive against the RUF in March 1998 enabled President Kabbah’s return to Freetown. Shortly after the March offensive, Nigerian Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, who had been in charge of ECOMOG’s ground 1operations in Sierra Leone, was assigned Chief of the Defense Staff of the SLA. This inclusion of ECOMOG staff within the Sierra Leonean government is important as it set a precedent that later allowed British troops to serve at the highest levels of the SLA, the Sierra Leonean Police, and the Ministry of Defense. Guinea was another important regional military player involved in Sierra Leone, as it backed and supplied the Kabbah government, contributed troops (along with Ghana and Nigeria) to the ECOMOG contingent, and even launched cross-border attacks on the RUF as it also became ensnared in the conflict that engulfed the region. While the Nigerians and their neighbors can be credited for engaging in Sierra Leone when the international community continued to ignore the conflict, it should also be noted that Nigerian ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone were accused of committing heinous atrocities against the civilian population, and some generals were accused of partaking in the illicit diamond trade. In addition to the military role, ECOWAS adopted sanctions in August 1997 on petroleum products, arms imports, and international travel for AFRC/RUF leaders. The UN Security Council xxviii adopted similar sanctions only six weeks later, as Nigerian Ambassador to the UN Ibrahim Gambari was instrumental in getting issues of conflict in West Africa on the UN Security Council agenda. Following Sani Abacha’s sudden death in June 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar took control of Nigeria. Abubakar promised elections to restore a civilian government in Nigeria, indicating that a possibility of a reduction and withdrawal of Nigerian forces from Sierra Leone might be on the horizon, which increased the pressure on the Sierra Leonean government to reach a peace agreement with the RUF. The election of Olusegun Obasanjo in early 1999 signified a critical shift in Nigerian policy, as Obasanjo found himself under significant pressure to end the conflict and bring the Nigerian troops home. It was only a year later, in May 2000, when the international community finally arose from its slumber and developed a united approach.
2.1.1 The Role of International Actors The tepid global response to the 1997 coup encapsulates the general ambivalence of the international community with respect to the situation in Sierra Leone. This lack of response was due to a number of different factors: the recently ended war in Bosnia; the US and UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda, which severely decreased confidence (and first world participation) in UN peacekeeping operations; and the conflict in neighboring Liberia. Most Western nations saw Sierra Leone as an issue with which the British needed to deal. Although the British provided some assistance to maintain Kabbah’s government while in exile, tense relations between the UK and Nigeria (the UK refused to provide financial or material support to ECOMOG as long as General Abacha was serving as chair of ECOWAS) meant that Sierra Leone received little tangible support from the international community. The events in May 2000 were a turning point in the international community’s role in Sierra Leone. Prior to this time, the UN had played a limited yet lead role: through establishing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in 1995; financing and supporting elections in 1996; adopting aforementioned sanctions during the AFRC/RUF rule (following ECOWAS’ lead) and further sanctions in 2000 on illegal diamond exports; authorizing deployment of 10 UN personnel in 1998 to report on the situation in Sierra Leone and develop a plan of further UN involvement if needed; authorizing a military observer force (UNAMSIL) in July 1999; participation by the SRSG in peace negotiations in Abidjan and Lomé; and finally through establishment of a full UN peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, in October 1999, three months after the Lomé peace agreement. ECOMOG forces, bowing mounting popular pressure in Nigeria, began drawing down in early 2000. This withdrawal of ECOMOG forces occurred without a proper handover to UNAMSIL troops. “The initial months of 2000 saw a rapid xxix worsening of the conflict, culminating in a decision by the RUF to seize 500 peacekeepers as hostages, creating another potential major UN peacekeeping debacle” (Olonisakin, 2008:9).
2.1.2 UK Involvement The UK responded immediately by intervening militarily and got the crisis under control. The British then pushed for a stronger and larger UNAMSIL force in the Security Council and took the lead bilateral role in Sierra Leone. Since 2000, the UK has provided prodigious support: for elections, the development of civil society, independent media, as well as security sector and judiciary sector reform. British assistance to the security sector has been critical in securing peace in Sierra Leone especially given the historically pernicious role of the Sierra Leone military. (Dorman, 2009:10),
British military support has consisted of numerous programs, including: the British Ministry of Defense Advisory Team (MODAT) and the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), which both aim to train, equip, and advise Sierra Leonean military forces. In addition, UK military advisers have been integrated into government forces. The British also assisted the government in restructuring the Ministry of Defense to improve civil-military relations. British support in Sierra Leone, however, has not been without misgivings from critics. Prior to 2000, the UK had been criticized for its role in the Sandline affair, in which the UK government seems to have been aware of Sandline International’s (a private security firm) intention to sell arms to the Kabbah government while international sanctions were in place prohibiting arms transfers. Peter Penfold, British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone at the time, and others in the British government claimed that the embargo applied only to the AFRC/RUF, not to the Kabbah government. The entire episode proved an embarrassment to the British government, though there are conflicting views as to whether or not tacit British support for arms transfers to the government was acceptable given the complexity of the situation (including the army’s dubious loyalty) and possible ambiguous meaning and interpretation of the sanctions. The UK also has been heavily criticized for the multi-million dollar Paramount Chiefs Restoration Program, which was introduced in 2000 and funded through the Department for International Development (DFID) (Dorman, 2009). This program was aimed at restoring paramount chiefs, a majority of whom had been displaced by the war, in an attempt to stabilize the vast rural areas of the country. As it turned out, money was often used in a corrupt manner, and xxx the program reinforced traditional modes of local domination and governance that were in fact among the root causes of the war, helping to maintain the system of elite patronage politics pervasive at both the national and local level in Sierra Leone.
2.1.3 UN Involvement The overall importance of the UN in Sierra Leone since 2000 should not be underestimated. The UN responded to the May 2000 crisis by revising UNAMSIL’s strategy to include ongoing promotion of dialogue with the RUF as well as increased military enforcement, which led to UNAMSIL taking a much more pro-active approach in Sierra Leone. In addition, the UN began to be more aware of the regional dynamic to the conflict in Sierra Leone. According to Mutwol and Olorunisakin, “A Security Council mission to Sierra Leone and Liberia in October 2000 documented Liberian President Charles Taylor’s ongoing support to the RUF and facilitating illegal transport of diamonds from Sierra Leone through Liberia” (Mutwol, 2009:14). “In March 2001 the Security Council adopted travel sanctions against Taylor and an arms embargo. In brief the UN – through the SRSG, UNAMSIL, and the humanitarian agencies on the ground (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.) – has been critical to the progress made in Sierra Leone during this decade. It is also worth noting that the US and Japan, being the largest financial contributors to the UN’s assessed and voluntary contributions, have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to UN activities in Sierra Leone.” (Olonisakin, 2008:9). May 2000 is thus now seen as a real turning point in finally getting to peace in Sierra Leone. Following the UK and UN leads, international attention rapidly increased, along with a large injection of international assistance and the critical recognition by much of the international community of the regional nature of the conflict.
2.1.4 US Involvement The United States has by and large played a supporting role to the British in Sierra Leone. The US too began to take the conflict in Sierra Leone seriously after fighting in late 1998 forced the evacuation of staff from the American Embassy as well as from other Missions. Although the US was concerned with Liberia at the time, it took a long while for the most senior-level officials in Washington to understand the regional context of both Sierra Leone and Liberia wars. “US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke (1999-2001) was advocating during this period for much stronger American participation in peacekeeping in Africa, and he pressed the US to exert greater pressure on the RUF.” (Olonisakin, 2008:10) The US did play a significant role in the Lomé peace negotiations in 1999 where American Ambassador Joseph Melrose’s was active as observer. Notably, the US had sent special envoy xxxi
Jesse Jackson to press President Kabbah to go to the Lomé negotiating table with the RUF. According to former American Ambassador John Hirsch, “Many in Sierra Leone argued that Jackson’s pressure forced Kabbah to enter negotiations from a weak position and that allowing several more weeks for ECOMOG forces to continue fighting would have changed the diplomatic equation significantly. Jackson earned the opprobrium of many Sierra Leoneans.” (Sesay, 2009:28) In the aftermath of Lomé critics have argued in hindsight that the US specifically, and the international community in general, may have pushed too hard for a negotiated solution to the conflict, essentially forcing the Kabbah government to the table and to accept an agreement that provided too much for the RUF, and one that would be extremely difficult if not impossible for each side to uphold. Although the provisions of the accord were heavily criticized by some, the agreement was seen by others as reflecting the realities on the ground – including the impending withdrawal of Nigerian troops – and the need for the government to reach a peace deal. Post Lomé and the British repulsion of the RUF from Freetown, the US played a key role in the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in supporting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and in providing support to elections and independent media. (Sesay, 2009) Once the international community was sufficiently engaged, the major priorities consisted of consolidating peace (including overseeing the DDR process as well as the reintegration of returnees back to their host communities) and addressing humanitarian needs. As peace began to hold, focus shifted to the 2002 elections and subsequently over the past several years to the general democratization process, which has included institution building, the fight against corruption, as well as support to civil society, independent media, and rule of law. Daunting challenges still remain – including many of the root causes of the civil war – that Sierra Leone must overcome if it is to continue along the path towards full democratization and development. The international community today can be criticized for not making significant enough demands of the post-war government, for putting in place weak accountability measures to fight corruption, for insufficient oversight mechanisms placed on the Kabbah government, and for certain initiatives introduced, such as the one to strengthen the local paramount chiefs. There is also a fear today of Sierra Leone stagnating. Inclusion as a priority country by the UN Peace Building Commission and ongoing attention from Nigeria, UK, US, EU and others, however, should ensure that Sierra Leone continues upon an upward trajectory.
2.1.5 The Demographics of Rebel Recruitment xxxii
The demographics of rebel recruitment added to Sierra Leone’s problems of democratization during the civil war. As a result of the Liberian Civil War, 80,000 refugees fled neighboring Liberia for the Sierra Leone - Liberian border. This displaced population, composed almost entirely of children, would prove an invaluable asset to the invading rebel armies because the refugee and detention centers, populated first by displaced Liberians and later by Sierra Leoneans, helped provide the manpower for the RUF’s insurgency. “…Abandoned, starving, and in dire need of medical attention, the RUF took advantage of the refugees' poor condition by promising food, shelter, medical care, and whatever profits they gleaned from looting and mining in return for their support.” (Adebanjo, 2002:17) When this method of recruitment failed, as it often did for the RUF, youths were then coerced at the barrel of a gun to join the ranks. “After being forced to join, many child soldiers learned that the complete lack of law – as a result of the civil war – provided a unique opportunity for self-empowerment through violence and thus continued to support the rebel cause.” (Beah, 2007:13)
2.1.6 The Roles Libyan, Russian, and United States’ Government played In addition to the problems of democratization in Sierra Leone before 1995 is the role libyan, russian, and united states’ government played: Muammar al-Gaddafi both trained and supported Charles Taylor. Gaddafi also helped Foday Sankoh, the founder of Revolutionary United Front. According to Douglas Farah, “the amputation of the arms and legs of men, women, and children as part of a scorched-earth campaign was designed to take over the region’s rich diamond fields and was backed by Gaddafi, who routinely reviewed their progress and supplied weapons” (Pham, 2005:45). Russian businessman Viktor Bout, who enjoys protection of the Russian state, supplied Charles Taylor with arms for use in Sierra Leone and had meetings with him about the operations.Charles Taylor worked for The United States' CIA, beginning in 1980s. The exact nature of this relationship is uncertain.
2.2 HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE FROM THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR
The history of Sierra Leone during the colonial administration was another problem of democratization before 1995 European contacts with Sierra Leone were among the first in West Africa, in 1652, the first slaves in North America were brought from Sierra Leone to the Sea Islands off the coast of the southern United States. During the 1700s there was a thriving trade xxxiii bringing slaves from Sierra Leone to the plantations of South Carolina and Georgia where their rice-farming skills made them particularly valuable. In 1787 the British helped 400 freed slaves from the United States, Nova Scotia, and Great Britain return to Sierra Leone to settle in what they called the ‘Province of Freedom’. Disease and hostility from the indigenous people nearly eliminated the first group of returnees. This settlement was joined by other groups of freed slaves and soon became known as Freetown. In 1792, Freetown became one of Britain's first colonies in West Africa (Bankole, 1997). Thousands of slaves were returned to or liberated in Freetown. Most chose to remain in Sierra Leone. These returned Africans--or Krio as they came to be called--were from all areas of Africa. Cut off from their homes and traditions by the experience of slavery, they assimilated some aspects of British styles of life and built a flourishing trade on the West African coast. In the early 19th century, Freetown served as the residence of the British governor who also ruled the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and The Gambia settlements. Sierra Leone served as the educational center of British West Africa as well. Fourah Bay College, established in 1827, rapidly became a magnet for English-speaking Africans on the West Coast. For more than a century, it was the only European-style university in western sub-Saharan Africa. “The colonial history of Sierra Leone was not placid. The indigenous people mounted several unsuccessful revolts against British rule and Krio domination. Most of the 20th century history of the colony was peaceful, however, and independence was achieved without violence.” (Dorman, 2009:6) The 1951 constitution provided a framework for decolonization. Local ministerial responsibility was introduced in 1953, when Sir Milton Margai was appointed chief minister. He became prime minister after successful completion of constitutional talks in London in 1960. Independence came in April 1961, and Sierra Leone opted for a parliamentary system within the British Commonwealth. Sir Milton's Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) led the country to independence and the first general election under universal adult franchise in May 1962. Upon Sir Milton's death in 1964, his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, succeeded him as prime minister. In closely contested elections in March 1967, the All Peoples Congress (APC) won a plurality of the parliamentary seats. Accordingly, the Governor General (representing the British Monarch) declared Siaka Stevens--APC leader and Mayor of Freetown--as the new prime minister. Within a few hours, Stevens and Margai were placed under house arrest by Brigadier David Lansana, the Commander of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), on grounds that the determination of office should await the election of the tribal representatives to the house. Another group of officers soon staged another coup, only to be later ousted in a third coup, the "sergeants’ revolt," and Stevens at last, in April 1968, assumed the Office of Prime xxxiv
Minister under the restored constitution. Siaka Stevens remained as head of state until 1985. Under his rule, in 1978, the constitution was amended and all political parties, other than the ruling APC, were banned. (Bell, 2005) Auty recorded that: In August 1985, the APC named military commander Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh, Steven's own choice, as the party candidate. Momoh was elected president in a one-party referendum on October 1, 1985. In October 1991 Momoh had the constitution amended once again, re-establishing a multi-party system. Under Momoh, APC rule was increasingly marked by abuses of power. Earlier in 1991, in March, a small band of men who called themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of a former corporal, Foday Sankoh, began to attack villages in eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border (Human Right Watch, 1999:13). Fighting continued in the ensuing months, with the RUF gaining control of the diamond mines in the Kono district and pushing the Sierra Leone army back toward Freetown. On April 29, 1992, a group of young military officers, led by Capt. Valentine Strasser, launched a military coup, which sent Momoh into exile in Guinea and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as the ruling authority in Sierra Leone. (Auty, 1993:22)
The NPRC proved to be nearly as ineffectual as the Momoh government in repelling the RUF. More and more of the country fell to RUF fighters, so that by 1995 they held much of the countryside and were on the doorstep of Freetown. To retrieve the situation, the NPRC hired several hundred mercenaries from the private firm Executive Outcomes. Within a month they had driven RUF fighters back to enclaves along Sierra Leone’s borders. As a result of popular demand and mounting international pressure, the NPRC agreed to hand over power to a civilian government via presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held in April 1996. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a diplomat who had worked at the UN for more than 20 years, won the presidential election. Because of the prevailing war conditions, parliamentary elections were conducted, for the first time, under the system of proportional representation. However, on May 25, 1997 the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma, overthrew President Kabbah and later invited the RUF to join the government. In March 1998 the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces ousted the AFRC junta after 10 months in office, and reinstated the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. “The RUF’s renewed attempts to overthrow the government in January 1999 brought the fighting to xxxv parts of Freetown, leaving thousands dead and wounded” (Olonisakin, 2008:9). ECOMOG forces drove back the RUF attack several weeks later. With the assistance of the international community, President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh on July 7, 1999, signed the Lome Peace Agreement, which made Sankoh Vice President and gave other RUF members positions in the government. The accord called for an international peacekeeping force run initially by both ECOMOG and the United Nations. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, with an initial force of 6,000 (Onyemeachi, 2009). ECOMOG forces departed in April 2000. Almost immediately, however, the RUF began to violate the agreement, most notably by holding hundreds of UNAMSIL personnel hostage and capturing their arms and ammunition in the first half of 2000. On May 8, 2000, members of the RUF shot and killed as many as 20 people demonstrating against the RUF violations outside Sankoh's house in Freetown. As a result, Sankoh and other senior members of the RUF were arrested and the group was stripped of its positions in government. (Mutwol, 2009:71)
After the events of May 2000, a new cease-fire was necessary to reinvigorate the peace process. This agreement was signed in Abuja in November of that year. However, Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR) did not resume, and fighting continued. In late 2000, Guinean forces entered Sierra Leone to attack RUF bases from which attacks had been launched against Liberian dissidents in Guinea. A second Abuja Agreement, in May 2001, set the stage for a resumption of DDR on a wide scale and a significant reduction in hostilities. “As disarmament progressed, the government began to reassert its authority in formerly rebel-held areas. By early 2002, some 72,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed and demobilized, although many still awaited reintegration assistance. On January 18, 2002 President Kabbah declared the civil war officially over.” (Ozerdem, 2008:32) In May 2002 President Kabbah was re-elected to a 5-year term in a landslide victory for the SLPP. The RUF political wing, the RUFP, failed to win a single seat in parliament. The elections were marked by irregularities and allegations of fraud, but not to a degree to significantly affect the outcome. On July 28, 2002 the “British withdrew a 200-man military contingent that had been in country since the summer of 2000, leaving behind a 105-strong military training team to work to professionalize the Sierra Leonean army” (Woods, 2008:10). In November 2002, UNAMSIL gradually began drawing down personnel until the end of its formal peacekeeping mission in December 2005. Following the end of the UNAMSIL mandate, the UN xxxvi established the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which assumed a peacebuilding mandate. In the summer of 2002, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) began operations. The Lome Accord had called for the establishment of a TRC to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict to tell their stories and to facilitate genuine reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its Final Report to the government in October 2004. In June 2005, the Government of Sierra Leone issued a White Paper on the Commission’s final report which accepted some but not all of the Commission's recommendations. According to Mustapha (2010) Members of civil society groups dismissed the government’s response as too vague and continued to criticize the government for its failure to follow up on the report’s recommendations. The Special Court was established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000. The Court’s mandate is to try those who "bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law within the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996" (Bell, 2005:57). The Special Court issued indictments against individuals representing all three warring factions of Sierra Leone’s civil conflict in addition to the case against former Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor. On June 20, 2007, the Court issued its first verdicts in the trial of the AFRC accused Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, all of whom were found guilty on 11 of 14 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court issued an indictment against a fourth AFRC defendant, former junta leader Johnny Paul Koroma, who is rumored to have been killed, though his death remains unconfirmed. In the trial against the leaders of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) accused, on August 2, 2007, the court found Moinana Fofana and Allieu Kondewa guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. A third defendant in the CDF trial, Sam Hinga Norman, the former Minister of Interior and head of the CDF died in Dakar prior to the announcement of a judgment. Five alleged leaders of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, were indicted on 18 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The indictments against Sankoh and Bockarie were withdrawn on December 8, 2003 due to the deaths of the two accused. Sesay and Kallon were found guilty of 16 counts on xxxvii
February 25, 2009, while Gbao was found guilty of 14 counts. (Mustapha, 2010:12)
On March 25, 2006, with the election of Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo permitted transfer of Charles Taylor, who had been living in exile in the Nigerian coastal town of Calabar, to Sierra Leone for prosecution. Two days later, Taylor attempted to flee Nigeria, but he was apprehended by Nigerian authorities and transferred to Freetown under UN guard. Taylor was tried before the Special Court in The Hague on 11 indictments of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
2.2.0 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Finally, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone were the greatest threat to democratization in Sierra Leone because the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone defied traditional patterns of guerilla movements, and in many ways defines the emerging pattern of armed struggle in Africa. Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana have observed: The RUF has defied all available typologies on guerilla movements. It neither a separatist uprising rooted in a specfic demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist movement with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow. Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as warlord insurgency. The RUF has made history; it is a peculiar guerilla movement without any significant national following or ethnic support. Perhaps because of its lumpen social base and its lack of an emancipatory programme to garner support from other social groups, it has remained a bandit organization solely driven by the survialist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated battle front and battle group commanders. Neither the peasantry, the natual ally of most revolutionary movements, nor the students, amongst whose ranks the RUF-to-be originated, lent any support to the organization during its six years of fighting. (Abdullah, 2004:33)
During the second half of the 1980s, many university students in Sierra Leone had become radicalized by the government's suppression of their demonstrations by exposure to new ideas, including the thoughts of Col. Gaddafi. This was matched by the continued and dramatic growth in unemployed and disaffected youth who had became socialized in a climate of violence, drugs and criminality. Between 1987 and 1988, between twenty-five and fifty Sierra Leoneans were taken to Libya for training in the ‘art of revolution’. Among the students was a functional illiterate who had become part of a ‘revolutionary cell’ in Kono. Foday Sankoh was a former army corporal xxxviii and photographer who had been jailed for seven years for alleged implication in the 1971 coup plot against Siaka Stevens. Only three of those trained in Libya showed up later in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the only survivor after a year or so was Foday Sankoh. “At the end of 1989, Charles Taylor launched an attack on Samuel Doe's government with a small band of men, several of them, including Taylor himself, with Libyan training or connections. Taylor also received support from the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso support for Taylor was later extended to Foday Sankoh and the RUF.” (Keen, 2005:17) By 1991 the Momoh regime governing Sierra Leone was in serious difficulty. Beset by a crumbling economy, growing popular agitation and factional turmoil within the government, Momoh announced a return to multi-party politics, and general elections were planned for 1992. Before the elections could be held, however, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked. With the assistance of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Foday Sankoh and a small band of men crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone's Eastern Province in March 1991, with the express aim of ending the APC's 24 year grip on power. Raids on several border towns over the next few days demonstrated the weakness of the Sierra Leone military, and within a month, most of Kailahun District was under rebel control.
A humanitarian crisis quickly resulted from the RUF's tactics, which involved brutal attacks on unarmed civilians and children. Attempting to copy the ethnic incitement that had served Charles Taylor well in Liberia, the RUF targeted Fula and Madingo traders. It murdered more than 100 in its first two months of operations. It also targeted Lebanese traders, beheading five in Bo District. The atrocities never sparked an ethnic divide, but they created alarm among the civilian population and caused rapid and widespread displacement. Panicked, President Momoh quickly doubled the size of the army from 3,000 men to almost 6,000, drawing most of his new recruits from vagrants in Freetown - the "rural...unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves" - as his foreign minister at the time later put it (Richards, 1999:29). Further confusion was added to the mix by the formation in Sierra Leone of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), a coalition of anti-Taylor Liberians who, with Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) support, initially fought both the RUF and Taylor's NPFL. Because of corruption and mismanagement, Sierra Leone's front line troops were badly underpaid and demoralized. In April 1992, a group from the Eastern front travelled to Freetown to protest their situation. Within a day, the mutiny became a coup and Joseph Momoh fled to Guinea. A military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was formed, with 29- year-old xxxix army paymaster, Capt. Valentine Strasser as Chairman. Soon the NPRC came to resemble the regime it had ousted. During 1992 and 1993 the fortunes of the RUF fluctuated. On occasion, they overran the diamond areas were pushed back and retook the area again. Civilians accused by the government of collaboration were arrested and some were executed. But the penalty for not collaborating with the RUF was as severe, or worse. The RUF had two major calling cards: dead civilians, and hundreds, possibly thousands, of living civilians with their hands, feet, ears or genitals crudely amputated. Any force with access to the diamond areas also had access to diamonds. It gradually became unclear who was responsible for a particular ambush. In some cases attacks were carried out by soldiers and blamed on the RUF. Soldiers by day and rebels by night, they became known as ‘sobels’. The RUF added to the sobel story by carrying out raids in stolen army uniforms.
Towards the end of 1992, a new force entered the picture, the ‘kamajors’. Kamajor is a Mende word meaning hunter. In traditional Mende society, the hunter was a guardian of society and part of a mystical, ‘invincible’ warrior cult. Joined by a number of educated individuals and retired military personnel, the Kamajors soon became a force to contend with, fighting back not only against the RUF, but against the excesses of the NPRC government. By 1995 the military situation had become desperate, with hit and run raids throughout the country giving the RUF an appearance of great strength. Early in the year, the RUF overran the country's last remaining economic assets, the SIEROMCO bauxite mine and the Sierra Rutile titanium mines, allegedly with the assistance of soldiers commanded by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Until about 1995, it was unclear what the RUF stood for, who Foday Sankoh was, and what he wanted. Although he had given the occasional BBC radio-telephone interview, it was not until the 1995 appearance of the RUF's Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone, “…that any consistent ideals or purpose were enunciated. Allegedly drafted by an employee of International Alert, Footpaths contains words and phrases lifted directly from Mao Zedong, Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon” (Abdullah, 2004:68). While it is true that the RUF is made up of disaffected young men, a very high proportion of them were already alienated and dangerous before the RUF opportunity arose. Only a tiny fraction of Sierra Leonean youth has joined the RUF of their own volition. The main RUF recruits have been drawn from the same Freetown slums where Siaka Stevens recruited his brutal ISU and where Joseph Momoh found the material to double his army. Others were children who were xl kidnapped, drugged, and forced to commit atrocities. The ‘radical intellectual’ roots of the RUF were extinguished in its first year of operation, and its brutal attacks on civilians stand in contradiction to its ostensible aim of creating a ‘revolutionary egalitarian system’. By early 1995, the RUF was only miles from Freetown, as much a result of the army's incompetence as of RUF prowess. In fact at the time, the RUF was estimated by some to have an overall strength of three to four thousand, with a hard core of only five to six hundred soldiers. Part of the NPRC problem was its calculation that at least 20% of its own troops were disloyal. In May 1995, the NPRC turned to Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African security firm that had successfully repelled UNITA rebels on behalf of the Angolan government. The first EO contingent arrived in Sierra Leone in May 1995. Within ten days of their operational startup, they had beaten the RUF back from Freetown, and within a month had cleared the diamond areas. By early 1996, the RUF had been seriously damaged, and had been pushed away from the diamond areas that had helped to pay for their efforts. Hard-pressed by continuing EO attacks, the RUF announced a cease-fire and sought unconditional peace talks with Bio's government. These began in Abidjan only a few days before the elections were held. After two rounds of voting, the SLPP formed a government, with Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former UNDP official, sworn in as President. The peace talks in Abidjan went on for almost nine months, during which RUF attacks resumed, only to be fended off with devastating effect by EO and Kamajor forces. When Foday Sankoh and the GOSL signed a peace agreement at the end of November 1996, it looked as though the RUF was a spent force. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that President Kabbah agreed to the expulsion of Executive Outcomes within five weeks of signing the agreement (although LifeGuard, an EO offshoot remained behind to protect the diamond areas). It is also not surprising, in view of subsequent events, that Foday Sankoh refused to sanction a 720-member UN Peacekeeping Force. The RUF gained most from the peace agreement. It was given an on-going political role and legitimacy, and was absolved of responsibility for its past activities. More importantly, it gained militarily in the sense that the government was left exposed with little reliable security beyond the Kamajors and a new contingent of Nigerian troops sent to bolster the ECOMOG force. RUF attacks continued, in part because of disagreement in the leadership over the peace agreement, while in Freetown, a number of army officers were arrested in a suspected coup plot. In May 1997, a group of soldiers attacked the central jail, releasing the coup plotters and an estimated 600 criminals. President Kabbah fled and Major Johnny Paul Koroma, freed in the prison break, became head the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC invited the RUF to join them, declaring the war to be over. The period of joint AFRC-RUF rule was xli characterized by a complete breakdown of law and order, and by a collapse of the formal economy. Schools, banks, commercial services and government offices ceased to function, while rape and looting became the order of the day.
In February 1998 ECOMOG forced the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown in a fierce battle that took the lives of many civilians. Restored to office, President Kabbah took steps to begin demobilizing the entire army. “…A total of 47 individuals were convicted of treason and other charges associated with the AFRC/RUF administration, and sentenced to death. Foday Sankoh, who had been arrested in Nigeria and returned to Sierra Leone, was also tried, found guilty and sentenced to death.” (Lujala, 2005:31). During this period, the AFRC/RUF forces conducted a violent rampage throughout the country, chased from one place to another without great success by ECOMOG forces. Several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated. Hundreds of others have been abducted from their villages and forced to join their attackers." The RUF referred to this period as “Operation No Living Thing”. (Bell, 2005:58) With Foday Sankoh and other AFRC/RUF defendants appealing their convictions, the RUF again appeared at the gates to Freetown in January 1999, catching both the government and ECOMOG off guard. Using women and children as a human shield, some RUF troops were able to bypass ECOMOG troops and join comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Among their number were Liberians and a small number of European mercenaries. In the fighting that ensued, an estimated five thousand people died, including cabinet ministers, journalists and lawyers who were specifically targeted. Before the rebels were beaten back, large parts of the city were burned and 3,000 children were abducted as they retreated. While many of the convicted AFRC/RUF collaborators were freed, Foday Sankoh remained in government custody. The Revolutionary United Front had been engaged in armed struggle against the corrupt government of Sierra Leone for nine years. Only recently did peace come to Sierra Leone in the form of the Lome Peace Agreement. The Lome Peace Agreement was signed by the Leader of the Revolutionary United Front, Foday Saybana Sankoh and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. This agreement brought peace, finally, to Sierra Leone. On 18 January 2002, the devastating 11-year civil conflict officially ended when all parties to the conflict issued a Declaration of the End of the War. The Government since asserted control over the whole country, backed by a large U.N. peacekeeping force. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgents, who fought successive governments since 1991, completed disarmament and demobilization. xlii
In March 2002 RUF leader Foday Sankoh and 49 RUF co- defendants were indicted with 16 counts of murder and 54 counts of shooting with intent to commit murder in connection with the 2000 incident outside Sankoh's residence in Freetown in which 20 persons were killed and 80 persons were injured. Thirty-one members of an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys were charged with 11 counts of murder and 11 counts of robbery with aggravation in connection with incidents that took place in Port Loko District in 1999 and 2000. Sankoh, the 49 former RUF rebels, and the indicted West Side Boys remained in detention awaiting trial at Pademba Road Prison at year's end. (Sesay, 2009:48)
No action was taken against the RUF for the following incidents in 2001: The July killing of 22 persons in an attack on the village of Henekuma; the August killing of 2 persons in an attack on the village of Seria, in Koinadugu district; and the death of four former RUF members, allegedly under orders from RUF chairman Issa Sesay. No action was taken against the RUF rebels responsible for the following killings in 2000: The April and May killings of U.N. peacekeepers; the May killings of journalists Kurt Schork and Miguel Gil Moreno; the June killings in the attack on Port Loko; and the August killing of nine civilians in the village of Folloh. Although the Special Court for Sierra Leone was expected to examine these incidents, no further action was taken by year's end. On 21 March 2003, after receiving an initial psychiatric report on the leader of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Foday Saybana Sankoh, Special Court Judge Benjamin M. Itoe called for further psychiatric examinations. The hearing was held at a Sierra Leone district court in Bonthe where the Special Court is functioning while its permanent courthouse and detention centre are under construction. The judge ordered that copies of the report, written by Dutch psychiatrist Dr Peter Verkaeed, be provided to lawyers of the Prosecution and Defence. The Prosecution requested that the Judge enter a 'not guilty' plea on behalf of Sankoh. Sankoh has not responded verbally since his first Special Court hearing earlier this month. The Judge denied the Prosecution's request, deciding instead that all three judges of the trial chambers need to make a determination. The case was adjourned to a date to be fixed by the Registrar. “Public hearings were also held during the day for three other indictees -- alleged RUF commanders Issa Hassan Sesay and Morris Kallon, and alleged junta commander Alex Tamba Brima, who each face seventeen count indictments” (Mustapha, 2010:12). Their cases were also adjourned. A fifth indictee, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, has had closed hearings at an undisclosed location. The xliii
Judge also held a hearing for the first suspect detained by the Special Court, Augustine Gbao. Suspects can be held up to ninety days without being charged, subject to the consent the Court.
2.2.1 Government and Political Conditions “Sierra Leone is a republic with an executive president and a multi-party system of government with a 124-seat parliament (112 elected members and 12 paramount chiefs)”, (African Election Database, 2007:7). On August 11, 2007, Sierra Leone held nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections for the first time since the departure of UN peacekeepers. In the parliamentary elections, the National Election Commission reported the All People's Congress (APC) won a parliamentary majority taking 59 of 112 seats, while the ruling Sierra Leone's People's Party (SLPP) took 43 seats. The People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) won 10 seats in parliament. In addition to their peaceful administration, the 2007 parliamentary elections were notable for the return to a constituency-based system, as called for in the 1991 constitution. In preparation for the elections, Sierra Leone redrew parliament’s constituency boundaries for the first time since 1985. APC presidential candidate Ernest Koroma won 44.3% of the total 1,839,208 votes cast, while former Vice President and SLPP presidential candidate Solomon Berewa finished with 38.9%. PMDC presidential candidate Charles Margai placed third, receiving 13.9% of the vote. Because none of the candidates got the 55% of the vote needed to win in the first round, a run-off election was held on September 8, 2007. The two leading candidates, former Vice President Solomon Berewa of the SLPP and Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC, contested the second round. On September 17, 2007, Sierra Leone’s National Election Commission declared Ernest Bai Koroma the winner with 54.6% of the vote. President Koroma was sworn in later that day at the Sierra Leone Statehouse. (African Election Database, 2007:11) According to Sesay (2009), Sierra Leone’s judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, High Court of Justice, and magistrate courts. The president appoints and parliament approves justices for the three courts. Local chieftaincy courts administer customary law with lay judges; appeals from these lower courts are heard by the superior courts. Judicial presence outside the capital district remains limited, which contributes to excessive delays in the justice system. Although magistrate courts function in all 12 judicial districts, magistrates appointed to those courts but not residing there permanently have complained of insufficient resources to do their job. Justices of the peace or customary law partially fill the gap. Civil rights and religious freedoms are respected. A critical press continues to operate, although journalists and editors are occasionally arrested for publishing articles the government considers inflammatory. xliv
In 2000 the Government of Sierra Leone promulgated the Anti-Corruption Act to combat endemic corruption, and a revised version of the law was passed on September 1, 2008. The amendment added new crimes for indictments, stiffer penalties, and gave the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) greater independence to investigate cases at every level. The ACC is working to secure convictions of high-level government officials, as well as raising national awareness of the problem and build in safeguards in “corruption hotspot” ministries through anonymous whistle-blowing programs and training on proper procurement procedures. The amended act requires that all government officials, regardless of rank or position, must declare their assets. President Koroma was the first to declare his assets in 2008, and all other government officials have since followed suit. ACC investigations since late 2008 have led to the removal of dozens of officials, including several ministers, the vice president’s chief of staff, a former member of parliament, and a judge. In 2010, the ACC pursued 99 cases, 86 of which were still under investigation. Of the remaining 13 cases, the ACC secured seven convictions. The ACC has recovered almost $3 million for the government. (Koroma, 2004:12)
The basic unit of local government outside the Western Area has generally been the chiefdom, headed by a paramount chief, who is elected for a life term. In 2004, however, the first local government elections in 32 years were held in 311 wards nationwide. Four years later, local elections were held again in July 2008. There are now 12 district councils and 5 town councils outside the Western Area, Sesay, (2009) remarked. The Western Area has a rural area council and a city council for Freetown, the nation’s capital. The local councils are gradually assuming responsibility for functions previously carried out by the central government. As devolution progresses, chiefdom and council authorities are starting to work together to collect taxes. While district and town councils are responsible for service delivery, chiefdom authorities maintain their own infrastructure of police and courts, which are also funded by local taxes.
2.2.2. Economy Rich in minerals, Sierra Leone has relied on the mining sector in general, and diamonds in particular, for its economic base. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic growth rate slowed because of a dropoff in the mining sector and increasing corruption among government officials. By the 1990s economic activity was declining and economic infrastructure had become seriously degraded. Much of Sierra Leone’s formal economy was destroyed in the civil war. Since the cessation of hostilities in January 2002, massive infusions of outside assistance have helped Sierra xlv
Leone begin to recover. The coming on line of the Bumbuna Dam hydroelectric project in 2009 and the installation of a 10-megawatt thermal power generating machine from Japan has alleviated chronic power shortages. “Electricity generation improved by 29% in 2010 (170.45 gigawatt/hour)” (Mustapha, 2010:58). Full recovery to pre-war economic levels will require hundreds of millions of additional dollars and many more years of serious effort by the Government of Sierra Leone and donor governments. Much of Sierra Leone’s recovery will depend on the success of the Government of Sierra Leone’s efforts to limit official corruption, which many believe was the chief reason for the country’s descent into civil war. A key indicator of success will be the effectiveness of government management of its natural resources. Besides mineral deposits, Sierra Leone has sizeable marine and timber resources. Both sectors are threatened by limited management and over-exploitation. Since 2007, the Government of Sierra Leone has tripled and quintupled public spending for development and anti-poverty measures, respectively, through infrastructure improvement (particularly road and school construction) and a free health-care program for pregnant women, lactating mothers, and children under 5 years old. As a result, “it has reduced the country’s incidence of poverty (percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 per day at purchasing power parity--PPP) from 70% in 2005 to 60% in 2010” (Mustapha, 2010:40). In 2010, Sierra Leone moved up 12 points from the bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development Index to 158. In November 2009, the government launched the ‘Agenda for Change’ to focus on improving agriculture (which employs over half of the workforce) and addressing corruption. About two- thirds of the population engages in subsistence agriculture, which accounts for 49% of national income. Mustapha (2010) remarked. The government is trying to increase food and cash crop production and upgrade small-farmer skills. The government is working with several foreign donors, including the United States, to operate integrated rural development and agricultural projects. Mineral exports remain Sierra Leone's principal foreign exchange earner. Sierra Leone is a major producer of gem-quality diamonds. Though rich in this resource, the country has historically struggled to manage its exploitation and export. Annual production estimates range between $250-$300 million, not all of which passes through formal export channels, although formal exports have dramatically improved since the days of civil war. The balance is smuggled, where it possibly is used for money laundering or financing illicit activities. Efforts to improve the management of the export trade have met with some success. In October 2000, a UN-approved export certification system for exporting diamonds from Sierra Leone was put into place that led to a dramatic increase in legal exports. In 2001, the Government of Sierra Leone created a mining xlvi community development fund, which returns a portion of diamond export taxes to diamond mining communities. The fund was created to raise local communities' stake in the legal diamond trade. African Minerals, Koidu Holdings, London Mining Co., Ltd., and “Sierra Mineral Holding Ltd. produced 83% of the country’s revenue from mining, primarily in iron ore, gold, diamonds, and bauxite.” (Lujala, 2005:66) Sierra Leone has one of the world's largest deposits of rutile, a titanium ore used as paint pigment and welding rod coatings. Sierra Rutile Limited, owned by a consortium of U.S. and European investors, began commercial mining operations near Bonthe in early 1979. Sierra Rutile was then the largest nonpetroleum U.S. investment in West Africa. The export of 88,000 tons realized $75 million in export earnings in 1990. The company and the Government of Sierra Leone concluded a new agreement on the terms of the company's concession in Sierra Leone in 1990. “Rutile and bauxite mining operations were suspended when rebels invaded the mining sites in 1995, but exports resumed in 2005”. (Sesay, 2009:23) In 2010, Sierra Rutile produced almost 10% of Sierra Leone’s mining revenue. In September 2009, Anadarko, a U.S. oil company, and its partners Woodside of Australia, Repsol of Spain, and Tullow Oil of the U.K., announced that they had made an oil find off the coast of Sierra Leone. This oil deposit, the Venus field, may be similar to the 2 billion barrel Jubilee deposit that Anadarko discovered off of Ghana in 2007. The Venus well was drilled to a depth of about 18,500 feet in about 5,900 feet of water (Mustapha, 2010:50).
Only further testing will ascertain whether the area includes commercially exploitable oil and/or gas deposits, and production will be at least several years off. Since independence, the Government of Sierra Leone has encouraged foreign investment, although the business climate has been hampered by corruption, a shortage of foreign exchange, and uncertainty resulting from civil conflicts. Investors are protected by an agreement that allows for arbitration under the 1965 World Bank Convention. Legislation provides for transfer of interest, dividends, and capital. The government passed the Investment Promotion Act in August 2004 to attract foreign investors and has been working with international financial institutions to lower its administrative barriers to trade. In 2007, the Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency was created to assist investors by creating a ‘one stop shop’ for starting a business. In 2010, the International Finance Corporation's ‘Doing Business’ guide ranked Sierra Leone 4th out of 16 West African countries and 26th out of 53 African countries in terms of ease of doing business. President Koroma’s October 2010 dedication of a Special Economic Zone in xlvii
Freetown, operated by U.S. company ‘First Step’, led to the April 2011 completion of a plant to process fruit for export. Sierra Leone is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With Liberia and Guinea, it formed the Mano River Union (MRU) customs union, primarily designed to implement development projects and promote regional economic integration. Cote d'Ivoire joined in May 2008. The MRU has been largely inactive because of domestic problems and internal and cross-border conflicts in all three countries. The future of the MRU depends on the ability of its members to deal with the fallout from these internal and regional problems, as well as adequately fund the union to carry out sub-regional activities. In June 2010, the Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 3-year successor arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s economic policy has generally shifted from post-conflict stabilization to poverty-reduction efforts, including good governance and fighting corruption; job creation; and food security. Sierra Leone continues to rely on significant amounts of foreign assistance, principally from multilateral donors. The largest bilateral donors are the United Kingdom and the European Union; others include the United States, Italy, and Germany.
2.2.3 Foreign Relations Sierra Leone has maintained cordial relations with the West, in particular with the United Kingdom and the United States. It also maintains diplomatic relations with China, Libya, Cuba, and Iran. Sierra Leone is a member of the UN and its specialized agencies, the Commonwealth, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Development Bank (AFDB), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Sierra Leone’s foreign relations with these countries and organization also affect its democratization.
2.2.4 U.S-Sierra Leone Relations U.S relations with Sierra Leone began with missionary activities in the 19th century. In 1959, the U.S. opened a consulate in Freetown and elevated it to embassy status when Sierra Leone became independent in 1961. U.S.-Sierra Leone relations today are cordial, with ethnic ties between groups in the two countries receiving increasing historical interest. In 2010, the United States exported almost $56.5 million of goods (transporation equipment, agricultural products, machinery, chemicals) to Sierra Leone and imported over $29 million in goods (minerals, metals, machinery, agricultural products). U.S. imports under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act – xlviii
AGOA – totaled over $1.15 million. Many thousands of Sierra Leoneans reside in the United States. In fiscal year 2011, total U.S. bilateral aid to Sierra Leone in all categories was $19.4 million. U.S. assistance focused on the consolidation of peace, democracy and human rights, health education, particularly combating HIV/AIDS, and human resources development. The United States is the largest single donor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. (Sesay, 2009)
2.3 Summary of the Bloody Civil War in Sierra Leone The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) began on 23 March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from the special forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), intervened in Sierra Leone in an attempt to overthrow the Joseph Momoh government. “The resulting civil war lasted 11 years, enveloped the country, and left over 50,000 dead.” (Richards, 1996:3) During the first year of the war, the RUF took control of large swathes of territory in eastern and southern Sierra Leone, which were rich in alluvial diamonds. The government's ineffective response to the RUF, and the disruption in government diamond production, precipitated a military coup d'état in April 1992 by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). By the end of 1993, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) had succeeded in pushing the RUF rebels back to the Liberian border, but the RUF recovered and fighting continued. In March 1995, Executive Outcomes (EO), a South Africa-based private military company, was hired to repel the RUF. Sierra Leone installed an elected civilian government in March 1996, and the retreating RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Accord. Under UN pressure, the government terminated its contract with EO before the accord could be implemented, and hostilities recommenced. In May 1997 a group of disgruntled SLA officers staged a coup and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) as the new government of Sierra Leone. The RUF joined with the AFRC to capture Freetown with little resistance. The new government, led by Johnny Paul Koroma, declared the war officially over. A wave of looting, rape, and murder followed the announcement. Reflecting international dismay at the overturning of the civilian government, ECOMOG forces intervened and retook Freetown on behalf of the government, but they found the outlying regions more difficult to pacify. In January 1999, world leaders intervened diplomatically to promote negotiations between the RUF and the government. The Lome Peace Accord, signed on 27 March 1999, was the result. Lome gave Foday Sankoh, the commander of the RUF, the vice presidency and control of Sierra Leone's diamond mines in return for a cessation of the fighting and the deployment of a UN xlix peacekeeping force to monitor the disarmament process. RUF compliance with the disarmament process was inconsistent and sluggish, and by May 2000, the rebels were advancing again upon Freetown. The British intervened to save the failing UN mission and the weak government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. With help from a renewed UN mandate and Guinean air support, the British Operation Palliser finally defeated the RUF. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah declared the Sierra Leone Civil War officially over. In sum, it is ordinary knowledge that there are certain minimum features and/or core values that any national constitution claiming to be democratic should embody. Thus, within the discipline, constitutional law is defined as the study of an aspect of a nation's public law which treats the organization, powers and framework of the government, the distribution of political and governmental authorities and functions, the fundamental principles of which are to regulate the relations of government and citizens, and which prescribes generally the plans and methods according to which the public affairs of the nation are administered.
In regulating relations between governments and citizens, it is presumed above all, that constitutions serve as the source for the protection of fundamental civil rights and liberties, therefore guarding against arbitrary acts of governments. Thus, in democratic societies, the civil rights of the people are protected by obligating governments to protect their citizens from actions of other individuals and/or acts of governments. Likewise civil liberties are protected by restricting what governments can or cannot do to their citizens. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought, constitutions of modern democratic polities not only establish the responsibilities and working relationships of governments vis-à-vis the governed, they represent yardsticks from which to judge the progress of a nation through time and historical space. Hence, the so often emphasized view that constitutions are fundamental laws of the land, goes hand in hand with a parallel belief in constitutionalism, i.e., the belief in constitutional governance and the rule of law. Consistent with the above, Professor Bankole Thompson in this book examines the constitutional history and law of Sierra Leone from 1961 through 1995 from the following three summary perspectives. First, he examines the country's experience with constitutional law's most fundamental and enduring problem, namely; the relationship between its legal and political components. Second, he examines the complex interaction between constitutional standards and values, on one hand, and institutional and societal forces, on the other, for Sierra Leone as a developing nation. Third, he evaluates the application of fundamental constitutional principles regulating the relations between the government and the people of Sierra Leone. It should be l noted here that this work by Professor Thompson is by far the most comprehensive treatment of the constitutional development of Sierra Leone to date. It is comprehensive in its coverage of developments in that country under the various constitutions adopted since its independence in 1961. It is interesting to note that Sierra Leone was once characterized as a model, if not the model, of British parliamentary democracy in West Africa. When Sierra Leone emerged as an independent nation in 1961, (during a period when several African nations were undergoing similar political conversions), there were reasons to believe that it could become a constitutional model for most West African nations. However, political upheavals over the years made this goal unattainable for Sierra Leone. Some of the reasons for the initial optimism were due in part to its pre-independence constitutional tutelage under British rule. It is no surprise, therefore, that between 1961 to 1996, Sierra Leone continued to demonstrate aspects of its inherited democratic legacy. In its very first competitive election, six years after independence, Sierra Leone witnessed the first defeat of a political party in power by an opposition party. That was in 1967. Fast-forwarding to 1996, the military junta which seized power in 1992 and suspended the Constitution, willingly returned power back to a democratically elected government. Professor Thompson premises his study on the notion constitutional law provides a useful point of departure to acquire a broad perspective on the institutional, political, social and often moral realities of a nation. He presents lucid analyses of Sierra Leone's constitution. In doing, so he makes an excellent case for the study of Sierra Leone's constitutional law and its historical development. He devotes special attention in analyzing how the three main branches of the government of Sierra Leone (i.e., legislative, executive and judiciary) between 1961 and 1995 responded to the following: political challenges, values aspirations, cultural ambiguities, and moral dilemmas. The author's approach and emphasis is worth elaborating upon. The traditional paradigm for studying constitutional law in common law countries has been that of describing how the government of a state is structured and organized, how roles and functions are authoritatively allocated and subsequently, explaining the basic principles which govern the relations of government and its citizens. The method adopted by Professor Thompson in his book transcends that narrow paradigm. He adopts an analytical problem approach, focusing on the abstract and empirical dimensions of both the growth of constitutional law problems and issues in the particular case situation of Sierra Leone. li
A prominent feature of this approach is the author's extensive use of the comparative method. This, of course, makes his overall analysis more understandable to comparative law and comparative constitutional law scholars. For example, because Sierra Leone shares a common legal tradition with other commonwealth countries, Professor Thompson sheds light on what could have been particularized and complicated issues of constitutional law by drawing from the experience of other common law jurisdictions. Contrasting them to the case of Sierra Leone, he argues that by learning how other courts have responded to similar constitutional challenges and/or dilemmas within a normative context. Finally, we have been able to learn about the democratization process in Sierra Leone before and after 1995, the governments of Sierra Leone, problems and causes of the civil war, and the role of Nigeria, ECOMOG/ECOWAS and the International Community at large. lii
CHAPTER THREE
CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF NIGERIA’S INTERVENTION BETWEEN 1995 AND 2005
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Sierra Leone's civil war started in 1991. Nigeria had nothing to do with it. It started against a backdrop of decades of resentment by disenfranchised, particularly young rural folk against a corrupt older coastal urban elite. This resentment has spread to engulf foreign elements (including Nigeria) viewed as propping up the Kabbah regime which is seen, along with the money-driven electoral process that brought it to power, (fairly or unfairly) as representing a system that has consistently exploited the country's resources for its own personal interests while looking down at the rural aborigines with contempt. Encouraged and fostered in part by conflict in neighboring Liberia (since 1990) diamonds have also been a key factor. Mercenaries have fought on both sides usually with a tacit quid pro quo for payment in diamonds. To complicate matters, the RSLMF, a descendant of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) like its Nigerian and Ghanaian counterparts, has been rendered dysfunctional by multiple coups (since 1967), poor leadership and corruption. “This frustrated the lower ranks who have been driven to exasperation in fighting a brutal counter-insurgency on behalf of a system that it owed little or nothing” (Englund, 2004:3). The disbanded RSLMF is an active part of the problem, rather than a partner in helping to reestablish order and legitimacy. This chapter focuses on the challenges faced by Nigeria in the ECOMOG during the settlement of disputes in Sierra Leone, the impact of the conflict on development outcome, the transition to peace process, the achievements and the Nigeria’s foreign policy interventionist role through ECOMOG and finally the similarities of the conflict. It should be noted here that the RUF majorly were to be blamed for the disputes in Sierra Leone especially because members of the RUF were frustrated and dejected people. To be sure, the RUF does not (at this time) have palpable mass support, primarily because of its (allegedly) brutal tactics. Much of the savagery in the war has been attributed to the RUF although the Kamajors and even ECOMOG have been accused (by the UN) of human rights abuses, including summary executions. It must also be a cause for pause that “…a movement that supposedly has no mass support has been able to wage an eight year long insurgency and create problems for the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG equipped with artillery and ground attack aircraft.” (Ajayi, 1998:12) The young ragtag fighters care little for their personal safety and are fanatically loyal to their commanders. liii
The tendency to view a resistance movement as illegitimate and not worthy of attention and respect simply because it is savage in its behavior on the battlefield is shortsighted. Disgusting reports of machete mutilation by RUF rebels are not original. As far back as 51 B.C., Julius Caesar crushed a rebellion in the town of Uxellodunum and cut off the hands of all Gauls who had risen against Rome. Barbarous savagery was also a characteristic of the RENAMO rebels in Mozambique (Hirsch, 2000:20).
This did not prevent a negotiated settlement to that country's long civil war in 1992. The Islamic front in Algeria has not been particularly civil either, not to mention the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda and Burundi. Furthermore, the technology of amputation should not mislead us. The most effective method of mass amputation is not a machete. It is the landmine, produced cheaply by many developed countries many of which have expressed horror at the RUF while doing little to curb the production of mines. To this day, Africa remains the most mined continent on earth. “Angola has about 70,000 amputees” - not to mention those who did not survive and the 40 individuals who get killed monthly. (Onyemaechi, 2009:104) In the subregion, history teaches us that wholesale burning of towns and massacres are not new either: King Jimmy burnt Freetown in 1787. The British burnt entire towns and villages in the hinterland during the Temne and Mende Hut Tax wars. In Liberia, massacres were frequent during the civil war, including the notorious Marshal massacre in August 1990 during which 1000 Ghanaian immigrants and their associates were slaughtered by Charles Taylor's NPFL in retaliation for Ghana's involvement with ECOMOG. But Taylor was not alone. Samuel Doe's soldiers sealed off the Lutheran Church premises and liquidated more than 600 citizens from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups from which Taylor drew support. Roosevelt Johnson was also notorious for savagery. Most will remember the manner in which he supervised the slicing to death (on videotape), of late Samuel Doe, who was not a saint either, having savagely murdered William Tolbert and others with bayonets. But Taylor eventually became Liberia's President while Johnson became a cabinet minister! Their style is a feature of the ‘Mano river’ political landscape. (Ghobarah, 2004:869- 884)
Nor is the tendency to renege from signed agreements new to the subregion. Temne chiefs did so in 1787 and 1801. The Creole-aborigine trade wars of the late nineteenth century were a study in misunderstood expectations and broken promises. The British took possession of Sierra Leone in 1896 and began taxing it without bothering to inform any local inhabitants. The events liv surrounding the elections and coup of 1967 & 1968 were consistent. So were the preemptive coup of 1992 to forestall the results of an agreed upon plebiscite, followed by Strasser's attempt to back out of the promised 1996 elections, and the failure to follow-through on the Abidjan and Conakry agreements. More than 200 years of such behavior cannot be an accident. These factors make Sierra Leone a slippery political slope for any outside nation seeking to get too deeply involved. One possible good that may come out of the history is the way and trend which Nigeria achieved lasting peace despite the challenges it faced in Sierra Leone. From a structural point of view Sierra Leone had, before the onset of the conflicts, a range of socioeconomic characteristics that are common to many countries that undergo civil conflict and that have been identified by cross-national econometric research as risk factors for civil war onset. Chief among these challenges are chronic poverty, economic dependence on a small range of natural resource commodities, and a demography characterized by a youth bulge. Statistically the chances of conflict onset also vary with geography (with higher chances for countries that have neighbours at war) and with time (with especially high chances at the moment of the end of the Cold War, as superpower support is realigned, aid monies are diverted and fresh supplies of small arms enter markets). While these factors are associated generally with conflict onset, they only partially account for the situation in Sierra Leone—even after we account for all of these factors, the estimated likelihood of a civil war breaking out in any given year is low. There are multiple challenges the Nigerian army faced during the conflict resolution in Sierra Leone and one of it was the mechanisms that link the levels of poverty seen in Sierra Leone to conflict onset. But amidst all these, several achievements were made which resulted to a lasting solution to the crisis. The two most prominent are that in poor economies states are weak and susceptible to takeover and that the lack of employment opportunities motivates frustrated youths to seek material advantages through violent means. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and there is evidence for both mechanisms working in the conflicts. A striking feature of the conflicts in the Mano River union is that the state was so weak that, unlike other conflicts in Africa, the state was not a major party to the conflict. In Liberia, the most intense moments of the conflict involved conflicts between rival rebel groups; in Sierra Leone they were between the RUF rebel group and civil militias. In both conflicts, the state, if represented militarily at all, was represented largely though multilateral forces or mercenary units. There is also evidence from interview and survey material that “the fighters themselves originated from very impoverished backgrounds, with little or no access to education or health services or to formal sector employment” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004:25). lv
There are also multiple mechanisms linking natural resource dependence to conflict onset. One of these focuses on the desires of fighters, with violence driven by the desire to control rich interior resources (notably diamond). The war itself seemed to provide much evidence for this mechanism (diamonds fuelled fighting in Sierra Leone). However, the rebel greed explanation focuses on the motivations of the rebel leadership and does not account for the motivations of rank and file fighters. Survey research from Sierra Leone indicates that “rank and file fighters had little awareness of the natural resource economy and accorded it relatively low prominence in their thinking about the conflict” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004:25). Natural resource dependence can also account for conflict onset through providing a financing mechanism for conflict. There is indeed evidence that even if fighters were not motivated by a desire to control resources, their units were sustained in part by natural resource financing. Finally, natural resources can affect conflict risks through mechanisms quite independent of their impacts on the motivations and financing of fighters. One channel is through the erosion of state capacity that often accompanies a reliance on natural resources. When this erosion of capacity is accompanied, or spurred, by rampant corruption, it can provide not just an opportunity but also a motivation for violent action against the state: the discourse of state corruption of the natural resources sector figured very prominently and seemingly to great effect, in the documents produced by the RUF leaderships (RUF/SL 1995). Understanding the causes of the Mano River conflicts also requires an understanding of who the fighters were, and what motivated them as individuals which was part of the challenges the Nigerian army faced during the conflict in Sierra Leone. On this, opinions are divided. One view is that “…the fighters are mainly urban street youth with little if any ideological agenda, destructive of the (otherwise largely contented) peasant populations in the areas in which they deploy” (Mkandawire 2002:185). Another view stresses unresolved agrarian tensions dating back to the late nineteenth century, when the imposition of colonial rule froze in place institutional controls that bear down heavily on the commoner classes, through controls on land, labour and property that limit the capacity of women and rural young people to alleviate their poverty through their own efforts.
Investigation shows that there is little support for the urban bandits thesis—at least among the rank and file of the rebel organization. More than 80% of 1000 ex-combatants sampled in a study of demobilization in Sierra Leone had backgrounds in farming or rural schools, and the leadership of the RUF included an influential educated group with strong agrarian interests. lvi
Interviewed about causes of the war, fighters and civilians stressed the importance of grievances concerning land, labour and women’s property (Denoy, 2010:55).
The spread of fighting to Côte d’Ivoire (since 2003) – where land and citizenship rights of immigrants are issues – suggests that more attention should be paid throughout the region to the agrarian causes of the instability. In summary we do not point to a single explanation for the challenges faced during the crisis and origins of the Mano River union conflicts. But a cluster of forcing factors finds strong empirical support and should feature prominently in the design of post conflict development strategies. These include: the weakness of state capacity, the poor regulation of natural resource industries, ingrained corruption, alienation of populations from governmental processes, and rural disaffection, particularly among youths, arising from poor education and employment opportunities.
3.1 ECOWAS The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional grouping of fifteen West African countries founded on May 28, 1975. It was formed to promote cooperation and integration through the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, foster relations among member states, and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent (ECOWAS 2007). The member states of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, cote d’ Iviore, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The organization’s institutions are the Authority of Heads of States and Governments, its Council of Ministers, Community of Parliament, Economic and Social Council, Community Court of Justice, Executive Secretariat, and the Bank for Investment and Development. Convinced that economic progress could not be achieved unless the conditions for security were assured in all member states of the Community, the ECOWAS member states signed two security agreements in 1978 and 1981, and a non-aggression protocol in 1990. They also signed a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD), in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on May 29, 1981 that provided for the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community (ECOWAS 2007). Under this Protocol, all member states agreed to place earmarked units from existing national armed forces at the disposition of the Community in case of armed intervention. However, member states have been selective in their response to conflict in the sub-region. Senegal initially declined to contribute troops for the ECOWAS operation in Liberia in 1990. Nigeria simply refused to do so for the ECOWAS operation in the Ivory Coast. Ghana refused to take part in the ECOWAS operation in Guinea-Bissau (Amponsem-Boateng, 2006). lvii
3.2 ECOMOG The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence that was signed in 1981 provided for a non-standing military force to render mutual military aid and assistance to member states. ECOMOG--the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group--is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea, and air components that were set up by ECOWAS member states to deal with the insecurity that followed the collapse of the state structure in the Republic of Liberia in 1990. The force restored security that permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia. ECOMOG has since controlled conflicts in West Africa, notably in Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1999), Guinea-Liberia border (2001), and for a second time in Liberia (2003). Even though the Protocol establishing the ESF had been signed by ECOWAS member states in 1999, the force was yet to be assembled by the time the 2003 Liberian conflict broke out. ECOWAS still relied on the ad hoc assembly of troops from member states, placed under ECOMOG, to control both the Guinea-Liberian border conflict, and the second Liberian conflict in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Apart from the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG’s exit strategy has been to transition its troops to a subsequent UN peacekeeping force. Its modus operandi has involved an initial emergency response, followed by the deployment of a multifunctional UN mission. ECOMOG operations have usually been stop-gap measures predicated on the UN eventually taking over the lead (Amponsem-Boateng, 2006).
Many problems have characterized ECOMOG operations. The most salient of these have been excessive control by home governments; language differences; lack of standardization of equipment, arms and ammunition; different training standards, doctrine and staff procedures; poor sea- and air-lift capabilities; absence of vital air-to-ground support assets; lack of logistic support for some contingents; inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems; and poor coordination and liaison with international relief agencies (Khobe, 2000). Despite all these difficulties, ECOMOG represents the first credible attempt at a regional security initiative within Africa.
3.2.0 Nigeria’s challenge in ECOMOG It must be mentioned that although an external appearance of pride and gratitude for ECOMOG's success in Sierra Leone was projected, internal differences among ECOWAS members soon emerged. Indeed, at a March 12 1998 ECOWAS ministerial summit in lviii
Yamoussoukro shortly after Kabbah returned to Freetown, divisions emerged among ECOWAS member states on issues of force structure, legality, control and deployment of ECOMOG as the basis for a strategic peace-keeping mechanism in the region. While Nigeria pushed for the retention of ECOMOG as constituted to remain as a standing peace-keeping army, Francophone states like Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Togo were more interested in pre-positioning task-oriented troops in different countries to be assembled as needed on a case to case basis. The fear was that a standing ECOMOG army as a Nigerian dominated force would evolve into hatchet-man for Nigeria's dictates in the region. Charles Taylor of Liberia, a longtime ally of Foday Sankoh, was not pleased with the ECOMOG (Nigerian) offensive. In his usual passive- aggressive style, he not only fussed about the interception of AFRC renegades in Liberian airspace but also moved to get ECOMOG to remove its headquarters from Monrovia thus denying it a pedicled logistic hinge-point from which to launch ground operations in Sierra Leone next door. This was in spite of the Liberian peace accord which had brought him to power after a supervised election and assured a role for ECOMOG on the ground in Liberia The UN, on the other hand, commended ECOWAS. In June, the UN Security Council established a monitoring unit in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). It had both a military and a civilian element contributed by many countries and a projected one year budget of more than 31 million dollars. Amadu accounted that: In support of the government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of about 33,000 former combatants was a key objective. UNOMSIL observers were later deployed alongside ECOMOG units in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and Makeni as well as the Lungi and Hastings airports. Given the estimated 500,000 refugees displaced within and outside the country (Guinea, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia and Senegal), the UN also continued to appeal to all member states to provide humanitarian assistance (Amadu, 1992:54).
As the rainy season began, activities of the AFRC/RUF rebels lulled but this eventually turned out to be a pause to regroup and rearm. The lull in guerrilla activities appeared coordinated with an apparent improvement in relations between Liberia and Sierra Leone and coincided serendipitously with a government ban on diamond mining as well as the sudden cardiac death of Nigerian strongman General Sani Abacha in early June. On July 25, 1998, the new Nigerian leadership released RUF Leader Foday Sankoh [from a Nigerian jail] to the Sierra Leonean government. Meanwhile Kabbah had set up treason trials in five Freetown courts against persons who were allegedly involved in the May 1997 putsch. “Of the 96 initially charged, 77 were later lix sentenced to death. In early November, another 16 of 21 defendants were found guilty of collaborating with the former AFRC”. (Fawole, 1999:24) Former President Joseph Momoh was also sentenced to jail. Beginning in late August and September 1998 during the run-up to the Sierra Leonean dry season, RUF/AFRC rebel attacks resumed in force revealing a level of determination, organization and strength in numbers and equipment which surprised ECOMOG and UNOMSIL observers even as they issued "rebel body counts" and public statements to the contrary. In mid- October, 24 military officers were shot for their part in the 1997 coup while Foday Sankoh himself was subsequently found guilty of treason on October 23. Along with other civilians so convicted, he was appealing the verdict, “competition by international Lawyers to defend Sankoh was intense with several bids as large as almost $5,000 daily plus expenses” (Nwolise, 1992:58). Not to be outdone, “a Nigerian legal team offered to do the job for $2,000 daily” (Nwolise, 1992). Eventually a British MP and former conservative government Agriculture Minister got the nod, with an international human rights organization underwriting costs. Subsequently, mutually suspicious Liberian (Taylor), Sierra Leonean (Kabbah) and Guinean (Conte) leaders met in a subregional 'Mano River Union' summit in November and issued the usual exhortations to work toward better relations. This was particularly crucial at the time because of flared tempers resulting from an alleged coup plot against Taylor which had led to shooting in Monrovia as Taylor attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, a former rival warlord and now cabinet minister. Kabbah had allegedly tipped Taylor off about the putsch but Taylor later turned around to accuse Kabbah of meddling. Taylor, on the other hand, was opposed to the executions of convicted AFRC/RUF elements and repeatedly put pressure on Kabbah to negotiate a political solution to the crisis even as Kabbah was accusing Taylor of backing the RUF. Clearly, there was no trust. By December 1998 it was clear that UN sanctions targeted at non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leoene were not being enforced. The rebels had signalled that not only were they better armed and trained than had hitherto been the case; they were well on their way in executing a major dry season offensive, advancing southwards towards Freetown from the North- west and diamond-mining eastern region in a move they said was aimed at forcing the government to the negotiating table. But this was not all. The rebels also implemented a wave of kidnappings of priests and journalists while maiming and killing any neutral civilians along with agents of the state, including policemen. As if the conflict with the AFRC/RUF was not enough, “the Kabbah government had to deal with a University lecturers strike and appeal against massive corruption lx among civil servants demanding bribes before service - for long a key grievance of the rebels”. (Vanguard: 2003:11) Faced with an increasing threat, Kabbah offered conditional amnesty to five important rebel commanders; ECOMOG imposed selective curfews; while Kamajor militia resorted to executions of suspected rebel sympathizers as well as illegal diamond miners. Civil Defence units also attempted to create a buffer zone along the Liberian border to prevent infiltration. Many demobilized former soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) were re- inducted by the Sierra Leone government to fight alongside ECOMOG and the Kamajors against the AFRC/RUF rebels. This turned out to be mistake because many of these soldiers simply switched sides at critical junctures. On December 19, 1998, the alliance of deposed RSLMF and RUF rebels seized the diamond town of Koidu and then advanced on Makeni while probing ECOMOG defences at Waterloo. “ECOMOG reinforcements, (long sought after by both Generals Khobe and Shelpidi) were rushed in by Nigeria” (Vanguard: 2003:11). But by December 30 rebels had captured Lunsar, an important road junction. According to Amadu (1992), Panic gripped Freetown. Foreign nationals as well as international workers were evacuated, anticipating full-fledged urban warfare. The pattern in each town was similar. Rebels would probe, and then ECOMOG would withdraw to save civilian lives or prevent our lines of communication from being cut off. Now and again ECOMOG would retake their previously held positions. It was the typical scenario of a regular army fighting against a guerrilla campaign in unfamiliar territory. On January 6, 1999, aided by probable leaks from the Sierra Leonean ministry of defence and coordinating their attack with already prepositioned elements, a rebel force consisting mostly of disaffected rural children and teenagers entered Freetown from the east having first slipped through the Kissy Safecon Terminal supposedly protected by the 93 mechanized battalion of the Nigerian Army. The Statehouse (located in the historic Granville town was seized and burned along with key parts of the city center. Within days they came very near to capturing all of Freetown, humiliating ECOMOG and forcing Kabbah to call for peace and cessation of hostilities even as confused, undertrained, underarmed, poorly logistically supported, allegedly underpaid and poorly motivated ECOMOG units regrouped. With some international logistic support, “thousands of Nigerian troops were rushed in, by mid-January anywhere from 15-20,000 Nigerian soldiers were reportedly in the country” (Hirsch, 2000:20). After weeks of fierce fighting the rebels were cleared out of most parts of Freetown, even though further attacks have occurred in and around Freetown and Kenema. Additional troops from Ghana, Guinea and Mali were also flown in after equivocations and conditionalities typical lxi of the ECOWAS membership. Meanwhile, Togo, leading a group of countries with no troops on the ground, quickly offered to host peace talks, citing its current chairmanship of the ECOWAS. Anywhere from 3-5000 civilians were killed but the true numbers will never be known. For Nigerian troops, the casualty rate was horrific. Although the government has kept mum about figures, foreign news agencies and some Nigerian newspapers reported an average figure of “30 deaths on a daily basis for all of January and early February, 1999” (Mkandawire, 2002:10). News reports (quoting former US President Jimmy Carter) of poor medical treatment for wounded ECOMOG soldiers surfaced along with reportedly secret mass burials. The Army (predictably) reacted angrily to these news reports as well as false and culturally abominable reporting about dead officers who were actually alive, ethnic selectivity in deployments to Sierra Leone and non- payment of the federal minimum wage to soldiers - all matters potentially capable of inciting soldiers to mutiny and causing disaffection among the war-weary and ethnically polarized Nigerian public. However, as at the year 2005, the government has still not released its own official casualty reports either for Sierra Leone or the preceding eight year adventure in Liberia. To compound the public relations crisis, newspaper reports have surfaced that some Nigerian officers in Sierra Leone have made diamond mining and trading their preoccupation rather than conducting a counter-insurgency war. But perhaps most provocatively, a Sierra Leonean Minister announced that “the conflict was costing Nigeria 1 million US dollars daily!” (Abdullah and Muana 1998:15). This has not been denied by any knowledgeable Nigerian official. Faced with declining oil prices, deteriorating conditions of living in Nigeria (with internal security implications), a transition program to civil rule and the anticipated emergence of a democratically elected President on 29th May 1998, Nigeria's leader, General Abubakar, hinted that Nigerian troops may be pulled out of Sierra Leone before he hands over. This announcement by Nigeria has caused panic and increased pressure not only for more vigorous international interest and support for Sierra Leone but also for a political settlement. Kabbah then agreed to allow Sankoh meet face to face with his RUF colleagues in a confidence building measure. Unconfirmed rumors was circulated that Presidential candidates in the forthcoming democratic elections in Nigeria have been lobbied by warring factions in Sierra Leone seeking to influence Nigerian foreign policy after May 1999.
3.3 IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME Even before the beginning of the conflict, the level of economic development in Sierra Leone was low. Richards attests to this: lxii
The pre-war economy of Sierra Leone was dominated by mineral enclaves. Alluvial diamond mining was the mainstay in Sierra Leone, but techniques were mainly pre-industrial and recovery rates low. Outside Freetown and the diamond centres the country remained impoverished, with particularly low levels of agricultural modernization, and some of the highest infant mortality rates in the world (Richards, 2002:23).
From the 1970s the best diamond deposits began to approach exhaustion and the economy went into decline. In 1987 the APC government defaulted with the IMF and had to seek unfavourable commercial loans to sustain its basic activities. The rapid decline of rural primary education and health services were clear signs of financial crisis which Nigeria had to aid financially before being able to restore permanent peace. In Sierra Leone, a small elite controlled vast wealth while a mass of ordinary people remained in extreme poverty. In Sierra Leone diamond wealth flows in private channels. Consistent with this economic structure, much of the fighting was centred on islands of mineral. Nonetheless, in Sierra Leone the geographic spread of the conflict was wide, with fighting resulting in the displacement of the majority of rural Sierra Leoneans. At one stage in the late 1990s more than half a million refugees from the conflict were living in neighbouring Guinea. An estimated 40% of Sierra Leone’s population was displaced by the conflict. “Gates established by factions at key points on the rudimentary road networks of the country choked interior trade, transportation became scarce due to unofficial taxes and the risk of ambush or robbery, local markets collapsed, clinics and schools were looted and destroyed, and teachers and health workers were either killed or abducted to provide services to rebel factions in the bush” (Keen, 2005:10). In Sierra Leone, the result of the conflict was a massive decline in income. The years before the conflict never produced anything like the declines in welfare seen once the violence began. “Income figures show an average annual growth rate of about -5% throughout the conflict years in Sierra Leone and a 50% decline in real per capita income over the course of the conflict; the decline in income was even more drastic than ever before, with an average 7% per annum decline in income between 1980 and 1997 and a total 80% decline in per capita over that period, these declines in income correspond very directly to the timing of conflict”. (Keen, 2005:12). The decline in income is however only a poor indicator of the decline in capital—a feature of conflict that can adversely affect welfare far into the future. In fact the level of destruction and dislocation varied considerably from place to place and was closely related to different displacement patterns. In rural central Sierra Leone displacement dates from 1995, but many villagers returned home accompanied by civil defence forces within 18 to 24 months, often to find lxiii their villages desolated. In parts of the north, villagers lived under RUF “occupation” for up to four years. Isolated corners of Kailahun and Pujehun Districts were controlled by the RUF for a decade. In some of these cases physical destruction was low, but people suffered from high levels of forced labour, sexual violence, hunger, and the total lack of basic services. In other areas physical destruction was chronic, resulting in a razing of homes and infrastructure. The capital loss in Sierra Leone is not to be measured in the destruction of physical capital alone. War also resulted in a loss of skilled personnel from both business and government. Many highly-educated Sierra Leone went to the United States. Many Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea, and some later moved to other parts of Africa (where they now occupy teaching and other professional positions from The Gambia to Botswana). In times of conflict, the loss in human capital stock through normal processes (of ageing and obsolescence) and the flight of skilled personnel is compounded by losses due to targeting of educated elite. Additionally the normal restocking of human capital through education is, at least in part, suspended due to the closure and destruction of schools and health facilities (that was reconstructed by Nigeria) (Mustapha, 2010). However, although the loss in physical and human capital and development opportunities is clear, the impact of the war on ‘social capital’ is more ambiguous. While the wars destroyed some social structures, it also produced new possibilities for social organization. The war brought to light a crisis of governance in the country and the result now is a heightened level of politicization among the population of the country. As many researchers have argued that one result of the conflict, in part due to the great increase in migration and information sharing across communities, brought about by forced displacement, was that “our eyes have been opened.” (Klein, 1999:8) This has been evident both in regards to the centralized management of the country’s’ resource and to the management of local economy. Another challenge Nigeria faced in Sierra Leone was that the management of national resources has received the most attention. In aiming to control the flow of wealth from diamonds, the RUF claimed to be reformist in intent. The broad concern over the management of this sector is still very general in Sierra Leone. It is now also shared by the international community, which presses for greater accountability and transparency over resource exploitation. If procedures governing diamond and logging transactions were less murky there would be less incentive for warlords to fight to control these resources, it is reasoned. Monitoring of logging activity and the tracking of alluvial diamond movements are intended, therefore, to force governments and concessionaires towards greater openness, upon the basis of which democratic debate about national income and expenditure can begin. According to one report, “the levels of transparency and professionalism in the diamond industry exceed that found in other sectors in the lxiv country (Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development 2005)” (Englund, 2004:24). The management of local economies has also begun to undergo a transformation. At grass roots level, villagers in Sierra Leone draw attention to an agrarian crisis affecting land, labour and marriage. Whatever national ambition the RUF leadership cherished, the RUF recruited a majority of their fighters from rural communities, and much of the violence of the war is explicable in terms of the local agrarian tension in which the fighters and their village victims were enmeshed. Young people complain that constraints on access to land and the exploitation of their labour through the application of onerous marriage customs in local courts were conducive to vagrancy, and that rural vagrants were vulnerable to militia recruitment. Even chiefs and elders are at times frank in their assessment that this type of social exclusion was a factor feeding the violence. In many cases the worst violence and atrocity was the product of intra-village revenge. As one consultation put it “our village was 100 per cent destroyed in the war but 95% was the work of our own indigenous rebels not the RUF” (Englund, 2004:28). A consequence is that some local institutions of indirect rule are probably beyond repair. Local pressure for rural institutional reform is beginning to bear fruit. Local awareness of these issues is very high in rural Sierra Leone, but as yet government and donors are not fully seized of the need for agrarian reform. The implication of the MDGs is another major challenge Nigeria faced in Sierra Leone. There are two major implications of the destructive and transformative aspects of the conflict for the prospects Sierra Leone have to meet the MDGs. The first relates to the rate of development that is required to reach the goals in Sierra Leone; the second to institutional and political constraints in a post conflict environment. Rate of development: a considerable challenge for Sierra Leone—as for other post conflict countries—derives from the fact that the Millennium Development Goals targets were set in 2000 for a 2015 goal that is itself based on a 1990 benchmark which Nigeria assisted in achieving. For most countries, the 1990 benchmark provides countries with a headstart of 10 years of growth for achieving the goals. In the case of Sierra Leone, however, the timing of war in the country was such that the gain of 1995 to 2005 period were in fact losses due to conflict. All indicators are worse in 2005 than they were in 1995. This has doubly adverse implications: to reach the goals, Sierra Leone has to make larger gains in a shorter period of time. Another challenge is that there is, first, a problem of government capacity. Government institutions, already weak, were especially badly hit by the loss in human capital that occurred during the conflict. This brain drain was perpetuated after the conflict ended through the recruitment of skilled personnel from government positions into international and national non- lxv governmental organizations. The problem is particularly acute in sectors in which government provided services successfully in the past—notably in education and health—but commensurably less so in sectors—such as agricultural extension—in which government behaviour was primarily informative, regulatory, or even predatory. These considerations emphasize the first simple conclusion: skill shortage, especially in government, is likely severely to hamper the recovery process in Sierra Leone. There is also concern that, beyond questions of personnel, the basic institutions of governance –especially at the local level – have been undermined by war. Sierra Leone retain, in modified form, a system of indirect rule introduced at the beginning of the 20th century. Sierra Leone administered rural area through a hierarchy of traditional chiefs. It seems that war has harmed the prestige of chiefs. Many government-recognized ruling families were founded during unstable conditions in the late 19th century through the exploits of war leaders. But as chieftaincy adapted to more peaceful conditions in the mid-20th century, warrior skills were lost. When war returned in the 1990s many chiefs were hunted by the insurgents, as representatives of a hated regime, and sought refuge in towns or overseas. The incoming democratic government in Sierra Leone in 1996 prioritised the return of paramount chiefs. The British government accepted the argument that only if chiefs returned would people follow, and helped fund their return. In fact many villagers either never left or invested in their own security by paying for initiation in the civil defence movement. Many chiefs were late arrivals. But in a society temporarily chief-less, less deferential younger elements continued to ask why chiefs were needed. It was argued that “in abandoning their communities, chiefs had forfeited the respect due to warrior-leaders.” (Keen, 2005:9). Seemingly in recent years the custom of popularly electing town chiefs has grown up, though apparently without constitutional mandate. All other levels are, in theory, nominated by the Executive Mansion and approved by Senate. Senators representing women’s interests sponsored a bill (passed in November 2003) to “improve rural women’s marriage and property rights, removing some of the customary props through which rural land-owning elites controlled married women’s resources but also exploited the labour of young men expended in bride service”. (Koroma, 2004:55). One major achievement, there is a slowness of adaptation of governments to a new political culture. Meeting the MDGs implies better delivery of basic services to the poor. The political culture of Sierra Leone is strongly patrimonial. In Sierra Leone, presidents have in the past preferred to claim that basic services—such as education—were privileges, not rights, and best supplied by talking directly to the main benefactor (State House). The rights-oriented framework implicit in the Millennium Development Goals however implies relations between the government and the poor that is incompatible with this long-established lxvi patrimonial form of politics. “But both the conflict and the humanitarian interventions have given villagers a first taste of grass-roots democratic accountability – for example in the form of elected committees to supervise distribution of resources and manage community-driven rehabilitation” (Archibald & Richards 2002a:356). “And there is evidence that war has shifted local perception a few points in the direction of rights-oriented thinking, and away from earlier patrimonial notions that food security and basic education for example are gifts provided by generous patrimonial leaders”( Archibald & Richards 2002b:339). That this change in perception is permanent is often voiced by villagers recounting their reaction to the dislocating experiences they have undergone. Nor are all chiefs opposed to calls for a rights-oriented approach to service provision at the local level. Some chiefs recognise customary prestige is no longer enough to guarantee respect, and appear interested in new roles approximating those of an elected mayor. The conclusion is that political constraints to achieving the MDGs remain especially important in Sierra Leone, and are as problematic at decentralized levels of governance as at the apex. In African post conflict recovery countries donor emphasis on propping up uncertain peace processes by rebuilding state institutions risks having the perverse effect of boosting patrimonial ways of thinking which war itself has thrown into doubt. Decentralization represents an opportunity for new forms of accountable, efficient local government and service provision, but due to the long- term derelict nature of local government in Sierra Leone (where district councils have not functioned for over 30 years) there is lack of awareness among the public of what to expect and demand. This means that development planning is at risk of capture by ethnicised patrimonialism, the game most local politicians and constituents know. Specific thought needs to be given to the issue of how to inculcate and support the emergence of a culture of rights among both citizens and officials as a necessary frame for MDG initiatives.
3.3.0 The Transition to Peace Process Typically, post-conflict countries experience a humanitarian interregnum, in which Nigeria and international agencies provide not only emergency feeding and shelter but many basic social services (such as health and education). Sierra Leone passed through this phase from 2000 to 2002. An important achievement of the peace process in Sierra Leone has been the successful demobilization of large numbers of fighters by Nigeria. The demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process, while suffering from flaws, was successful in getting guns out of communities and in doing so in a manner that did not appear inequitable vis-à-vis the rival political groupings in the country. These are preconditions for success that should be emulated lxvii elsewhere. The problems of DDR in Sierra Leone are many. It is hard to tell what progress has been made due to confusion over numbers. There is a strong suspicion that some fighters have registered more than once, whereas others have been deprived of their weapons by commanders who allegedly redistribute guns to civilian youths, so that these youths can claim a disarmament package. Recovery of weapons is far from complete, and disgruntled fighters mutter about reverting to war. A factor is their idleness. This reflects a chronic undersupply of promised skill- training packages. Onyemeachi recorded that: Ex-combatants besiege potential training sites, to await non- existing courses, and for now, few are tempted by road rehabilitation work at $2/day (Onyemaechi, 2009:103).
Private sector employment has been slow to materialize. The large timber sector remains under Security Council sanctions, and plantation owners are cautious to invest in rehabilitation, perhaps especially given the rebellious mood among some of their labour force. Without a solution to bottlenecks in the DDR process, IDPs (internally displaced persons) and refugees remain reluctant to begin the laborious process of rebuilding their villages, sensing war might return at any time. From the Sierra Leone DDR process, two central lessons stand out. First there is a need for a more robust complaints mechanism. Research indicates that demobilization program is subject to manipulation by individual ex-combatants, often to the exclusion of other ex-combatants. A failure to put in place a mechanism to “address grievances emanating from the process can result in new frustrations as well as clusters of fighters that remain excluded outright and that continue to engage in conflicts elsewhere in the region” (Richards et al 2004; Human Rights Watch 2005:12). Second, the failure of the “training from demobilization processes to lead to job opportunities was a primary source of frustration among ex-combatants” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004:24). A second area of important is the impact that humanitarian agencies have on local economies. A positive aspect of the transitional period has been that the humanitarian agencies provide services to higher standards than some poor people have historically experienced. Many IDPs in camps in Sierra Leone say that they have appreciated for the first time the full value of education, including education for girls, and that they will not agree to re-settle in remote areas of the Country without schools and teachers. Post-conflict governments will as a result be driven to meet their MDG commitments by much more clearly articulated demand from the poor. A negative aspect, noted above, is that NGOs drain away skilled staff from government services, which end up demoralized, with a much reduced capacity to plan and execute longer- term recovery initiatives. lxviii
Also some NGOs act as a law unto themselves. Different aids and supports were provided for the affected Sierra Leoneans by Nigeria and other agencies, standards of benefit provision also prevailed among agencies working in communities previously administered to a single national standard. Some IDPs (internally displaced persons) in Sierra Leone were given packages including cement and roofing materials and so rebuilt their villages to a much higher standard than before the war. Others were given only basic tools, seeds and tarpaulins. More isolated communities were left to fend for themselves, too far off road for agency staff to venture. A complex web of local tensions eventuates from the evident inequalities in restorative action in the humanitarian interregnum, and nobody knows quite to whom they can complain. In Sierra Leone these problems have been tackled in part by Nigeria under humanitarian auspices. Some agencies have pushed further by implementing international standards, such as the Sphere humanitarian protocol, or through seeking to make activity rights compliant. Such approaches can usefully draw upon or link with national level rights-oriented initiatives. For example Sierra Leone has invested in truth and reconciliation processes, which encourage citizens to reflect upon the role played by social injustices, including injustices in delivery of development and humanitarian benefits, in provoking or sustaining conflict. The humanitarian interregnum risks creating dependency, or unrealistic expectations about service delivery. But where it is linked to attempts to stimulate a culture of rights it can lay an important foundation for citizen involvement in the pursuit of MDG.
3.4 ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY INTERVENTIONIST ROLE IN SERRA-LEONE CRISIS Foreign policy according to Reynolds is the "range of actions of government of a state in its relation with other bodies similarly acting on the stage supposedly in order to advance the nation's interest" (Reynolds, 1976:3). Evaluating this definition, it could be deduced that the foreign policy of a state involves not only interactions with other states but also relations with international non- state bodies, both government organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOS). Rosenau sees foreign policy as "the authoritative actions which governments take or are committed to take, in order to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or alter its undesirable aspects" (Reynolds, 1974:6). Kolawole (1997) also lends his voice when he insists that "a nation's foreign policy orientation is informed by what is considered to be its national interest". Generally, the most potent instrument of gauging a nation's foreign policy is its stated foreign policy objectives. Section 19 of the 1979 Nigerian constitution, saliently articulates its lxix objectives as the defence of the country's sovereignty; independence and territorial integrity; restoration of human dignity to Blackman all over the world; the creation of relevant political and economic conditions in Africa, promotion and improvement of the economic well–being of all Nigerian citizens; and promotion of world peace (Kolawole, 1997). Of principal concern to Nigeria, from these objectives, are well–being of Nigerians; the imperative of justice for all, and a peaceful and secured world in which conflicts are resolved amicably. These aspiration values are prioritized by policy makers into three concentric circles. The narrowness of the circles denotes the nation's security priorities, attitude and responses to foreign policy issues within Africa and the rest of the world. “The inner–most circle has Nigeria. Nigeria's neighbours and the West African sub –region occupy the second, while third layers belongs to other states in Africa” (Buhari, 1984:2; Ajayi, 1998:179). This prioritisation implies that defence and security planners must be sensitive to the behaviour, capabilities and plans of countries that fall within these concentric securities boundaries.
The second circle, which has ECOWAS states, is strategic to Nigeria for a few reasons. One, Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS like Sierra-Leone. Therefore whatever happens to any of the members must be of keen interest to Nigeria. Two, it will be dangerous for the country to ignore any major crisis within the sub-region for its spill-over effects. Such effects can include the influx of refugees and the contagious nature of the crisis as events in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Congo Kinshasa have evidently shown. This stems from the ease with which conflict spreads in Africa. Three, any crisis in the sub-region will disrupt the realisation of the integrative economic goals of ECOWAS. Any prolonged conflict in the sub- region will constrain and stiffen the overall economic growth and development of individual state. Lastly, by its position in terms of economic status, military capability, ethnic pluralism, demographic capacity and preponderance, Nigeria occupies a leadership status in the sub- region. This constrains her from being a mere observer of events in the area. An examination of her role in Sierra-Leone will adequately reflect this prioritization of objectives. The war continued and became uncontrollable, wrote Nwolise and Ajayi:
As the war progressed, and hardship increased, discipline broke down among the Armed forces of Sierra-Leone and rebel troops which began kidnapping foreign citizens indiscriminately (Nwolise, 1992:58). The ensued carnage, destruction to public property and danger posed to foreigners, aroused the attention of the international community (Ajayi , 1998: 181). lxx
Though the civil war took place in Sierra-Leone, the neighbouring countries felt the ffect. Apart from the fact that foreigners were killed, the influx of refugees to countries like Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria was highly noticeable. It is on this note that one shall look into the involvement of the input of idea, and the actual participation in the conflict resolution by Nigeria. Nigeria's Full Participation in Resolving the Crisis, the conflict in Sierra-Leone became worrisome not only to the indigenes (Sierra-Leoneans) but also to the neighbouring nations and the whole continent. The involvement of Nigeria in input of idea in resolving the Sierra-Leone crisis has its root in the 13th session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government held on the 28th to 30th May, 1990 at the Gambia. According to Ajayi (1998:183- 184), "President Babangida of Nigeria, canvassed for a community standing mediation committee to intervene in the Sierra-Leone dispute" the mediation committee comprises Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Guinea as aspired by the Authority. This marked the bi rth of the "ECOWAS cease- fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of which military contingents from members of the committee were drawn to restore and keep the peace in Sierra-Leone" (Ajayi, 1998:184). As regards ECOMOG, the aforementioned countries according to their military strength and capability donated soldiers. This prompted Nigeria to have about 80% of the total composition of ECOMOG (Shanon and Ebrahim, 2000). Apart from this, the chief of staff, since inception, has been Nigerians. This might account for why Randall Robinson (1996) noted that "Nigeria is a great country, the hope of Africa. If Nigeria works, Africa will get there". The success of ECOMOG in Sierra-Leone as led by Nigeria has proved the above postulation. Thus the actual ‘participation in the conflict resolution' began in August 1990. In the words of the Nigerian ex-president Ibrahim Babangida, "unless arrested, the carnage in that country (Sierra-Leone) would spill over to neighbouring countries, leading to external non- African intervention and we thereby decided to send out troops to participate in this laudable peacekeeping mission"(African Guardian, 1991:10). The ex-president noted that Africa must not wait for the interventionist role from the international peace keeping force from such international organisation like UN before it tackles any problem within the region. Hence it is germane for African leaders to take appropriate initiative on the region's problems.
One notable fact is that all Nigerian leaders usually realize the importance of peace in the sub-region. This was what prompted Babangida's successor, Late General Sani Abacha to continue peace-keeping mission in the sub-region. To him, "the issue of peace in the West African sub-region should supersede the economic interest of individual states as there cannot be economic progress without peace in the region" (West African 1995: 586). lxxi
It is an indisputable fact that ECOWAS through its military wing – ECOMOG – had once again succeeded in restoring peace to Sierra-Leone against all odds. Constitutional or unconstitutional, legal or extralegal, ECOWAS, indeed Nigeria, has gained more recognition in the international system in the area of peace making. If certain attributes of rationality include objectivity, technicality, expertise, availability of relevant and reliable data (information), cost–effect, etc, then, the motives behind Nigeria's intervention in Sierra-Leone must reflect these attributes. In evaluating, identifying and understanding this, we shall attempt to look at the practical factors that have motivated Nigeria's intervention. Available evidence proves that Nigeria's intervention is as a result of pursuance of its foreign policy objectives; objectives in this sense connote ideology rather than rationality because it deals with, and centres on, emotion. Also, scholars have unveiled that salient factor which include "the carnage in the trouble spots is enough to evoke humanitarian feelings, Nigeria has multi-million dollar investments in petroleum and solid minerals in Sierra-Leone" (Ajayi, 1989: 184). The first factor centres on the issue of humanitarianism which is ideological in nature, while the second is on economic/personal gains; the third is on both power and ideology. The second reason being economic (investment) can be elaborated upon and issue of rationality drawn from it. In this regards, it leaves more questions than answers. Is the investment in Sierra- Leone commensurate with 1,000 lives that were lost foreign, the psychological effect thereof and an estimated "$8billion wasted on the prosecution of war that was none of its making?" (Vanguard: 2003:11).
3.5 SIMILARITIES OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT WITH VIETNAM After the RUF attack on Freetown in January, it was observed that the RUF's dry season offensive was somewhat reminiscent of the Vietnamese TET offensive of January 1968 and the gradual escalation of Nigeria’s involvement bore similarities to US involvement in Vietnam. But by publicly stating that there was no intelligence failure on the part of ECOMOG (as happened during Tet), Sierra Leone's Defence Chief, Brigadier Khobe, has blamed the Freetown disgrace on poor leadership, singling out the Nigerian Battalion Commander of the 93 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, who is supposedly the subject of a Board of Inquiry. He also complained bitterly about lack of timely reinforcements and disunity within ECOWAS. Other reports have raised questions about the loyalty of Ministry of Defence officials in Freetown who leaked details of ECOMOG deployments. Even NGOs have not been spared suspicion. The Red Cross was accused of providing electronic communications support for the RUF. However, getting preoccupied with tactical specifics in Freetown risks missing the forest for the trees. Meanwhile, some lessons of lxxii challenges and achievements the Nigerian soldiers faced in Sierra Leone and the parallels from Vietnam can be drawn out. TET [Tet Nguyen Dan], is the Vietnamese lunar New year Festival. It is the most important of their holidays. TET is both the celebration of the beginning of spring and the New Year. It is typically reserved for family reunions, exchanging gifts and best wishes. The TET offensive actually began in September 1967 when the Vietcong (VC) began prepositioning for it by gradual infiltration into multiple cities using civilians as cover (shields). Before year's end they launched the diversionary siege of Khe Sanh - a remote American jungle outpost near the border between South and North to draw American forces and attention away from their true objectives further to the south. On Jan 31, 1968, to coincide with the Vietnamese New Year celebration (TET), they simultaneously attacked many cities in South Vietnam including the capital Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). In Saigon, they attacked the US Embassy as well as many government buildings including the Presidential Palace. The offensive in great details (including live pictures of the fighting in the US Embassy) was recorded on international TV and brutally brought the war home to Americans in their living rooms. The propaganda effect was devastating. Here were the Vietcong who had been said to be a guerrilla movement actually within reach of seizing the US Embassy “…thus exposing the fundamental weakness of the Saigon government and its Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops along with its foreign sponsor, the US. US Intelligence was taken by surprise.” (Mkandawire, 2002:20)
The US rushed in troops and fought back fiercely eventually winning, after some particularly gruesome firefights in places like Bien Hoa, Hue and Khe Sanh among many others. The conventional wisdom among US commanders on the ground was that they were forced to destroy entire towns and villages in order to save them - a dilemma that also faced ECOMOG commanders in Sierra Leone. After the conventional aspects of the battle, the CIA Phoenix program helped to disrupt and decapitate the leadership structure of the VC at community level through assassinations. But the US Army remained frustrated by its inability to conduct operations without political interference, and senseless waste of American lives in seizing (and then yielding, only to reseize) tactical objectives of uncertain strategic value. (Mkandawire, 2002:21)
The VC suffered horrendous casualties. But the long term damage to the US war effort and will was done. The already war-weary and divided US public lost its stomach for the war and the lxxiii anti-war movement gained ground, eventually forcing the US government to accept the futility of the conflict. This played out in President Johnson's decision not to contest for reelection and eventually influenced Nixon's plan for a graceful exit from Vietnam. Of course, more was yet to come to nudge the VC (and North Vietnam) to the Paris talks, including the secret bombing of Hanoi, but eventually the US pulled its troops out in 1973. The ARVN collapsed and Vietnam became one country again in 1975 under the North Vietnamese/ Communist sponsored VC. After some diversionary attacks outside Freetown, the RUF in Sierra Leone infiltrated Freetown in the same way. They launched their attacks like the VC, seized the Nigerian Embassy (as the VC tried to do with the US) and seized the Sierra Leone State House (as the VC tried to do in Saigon). They laid siege to Nigerian troops in the Lungi airport and other ECOMOG staging areas (like the VC did to US units in BienHoa). Nigeria was caught flatfooted but rushed in troops (like the US) including the 72nd airborne battalion in Makurdi (because of the heliborne nature of operations - just like Vietnam). The ARVN (South Vietnamese Army) was inept and many of its soldiers were VC sympathizers (just like the Sierra Leonean army and its ties to the RUF). General Westmoreland (US Commander in Vietnam) kept asking for more troops and the freedom to use maximum military force. Generals Shelpidi and Khobe faced similar challenges. They kept asking for reinforcements to finish the job. ECOWAS never grasped the seriousness of the situation on the ground. Even the Nigerian authorities were slow to appreciate the scale of the requirements. Indeed a Nigerian Commander of the 93 Mechanized Infantry Battalion was left in place in spite of complaints from officers in the field that he was not up to the job - primarily illustrating the dangers of remote command and control. Less charitably, this development was perhaps a hint that the dysfunctionality of prolonged involvement of the military in government has eaten deeply into the Nigerian Armed Forces itself. The Sierra Leone involvement long ago ceased to be a peace-keeping (or monitoring) operation. It evolved into a peace enforcement / counter-insurgency operation with bursts of full scale conventional war requiring overwhelming force running side-by-side with dishonest political dialogue. The ratio of space to force in such a strategic context demands a force configuration that ECOWAS was simply not willing to commit. At one point during the peak of the RUF offensive, only one helicopter was available to ECOMOG at Lungi, rendering the force dependent on truck transport and vulnerable to ambush. “ECOWAS reportedly expected every unit in the Army to contribute 100 soldiers each of whom was issued 5-10 bullets” - as if it was an internal security operation against unarmed university student (Julius, 1999:50). When member countries were asked to send their complement of troops they dragged their feet, asking for guarantees against combat. lxxiv
In the short term, it may be predicted that ECOMOG will prevail temporarily in a tactical military sense (like the US) but the horse has left the barn. The Nigerian public is appropriately questioning the whole adventure with increasing disquiet (like the American public did) and the outgoing government was looking for an exit strategy (as the US did in 1973). Nigeria will continue to assist in retraining the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces. Nigeria tactically punished Taylor for sponsoring the RUF (just as the US bombed North Vietnam) in order to force a respectable peace treaty with the rebels. But eventually, Kabbah will fall unless he takes drastic statesmanlike action to associate with and assimilate his enemies, while 'containing' the new RSLMF. There were many refugees (as with Vietnam). Even the 'amputee' brutality of the RUF against civilians, policemen and civil servants 'collaborating with ECOMOG and Kabbah' is classic VC style to ensure political correctness. Khmer Rouge insurgents also targeted all educated cadres in Cambodia. During TET, the VC were horrendously brutal against civilians, journalists, foreign missionaries and civil workers, but the international press was preoccupied with US excesses such as occurred during the My Lai massacre - in much the same way as the UN seems to be placing the alleged human rights abuses of ECOMOG troops out of context. A comment about the French is apropos. Back in 1968 they criticized the US policy in Vietnam. In 1999 they are not excited about the regional projection of power in West Africa by Anglophone countries like Nigeria and Ghana with British and American assistance. So it was no surprise that during that period Nigeria was witnessing certain passive aggressive resistance from Francophone countries secretly backed by Taylor to humiliate Nigeria. The French have always had designs on the Sierra Leonean hinterland. Having established some similarities with Vietnam it should be noted that it was not until 6 years later that the US eventually packed its bags out of Vietnam, but the die was cast after TET. What appeared like a military victory after the brutally efficient counter-attacks against the VC only concealed the strategic failure of the US in Vietnam. This was a similar situation in Sierra- Leone. Even Nigeria proclaimed the establishment of a new garrison in Freetown (under Col. Buhari Musa), legitimacy has to come from within through political dialogue and the reestablishment of a social contract between the leaders and the led. One cannot legislate or decree a political culture by force imposed from afar unless long term colonization is the goal and one is willing to forcefully impose oneself over decades. The Sierra Leonean quarrel was very deep and years of brutality and counter-brutality had undermined a basic sense of civility which ruined the economy. The US entered Vietnam to prevent the domino spread of communism which threatened its ruling class. Nigeria entered Liberia and eventually Sierra-Leone to prevent the domino spread of lxxv warlord instability in West Africa, fearful of a precedent that would someday threaten the Nigerian ruling class and faced several challenges in Sierra Leone.
3.6 DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ACHIEVEMENTS IN SIERRA LEONE With the help of Nigeria, Sierra Leone has produced development strategies at three levels. In the short term, and in principle completed, is Sierra Leone’s National Recovery Strategy. Strategies in the short to medium term are the national PRSP, the Public Investment Programmes (PIPs) and Sierra Leone’s Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. Strategies for the long term are developed especially in Sierra Leone’s Vision 2025 document. The National Recovery Strategy document makes no mention of the Millennium Development Goals, except to emphasize that the goals need to be addressed in the PRSP. The Vision 2025 document, offers to set “the long-term direction for Sierra Leone and [aims] to provide a sense of purpose and directions for the development management process in Sierra Leone” (Shanon and Ebrahim, 2000:63) But again it makes no explicit mention of the MDGs. The Vision 2025 document is itself in a sense a bigger project than the Millennium Development Goals. Whereas the MDGs focus especially on basic human needs such as health and education and freedom from hunger and poverty, the Vision 2025 focuses on the overall state of the country, as captured by the more general goal of a Sweet-Salone – a United People, Progressive Nation, and Attractive Country. The Interim PRSP report makes no mention of the goals, nor does the status report on the preparatory activities for the full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of September 2003. The December 2004 (“final”) draft, of the PRSP does however make explicit mention of the role of the MDGs in Sierra Leone’s development strategy. lxxvi
In sum, ECOMOG, its glaring deficiencies notwithstanding, is an important example of the emerging modes of regionally based peacekeeping. Yet, the ECOMOG operations also demonstrate the difficulties and pitfalls of such regional peacekeeping. In a geopolitically fissured region like West Africa, regionalism proved to be a problematic vehicle for intervention. While regional self-interest forced ECOWAS to stay in the operation, factional frictions within the organisation (exploited in turn by the warlords), forced a prolongation of the conflict. On the other hand, many of the challenges faced by Nigeria in ECOWAS/ECOMOG were also inherent in the very nature of post-Cold War conflicts and peacekeeping. The deep-seated causes of these conflicts, and the lack of overwhelming military advantage on the part of governments and intervention forces, make for protracted violence, and call for political commitment as well as open-endedness in the intervention agenda (in the ECOMOG case, the peacekeepers went in expecting the intervention to last between six and twelve months, and ended up with an involvement that lasted eight years).
These challenges are likely to be exacerbated in the context of weak regional states and collectivities, as ECOWAS demonstrates. The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult moment for the states in the region. Firstly, the members of the regional organisation were themselves involved in complex political transitions, with most of their regimes under considerable challenge from their own civil societies. Secondly, the war generated huge resource demands — economic, military, political and diplomatic — that these states were ill-equipped to be fulfilled, and which the international community was disinclined to deliver. Meanwhile only Nigeria single- handedly sponsored the peace keeping processes in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Thirdly, the structural and political crises that sustained these rebellions — economic stress, state decay and delegitimisation, the dislocation of youth — were present among other states in the region. There was thus a real danger that the conflict would spread beyond the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The major dilemma of weak states is that they are vulnerable to such regional disturbances, but have limited power to stop or suppress them. Ironically, it was arguably this very sense of their own vulnerability and of the possibility of a ‘domino effect’ within the region that furnished ECOWAS with the political will to remain engaged in the Sierra Leonean issue. lxxvii
Despite the often discouraging prospects, the ECOMOG operation was ultimately successful for several reasons. The first was the sheer political will and tenacity of Nigeria in ECOWAS. The organisation did not have the option of cutting and running, for reasons that were as much self-interested as humanitarian. The second was the ability to combine three phases of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, thereby changing mandates of forces in the field as developments on the ground required (a flexibility due, ironically, to the autonomy enjoyed by the military command and as a result of the weak control exercised by the ECOWAS directorate). In addition, the subregional, regional, and international initiatives each brought different strengths and weaknesses to the peace process.
One of the more notable achievements of ECOMOG, in the long term, is its success in pushing the region from argument to consensus and from division to unity on matters of regional security. Prior to the Sierra Leone crisis, as well as throughout the early stages of the intervention, ECOWAS members displayed little commitment to the ideals of regional security embodied in the 1981 treaty. This cynical disregard was apparent, on the one side, in the way in which certain Francophone states connived in the attack on Sierra Leone and deliberately frustrated peace initiatives and, on the other side, in the way in which the intervening states (Nigeria in particular) acted unilaterally and resisted control by the regional political directorate. The operation was bedevilled by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries, and undermined by questions about its legitimacy and format. Following the ‘resolution’ of the Liberian crisis, two crises have revived and extended these disputes in particular. lxxviii
The first is the 25 May 1997 coup that overthrew the newly installed democratic civilian government in Sierra Leone. The Nigerians responded to the coup with a naval bombardment of Freetown, followed by an invasion a year later to dislodge the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup-makers by force. While the earlier ECOMOG intervention into Sierra Leone had generated little controversy, largely because of the (mistaken) assumption that the RUF was merely a creature of the Liberian NPFL, these later events evoked very different responses. Those opposed to the second ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone pointed to the ‘material’ differences between Liberia and Sierra Leone: in the latter case, the civil war had ended, and a government had been elected into power. This made the event of 25 May an internal affair outside the competence of the 1981 Agreement. Hence Bundu Abass, who had put forward arguments in support of the intervention into Liberia as Secretary-General of ECOWAS, now made powerful arguments opposing the (Nigerian) intervention into Sierra Leone.
The intervention also raised fears once more of Nigerian unilateralism. However, there was unanimity within the ranks of ECOWAS, the OAU and the international community that the coup was intolerable and could not be allowed to stand. This rationalisation, missing in the 1981 treaty, suggests an expanding horizon of what constitutes ‘regional security’ and of the acceptable justifications for intervention.
The second event is the civil war in Guinea-Bissau, which began as a military rebellion following an attempt by President Nino Vieira to remove his armed chief, General Asunmane Mane, on charges of trading arms with Casamance rebels across the border in Senegal. Forces from Senegal and Guinea intervened to support Vieira’s government, but unlike Sierra Leone and Liberia, ECOMOG forces were not committed. One explanation was that the Anglophone countries in ECOMOG were anxious to pay back Senegal and the Francophone countries for their earlier lack of support to ECOMOG. It should be noted, however, that the mediation effort in Guinea- Bissau, by contrast, was not conducted exclusively by ECOWAS, but co-ordinated with the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), which included Portugal, and there was some ill-disguised rivalry with ECOWAS. lxxix
These ‘post-Liberia’ developments have revived several issues. For example, what are the parameters for intervention (in other words, which conflicts in the region qualify for intervention, and which not)? Who initiates intervention? Should intervention be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral? With reference to Guinea-Bissau, how is ‘region’ to be defined? Is the criterion territorial, or linguistic? Another source of debate is how the mutual security mechanism is to be defined. It is noteworthy that the L’ANAD structure has continued to exist alongside the ECOWAS mutual defence arrangement.
In December 1997, the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Lomé directly confronted these issues, approving the establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and regional security. Following this, a meeting of experts in Banjul in July 1998 drafted a set of proposals for such a Mechanism for the approval of the ECOWAS Heads of State meeting in Ouagadougou in October. These proposals recognised that "... though the organization [ECOWAS] was established for the primary purpose of economic integration of the region, economic development can only be effectively pursued in a secure and stable environment" (Punch 2003, April 21:6), thus getting around the ‘constitutional’ issue that had earlier generated such heat.
The mechanism consisted of an elaborate set of structures, with a Mediation and Security Council of nine member states at the apex, elected from among the sixteen members of the organisation, and responsible for taking decisions on issues of regional peace and security on behalf of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State. The military force would continue to be called ECOMOG. ECOMOG would be deployed in accordance with the terms of the 1981 treaty. But there was also a significant new twist. While the provisions for intervention would not extend to "... internal situations that are sustained and maintained from within", it would apply to those situations in which an internally-driven conflict:
• threatened to trigger a humanitarian disaster;
• posed a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; or
• erupted "... following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government." (Denov, 2010:11) lxxx
These prescriptions are the result of a growing consensus within the region and between the various factions in ECOWAS that conflict is self-defeating. As a result, states in the region were able to demonstrate considerable flexibility, redefining their positions in order to promote consensus regarding the nature of regional security mechanisms. For the region, the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia have been a traumatic experience, conferring both a sense of its vulnerability as well as its ‘regionness’. After years of myopic focus on national sovereignty and security, West African states now see the connection between domestic anarchy and regional political instability much more clearly. States are ready to concede that ‘my neighbour’s business is my business’ and, correspondingly, accepting the necessity of acting collaboratively within a regional framework to tackle these problems rather than attempting to seek favoured status and arrangements with external powers.
Notwithstanding this consensus, which helped to facilitate an end to the Sierra Leonean crisis, the ECOMOG experience teaches the important lesson that one should not conflate regional security and human security. The sharp polarisation that greeted Abacha’s sudden death in June — with those who remembered him primarily for his contributions to regional peacekeeping (such as the OAU Secretary General and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone) celebrating him as a ‘great statesman’, while those (including the majority of Nigerians) who recalled his brutal repression of human rights and democracy at home rejoicing publicly — demonstrated the tension in the region between these two forms of security. The authoritarian structures prevalent in the region facilitated external intervention to support regional security but, at the same time, undermined human security on the domestic front. There have been further indications that, while regional political stability is a necessary condition for human security, it is far from sufficient. lxxxi
The settlements that brought ‘peace’ to Sierra Leone and Liberia did not forcefully seek to address the domestic issues (of governance, economic justice and exclusion, etc.) at the root of regional conflagration. The end of hostilities in Sierra Leone, capped by ‘successful’ elections, has not prevented the reappearance, under Kabbah’s government, of many of the same abuses which provoked the war in the first place. In many respects, the post-civil war government in Sierra Leone has assumed the predatory hues common to the region’s governments. After its prodigious sacrifices to ensure peace, Nigeria and ECOWAS has shown much more inclination or ability to impose acceptable standards of governance on the region. Without this, the ‘regional security’ mechanism is liable to degenerate into a protection racket for autocrats.
CHAPTER FOUR
SIERRA LEONE AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY
4.0 INTRODUCTION Today, more people than ever before are governed by elected representatives. Democracy – the idea that people have the right to control their government and that “a government is legitimate only if and when it is controlled by the people” – has acquired an almost unique global hegemony, hardly matched by any other worldview in modern history (Bankole, 1997:3). Democracy transcends cultures, religions and languages; but more importantly, it takes multiple forms and survives in the most inhospitable environments: in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the country started a democratization process on the wreckage of a 20 year civil war. In Chile, President Bachelet is launching a reform of the electoral system, a leftover from the Pinochet era. In Nepal, a constitution building process will seek to establish democracy following the rejection of the King’s authoritarian rule. Yet democracy is under pressure and efforts to promote democracy are contested. The skepticism ranges from questioning the role and effectiveness of lxxxii external assistance in general, to outright campaigns against democracy promotion. There is a growing sense that governments and citizens have lost control over democratization processes within their countries. Accusations are levelled against democracy support as having hidden agendas or double standards. The important international efforts against terrorism are too often misused to legitimize autocratic measures against individual freedoms and political opposition. Against this background, the challenge is to support democracy from within and below. Democratic political changes do not happen by imposing an outsider’s technical institutional solutions, be that in the form of constitutions, elections, or political party systems. To be credible and sustainable, democracy building must be home grown and its delivery should be attributed to well known national actors. According to Hirsch: Democracy is highly adaptable and will inevitably take different institutional forms that resonate with local conditions in different regions, countries and localities. This is both possible and to be supported, whilst still recognising the universal validity of the broad principles that underpin democracy: representation, participation of the people and accountability of the government. (Hirsch, 2000:21)
International IDEA provides an important tool for ‘homegrown’ democracy in the form of our State of Democracy assessment methodology. Recognising the need to build, and to build on, national expertise, the State of Democracy gives citizens of any country the means to assess how their own democracy is performing. As opposed to systems ranking democracies from the outside, it triggers analysis, dialogue and demands for policy reform from within. The methodology has been pilot tested in eight countries across the world, and today the governments of Mongolia, Bosnia Herzegovina and the Netherlands alike are using it to drive institutional and political reforms. The local nature of democracy does not mean that the billions of euros spent each year on democracy assistance amount to nothing. But being able to help requires the involvement and training of local experts at every stage, rather than international experts – from the design of sustainable institutions to the implementation of policies. Today, we know that what happens after an election is just as important as the months leading to the vote. In a post conflict setting it is particularly important to get not only the first elections right, but the second and the third. If national authorities cannot ensure that electoral processes are free and fair, open and transparent, and perceived as such by their citizenry, the process is a failure. Despite what seem to be hardening attitudes towards democracy, democracy building is possible as long as it promotes citizen participation, takes into account countries’ differing historical and socio economic contexts and recognises that democratization is a complex lxxxiii rather than a linear process. The Nepali demonstrators remind us that democracy is indeed a value and an end in itself. While it can neither be imported, nor exported, it can certainly be supported. This chapter examines the constitutional history and law of Sierra Leone from 1961 through 1995 from the following three summary perspectives. First, it examines the Sierra Leone's experience with constitutional law's most fundamental and enduring problem, namely; the relationship between its legal and political components. Second, it examines the complex interaction between constitutional standards and values, on one hand, and institutional and societal forces, on the other, for Sierra Leone as a developing nation. Third, it evaluates the application of fundamental constitutional principles regulating the relations between the government and the people of Sierra Leone. In addition it also deals with the historic political trends, their mode of governance from the pre-colonial period through the independent, the democratization process of each tenure, the roles of a democratically elected government and the future of democracy in Sierra Leone.
4.1 POLITIAL EVENTS IN SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN 1787 AND 1945 The abolitionist’s agitation in Britain in the eighteenth century created the new social problem of the rehabilitation of freed slaves in the continent of Africa. The challenge was answered by Granville Sharp a leader of the abolitionist movement in England who planned to establish a settlement for freed slaves in Sierra Leone. The settlement which was eventually established in 1787 provided a sanctuary for some 351 freed slaves. Thereafter, the control of the settlement was vested by charter in the Board of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company. This company appointed a Governor and a Council of two members to administer the territory. Even then, over 1,000 freed slaves still remained in England waiting to be re-settled in Africa. Also, in America, there were over 1,000 Africans who had just laid up their arms after fighting on the side of Great Britain during the American War of Independence (Francis, 1984). The ship which repatriated these ex-service men headed for the settlement which was already functioning in Sierra Leone. It would have been more expensive in terms of human and material resources to have attempted to open up a new settlement elsewhere. It was actually after the abolition of slavery in 1807 that Great Britain decided to colonize the settlement in Sierra Leone. Accordingly in 1808, the settlement became a British Crown Colony. The fact that a naval squadron was then based in Freetown to try slave dealers suggests that the colonization of the settlement was motivated by the desire or need for an operational base in West Africa from which anti-slavery legislation could be enforced. It was not until the end of lxxxiv the French Napoleonic Wars and the abolition of slavery in Europe that a mixed commission was launched to aid the naval squadron in the enforcement of anti-slavery legislation. In the course of time, thousands of freed slaves who hailed from various parts of Africa took advantage of the rehabilitation scheme being operated in Sierra Leone and upon repatriation, settled there. By 1861, British authority had been extended to the whole of Sierra Leone Peninsula, Sherbro Island and other small Islands. To meet the increased burden of administration, the advisory council was enlarged and constituted into a Legislative Council in 1863. The council was composed of an official majority and two unofficial Africans nominated from among the settlers or Creoles. At the same time, an Executive Council composed of official members was established. Effective colonial administration having been set up in the Colony of Freetown, in 1896 the British Government proclaimed as a protectorate the territory surrounding the colony. The Protectorate was divided into five administrative units or districts. Each of these districts was in turn split into a number of administrative units, each of which was administered by British officials and a local Chief, Francis (1984) observed. A dual system of administration was adopted. Whilst the colony was administered directly by the Governor and a cadre of British officials, the indirect rule system of government whereby local chiefs were engaged as intermediary instruments of government was applied in the Protectorate. The launching in 1920 of the Sierra Leone branch of the National Congress of British West Africa helped to awaken nationalistic feelings. In 1923, three more unofficial Africans were added to the Legislative Council and some new constitutional proposals were debated. Remarkably however, the Sierra Leone National Congress opposed a proposal that urged the introduction of Chiefs into the Legislative Council.
4.2 THE SLATER CONSTITUTION OF 1924 The Sierra Leone Constitution of 1924 was a major advance. Apart from bringing the colony and the Protectorate under one uniform system of government, it brought Africans from the hinterland into the institutions of government. 4.2.0 The Legislative Council
Despite the fact that the number of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council was increased to five in 123, it was reconstituted in 1924. Under the 1924 Constitution, the number of the unofficial members in the Council rose to ten while the number of official members was eleven. “Three of the ten unofficial members were to be elected from three constituencies in the colony while the remaining seven members nominated from the Protectorate included three lxxxv
Paramount Chiefs”. (Bankole, 1997:14) Prior to 1924, the Council could not legislate for areas beyond the colony. Legislation for the protectorate was carried out by Royal Instructions or Proclamations. Under the 1924 Constitution however, the power to legislate for both the colony and the protectorate vested in the legislative council. The increase in the membership of the council to twenty-one was a result of the extension of its territorial jurisdiction. In conclusion, it might be observed that despite the addition of more Africans to the Legislative Council, the country was till far from representative government. The majority of the members of the council were nominees of the British Monarch and the Governor’s reserved powers over legislation were very extensive.
4.2.1 The Executive Council Although the Executive Council was still only composed of officials, its jurisdiction was extended to the Protectorate. But although it was obliged to advise the Governor on matters of policy, it was not mandatory for the Governor to act on its advice. Indeed, the Executive Council possessed all the attributes of the instruments of policy commonly found in newly established colonies. It was not until 1943 that two Sierra Leoneans, one of whom was a Chief, were appointed to the Council as unofficial members. Another Sierra Leonean joined them in 1947. The territory surrounding the Colony was proclaimed a Protectorate by the British Government in 1896. From that date, the Protectorate was government by District Commissioners responsible to the Governor. The territory was divided into five administrative District Commissioners governed indirectly through local Chiefs and their councils. Orders flowed from the District Commissioners through Chiefs to the natives. Local institutions of government were re-modeled and constituted into recognized native authorities which could carry out the task of local government.
4.2.2 Sierra Leone 1945 – 1960 Sierra Leone was affected by the various factors that influenced constitutional advance in other British West African colonies at the close of the Second World War. The impact of Clause 3 of the Atlantic Charter of 1941 not only weakened colonialism, it also inspired freedom-fighters all over the world. According to J. B. Seay: Two organs of government were established in 1946. The first was a number of District Councils each of which was to be composed of one Paramount Chief, other members representing a constituency in the District, and three members to be selected at large by the Council. The second new organ of government lxxxvi
was a Protectorate Assembly which was to be composed of twenty-six Paramount Chiefs, eleven official members, two Africans nominated from the Protectorate, one nominated Creole, one European businessman, and one nominated missionary. In 1950, six seats were created in the Assembly for non-educated Africans other than Chiefs. Although the Assembly had no legislative powers, it was empowered to discuss Bills pending in the Legislative Council. (J. B. Seay. 2010:7)
By 1950, the Protectorate had started to take a keen interest in politics. But a proposal that ten out of fourteen seats in the Legislative Council should be given to the Protectorate was opposed by the Creole members of the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL). These elements indicated that they would secede if the colony and the Protectorate were not to send an equal number of representatives to the Council.
4.3 THE STEVENSON OR BERESFORD-STOOKE CONSTITUTION OF 1951 Although the unofficial membership of the Executive Council rose to three in 1947, it was the 1951 Constitution that furnished convincing proof that the British Government was intending to hand over the administration of the country to Sierra Leone. It is significant that in 1951, the executive in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria had been placed under the control of the Legislature. But the Sierra Leone constitution of 1951 established an unofficial majority in both the Executive and Legislative Councils; a position which was attained in the Gambia in 1954.
4.3.0 The Legislative Council In order to bring the Sierra Leone Constitution in line with its counterparts in the God Coast and Nigeria, the membership of the Legislative Council was increased from twenty-one to thirty-one. With the exception of the Governor who presided and seven other officials, all the members of the council were unofficial Africans. While the seven electoral districts in the colony were represented by seven people, the protectorate was represented by twelve members nominated by the District Councils, two members nominated by the Protectorate Assembly and two members appointed to represent commercial interests. Even though only seven members of the council were elected directly from the colony, unofficial members were in the majority. In 1956, the council became known as the House of Representatives.
4.3.1 The Executive Council lxxxvii
The Constitution established an Executive Council which was to be composed of five ex- officio members and not less than four elected members of the Legislature. These elected members might be either directly elected from the Colony or indirectly elected from the Protectorate. Six elected members were eventually chosen by the Governor and confusingly designated ‘Official Members’. “…Although the Constitution did not expressly require members of the Executive Council to be responsible to various departments of the Government, it authorized the Governor to make them responsible if the Legislative Council desired it.” (Francis, 1984:14) When the Legislative Council did desire this in 1953, the six unofficial members were to all intents and purposes, constituted into ‘Ministers’. From that date, with the exception of a Minister who had no direct responsibility, the new Ministers were charged with responsibility for the administration of their respective groups of Departments. It is necessary to point out that each of the Ministers was not charged with the responsibility for one Department but for a group of Departments. As part of the innovation, the Departments in the State were organized into five groups, (1) Health Agriculture and Forests; (2) Local Government, Education and Welfare; (3) Works and Transport; (4) Trade, Commerce, Posts and Telegraphs (5) Lands, Mines, Labour. Although the sixth ‘Minister’ had no direct responsibility was to advise on government business as a whole, each of the remaining five Ministers was given one of the above portfolios. It should not be thought that all the Ministers were to be directly responsible for the administration of all the Departments. But the Constitution was silent on whether the Legislative Council could dismiss a member of the Executive Council. In July 1954, one of the Ministers, Dr. Milton Margai, leader of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) formed in 1951, assumed responsibility for Government business and was given the title ‘Chief Minister’. It should be noted that in 1952, the Sierra Leone People’s Party had won a general election by defeating the rival National Council of Sierra Leone.
4.4 THE 1957 CONSTITUTION The 1957 Constitution was based on Government recommendations which were extracted from proposals suggested by various sections of the community on the invitation of the Chief Minister. After these recommendations were accepted by the House of Representatives and the Colonial Office in October 1956, they were written into the Constitution. By all standards, the 1957 Constitution was a major advance on the road to self-government.
4.4.0 The House of Representatives lxxxviii
The membership of the House was increased to fifty-six. Fifty-one of the members were elected by secret ballot from constituencies of roughly equal population. But even though elected Africans were in a clear majority, the Governor was still armed with his reserved powers in respect of defence, police and foreign affairs. The House was to be composed of the Speaker, four official members, fourteen members elected from the colony, twenty-five members elected from the Protectorate, twelve Paramount Chiefs elected by the Protectorate Special interests.
4.4.1 The Executive Council Under the constitution, the Executive Council was to be composed of the Governor who presided, four officials and nine unofficial selected from the Legislative Council. Unofficial members were in the majority.
4.4.2 The Franchise The Constitution conferred a wider franchise and a new electoral system on the Protectorate. Election was to be by secret ballot and the franchise was limited to property owners and tax payers.
4.5 THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1957 In the election, the SLPP won eighteen seats whilst the United Progressive Party (UPP) formed in 1954 gained nine seats. Twelve independents and the paramount chiefs crossed the floor and joined the SLPP giving it a total of forty one seats. Sir Milton Margai became the Prime Minister. From its inauguration in 1896, the protectorate was governed by five district commissioners who were responsible to the governor. The system of indirect rule was later introduced by the Protectorate Ordinance of 1901 and the Protectorate Native Ordinance of 1905. By 1946, the five original districts were re-organised into twelve distinct districts. “In that year, a district council was established in each of the twelve districts. It fell to the district councils to advise the Native Authorities which were over 200 in number and to co-ordinate their activities. As a mark of their growing importance, the District Councils were incorporated in 1950.” (Lisa, lxxxix
2007:22) This meant they were constituted into legal entities distinct from their members. As legal persons they could henceforth hold property, sue and be sued. Each council was composed of all the Paramount Chiefs in its area of authority, one or more chiefs elected to represent each Chiefdom, and three other members elected by the councilors themselves. From 1950, much of the responsibility for local government devolved on the district councils. The district councils shared the responsibility for local government with the native authorities which were subservient to them. Between 1946 and 1957, a Protectorate Assembly functioned as an instrument of Government. The Protectorate was not empowered to elect and had not been electing representatives to the House of Representatives. The Protectorate Assembly was therefore designed to fill the gap, and when the 1958 Constitution empowered the Protectorate to elect members to the House of Representatives, it was accorded a neat burial. Its functions were similar to the functions of the Nigerian Regional Council of 1946 and the post 1925 Provincial Councils in the Gold Coast. But unlike the Nigerian Councils, it could not nominate representatives to the Legislature. But it was empowered to discuss Government estimates and to all intents and purposes, served as a liaison between the representatives of the Protectorate and the Government. And although it was not vested with any legislative powers, it was empowered to consider Bills pending in the Legislative Council.
4.6 THE 1958 CONSTITUTION Towards the end of 1957, the Sierra Leone Government sent a delegation to London to discuss possible changes that could be introduced in the constitution. The result of the deliberation was a new constitution which came into force in August 1958. as we shall see in the following paragraphs, the constitution eliminated four ex-officio members from the Legislative and Executive Councils and entrenched the principle of collective responsibility. These innovations brought Sierra Leone very close to independence. Important Changes Introduced by the Constitution include the Chief Minister becoming the Prime Minister and the House of Representatives reconstituted. The four official or ex-officio members who formerly sat in it were to be withdrawn and the number of the directly elected members remained fifty one. This number consisted of fourteen members elected from the colony, twenty-five members elected from the Protectorate, and twelve paramount chiefs. In addition, there were two other members appointed to represent special interest. The house was to be presided over by a speaker who xc
was not to be a member of the House. If the Speaker was elected as a member of the House, he would vacate his office. (Vidar, 2006:78)
4.7 THE LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF 1960 Between 20 April and 4 May, a delegation consisting of representatives of all the political parties as well as other interested bodies in Sierra Leone held a constitutional conference in London with officials of the British Government.
4.7.0 Delegation of the reserved powers of the Governor It was agreed that the Governor, acting on his discretion, might, by directions in writing, delegate to any Minister on the Governor’s behalf but subject to his control, any power or duty relating to defence, external affairs, internal security and police, or the Public Service. W.E.F Ward in his book Government in West Africa has quarreled with the phrase ‘but subjects to his control’ and suggested that it would have been better for the Governor either to have withheld authority or delegated it unreservedly. But this suggestion appears to be untenable. It should be remembered that the country was still under British rule. For the Governor to delegate his power completely would have amounted to his abdicating those powers. Lisa attest that “…Unrestricted devolution or deputation without control would have been tantamount to constituting an agent into a principal. It would have infringed the cardinal principle that a master cannot delegate his discretion. The powers of a delegate can never be greater than those of his master. Nor should a delegate be allowed to do what his master could not have done.” (Lisa, 2007:33) It is therefore only logical and necessary that a master should come in occasionally to regulate the activities of his delegate.
4.7.1 The Formation of the All People’s Congress In 1960, the UPP, the PNP and the SLPP combined and formed the United Front. The central aim of the party was to carry out the final negotiations for Independence. Not long after, a faction of the party broke away under the leadership of Siaka Stevens and launched the All People’s Congress (APC). Some months after its formation, the APC was able to win control of Freetown Council.
4.8 SIERRA LEONE 1961 – 1969 xci
After the enactment by the Imperial Parliament of the Sierra Leone Independence Act 1961, Sierra Leone became a sovereign and independent State within the Commonwealth on 27 April 1961. Sir Maurice Henry Dorman became the Governor – General and Sir Milton Margai was inducted as Prime Minister. Shortly after, many countries gave Sierra Leone diplomatic recognition. Sierra Leone is a member of the UN and was one of the signatories to the Original Charter of the OAU. The Sierra Leone Independence Constitution is contained in the Second Schedule to the Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council 1961 (Statutory Instrument No. 741 of 1961). Taking after the Nigerian Independence Constitution of 1960 but establishing unlike its Nigerian counterpart, a unitary Government, the Constitution obliterated most of the signs of colonial status. There was great similarity between the Nigerian and Sierra Leone Independence Constitutions, though the Sierra Leone Constitution devoted no separate section to the police.
4.8.0 Headship of the State The head of the State was the Queen of Great Britain who was represented by a Governor- General appointed by her on the advice of the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone. But as was the case in the Nigerian Independence Constitution, the Queen was a constitutional not an absolute monarch. Accordingly, her role as Head of State was played by the Governor who was her representative. But in practice, except in the appointment of his personal staff and the appointment of the Prime Minister, the Governor-General was required to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister under the general authority of the Cabinet. The result was that most of the Queen’s powers as Head of State were exercised by Ministers who were responsible to the National Legislature. The Governor-General was to become a ceremonial institution, the Ministers being the active agents that conducted the day-to-day administration of government.
4.8.1 The National Parliament The National Parliament consisted of the Queen who was represented by the Governor- General, and the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives was composed of the Speaker who was elected from amongst the members of the House or from amongst people qualified to be elected to the House; a minimum of sixty members directly elected through universal adult suffrage from constituencies of practically equal population, and one Paramount Chief representing each District. Every member of the House had to be not less than twenty five years old and had to be literate in English. xcii
The normal life span of the parliament was five years though the Governor-General was empowered to dissolve it any time the Prime Minister desired. Parliament was also empowered to extend its own life beyond the five-year period for a period of not more than twelve months at a time, or for five years if the State was at war. Only adults of not less than twenty-five years who were citizens of Sierra Leone and who were able to speak and read the English language proficiently enough to enable them to participate actively in the proceedings of the House, were qualified to be elected. Of the constitution expressly banned certain people from contesting election to the House. The people so disqualified were: (a) non-citizens of Sierra Leone; (b) Public Officers; (c) Members of the armed forces; (d) the Speaker of the House; (e) holders of offices of emolument under the crown; (f) undischarged bankrupts; (g) professionals banned from practicing their professions in Sierra Leone within five years immediately preceding the election; (h) lunatics or persons of unsound mind; (i) people who were under sentence of death or sentence of imprisonment exceeding twelve months. (Francis, 1984:45)
The functions of the Parliament can be classified under three heads, legislation, deliberation, and the control of public finance.
4.8.2 The legislative functions of Parliament The parliament had power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Sierra Leone. Bills originated from the floor of the House of Representatives but the House of Representatives could not proceed with certain Bills, Motions or Petitions without the recommendation of the Governor-general signified by a Minister. The Bills, Motions or Petitions that required the Governor-General’s recommendation were those which made provisions for: (a) The imposition of taxation; (b) The alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction; (c) The imposition of a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the State or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction; (d) The payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the State of moneys not charged thereon, or any increase in the amount of such a payment, issue or withdrawal; (e) The composition or remission of any due to the Government of the State. xciii
4.8.3 The Deliberative Functions of Parliament These included the discussion of topic touching the day-to-day lives of the people with a view to meeting the needs and retaining the confidence of the people. The functions include: (i) The Cabinet: The constitution established a Cabinet which resembled the British and the Nigerian Cabinets. This Cabinet was to be composed of the Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the Governor-General might, on the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint from time to time. As a general rule, it was the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet that advised the Governor-general on government business. Nonetheless, it was not obligatory for the Governor-General to act on such advice where the constitution so provided, for example in the matter of dissolution of an acting Prime Minister when the Prime Minister was himself unable to give advice and in the matter of appointing his personal staff. In line with the tradition in most democracies, the Cabinet was collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to the Governor- General and for anything done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office. But the concept of collective responsibility did not apply to such matters as the appointment and dismissal of Ministers and the assignment of Portfolios.
(ii) The Prime Minister: The Governor-General was to appoint as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who appeared to him likely to command the support of a majority in the House. Other Ministers of State were to be appointed or dismissed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Office of the Prime Minister was important for many reasons: (a) He was to be a vital link between the Governor-General and the Government. In fact, he was in duty bound to keep the Governor General fully informed about the general conduct of the Government and to furnish him with any information he might ask for concerning the Government. (b) As the political leader of the state, he represented the State in international conventions. xciv
(c) He was the head of the Cabinet and once his office became vacant, all other Ministers resigned their posts. (d) Most of the powers of the Governor-General were to be exercised in accordance with the Prime Minister’s advice. Examples of such powers were the Governor-General’s power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, the power of exercising the prerogative of mercy, and of appointing Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. (Francis, 1984:55)
(iii) The Governor-General: The Governor-General was the representative of the Queen of Great Britain on whom the executive authority of the State was vested. He was appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone. The Governor-General held many powers. Although the executive authority of the state lay with the Queen of Great Britain, it was the Governor-General that exercised the authority on her behalf. Because the distant Queen was a constitutional monarch, most of her powers relating to the Government of Sierra Leone were in practice exercised by Ministers on whose advice the Governor-General generally acted. The Governor-General had certain powers of appointment. He appointed the Prime Minister. But he had to appoint a member of the House of Representatives who appeared to him likely to command the support of the majority of members of the House. The Governor-General could also appoint other Ministers of State but he had to appoint them in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. He could not remove any Minister from office unless the Prime Minister advised him to do so. Nor could he dismiss the Prime Minister except where it appeared to him that the Prime Minister no longer command the support of the majority of the Members of the House (the invariable test for determining this was the outcome of a general election), or where the House of Representatives had passed a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister did not resign or advise a dissolution of the House. Under normal circumstances, the Governor-General prorogued or dissolved Parliament whilst acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. But the Governor-General was not just a robot in this matter; he might reject the Prime Minister’s advice if he considered that the Government could be carried on without a dissolution and that a dissolution would not be in the interest of the state. Sometimes, the Governor-General might dissolve the House when the Prime Minister had not advised him to do so. This could happen on two occasions Francis stated: xcv
(a) Where the House of Representatives passed a resolution of no confidence in the Government and the Prime Minister did not within three days, either resign or advise a dissolution; (b) Where the office of the Prime Minister was vacant and the Governor-General considered that there was no prospect of his being able to appoint a person who could command the support of the majority of the House of Representatives. (Francis, 1984:57)
The Governor-General held the prerogative of mercy over criminals. This power was to be exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister given after the case had been referred to the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy. But it was not mandatory for the Prime Minister to accept the Committee’s recommendation. It is noteworthy that this method of exercising the prerogative of mercy was not contained in the Nigerian Independence Constitution. Being the representative of the Queen who was part of the Parliament, the Governor- General gave assent to Bills which had been passed by the Parliament. Although the Governor-General generally acted on the advice of the cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet, he sometimes acted on his own personal judgement. He did so with respect to the dissolution of Parliament, the appointment of an acting Prime Minister when the Prime Minister himself was unable to give advice, the appointment of his personal staff and the appointment of the Prime Minister. (iv) The Judiciary The Supreme Court: The constitution established a Supreme Court which consisted of the Chief Justice and such Puisne Judges as Parliament might allow. The Governor-General was empowered to appoint one of the Puisne Judges to act as Chief Justice if the office was vacant or if the Chief Justice was for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office. The appointment was to be made on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Court of Appeal: The constitution also established a Court of Appeal which was a Superior Court of Record. Whenever the court was sitting over any matter which was not interlocutory, it had to be composed of an uneven number of judges numbering not less than three. In specified cases, appeals lay from the Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. The Office of Judges: The provisions governing the judiciary were similar to those in the Nigerian Independence Constitution in 1960. Under the Sierra Leone Independence Constitution, the power of appointing the President of the Supreme Court lay with the xcvi
Governor-General. In exercising this power, the Governor-General acted on the advice of the Prime Minister. In addition, the power of appointing other judges lay with the Governor-General. But in exercising this power, the Governor-General acted on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. The Judicial Service Commission was composed of: (a) The Chief Justice who was its Chairman; (b) A Judge of the Supreme Court designated by the Governor- General on the advice of the Prime Minister; (c) The Chairman of the Public Service Commission; (d) Any other person who was qualified to be a Puisne Judge to be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. This member was to hold office for five years. (Bankole, 1997:29)
The power to appoint, promote, transfer, dismiss and discipline judges of any Court of Appeal, Master and Registrar of the Supreme Court as well as his deputy, the Senior Registrar of the Supreme Court among others, lay with the Judicial Service Commission. The normal retiring age of a Judge of the Supreme Court was sixty-two years. But the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, permit a Judge to continue in office until he had attained an age not exceeding seventy-five years. To what extend did the constitution secure the office of Judges? Under the constitution, a judge of the Supreme Court might be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of his office or for misbehaviour. But he could not be removed or dismissed unless the Privy Council had advised the Queen that the judge should be removed for any of the above reasons. Even before the matter reached the Privy Council the Prime Minister would have had to advise the Governor-General that the issue of removing the Judge ought to be investigated. Thereafter, the Governor-General would appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter and submit a report and recommendations as to whether or not the Governor-General should refer the issue to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Where the tribunal so recommend, the Governor-General would then refer the question to the Privy Council. The Privy Council would in turn advise the Queen on the issue. The foregoing procedure which was similar to that laid down in the Nigerian Independence Constitution was designed to secure the independence of the Judiciary by insulating it from political control. (v) The Organization of the Central Government Sierra Leone adopted a unitary system of government. Federalism could hardly thrive in a country like Sierra Leone which has a land area of only 73,326 square kilometers (27, 925 square xcvii miles) and a population of about 2,439,000 (1967 estimate). As is usual in unitary states, the constitution vested the entire executive authority of the State in the Head of State. Although the Governor-General represented the Queen, the actual exercise of most of the executive authority of the State was carried out by Ministers of State on whose advice the Governor-General generally acted. The public Service assisted in the day-to-day conduct of the general administration of government. The public or civil service was made up of departments or ministries each of which was under the charge of a Minister who was responsible to Parliament. These Departments gave advise on technical points to the Government. The posts of Public or Civil Servants were, of course, considerably secure; the power to appoint, dismiss and discipline them being vested in the Public Service Commission and not in Parliament. The other important arms of government were the Sierra Leone Police Force which consisted of about 2,000 policemen and 250 auxiliary police serving the diamond area of the South-Eastern Province, and the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces which consisted of about 2,000 soldiers and a small Volunteer Naval Force. It should be observed that as was the case with the Public Service, the responsibility for the appointment and dismissal of officers of the Sierra Leone Police Force above the rank of Inspector, rested on the Public Service Commission. (vi) The Organization of Local Government The considerations which prompted the establishment of a dual local government structure were: (a) The Colony was inhabited mainly by the descendants of repatriated free slaves and of Africans who fought on the side of Great Britain during the American War of Independence, whilst the Protectorate was inhabited mainly by indigenous people. It would have been extremely difficult to work out a homogenous system of local government which would have met the needs of these two communities. (b) The inhabitants of the colony tended to be more progressive in industrial and educational terms than the inhabitants of the protectorate. (c) There was an indigenous political structure in the Protectorate but not in the Colony. With a majority of elected members, each of the local government councils tried to meet the needs of the area of its authority. (Gberie, 1998:41)
The Freetown City Council was established by a Royal Charter in 1799 and re-organised in 1893. It was composed of a Mayor, three Aldermen, nine elected Councillors and six Councilors nominated by the Governor-General. Apart from the functions reflected in the names xcviii of the committees through which it worked, the council assumed the powers of a local education authority. The committees through which it worked were: “the Finance and General Purposes Committee, the Municipal Trading Committee, the Establishment Committee, the Health Committee, the Housing and Building Committee, the Charity Committee, the Recreational Facilities Committee, and the Assessment and Protection Committees.” (Vidar, 2006:78) The Council’s main sources of income were rates and government grants. The Sherbro Urban Council was composed of a majority of the electoral areas of the Colony. To enable it to deal effectively with matters affecting local government in any part of the rural districts, some twenty-eight Village Committees in the territory sent representatives to six District Councils each of which in turn sent a representative to the Rural Areas Council. There was a separate arrangement for the former protectorate. This territory was for the purpose of local government, divided into three distinct provinces each of which was under a resident Minister of Cabinet rank. These Provinces contained two Districts, 146 Tribal Authorities and some three Townships. The activities of the District Councils were directed from and harmonized by, an advisory Protectorate Assembly the membership of which included officials, six nominees of the Governor- General and two representatives from each District Council. District Councils were mainly concerned with building and maintaining roads and primary schools. They recruited their own staff, though the Central Government often assigned professional staff to them. The Tribal Authorities consisted of Paramount Chiefs, the Chiefs, Councilors and men of note elected by the people according to traditional law and custom and approved by the Governor. Among other functions, Tribal Authorities undertook the administration of Native Courts. The Paramount Chief had the last word in most of the deliberations of a Tribal Authority. In the early 1950s, the District Commissioners stopped issuing orders and instead gave advice to Paramount Chiefs. (vii) Fundamental Human Rights Like the Nigerian Independence Constitution of 1960, the Sierra Leone Independence Constitution laid down detailed provisions for fundamental human rights. These rights were extended to every citizen of Sierra Leone irrespective of his race, ethnic group, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, subject however to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and to the public interest. The freedoms expressly guaranteed were the right to life, liberty and security of the person, the enjoyment of property, protection of the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest or xcix detention, freedom from slavery and enforced labour, freedom of movement, conscience, expression, assembly and of association, freedom of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic group, place of origin, colour, creed, sex or political opinion, and respect for the home and family life. These freedoms were not to be absolute. In fact, they have never been absolute in any democratic State. For one thing, “they were subject to respect for the rights and freedom of others and to the public interest” (Human Right Watch, 1998:15). For another, “they were curtailed by the constitutional provision that whenever there was a state of emergency in the country, a person could be arrested and detained without trial with his case being reviewed only after a period of six months”. (Human Right Watch, 1998:16) (viii) Citizenship Chapter 1 of the constitution conferred the citizenship of Sierra Leone on: (a) any person who having been born in the former Colony or Protectorate of Sierra Leone, was on 26 April 1961, a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person provided either of his grandparents was born in the former Colony or Protectorate of Sierra Leone. (b) Any person born outside Sierra Leone who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies on 26 April 1961 and whose father was a Sierra Leone Citizen. (ix) Control of Public Finance The constitution established a Consolidated Revenue Fund and stipulated that all revenue and money accruing to the State must be paid into the Fund. As in Nigeria, there were three ways in which Parliament controlled the public fund. (a) Control by placing restrictions on withdrawal: Money paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund could only be withdrawn either on the authority of the Constitution (in order to meet expenditure that was charged on the fund by the constitution) or on the authority of an Act of Parliament. It is noteworthy that the salaries and allowances payable to holders of certain offices were to be charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The offices in question were the offices of the Governor-General, the Chief Justice, Judges of the Supreme Court and the Auditor-General. Also charged on the fund were the pensions, gratuities and other emoluments of members of the Civil Service, the Judicial Service and the Police Service. Apart from these charges, no withdrawal could be made from the Consolidated Revenue Fund except with the approval of the c
parliament. The charging of these salaries and allowances on the Consolidated Revenue Fund was designed to safeguard the independence of holders of the office. (b) Control by debate on the Appropriation Bill: Every year, the Treasury was required to approve the estimates of expenditure submitted to it by each Ministry or Department in the State. Upon their approval, the Minister of Finance was to present to the House of Representatives a Budget Speech which embodied the Annual Estimates. It was the Minister of Finance who was to introduce the Bill seeking to authorize the withdrawal of the estimated expenditures of the State for the following year. Subsequently, these estimates scrutinized and debated by the Committee of the Whole House. When the estimates were approved by the House, the Bill would be passed into the appropriate Act. Supplementary Appropriation Acts could also be passed to authorize further withdrawals pending the coming into force of the Appropriation Act. In order to ensure that the expenses of the Ministries or Departments complied with the intentions of the Parliament, a Public Accounts Committee composed of members of the House scrutinized the expenditures of each Ministry or Department. In the course of its investigations, the Committee could question Government officials on irregular expenditure. The Committee had to submit a report to the House. (c) Control by the Auditor-General: With the aid of his assistants, the Auditor-General audited the accounts of all Government Departments and statutory corporations. The Auditor-General’s report which usually embodied irregularities detected in audited accounts was eventually laid before the House of Representatives. The House debated any discrepancy or irregularities that occurred in the report. (x) Procedure for Constitutional Amendment A simple majority was all that was required to amend certain sections of the Constitution. However, the entrenched sections could only be amended after a motion seeking the amendment had been passed by two-thirds majority in two different sessions of Parliament in between which a general election had been held. This tortuous procedure was required for amending the whole section of the constitution dealing with fundamental human rights, the Judiciary, the Public Service Commission, the Existence of Parliament and of Paramount Chiefs. (xi) The Party System in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone is still operating the two party system of Government although the SLPP Opposition party is just a shadow of its former self. However, “the continuation of the party system cannot be taken for granted because although the then SLPP Government introduced a white paper in 1965 ci calling for a one party system which was never implemented due to heavy criticism, the present APC Government is again considering the idea of setting up a one party system”. (Sesay, 2009:21) Before 1951, there were only three organizations which took interest in political affairs: the Sierra Leone National Congress (SLNC), The Protectorate Educational Progressive Union (PEPU), and the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS). As far back as 1923, the SLNC opposed the introduction of Chiefs into the Legislative Council. And in 1930, the SOS joined the Creoles in demanding that all Chiefs in the Legislative Council must be literate. The decade starting in 1951 witnessed the formation of many political parties. The first of these was the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL). Then the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) followed which resulted from the coalition of SOS, PEPU and the Peoples Party. In the general election of 1952, SLPP won six seats while NCSL gained five seats. Later, the ten candidates who were elected as independents crossed over to SLPP. The leader of the party, Sir Milton Margai later became the Prime Minister. It was in 1958 that the Peoples National Party (PNP) was formed as a splinter from SLPP by Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens. This was a result of the failure by a faction of SLPP to secure the office of Prime Minister for Albert Margai. The party urged the abolition of Chieftaincies and suggested other radical reforms. The desire to prepare the ground for the attainment of independence occasioned the formation of three new parties. The first was the Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (SLPIM) which was formed in 1959. The second was the United Front which was formed in 1960 by some members of UPP, PNP, and SLPP. Its aim was to carry out the final negotiations for independence. The third was the All People Congress (APC) which was formed in 1960 by a faction of the United Front led by Siaka Stevens. Upon its formation, Alebrt Margai went back to the SLPP. The APC drew its support from Freetown and the Colony Province. In the General Election of 1962, it gained twenty seats as against SLPP’s twenty-one. Following the crossing over of thirteen Independents and twelve Paramount Chiefs to SLPP it became the official opposition. The post of Prime Minister passed over to Albert Margai when Sir Milton Margai died in 1964. Up to 1967, the Government was led by Albert Margai, while Siaka Steven’s APC was the official Opposition. By this time, the tussle between the party in power (SLPP) and the Opposition had become so serious that it seemed a crisis was imminent. The Opposition criticized the party in cii power on its foreign and domestic policies. The ruling party in turn accused the Opposition of non-co-operation and claimed that a plot was being planned to subvert the Government. It was in this tense atmosphere of acrimonious party rivalry that a general election was held on 17 March 1967. The election was passionately contested by the SLPP which drew its major support from the Protectorate, and the APC whose supporters were mainly from Freetown and the Colony Province. At the close of the election, it was not clear which party had won. In some quarters, it was claimed that the SLPP won thirty-two seats whilst the APC won thirty-one seats. In other quarters, it was claimed that APC won thirty-two seats while the SLPP won twenty-eight seats. The doubts seemed to have cleared when the Governor-General, Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston swore in the leader of the APC, Siaka Stevens, as the new Prime Minister. But almost immediately, Brigadier David Lansana, Commander of the Sierra Leone armed forces, declared the Governor-General’s action unconstitutional, placed the Governor-General and Siaka Stevens under house arrest, and declared martial law. Two days later on 23 March 1967, the Commander was toppled by his officers.
4.9 POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1967 AND 1971 Shortly after the overthrow of Brigadier Davi Lansana on 23 March 1967, a National Reformation Council (NRC) was established jointly by the Military and Police Forces. Lieut. Colonel Juxon Smith became the chairman of the council. The NRC placed greater responsibility than before on Senior Civil Servants. It also set up the National Advisory Committee which was composed of distinguished civilians. The duty of advising the NRC on the conduct of the administration rested on this committee. The NRC also established the Dove-Edwin Commission which was charged with the duty of conducting an inquiry into the 1967 general election and of ascertaining the party that won it. It was after the Dove-Edwin Commission had reported that the election was won by Siaka Stevens’ APC that a Civilian Rule Committee was set up. This committee was to advise the NRC on the restoration of civilian rule. A smaller committee charged with a similar function was set up in the early part of 1968. At the same time, two people representing two previously banned political parties were co-opted into the original Civilian Rule Committee. Eventually, this Committee recommended that Civilian rule should be restored without a fresh general election. ciii
But as no immediate action was taken on the report, people started to wonder whether the NRC was prepared to hand back power to civilians. Certain people disapproved of the rate at which certain officers in the Army were being promoted. Furthermore, there were rumours that charged two members of the NRC with complicity in diamond smuggling. In April 1968, a team of non-commissioned officers in the Army toppled the NRC. They formed the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement and detained some officers. In its first order, the new regime reverted all officers in the Army to their pre-April 1967 ranks and pay. In June 1968, civilian rule was restored and Siaka Stevens became the Premier. In spite of, or perhaps partly because of, the sweeping Cabinet reshuffle of April 1969, some people were not happy with the Government. In the course of time criticism against the Government had settled around the following points: (a) the removal in April 1969, of the last SLPP man in the Government launched in 1968; (b) the failure to achieve the envisaged economic goals – the standard of living of the people was still generally low; (c) allegations of corruption and arbitrariness; (d) the recent declaration by the Government of a state of emergency; (e) the trial and conviction of Lansana and some of his aides in connection with the 1967 crisis. (Bell, 2005:17)
These criticisms notwithstanding, the government had certainly done all it could to improve the welfare of the population. In fact, it would seem that the animosity of most of the enemies of the regime stemmed from ethnic or sectional prejudice. On 23 March 1971, two unsuccessful attempts were made by unnamed Army Officers to assassinate Dr. Siaka Stevens. These incidents led to the introduction in April 1971 of a Republican Constitution. Under the Independence Constitution of 1961, a Bill proposing a new constitution was required to secure not only a two-thirds majority in an exiting Parliament but also a two-thirds majority in the first session of a new Parliament formed after a general election. Prior to the general election of 1967, Sir Albert Margai’s Government had secured the requisite initial two-thirds majority for a Republican Constitution. But its chances in the general election that followed seemed to have been reduced by its advocation of a one-party system of government. In 1970, a committee consisting of thirty-six members was set up under Sir Emile Luke, the speaker of the National Assembly. It was to consider the desirability of adopting a republican form of constitution. After the attempted coup of 23 March 1971, the campaign for the civ establishment of a Republican became stronger. The women’s wing of the ruling APC were in the Vanguard of this movement. The Emile Luke Report recommended that the country should be transformed into a republic. This was in accordance with the general trend of opinion in Sierra Leone. It would be wrong however to assume that setting up a republic was to be the solution for all the political problems in Sierra Leone. The change was mainly for psychological reasons because although the Head of state was the Governor-General as a representative of the Queen, the convention had already been clearly laid down that the head of State exercised his powers on the advice of the Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. In other words, there was nothing a President could do in a republic which a Prime Minister, after consultation with his Cabinet could not do. In fact, the present Siaka Stevens regime proves the point. The first government crisis, which resulted in the resignation of Steven’s Ministers of Finance and Information in 1970 when the country was not a republic, was over the allegation that Siaka Stevens was too dictatorial and acted without consulting his colleagues. The second crisis was the attempted coup d’etat led by the late Brigadier Bangua. Siaka Steevns proved strong enough to tackle all these crises by all means available to him including the invitation to Gunean troops to foil the coup d’etat. There is no doubt that Siaka Stevens as President in the Republic of Sierra Leone would not have had more powers at his disposal than he had as Prime Minister. The strongest argument for Republican status was that it would place Sierra Leone on the same footing as most other African sovereign states. The 1967 draft constitution was again proposed. Since the constitution had already been approved once in 1967 and a general election had been held afterwards, only one more approval was necessary. But a constitutional hurdle lay on the path. The parliament of April 1971 which had to vote the constitutional proposal for the last time was not in its first session. In order to skip this hurdle Parliament, in the interim, passed an Act substituting the word ‘Session’ with ‘Parliament’ in the 1961 Constitution. How clearly this hurdle has been skipped may have to be assessed by constitutional experts and perhaps the law-court. After this amendment was made, the Bill proposing the establishment of a Republican Constitution was tabled in Parliament. It was passed by an overwhelming majority. Fifty-two members voted in support of the bill while only ten opposed it. Consequently on 19 April 1971, Sierra Leone was proclaimed a Republic.
4.9.1 The Republican Constitution of 1971 cv
The Republican Constitution was identical to the draft submitted by Sir Albert Margai’s government in 1967. In the form, it took at the time of its approval by the Parliament it was a President who was to be the ceremonial Head of State in the new system. He was to be appointed and dismissed by the Cabinet; in other words, by the Prime Minister. By the end of April however, Parliament had promulgated a measure which established an Executive Presidency, an office which was later held by Dr. Siaka Stevens.
4.9.2 Independence to Democratic Rule in Sierra Leone To most public law scholars, it is ordinary knowledge that there are certain minimum features and/or core values that any national constitution claiming to be democratic should embody. Thus, within the discipline, constitutional law is defined as the study of an aspect of a nation's public law which treats the organization, powers and framework of the government, the distribution of political and governmental authorities and functions, the fundamental principles of which are to regulate the relations of government and citizens, and which prescribes generally the plans and methods according to which the public affairs of the nation are administered. In regulating relations between governments and citizens, we presume above all, that constitutions serve as the source for the protection of fundamental civil rights and liberties, therefore guarding against arbitrary acts of governments. Thus, in democratic societies, the civil rights of the people are protected by obligating governments to protect their citizens from actions of other individuals and/or acts of governments. Likewise civil liberties are protected by restricting what governments can or cannot do to their citizens. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought, constitutions of modern democratic polities not only establish the responsibilities and working relationships of governments vis-à-vis the governed, they represent yardsticks from which to judge the progress of a nation through time and historical space. Hence, the so often emphasized view that constitutions are fundamental laws of the land, goes hand in hand with a parallel belief in constitutionalism, i.e., the belief in constitutional governance and the rule of law. Covering a period of three decades, this chapter identifies and analyzes major challenges to Sierra Leone's orderly constitutional evolution. It also evaluates Sierra Leone's Supreme Court's jurisprudential development and its application of constitutional law principles during the performance of two crucial tasks: interpreting the constitution and protecting and enforcing the fundamental rights of the people of Sierra Leone. The chapter traces the constitutional development and history of Sierra Leone from 1787-1960. It argues among other things that a cvi lesson to be learned from the constitutional growth and development of Sierra Leone is that for a considerable length of time, colonial rule, although thought then to be democratic, was in reality, autocratic. The preparation of political and hereditary elites for the transition from colonial autocracy to fully representative and responsible government was both inadequate and cosmetic in nature. In effect, this chapter maintains, parliamentary constitutionalism is wrongly equated with political democracy. This chapter also examines both the structural and functional aspects of the 1961 independence Constitution of Sierra Leone. Its central argument is that the Constitution was not a "faithful reproduction of the Westminister model of parliamentary democracy" (Bankole, 1997:42). To underscore this argument, it sketches the constitutional structure at independence and then compares its main features with the British Constitution of that time to reveal inconsistencies. It buttresses this point by reviewing several court cases during a similar period challenging the basis of the 1961 constitution. Also is the critique of the role of the judiciary as both the custodian and interpreter of the Constitution. This chapter argues that in a majority of the cases, "the techniques used by the courts to interpret relevant constitutional provisions regarding clear instances of derogation from the rights and freedoms of individuals were regrettably that of restrictive interpretation" (Cooper,2004:68). In our view, the Sierra Leone Courts during this period missed the opportunity to inquire into important questions of whether "rights and freedoms were absolute, limited or qualified" (Bankole, 1997:42). With clear preference for judicial activism over restraint, this chapter also takes the zealous view that within the sphere of constitutional interpretation, Courts should play a constructive role with "clear preference" to change as a safeguard against illegitimate constitutional constraint that may be intolerable to the majority. It also highlighted the "jurisprudential analysis of the revolutionary situation of 1967" which resulted from the defeat, in competitive elections, of the first party and government in power. It maintains that the "revolutionary situation of 1967 was the denouement of a consistent trend of judicial ultra-restraint and abdication, on the part of the Courts, in performing effectively and constructively their regulatory functions". (Francis, 1984:67) This fourth chapter focuses on the ‘republican constitution of 1971’. It explores what we call ‘Sierra Leone's quest for constitutional autochthony’. It argues that in an effort to overcome problems occasioned by the political upheavals of the period, the government consolidated authority by transforming the country from a constitutional monarchy to a republican state. The 1971 constitution, Thompson notes, “placed striking emphasis on the sovereignty of the people of cvii
Sierra Leone and highlighted specific rules for the conduct of State affairs” (Bankole, 1997:50). More importantly, for the first time it maintains, the Constitution classified the functions of the government into three branches, namely; legislative, executive and judiciary. In our view, this constitutional reorganization injected accountability in the government in the form of separation of power and checks and balances. Also is the critical examination of the functioning of the ‘1978 One-Party Constitution’. Chapter four begins by drawing attention to the incorporation into the constitution provisions for public emergencies and the extensive use of that provision by the government as a technique of statecraft. It critiques the role of the Court in their inability to curb the abuse of freedoms and infringements of civil rights and liberties during the period of the enforcement of the emergency provisions. While acknowledging the dilemmas confronting Courts in passing judgment in government declared emergency situations in general, it notes as do other constitutional scholars, the general difficulties Courts confront in making legal determination as to when, in fact, an emergency has occurred and/or when it is sufficient to warrant the use of restrictive measures by a government for the purpose of maintaining law and order. Notwithstanding the often used rationale of separation of powers by Courts when declining to assess the merits of emergency declarations, this research work insists however, that there is no reason why measures taken during periods of emergencies in time of peace, should be immune from judicial review. The 1991 Constitution specifically focused on military rule and government accountability. First, the research work provides a general critique of the main features of the 1991 Constitution in light of its declared principles and potential for effective democratic governance. Among other things, it questions whether the 1991 Constitution, adopted a year prior to the military coup of April 1992, was a commitment to restoring a truly electoral democracy in Sierra Leone. Second, it examines the inquisitorial role played by Sierra Leone courts to curb corruption in the public service beginning with the period of All People Congress (APC) party rule in 1968 through 1990. Endorsing the judiciary's role in several post-facto imposition of restrictive orders and forfeitures of assets of corrupt government officials, this chapter concludes that as techniques of public accountability, such Court actions were effective in unearthing massive administrative corruption during that period. In addition it analyses ‘the 1993 Draft Constitution’ as a potential instrument for effective government. From a comparative perspective, this chapter undertakes a comprehensive examination and analysis of key provisions of the Draft Constitution. It questions its potential as an instrument for creating institutions intended to form the bedrock of sustainable democracy in cviii
Sierra Leone based on a commitment to political pluralism. While it agrees that the Draft Constitution was a major step towards the restoration of political and electoral democracy, it questions its potential as an instrument designed to create a progressive, viable, and stable democracy. Realism and pragmatism it insists, dictate different approaches. Because ideal situations are rarely attainable, the Draft Constitution at best, established a political and legal foundation from which to accomplish future goals and objectives of the country. Such objectives it hoped would be consonant with a revitalized society committed in theory and practice to electoral democracy through the collective will of the people and their government. Two things are mostly emphasized in this chapter. First is that whatever role the Courts play or were expected to play in dispensing justice in Sierra Leone is perhaps taken too seriously by the author. For example, it blames the Courts for not advocating an activist position in defense of the Constitution. It also blames the Court for not taking a position against government imposed ‘emergency orders.’ It is indeed doubtful whether Courts alone can shoulder all the blame in Sierra Leone constitutional history. Second is the absence of a coherent and consistent body of empirical beliefs and values designed to give meaning to prescribed constitutional norms. This second point, which in some way is related to the first, is worth reiterating further. Constitutions as we know, are generally perceived as institutional control mechanisms, even though their main objectives include ensuring that political organs of the state function effectively within the limits of the law in order to achieve legitimate national goals and objectives. The realization of these goals and objectives is facilitated by empirical beliefs observable and practice in the society, if such beliefs and practices are themselves outgrowth of values underlying the constitution. Primary among such beliefs, of course, are "free press," "right to vote" "freedom of association," "the respect for the rule of law" by both the government and the people. In a country where the legitimacy of the law is constantly questioned or being challenged, especially by the lawmakers, as portrayed, public confidence in the law and the judiciary is easily eroded. When this happens, it unleashes popular grievances and an immediate quest for redress outside the natural framework of the law. And assuming such a course is pursued, it poses serious peril to the status quo process. Who then can truly shoulder the blame in these instances? Finally, the case for Sierra Leone's constitutional history presented in this fourth chapter points to a fact applicable to most Third World countries with a similar history. For those who argue for particular kinds of constitutions, it speaks clearly to the fact that typically ‘home-grown’ types as opposed to ‘foreign grown or influenced constitutions’ are no panaceas for democracy or for that matter, for effective democratic governance. Democracy and/or democratic values cannot cix be achieved simply through the enactments of constitutional documents void of a strong will and commitments from the people and their government to democratic ideals. The history of sustained democracy in the West and other emerging democracies in the former Soviet Union, teaches us that democracy cannot, in fact, be legislated. Democracy, as argued by political theorists, “must be cultivated, natured, and sustained by the people through compromises and consensus rooted in the spirit of their liberty and the respect for the rights and freedoms of individual, tolerance for political dissent, openness in government, and above all, the respect for the rule of law and an impartial judiciary”. (Olonisakin, 2008:33) It is interesting to note that Sierra Leone was once characterized as a model, if not the model, of British parliamentary democracy in West Africa. When Sierra Leone emerged as an independent nation in 1961, (during a period when several African nations were undergoing similar political conversions), there were reasons to believe that it could become a constitutional model for most West African nations. However, “political upheavals over the years made this goal unattainable for Sierra Leone” (Azam, 2006:4). Some of the reasons for the initial optimism were due in part to its pre-independence constitutional tutelage under British rule. It is no surprise, therefore, that between 1961 and 1996, Sierra Leone continued to demonstrate aspects of its inherited democratic legacy. In its very first competitive election, six years after independence, Sierra Leone witnessed the first defeat of a political party in power by an opposition party. That was in 1967. By 1996, the military junta which seized power in 1992 and suspended the Constitution, willingly returned power back to a democratically elected government. For example, because Sierra Leone shares a common legal tradition with other commonwealth countries, we emphasized on what could have been particularized and complicated issues of constitutional law by drawing from the experience of other common law jurisdictions. Contrasting them to the case of Sierra Leone, we argued that by learning how other courts have responded to similar constitutional challenges and/or dilemmas within a normative context, we are able to learn more about how far Sierra Leone has gone in promoting the principles of constitutionalism and preserving the common law legal tradition. Moreover, we are also able to understand Sierra Leone's specific shortcomings with respect to other social changes.
4.10 HOPE FOR THE FUTURE IN SIERRA LEONE There is nothing dour or staid about politics in the Sierra Leonean elections. The solemnity that attends political debate in many other countries is replaced by a carnival of music, colour and cx dancing. On their allocated days, all shades of green (the incumbent Sierra Leone People’s Party), red (the main opposition All People’s Congress) and orange (the SLPP breakaway, People’s Movement for Democratic Change) take the streets of Freetown by storm, causing already day- long traffic jams to congest further. Youths high on the exhilaration of the possibility of change hang out of car windows, or perch on trucks carrying speakers that pump with music and the occasional political message. The expatriate community in such times keeps a conversely low profile. Most have been scouring their closets for politically neutral clothing that does not suggest affinity with one party or another. Non-government organisations have taken to printing promotional materials in the non-party suggestive blue, also to avoid bias. Kamara said that: People of Sierra Leone are resistant to the idea that the elections could spur a new wave of violence, only five years after the official end of their decade-long civil war, renowned for its brutality of ‘chopping’ limbs and use of child soldiers drugged up on 'brown brown' – a mixture of gunpowder and cocaine. Wrist bands bearing the slogan "voters say no to violence" are popular and travelling musical ensembles promoting peaceful elections have emerged with a keen following. (Kamara, 2008:32)
In a wonderful demonstration of perspective, people are engaging the serious issues of elections and democracy with exuberance and fun. This boisterousness, of course, also has the potential to become a prelude to violence, if the results of the election are not accepted by the contesting parties, who currently all claim likely victory. It is this moment that will be a test to Sierra Leone’s democratic transition. In the hype of election euphoria, it is easy to forget that it is not just the ballot box that gauges democracy, but an adherence to the rule of law also. For most Sierra Leoneans, the key political issues are jobs, corruption and development. Across the country, and particularly in the capital, Freetown - where many people converged during and after the war in hope of greater opportunity - unemployed youths congregate on street corners, in chop houses and around markets. Their idle hands and disgruntlement are not only an economic concern, ensuring that much of the population remains locked in poverty, but also pose a potential security threat. “Sierra Leone is currently ranked second lowest on the human development index by the United Nations Development Program, ahead only of Niger”. (Human Right Watch, 1998) With investment still lagging, the much needed jobs simply don’t exist. The election is a crucial stability landmark that, all things remaining peaceful, may see a return of investors and foreign companies, whose taxes and license fees can help to generate government revenue, and whose operations can create much needed employment. cxi
Development still remains a buzz word five years into the post-conflict era and encapsulates an overwhelmingly extensive list of services and infrastructure. Roads remain poor, particularly upcountry, with only one town connected to Freetown by a paved road. Schools and hospitals are severely underfunded with high illiteracy and infant mortality rates. According to the World Health Organisation, “life expectancy is 40 years for women and 37 years for men”. (Human Right Watch, 1998) The absence of reliable power is also a severely limiting factor for families and businesses in Sierra Leone. Freetown hums continuously with the drone of generators that are expensive to acquire, maintain and run. Boys selling kerosine and women carrying baskets of coal stacked on their heads fill the electricity void with these alternatives to light lamps and start fires. A long-running plan to build a hydro-electric power station seems no further off the ground than when the idea was first mooted over a decade ago. Weeding out corruption within government, business and the security sector is also a central concern of many voters. The sentiment is summed up in the hugely popular Freetown- based musician, Daddy Saj’s song, ‘Corruption e do so’ (‘Corruption – enough is enough’), which outraged politicians at the time of its release in 2003. Yet despite the seriousness, complexity and inter-relatedness of such issues constituting the political agenda, Sierra Leoneans remain optimistic that the future, under the right leader, is promising. The difficulties arise in determining who that ‘right leader’ will be.
cxii
CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since 2002 Sierra Leone has been slowly emerging from the devastation caused by its civil war. However, the country ranks near the bottom of most global indices. According to available data, it appears that the current status quo will continue in the short-term. Moderate gains have been made in terms of government reforms. However, attempts to implement these reforms in all sectors of society will likely be slowed by endemic corruption. Even with the ongoing support of foreign governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, it will be several years until the government is able to build a semblance of capacity and provide its citizens with the most basic services. Human development levels will likely remain very low, without great likelihood of worsening in the near future. On a positive note, Sierra Leone’s economy will likely recover to pre-economic crisis levels over the next several years. The ongoing presence of international crime networks and emerging presence of terrorist groups will likely adversely affect the country’s security and political stability. Regional volatility, especially in Guinea, threatens to spillover to neighbouring countries, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, which have a history of intertwined civil wars. The presence of certain natural resources (diamonds) and discovery of new ones (oil) may contribute to economic development in the future. However, if the mismanagement of natural resources continues, the country could enter a new stage of conflict. In sum, the likely trigger for the above scenario may be a failure of the nascent government institutions, which can materialize in a form of a corruption scandal, or popular uprising. The prevalence of discontented and unemployed youth, most of which has borne arms in the civil war, provides an element of uncertainty as the group can be manipulated by political actors.
5.0 SUMMARY The diplomatic community presence in Sierra Leone has been very limited. Through the early years of this decade, the major diplomatic presence in Freetown was provided by the UK, the US, and the EU, including some EU member states. But until the late 1990s, the UK and the US diplomatic Missions did not enjoy sufficient support from their home governments. Once London and Washington realized the importance of acting in Sierra Leone, the leverage of support from each of these global powers made a significant difference. The British sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1132, which was adopted in October 1997 and established an embargo on weapons and other military equipment, petroleum, and petroleum products on Sierra Leone. This UN embargo followed directly upon the heels of a similar ECOWAS embargo cxiii adopted in August of the same year, once again illustrating the critical role ECOWAS played during the 1990s when the international community was not paying close enough attention to Sierra Leone. Support from a home authority was finally illustrated by the 1999 visit of then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright to refugee camps outside Freetown, as well as the sending by US President Bill Clinton of Special Envoy Jesse Jackson to help negotiate the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. These events raised the profile of the crisis in Sierra Leone in the US – both in the media as well as in the government in Washington. “The British also took very decisive and prompt action by intervening militarily in May 2000 following the seizure and hostage holding of nearly 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers by the RUF, and the impending fall of Freetown to the rebels”.( Lujala, 2005:60) The British deployed 600 troops in the defense of Freetown and the airport. This decision by the Blair Administration signified the recognition by the British that something had to be done in Sierra Leone to demonstrate that the international community had the will and capacity to act effectively in these types of situations. Finally, the British government made an “over-the-horizon” security guarantee to intervene militarily in Sierra Leone within 48 to 72 hours if a security crisis in Sierra Leone emerged. This guarantee, along with the presence of 17,500 UN peacekeepers serving under a Chapter VII mandate, helped serve as deterrents to the resumption of conflict. The US played the lead role in both the preparation and implementation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which is a hybrid court (an international court staffed by expatriates and Sierra Leonean nationals, operating outside the Sierra Leonean judiciary but with the ability to prosecute under Sierra Leonean law), established by UN Security Council Resolution in 2000 to try those who bore the greatest responsibility for crimes committed after the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. The US has been the largest donor to the SCSL, and the first prosecutor for the Court was an American (marking the first time an American was prosecutor of an international court since Nuremburg). Although viewed by many in the international community as a success, some Sierra Leoneans have not supported the SCSL, “as complaining that the significant amount of money spent on the SCSL (the Court’s budget in its first year of operation was $25 million) would have been better spent in other ways” (Jalloh, 2001:45). Compared to recent international tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, the SCSL has operated in a much more timely and cost- effective manner. The US was also instrumental in supporting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established through the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement and approved by Sierra Leone’s Parliament in 2000. The TRC was mandated to create an impartial historical record of human rights violations during the conflict, address impunity of offenders not tried by the Special cxiv
Court, respond to the needs of victims, and promote healing and reconciliation. The US supported the TRC through sponsoring various seminars and conferences throughout the country to promote discussion of human rights and reconciliation type issues. Diplomatic support by the Americans of these two transitional justice mechanisms helped provide legitimacy to the processes and the government efforts to address major human rights violations that occurred during the war. US Embassy staff would often participate directly in the seminars and meetings that were promoting the TRC and dialogue around human rights issues. This was also an example of the solidarity provided by the diplomatic community to those who were acting in support of peace and democracy promotion. There were frequent visits by American Ambassadors to civil society groups, as well as through diplomats speaking out publicly in support of the 1996 and 2002 elections. Funds from the UK and US governments have been channeled mainly through the aid agencies DFID and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Annual DFID bilateral funding to Sierra Leone is currently £40m. USAID funding for development assistance in 2008 was $4 million, with an additional $400,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET), $150,000 for narcotics control. USAID’s strategy for Sierra Leone focuses on “agriculture and local economic development” and “strengthening democracy and reducing corruption.” Both of these countries also footed a significant portion of the UNAMSIL bill, which totaled an estimated $3 billion over six years (1999-2005).( Hirsch, 2000:66) Direct diplomatic mission funds, while not that significant in amount, were used strategically to support independent media, civil society (including an emphasis on youth), and elections-based work.
5.1 APPLICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY The Golden Rules: The small but influential diplomatic community in Sierra Leone was on the whole highly collaborative, in very regular contact regarding democracy-related activities. This sharing of information and coordination of strategies allowed democracy-promoting missions to come to dialogue and come to consensus on key issues, as well as to coordinate which mission would take the lead on different issues. The British High Commission has played the largest role within the diplomatic community in Sierra Leone since 1992. Diplomats in Sierra Leone also sought to understand the overall situation in Sierra Leone through interactions with a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society, local and international NGOs, the government, as well as the international community. Even though there were initially numerous failures to understand, including a general lack of comprehending the cxv conflict and historical situation and the inability by many observers to grasp the regional nature of the conflict, diplomats were finally able to recognize that, although government and civil society capacity were relatively low, Sierra Leonean understanding of the conflict and its own history was critical to the international response. As former British High Commissioner Alan Jones has noted, “Credit for what has happened in Sierra Leone does not just lie with the international community. Primarily it lies with the people of Sierra Leone. They were the ones who suffered the horrors of eleven years of civil war. They are the ones who fought against injustice.” International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, which was influential in identifying key human rights issues upon which to focus attention, and International Crisis Group, whose analysis helped the international community understand the on-the-ground realities of the conflict, were also instrumental in increasing greater awareness and understanding.
5.1.0 Truth in Communications Diplomats reported back to their host governments in as candid a way as possible on the situation in Sierra Leone. From the American side, reports back to Washington were regular (except when communication was cut off because of personnel insecurity) and these reports were known for being candid and credible. Reports did not shy away from highlighting criticisms of the government and the true extent of atrocities being committed mainly by the RUF. While reports from the American Embassy in Freetown in the mid-1990s also highlighted the regional nature of the war in Sierra Leone, including direct Liberian involvement, it took a long time for Washington to finally understand the Sierra Leonean conflict. Washington, even with the candid reporting from Freetown, did not make responding to the conflict a policy priority until after the British mobilized to act against the RUF in 1999. This led to subsequent visits in 1999, first by the American Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and then by the American Secretary of State. These visits helped raise the priority level of Sierra Leone in Washington. The British government began prioritizing Sierra Leone in 1999 as a result of a series of BBC news spots that were aired following the invasion of Freetown. These spots revealed the atrocities being committed against innocent civilians, and were influential in moving the UK to respond. American print and television media, particularly the Washington Post, New York Times, and CNN (including Sierra Leonean journalist Sorious Somura’s Cry Freetown) also increased American awareness of and interest surrounding the conflict. Finally, the UN Panel of cxvi
Experts reports on Liberia and Sierra Leone helped raise international community awareness and improve the understanding of the regional aspects of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The diplomatic community has been deeply involved since 2001 in informing the Sierra Leonean population through support to independent media. Missions have frequently provided media with information from their governments’ perspectives, as well as supported local and international NGOs working in radio and print media, through financing, support to community radio, and promotion of independent media activities.
5.1.1 Working with the Government The diplomatic community in Freetown has played a major role both in advising as well as capacity / institution building. When President Kabbah was in control of the government in the 1990s, (which was on an on-again, off-again basis between 1996 and 2002) diplomats provided timely and critical advice to Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean government in general. American Ambassador Joseph Melrose was also involved in close discussions with President Kabbah regarding how to deal judicially with the seizure of the UN peacekeepers, especially given that this was a clear violation by the RUF of the terms of the Lomé Agreement. Discussions between Kabbah and Melrose revolved around concerns that the judicial system in Sierra Leone could not deal adequately with the RUF. Melrose also provided advice to the drafting of the TRC legislation that was passed by Parliament. In the early part of this decade, British High Commissioner Alan Jones and American Ambassador Peter Chaveas met frequently with President Kabbah on a wide variety of pressing issues and acted as interlocutors with senior level government officials. The diplomatic community, particularly Britain, has played an instrumental role in efforts to strengthen the capacity of Sierra Leone’s woefully inadequate state institutions. The British are currently in the process of providing major funding and support to a ten year security sector reform (SSR) program, which includes equipping, training, and restructuring both the military and police forces and is being led by IMATT. Much of the funding for SSR has come from the UK’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. “In addition, the UK is supporting a major decentralization process, as well as a five-year, £25 million project (funded via DFID) to develop an effective and accountable justice sector capable of meeting the interests and needs of Sierra Leoneans, especially the poor and marginalized” (Keen, 2005:29). Finally, the British are funding the Anti- Corruption Commission (ACC), and through DFID have provided general support for reforming cxvii other government ministries and institutions since the late 1990s. The US, meanwhile, has complemented British efforts to SSR and justice sector reform. The US has targeted military personnel and civilians by organizing programs to improve civil-military relations, as well as initiated a significant program in the military to address HIV/AIDS. The US has also sent a small number of Sierra Leonean military personnel to the US for training. With respect to the justice sector, the US has brought in American legal experts for short capacity building programs, as well as assisted in repopulating the Supreme Court’s legal library in Freetown. Finally, various international NGOs (INGOs), through financial support from various Community of Democracy members, have provided training to national parliamentarians. Support to Sierra Leone’s weak institutions has not been without its share of controversy, however. For example, the British have been criticized for prioritizing police reform at the expense of military reform, leading to resentment within the armed forces. In addition, the penal system has been neglected as prison conditions remain deplorable, and many inmates have spent years in prison without being charged. The ACC has also never really been functional and has not pursued serious corruption cases at the senior level. Millions of dollars have thus been poured into a body that was supposed to be fighting corruption and was ironically proven to be quite corrupt itself. The British and others failed to use their leverage as donors to pressure the government into improving the ACC. Newly elected President Ernest Bai Koroma has, though, vowed to tackle corruption and has appointed Abdul Tejan-Cole, a well-respected civil society leader, as the new head of the ACC, illustrating this commitment to fight corruption. Civil society groups have made important contributions to the peace and democratization processes in Sierra Leone. Diplomatic missions played an active role in connecting civil society groups to international NGOs, outside assistance, and other types of support. Since the early 2000s, the US and UK have supported the local NGO 50-50, which is an organization that has worked to bring more women into the political process. Other groups focusing on women and youth have also received diplomatic support. In the preparations for elections in 2002, the country director for an international NGO (INGO) working on democracy and governance issues, stated: “The international community saw civil society as the only hope… Civil society had more credibility and ability to function than (political) parties.” (Olonisakin, 2008:32). The diplomatic community has also supported civil society through working with local elections observers. Prior to the 2002 elections, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Forum for Democratic Initiative (FORDI), a local NGO, convened a workshop to discuss election monitoring: This workshop gave birth to the National Election Watch (NEW), which has grown into a coalition of over 375 local and cxviii
international civil society organizations and a national network of civilian election observers, headed by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), another INGO. During the 2007 presidential elections, NEW placed trained civil society observers in 97% of polling stations around the country. NEW received funding from DFID, NDI, and the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives in 2007. NEW has thus helped ensure transparent elections over the past five years. Prior to the 2007 election, NDI also trained local NGOs to help with registration and voter education. It should be noted that NDI and Search for Common Ground both received a majority of their support in Sierra Leone from the US and UK since 2001, and are very highly respected by the diplomatic community. (Mustapha, 2010:10)
In addition to providing support to civil society, diplomats have also played important convening roles in Sierra Leone. Diplomatic missions have supported the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the governmental body established to organize and conduct elections. In the early days of the NEC (preceding the 2002 elections), the UN, UK, US, Nigeria, and EU provided massive support to the NEC to enable it to function, including technical, material, and financial assistance. Following the 2004 parliamentary elections the NEC’s performance was so poor that the NEC had to be nearly completely dismantled and restructured. The reconstituted NEC, under the leadership of well-reputed civil society and government veteran Christina Thorpe, is now seen as much more capable, neutral, and independent. Most recently, the NEC was lauded by the international community for its oversight of free and fair presidential elections in 2007. Furthermore, prior to the 2002 elections, the diplomatic community provided funding to FORDI to set up the Political Party Resource Center (PPRC), a training and resource center in Freetown for political parties to use that included computers and a photocopier that all legitimate parties had access to, as well as meeting space. The meeting space was used for political party trainings, cross-party dialogues, as well as for meetings between parties and the NEC. The diplomatic community also used this space to come together with party leaders and presidential candidates. Diplomats have facilitated peace processes and negotiations, as well as in trying to foster political dialogue and reconciliation. For example, American Ambassador Melrose met privately on multiple occasions with the RUF leadership, including Foday Sankoh, trying to push for a cease-fire. The diplomatic community has also been active in promoting dialogue, accomplished most notably through diplomatic support to the Special Court and the TRC. Diplomats have also shown support to political dialogue through public support of the Political Parties Registration Commission, a body established to ensure peaceful political representation of the population through independent registration and balanced monitoring of parties. This support was evidenced cxix by a public communiqué issued in 2006 and signed by the US Embassy, the British High Commission, the European Commission, and the German Embassy. A section of the press release read, “We hope that Sierra Leone’s political parties… will take advantage of this opportunity to educate and inform the electorate by generating a genuine and vigorous issues-based national debate as they approach the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. Such a debate is a critical component of Sierra Leone’s successful emergence from its turbulent past.” (James Day, 2011:25).Most recently, after the tense 2007 elections, the American Ambassador June Carter Perry and British High Commissioner Sarah MacIntosh worked with a number of international and local civil society groups to organize an event aimed at general reconciliation and dialogue among women and that also encouraged and supported women’s participation in the local elections that followed. First Lady Sia Koroma hosted the two day event, and NEC Commissioner Christiana Thorpe was the keynote speaker. Diplomats have used financing – channeled both directly through the missions as well as through aid agencies – to support democracy promotion work in Sierra Leone. Significant amounts of financing since 2002 have been devoted to preparing and running elections, UNAMSIL, DDR programming, capacity building of government institutions, fighting corruption, reforms in the diamond industry, and civil society and independent media support. In addition to Nigeria, the US, UK, and UN, major donors active in Sierra Leone include the European Commission, Canada, and Germany. The US, for example, has provided funding to local democracy and human rights groups through the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, which is provided by USAID, as well as small grants to community groups through the Ambassador’s Special Self-Help project, which supports various activities such as small-scale economic initiatives and community theatre. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) also provided funding for the Lomé peace talks, as well as other quick-impact projects (including independent media support). US financing to support parliamentary and presidential elections has been channeled through INGOs such as SFCG, NDI, IFES, the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In addition, financial support to diamond industry reform has included assistance in setting up the Kimberley Process for certifying non-conflict diamonds, as well as community initiatives to support miners and mining communities. It should be noted that much of the money provided multilaterally to the government has not been spent in the way in which it was intended, due to ongoing government corruption and a lack of international community oversight and accountability mechanisms for financial expenditures of donor money. Government financial cxx systems have not been sufficiently analyzed and improved, and the government has often accepted funding for projects it is not prepared to implement. There was a major scandal, for example, surrounding the parliamentary elections in 2004, as a damning report on the NEC’s performance by IFES detailed widespread irregularities and embezzlement of funds (this report was not made public, and led to the overhaul of the NEC). 5.1.2 Defending Democrats The diplomatic community in Sierra Leone has also been instrumental in verifying elections. Election monitoring has been an important part of diplomacy for democracy-promoting missions since the 1996 elections. The diplomatic community has also provided general elections support and contributed vast amounts of resources to ensure the success of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. During the 1996 presidential elections, the British took the lead within the international community in preparing the elections. The US and EU also played supporting roles. The 2002 presidential elections, the first since the official end of the civil war, were closely monitored by diplomats and were considered a major diplomatic priority. Once again, the UK, US, EU, and UN provided major funds for these elections. In addition, American Ambassador Chaveas secured the use of two contract helicopters that were dispatched around the country to fill gaps in preparation for Election Day. The UK, EU, and US all sent out election monitors in teams of two throughout the country to observe the elections. International observers have also been involved in monitoring in subsequent elections, including the 2007 presidential elections, whose results were monumental in that they brought about peaceful democratic transfer of power through the ballot box as Ernest Boi Koroma, leader of the APC opposition, won in a run-off. Koroma’s election was seen by many as more a rejection of the SLPP and its years of inept and corrupt rule than a wholehearted or informed endorsement of the APC. In spite of this, the peaceful transition to opposition rule is an extremely significant result for Sierra Leone.
5.2 CONCLUSIONS Although peace in Sierra Leone remains somewhat tenuous, diplomatic involvement in Sierra Leone has allowed the country to move out of civil war and begin the long and arduous path towards democratization and rebuilding. “Once the UK and UN decided, beginning in the late 1990s and culminating in May 2000, to engage more sincerely and vigorously over the long- term, others followed their lead. Sierra Leone remains one of the poorest countries on earth today (ranked 176 out of 177 countries in the UN Human Development Index as of 2006)", however, and still urgently needs to address many of the root causes of the civil war, including issues of corruption, abuse of power by politicians and local chiefs, and lack of economic opportunity for cxxi the majority of Sierra Leoneans, especially the growing youth population. (Human Rights Watch, 1998:13) Sierra Leone now has in place a functioning government – including a president and legislature elected freely and fairly by the populace; a justice system that, while seriously flawed, has shown signs of improvement; a security sector undergoing thorough reform; and a civil society that is becoming increasingly more active. Although elections are by no means a panacea, the 2007 presidential elections seem to have been a major step forward for the country. The election put in place a government that was seen as at least nominally credible by the international community and the population. The election, in combination with the security guarantee from the British and the major presence of the UNAMSIL force until 2005, helped consolidate the peace and allow Sierra Leone to move forward to focus upon other critical aspects of the democratization process, such as institution building, combating corruption, providing openings for civil society development, and ensuring freedom of the press and rule of law. Progress on each of these issues has been extremely slow. Yet continued international engagement in Sierra Leone since the late 1990s has illustrated the generally positive role that the international community can play once it decides to commit itself. The recent declaration of Sierra Leone as a priority country for the UN Peace Building Commission signifies the recognition of the need for the international community to maintain sufficient attention on post-conflict developments within Sierra Leone. In conclusion, Sierra Leone is a country where, if one judges in comparison with its past, and especially considering the conflict in the 1990s, the international community has gotten it somewhat right, while struggling in the attempt to address underlying causes of the war, foster institutions, or consolidate democracy. The initial rebellion could have easily been quelled in the first half of 1991. But the RUF – despite being both numerically inferior and extremely brutal against civilians – controlled two- thirds of Sierra Leone by the year’s end. The SLA’s equally poor behavior made this outcome possible Often afraid to directly confront or unable to locate the elusive RUF, government soldiers were brutal and indiscriminate in their search for rebels or sympathizers among the civilian population. After retaking captured towns, the SLA would perform a ‘mopping up’ operation in which the towns people were transported to concentration camp styled ‘strategic hamlets’ far from their homes in Eastern and Southern Sierra Leone under the pretense of separating the population from the insurgents. However in many cases, this was followed by much looting and theft after the villagers were evacuated. The SLA's sordid behavior inevitably led to the alienation of many civilians and pushed some Sierra Leoneans to join the rebel cause. With morale low and rations even lower, many SLA cxxii soldiers discovered that they could do better by joining with the rebels in looting civilians in the countryside instead of fighting against them. The local civilians referred to these soldiers as ‘sobels’ or ‘soldiers by day, rebels by night’ because of their close ties to the RUF. By mid-1993, the two opposing sides became virtually indistinguishable. For these reasons, civilians increasingly relied on an irregular force called the Kamajors for their protection. A grassroots militia force, the Kamajors operated invisibly in familiar territory and was a significant impediment to marauding government and RUF troops. For displaced and unprotected Sierra Leonans, joining the Kamajors was a means of taking up arms to defend family and home due to the SLA’s perceived incompetence and active collusion with the rebel enemy. The Kamajors clashed with both government and RUF forces and was instrumental in countering government soldiers and rebels who were looting villages. The success of the Kamajors raised calls for its expansion, and members of street gangs and deserters were also co-opted into the organization. However, the Kamajors became corrupt and deeply involved in extortion, murder, and kidnappings by the end of the conflict. Within one year of fighting, the RUF offensive had stalled, but it still remained in control of large territories in Eastern and Southern Sierra Leone leaving many villages unprotected while also disrupting food and government diamond production. Soon the government was unable to pay both its civil servants and the SLA. As a result, the Momoh regime lost all remaining credibility and a group of disgruntled junior officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew Momoh on 29 April 1992. Strasser justified the coup and the establishment of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) by referencing the corrupt Momoh regime and its inability to resuscitate the economy, provide for the people of Sierra Leone, and repel the rebel invaders. The NPRC’s coup was largely popular because it promised to bring peace to Sierra Leone. But the NPRC’s promise would prove to be short lived
In March 1993, with much help from ECOMOG troops provided by Nigeria, the SLA recaptured the Koidu and Kono diamond districts and pushed the RUF to the Sierra Leone – Liberia border. The RUF was facing supply problems as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) gains inside Liberia were restricting the ability of Charles Taylor’s NPFL to trade with the RUF. By the end of 1993, many observers thought that the war was over because for the first time in the conflict the Sierra Leone Army was able to establish itself in the Eastern and the Southern mining districts. However, with senior government officials neglectful of the conditions faced by SLA soldiers, front line soldiers became resentful of their poor conditions and began helping themselves to Sierra Leone’s rich natural resources. This cxxiii included alluvial diamonds as well as looting and ‘sell game’, a tactic in which government forces would withdraw from a town but not before leaving arms and ammunition for the roving rebels in return for cash. Renegade SLA soldiers even clashed with Kamajor units on a number of occasions when the Kamajors intervened to halt the looting and mining. The NPRC government also had a motivation for allowing the war to continue, since as long as the country was at war the military government would not be called upon to hand over rule to a democratically-elected civilian government. The war dragged on as a low intensity conflict until January 1995 when RUF forces and dissident SLA elements seized the SIEROMCO (bauxite) and Sierra Rutile (titanium dioxide) mines in the Moyamba and Bonthe districts in the country's south west, furthering the government’s economic struggles and enabling a renewed RUF advance on the capital at Freetown. In March 1995, with the RUF within twenty miles of Freetown, Executive Outcomes, a paramilitary group from South Africa, arrived in Sierra Leone. For $1.8 million per month (financed primarily by the International Monetary Fund), according Mutwol, EO was paid to accomplish three goals: To return the diamond and mineral mines to the government, to locate and destroy the RUF’s headquarters, and to operate a successful propaganda program that would encourage local Sierra Leoneans to support the government of Sierra Leone. (Mutwol, 2009:71)
EO’s military force consisted of 500 military advisers and 3,000 highly trained and well-equipped combat-ready soldiers, backed by tactical air support and transport. Executive Outcomes employed black Angolans and Namibians from apartheid-era South Africa’s former 32 Battalion, with an officer corps of white South Africans. Harper’s Magazine described this controversial unit as a collection of former spies, assassins, and crack bush guerrillas, most of whom had served for fifteen to twenty years in South Africa’s most notorious counter insurgency units. As a military force, EO was extremely skilled and conducted a highly successful counter insurgency against the RUF. In just ten days of fighting, EO was able to drive the RUF forces back sixty miles into the interior of the country EO outmatched the RUF forces in all operations. In just seven months, EO, with support from loyal SLA and the Kamajors battalions, recaptured the diamond mining districts and the Kangari Hills, a major RUF stronghold A second offensive captured the provincial capital and the largest city in Sierra Leone and destroyed the RUF’s main base of operations near Bo, finally forcing the RUF to admit defeat and sign the Abidjan Peace Accord in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire on 30 November 1996. This period of relative peace also allowed the country to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in February and March 1996. Ahmad cxxiv
Tejan Kabbah (of the Sierra Leone People's Party [SLPP]), a diplomat who had worked at the UN for more than 20 years, won the presidential election. The Abidjan Peace Accord mandated that Executive Outcomes was to pull out within five weeks after the arrival of a neutral peacekeeping force. The main stumbling block that prevented Sankoh from signing the agreement sooner was the number and type of peacekeepers that were to monitor the ceasefire. Additionally, continued Kamajor attacks and the fear of punitive tribunals following demobilization kept many rebels in the bush despite their dire situation. However, in January 1997, the Kabbah government – beset by demands to reduce expenditures by the International Monetary Fund – ordered EO to leave the country, even though a neutral monitoring force had yet to arrive. The departure of EO opened up an opportunity for the RUF to regroup for renewed military attacks. The March 1997 arrest of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria also angered RUF members, who reacted with escalated violence. By the end of March 1997, the peace accord had collapsed. After the departure of Executive Outcomes, the credibility of the Kabbah government declined, especially among members of the SLA, who saw themselves being eclipsed by both the RUF on one side and the independent but pro-government Kamajors on the other. On 25 March 1997, a group of disgruntled SLA officers freed and armed 600 prisoners from the Pademba Road prison in Freetown. One of the prisoners, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, emerged as the leader of the coup and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) proclaimed itself the new After receiving the blessing of Foday Sankoh, who was then living under house arrest in Nigeria, members of the RUF – supposedly on its last legs – were ordered out of the bush to participate in the coup. Without hesitation and encountering only light resistance from SLA loyalists, 5,000 rag- tag rebel fighters marched 100 miles and overran the capital. Without fear or reluctance, RUF and SLA dissidents then proceeded to parade peacefully together. Koroma then appealed to Nigeria for the release of Foday Sankoh, appointing the absent leader to the position of deputy chairman of the AFRC. The joint AFRC/RUF leadership then proclaimed that the war had been won, and a great wave of looting and reprisals against civilians in Freetown (dubbed "Operation Pay Yourself" by some of its participants) followed. President Kabbah, surrounded only by his bodyguards, left by helicopter for exile in nearby Guinea. The AFRC junta was opposed by members of Sierra Leone's civil society such as student unions, journalists associations, women's groups and others, not only because of the violence it unleashed but because of its political attacks on press freedoms and civil rights. The international response to the coup was also overwhelmingly negative. The UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) condemned the coup, foreign governments withdrew their diplomats and missions cxxv
(and in some cases evacuated civilians) from Freetown, and Sierra Leone's membership in the Commonwealth was suspended. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also condemned the AFRC coup, and ECOMOG forces demanded that the new junta return power peacefully to the Kabbah government or risk sanctions and increased military presence. ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone brought the AFRC/RUF rebels to the negotiating table where, in October 1997, they agreed to a tentative peace known as the Conakry Peace Plan. Despite having agreed to the plan, the AFRC/RUF continued to fight. In March 1998, overcoming entrenched AFRC positions, the ECOMOG forces retook the capital and reinstated the Kabbah government, but let the rebels flee without further harassment. The regions lying just beyond Freetown proved much more difficult to pacify. Thanks in part to bad road conditions, lack of support aircraft, and a revenge driven rebel force, ECOMOG’s offensive ground to a halt just outside Freetown. ECOMOG’s forces suffered from several weakness, the most important being, poor command and control, low morale, poor training in counterinsurgency, low manpower, limited air and sea capability, and poor funding.
In January 1999 the AFRC/RUF again set upon Freetown in a bloody assault known as "Operation No Living Thing" in which rebels entered neighborhoods to loot, rape and kill indiscriminately. A Human Rights Watch report documented the atrocities committed during this attack. The report estimated that “over 7,000 people were killed and that at least half of them were civilians. Unable to consistently defend itself against the AFRC/RUF rebels, the Kabbah regime was forced to make serious concessions in the Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999”. (Human Rights Watch, 1999:32)
Given that Nigeria was due to recall its ECOMOG forces without achieving a tactical victory over the RUF, the international community intervened diplomatically to promote negotiations between the AFRC/RUF rebels and the Kabbah regime. The Lome Peace Accord, signed on 7th July 1999, is controversial in that Sankoh was pardoned for treason, granted the position of Vice President, and made chairman of the commission that oversaw Sierra Leone’s diamond mines. In return, the RUF was ordered to demobilize and disarm its armies under the supervision of an international peacekeeping force which would initially be under the authority of both ECOMOG and the United Nations. The Lome Peace Agreement was the subject of protests both in Sierra Leone and by international human rights groups abroad, mainly because it handed over to Sankoh, the commander of the unimaginably brutal RUF, the second most powerful position in the country, and control over all of Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond mines. cxxvi
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration- Following the Lome Peace Agreement, the security situation in Sierra Leone was still unstable because many rebels refused to commit themselves to the peace process. The DDR camps were an attempt to convince the rebel forces to literally exchange their weapons for food, clothing, and shelter. During a six week quarantine period, former combatants were taught basic skills that could be put to use in a peaceful profession after they return to society. After 2001, DDR camps became increasingly effective and by 2002 they had collected over 45,000 weapons and hosted over 70,000 former combatants. (Human Rights Watch, 2005)
In October 1999 the UN established the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The main objective of UNAMSIL was to assist with the disarmament process and enforce the terms established under the Lome Peace Agreement. Unlike other previous neutral peacekeeping forces, UNAMSIL brought serious military power. The original multi-national force was commanded by General Vijay Jetley of India. Jetley later resigned and was replaced by Lieutenant General Daniel Opande of Kenya in November 2000. UNAMSIL forces began arriving in Sierra Leone in December 1999. At that time the maximum number of troops to be deployed was set at 6,000. Only a few months later, though, in February 2000, a new UN resolution authorized the deployment of 11,000 combatants In March 2001 that number was increased to 17,500 troops, making it at the time the largest UN force in existence, and UNAMSIL soldiers were deployed in the RUF-held diamond areas. Despite these numbers, UNAMSIL was frequently rebuffed and humiliated by RUF rebels, being subjected to attacks, obstruction and disarmament. (Human Rights Watch, 2005) In the most egregious example, in May 2000 over 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were captured by the RUF and held hostage. Using the weapons and armored personnel carriers of the captured UNAMSIL troops, the rebels advanced towards Freetown, taking over the town of Lunsar to its northeast. For over a year later, the UNAMSIL force meticulously avoided intervening in RUF controlled mining districts lest another major incident occur. After the UNAMSIL force had essentially rearmed the RUF, a call for a new military intervention was made to save the UNAMSIL hostages and the government of Sierra Leone. In May 2000, the situation on the ground had deteriorated to such an extent that British Royal Marines were deployed in Operation Palliser to evacuate foreign nationals and establish order. They stabilized the situation, and were the catalyst for a ceasefire that helped end the war. The British forces, under the command of Brigadier David Richards, expanded their original mandate which was limited to evacuating commonwealth citizens and now aimed to save UNAMSIL from the brink of collapse. At the time of the British intervention in May 2000, half of cxxvii the country remained under the RUF’s control. The 1,200 man British ground force - supported by air and sea power - shifted the balance of power in favor of the government and the rebel forces were easily repelled from the areas beyond Freetown. Several factors led to the end of the civil war. First, Guinean cross-border bombing raids against villages believed to be bases used by the RUF working in conjunction with Guinean dissidents were very effective in routing the rebels. Another factor encouraging a less combative RUF was a new UN resolution that demanded that the government of Liberia expel all RUF members, end their financial support of the RUF, and halt the illicit diamond trade. Finally, the Kamajors, feeling less threatened now that the RUF was disintegrating in the face of a robust opponent, failed to incite violence like they had done in the past. With their backs against the wall and without any international support, the RUF forces signed a new peace treaty within a matter of weeks. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah declared the eleven year long Sierra Leone Civil War officially over. By most estimates, over 50,000 people had lost their lives during the war. Countless more fell victim to the reprehensible and perverse behavior of the combatants. In May 2002 President Kabbah and his party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), won landslide victories in the presidential and legislative elections. Kabbah was re-elected for a five year term. The RUF's political wing, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), failed to win a single seat in parliament. The elections were marked by irregularities and allegations of fraud, but not to a degree that significantly affected the outcome. On 28 July 2002 the British withdrew a 200-strong military contingent that had been in country since the summer of 2000, leaving behind a 140-strong military training team with orders to professionalize the SLA and Navy. In November 2002, UNAMSIL began a gradual reduction from a peak level of 17,800 personnel. Under pressure from the British, the withdrawal slowed, so that by October 2003 the UNAMSIL contingent still stood at 12,000 men. As peaceful conditions continued through 2004, however, UNAMSIL drew down its forces to slightly over 4,100 by December 2004. The UN Security Council extended UNAMSIL’s mandate until June 2005 and again until December 2005. UNAMSIL completed the withdrawal of all troops in December 2005 and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). The Lome Peace Accord called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict to tell their stories and facilitate healing. Subsequently, the Sierra Leonean government asked the UN to help set up a Special Court for Sierra Leone, which would try those who "bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes cxxviii and serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law within the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996." Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court began operating in the summer of 2002.
Diamond revenues in Sierra Leone have increased more than tenfold since the end of the conflict, from $10 million in 2000 to about $130 million in 2004, although according to the UNAMSIL surveys of mining sites, "more than 50 per cent of diamond mining still remains unlicensed and reportedly considerable illegal smuggling of diamonds continues". (Campbell, 2004:15) On 13 January 2003, a small group of armed men tried unsuccessfully to break into an armory in Freetown. Former AFRC-junta leader Koroma, after being linked to the raid, went into hiding. In March, the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued its first indictments for war crimes during the civil war. Foday Sankoh, already in custody, was indicted, along with notorious RUF field commander Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, Koroma, the Minister of Interior and former head of the Civil Defense Force, Samuel Hinga Norman, and several others. Norman was arrested when the indictments were announced, while Bockarie and Koroma remained at large (presumably in Liberia). On 5 May 2003, Bockarie was killed in Liberia. President Charles G. Taylor expected to be indicted by the Special Court and had feared Bockarie’s testimony. He is suspected of ordering Bockarie's murder, although no indictments are pending. Several weeks later, word filtered out of Liberia that Koroma had been killed as well, although his death remains unconfirmed. In June the Special Court announced Taylor’s indictment for war crimes. Sankoh died in prison in Freetown on 29 July 2003 from a heart attack. He had been ailing for some time. In August 2003 President Kabbah testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on his role during the civil war. On 1 December 2003, Major General Tom Carew, who had been the Chief of Defence Staff for the Government of Sierra Leone and an important figure in the Sierra Leonean Army, was reassigned to civilian duties. In June 2007, the Special Court found three of the eleven people indicted – Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu – “guilty of war crimes, including acts of terrorism, collective punishments, extermination, murder, rape, outrages upon personal dignity, conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces, enslavement and pillage”. (Jalloh, 2001:28) Sierra Leone was embroiled in a civil war that began in March 1991, as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow successive governments. On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone [UNAMSIL] to cooperate cxxix with the Government and the other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL's mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and on 30 March 2001. The internal conflict involved multiple ethnic groups and resulted in an estimated 15,000 deaths from 1991 through 1996. By early 1999 estimates of the number of dead in the rebel war ranged upward from 50,000. At different times estimates of the number of displaced people were as high as 2.5 million - more than half of the entire population. As many as half a million persons fled to neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict, and remain outside the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia. Over 250,000 citizens crossed the borders of Guinea and Liberia to escape the conflict; many thousands of others were displaced internally, and fled their homes to hide in wooded areas, or to towns where there are security forces and some degree of protection from rebel forces. The conditions that existed in Sierra Leone made it vulnerable to a person like Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front, to gather up disenfranchised young people who had not been paid for a long time. Over a period of twenty years, the central government gradually disintegrated as a result primarily of the political class, as they would say in Sierra Leone, eating everything in the government. Over a period of time, they destroyed the ability of the government to rule, to govern, to do anything on behalf of the people. They stopped years ago paying civil servants or teachers. And when the center disintegrated all the periphery went its own way. And people felt that they could not change this society through the political process because it had been compromised through the one-party state and through corruption. Foreign involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict is a serious problem, and there is clear evidence that Liberia and Burkina Faso are supporting the rebel efforts. Sierra Leone's participation in the West African peace-keeping force, ECOMOG, that went into Liberia that provoked Charles Taylor's retaliation against Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor of Liberia, saw that intervention as hostile to him when he was fighting for power there. They also had the support of Libya, which sent weapons to them through Burkina Faso which were then transshipped overland through the Ivory Coast, through Liberia, into Sierra Leone. The diamond mining industry provides the rebels with potential revenue of approximately $300 million per year. Precisely how much is spent on small arms and ammunition is unknown. What is known is that arms are apparently procured in eastern Europe and staged through Burkina Faso and then continue on to Liberia for eventual delivery to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. cxxx
Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country. Before the civil war began in 1992, more than 70 percent of the 4.5 million citizens were involved in some aspect of agriculture, mainly subsistence farming. Although the country has substantial mineral resources, including diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite, official receipts from legal exports have been small in recent years. For decades the majority of diamond and gold production has been smuggled abroad. The economic infrastructure has nearly collapsed due to corruption, neglect, and war-related disruptions. The 6- year RUF insurgency dislocated more than 40 percent of the country's population, placing additional burdens on Sierra Leone's fragile economy. Eighteen ethnic groups make up the indigenous population of Sierra Leone. The Temne in the north and the Mende in the South are the largest. About 60,000 are Creoles, descendants of freed slaves who returned to Sierra Leone from Great Britain and North America. Sierra Leoneans were noted for their educational achievement, trading activity, entrepreneurial skills, and arts and crafts work, particularly wood carving. Many are part of larger ethnic networks extending into several countries, which link West African states in the area. The colonial history of Sierra Leone was not placid. The indigenous people mounted several unsuccessful revolts against British rule and Creole domination. Most of the 20th century history of the colony was peaceful, however, and independence was achieved without violence. Sierra Leone is an interesting country because it has no serious ethnic divisions. It has no serious religious divisions. It has no serious class divisions or regional divisions. People married across tribal boundaries, across religious boundaries, because the country is essentially a Muslim country with some Christians and some animists. But those divisions never really became an issue in early Sierra Leone. All ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, there is little ethnic segregation in urban areas. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population. Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute appreciably to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict. There was no identifiable ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels, who controlled territory by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent. cxxxi
In October 1990, President Joseph Saidu Momoh set up a constitutional review commission to review the one-party 1978 constitution with a view to broadening the existing political process and strengthening and consolidating the democratic foundation and structure of the nation. There was great suspicion that Momoh was not serious, however, and All Peoples Congress (APC) rule was increasingly marked by abuses of power. The rebel war in the eastern part of the county posed an increasing burden on the country, and on April 29, 1992, a group of young Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) officers launched a military coup which sent Momoh into exile in Guinea and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as the ruling authority in Sierra Leone. After 4 years of military government, which followed 25 years of one party rule, the Republic of Sierra Leone returned to civilian government after elections in March 1996. With 70 percent of the electorate participating, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected President in the first free and fair elections since 1967. On 30 November 1996, President Kabbah signed the Abidjan Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had been attempting to overthrow successive governments since March 1991. Joint Government and RUF committees were to oversee disarmament and demobilization of RUF and government forces. Mustapha (2010) recorded. The RSLMF was supported by Nigerian and Guinean military contingents and by personnel working under a training and logistics contract with Executive Outcomes, a private South African mercenary firm. In compliance with the November 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement, President Kabbah terminated the contract with Executive Outcomes at the end of January 1997. For 20 months, Executive Outcomes had played the critical role in government efforts to protect major towns and diamond mining areas from RUF attacks. Groups of traditional hunters (including the Mende Kamajohs, Temne Kapras, and Koranko Tamaboros) organized as civil defense militias, with government support defended their chiefdoms from RUF attacks and RSLMF looting. Neither the RSLMF nor the civil defense militias were fully under government control. Though the threat had significantly diminished by the time of the democratic elections in 1996, which brought President Kabbah to office, a number of serious problems remained; in particular, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had refused to participate in the elections and continued to control some of Sierra Leone's territory. It turned out near impossible to reconcile a government unfriendly army (who backed another candidate having already had to give up power) and the well-organised pro-government kamajors (the regional armed militia who had been trained by foreign mercenaries officially employed by a previous government to fight the RUF). cxxxii
This friction culminated in an army-led coup in May 1997 -the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)-, which invited the RUF to join government in the hope to gain wider recognition. This was to be the first coup in Africa that had been effectively boycotted by the UN. On 25 May 1997, dissident junior officers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) violently seized power from the 14-month-old democratically elected Government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The United Nations Security Council condemned the overthrow of the government and called upon the military junta to restore the elected Government unconditionally. Major Johnny Paul Koroma, awaiting trial on charges stemming from a September 1996 coup attempt, was freed from prison and named Chairman of the new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution, banned political parties and all public demonstrations and meetings, and announced that all legislation would be made by military decree. Koroma invited the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to join the AFRC in exercising control over the country. The RUF quickly took control of the military junta, although Koroma remained nominal Chairman of the AFRC. The RUF had conducted an insurgency against successive governments. After 25 May 1997, the RUF joined with RSLMF troops loyal to the AFRC junta and renamed itself the People's Army of Sierra Leone. RSLMF forces loyal to the AFRC appear to function separately from RUF troops. They also fought occasional battles against each other. In June the AFRC formed joint military and police antilooting squads and gave them authority to shoot looters on sight. On 08 October 1997, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions prohibiting the importation of weapons, military materiel, and petroleum as well as international travel by members of the military junta. “Dozens of civilians were killed in clashes between AFRC/RUF forces and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as ECOMOG attempted to enforce the sanctions”. (Gberie, 2005:53) On 23 October 1997, AFRC/RUF and ECOWAS delegations signed a peace plan calling for the restoration to power of President Kabbah on April 22, 1998. In January 1998, the coup was (only partly and only temporarily, it turned out) overturned by 'ECOMOG' forces (the Nigerian-lead West Africa multilateral peace-keeping force) and significant progress in restoring order was made, by the returning democratic government. Notably, this was the first time that a coup against a democratic government in Africa had been reversed without UN intervention, suggesting a new and positive level of regional co-operation. In March 1998 the Government, led by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected in 1996, was returned to power after 9 months in exile. The President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has had a majority in the Parliament since 1996. The Government's return followed cxxxiii the February 1998 ouster of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and Revolutionary United Front. Throughout 1998 AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses, including brutal killings, severe mutilations, and deliberate dismemberments, in a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No Living Thing." (Cooper, 2004:11) One particularly vicious practice was cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants who were unwilling to cooperate with or provide for the insurgents. The victims ranged from small children to elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off, in others two limbs, typically two hands or arms. Rebel forces also detained, decapitated, burned alive, and inflicted bullet and machete wounds on civilians; many died from their wounds before they could obtain any form of treatment. The rebel forces abducted missionaries and aid workers, ambushed humanitarian relief convoys and raided refugee sites. The junta forces continued the long-standing practice of abducting villagers and using them as forced laborers, as sex slaves, and as human shields during skirmishes with Government and ECOMOG forces. Boys were forced to become child soldiers. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic against women. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The AFRC and RUF junta forces were defeated and driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by the armed forces of Nigeria. In February and March 1998 there was fierce fighting throughout the country as ECOMOG and members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) continued to fight remnants of the AFRC and RUF, particularly in the larger cities outside the capital. However, government and ECOMOG forces failed to gain control of the whole country, and the civil conflict continued throughout 1998. In December 1998 AFRC AND RUF rebels infiltrated Freetown and, at year's end, controlled areas close to the capital. Unfortunately clashes continued to occur between ECOMOG, rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) who attacked and re-entered Freetown in January, 1999. It was to be the saddest period of the 10year old conflict with reprisals and worst human suffering. Following the agreement of all parties to the principle of a negotiated settlement in February, 1999, a ceasefire was arranged for May 24, 1999 and a UN backed peace accord implemented. The early months of 1999 were consumed with some of the bloodiest fighting in the country's eight-year civil war. By the end of January, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force had regained control of Freetown - pushing the war back into Sierra Leone's rugged interior. But the cost of the assault on Freetown was staggering. Estimates suggest upwards of five or six- thousand people were killed, thousands more were injured, and still more thousands were left cxxxiv homeless by a rebel arson spree. The psychological impact of the invasion was equally important, leaving many Freetown residents - like Christina Leigh - fearing peace with the rebels would be impossible. Pressure to resolve the crisis grew from the international community and from Nigeria's new civilian government, which wanted to bring its troops home. In May 1999 president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah allowed Foday Sankoh, the jailed chief of the Revolutionary United Front rebel movement to travel to Lome, Togo for talks with his military commanders. Eventually, teams of negotiators from the government and civilian groups joined the talks. After several weeks of difficult negotiations, a wide-ranging peace accord was signed on 07 July 1999. Under the terms of the Lome accord, a cease-fire was agreed to, and the United Nations pledged to send a sizeable peacekeeping force to oversee the disarmament and demobilization of an estimated 45,000 combatants on both sides. Mr. Sankoh was pardoned and released from the death sentence he was facing for treason. Other combatants who had not engaged in heinous war crimes were also given a blanket amnesty, and the rebel factions were allotted four ministerial posts in a new government of national unity. Mr. Sankoh demanded and received a high-level position as well, being named chairman of a special commission on strategic resources - namely the diamonds that lie at the root of Sierra Leone's conflict. In the months following the accord, Sierra Leone's peace process settled into the doldrums, and very little happened. Citing security concerns, Mr. Sankoh - and his ally former coup leader Johnny Paul Koromah - remained in Togo or Liberia, raising questions about their commitment to the July accord. Divisions also emerged between the two men - with Mr. Koromah's supporters accusing Mr. Sankoh of making their leader insignificant. And in September and October, a series of kidnappings and skirmishes erupted between the factions. Foday Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone in October, heralding what he called a new era, and asking the Sierra Leonean people for their forgiveness. Denov accounted: In the final weeks of 1999, Sierra Leone's peace process remained a work in progress, and many important parts of the July agreement had not been implemented. UN troops began arriving, but their numbers fell far short of the 6,000 authorized by the Security Council. This delay slowed the disarmament process, which had only recovered a token number of weapons, and raised suspicions on both sides. As Sierra Leone began the year 2000, disarmament was the key issue. Without it, political reforms, social reconciliation, jump starting the economy, and returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to their homes would be impossible. In February 2000 the UN Security Council voted in enlarge UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 troops, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation. At that time, cxxxv
the UN peacekeepers were taking on the duties of the departing 5,500-troop peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), made up of units from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria. (Denov, 2010:7)
All the parties to the settlement agreed to return to Freetown with a share in government and a UN peace keeping force, larger than that seen in Kosovo or Timor, was to be widely deployed in the country. However distrust continued to prevail on the intentions of each party, and UN peacekeepers after initial success in disarming RUF or AFRC groups, faced serious opposition when closing in on the alluvial diamond producing areas, and eventually fell victim to hostage taking in May 2000. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) subsequently reneged, refused to disarm and took hundreds of UN soldiers hostage. The United Nations force, which had been designed, equipped, and deployed as a peacekeeping force, was quickly forced into actual combat with RUF -- one of the parties that had pledged to cooperate with it. After Mr. Sankoh's forces fought with UN peacekeepers and had taken hundreds of them hostage, he himself was taken into custody by the Sierra Leone government. The UN in close cooperation with President Taylor of Liberia managed to liberate the hostages with limited casualties, and the RUF found itself without leadership after the capture and imprisonment of their discredited spokesman Foday Sankoh. The UN Security Council on 19 May 2000 authorized the expansion of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to 13,000 troops and military observers. The expansion was approved when West African nations, especially Nigeria, offered additional troops to the beleaguered UNAMSIL after about 500 peacekeepers were detained by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters who refused to be disarmed and the RUF began attacking UNAMSIL positions. In late May 2000 Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone be increased to 16,500 in order to help stabilize the peace, and suggested that more troops might be needed in the future to solidify the peace process. (Human Rights Watch, 2005)
On 14 August 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1315, which requested "the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court," whose subject matter jurisdiction "should include notably crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law." (Dorman, 2005:16) The Special Court for Sierra Leone differs from the war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). While the ICTY and ICTR were established cxxxvi by Chapter VII Resolutions of the Security Council, the Special Court is a treaty-based court established by the Agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, and lacks the power of the ICTY and ICTR to assert primacy over national courts of other States or to order the surrender of an accused located in any other State. And unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which are composed exclusively of international judges elected by the UN General Assembly, and a Prosecutor selected by the Security Council, the Special Court is composed of both international and Sierra Leonean judges, prosecutors and staff. On 18 January 2002, the devastating 11-year civil conflict officially ended when all parties to the conflict issued a Declaration of the End of the War. The Government asserted control over the whole country backed by a large UN peacekeeping force. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgents, who fought successive governments since 1991, were completed disarmament and demobilization. The Civil Defense Force (CDF), a government-allied militia, also disarmed and demobilized, but many CDF members retained informal links to act in concert as a veterans' lobbying group and in their centuries-old role as members of traditional hunting societies. In May 2002 peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections were held; Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re- elected President and his Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won a large majority in Parliament. Many international monitors declared the elections free and fair; however, there were numerous reports of election irregularities and abuses. Since the resumption of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in May 2001, an estimated 72,500 former combatants disarmed; on 31 January 2002, the disarmament and demobilization sections of the program were completed. The process of reintegration continued at year's end. The U.N. maintained a force of approximately 17,500 peacekeepers during most of the year. In September 2002 the U.N. Security Council decided to begin a gradual withdrawal of U.N. Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops, to be completed by 2005. The official independent judiciary began functioning in areas abandoned during the war, but there still were sections of the country where the judiciary had not yet returned. The judiciary demonstrated substantial independence in practice but at times was subject to corruption.
The security situation in Sierra Leone, which has steadily improved since August 2000, was bolstered by the May 2002 re-election of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. However, areas near the Liberian border remain unstable as a result of continued border incursions by both the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and LURD. According to UN OCHA, the humanitarian community operating in Sierra Leone has developed an alert system to inform agencies of security incidents near the border. On July 16, 2002, LURD militia abducted 20 people from the villages cxxxvii of Sanga, Kolu, and Manduvuluhun. The villagers were still reported missing at the end of August and are presumed to be in Liberia. On September 5, 2002, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended a six-month extension for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the gradual downsizing of the mission from the current level of 17,000 peacekeeping troops to 5,000 by 2004. The U.N. Security Council approved the renewal of UNAMSIL's mandate on September 18. President Kabbah requested the extension in August 2002, citing the threat posed to Sierra Leone's fragile peace by renewed insecurity in Liberia. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) campaign in Sierra Leone officially ended on January 7, 2002. According to the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), approximately 21,000 of the 54,000 ex-combatants are participating in reintegration programs; 10,509 former soldiers have completed the program. According to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), less than 12,000 IDPs remained in Sierra Leone as of July 2002. The remaining IDPs are mainly in the Tonkolili District. UNHCR completed the resettlement of registered Sierra Leonean IDPs from camps in the Pujehun District in August 2002 leaving the camps occupied almost exclusively by Liberian refugees. The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) expects resettlement efforts to be completed by October 2002. (Keen, 2005:58) The number of refugees returning to Sierra Leone from Liberia continues to decline. As of September 2002, UNHCR reports indicated that approximately 30,000 Sierra Leoneans remained in Liberia. According to UN OCHA, the refugees are awaiting more favorable social and economic conditions to develop in Sierra Leone before returning. In September, repatriation vessels, with capacities of 300, transported between 50 and 100 returnees per trip. On September 10, UNHCR announced the temporary suspension of repatriation efforts until refugee demand increases. According to UNHCR, of the 2,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Nigeria, only 270 have registered for repatriation. UNHCR resumed overland repatriation of refugees from Guinea following a 42-day suspension resulting from logistical problems. As of August 2002, 42,000 Sierra Leonean refugees remained in Guinea. (Keen, 2005) Focus has since been on retraining a new Sierra Leone army, as well as further ECOMOG reinforcement troops in Nigeria, by the UK and USA respectively. Meanwhile strategies have gradually been put in place to reduce illicit 'conflict' diamonds exports in order to reduce the RUF's source of funding. It is expected that an enlarged UN/ECOMOG/Coordinated S L army possibly incorporating previous kamajors would eventually defeat the RUF and remaining AFRC now calling themselves the 'West Side Boys' ill-famed for their capture of strayed British soldiers cxxxviii in Summer 2000; however a new RUF leadership under pressure seems more anxious to push for a negotiated settlement, as long as they can overcome their view that the UK's involvement is an extension of mercenary deployment that successfully crushed them years earlier. High level visits demonstrate the world's readiness to alleviate the human tragedy and bring lasting peace to the sub-region. Throughout the 10 year period, Sierra Leone has constantly improved its minerals legislation. For the time being a situation of force majeure exists, with the suspension of exploration work on Mano's licences. It is hoped that preliminary visits to permit areas in Sierra Leone will be possible in the near future. Sierra Leone is rich in minerals and is one of the world's most important sources of large diamonds. The country also hosts gold, platinum, rutile, chrome, bauxite and iron. Major producers have included the Nord/Consolidated Rutile world-class rutile deposit, Alusuisse's bauxite operations and the famous Kono diamond fields worked for many years by Selection Trust at Yengema and Koidu.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS Our study was able to establish the framework that Nigeria contributed most to the democratization of Sierra Leone. In view of the foregoing, we put forward these recommendations for policy implementation: Nigeria is seen to be setting the pace of a ‘big brother’ role in Africa which isn’t appreciated, meanwhile, losing soldiers, pumping funds, supplying resources and wasting time due to her foreign policy objectives. However, its time she redefine her objectives from intervening in other countries internal problems and focus on her own internal issues and state building, after which when advanced, may assist others. • The deep division, misunderstanding and hatred arising from the different political parties in Sierra Leone characterize the major cause of the civil war which eventually resulted to ‘state-collapse, hence, the different political parties should reach to an agreement. • Sierra Leone has long toyed with the issue of national cohesion and development at its own peril. Thus, democratic forces, civil society, organizations and the general public should not relent in their agitations for a national dialogue where the teething problems besetting the Sierra Leonean state would be tabled and resolved amicably. • Corruption has eaten deep into the marrow of political leaders which made even Sierra Leone’s ‘natural resource’ more of a curse instead of a blessing (resource cxxxix
curse). Therefore, those in power should be checked by law if embezzlement and misappropriation or unnecessary accumulation of wealth is found. • Nigeria should provide clear guidelines in their foreign policy objectives and design new strategies of peacekeeping operations. Also Nigeria should provide more protective materials of war for her troops so as to reduce the number of death of her peacekeeping troops in the ECOMOG. • Moreso, Nigeria should try to redefine her foreign policy, because some African countries are taking it for granted. If there are strings attached to Nigeria’s peacekeeping operations, neighbouring countries will be mindful of it and will respect Nigeria the more because no country, not even America, will do anything free of charge to another country. • Evidently, Nigeria’s contributions to peacekeeping operations are unparalleled. Nigeria has been consistent in promoting peace and security, both at regional, sub- regional and global level. We examined the contributions of Nigeria’s troops to achieve peace in Sierra Leone and observed that the independent Nigeria has reckoned to employ fund, knowledge, military, police and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations across the globe. Nigeria has usually participated in well over fifteen (15) peace missions. Fundamental principles underline Nigeria’s participation in international peacekeeping operation. Meanwhile, these principles are enshrined in Nigeria policy objectives concentrated in promotion and development of Africa. This is expressed through her numerous peacekeeping mission in the sub-region and the globe. • Arising from the above discourse, we recommend that Nigeria’s participation in international peace and security must be built on a general idea, which acknowledges the inevitability of power and is able to distinguish between the concepts of perceived and real power. It should be recognize that why perceived power could have a deterrent effect; there are chances that value system may compel adversary’s hostile reaction, which would make war or armed conflict inescapable. Nigeria must recognize the fact that power is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. • It should be seen to complement such other techniques of statecraft as diplomacy economic sanction, propaganda and so on. Nigeria’s participation in global affairs of the 21st century must be seen to reflect forces in the internal and external cxl
environment or it will be inappropriate, inadequate and irrelevant, with dire consequences. • Nigeria must also ensure that the interest and values that the non-state-actors pursue are not different from those defined by the state. This is only possible if the public participates in the determination of national interest and is widely consulted through recognized channels in the development of public policies. Nigeria’s National Interest must be the over-riding factor in her involvement in any peace mission or security operation internally. These international activities involve peace keeping missions that neither available resources nor circumstances can conveniently support just like western nations like USA and Britain among others. The nation should appreciate that what is desirable is not feasible, ad learn to make do with what quota of external activities she can contribute to without strains and stresses to herself, her citizens and even to others. • With a large sweeping population of about 150 million people, this is a huge resource base for the nation. This gives the country a solid base for effective participation in the area of international peace and security, especially peacekeeping. Nigeria’s armed forces should create specially trained peacekeeping troops as its preparedness to always respond to conflict and security situations in the sub-region, regional and global level. • Nigeria should aspire to be the “policeman” of Africa and the U.S of West Africa, a dedicated peacekeeping training curriculum which being from the military school (at the lowest level) to the National War College at the highest level should and must focus on basic skills like patrolling, map reading, observation post duties, mine clearing, road-blocks, manning, first aid administration, communication as well as knowledge of international laws and conventions. • Furthermore, the course contents of infantry centers and schools, including command and staff Colleges should be synchronized with international standard in peacekeeping. The institutes should be expanded to accommodate training of officers in escort duties, ensuring impartiality and neutrality in peacekeeping and ambush drills, cordon and search and guarding. • In conclusion, while keeping the peace, maintaining the peace and conflict resolution, all of the agencies involved (the foreign affairs department, diplomatic core, the military, the civil police, and all of the other participatory governmental cxli and non governmental agencies) should strive to promote the “Nigerian interest”, should articulate a position that promotes Nigerian indigenous companies that should have a first stab at reconstruction projects both on the pre or the post reconstruction eras. There should be an arm of the diplomatic core that engages the individuals in power in those conflict areas to accept Nigeria’s solicitation of help in order to facilitate the rebuilding process. After all, if Nigeria is good enough in helping solve those attendant problems, it also should be good enough in helping rebuild those economies, infrastructure and in general its’ government. These are what are attainable in the West with its colonial and post-colonial approach to underdeveloped world problem solving. In the West, these actors mostly intervene with selfish motives very often they have agendas of their own and are rarely completely impartial. For example, Albania, Italy no doubt feared a massive influx of refugees but also delighted in the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to lead an operation that could buttress its claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council. It is also what the UN accomplishes through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the only difference this time is that the Nigerian approach will be more compassionate and with a human face.
cxlii
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Adebajo, Adekeye (2002). Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Auty, Richard M. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge.
Bankole Thompson (1997). The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone 1961-1995. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Beah, Ishmael (2007). A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gberie, Lansana (2005). A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana UP.
Bergner, Daniel (2003). In the Land of Magic Soldiers: a Story of White and Black in Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Campbell, Greg (2004). Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones. Boulder: Westview.
Cooper, Niel; Goodhand, Jonathan (2004). War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Denov, Myriam S (2010). Child soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front. New York: Cambridge University Press. cxliii
Dorman, Andrew M (2009). Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone. Ashgate. Lewins Books.
Hirsch, John L. (2000). Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Kamara, Mariatu with Susan McClelland (2008). The Bite of the Mango. Buffalo, NY: Annick Press.
Keen, David (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey.
Koroma, Abdul Karim (2004). Crisis and Intervention in Sierra Leone 1997-2003. Freetown and London: Andromeda Publications.
Mustapha, Marda; Bangura, Joseph J. (2010). Sierra Leone Beyond the Lomé Peace Accord. New York: Palgrave MacmXillan.
Mutwol, Julius (2009). Peace agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, State Responses, and Third-Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.
Olonisakin, Funmi (2008). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Özerdem, Alpaslan (2008). Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pham, John-Peter (2005). Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimension of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Richards, Paul (1996). Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
JOURNAL ARTICLES Abdullah, I., and Y Bangura, Y. eds (1997). “Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leon Civil War”. Special Issues of African Development 22 (3-4).
Azam, Jean-Paul (2006). "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians". Economics of Governance 7 (1).
Heupel, Monika and Bernhard Zang (2010). "On the Transformation of Warfare: a Plausibility Probe of the New War Thesis". Journal of International Relations and Development 13 (1):
Jalloh, S. Balimo (2001). "Conflicts, Resources and Social Instability in Subsahara Africa – The Sierra Leone Case". Internationales Afrika-Forum 37 (2). cxliv
Lujala, Paivi (2005). "A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource". Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4).
Zack-Williams, Alfred B. (1999). "Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991– 98". Third World Quarterly 20 (1). CONFERENCE PAPER/PUBLIC LECTURE
Abdullah, Ibrahim (2004). “Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War”. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
Lykke, A.M. and Due, M.K. and Kristensen, M. and Nielsen, I. (2004). “The Sahel. Proceedings of the 16th Danish Sahel Workshop.” Dept. of Systematic Botany, Institute of Biological Sciences, Aarhus University. OFFICIAL DOCUMENT
Ayittey, George B.N. (2010). "A New Mandate For UN Mission In Africa". CADS Global Network.
Bell, Udy (2005). "Sierra Leone: Building on a Hard-Won Peace". UN Chronicle. December.
Global Human Rights Organization which promotes freedom of expression and access to information. (1998) Article 19: Vol. 8 No. 9 August.
Sesay, Amadu et al. (2009). “Post-War Regimes and State Reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone”. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Smillie, Ian, Gberie, Lansana and Hazelton, Ralph (2000). “The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Insecurity” (Summary Report). Ottawa, Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada. January.
Woods, Larry J. and Colonel Timothy R. Reese. (2008). "Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State". Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press. May.
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENT
Gberie, Lansana (1998). “War and state collapse: The case of Sierra Leone” (M.A. thesis). Wilfrid Laurier University.
NEWSPAPERS
African Elections Database (2007) "Elections in Sierra Leone", 17 September.
The Economist (2007) "How the mighty are falling", 5 July.
James Day (2011). "Revealed: Colonel Gaddafi's school for scoundrels", 15 March. cxlv
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Ackerman, Bruce and James Fishkin. (2004). Deliberation Day. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Adebajo, Adekeye (2002). Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Auty, Richard M. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge.
Bankole Thompson (1997). The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone 1961-1995. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Beah, Ishmael (2007). A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Bergner, Daniel (2003). In the Land of Magic Soldiers: a Story of White and Black in Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Campbell, Greg (2004). Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones. Boulder: Westview.
Cooper, Niel; Goodhand, Jonathan (2004). War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Denov, Myriam S (2010). Child soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dorman, Andrew M (2009). Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone. Ashgate. Lewins Books.
Egbui. K. I (1998). Grand Work of Research Methods and Procedures. Enugu: Institute for Development Studies. Englund, H. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2004). Rights and the politics of recognition in Africa. London: Zed Books.
Fardon, R. & Furniss, G. (2001). African broadcast cultures. Oxford: James Currey.
Fawole, W.F. (1999) Gen. Sani Abacha and the New Nigeria Foreign Policy. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd.
Francis, Adigwe (1984). Essentials of Government for West Africa. USA: Oxford University press.
Gberie, Lansana (2005). A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana UP. cxlvi
John. T. Rourrke (1997) International Politics on the World Stage, 6th ed. USA: McGraw- Hill.
Hirsch, John L. (2000). Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Kamara, Mariatu with Susan McClelland (2008). The Bite of the Mango. Buffalo, NY: Annick Press.
Keen, David (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey.
Klein Goldewijk, B. & de Gaay Fortman, B. (1999). Where needs meet rights: economic, social and cultural rights in a new perspective. Geneva: WCC Publications.
Kolawole, D. (1997) Readings in Political science. Ibadan: Dekaal Publishers.
Koroma, Abdul Karim (2004). Crisis and Intervention in Sierra Leone 1997-2003. Freetown and London: Andromeda Publications.
Mustapha, Marda; Bangura, Joseph J. (2010). Sierra Leone Beyond the Lomé Peace Accord. New York: Palgrave MacmXillan.
Mutwol, Julius (2009). Peace agreements and Civil Wars in Africa: Insurgent Motivations, State Responses, and Third-Party Peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.
Nicholas, A. (1988) Dictionary of Sociology. London, Pengium, Stephen H. and Books.
Obasi, I (2007). Politics and Globe Dictionary Enugu. Keny & Brothers Enterprises
Obasi, I. N (1999). Research Methodology in Political Science. Enugu: Academic Publishing Company.
Olonisakin, Funmi (2008). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Omotere, (2011). Nigeria’s foreign policy under Murtala/Obasanjo and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa: a comparative study. Ogun state, Nigeria. Ego Boosters Books.
Onyemachi, E. A (2009). Globalization Challenges and Nigeria Foreign Policy: Emerging Issues in the Formulation and Conduct of Nigeria Foreign Policy. Ebonyi: Willyrose & Appleseed Pubslihing Coy. Osaghae, E.E. (1996) Ethnicity, Class and the Struggle for State Power in Liberia. Dakar,Codestria.
Özerdem, Alpaslan (2008). Post-War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pham, John-Peter (2005). Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimension of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy. New York: Nova Science Publishers. cxlvii
Richards, Paul (1996). Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Rosenau, J. (1974) Comparing Foreign Policies. New York, john Wiley
Selltiz et al (1979). Research Methods in Social Relations. London: Methuen & Co Ltd.
Steven, G. K. etal (1998) American Public Policy: The Contemporary Agenda. New York.Houghton Mifflin Company Boston.
BOOK CHAPTERS
Abdullah. I, and P. K Muana (1998). “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)”. In C.Clapham (ed). African Guerrilas,. Oxford: James Curry.
Ajayi, K. (1998). “ Nigeria's Peace Keeping role in Liberia and Sierra Leone” in Kolawole (ed) Issues in Nigerian government and Politics. Akure, Steebal Publishers.
An-Naim, Abdullahi A. 1998. “Expanding the limits of imagination: human rights from a participatory approach to new multilateralism.” In M. Schechter, ed., Innovation in multilateralism. Tokyo, New York, London: United Nations University Press.
Asobie, A. H (1980). “The Foreign Policy of a Developing Nation: An Analysis”, in E. C Amucheazi, (ed), Reading in Social Sciences: Issues in National Development. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publisher.
Julius Thonvbere (1989). “The Political Economy of Crisis and Undevelopment” in Julius Thonvbere (ed) Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake. Lagos: JAD Publishers,
Nwolise, O.B.S (1992) “The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis and its Effects on West Africa” in M.A. Vogt etal (eds) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping. Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd.
Ojo, O. (1990) "Sponsorship and Memebrship of ECOWAS" in Gabriel, O. and Akindele, R.A. (eds) The structure and Process of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960 – 1990. Ibadan, Ventage Pub. Ltd.
Olusanya G. O and R. A Akindele (1986). “The Fundamentals of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations”, in G. O Olusanya and R. A Akindele (eds), Nigeria’s External Relations: The first Twenty- Five Years Ibadan: University press Limited.
Vidar Helgesen October (2006). “The Future Of Democracy - Going Local” in O.Kanayo (ed) Politics in Sierra Leone: Darka, Abel
JOURNAL/ARTICLES cxlviii
Abdullah, I., and Y Bangura, (1997).” Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leon Civil War.” Special Issues of African Development 22 (3-4).
Amadu, S. (1992) "ECOMOG and Sub-Regional Security in West Africa" in conflict Trend, West African Journal of Peacekeeping, (3) 4, September.
Amnesty International (1992): “The Extrajudicial Execution of Suspected Rebels and Collaborators”. London: International Secretariat of Amnesty International In Dex AFR 51/02/92. Archibald, S. & Richards, P. (2002a) “Seeds and rights: new approaches to post-war agricultural rehabilitation in Sierra Leone.” Journal of political Disasters 26(4), 356-367.
Archibald, S. & Richards, P. (2002b) “Conversion to human rights? Popular debate about war and justice in central Sierra Leone” Qualitative Human Rights Research 72(3), 339- 367.
Azam, Jean-Paul (2006). "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians". Economics of Governance 7 (1).
Buhari, M. (1984) "On Nigerian Foreign Policy, National Interest an ECOWAS", Nigerian Journal of International Affairs.
Heupel, Monika and Bernhard Zang (2010). "On the Transformation of Warfare: a Plausibility Probe of the New War Thesis". Journal of International Relations and Development 13 (1):
Humphreys, Macartan. (2005). “Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Forthcoming.
Jalloh, S. Balimo (2001). "Conflicts, Resources and Social Instability in Subsahara Africa – The Sierra Leone Case". Internationales Afrika-Forum 37 (2).
Jean Herskovit (1997). “Africa’s Security and the World Beyond”. Africa Solving African Problems: Militaries, Democracies and Security in West and Southern Africa. Abuja. International Peace Academy, 1997, pp. 17-22.
Journal of Organizational Behaviour (1992). “Issues of African Development”. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, vol. 13, 265-274. USA. John Wiley & Sans, Ltd.
Lisa, Denney. (2007) “Hope for the Future In Sierra Leone”. ANSU Journal of Politics and Administration. August.
Lujala, Paivi (2005). "A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource". Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4). cxlix
Mark, Watson S. (1999). “Sierra Leone - Another African Diamond War.” Federal Governance, (7)1.
Mkandawire, Thandika. (2002). ‘The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa: towards an explanation of violence against the peasantry.’ Journal of Modern African Studies, 2.
Muana, P. K (1997). “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Canter- Insurgency”. Africa Development 22(3-4).
Nelson, Oppong. (2011) “Sierra Leone: too fragile to ignore article.” Qualitative Political Research, 3,112-121.
Odularu Gbadebo (2004). “ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme: Policy options for Members within its Regional Trading Bloc”. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigerian forum, UD. 26, Nos 5-6, May-June.
Pajibo, E. (1999). “Building a sustained peace: human rights and democratization in Liberia: a commentary.” Liberian Studies Journal 24(1).
Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development (2005). “Sierra Leone Diamond Industry Annual Review”
Peters, K., and P Richards (1998). “Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Ex- Combatants in Sierra Leone”. African 68(1).
Zack-Williams, Alfred B. (1999). "Sierra Leone: the Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98". Third World Quarterly 20 (1).
CONFERENCE PAPERS/PUBLIC LECTURES
Abdullah, Ibrahim (2004). “Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War”. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
Atkinson, P. and Mulbah, E. (2000). “NGOs and peace building in complex political emergencies: community surveys from Liberia”. Peace Building & Complex Emergencies Working Paper Series Nos. 9 & Institute of Development Policy Management, Manchester University.
Lykke, A.M. and Due, M.K. and Kristensen, M. and Nielsen, I. (2004). “The Sahel. Proceedings of the 16th Danish Sahel Workshop.” Dept. of Systematic Botany, Institute of Biological Sciences, Aarhus University.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). “Act to Govern the Devolution of Estates and Establish the Rights of Inheritance for Spouses of Both Statutory and Customary Marriages” approved by the House of Representatives October 7th 2003. Monrovia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interim Government of National Unity, Republic of Liberia (publication date 1st December 2003).
cl
Ogwu, J (2003). “The Future of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy”: Paper Delivered at the Internal Conference on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Domestic, Regional and External Influences, held at the Center for International Relations, University of Oxford England, 2003.
Richards, P., Bah, K, & Vincent, J. (2004). “Social capital and survival: prospects for community- driven development in post-conflict Sierra Leone”. Social Development Papers: Community Driven Development/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 12, April 2004.
Richards, P., Archibald, S., Bruce, B., Modad, W., Mulbah, E., Varpilah, T., & Vincent, J. (2005). “Community cohesion in Liberia: a post-war rapid rural assessment’. Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 21, January 2005.
Seay, J. B. (2010). “Role of Access to Information in Strengthening Democratic Governance: A Case Study of Sierra Leone”. Intercontinental address of W/A States.
UNPUBLISHED WORKS
Atkinson, P. and Mulbah, E. (2000). “NGOs and peace building in complex political emergencies: community surveys from Liberia”. Peace Building & Complex Emergencies Working Paper Series Nos. 9 & Institute of Development Policy Management, Manchester University.
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf quoted in S. N. Eze. “Nigeria’s Participation Peace Support Operations: A Critical Analysis of Policy and Strategy in ECOMOG Operations in Liberia (1991- 2003)”, Ph. D Seminar Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka, November 2008, p. 36.
Gberie, Lansana (1998). “War and state collapse: The case of Sierra Leone “(M.A. thesis). Wilfrid Laurier University.
Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy. (2004). “What the fighters say: a survey of excombatants in Sierra Leone”, June-August 2003 (Columbia University, CGSD Working Paper #20).
ORGANIZATIONAL/OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
Andres Perez, Le Monde Diplomatique. (2000) “UN peacekeepers for rival gangsters; Sierra Leone's diamond wars”: Paris, June.
Ayittey, George B.N. (2010). "A New Mandate For UN Mission In Africa". CADS Global Network.
Bell, Udy (2005). "Sierra Leone: Building on a Hard-Won Peace". UN Chronicle, December. cli
Global Human Rights Organization which promotes freedom of expression and access to information. (1998) Article 19: Vol. 8 No. 9 August.
National Transitional Government of Liberia/United Nations/World Bank (2004). “Joint needs assessment”. Monrovia, February. Sesay, Amadu et al. (2009). “Post-War Regimes and State Reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone”. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Smillie, Ian, Gberie, Lansana and Hazelton, Ralph (2000). “The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Insecurity” (Summary Report). Ottawa, Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada. January.
The World Bank, Washington. RUF/SL (1995). “Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone”. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Sphere Project 2000. Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response (edited I. McConnan). Oxford: Oxfam.
UN IRIN News services. (2005). “Angola: 'Normalcy before Transparency’” 1 April 2005.
UN Secretary-General (2005). “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”. General Assembly, 59th Session, Agenda Items 45 and 55, distributed March 21st 2005.
UNDP Millennium Project (2005). “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals”. United Nations. New York.
Wiking C. (1983) “Military Coups in Subsaharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumption of Power”. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Woods, Larry J. and Colonel Timothy R. Reese. (2008). "Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State". Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press. May.
NEWSPAPERS
Abbah, T. (2003) "The Mess Taylor Left Behind", Punch, April 21.
African Elections Database (2007) "Elections in Sierra Leone", 17 September.
The Economist (2007) "How the mighty are falling", 5 July.
James Day (2011). "Revealed: Colonel Gaddafi's school for scoundrels", 15 March.
Lamido, S. (2000) "Main Thrust of Nigerian Foreign Policy", National Concord, February 22.
clii