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Downloads/Ge/Ktifezlljky for End of Anti-Kremlin Satellite Channel’S Twmwbpggc.Pdf View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by eDoc.VifaPol National Minorities and the Media Situation in Georgia Tobias Akerlund ECMI WORKING PAPER #52 January 2012 ECMI- Working Paper The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI‟s aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned. ECMI Working Paper European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Director: Dr. Tove H. Malloy © ECMI 2012 2 | P a g e ECMI- Working Paper National Minorities and the Media Situation in Georgia Media plays a central role in forming relationships between members of minority and majority communities. On the one hand there is access to information as key to the successful integration of minority communities, and on the other there is the portrayal of minorities in the media shaping the views of the general public. Issues related to the Georgian media and minority communities have received little attention from practitioners and think tanks working on minority-related issues. This working paper envisages analyzing issues related to media and national minorities in Georgia in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the current situation of minority media and of the impact of media on majority-minority relations. To gather data on this topic, 30 interviews with various media and NGO actors both in Tbilisi and the regions were conducted from October 2010 through April 2011. Tobias Akerlund, January 2012 ECMI Working Paper #52 I. INTRODUCTION of quality information in the languages they understand. In spite of efforts to broadcast in minority In recent years Georgia has seen positive languages throughout Georgia, minorities living developments on the policy level as well as on in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, two the ground concerning media. The Law on regions with compact minority settlement, Broadcasting already obliged the Georgian experience a lack of access to national/Georgian Public Broadcaster to highlight the concerns and media. Both Armenians and Azeris, Georgia‟s issues of relevance to minorities, in addition to largest minority contingents, rely heavily on airing programs in minority languages.1 To news from neighboring states. As a result, improve the situation for minorities in Georgia, minority communities living in regions where The National Concept for Tolerance and Civil they constitute a majority are, for the most part, Integration was adopted in 2009 and contains unaware of what is happening in the rest of the provisions to remedy deficiencies with regard to country. While this in part is due to limited media. Despite these positive developments, knowledge of the Georgian language among however, access to information remains an minority groups, socio-economic and impediment to integration into wider society as institutional factors hinder the kind of general Georgia‟s minority communities are largely media development that could potentially bridge distanced from mainstream media due to a lack that gap. Access to televised information is in some cases also limited by sub-standard 1 coverage resulting from technological The Law of Georgia on Broadcasting, Article 16, deficiencies. available at Apart from informing minority http://www.gncc.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id communities, media outlets also play a role in =7050&info_id=3380. 3 | P a g e ECMI- Working Paper shaping majority attitudes toward minorities; the media. The Shevardnadze government grew ways in which minorities and minority issues are uncomfortable with the many reports chronicling covered in the mainstream media are thus of the chaotic situation in the country and crucial importance. In this regard, problems wrongdoings at the official level, and already by endemic to Georgian media at large again serve the mid-nineties the government tried to shut to exacerbate the current situation. Lack of down newly formed TV station Rustavi 2 on two professionalism among journalists, for example, occasions.3 The new millennium brought with it results in discrimination when the ethnicity of attacks on journalists and even the killing of a criminal suspects is highlighted in conjunction television anchor. In spite of tighter restrictions, with reporting from crime scenes. Unfortunately, the media played an important role in the events there have also been few efforts on part of that led up to the Rose Revolution in 2003. The Georgian media following its reporting on coverage of electoral irregularities by the minorities as separatists to regain the trust of national media was the main factor triggering minority communities. Together with an absence the mass demonstrations that eventually brought of enforcement of existing frameworks to deal an end to the Shevardnadze government.4 with discrimination and stereotyping in the The Rose Revolution and the accession to media, minorities still face obstacles in power of Mikhail Saakashvili brought about a becoming a part of Georgian society. general trend towards liberalization of Georgian economic and social life. Eight years later II. GENERAL PICTURE OF THE however, freedom of media remains a political controversy and the subject of fierce fighting MEDIA IN GEORGIA between the government and opposition. Moreover, the August 2008 war with Russia and After the demise of the Soviet Union, several the nationalistic propaganda that followed made new newspapers and TV channels sprang up in for deterioration in the media environment.5 the wake of newfound independence. However, Compared to other countries in the South the absence of state-run media did not translate Caucasus and post-Soviet region, with the into free and unbiased outlets. Instead, television exceptions of the Baltic States and Ukraine, channels and newspapers supporting media in Georgia is freer and more developed. independent Georgia‟s first president Zviad The U.S. based watchdog organization Freedom Gamsakhurdia were filled with nationalist House rates Georgian media as „partly free‟, due propaganda and acerbic attacks on opposition in part to governmental control over some TV members. The new leadership made sure to stations with national coverage and the lack of place loyal supporters in key positions at the transparency of TV station ownership. In state television and cracked down on opposition addition, independent media outlets are subject 2 publications. Following the ousting of to various pressures from the government. Gamsakhurdia in late 1992, independent media outlets proliferated under President Eduard 3 Shevardnadze even though restrictions on party- Bokeria, Giga, Givi Targamadze, and Levan affiliated publications were not eased until 1994. Ramishvili; “Georgian Media in the 90s: A Step to Gradually the curtain would close on this Liberty”, 1997, available at: unprecedented freedom enjoyed by the Georgian http://www.liberty.ge/eng/files/Georgian%20Media %20in%20the%2090s.pdf. 4 Mikashavidze, Maia; “Media Landscape: Georgia”, 2 Topouria, Giorgi; “Media and Civil Conflicts in European Journalist Centre, 2010, available at Georgia” in “Regional Media in Conflict”, IWPR, http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/georgi 2001: 15-22, a/#l5. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resourc 5 Akhvlediani, Marina; “The fatal flaw: the media and es/C097ED71A0C840CAC1256C14003778BA-iwpr- Russian invasion of Georgia”, in Small Wars and media-30jun.pdf. Insurgencies, June 2009, 387. 4 | P a g e ECMI- Working Paper Together with the problems of ownership and the guaranteed prime time coverage afforded to editorial independence, Freedom House cites each opposition party every month.10 Currently, low journalistic professionalism as an obstacle the Second Channel is mainly available in bigger that the Georgian media has to overcome.6 cities and reaches about 60% of the population.11 The three main TV channels with national Access to balanced information thus remains coverage are privately held Rustavi 2 and Imedi limited and the current situation leaves it up to as well as public television‟s First Channel. the Georgian population to account for the While the First Channel is part of the state- polarization in media by actively seeking out funded public broadcaster, foreign registered both sides of the news in order to piece together companies currently control both Rustavi 2 and their own version. Imedi in a scheme that renders ownership In terms of independence of the media, it opaque and subject to rumours regarding should be noted that there is a difference possible government involvement. However, between TV stations and newspapers. According new legislation to prevent offshore ownership of to interviewees, because TV broadcasts are media outlets was passed in April of 2011, much more influential, they are therefore subject compliance with which has to be in line by to tighter control. Newspapers, on the other January 2012.7 In a 2009 report, the anti- hand, can usually operate more freely due to corruption NGO Transparency International (TI) their low impact, which has made the print pointed out the national channels‟ reluctance to media opposition dominated. Also, air any criticism of the Georgian government sensationalist journalism flourishes in the print and the fact that, taken together, they claim 70% media.12 Adding to the problem of independence of the urban market.8 Comparatively, Maestro is the scarcity of funding resources available.
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