DOCSLIB.ORG

MONITORING Hate Speech and Discrimination in GEORGIAN MEDIA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
MONITORING Hate Speech and Discrimination in GEORGIAN MEDIA MEDIA DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION MONITORING Hate Speech and Discrimination IN GEORGIAN MEDIA 15 APRIL-15 AUGUST, 2013 ABOUT PROJECT The Media Development Foundation (MDF) implements a project Monitoring Hate Speech and Discrimina- tion in Georgian Media within the framework of program, Project Advancing National Integration in Georgia, carried out by the United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG) and the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF) with the financial assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The project is aimed at encouraging professionnal coverage of minorities in Georgian media through public discussions of problems identified during the monitoring. Before releasing the final report and recommendations envisaged by the project, the MDF was providing me- dia outlets, civil society and other interested parties with weekly electronic bulletins of monitoring results. The project involves the monitoring of six newspapers (Asaval-Dasavali, Rezonansi, 24 Saati, Chronika, Alia, Kviris Palitra), evening news programs and talk shows of six TV channels (Georgian Public Broad- caster, or GPB, Imedi, Rustavi 2, Kavkasia, Maestro and Channel 9), as well as an evening talk show of Media Union Obiektivi. The project also envisages monitoring of reaction of non-governmental organizations and other institu- tions to intolerance and hate speech in the public domain, as well as their responses on particular dis- crimination cases. The report covers key findings of monitoring for the time span from April 15 to August 15. REGULATIONS An overall document on professional standards which would be treated as a guiding manual by all types of media – print and electronic, does not exist in Georgia at present. Nor has the tradition of considering complaints been developed in the country, which took decades all traditional democracies to form. For broadcast media, the Code of Conduct for Broadcasters was drawn up, which, among other issues, regulate the coverage of minorities as well. The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) has its own in-house Code of Conduct, whilst members of the Charter of Journalistic Ethics must abide to provisions of the Charter of Journalistic Ethics (see, Appendix No 1) It must be noted that both the Code of Conduct for Broadcasters and that of the GPB include detailed regulations regarding the coverage of minorities, which reflect the experience of the democratic media. Therefore, it is desirable that they are applied as a professional and civil principle not only by electronic media representatives but those of print and online media too. METHODOLOGY The methodology is based on separate indicators of the Media Diversity Institute (MDI), Code of Conduct for Broadcasters and international standards, concerning the unacceptability of discrimination and hate 5 speech on ethnic, religious, sexual orientation, gender or any other grounds; observation of principles of accuracy and impartiality. The study was conducted using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. A distinguished approach was applied towards TV news bulletins and reports and print articles. In this case, those materials which essentially violated the principle of accuracy or facts and context were not fully reported; also in which discrimination on the part of journalists was observed or in case of discrimination on the part of respon- dents, journalists failed to react to it, i.e. did not follow the relevant professional standard were assessed as negative coverage. In contrast, those materials which were essentially accurate in terms of factual data and anti-discriminatory standards were observed; as well as materials reporting ethnic or religious holidays of minorities, problems of minorities, were evaluated as a positive coverage. The neutral cover- age included those materials which more or less fully provide the essence of an issue, journalists are not sources of discrimination themselves and they only cover public attitudes. In case of interviews published in print media as well as TV talk shows, instances of discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender and hate speech were identified and typology of violations were defined. It was also observed how journalists react to expressions of such discrimination and hate speech – whether they express such a position or challenge the respondents. The study separated unsubstantiated parallels often drawn by journalists or respondents with the minori- ties, thereby facilitating the spread of incorrect facts and various speculations about minorities. The aim of the study also was to detect sources of hate speech and discrimination on various grounds – the media itself or respondents. Consequently, the report separated such expressions made by the media from those of respondents and classified respondents by groups. 6 CONTENT 1. TV NEWS PROGRAMS 9 1.1. Ethnic minorities 12 1.2. Religious minorities 13 1.3. Sexual minorities 17 1.4. Gender issues 21 2. TV TALK-SHOWS 23 2.1. Ethnic minorities 26 2.2. Religious minorities 29 2.3. Sexual minorities 30 2.4. Sexism, discrimination on gender ground 35 3. PRINT MEDIA 37 3.1. Ethnic minorities 40 3.2. Religious minorities 43 3.3. Sexual Minorities 47 3.4. Discrimination on gender ground 55 4. RESPONDENTS 57 4.1. Ethnic minorities 60 4.2. Religious minorities 66 4.3. Sexual minorities 70 4.4. Sexism, discrimination on gender ground 88 5. HATE SPEECH 89 5.1. Journalists 90 5.2. Politicians 93 5.3. Representatives of society 93 6. UNJUSTIFIED PARALLELS 99 6.1. Ethnic and religious minorities 101 6.2. Sexual minorities 102 7. CIVIL SECTOR 105 8. RECOMMENDATIONS 109 9. APPENDIX 113 Appendix 1. Professional Standards 115 Appendix 2. Definition of terminology 122 1. TV News Programs 9 10 In the reporting period, 194 reports of the news programs under monitoring were analyzed. Of these 67 reports were examples of positive coverage, 105 – of neutral coverage and the remaining 22 of negative coverage. PRIME-TIME TV NEWS BULLETINS 22 67 105 POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE By topics, the data has been distributed in the following way: 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ETHNIC RELIGIOUS SEXUAL GENDER POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE The highest number of reports on minority topics was produced by the prime time news program of the GPB, Moambe. By the production of reports on independent topics, the GPB and TV company Maestro were in the lead. 11 1.1. ETHNIC MINORITIES Property Disputes The ethnic discrimination in TV news and current affairs programs has been mostly coupled with the issues related to social problems concerning the land property rights. It is worth noting that these topics were covered in light of dissatisfaction of local population with foreign land owners and the government and lacked proper balance in terms of providing foreign investors’ positions or the position of a relevant state entity (Ministry of Economy). Such incidents require comprehensive journalistic investigation, which was not carried out by any of media outlets to shed more light on the issue, during the monitoring period. Conflict of the population of the Artsevi village in the region of Gori with the Indian investors has been covered in a considerably balanced manner by TV Imedi (Qronika, April 26)1. Although the report does not reflect comprehensive picture, it presents position of all sides including the foreign investor, the positive message of the Prime Minister and underlines that the representatives of the Ministry of Economy declined to provide the on-camera comment. Rustavi 2 (June 22)2 violated Article 31 of the Code of Conduct for Broadcasters when it used a quote of one of the respondent3 in the report about land ownership, containing hate speech. The media outlet could have refrained from using that comments it did not represent a necessity for describing the essence of the social problem covered in the report. The report itself incorrectly conveys the essence of the problem and contains factual inaccuracies. The journalist cites other examples of similar conflict and in the case of Samtaskaro says that this village “is the last Georgian settlement at the border with Azerbaijan,” thereby dramatizing the situation. In spite of containing the positions of different sides, the stories of the weekly program Post Scriptum, Rustavi 2 (April 28)4 are blended with the xenophobic, discriminatory expressions of the local residents towards the foreigners5, and contain groundless comparisons6 as well. The report of Imedi TV (June 22)7 on the same subject – property dispute in the village of Karaleti – provides neutral comments of respondents, in which the emphasis is placed on social issues and not on the origin of the investor. The report of Maestro TV news program (19 April)8 on a conflict between locals and a foreign investor in the Kvemo Artsevi village was one sided, covered from the perspective of locals alone. It contained four comments of which two were made by local residents, one by local governor and the remaining one by a machine operator hired by the investor to perform works. A position of the Indian investor was not represented at all in the report. The journalists did not even note whether she undertake any attempt to contact the investor and why his position was not represented in the report. Nor had the journalist double checked the factual data with official agencies (Public Registry) to find out what size of land 1 http://www.myvideo.ge/?video_id=2021782 2 http://www.myvideo.ge/?video_id=2079309 3 Anzor Chukhrukidze, a resident of the Shindisi village: “In the past, those Muslims waged war against us, invading and killing Georgians with swords. Who are they now? Do they not have seniors or juniors, or do we not have the government? On which government should one hope for getting rid of those Muslims?” 4 http://www.myvideo.ge/?video_id=2022953 5 Giorgi Mdzinarishvili, resident of the village of Ditsi: “Tatars, those infidels were here. They captured our lands.” Resident of Ditsi village (no title): “Georgians died in Tskhinvali for these lands.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Georgia's October 2013 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications
    Georgia’s October 2013 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs November 4, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43299 Georgia’s October 2013 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications Summary This report discusses Georgia’s October 27, 2013, presidential election and its implications for U.S. interests. The election took place one year after a legislative election that witnessed the mostly peaceful shift of legislative and ministerial power from the ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM), to the Georgia Dream (GD) coalition bloc. The newly elected president, Giorgi Margvelashvili of the GD, will have fewer powers under recently approved constitutional changes. Most observers have viewed the 2013 presidential election as marking Georgia’s further progress in democratization, including a peaceful shift of presidential power from UNM head Mikheil Saakashvili to GD official Margvelashvili. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns over ongoing tensions between the UNM and GD, as well as Prime Minister and GD head Bidzini Ivanishvili’s announcement on November 2, 2013, that he will step down as the premier. In his victory speech on October 28, Margvelashvili reaffirmed Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, including the pursuit of Georgia’s future membership in NATO and the EU. At the same time, he reiterated that GD would continue to pursue the normalization of ties with Russia. On October 28, 2013, the U.S. State Department praised the Georgian presidential election as generally democratic and expressing the will of the people, and as demonstrating Georgia’s continuing commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration.
    [Show full text]
  • News Digest on Georgia
    NEWS DIGEST ON GEORGIA May 13-15 Compiled by: Aleksandre Davitashvili Date: May 16, 2019 Foreign Affairs 1. Georgia negotiating with Germany, France, Poland, Israel on legal employment Georgia is negotiating with three EU member states, Germany, France and Poland to allow for the legal employment of Georgians in those countries, as well as with Israel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia reports. An agreement has already been achieved with France. ―Legal employment of Georgians is one of the priorities for the ministry of Foreign Affairs, as such deals will decrease the number of illegal migrants and boost the qualification of Georgian nationals,‖ the Foreign Ministry says. A pilot project is underway with Poland, with up to 45 Georgian citizens legally employed, the ministry says (Agenda.ge, May 13, 2019). 2. Georgia elected as United Nations Statistical Commission member for 2020-2023 Georgia was unanimously elected as a member of the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) for a period of four years, announces the National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat). The membership mandate will span from 2020-2023. A total of eight new members of the UNSC were elected for the same period on May 7 in New York at the meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Agenda.ge, May 14, 2019). 3. President of European Commission Tusk: 10 years on there is more Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine in EU President of the European Commission Donald Tusk stated on the 10th anniversary of the EU‘s Eastern Partnership format that there is more Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the EU.
    [Show full text]
  • Georgia: What Now?
    GEORGIA: WHAT NOW? 3 December 2003 Europe Report N°151 Tbilisi/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 2 A. HISTORY ...............................................................................................................................2 B. GEOPOLITICS ........................................................................................................................3 1. External Players .........................................................................................................4 2. Why Georgia Matters.................................................................................................5 III. WHAT LED TO THE REVOLUTION........................................................................ 6 A. ELECTIONS – FREE AND FAIR? ..............................................................................................8 B. ELECTION DAY AND AFTER ..................................................................................................9 IV. ENSURING STATE CONTINUITY .......................................................................... 12 A. STABILITY IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD ...............................................................................12 B. THE PRO-SHEVARDNADZE
    [Show full text]
  • PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION in GEORGIA 27Th October 2013
    PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN GEORGIA 27th October 2013 European Elections monitor The candidate in office, Giorgi Margvelashvili, favourite in the Presidential Election in Georgia Corinne Deloy Translated by Helen Levy On 27th October next, 3,537,249 Georgians will be electing their president of the republic. The election is important even though the constitutional reform of 2010 deprived the Head of State of some of his powers to be benefit of the Prime Minister and Parliament (Sakartvelos Parlamenti). The President of the Republic will no longer be able to dismiss the government and convene a new Analysis cabinet without parliament’s approval. The latter will also be responsible for appointing the regional governors, which previously lay within the powers of the President of the Republic. The constitutional reform which modified the powers enjoyed by the head of State was approved by the Georgian parliament on 21st March last 135 votes in support, i.e. all of the MPs present. The outgoing President, Mikheil Saakashvili (United National Movement, ENM), in office since the election on 4th January 2004 cannot run for office again since the Constitution does not allow more than two consecutive mandates. Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia in coalition with Mikheil Saakashvili. 10 have been appointed by politi- Our Georgia-Free Democrats led by former representa- cal parties, 13 by initiative groups. 54 people registe- tive of Georgia at the UN, Irakli Alasania, the Republi- red to stand in all. can Party led by Davit Usupashvili, the National Forum The candidates are as follows: led by Kakha Shartava, the Conservative Party led by Zviad Dzidziguri and Industry will save Georgia led by – Giorgi Margvelashvili (Georgian Dream-Democratic Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili has been in office Georgia), former Minister of Education and Science and since the general elections on 1st October 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 4, 2002
    Georgia Page 1 of 19 Georgia Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 4, 2002 The 1995 Constitution provides for an executive branch that reports to the President and a legislature. The President appoints ministers with the consent of Parliament. In April 2000, Eduard Shevardnadze was reelected to a second 5-year term as President in an election marred by numerous serious irregularities. International observers strongly criticized the election, citing interference by state authorities in the electoral process, deficient election legislation, insufficient representative election administration, and unreliable voter registers. The country's second parliamentary elections under the 1995 Constitution were held in 1999 and were characterized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a step toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments. The civil war and separatist wars that followed the 1992 coup ended central government authority in Abkhazia and Ossetia, and weakened central authority in the autonomous region of Ajara and elsewhere in the country. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to executive pressure. Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unresolved. Ceasefires were in effect in both areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occurred in Abkhazia. These conflicts and the problems associated with roughly 270,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) from Abkhazia, 60,000 from South Ossetia, and another 4,000-5,000 refugees from Chechnya, posed a continued threat to national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia, and most ethnic Georgians were expelled from or fled the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Kaliningrad: a Special Area in Central-Eastern Europe
    Cultural Relations Quarterly Review Winter 2014 Kaliningrad: a special area in Central-Eastern Europe Kitti Mária Tádics Abstract: The main objective of this work is to analyse in detail Kaliningrad territory, focusing on the current political situation, separation tendencies and features of the national identity. The content of the work is divided into separate parts. The ambition of the first part is to define basic facts that make this area specific in the Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of the second part is to identify significant milestones in the history of Kaliningrad that substantially shaped Kaliningrad’s contemporary political picture, particularly Kaliningrad after the Russian regime change. The thesis also emphasizes the inclination of Kaliningrad to the West and the EU instead of Russian Federation and attempts to define causes that led to this particular tendency. The author of the work also would like to concentrate on the considerable alteration of Kaliningrad since the first presidency of Vladimir Putin. The intention of the last part is to resolve Kaliningrad-EU-Moscow relations. The author concluded that most profitable policy for Kaliningrad would be to help balance these two seemingly antagonistic positions and attempt to urge Russia and the EU to adopt measures most convenient for Kaliningrad. Keywords: Kaliningrad, Russia, sovereignty, European Union, regional policy Introduction In this essay I would like to summarize the current political situation, the separation tendencies and the features of the national identity in Kaliningrad oblast. First I would like to lay out some basic statements regarding to the area: 1. Kaliningrad oblast is a small Russian enclave which is inhabited by 1 million people and bordered by Lithuania and Poland at the coast of the Baltic Sea.
    [Show full text]
  • The Issue of Contemporary Separatism in Caucasus and Its Outcome on Georgia /Abkhazia/: New Approaches to Conflict Peaceful R
    Giorgi Merabishvili, Ph.D. Sokhumi State University ”The issue of contemporary separatism in Caucasus and its outcome on Georgia, Abkhazia; new approaches to conflict peaceful resolution”. Already 20 years have passed since the start of the Georgian-Abkhazian war in 1992. The conflict has persisted to this day and brings with it insecurity, deep mistrust, long-term displacement and serious constraints on growth and development. Georgian-Abkhazian conflict refers to the ethnic conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians and in a broader sense can be considered as a part of the geopolitical conflict in the Caucasus region remaining unresolved. Such persisting “frozenness” restricts sustainable economic and social development as well as the establishment of free democratic civil societies. As the Georgian historians note, the fact of Russian permanent imperial aspirations to tear off the North-West part of Georgia has become “the reason of history politisation and falsification of the historical past of Abkhazia and along to it of the whole Georgia. Namely, at the beginning of the 20th century, under the motto “Abkhazia is not Georgia” Apsua-Abkhazian political separatism as one of Russian imperialism varieties and its stronghold in Georgia was formed”. (1) During last twenty years several works in Russian and English languages have been published by Abkhazian historians: S. Lakoba, O. Bgazhba. V. Chirikba, M. Gunba, E. Ajinjal, D. Dbar, etc. “Unfortunately the authors, with the aim of “restoration of historic” rights pursued and served the illusory and rather dangerous political aims and not the scientific/research ones”. The historiography is under a special attention and “protection” of the separatist regime as well as of the Russian political leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Prisoners in Post- Revolutionary Georgia
    After the rose, the thorns: political prisoners in post- revolutionary Georgia Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone has be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the the right to life, liberty and security of person.
    [Show full text]
  • Hate Speech and Xenophobia
    HATE SPEECH AND XENOPHOBIA მედიის განვითარების ფონდი MEDIA DEVELOPMENT FOUNDADTION MEDIA DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION HATE SPEECH XENOPHOBIA MEDIA MONITORING REPORT 2014-2015 MEDIA DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION Author: TAMAR KINTSURASHVILI Researchers: SOPHO GOGADZE, TATA KAPIANIDZE, TAMUNA KANDELAKI Design: BESO DANELIA, IBDESIGN The report is prepared by Media Development Foundation within the framework of the project “Advancing National Integra- tion in Georgia” implemented by United Nations Association of Georgia with the support of the United States Agency for In- ternational Development. The content of the report is responsibility of Media Development Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID and UNAG. © 2015, MEDIA DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION WWW.MDFGEORGIA.GE ISBN 978-9941-0-7733-3 INTRODUCTION The Media Development Foundation (MDF) has conducted media monitoring within the framework of Advancing National Integration in Georgia program. The aim of monitoring is to identify sources of hate speech, xenophobia, homophobia, gender discrimination and stereotyping, and anti-Western attitudes in media and public domain, in general. This study covers the period of one year (17 February 2014 –18 February 2015) and it exposes hate speech and discrimination on various grounds. The monitoring report represents a set of three editions: the first edition combines expressions of hate speech and xenophobia. For its part, the section on xenophobia is divided into subsections on a) various ethnic and national groups; b) Turkophobia/Islamophobia; c) Armenophobia; and d) religious discrimination. The second edition covers homophobic, discriminatory and stereotyped approaches to gender identity. The third edition reflects ant-Western attitudes. All the three editions have identical structure arranged according to the following sources: media, political parties and public organizations affiliated thereof, representatives of current and former authorities, religious servants, and other representatives of public i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Mukhtar Ablyazov the Case of Tatiana Paraskevich The
    www.odfoundation.eu The case of Mukhtar Ablyazov The case of Tatiana Paraskevich The case of Alma Shalabayeva The case of Muratbek Ketebayev The case of Alexandr Pavlov www.odfoundation.eu Contents 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (page 3) 2. The case of Mukhtar Ablyazov……………………………………………………………………………….. (page 7) 3. The case of Tatiana Paraskevich……………………………………………………………………………… (page 14) 4. The case of Alma Shalabayeva……………………………………………………………………………….. (page 17) 5. The case of Muratbek Ketebayev…………………………………………………………………………… (page 21) 6. The case of Alexandr Pavlov…………………………………………………………………………………… (page 23) 7. The cooperation of the intelligence services of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the prevalence of torture in these (page 28) countries……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8. Examples of misuse of the Interpol system by the countries in which human rights are violated………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (page 32) 9. Conclusions and recommendations……………………………………………………………………….. (page 35) Appendix 1. Documents relating to the cooperation between Kazakh and Italian security agencies through Interpol channels on the case of Alma Shalabayeva………….. (page 39) Appendix 2. The inquiry of the members of the Polish Sejm, Marcin Święcicki and Ligia Krajewska to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Radosław (page 43) Sikorski, regarding the deportation of activists of political opposition to Kazakhstan… Appendix 3. The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the inquiry of the members of the Polish Sejm, Marcin Święcicki and Ligia (page 45) Krajewska…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 www.odfoundation.eu 1. INTRODUCTION During its 22nd annual meeting, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly expressed its regret that some OSCE participating states, seeking the arrest of opponents on politically motivated charges, continue to misuse the Interpol system.
    [Show full text]
  • Chronicle: the Caucasus in the Year 2013
    Chronicle: The Caucasus In the Year 2013 January 9 January 2013 The Georgian State audit agency launches a probe into the alleged violation of funding political parties’ rules by the United National Movement during the electoral campaign of 2012 11 January 2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulates the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Ilia II, on his 80th birthday 18 January 2013 During an official visit to Armenia, Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili promises to the head of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church Catholicos Karekin II that Armenian history will soon be taught in Georgian schools 19 January 2013 police in Baku clash with shopkeepers protesting a rent increase by the managers of Azerbaijan’s largest shopping center 24 January 2013 The Azerbaijani police break up protests in the town of Ismayilli demanding the resignation of the local governor Nizami Alekberov 26 January 2013 Hundreds of people demonstrate in Baku to express their solidarity with the protests in the town of Ismayilli and some 40 participants are detained by the police including the blogger Emin Milli and investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova 26 January 2013 A statue of Azerbaijan’s late President Heydar Aliyev is removed from a park in Mexico City 27 January 2013 Three activists involved in a 26 January protest in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku are given prison sentences 28 January 2013 The Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers meet in Paris for talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group and aimed at settling the conflict
    [Show full text]
  • Adlib Express Watermark
    IHS Global Insight Report: Georgia (Country Intelligence) Report printed on 14 January 2009 CONTENTS Country Reports AdlibCopyright ©2008 Express Global Insight Inc. All rights reserved. WatermarkPage 1 of 36 Nature of Risk Rating Summary Political: Risks 2.75 The situation in Georgia is uncertain in the aftermath of the military conflict with Russia, but it is clear that the state will remain functioning, even if the separatist republics claim chunks of its territory (highly unlikely). The economy will pay the price of military damage, although most importantly, crucial elements of the country's infrastructure such as bridges and mountain tunnels have remained intact. President Mikhail Saakashvili, who essentially triggered the hostilities by ordering a Georgian offensive on South Ossetia, will have to fight to retain his seat, which he only won for the second term in January 2008. Given the popular consensus in the face of the Russian offensive, however, Saakashvili may well rely on his charismatic turns to actually elevate and strengthen his domestic position. The government will also remain committed to its economic reform policy, although most of the legislation and regulation is already in place. Economic: Risks 3.50 Georgia is a poor country with weak external financial and trade links outside Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The collapse in growth associated with post-Soviet economic management during the early 1990s was heightened in Georgia's case by a brief civil war on its borders. The economy finally began to recover strongly from its collapsed base in the second half of the 1990s. Although Georgian GDP rose steadily in 1995-2006, growth rates have been highly variable, from lows of about 2% to highs of arou nd 11%.
    [Show full text]