Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces

At the end of the 20th century warfare was increasingly characterized by operations where the forces of different nations fought together in coalitions and different branches of the armed forces (e.g., army, navy and air force) worked together closely to accomplish a mission. These operations are often called combined and joint, respectively. At the beginning of the 21st century, new security challenges have caused many Western nations to have their armed forces work much more closely with other agencies, and this phenomenon has added expressions like Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP); 3D (defence, diplomacy and development); and “integrated” to the national security lexicon. Working in these environments creates command and control challenges at all rank levels in the military. While there is some literature on the challenges of working in multi-national coalitions, the literature on command and control in joint operations, let alone in the new integrated operating environment, is extremely sparse, despite the fact that joint operations are even more numerous than combined operations and integrated operations are becoming the norm. Effective command and control (C2) is essential to the successful conduct of military and integrated operations and especially to the application of aerospace power. However, in much of the current C2 doctrine, the terms “command,” “control” and “command and control” are not defined clearly or are defined in ways that fail to provide practical help to military professionals in the exercise of command or in the design of command arrangements. Some of the confusion is due to the fact that, as is explained in Canadian Forces leadership doctrine, the “inter-relationships and interconnectedness of command, management, and leadership functions often make it difficult to disentangle the command, management, and leadership effects achieved by individuals in positions of authority.” Due to this lack of clarity, the terms command, management, and leadership are sometimes used interchangeably. Nevertheless, the interconnectedness of leadership and command is such that leadership is “an essential role requirement for commanders;” therefore, that interconnectedness is reflected in this publication. Command&Control Conceptualof Canadian Aerospace Foundations Forces:

Dr Allan English Command&Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations

ISBN Number: D2-225/2008E 978-0-662-48659-6

ISBN Number: D2-225/2008E-PDF 978-0-662-48660-2

This publication is available online at trenton.mil.ca/lodger/cfawc/index-e.asp on the intranet or www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC on the internet

Art direction and editing by Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Production Section.

This publication was prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence but the views expressed in it are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence

Table of Contents Conceptual Foundations Introduction vii General ix Approach x Purpose xii Endnotes Chapter 1 Theories of Command & Control 1 General

3 The Origins of Some Command and Control Terms 3 Background 4 Unity of Command or Operational Command 4 Operational Control 6 Operational Direction 6 Implications of Historical Experience for Today 7 New Ways of Thinking about Command, Control, and C2

8 The Czerwinski Command Framework

9 The Pigeau-McCann Command Framework 9 General 10 Definition of Key Terms 11 Dimensions of Command44 12 Command Capability Space and the Balanced Command Envelope45 13 The Relationship between Command and Control 14 Intent and C2 15 Intent 15 Common Intent 16 Explicit and Implicit Intent 16 Balancing Explicit and Implicit Intent52 19 Types of C2 Organizations 20 Endnotes Chapter 2 Command & Control in the 21st Century ‑ Context 23 General

25 Network-Centric Warfare / Network-Enabled Operations 25 Network-Centric Warfare 26 Network-Enabled Operations 27 Effects-Based Operations 29 Network-Centric Warfare and Effects-Based Operations 30 Operational Art iii Command&Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations

31 The Canadian Army and Operational Art 32 Modern Theories of Manoeuvre – The OODA Loop 34 Manoeuvre in a Canadian Context 36 Manoeuvre and the Contemporary Operational Environment 37 Conclusion 38 Endnotes Chapter 3 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements1 43 General

44 Historical Overview

45 The CF Air Element and the Fragmentation of Command Unification: Canada’s Air Forces 1968-1975 45 Overview of Unification 47 The CF Organizational Concept for Unification 48 Unification and the CF “Air Element” 49 Operational and Personnel Considerations of Unification 51 The New CF Command Structure 52 Mobile Command 53 Maritime Command 53 Air Defence Command 54 Air Transport Command 54 Materiel Command 54 Training Command 55 NATO Europe – 1 Air Division 55 Unification and the Problems of the Air Element 57 Corrective Measures – A Window of Opportunity 59 Summary 61 The Struggle to Centralize Air Force Command: Canada’s Air Force and Air Command 1975 – 2005 61 Introduction 63 The Command and Control Structure of Air Command – The First 12 Years 63 The Headquarters Structure 63 The Air Group Structure 66 The Base Structure 67 Restructuring in 1993 – The Wing Concept 71 Restructuring in 1997 – the MCCRT 72 The Air Staff at NDHQ 72 1 Canadian Air Division HQ 72 Wing Headquarters 73 A Critique of the AFCCRT 74 The Air Force Capability Framework 75 Capability Advisory Groups 76 Systemic Problems with Air Force Re-organization and Transformation 77 The Air Reserve and the Total Force Concept 79 Summary 81 Endnotes iv Command&Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations

Chapter 4 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues 85 Introduction

87 Command and Control Definitions 88 Traditional Principles of Command 88 Traditional Command and Control Relationships 90 New Command and Control Relationships 90 Supporting/Supported Command

91 Canadian Aerospace Forces Command and Control Organization 91 Air Command Organization 91 Chief of Air Staff Organization 91 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters Organization

93 Summary 94 Endnotes Chapter 5 Principles of Command, Control, and Command and Control 95 General

96 Principles of Command 96 Competency 97 Authority 97 Responsibility 98 The Balance between Authority and Responsibility 98 Mission Command 98 Flexibility in Approaches to Command 99 Principles of Control

101 Principles of C2 101 Intent 102 Common Intent 102 Balancing Explicit and Implicit Intent 103 Conclusion

104 Endnotes

105 Abbreviations

109 Bibliography

115 Recommended Reading List

Command&Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations

Foreword

This book is not doctrine and it should not be treated as such. Its purpose is much more fundamental. As the title implies, the author provides an overview of the major concepts, or theoretical approaches, that underpin current debate on command and control (C2). Given the complex nature and importance of C2 within the context of modern military operations, it should come as no surprise that the concepts and theories vary widely in focus and scope. Command and Control of Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations seeks to establish a basis for understanding how these basic principles have influenced C2 doctrinal development. Although the book discusses C2 conceptual foundations from a wide variety of sources, it pays more attention to those that influenced the development of Canadian joint C2 doctrine in general and that might guide the development of Canadian aerospace C2 doctrine in particular. Canadian aerospace doctrine, of which C2 doctrine is a key element, is in a developmental phase and thus influenced by ongoing conceptual debates. Therefore, this work is necessary and timely; necessary in that it will aid in creating a broader understanding of C2 concepts and timely in that it well help to identify C2 principles that will guide aerospace doctrine development. Therefore, I encourage Air Force members to treat Command and Control of Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations as a companion work to Cana- dian aerospace doctrine. The information therein will serve to both educate and stimulate the reader with respect to basic C2 concepts and theories. The end result will be a broader base of aerospace professionals better prepared to positively contribute to C2 doctrine from the ground up.

olonel . ottingham CommandingC J.F Officer,C Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre vi Introduction

General At the end of the 20th century warfare was increasingly characterized by operations where the forces of different nations fought together in coalitions and different branches of the armed forces (e.g., army, navy and air force) worked together closely to accomplish a mission. These operations are often called combined and joint, respectively. At the beginning of the 21st century, new security challenges have caused many Western nations to have their armed forces work much more closely with other agencies, and this phenomenon has added expressions like Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces:

(JIMP); 3D (defence, diplomacy and development); and “integrated” to the national security lexicon. Working in these environments creates command and control challenges at all rank levels in the military. While there is some literature on the challenges of working in multi-national coalitions, the literature on command and control in joint operations, let alone in the new integrated operating environment, is extremely sparse, despite the fact that joint operations are even more numerous than combined operations and integrated operations are becoming the norm.1

Effective command and control (C2) is retired), it has been, and remains in many essential to the successful conduct of cases, “descriptive” and “prescriptive” military and integrated operations and in the sense that it describes various especially to the application of aerospace principles and tenets and dictates how power. However, in much of the current C2 they should be applied. Holley portrayed doctrine, the terms “command,” “control” this “flawed” approach to doctrine as and “command and control” are not consisting of “page after page” of “gener- defined clearly or are defined in ways that alizations” and “abstractions” that are fail to provide practical help to military difficult to apply in real life situations.3 professionals in the exercise of command Recent additions to doctrine manuals of or in the design of command arrange- historical examples of these principles ments. Some of the confusion is due to and tenets have helped us better under- the fact that, as is explained in Canadian stand the complexities of subjects like Forces (CF) leadership doctrine, the “inter- C2. However, while this approach has relationships and interconnectedness of improved the usefulness of doctrine, what command, management, and leadership is still lacking is a useable framework or functions often make it difficult to disen- model that will help us to understand C2 tangle the command, management, and outside of past experience and that can be leadership effects achieved by individuals used to solve new C2 problems. in positions of authority.” Due to this lack of clarity, the terms command, manage- Similarly, the approach to air force ment, and leadership are sometimes used command and leadership of our principal interchangeably. Nevertheless, the inter- allies is largely prescriptive and descrip- connectedness of leadership and command tive, and lacks the analytical focus, based is such that leadership is “an essential role on a coherent and overarching approach, requirement for commanders;”2 therefore, that is now appearing in the CF leader- that interconnectedness is reflected in this ship and command doctrine.4 For example, publication. the most recent analysis of United States Air Force (USAF) leadership training and Another shortcoming of most past and education in USAF professional military current doctrine, including C2 doctrine, education institutions concluded that there is that, according to one of the leading was an “absence of fundamental truths scholars on doctrine, Major General I. B. based upon rigorous research of what it Holley (United States Air Force [USAF] means to lead airmen.” The author of viii Conceptual Foundations Introduction this analysis observed that “our schools formally present most service members pproach with academic models having no basis in A Air Force experience and informally talk Each nation and each service (or Environ- to them about Air Force stories. Some- ment in the CF) in a nation’s armed forces times the models support the stories; other has its own unique approach to military times they do not. Many times the stories operations based on the physical environ- conflict with each other. At the end of the ment in which they operate, their histor- day, the service member must bridge the ical experience, and their culture.9 intellectual gap.”5 A number of commentators have also noted the lack of USAF Two CF publications have recently codi- leadership and command doctrine.6 This fied and described in detail, for the first lack was only partially remedied with time, what it means to be a leader and a the publication of Leadership and Force commander in the CF. As well as providing Development (AFDD 1-1) in February doctrinal guidance for members of the 2004, because this doctrine document is CF, Duty with Honour and Leadership in focussed primarily on force development the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Founda- and only eleven pages are given over to tions (hereafter Leadership in the CF) also a fairly cursory examination of USAF provide frameworks and theoretical models leadership and the USAF as a profession.7 to analyze Canadian military leadership Likewise, USAF and US joint command and command. Both these publications and control doctrine focus on processes, acknowledge that despite many similari- planning, training and operations and offer ties, there are environmental differences in little in the way of analysis or theoretical culture, based on the unique physical envi- frameworks of C2.8 ronments in which the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force operate.10 These Unlike the situation in other countries, unique physical operating environments much work has been done in this area have produced a unique body of profes- by Canadian military professionals and sional knowledge, experience, and there- academic researchers. With the publica- fore, culture for each Environment.11 Duty tion by the Canadian Forces of Duty with with Honour acknowledges that differ- Honour and Leadership in the Canadian ences among the three Environments are Forces: Conceptual Foundations as well “essential for readiness, generating force as the work on the human dimension of and sustaining a multi-purpose, combat- command by Canadian researchers Ross capable force.”12 And these differences Pigeau and Carol McCann of Defence account for why “all three Environments Research and Development Canada often manifest certain elements of the – Toronto, Canada is at the forefront of [CF’s] ethos in different ways; for example, Western militaries by producing leader- the influence of history, heritage and ship theories and doctrine that can be used tradition or how team spirit is promoted for the rigorous analysis of operational and manifested.”13 Consequently, Duty experience. We are, therefore, now able with Honour recognizes that the CF must to move to the next phase of writing C2 accommodate the separate identities of the doctrine, which consists of using theo- Army, Navy and Air Force.14 Leadership in retical frameworks to provide us with a the CF notes that “leaders are formed and consistent vocabulary and a coherent way conditioned by their social environment to approach C2 problems. These frame- and culture;”15 therefore, we can expect works give us the tools to diagnose what to see differences in leadership styles and is right and what is wrong with command command arrangements in the Canadian arrangements and to make changes to Army, Navy and Air Force based on these improve them. Furthermore, they not only environmental differences in professional give us better tools to discuss and design expertise and culture. C2 arrangements, they also give us ways to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of CF doctrine goes on to discuss Envi- command arrangements and to improve ronmental differences in leadership and them based on a common understanding command based on “distinct and unique of C2. bodies of knowledge” that are required to conduct operations in the distinctly ix Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces:

different physical environments of land, doctrine as well as foreign and combined/ sea and air.16 The “defining document for alliance aerospace doctrine are found in Canada’s profession of arms,” Duty with other CF and allied publications; therefore, Honour, puts it this way: this publication focuses on the unique aspects of the command and control of …all CF members must master the art of Canadian aerospace forces in the context warfare in their own medium if they are of joint and other nations’ and alliance to become true professionals in the joint, aerospace doctrine. combined and inter-agency context that characterizes modern conflict. Expertise must be distributed according to the harsh demands of this environment, and the urpose military ethos must P accommodate the sepa- The purpose of this publication is to estab- rate identities forged by lish the conceptual foundations, based on combat at sea, on land the enduring principles, that can serve as and in the air.17 the basis for the command and control of Canadian aerospace forces. Based on the environmental differences in The purpose will be achieved as follows: operations, there are many different types  Chapter 1 will summarize the origins of doctrine, including of current C2 terminology and combinations of describe two theoretical frameworks of national, service (Envi- command and control that have prac- ronmental), alliance, and tical application for 21st century C2; joint. Three main types of doctrine apply to Canadian aerospace  Chapter 2 will provide the context forces – joint (aerospace forces and another for understanding command and Environment), combined/alliance (Canada control in the 21st century in joint and other nation[s]), and Canadian aero- and combined operations, as well as in space. Joint doctrine is used to orchestrate multinational coalitions; the effects of operations involving more than one Environment in the CF or for  Chapter 3 will describe the evolution other nations more than one branch of of current Canadian aerospace C2 their armed forces. Combined/alliance arrangements from integration (1968) doctrine describes to 2005 (just prior to General Rick Hillier’s CF transformation initia- the application of 18 aerospace power when tives) so that the reader will under- two or more nations stand the historical and cultural roots work together. Some of Canadian C2 arrangements; nations, alliances and other groups also  Chapter 4 will discuss the context publish aerospace behind current Canadian aerospace doctrine to guide the command and control arrangements as application of their well as selected issues that have arisen aerospace power. since the start of recent CF transfor- While it is essential mation initiatives that began in early that Canadian aerospace forces be interop- 2005; and erable with other elements of the CF as well as our allies and partners in coalitions,  Chapter 5 will enunciate principles interoperable doctrine does not imply of Canadian aerospace command and identical doctrine. Factors such as national control based on a synthesis of the policy, history, culture, and geographical principles of command and control as location influence the different ways in espoused by the air forces of Canada’s which nations employ their armed forces, major partners (Australia, Britain and including their aerospace forces. Joint the US) and Canadian experience. Conceptual Foundations Introduction

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide summaries of material found in Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations for the reader’s convenience so that the history and context underlying the conceptual foundations of the command and control of Canadian aerospace forces is available in one document.19 The most important innovation in the approach taken here is the presentation of two theoretical C2 frameworks, in the next chapter, which can be used to analyse, design and evaluate C2 arrangements now and in the future.

xi Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces:

ndnotes E 1 The idea of national differences in operational-level command styles is examined in Howard Coombs, “Perspectives on Operational Thought,” in Allan English, ed., Leadership and Command and the Operational Art (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 75-96. 2 DND, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005), 10-13. Italics in original. Available at http://www.cda-acd.forces. gc.ca/cfli/engraph/leadership/leadership_e.asp 3 I.B. Holley, Jr., “A Modest Proposal: Making Doctrine More Memorable,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 14-20. 4 See for example, UK Ministry of Defence, British Air Power Doctrine, AP 3000, Third Ed. (London: The Stationary Office, 1999); and Australia, Royal Australian Air Force, Aerospace Centre, Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, Fourth Ed. (August 2002). 5 Mike Thirtle, “Toward Defining Air Force Leadership,”Air and Space Power Journal 16, no. 4 (Winter 2002), 9-16. Quotes from internet version, np. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/vorwin02.html (accessed October 18, 2007). 6 See for example Shannon A. Brown, “The Sources of Leadership Doctrine in the Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal 16, no. 4 (Winter 2002), 37-45. 7 See US Air Force, Leadership and Force Development (AFDD 1-1) dated 18 February 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1_1.pdf (accessed February 2, 2007). Note that the USAF defines “force development” as “a series of experiences and challenges, combined with education and training opportunities that are directed at producing Airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions.” AFDD 1-1, vii. 8 See US Air Force, Command and Control (AFDD 2-8) dated 16 February 2001(Maxwell AL: US Air Force Doctrine Center, 2001); and DoD, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (JP 3-30) dated 5 June 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf (accessed February 25, 2008). 9 See for example Allan English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press, 2004); and Allan English and G.E. (Joe) Sharpe. “Network Enabled Operations: The Experiences of Senior Canadian Commanders.” Defence Research and Development Canada - Toronto, report CR 2006-112, 31 March 2006. 10 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Duty with Honour (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 51. Available at http://www.cda-acd.forces. gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/poa/poa_e.asp 11 Ibid., 59. 12 Ibid., 74. 13 Ibid., 25. 14 Ibid., 74. 15 Ibid., 4. 16 Ibid., 19, 25, 59. 17 Ibid., 74. 18 Hillier started these initiatives shortly after his appointment as CDS in February 2005. 19 Allan English and John Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2007). Available at http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/eLibrary/eLibrary_e.asp xii Theories of Command & Control Chapter 1

General The CF profession of arms manual, Duty with Honour, states that members of the profession of arms in Canada are required to achieve high standards of professional expertise.1 This expertise comprises “a sophisticated body of theoretical and practical knowledge and skills that differ from those in any other Theories of Command and Control

profession,” and the knowledge that is the foundation of the profession of arms is based on “a deep and comprehensive

understanding of the theory and practice of armed conflict.”2

To acquire the necessary professional bring to armed forces in dealing with this expertise, military professionals must have confusion, some members of the profession a balance among training, education and of arms argue that the use of theoretical experience. While the idea that training frameworks may detract from the practice and experience are essential components of command, especially given that they are of military professionalism is widely not fully developed. Pigeau and McCann accepted, some challenge the idea that respond to this argument in this way: developing an understanding and subsequently a mastery of relevant theories is From a military perspective, an equally important component of mili- attempting to dissect C2 may tary professionalism.3 Of course training seem overly analytical and sterile. in certain C2 processes is important so After all, military commanders that military professionals may use them have been ‘doing’ C2 more or less effectively, and experience is vital so that successfully for hundreds of years. military professionals can analyse that Some may argue that too much experience to improve the practice of their analysis, especially if it is incom- profession. However, just as professional plete, may actually get in the way engineers must master certain theories of excelling in military command founded in the physical sciences to practise and other command-related their profession, military professionals activities like the operational must master theories of war, leadership art. From a scientific perspective, and command to be competent to practise some researchers may view the their profession. This mastery is critical theoretical framework we propose for military professionals, as well as others as too loose and imprecise. Both in the defence community, if they are to criticisms have merit, yet both adapt to change effectively. Therefore, they criticisms suffer the same short- need to understand the intellectual as well coming. Both assume that only as the technical tools that they use in their complete knowledge can further work, because in professions, tools are not the practice and understanding of only physical objects, but also theories, a field or discipline.6 concepts and knowledge. In the case of C2, military professionals must understand Instead of individual instructors or leaders theories of C2 to be aware of not only how showing their pupils or subordinates their to use this professional “tool,” but also own personal ways of flying or avoiding how to modify the “tool” so that it can be dangerous situations in the air, if theories used in new or unforeseen circumstances.4 of flight had been taught consistently throughout the RFC, manoeuvres such as Unfortunately for military professionals, spin recoveries would have been learned the theoretical study of command in a as a matter of routine. Of course, theo- military context is still immature, and in ries of flight have progressed significantly practice, there is confusion among some since the First World War; however, even branches of Western militaries in terms the rudimentary theories extant at the of how they describe their approach to time, if disseminated and taught widely, command. Some endorse the concept of would have saved many lives. This is not to “mission command,” others endorse a suggest that, given the complexity of the philosophy of “centralized control and human dimension of command, theo- decentralized execution,” while in other ries of command will ever be taught like branches the notion of “network-centric” aircraft operating instructions; however, C2 is prominent.5 Despite the advantages an understanding of human behaviour that using emerging C2 theory might and theoretical command frameworks will C h a p t e r 1

An analogy may clarify why C2 theory, even incomplete theory, is required to maximize the effectiveness of armed forces in the 21st century. In the early days of powered flight, the theories of flight were poorly understood and flying training was based on students copying their instructors’ actions with little understanding on the part of either student or instructor of the principles behind their control movements. The causes of spins and other unusual aircraft attitudes were, therefore, not well known, and many deaths resulted due to avoidable flying accidents.7 Without coherent theory as a guide, showing pilots how to avoid dangerous situations during the First World War was the responsibility of individual H a w k e r leaders. One remarkable case of leadership by technical expertise was that of squadron commander and Victoria Cross winner Lanoe Hawker. His unit was the first to be equipped with DH2 aircraft, which had been rushed into service to counter the “Fokker scourge.” At that time the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was suffering large numbers of casualties at the hands of the newly introduced Fokker E1 fighters. These fighters were the first aircraft to have interrupter gear allowing them to fire their machine guns forward through the arc of their propellers. Unfortunately for the RFC, the DH2 had a number of manufacturing and technical problems, and it was soon dubbed the “Spinning Incinerator” by the pilots who flew it. On 13 February 1916, two of Hawker’s best pilots were killed in accidents involving spins on their own side of the lines. Rumours quickly circulated among his pilots that these machines were death traps. A complete collapse in squadron morale seemed imminent, and Hawker had to act quickly. Immediately after the fatal accidents, he took a DH2 up on his own and recovered from every possible spin condition. He then explained the proper manoeuvres to his pilots, and they all practised them until they were proficient in spin recoveries. After that, while Hawker was in command, his squadron did not lose another flier from spinning into the ground. Thus, a potentially serious morale problem was avoided by a commanding officer (CO) demonstrating his flying competence and by taking a personal risk.8 However, this exceptional demonstration of leadership and flying skill would not have been required if theories of flight had been adequately researched, documented and taught to all RFC pilots.

allow command challenges to be addressed A i r c o D H 2 more consistently and effectively by military personnel.

The Origins of Some Command and Control Terms outcome of negotiations among the Allies, ackground particularly the US and Britain, over how B terms like “command,” “control,” “unity Most of the formal definitions related to C2 of command,” and “coordination” should in current military doctrine and usage date be used to ensure the effective employment from the Second World War, and reflect the Theories of Command and Control

of forces in joint and combined operations An official definition of unity of command in that war. Therefore, a brief outline appeared in the 1941 Joint Canadian- of how some of these terms came to be United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 defined is offered to provide the reader (Short Title ABC-22): with the context necessary to understand current issues in command and control Unity of command, when estab- terminology. lished, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority At the beginning of the Second World War, to co-ordinate the operations of the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force the participating forces of both feared being dominated by other services, nations by the setting up of task both Canadian or foreign, and, therefore, forces, the assignment of tasks, they “jealously guarded their indepen- the designation of objectives, dence.”9 Each service was opposed to any and the exercise of such co-ordi- kind of centralization of command and nating control as the commander control, and they insisted “on mutual and deems necessary to ensure the voluntary cooperation as the only basis for success of the operations. Unity joint planning and command.”10 Coopera- of command does not autho- tion, then, became the main command and rize a commander exercising it control principle amongst the Canadian to control the administration services, and it entailed working “together and discipline of the forces of for mutually agreed goals.”11 the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective Unity of Command or co-ordination.14 This 1941 definition of unity of command Operational Command closely resembles today’s modern defini- The creation of formal defence arrange- tion of the term “operational command.”15 ments between Canada and United States, Therefore, during the Second World War with the establishment of the Permanent unity of command implied, in today’s Joint Board on Defence in August 1940, terms, vesting operational command brought a new and unfamiliar command of multi-service forces in a single and control term to the attention of commander.16 Canada’s armed forces: unity of command. This principle “was alien to Canadian doctrine and practice.”12 Nonetheless, this command and control principle was perational Control deeply entrenched in the US Army (which O included the US Army Air Corps) and The term “operational control” was first Navy. Unity of command essentially used by the Royal Navy in 1941 as a meant having one commander – from any means to increase its influence over Royal service – to command the air, ground, and Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command mari- naval forces in a theatre of operations. time patrol operations. However, because This “single authority” would be able to it was not precisely defined at first, opera- choose between strategic plans, resolve the tional control proved to be an ambiguous conflicting claims of feuding subordinate command and control principle. The commanders for resources, and assign March 1941 “Coastal Command Charter” operational priorities. The principle of stipulated that “operational control of unity of command aimed to avoid duplica- Coastal Command will be exercised by tion of effort and competition for resources the Admiralty through the Air Officer among coequal commanders; this principle Commanding-in-Chief (C-in-C), Coastal also prescribed the establishment of a clear Command.”17 It did not, however, exactly chain of command to minimize delays in define what “operational control” actually issuing orders and to ensure that orders entailed. The naval C-in-C only had the came from only one source.13 authority to issue “general directives” as to the objectives to be obtained, and it was C h a p t e r 1 the air commander who actually exercised “operational control” by “designat[ing] the day-to-day detailed conduct of air operations.”18 The C-in-C of Coastal Command, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, described the command and control relationship from his perspective as follows: “the sailor tells us the effect he wants achieved and leaves it entirely to us how that result is achieved.”19 It was therefore not surprising that the RAF felt use of normal organisation Units that the Admiralty’s “operational control” assigned, through the responsible over Coastal Command was a “polite Commanders. It does not include myth.”20 such matters as Administration, discipline, Internal Organisation While the British continued to tolerate and training of Units… It is ambiguity on this issue, the Americans recognised that the Operational did not. At the end of May 1941, they Authority may in emergency revealed their definition of operational or unusual situations employ control to their Canadian counterparts on assigned Units on any task that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence: he considers essential to effec- “Operational control includes the responsi- tive execution of his operational 23 bility and authority to dispose and employ responsibility. available means to require such action by all available forces as will most effectively This definition mirrors very closely the execute the assigned task.”21 This defini- modern definition of operational control, tion was more precise than the British which is “the authority delegated to a one, and in late 1943, under American commander to direct assigned forces to pressure, the Royal Navy and Royal Air accomplish specific missions or tasks, Force – after some disagreement22 – finally which are usually limited by func- agreed on a clear definition of operational tion, time, or location; to deploy units control: concerned; and to retain or assign TACON [Tactical Control] of those units. It does Operational Control comprises not include authority to assign separate those functions of Command employment of components of the units 24 involving composition of Task concerned.” Indeed, this 1944 defini- Forces or Groups or Units, assign- tion proved to be of great importance, for ment of Tasks, designation [sic] operational control became the corner- of objectives and co-ordination stone command and control principle of necessary to accomplish the the two key post-war Western military alli- Mission. It shall always be exer- ances, North Atlantic Treaty Organization cised where possible by making (NATO) and North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).25 Theories of Command and Control

direction closely mirrors the relation- perational Direction ship between Coastal Command and the O Admiralty as indicated in the 1941 Coastal In early 1943, the Western Allies estab- Command Charter (see above). There- lished the Canadian Northwest Atlantic fore, one could argue that the Admiralty Command, and granted Rear-Admiral had “operational direction” not “opera- L.W. Murray, the Royal Canadian Navy tional control” over Coastal Command C-in-C in Halifax, “operational direc- operations.29 In modern terms, operational tion” over all maritime patrol forces in direction was the precursor to mission the new theatre of operations.26 The command where the commander sets out problem for Murray was that operational their intent and subordinate commanders direction was not specifically defined decide, within certain guidelines, the when the new command was stood up on details of how to achieve that intent. 30 April 1943. Therefore, when Murray Mission command is discussed in more began, in the Royal Canadian Air Force’s detail later. (RCAF) opinion, to exert too much influence on maritime patrol operations, the RCAF sought advice from RAF Coastal Command.27 Air Marshal Slessor stressed mplications of to the RCAF that Murray was exceeding I his authority by giving specific and detailed instructions for maritime patrol Historical Experience operations. Instead, Slessor indicated that: for Today Many principles of operational-level …what he should tell us is that command and control evolved significantly he wants that convoy protected; during the Second World War and the and he should give us an order definitions of a number of command and of priority for the convoy; and control terms forged during this conflict he should tell us whether in his provided precedents for future command view, convoy protection at any and control principles both during the Cold given place or time should have War and today. It must be emphasized, priority over offensive sweeps; but however, that the focus of the command how you protect [the] convoy is and control principles and terms discussed entirely a matter for Johnson [the above was at the operational level of war. RCAF Air Officer Commanding- If there is a theme that is consistent with 28 in-Chief Eastern Air Command]. all of these definitions, it is that none of these command and control principles In summary operational direction was granted a commander authority over understood to be the authority to issue another service’s administration and disci- directives as to the objectives to be pline. This authority instead fell to the pursued (i.e., command that the service itself exercised the effect through the head of that service (i.e., that one Chief of the Air Staff, Chief of the Naval/ wanted to Maritime Staff, Chief of the General/Land achieve) in Staff, etc.), a practice that continues to operations. this day. It did not include the Furthermore, as Slessor stated, higher planning levels of command should only tell lower and issuing levels of command the effects they wanted S U P E R M A R I N E of detailed to achieve and leave it to lower levels of S T A N R A E R C O A S T A L instruc- PATROL FLYING BOAT command to work out the details appro- tions for priate to their level. This principle was the actual particularly applicable to the RCAF and execution of operations, as these func- RAF when dealing with armies and navies tions were a part of operational control. who might not have the expertise to Importantly, this definition of operational request specific aircraft types or weapons C h a p t e r 1 loads, and, therefore were asked to state definitions of command [e.g., operational their requirements in terms of the effects command and operational control] are they desired the air force to achieve. The becoming too crude to apply effectively in specific choice of aircraft and missions a highly dynamic politico-military envi- was then the responsibility of the air force ronment. Therefore the adaptive command based on the commander’s intent. and control process also seeks to provide greater flexibility for command and Finally, we should see from this discussion control configurations in order to optimise that definitions of terms related to C2 are integration with coalition partners.”30 not fixed, but evolve based on experience, Consequently, while for doctrinal purposes new theories, and the increased complexity it is important to understand the terms as of coalition operations. As a contem- they are currently defined, we should be porary study, The UK Joint High Level open to changes in definitions over time. Operational Concept, puts it: “The current New Ways of Thinking about Command, TheControl, problems withand current C2 formal doctrinal the more restricted sense, command is a definitions of terms like “command,” legal authority vested in an individual (an “control,” and “command and control” authority that can only be drawn from stem from the historical roots discussed national laws), the expression “command above and also from the fact that many and control” generally conveys the meaning current doctrinal definitions, particularly of command proposed by van Creveld in those used by NATO and other groups, that it is a function that has to be exercised are the result of negotiation and compro- if a military force is to exist and operate in mise and not of theory or research. The war.32 US Joint Staff provides a more elaborate definition than NATO’s, and specifically Many contemporary problems with emphasizes the legal authority associated Canadian Air Force command are directly with exercising command: related to this state of affairs. The historical and contemporary origins of these The authority that a commander problems are discussed in Chapter 3. The in the Armed Forces lawfully description of how the common usage of exercises over subordinates by these terms has led to confusion in both the virtue of rank or assignment. study and the application of C2 is described Command includes the authority best by Pigeau and McCann: and responsibility for effectively using available resources and These terms [“command,” for planning the employment “control,” and “command and of, organizing, directing, coordi- control”] are recognizably military, nating, and controlling military and are well-entrenched in the forces for the accomplishment of military’s doctrinal and opera- assigned missions. It also includes tional vocabulary. Yet the manner responsibility for health, welfare, in which these terms are used, morale, and discipline of assigned as well as the circumstances of personnel.31 their usage, varies with confusing complexity. For example, some Despite the differences, one of the branches of the military endorse striking characteristics of the definitions the concept of mission command, of command over time is the extent to others endorse a philosophy of which they evoke the personal nature of centralized control and decentral- command itself, especially the fact that ized execution, while in other the authority to command is vested in services the notion of network- one individual. In summary, while, in centric C2 is prominent. NATO Theories of Command and Control

employs a dizzying array of C2 which are cited frequently in the litera- nomenclature and authorities: ture on C2, will now be presented. The OPCON [operational control], first was devised by Thomas J. Czerwinski TACOM [tactical who served in the US Marine Corps and command], full US Army and was on the faculty of the command, etc. And National Defense University; the second if we look for help was put forward by Canadian researchers from official defini- Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. Czerwin- tions of Command, ski’s framework represents the evolution Control and C2 (e.g., of the theory of C2 in the US literature those of NATO), we from its roots in two leading military find that the defini- theorists, Carl von Clausewitz and Martin tions themselves are van Creveld. However, the Czerwinski circular and redun- framework has not been developed in any dant. The command detail since the publication of the original definition makes use concept in 1996. Therefore, the Pigeau- of the word control, McCann framework is emphasized here the control definition because it is one of the leading empiri- uses concepts that are part of the cally-based models of C2 currently being definition of command, and the developed. The Pigeau-McCann model is definition of C2 is merely a longer cited in CF leadership doctrine and in CF restatement of the definition of aerospace doctrine.34 Furthermore, it is control. Add to this confusion cited in The UK Joint High Level Opera- the growing and bewildering tional Concept and this document tells us array of C2 acronyms adopted by that the framework provides “essential militaries around the world (e.g., features” to better understand command.35 C2I, C2IS, C4ISR, etc.), Concepts from the Pigeau-McCann and it is no wonder that framework have also been incorporated defence analyst Greg recently into definitions of “command” Foster has described and “control” in NATO joint doctrine.36 the state of Command Finally, as a model being developed by and Control theory as Canadian researchers, using Canadian (as bleak, using words like well as other) data, it is compatible with “inchoate,” “diffuse,” the organizational culture of the CF and it “conjectural” and “seem- addresses the major challenges confronting ingly random.”33 Canadian decision makers. In an attempt to put some order into the discussion of C2, two major frameworks,

The Czerwinski Command Framework Czerwinski proposed a framework, based on commanders attempting to direct on three types of command style, which all of their forces all of the time. This summarizes many of the concepts in form of command fell into disfavour in the current debate. He described the the middle of the 18th century as the first command style, used in the US increase in the size of armed forces made it Army’s digitized battlefield concept, as increasingly difficult to physically exer- “command-by-direction.” This form of cise direct command. Czerwinski argued command has been used since the begin- that “command-by-direction” has been ning of organized warfare, and it is based resurrected by the US Army because it C h a p t e r 1 believes that technology can provide the Czerwinski advocated the adoption of a commander with the ability to exercise third type of style, “command-by-influ- this type of command again; however, ence,” to deal with the chaos of war and he asserted that, because of the size and the complexity of modern operations. complexity of the technical support This command style, which has also required to support this command style, been called mission command or auftrag- it will be inadequate and self-defeating if staktik, attempts to deal with uncertainty applied to 21st century conflict. by moving decision thresholds to lower command levels, thereby allowing smaller Czerwinski’s second style, “command-by- units to carry out missions bounded by plan,” was created by Frederick the Great the concept of operations derived from the 250 years ago to overcome the limitations commander’s intent. In mission command, of “command-by-direction.” “Command- subordinate commanders are given freedom by-plan” emphasizes adherence to a pre- to achieve the goals set by the commander, determined design and it has evolved as the but are free to decide, within certain norm for many modern military forces in guidelines, the specific ways and means the West. The US Air Force’s air campaign themselves. The emphasis in this method doctrine is cited as an example of this type of command is on training and educating of command system which is characterized troops to have the ability to exercise initia- by trading flexibility for focus in order to tive and to exploit opportunities guided by concentrate on identifying and neutralizing the commander’s intent. The commander’s an opponent’s centres of gravity. Czer- ability to create “common intent,” which winski claimed that “command-by-plan” is is discussed in detail later in this chapter, useful only at the strategic and operational is a key to effective “command-by-influ- levels of war, but if too much emphasis is ence.” Czerwinski’s contention that only put on adhering to the plan, this method “command-by-influence” systems are likely will be ineffective because of its inability to to be consistently successful in the 21st cope with unforeseen or rapid change. century is supported by a number of military communities, notably the US Marine Corps.37

The Pigeau-McCann Command Framework initiate, revise and terminate action. It eneral is the human who must ultimately accept G responsibility for mission success or Pigeau and McCann devised their frame- failure. All C2 systems, from sensors and work to address the gaps in the theoretical weapons to organizational structures and study of command in a military context chain of command, must exist to support and their framework is being evaluated human potential for accomplishing the based on data gathered from Canadian mission. For example, C2 organizations military operations.38 They note that that are intended to allocate authorities whether involved in disaster relief, peace- and define areas of responsibility should keeping operations or war, the CF deal facilitate the coordination of human in human adversity. Inevitably, the CF effort to achieve mission objectives. If responds to and resolves this adversity the organization hinders this goal–for through human intervention. Any new example, by confusing lines of authority theory of C2 must, therefore, assert the or by imposing excessive bureaucracy–then fundamental importance of the human as the human potential necessary for accom- its central philosophical tenet. It is the plishing the mission is also compromised. human–e.g., the CF member–who must The challenge, then, becomes one of speci- assess the situation, devise new solutions, fying those aspects of human potential make decisions, coordinate resources and that should guide C2 development.39 effect change. It is the human who must Theories of Command and Control

Pigeau and McCann’s framework first the slavish adherence to rules and proce- distinguishes the concept of command dures (e.g., standard operating procedures from control, giving pre-eminence to [SOPs]), devoid of creativity, produce command. They then link the two effective organizations. Indeed, as most concepts together in a new definition of labour unions know, a good method for C2. hampering operational effectiveness is to “work to rule” or to follow only “the letter of the law.” Nevertheless, well designed rules and procedures are effective efinition of Key in the proper circumstances. Command, D therefore, needs a climate of prudent risk taking, one where individuals are allowed Terms to tap inherent values, beliefs and motiva- Pigeau and McCann define key terms tions to marshal their considerable creative as follows. Command is “the creative talents towards achieving common goals. expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission.” Control is “those It follows from their definition that all structures and processes devised by humans have the potential to command; command to enable it and to manage risk. put another way, that command is an The function of control is to enable the inherently human activity that anyone, creative expression of will and to manage if they choose, can express. To limit the mission problem in order to minimize command only to those individuals who the risk of not achieving a satisfactory have been bestowed with the title of solution. The function of command is to “Commander,” begs the question of what invent novel solutions to mission prob- command is in the first place. Notice lems, to provide conditions for starting, that their definition allows even junior changing and terminating control, and to non-commissioned members to command. be the source of diligent purposefulness.”40 If, through their will, they are creative The functions of command versus control in solving a problem which furthers are shown in Table 1-1. the achievement of the mission, then

Command Control  Creating new structures and processes  Monitoring structures and processes (when necessary) (once initiated)

 Initiating and terminating control  Carrying out pre-established procedures

 Modifying control structures and  Adjusting procedures according to pre- processes when the situation demands established plans it

Table 1-1 Command and Control Functions 4 1

Their definition of command, whose influ- they have satisfied the requirements for ence can be found in the second of five command. NATO definitions of command,42 is: the creative expression of human will neces- But if all humans can command, on what sary to accomplish the mission. Without basis do Pigeau and McCann differentiate creativity, C2 organizations are doomed to command capability? What differenti- applying old solutions to new problems, ates the private from the general officer? and military problems are never the same. What key factors influence its expression? Furthermore, without human will there To address these questions, Pigeau and is no motivation to find and implement McCann have further refined the notion new solutions. For example, rarely does of command in proposing the concept of 10 C h a p t e r 1

“effective command,” defined as “the These four competencies define the broad creative and purposeful exercise of legiti- set necessary for effective command. mate authority to accomplish the mission legally, professionally and ethically.”43 This Authority, the second dimension of definition highlights the notion of legiti- command, refers to command’s domain mate authority as the basis of effective of influence. It is the degree to which a command in the military. Even though commander is empowered to act, the scope all humans can command, according to of this power and the resources available their definition of command, the exercise for enacting their will. Pigeau and McCann of command by those not in positions distinguish between the two components of legitimate authority would probably of command authority: that which is not be deemed effective command in a assigned from external sources and that military context. In this book, the term which an individual earns by virtue of “command” is used to denote “effective personal credibility – that is, between legal command,” using the Pigeau-McCann authority and personal authority. Legal definition. authority is the power to act as assigned by a formal agency outside the military, typically a government. It explicitly gives commanders resources and personnel for imensions of accomplishing the mission. The legal D 44 authority assigned to a nation’s military goes well beyond that of any other private Command or government organization; it includes To elaborate further on their concept of the use of controlled violence. Personal command, they propose that command authority, on the other hand, is that capability, as shown in Figure 1-1, can be described in terms of three independent dimensions: competency, authority and RESPONSIBILTY responsibility (CAR). Command requires four essential competencies so that missions can be accomplished successfully. For most COMPETENCY militaries, physical competency is the PHYSICAL most fundamental, one that is manda- EXTRINSIC tory for any operational task, from INTELLECTUAL INTRINSIC conducting a ground reconnaissance to flying an aircraft. The second,intellec - EMOTIONAL tual competency, is critical for planning INTERPERSONAL missions, monitoring the situation, for reasoning, making inferences, visualizing the problem space, assessing risks and PERSONAL making judgements. Missions, especially LEGAL peace support missions, can be ill-defined, operationally uncertain, and involve high risk. Command under these conditions AUTHORITY requires significantemotional competency, a competency strongly associated with Figure 1-1 – Dimensions of resilience, hardiness and the ability to cope under stress. It is sometimes described Command Capability as perseverance in the face of adversity. Command demands a degree of emotional authority given informally to an individual “toughness” to accept the potentially dire by peers and subordinates. Unlike legal consequences of operational decisions. authority which is made explicit through Finally, interpersonal competency is essen- legal documentation, personal authority is tial for interacting effectively with one’s held tacitly. It is earned over time through subordinates, peers, superiors, the media reputation, experience, strength of char- and other government organizations. acter and personal example. Personal 11 Theories of Command and Control

authority cannot be formally designated, tary ethos. Of all the components in the and it cannot be enshrined in rules and dimensions of command, intrinsic respon- regulations. It emerges when an individual sibility is the most fundamental. Without possesses the combination of competencies it, very little would be accomplished. that yields leadership behaviour. The third dimension of command is responsibility. This dimension addresses ommand Capability the degree to which an individual accepts C the legal and moral liability commensurate with command. As with authority, there Space and the Balanced are two components to responsibility, one 45 externally imposed, and the other inter- Command Envelope nally generated. The first, called extrinsic Pigeau and McCann propose that compe- responsibility, involves the obligation for tency, authority and responsibility public accountability. When a military each define one axis of a 3-dimensional commander is given legal authority, there volume that encompasses the entire space is a formal expectation by superiors that of command capability (Figure 1-2). they can be held accountable for resources That is, military members can each be assigned. Extrinsic responsibility taps a positioned in this space, with their loca- person’s willingness to be held account- tions specifying the degree and type of able for resources. Intrinsic responsibility, command capability they possess. Indi- the second component of responsibility, is viduals with high levels of competency, the degree of self-generated obligation that authority and responsibility – i.e., occu- one feels towards the military mission. It is pying the far upper right-hand corner a function of the resolve and motivation of the space – represent high levels of that an individual brings to a problem command capability, presumably senior officers. Individuals with low levels of competency, authority and responsibility High Low – i.e., occupying the near lower left-hand RESPONSIBILITY corner of the space – represent low levels of command capability, presumably junior non-commissioned personnel. Further- more, they hypothesize that the command capability of each person in a military organization should ideally lie inside the Balanced Command Envelope (BCE), a High diagonal column46 of space running from low competency, authority and respon- COMPETENCY sibility to high, as shown in Figure 1-2. Individuals lying outside the BCE have reduced command capability due to an High imbalance in one or more of the command dimensions. For instance, an organization Balanced Command Envelope may have put an individual in the position

of expecting them to take responsibility AUTHORITY Low for a situation for which they lack the Low authority (e.g., the resources and power) Figure 1-2 – Command to influence. Alternatively, an organiza- Capability Space with the Balanced 4 7 tion may under-utilize individuals with Command Envelope high levels of competency by assigning them tasks with too little authority and responsibility. The point is that being – the amount of ownership taken and off the BCE runs the risk of compro- the amount of commitment expressed. mising command effectiveness – that is, Intrinsic responsibility is associated with of compromising an individual’s ability to the concepts of honour, loyalty and duty; creatively express their will in the accom- those timeless qualities linked to mili- plishment of the mission. 12 C h a p t e r 1

Pigeau and McCann’s human-centred defi- (ROE), for example, are formal processes nition of command is a powerful tool for for regulating the use of force. Process deducing some organizational principles. increases speed of response and reduces However, the careful reader will notice that uncertainty. simply specifying command characteristics is insufficient for completely describing COMMAND High C2. How can one facilitate and support, Low for example, command expression? Under RESPONSIBILITY what conditions does the creative expression of will best manifest itself? Alter- natively, unbridled creativity can lead to uncoordinated activity and organizational High chaos. Under what conditions should the COMPETENCY creative expression of will be limited or channelled? The answer to these questions High is control. Command must execute control Balanced Command Envelope

both (1) to support and facilitate creative AUTHORITY Low command, while (2) controlling command Low creativity. Indeed, much of organizational theory can be seen as the attempt to estab- CONTROL lish the optimum balance between the two Support Command Manage Risk functions performed by control. Structure Process Bounds the problem space Increases e ciency Provides context Increases speed of response Reduces uncertainty Mission Statement ROEs he Relationship Policy SOPs T Doctrine between Command and Procedures Control As we have seen, Pigeau and McCann Figure 1- 3 - The Relationship definedcontrol as those structures and between Command and Control 4 8 processes devised by command both to support it and to manage risk. The relationship between command and control is shown Knowing which structures and processes in Figure 1-3. Structures are frameworks to invoke in order to achieve operational of interrelated concepts that classify and success is a key issue for command. Recall relate things. The military environment that their definition specifies that control encompasses a host of control structures is devised by command. Structures and (e.g., chain of command, order of battle, processes come into existence only through databases for describing terrain, weapon some creative act of human will. What systems, organizations, etc). Structures are the guidelines for knowing when new are attempts to bound the problem space control systems should be developed or and give a context within which creative when existing control systems should be command can express itself. For example, allowed to continue? Their definition an organization’s mission statement is a specifies two broad guidelines. First, strategic-level structure whose purpose is structures and processes should exist to to give long-term guidance to all members support command. They should facilitate (including leaders in the organization) on (or at least not hinder) the potential for how to apply and channel their motiva- creative acts of will. They should facili- tion and creativity. Once stable structures tate (or at least not hinder) the expression have been established, processes can be of competencies (physical, intellectual, developed to increase efficiency. Control emotional and interpersonal). They should processes are sets of regulated procedures clarify pathways for legal authority; they that allow control structures to perform should encourage (not impede) the oppor- work. They are the means for invoking tunity to establish personal authority. action. Military rules of engagement And finally, they should encourage the 13 Theories of Command and Control

willing acceptance of responsibility while to reduce risk; however, this would come at the same time increasing motivation in at the expense of inhibiting command military members. From an organizational creativity–creativity that, inevitably, is perspective, any control system that forces needed for solving new problems. its members off the Balanced Command Envelope will, over time, compromise orga- Therefore, as shown in Figure 1-4, a nizational effectiveness. tension exists between the two reasons for creating control: to facilitate creative The second criterion for knowing when command and to control command control should be invoked is whether it creativity. Getting the balance right is promotes the management of risk. Pigeau a perennial challenge for most organizations. Pigeau and McCann suggest that, as a general strategy, militaries should give priority to facilitating creative command. Control Mechanisms for controlling command creativity should then be used wisely and with restraint. Their definitions of command and of control (as separate concepts) were designed to highlight a military’s most important asset: the human. However, a military is not simply a collection of independent individuals, each of whom pursues their own interpretation of the mission. Militaries are organizations for coordinated action, for achieving success by channelling the creative energies of Figure 1-4 – Reasons for their members towards key objectives. Creating Control It is this important feature of military capability that they emphasize in their new definition of command and control: and McCann define risk loosely as anything C2 is the establishment of common intent that jeopardizes the attainment of the to achieve coordinated action. Without mission. This includes uncertainties due to coordinated action military power is personnel (including the adversary), uncer- compromised. Without common intent tainties in the environment (e.g., weather, coordinated action may never be achieved. terrain, etc), equipment failures, miscom- In their work Pigeau and McCann have munication, and the unbridled expression specified some of the issues that must be of creativity, since such expression may addressed to make common intent clear. A lead to chaos. Imposing an elaborate discussion of the concepts of intent and control structure and process is one way common intent follows.

Explicit Implicit Intent and C2

14 C h a p t e r 1

smooth functioning of a military orga- ntent nization, particularly during operations, I depends upon its members correctly A key concept in their definition of C2, as inferring not only the commander’s intent we have seen, is intent; that is, a specific aim but also one another’s intent, especially in or purpose and its associated set of conno- unanticipated situations for which plans tations. When a commander gives the order may not have been prepared. In fact, to “Attack target X by 1300 hours,” they intent is such a profound concept, it is not only mean attack target X explicitly, key to their definition of command and but also mean: “Attack target X while control, as we have seen. making effective use of your resources, without killing innocent civilians, etc.” The establishment of common intent in Thus the commander’s intent is made up of C2 is not an end in itself but a means to two components. an end: specifically, to coordinate action in military operations. Intent is more The first is explicit intent, that part which than an aim or purpose; it is an aim or has been made publicly available through purpose with all of its associated connota- orders, briefings, questions and backbriefs. tions. Intent conveys the idea of needing It includes communications that can be to interpret an aim in the context of written, verbalized or explicitly trans- unforeseen circumstances. For example, mitted. But it is impossible to be explicit a military objective may involve securing about every minute aspect of an operation. and stabilizing an area to allow humani- For expediency’s sake some things (actu- tarian relief efforts. Assuming that the ally most things) are left uncommunicated. physical resources exist to accomplish Thus explicit intent carries a vast network of connotations and expectations–the implicit intent. Implicit intent derives from Implicit Intent personal expectations, experi- Implicit ence due to military training, Intent tradition and ethos and from deep cultural values. Much of implicit intent may be that which cannot be vocalized. And it is usually acquired slowly—through cultural immersion or years of experience. Finally, common Explicit intent, shown in Figure 1-5, Intent consists of the explicit intent that is shared between a commander and subordinates immediately prior to or during an operation plus the (much larger) operationally-relevant shared implicit Figure 1-5 – Common Intent intent that has been developed over the months, and even years, prior to the operation.49 this objective, what factors are involved for ensuring that the objective is interpreted correctly by those charged with its completion? Is it simply a matter of ommon Intent giving explicit instructions on how the C objective should be accomplished? If so, Correctly interpreting an aim, purpose how explicit should these instructions be? or objective—that is, correctly inferring Will it be necessary to elaborate on these intent—is a fundamental concept in mili- explicit instructions? If so, how extensive tary thought. Military doctrinal literature should the elaborations be? At some point is rife with terms like commander’s intent, elaboration, amplification and clarifi- intent statements and enemy intent. The cation must give way to action. When 15 Theories of Command and Control

should this happen? In other words, how supports its interpretation. The bottom of much effort must a commander expend the intent pyramid represents the well- to ensure that the connotations of the entrenched factors (personal, military objective are understood by subordinates? and cultural expectations) that influence interpretation of the commander’s explicit intent. Furthermore, these Intent Pyramid factors may be very difficult to change, largely because we are often not aware of them. These explicit and implicit aspects Orders of intent roughly correspond to Explicit Intent Questions Publicly communicated Answers the two general approaches for achieving coordinated action. Unvocalized Personal Explicit intent corresponds to the Implicit Intent (and unvocalizable?) Expectations requirement for explicit control, (Based(Based onon stylestyle andand experience)experience) Resistance to change and implicit intent corresponds to the necessity for allowing sponta- Military Expectations neous behaviour to emerge consis- (Based(Based onon training,training, doctrine,doctrine, tradition,tradition, andand ethos)ethos) tent with the overall objective. However, for the concept of intent to be useful—that is, for it to Cultural Expectations contribute to coordinated action— (Based(Based on on societal societal values, values, cultural cultural morals, morals, and national national pride) pride) it must be shared between one or more individuals. Intent must be Figure 1-6 - The Intent Pyramid – An common between individuals. Illustration of the Relationship Between Explicit and Implicit Intent 50 There are a number of mechanisms for sharing explicit and When does commander control give way implicit intent, as illustrated in to subordinate freedom of action? These Figure 1-7. The two most important of questions are particularly important when these mechanisms are dialogue for sharing commanders are not familiar with the indi- explicit intent and socialization for sharing vidual capabilities of their subordinates implicit intent. If commanders shared (for example, during coalition operations) implicit knowledge of the mission objec- or if the circumstances of the mission are tive through dialogue and if they shared unusual. tacit knowledge on how to interpret the objective through socialization, then the likelihood of having common intent with their subordinates would be enhanced. Two other important factors are that: xplicit and Implicit (1) there must be comparable levels of E reasoning ability among subordinates for Intent making decisions when neither the time The concept of intent includes an explicit nor the opportunity exists to obtain advice portion that contains the stated objective from the commander; and (2) there must (as well as all of its elaborations) and an be comparable levels of motivation and implicit portion that remains unexpressed commitment to achieve mission objectives. for reasons of expediency but nonetheless is assumed to be understood. This unexpressed implicit intent guides or bounds (but does not direct) the actions alancing Explicit of subordinates when faced with unantici- B 52 pated circumstances. The intent pyramid in Figure 1-6 reflects the relation between and Implicit Intent explicit intent and the large unstated An important consideration for implicit intent that underpins it and commanders then is: How much effort should they expend in making their intent 16 C h a p t e r 1 explicit in order for them to have confi- and the level of tacit knowledge about dence that their implicit intent is under- guiding principles that subordinates share stood by subordinates? for interpreting intent. There are three factors that influence Faced with the reality of differing the correct balance between explicit and reasoning ability among subordinates, implicit intent: commanders are left with three strategies.  the amount of explicit and tacit  Commanders should identify, as knowledge that subordinates share for soon as possible, those individuals guiding their actions, who demonstrate a competence for thinking a problem through. These  the degree of comparability that individuals should occupy key roles in exists in the reasoning ability of the commander’s team. subordinates, and  Commanders should match the diffi-  the level of commitment and motiva- culty of the task to the intellectual tion towards the mission that subordi- ability of the member. Not all prob- nates share. lems are equally onerous, nor are they all equally critical for mission success. The following paragraphs offer suggestions Commanders should be judicious in for how commanders can deal with each of the formation of teams and the tasks these three issues in turn. those teams are assigned. Commanders need to know how well their subordinates understand their explicit Explicit intent for the mission, and more importantly, the level of their subordinates’ Communication tacit knowledge, or how well subordinates have internalized the guiding principles that bound proper military behaviour Shared and acceptable military solutions. If knowledge reasoning commanders are not confident that their motivation explicit intent has been understood adequately—that is, they are not confident Interaction that subordinates have understood what to do—then their only recourse is to take the time and explain their intent more fully. Implicit But if commanders are not confident that Figure 1-7 – Facilitating the subordinates share even the same guiding Achievement of Common Intent 51 principles for acceptable behaviour, then they have a much more daunting task. Not only must they be more explicit about  Commanders should ensure that subor- what to do in the mission, but they must dinate commanders engage in similar be explicit about what not to do, which kinds of strategies—that is, carefully can be very time consuming since unac- choose their teams and allocate tasks ceptable solutions greatly outnumber according to competence. acceptable ones. In other words, if commanders are not confident that their Of course, these strategies are not new; subordinates’ solutions will be within the however, Pigeau and McCann have bounds of proper military behaviour and provided a theoretical framework for acceptable military solutions, then they intent that situates these strategies will not be confident that spontaneous, within the larger objective of establishing acceptable, coordinated behaviour will common intent to achieve coordinated emerge in their absence. Commanders, action. therefore, must continually assess both the level of overt knowledge about the mission 17 Theories of Command and Control

In order to maximize the level of commit- the commander’s intent to be interpreted ment and motivation towards the mission correctly. But it is one thing to know what that subordinates share, commanders must must be done (that is, understand explicit tap the creative will of their subordinates intent) under circumstances that may have at the same time as they explain their been envisaged by the commander, and it intent. They must realize that conveying is quite another to be able to solve a new intent is more than conveying a concept of operational problem in the commander’s operation; it is also an opportunity to ener- absence. Even if a subordinate has inter- gize subordinates, to motivate independent nalized the correct guiding principles, new thought and action, and to make members problems require intellectual capability to commit to working together. As in all solve. However, it may be unreasonable to aspects of military life, the importance expect that every member of a military of the leadership skills of the commander organization achieve this level of reasoning cannot be overemphasized in motivating ability. subordinates for a mission. Commanders, therefore, must continu- Achieving coordinated action requires ally estimate the need for explicit control the correct balance of explicit control versus allowing subordinates the freedom and spontaneous emergent behaviour. of action to solve their own operational Explicit control is an aspect of explicit problems. Achieving the correct balance intent which depends on the establish- is key to achieving coordinated action ment of guiding principles that will allow efficiently.

Comparable Level of Shared Reasoning Commitment Impact on C2 Knowledge Ability and Motivation

Greatest potential for establishing common Maximum Maximum Maximum intent Wasted potential for common intent Maximum Maximum Minimum (leadership issue?) Good potential for common intent if guiding principles for appropriate action exist (means Minimum Maximum Maximum more effort needed for explicating the objective); if shared guiding principles do not exist, unacceptable solutions are a possibility Some potential for common intent; will need Maximum Minimum Maximum to rely on very detailed plans and explanations Poor potential for common intent; leadership Maximum Minimum Minimum and detailed plans required Little potential for common intent; leadership Minimum Maximum Minimum and very detailed, explicit intent are required Dangerous common intent; over zealousness Minimum Minimum Maximum may lead to uncoordinated chaos with high potential for unacceptable solutions

Minimum Minimum Minimum Least potential for establishing common intent Table 1-2 - A Method for Diagnosing the Potential for Achieving Common Intent among Subordinates 5 3

18 C h a p t e r 1

The definition of C2 used here emphasizes the critical importance of establishing ypes of C2 common intent among military members T that is necessary for achieving coordinated action. Regardless of where on the C2 Organizations continuum between command-by-direc- Based on Pigeau and McCann’s definition tion and command-by-influence a military of C2, there are two contrasting kinds of mission lies, individual commanders can organizational structures, centralized and nonetheless maximize common intent decentralized, with a range of possibili- within their limited span of influence. ties in between. When the proportion of By paying attention to the amount of shared explicit intent in a C2 organization explicit and tacit knowledge subordinates is high compared to the amount of shared share, by assessing their ability to reason implicit intent, this is indicative of central- based on that knowledge, and by influ- ized C2. Members of a centralized orga- encing their overall level of motivation and nization are explicitly told not only what commitment to achieve the objective, a to do in a particular situation, but how commander can take full advantage of the to do it. If the situation changes quickly, potential for common intent that resides in however, the generation and dissemination their subordinates. of new orders may not be fast enough. On the other hand, if an organization encour- Table 1-2 is a simple example of how ages the sharing of implicit intent, the a commander can use the three factors amount of explicit intent necessary to to diagnose the potential among their achieve the same level of common intent subordinates for achieving common intent. will be small. In the military context, Each factor is identified as either maxi- de-centralized organizations are consistent mally present or minimally present, and all with mission command philosophy. De- eight combinations across the three factors centralized organizations are flexible, but are listed. We can see that the greatest at the expense of efficiency and a certain potential for achieving common intent loss of control. Note that one type of exists when all three factors are assessed organizational structure is not necessarily by the commander as being maximally always superior to another type. Based present. Conversely, when all three factors on a number of factors, as seen earlier in are minimally present, the commander Table 1-2, and the circumstances in which will have significant challenges achieving the C2 organization is to function, a wide any kind of action (coordinated or other- variety of C2 options exist.54 This range of wise). The six combinations in between options is consistent with the notion that these two extremes offer varying levels there is no “one size fits all” approach to of common intent potential. In general, command. minimum motivation and commitment implies leadership challenges. Minimally shared explicit and tacit knowledge implies that subordinates may fail to understand mission objectives as well as fail to operate within the acceptable solution space. A minimum amount of subordinate reasoning ability implies that their ability to draw inferences in the absence of the commander will be hampered. Each combination of factors requires different responses from the commander in order to yield the greatest likelihood of achieving coordinated action.

19 Theories of Command and Control

ndnotes E 1 Canada, Department of National Defence, Duty with Honour, 1, 11. 2 Ibid., 17. 3 Allan English, “Introduction,” in Allan English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command, xii-xiv. 4 D.J. Bercuson, “Defence Education for 2000 … and Beyond,” in Educating Canada’s Military, report of a workshop held at the Royal Military College of Canada 7-8 December 1998, 30. 5 Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 53. Available at http://www.journal.forces. gc.ca/engraph/Vol3/no1/home_e.asp 6 Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Establishing Common Intent: The Key to Co-ordinated Military Action,” in Allan English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 107. 7 Allan English, The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 42-5. 8 Tyrrel Mann Hawker, Hawker, V.C. (London: Mitre Press, 1965), 125, 129, 135, 140-3. 9 Roger Sarty, The Maritime Defence of Canada (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 206. 10 M.V. Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs,” unpublished MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1978, 68. 11 Bezeau, “Role and Organization,” 156. The Canadian government was also wary of the Canadian Armed Forces coming under foreign command. Early in the war, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King officially established cooperation as the primary command and control principle upon which Canadian Armed Forces operations were to be based. Order-in-Council by the Canadian Government, 17 November 1939, reproduced in David R. Murray, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 7, 1939-1941, Part I (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), 842. 12 W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Department of National Defence, 1986), 382. 13 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command: The European Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 41; Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years: The War in the Pacific, United Sates Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), 250. Another analogy is that unity of command avoids having “a ship with several captains.” Memorandum from Newfoundland Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Commission of Government of Newfoundland, 14 January 1942, reproduced in Paul Bridle, ed., Documents on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland Volume I: 1935-1949 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), 916-918. 14 Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22), 28 July 1941, reproduced in Paul Bridle, ed., Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfoundland Volume I: 1935-1949 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), 894-899. 15 The similarities between the two definitions are indicated as follows (similarities are bolded and numbered for easier comparison): Defence Terminology Bank definition of “operational command”: The authority [2] granted to a commander [1] to assign missions or tasks [3] to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary [4]. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration [5]. ABC-22’s definition of “Unity of Command”: Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander [1] the responsibility and authority [2] to co-ordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks [3], the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary [4] to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and 20 C h a p t e r 1

discipline [5] of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination. Sources: Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2b; and ABC-22 Agreement, 28 July 1941, reproduced in Bridle, ed., Documents, 896. 16 Stanley W. Dziuban, United States Army in World War II Special Studies: Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 110, 141. 17 Committee on Coastal Command Report, 19 March 1941, British National Archives (formerly Public Records Office [hereafter PRO]), Air Ministry file [hereafter Air] 15/338. 18 Committee on Coastal Command Report, 19 March 1941, 15/338; and Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence [hereafter DHH] file 79/599, Captain D.V. Peyton-Ward, The RAF in the Maritime War, Volume II: The Atlantic and Home Waters: September 1939-June 1940 (RAF Air Historical Branch Narrative, nd), 275, 286. 19 Air Marshal J. Slessor to Air Vice-Marshal N.R. Anderson, 24 June 1943, DHH 181.009 (D6734). This was not unlike the RN’s understanding of the relationship: “the naval Commander- in-Chief stated his requirements for protection, escorts or patrols and the Air Officer Commanding the Coastal Command Group then issued his orders to meet the Naval requirements.” S.W. Roskill, The War At Sea, 1939-1945: Volume 1: The Defensive (London: HMSO, 1954) 361. 20 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassel and Company Limited, 1956), 482. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, felt that the provision in the Coastal Command Charter was “a rather meaningless formula and that, in fact, you [CinC Coastal Command] exercise operational control in their interests.” Air Chief Marshal C. Portal to Air Chief Marshal P. Joubert de la Ferté, 11 June 1942, Portal Papers, Folder 8A, DHH 87/89. 21 Memorandum from Assistant Chief of the General Staff to the Chief of the General Staff, 31 May 1941, reproduced in David R. Murray, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 8, 1939-1941, Part II (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976), 219. 22 See correspondence between the RAF and the RN from October 1943 to January 1944 in Air 15/339. 23 Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy to USN Commands, Admiralty, Air Ministry and COS Army, 11 February 1944, PRO, Air 15/339. 24 DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2006), 51. 25 Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 105; Raymont Collecton, DHH 73/1223, files 84 to 99. 26 The Royal Canadian Air Force commander in Halifax (Air Officer Commanding-in- Chief Eastern Air Command) was granted operational control over all maritime patrol assets in the new command, while the RCAF’s Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group exercised local operational control over maritime aircraft based in Newfoundland. This included a large number of American aircraft. Report of Sub-Committee on Command Relations, Atlantic Convoy Conference Minutes, DHH 181.003 (D5027). 27 Commander-in-Chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic to Air Officer Commanding-in- Chief Eastern Air Command, 5 May 1943, DHH 118.002 (D122); Group Captain P.F. Canning to Air Marshal J. Slessor, 27 May 1943, Air 2/8400; Slessor to Portal, 1 June 1943, Portal to Slessor, 1 June 1934, and Slessor to Portal, 3 June, Portal Papers, Folder 8A, DHH 87/89. 28 Slessor to Anderson, 24 June 1943, DHH 181.009 (D6734). Underline in original. 29 Richard Evan Goette, “The Struggle for a Joint Command and Control System in the Northwest Atlantic Theatre of Operations: A Study of the RCAF and RCN Trade Defence Efforts During the Battle of the Atlantic,” unpublished MA thesis, Queen’s University, 2002, 43. 30 UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, The UK Joint High Level Operational Concept, Analytical Concept Paper (2003), p. 4-2; Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, p. 2-1, GL-3. 31 United States, Department of Defense, Glossary, Part II – Terms and Definitions, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Suffolk: US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 2006), GL-10. 21 32 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 5. 33 Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” 53. 34 See DND, Leadership in the CF, 9, 10, 125, 135, 137, 144; and DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 49, 57 notes 3, 4, 5 for Chapter 6. 35 UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, The UK Joint High Level Operational Concept, pp. 4-1, 4-2, 4-4. Citation from p. 4-1. 36 NATO, Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations, AJP-3(A), (July 2007), p. 2-1, Lexicon 8, 9. See also NATO, AAP-6, p. 2-C-9, the second definition of “command.” 37 Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” Parameters 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 121-32. Available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96autumn/ contents.htm 38 See for example C. McCann, R. Pigeau and A. English. “Analysing Command Challenges Using the Command and Control Framework: Pilot Study Results,” Technical Report, DRDC-TORONTO # TR-2003-034 (1 February 2003). Available at http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/ BASIS/pcandid/www/engpub/SF. 39 This paragraph is excerpted from G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 71-2. 40 Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” 56. 41 Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” 56. 42 The second definition is: “An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.” NATO, AAP-6, p. 2-C-9. 43 Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” presentation given to Command and Staff Course 31, Canadian Forces College (CFC), 3 Sep 2004. Emphasis added. 44 This section is excerpted from G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 73-5. 45 This section is excerpted from G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 73-5. 46 Whether the envelope is actually linear, as shown below, or some type of curve, is an empirical question that could be addressed through research. 47 This figure is based on Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” presentation given to Command and Staff Course 31, CFC, 3 September 2004. 48 This figure is based on Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” presentation given to Command and Staff Course 31, CFC, 3 September 2004. 49 This paragraph, somewhat revised, is excerpted from G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 79-80. 50 This figure is based on Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” presentation given to Command and Staff Course 31, CFC, 3 September 2004. 51 This figure is based on Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” presentation given to Command and Staff Course 31, CFC, 3 September 2004. 52 This section is from Pigeau and McCann, “Establishing Common Intent: The Key to Co- ordinated Military Action,” in English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command, 85-108. 53 Table 1-2 is based on Pigeau and McCann, “Establishing Common Intent: The Key to Co-ordinated Military Action,” in English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command, 106. 54 This material is excerpted from Sharpe and English, Principles for Change in the Post- Cold War Command and Control in the Canadian Forces, 78-80. 22 Command & Control in the 21st Century ‑ Context Chapter 2

General Command and control arrangements and practices in major Western countries at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century were based on what is often referred to today as the “continental” staff system, in which the staff is divided into many functional directorates.1 This system originated with the French Army in the Napoleonic Wars and was adopted by the US Army in the First World War. The other major approach to staff systems is the so-called Prusso-British approach, which split staffing responsibilities more or less into two equal halves – operations and support. The dominance of US Army doctrine at the end of the 20th century and the Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

beginning of the 21st century has led to the “continental” staff system almost completely displacing all other staff systems in Western militaries. Until recently, most air forces followed the Prusso-British approach because it seemed most appropriate

for air operations.2 It should be noted that the “continental” staff system was not adopted because of any theoretical or practical superiority but because it was embedded in US Army operational-level doctrine that became, and remains, the dominant

higher level C2 doctrine.3 But the dominance of US landcentric similarities among army, navy and air C2 arrangements and practices is based force command and control arrangements on more than mere staff systems. That and practices, there are also significant dominance is also based on the ascendancy differences based on physical operating of a particular approach to military opera- environment and conceptual framework. tions – operational art – favoured by the Therefore, a “one size fits all” approach US and many other Western armies. Air to command may not work in today’s Forces and navies are now challenging that complex security environment because of supremacy with their own approaches to these differences. military operations, and each of these approaches contains embedded assump- For example, air forces operate in the tions about how operations should be least cluttered battlespace. In these conducted and which C2 arrangements circumstances both command-by-direc- and practices are preferable. Therefore, in tion and command-by-plan (as discussed order to fully understand Western military in Chapter 1) are possible, and they are command arrangements and practices, it effective command styles given the nature is essential to understand the three major of modern air warfare. Armies, on the approaches to operations, and they will be other hand, usually operate in the most discussed next.4 complex and chaotic operating environment, and, therefore Western armies have, Each nation and each branch of a nation’s for the most part adopted the doctrine of armed forces has its own unique paradigm mission command, or command-by-influ- of how military operations should be ence, so that decisions can, in theory, be conducted based on the physical environ- taken by those closest to the situation, ment in which they operate, their histor- often down to the level of the individual ical experience and their culture. Based soldier. Navies, however, operate in an on these factors, there are currently three environment of medium complexity, major ways of conceptualizing military compared to air forces and armies, and, operations at the beginning of the 21st therefore most Western navies in the century. They are network-centric warfare Anglo-American command tradition have (NCW) [network-enabled operations identified the need for a command and (NEOps) in Canadian usage], effects-based control system that can effectively coor- operations (EBO), and operational art. dinate maritime operations in a relatively Western armies use operational art as their complex, multi-threat environment, over basic principle for conducting operations, a wide area. Within the naval framework, western navies favour NCW and western although individuals would be connected air forces prefer EBO. While there are via their consoles, they would be operating 24 C h a p t e r 2 as elements of larger systems, such as the of its leading advocates, the late Arthur various ships’ operations rooms (at the Cebrowski. However, there is still consider- lowest level) within the fleet framework. able confusion as to what the concept of While the Canadian Navy and some other NCW actually entails because the concept navies in the Anglo-American command itself has been evolving at the end of the tradition are creating and increasingly 20th century and the beginning of the implementing a unique naval command- 21st century and because of its arcane by-influence style, navies still have occa- language. Furthermore, as the concept sion to use the command-by-direction style has evolved, it has moved well beyond its that they have practised for centuries. naval roots and incorporated a number of models from other domains, for example While the notion of networked operations EBO, information age warfare, mission has been embedded in the conceptual command, manoeuvre,5 and elements of approaches to operations of a number the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) of militaries, recently a specific variant, loop, which are not necessarily compat- NCW, has come to dominate the debate on ible with the original NCW construct and change and transformation and it is being which are not always well articulated or used as a template for future American described themselves. This has caused a command and control frameworks. This great deal of confusion in the debates on domination came about not because of NCW-driven transformation and, unfortu- any overwhelming empirical evidence nately, this confusion has been glossed over or because of its wide-ranging practical in a number of official publications.6 The virtues, but because it was imposed on following overview of NCW attempts to the US Office of Transformation by one put this approach to operations in context.

etwork-Centric Warfare / NetworkN -Enabled Operations tional concepts of command involving the etwork-Centric exercise of authority over subordinates. N Therefore, in coalition operations the leadership concepts of emergent leadership Warfare and distributed leadership may be more The concept of NCW originated with useful than concepts of authority. In fact certain Western navies, and, therefore one might characterize the high reputation NCW’s basic principles are based on that senior Canadian naval officers have the Anglo-American tradition of naval earned in certain operational command command and operations at sea. The Cana- positions as a type of emergent leader- dian Navy’s practical experience and its ship based on three sub-classes of personal unique relationship with the United States power (i.e., expert, referent, and connec- Navy put it in a position to influence both tion), rather than position power.7 the theory and practice of the nascent NCW concept. The Canadian naval experi- Navies, therefore, perceive systems like ence has indicated that future operations NCW as primarily a command and control at sea will likely be composed of ad hoc architecture necessary to effectively “coalitions of the willing.” The differences coordinate complex, multi-threat mari- in culture, technology, and capabilities in time operations over a wide area (gener- such coalitions seem to indicate that C2 in ally within a theatre of operations, but coalition operations will be re-defined as up to global in scope). Within the naval “cooperation and coordination.” This new C2 framework, individuals are connected paradigm of “cooperation and coordina- via their consoles, but they operate as tion” depends on leadership or influence elements of larger systems, such as the behaviours among peers more than tradi- various ships’ operations rooms within the 25 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

fleet framework. Therefore, the notion of mission command (or command-by-influ- etwork-Enabled ence) in navies, unlike the army model N where command is delegated down to the lowest possible levels, might extend down Operations only to the captain of a vessel and a very Contemporary command philosophies like few of their specially delegated principal NEOps or NCW assume that if a large officers. Nevertheless, human-centred number of humans are linked together as networks are the basis of the Canadian nodes in a network, and if common and naval command style, and this style has accurate information about the opera- proven itself to be particularly effective tion is made available to them, self-orga- in recent coalition operations where it has nizing behaviour will emerge that will been necessary to engage a wide variety of yield unsurpassed knowledge superiority coalition members in a task force and then and speed of response. What the NEOps to ensure their effective participation in philosophy fails to recognize, however, operations. Canadian naval commanders is that detailed and accurate informa- therefore appreciate that information tech- tion is only one necessary condition for nology is an enabler, not an end in itself.8 (self-) synchronized, coordinated action. NEOps assumes that guiding principles A fundamental criticism of NCW was put for defining acceptable solution spaces forward by Frederick Kagan who asserted are known and are embodied by military that its origins in 1990s business and members; it assumes that comparable technical processes were not necessarily abilities for analyzing a situation and conducive to a 21st century theory of war. making decisions exist; and it assumes The idea that in using NCW a military can that all members are as committed to achieve information dominance over an achieving the objective as they should be. enemy in much the same way that some These are unwarranted assumptions given successful corporations have used informa- the fact that theorists view a network as tion to dominate their markets is a dubious “a moral relationship of trust…[among] a group of individual agents who share proposition at best, according to some 11 critics, as unlike customers, enemies will informal norms and values,” rather than as a simply physically interconnected node usually try to frustrate attempts to gather for exchanging information.12 One way intelligence, especially using the technical of mitigating these problems is to ensure means favoured by NCW.9 that commanders are within Pigeau and Even if NCW is able to fuse information McCann’s balanced command envelope into a common operating picture, Christo- (see Chapter 1) to ensure the required pher Kolenda argues that the education, symmetry amongst the competency, culture, and personalities of those viewing authority, and responsibility necessary for the picture will result in diverse interpreta- effective command. tions of what is presented. Furthermore, NEOps has not yet been formally accepted a number of commentators have noted as a principle supporting the transforma- that the more efforts that are taken to tion of Department of National Defence standardize both the information and nor has it been clearly defined, but recent the interpretation of that information, NEOps conceptual statements indicate a the more likely it is that creativity and similarity to the NCW idea in that NEOps originality will be stifled. This suppres- is expected “to generate increased combat sion of creativity and originality will work power by networking sensors, decision against the development of command-by- makers and combatants to achieve shared influence in a NCW environment. Further- battlespace awareness, increased speed more, it has been argued that information of command, higher operational tempo, technology will not guarantee self- greater lethality, increased survivability, synchronization in a NCW environment and greater adaptability through rapid if commanders at all levels do not have feedback loops.”13 However, a number of the attributes required to do their jobs.10 Canadian commentators note that NEOps Kolenda’s criticisms are further developed is more focussed on human factors than by Pigeau and McCann. NCW. There is also an awareness among 26 C h a p t e r 2 many Canadian commentators that any which put the technological cart before definition of NEOps should be consistent the human requirements that should drive with Canadian culture and ethos. The any transformation initiative. Therefore, Department of National Defence (DND) future development of the NEOps concept and the CF should, therefore, be careful should be firmly rooted in the Canadian about borrowing a concept that may not context and based on Canadian experience. be compatible with their needs and be NEOps concept development should be cognizant of the fact that implementing complemented by the relevant experience NEOps will require more than simply of others, but it should avoid slavishly overlaying a networking capability onto an copying other frameworks as DND has existing organizational or command and sometimes done in the past. In the Cana- control structure. Perhaps most impor- dian context of human-centred networks, tantly, from a Canadian point of view research to support the development of and based on recent Canadian experience, using NEOps in the JIMP context will the NEOps concept should be conducted require network architects not only to in the areas related to the human dimen- consider the mere use of information tech- sion of networks based on theory and on nology as an enabler, but also for them to Canadian practical experience. In this way, address the much more complex issue of NEOps could become a suitable model to creating effective social networks. support the transformation of the CF and DND. In summary, NEOps as a concept has a promising future if it is predicated on Recently, EBO has regained prominence Canadian needs and culture. However, as an approach to operations, and the there is significant risk in placing too following overview attempts to put it in much reliance on concepts like NCW context.

Effects-Based Operations EBO’s roots go back to the 1920s when in the First World War air power theorists like Douhet asserted where stalemate at sea that the long First World War stalemate and on land caused wide- at sea and on land could be overcome in spread devastation and future wars by air forces with their largely loss. He advocated a new unfettered ability to attack enemy centres style of warfare whereby of gravity. Douhet’s modern day disciples aircraft would directly have expanded his ideas in more formal attack enemy vital expositions of EBO, but the basic concept centres, what might be remains the same – planning and taking called centres of gravity actions, ranging from threats to bombing today, and bring future attacks, to cause changes in opponents’ wars to a quick and deci- behaviour. sive conclusion.15 Ideas D o u h e t like these were modified A number of commentators have noted or developed in parallel by airmen in the that EBO has its roots in ancient (Sun US and Britain to win or to maintain the Tzu) and classical (Clausewitz) theories of “independence” of air forces from armies wars.14 However, the most recent branch and navies from the 1920s through to the on the EBO theory tree is the one based on 1950s.16 Therefore, Douhet’s vision of the writings of Italian air power theorist EBO is the one most commonly used in air Giulio Douhet and American air power force circles; however, Ho notes that there theorist and former USAF officer John is no authoritative definition of EBO and Warden. Douhet proposed solutions to the he describes six different theoretical vari- problems encountered by Western nations ants on the EBO theme.17 27 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

In general terms, EBO focuses on causal have claimed that the initial “shock and explanations to see if actions that are awe” bombing campaign in Operation planned or taken actually result in the Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was an example of desired effects. The key to achieving rapid decisive operations (RDO). The success with EBO is in predicting how shock and awe concept comes from a physical actions can result in behavioural 1996 paper written by military strategists outcomes. In many ways EBO is a new Harlan Ullman and James Wade titled way of describing an old concept because “Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Domi- it has been at the heart of theories of air nance.”22 The theory appears to be very warfare since the earliest air power theo- Douhetian in its concept of destroying rists who were almost always concerned the enemy will to resist by imposing “the with the effects as much as the means non-nuclear equivalent of the impact of of applying air power. In fact, Douhet’s the atomic bombs dropped on” Japan, and theories were based on the notion of using very ambitious in its desire to: “…control the physical action of bombing to effect the environment and to master all levels of behavioural changes in the leadership of an opponent’s activities…resistance would a nation. Critics of EBO have, therefore, be seen as futile.” To many this prescrip- used the failures of air power theorists to tion seemed to fit the description of what accurately predict the outcomes (effects) was attempted by air forces in the early of aerial bombardment to illustrate why stages of OIF. Ullman, however, stated true EBO may not be possible.18 Some of that the air campaign in OIF “appears to these criticisms are based on the chaotic come out of a book by strategic-air-power nature of warfare and the fact that chaos advocates, who have argued that you start theory tells us that second and third order at the center and work your way out to effects, especially those associated with disrupt and destroy whatever,” but that human behaviour, cannot be predicted it was not what he envisaged as shock and with the accuracy necessary to achieve the awe.23 This example of different inter- results EBO enthusiasts have claimed.19 pretations of the shock and awe concept Other critics of the term EBO note that demonstrates once again the problem with it was derived from the writings of 20th a number of current theories of war – they century air power theorists, and that the are, as noted earlier, still hazy, ill defined, term EBO was first used by the USAF and subject to different interpretations. in the late 1990s. Because of this recent background and its technological focus, Critics of approaches to EBO that EBO is seen by some as a particularly concentrate on targeting as a means of air force approach to operations. Given achieving outcomes caution that studying the perceived air force origins of EBO, the theoretical foundations and historical some prefer to use the term “effects-based examples of this type of EBO proves approach to operations” (EBAO), because, its futility as an approach to conducting they argue, EBO has become associated operations. They note that attempts to with a prescriptive, technologically-based, destroy an enemy’s will to resist without largely air force way of conducting opera- destroying all their infrastructure and tions, whereas EBAO conveys the idea of without physically occupying the terri- a broader, more philosophical approach to tory, such as was attempted in the stra- operations.20 tegic bombing campaigns of the First and Second World Wars, failed, and that While acknowledging non-combat aspects strategic bombing theories, like those of of EBO, some in the USAF still present it Douhet and Warden, have underestimated as largely a targeting exercise. For example the obstacles to achieving their goals. As Colonel Gary L. Crowder, the Chief of for the recent shock and awe variant of Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine of the EBO theory, Kagan asserts that those who USAF’s Air Combat Command, in an advocate this approach to warfare ignore article purporting to represent the USAF the fact that the destruction of targets and approach to applying air power, focuses resultant killing of civilians necessary to on the effects of new precision-guided achieve the desired effect may undermine munitions in executing EBO.21 Those who the political objectives of the campaign. 24 favour this targeting approach to EBO The challenge for champions of EBO will 28 C h a p t e r 2 be to see if modern theories, methods of third order effects, especially those associ- analysis, and technology can make true ated with human behaviour. EBO possible.25 Even if EBO is not a fully functional theory of war, Western air forces have adopted it as the guiding principle for etwork-Centric integrating air operations into joint opera- N tions. Building on their experiences in the Gulf War in the early 1990s, Western air Warfare and Effects- forces have created an elaborate C2 system based on the air operations centre (AOC) to Based Operations coordinate all aspects of air operations for A number of advocates of NCW have the joint force commander. However, the recently portrayed EBO as an adjunct to air force approach to C2 is largely incom- the theory of NCW; however, proponents patible with some of the C2 concepts now of EBO would argue that EBO focuses being articulated in NCW policy docu- on outcomes more than NCW, which ments, particularly self-synchronization, focuses on inputs, i.e., the network. For self-organization, and mission command or proponents of EBO, networks are enablers command-by-influence.28 These incompat- for EBO and should not be seen as the ibilities will be discussed next. primary consideration in devising new ways of war and other operations. Synchronization as a concept of operations is emphasized more by land forces Whatever their differences, proponents than air forces. In comparing USAF and of both EBO and NCW have focussed US Army doctrine it can be seen that the on the technical rather than the human USAF focuses on the integration of air dimensions of war. Many commentators power across the entire joint theatre of have identified the need for more atten- operations, whereas the US Army tends tion to be paid to the human dimension to think geographically and emphasizes of EBO, but the complexity of this effort the synchronization of actions in time has been equated to “PhD level warfare.”26 and space. It has been argued that the However, like NCW, confusion over what Army approach contrasts with the more EBO really means has led to a situation holistic USAF perspective that focuses on where “the concept is neither thoroughly the effects that massing forces through nor evenly understood among military integration can achieve.29 people” and as a result, “[o]nly now is EBO being tentatively and unevenly incor- In an NCW context, Roddy notes that porated into service and joint doctrine.”27 Cebrowski originally defined self-synchro- Until a fully developed theory of EBO is nization as “the ability of a well informed validated, however, it will be an uncertain force to organize and synchronize complex guide for transformation initiatives. warfare activities from the bottom up.” And that more recently it has been While some in the USAF still present suggested that “self-synchronization EBO as largely a targeting exercise, more ‘calls for lower-level decision makers to sophisticated variants of EBO have now be guided only by their training, under- been incorporated into joint doctrine. Like standing of the commander’s intent, and NCW, the notion of EBO is subject to their awareness of the situation in relevant different interpretations as we know that portions of the battlespace,’” and that there is no universally accepted theory of “[s]elf-synchronization emerges when units EBO and at least six different variants within a force use common information, now coexist. Furthermore, EBO’s critics the commander’s intent, and a common note that in the past it has not lived up rule set – or doctrine – to self-organize and to its promises. They point out that the accomplish the commander’s objectives.”30 chaotic nature of warfare makes it almost impossible to predict, with the accuracy At fairly low tactical levels when close necessary to achieve the results EBO coordination among many air assets is not enthusiasts have claimed, how various essential and when threat levels are low, actions will achieve the desired second and self-synchronization and command-by- 29 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

influence can be employed by air forces; nize or to employ command-by-influence is however, in other circumstances these difficult to imagine. One author notes that processes can be problematic. For example, to achieve unity of effort “the realities when decisions have enormous political of modern joint air operations… require consequences, such as the release of centralized planning and direction” at nuclear weapons or shooting down civilian “the highest levels.”33 Crowder tells us that aircraft, decision making will be retained a critical element in achieving unity of at the highest levels, and one would effort while executing EBO, from an air be hard pressed to imagine a plausible force perspective, is the air tasking order scenario where these types of decisions which provides “a common command would be susceptible to self-synchroniza- and control architecture for all the air tion or command-by-influence processes.31 players that are involved.”34 The nature A recent Joint Force Quarterly article put it of complex air operations suggests that, this way: while there may be limited opportunities for self-synchronization and command- Because of casual linkages among by-influence processes, for the foreseeable target sets and the danger of future air forces will rely on command-by- objective fratricide, effects based plan to execute their missions. There are, operations must be orchestrated therefore, unique aspects to employing by a centralized planning and air power that make NCW’s emphasis on execution authority that has situ- synchronization and mission command ational understanding of every inappropriate from an air force point of aspect of the diplomatic, infor- view. mational, economic, and military campaign.32 If the principle of self-synchronization seems difficult to apply to air forces, In other circumstances, such as when dependant as they are on command-by- large air forces need to conduct operations plan as represented by air tasking orders against an enemy with some credible air produced by discrete organizational struc- defence capability, neither self-synchro- tures like the AOC, the idea of a self-organization nor command-by-influence are nizing system, as proposed by advocates of likely to be of much use except for short NCW,35 seems almost beyond the realm of periods of time at the lowest tactical plausibility. Therefore, air forces today and levels. For example, in Operation Allied in the foreseeable future rely on command- Force, an air campaign against a very weak by-plan, and in certain cases, such as when state but one with some air defence capa- a command decision could have important bility, complicated command and control political repercussions, even command-by- arrangements were necessary to coordinate direction. While air force C2 organizations the activities of hundreds of air assets and related joint organizations depend on down to the minute (or less). The idea of networks to accomplish their tasks,36 the allowing the vast number of air assets network is not the focus; it merely enables involved in such operations to self-synchro- the activity – EBO.

Operational Art Like airmen, soldiers after the First World preferred method to implement manoeuvre War searched for solutions to the deadlock warfare. of the trenches. The solution favoured by most Western armies was manoeuvre, Operational art has been, in many ways, which by the end of the 20th century had the dominant paradigm in US military become almost an obsession with many thought in the last 15 years of the 20th of them. In recent times the American century. It was the intellectual basis for Army version of operational art has been the creation of the US worldwide regional adapted by most Western armies as the command system, so that the world 30 C h a p t e r 2 could be divided into “theatres of opera- To counter the dominant land-centric tion” and campaigns could be planned influence on joint doctrine based on the and conducted on the operational-level operational art and manoeuvre concept, geographical principles favoured by air forces and navies have challenged many armies. of the US Army interpretations of these concepts. They have devised their own In an attempt to rectify its mistakes concepts to explain how operations should in Vietnam, the US Army engineered be conducted, at the very least in their the renaissance of a 19th and early 20th respective physical environments, and put century European approach to war based forward their challenges with ideas like on operational art. The legacy of this EBO and NCW. This intellectual ferment renaissance is considerable, as opera- has resulted in at least five different tional art remains the foundation of most approaches to operational art. Western joint doctrine today. Embedded Besides service differences in approaches in this doctrine are the notions of (1) the to operational art, there are also national geographical division of military effort differences. It is only recently, however, into theatres of war where separate that some progress has been made in campaigns can be planned and executed, Canada towards examining operational art (2) a campaign design process that uses concepts from a theoretical and doctrinal the operational level of war to link tactical point of view. In the past there was no actions to strategic goals, and (3) a reli- sound intellectual base in this country for ance on extensive written doctrine as the studies of operational art. Furthermore, basis for operational art. This approach an arbitrary bureaucratic process was used has been described as an “objectives-based to import mostly American Army ideas on approach to operations” as opposed to an the operational art into Canadian doctrine. “effects-based approach to operations.” In These situations created a “fragmented” addition, this US Army school of thought approach to operational thought in this has also inextricably linked the notion of country, which explains why the CF does manoeuvre on the battlefield with success not always follow the tenets of prevailing at the operational level. Finally, implicit in Western doctrine.37 this approach to war is the belief that the decisive actions of war are conducted by land forces. he Canadian Army However, the army concept of manoeuvre T on the battlefield is not always compatible with the notion of manoeuvre at and Operational Art sea or manoeuvre as understood by air In Canada (as in the US), the Army has forces; therefore, the word “manoeuvre” the most coherently articulated theoretical still invokes different mental pictures approach to operational art, although in different warfighting communities. recent practical experience has led to Recently Boyd’s OODA loop model has a somewhat unique development. For example, peace support operations in been adopted by some in the US Army and an alliance or coalition context has been elsewhere as an example of manoeuvre in one of the most formative influences on the “fourth dimension” of time. Aspects the Canadian practice of operational art. of the OODA loop model have also been Therefore, unlike many other militaries, used by advocates of NCW to argue for the Canadian Army’s perception of the increased speed in decision making cycles operational level of war is not focused or “speed of command.” As many critics on operational manoeuvre or operational have noted, however, faster decisions do logistics, nor is it tied to a theatre of not necessarily mean better decisions. As war. Rather Canadian commanders seek with other theories of war, there is still to coordinate operational-level systems much work to be done before the OODA appropriate to a multi-agency environ- loop model can be said to provide a precise ment and to use the force structures under guide to transformation in networked their command to achieve operational-level operations. objectives. 31 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

The Canadian Army’s approach to opera- Canadian Army calls mission command or tional art is based on these premises: command-by-influence, sometimes called “trust leadership.”  land operations are complex and continuous, regularly involving Since the 1990s the Canadian Army has physical and psychological isolation explored how technology can facilitate and more often than not, until too its version of manoeuvre warfare. Terms late, unseen lethality; such as digitization, NCW, network-centric operations, network-enabled capability,  adversaries are often non-state and and NEOps have all been used in an motivated by issues other than that of attempt to define this fluid relationship policy; between operations and emerging technology. However, whatever terminology  these adversaries attack in unpredict- has been used, Canada’s Army sees itself able ways using the strengths of an as a doctrine-based organization that uses opponent as its weakness to gain a technology to increase its capability to temporary advantage that can be practice manoeuvre warfare. Therefore, for exploited; Canada’s Army, ideas of NCW or NEOps do not constitute a fundamental change in  conflict is not confined to discernable the manner in which it will conduct opera- regions and involves all aspects of the tions, but reflect a need to use emerging spectrum of conflict in a specific area technology in a way that will support the including the diminishing distinction user and enable manoeuvre doctrine so between combatants and non-combat- that Canada’s small professional army can ants; and operate in today’s complex environment of conflict. Networks created by the Cana- dian Army show that it views human, not  effective joint, multi-national and technical, factors as the primary consid- multi-agency operations are the key to eration in the creation of these networks. success in future operations. Furthermore, because of financial and other limitations these networks are hybrid Therefore, the objective, or endstate, of in nature, where the technology employed the Canadian manoeuvrist approach to is not always the latest variant, but only operational art is to impede the enemy’s what is required to carry out the mission. ability to conduct warfare as a cohesive In this situation command is predicated on force. In this vision, manoeuvre warfare communication, dissemination of intent, should be based on these principles: creation of shared awareness, and decen-  focus on enemy vulnerabilities not tralized decision making. ground;

 avoid enemy strength and attack their weaknesses; Modern Theories  focus on the main effort; and of Manoeuvre – The

 be agile. OODA Loop Manoeuvre, or manoeuvre warfare, is a Given their circumstances, successful concept that has at least as many interpre- practitioners of Canadian manoeuvre tations as the variations on the spelling of philosophy have had to place much greater the word. Despite these variations, it has emphasis on the creation of shared aware- become a driving concept behind many ness in order to overcome the ambiguity theories of war at the operational level, and corresponding friction found in and almost an obsession with some mili- current operational environments. One tary professionals who study or practice way of creating this shared awareness is the operational art. Historical concepts of by commanders at all levels using what the manoeuvre are discussed elsewhere,38 but 32 C h a p t e r 2 at the beginning of the 21st century the Boyd’s model calls for commanders and concept of manoeuvre is firmly embedded their staffs to constantly revise their in US Army operational art theory, and mental models to stay inside an oppo- now NCW. The fundamental assump- nent’s OODA loop. This process also has tion underlying operational plans is that the effect of creating a mind-set more they will be “manoeuvrist,” and current predisposed to fight the enemy rather concepts of manoeuvre embraced by than fighting according to a pre-set plan, the US Army, and other branches of the as is common with plan-based methods armed forces, have been strongly influ- currently in use. Boyd’s model is therefore enced by a model developed by USAF congruent with pattern recognition theo- Lieutenant-Colonel John Boyd. He retired ries of decision making, such as those of in 1985 and died in 1997, and he had little Gary Klein, that advocate naturalistic or in the way of command or combat experi- intuitive decision making in time-sensitive ence, but he based his model on observa- situations.41 tions of fighter pilots in training and in the Korean War. His OODA (observation- The OODA loop concept has been used by orientation-decision-action or Observe, advocates of NCW to argue for increased Orient, Decide, Act) Loop model, shown in speed in decision making cycles or “speed Figure 2-1, was designed to enable of command.”42 However, as many US forces to fight smarter, critics have noted, faster deci- employing mission-type sions do not necessarily orders (or command- Observe mean better decisions. by-influence) to As one critic put it: effect a sort of “The ‘speed of “military judo” command’ char- on the enemy by acteristic of the creating friction NCW environ- and exploiting ment could lead enemy to some unde- mistakes.39 sirable effects. ActAct OrientOrient ‘We may find Boyd’s model, ourselves which has been acting so referred to as the rapidly within “Boyd Theory,” was our enemy’s not a novel concept decision loop but, according to that we largely some, a synthesis of are prompting and much of what had been responding to our own written before by other Decide signals ... like Pavlov’s theorists of war. Others charac- dog ringing his own bell and terize it as a profound Figure 2-1 – OODA Loop wondering why he’s new theory of warfare. salivating so much.’”43 Boyd’s model is simple but elegant. In it, every decision occurs in time-competitive Boyd never attempted to publish his ideas, OODA cycles. This process implies that but William S. Lind codified them in his military decision makers need a psycho- Maneuver Warfare Handbook specifically logical and temporal orientation instead tailored for the United States Marine of the usual physical and spatial orienta- Corps (USMC). In it Lind posited that tion. There is a need for mental agility and future ground combat would be domi- creativity, comfort with ambiguity, and nated by those who could decentralize the confidence to allow subordinates to actions, accept confusion and disorder use their initiative. Boyd’s model portrays while avoiding all patterns and formulas the most important manoeuvres as taking of predictive behaviour.44 Proponents, place inside the enemy’s mental processes like Lind, of manoeuvre based on the (the enemy’s OODA loop); therefore, the Boyd Theory advocate a more dynamic most important manoeuvre space is in the approach to strategy and operational fourth dimension of time.40 thinking than is currently found in some 33 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

US military circles. Critics of the current means they know best, and true joint system point out that the OODA model manoeuvre theory is handicapped by the contrasts with the inherently analytical largely single-service approach taken by nature of US Army planning and deci- the US services. Furthermore, support sion making, which neglects the role and logistics, for some the heart of the of synthesis as an enabler of intuition operational art, is often overlooked in in the Boyd Theory. This has caused manoeuvre theory. rifts in the US Army where some advocate radical and bold culture shifts to Few would argue that manoeuvre is not allow for true mission command, while a necessary part of the operational art, others suggest that the present model but a number of commentators remind of centralized planning and decentral- us that manoeuvre today has been ized execution is sufficient to meet future portrayed as a solution for problems needs. Polk argues that true manoeuvre that are beyond its capacity to solve. warfare, as described by the Boyd model, First, it is often portrayed as a solu- cannot be practiced by the US Army tion for the perceived predisposition for because toleration of mistakes and the casualty aversion in the West, when in use of initiative are antithetical to US fact manoeuvre warfare between roughly Army culture today. This may not bode equal opponents (e.g., the last Hundred well for the future because in a culture Days battles of the First World War where conformity is rewarded more than and the Eastern front in the Second initiative, those who rise to command World War) has resulted in very high the Army are being selected on criteria casualty rates indeed.47 Second, it has that will not allow them to be proficient become a mantra for some that auto- practitioners of the operational art as it matically excludes other possibilities for was envisioned by Boyd.45 fighting, like defensive attrition, which are then not fully explored when devising This situation is exacerbated, according operational plans. In today’s climate of to Polk, because one of Boyd’s most doctrinal flux, perhaps it is best to keep important insights, his emphasis on the an open mind. Remember that the word importance of time, has been lost in “manoeuvre” conjures up many possibili- a doctrinal “dumbing down process.” ties in different warfighting communi- Too often, Polk claims, the OODA loop ties, but that a great deal more study process is portrayed as one of making is required before all its possibilities are decisions more quickly than an enemy. clearly understood. But “out-OODAing” an enemy is more a process of achieving temporal effects than just being faster (or slower) than an enemy in decision making. Fadok argues anoeuvre in a that Boyd’s approach is predominantly M Clausewitzian because manoeuvring inside the enemy’s mental processes as Canadian Context depicted by the OODA loop is a more Throughout the last hundred years philosophical, abstract and nonlinear the doctrinal paradigm of Canada’s approach than the approach advocated Land Forces has migrated from that of by Warden. In other words, Boyd’s attrition to manoeuvre; therefore, the theory is about “err-power”—how to Canadian Army has become the leading make the enemy lose versus how to win proponent of manoeuvre in the CF. ourselves.46 Using Lind’s precepts, it has articulated its vision of manoeuvre warfare for Most theorists of manoeuvre agree on land operations in its current keystone the ends of manoeuvre warfare: to defeat doctrine manual of April 1998, B-GL- the enemy quickly, decisively and with 300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army: We minimum loss. The means of achieving Stand on Guard for Thee. For example, these ends; however, are varied and it provides a key tenet of manoeuvre depend largely on which warfighting warfare, comprehension of the higher community the “manoeuvrist” comes commander’s intent, as a principle from. Theorists tend to focus on the component of command:48 34 C h a p t e r 2

The principle of subsidiarity commander’s intent for battle.” The use of is to be applied. Subordinate operational art by land forces in Canada commanders are to be given, to is founded on the command philosophy of the greatest extent possible, the what they call “trust leadership.” Using responsibility, information, and this philosophy, commanders at all levels resources to act as the tactical are expected “to issue mission orders situation demands, without along with their intent and then allow further reference to higher their subordinates to get on with their authority. In effect subordinates tasks.” However, it is recognized that this are empowered to perform and philosophy may be difficult to achieve in respond to situations as their practice, “since it is inherent to the nature commander would have, had their of the military to over-control its subordi- commanders been there in person. nates, and with modern information and To realize this command philos- communication facilities, it is becoming ophy, leaders must know their increasingly easy to do so.” Canadian subordinates intimately and trust Army doctrine cautions us not to confuse them implicitly; subordinates in the concept of manoeuvre warfare with turn, must not only be skilled in manoeuvre. While manoeuvre is defined as the military art, but fully aware “the employment of forces through move- of their responsibilities to their ment in combination with speed, firepower, commander and committed to 49 or fire potential, to achieve a position of fulfilling them. advantage in respect to the enemy in order to achieve the mission” [emphasis in original], This philosophy is predicated on a partic- manoeuvre warfare is described as “a ular state of mind or manner of thinking mind set.” Canadian Army doctrine goes rather than techniques and procedures.50 It is an attitude that strives to defeat an on to say that “There are no checklists or adversary by destroying their source of tactical manuals that offer a prescribed moral, cybernetic or physical power.51 The formula on how to employ manoeuvre objective, or endstate, of the manoeu- warfare. Leaders at all levels must first vrist approach is to negate the enemy’s understand what is required to accomplish ability to conduct warfare as a cohesive a superior’s mission and then do their force.52 In this vision, manoeuvre warfare utmost to work within the parameters should: focus on enemy vulnerabilities set out for that mission.” It concludes not ground; avoid enemy strength and by describing manoeuvre warfare as “an attack their weaknesses; concentrate on attitude of mind; commanders think and the main effort; and be agile. In order react faster than their foes in order to mass to achieve these ends the manoeuvrist friendly strengths against enemy weak- commander should: support manoeuvre nesses to attack [their] vulnerabilities be 55 with fire; exploit tactical opportunities; they moral or physical.” act boldly and decisively; avoid set rules and patterns; use mission type orders; and Proponents of manoeuvre believe the command from the front.53 These ideas physical conduct of military operations to were further affirmed inConduct of Land be circuitous. They visualize the efforts of Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for military forces as being directed towards the Canadian Army issued in July 1998.54 the creation, exploitation and enhance- ment of misdirection rather than force on The Canadian Army’s concept of force confrontation. Manoeuvrist military manoeuvre emphasizes that the defeat activities will disorient, disrupt and strain of the enemy can best be achieved by enemy systems to the breaking point “bringing about the systematic destruction by attacking indirectly [their] centres of the enemy’s ability to react to changing of gravity.56 In essence, the tempo of situations, destruction of [their] combat operations must be such that the enemy cohesion and, most important, destruc- is forced to conform to our plans, to the tion of [their] will to fight.” Nevertheless, point where [they] can no longer react in Canadian Army doctrine recognizes that a coherent manner. Moreover, the concept “attrition may not only be unavoidable, it of directive control is utilized to provide a may be desirable,” depending upon “the philosophy of command.57 35 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

Directive control, sometimes known ness in order to reduce the ever present as directive command, uses higher ambiguity and corresponding friction of commanders’ intent, mission analysis and current operational environments. designation of a main effort to promote rapid manoeuvre in the physical and This recognition has come from the experi- conceptual sense.58 Effective implementa- ences of modern peace operations. These tion of this method of command is contin- military activities involve comprehensive gent upon decentralization of authority. campaigns that simultaneously address In conjunction with awareness of the diplomatic, informational, military and larger purpose of tasks59 this permits economic aspects of the environment. At subordinates to implement operations the same time the setting is asymmetric that employ rapid tempo and synergistic and usually non-permissive with innumer- effects to achieve decisive results.60 The able state and non-state actors.65 As we differences between command in attrition have seen, land operations are complex and and manoeuvre warfare are simplistically continuous, regularly involving physical and depicted in Table 2-1.61 psychological isolation and more often than not, until too late, unseen lethality.66 Adversaries are often non-state and moti- Warfare vated by issues other than that of policy. They attack Attrition Manoeuvre in unpredictable ways using  Physical  Psychological the strengths of an opponent as its weakness to gain  Position  Fluid a temporary advantage that can be exploited. Conflict is not confined to discern-   Centralized Authority Decentralized Authority able regions and involves all aspects of the spectrum Table 2-1 Parameters of conflict in a specific area o f C o m m a n d 62 with diminishing distinc- tions between combatants and non-combatants. Effectiveness in joint, multi-national and multi-agency operations is the key determinant of success.67 Furthermore, anoeuvre and due to the increasing role of technology, M the intellectual dimension of warfare has increased. It is no longer viewed as a clash the Contemporary of wills between two opposing commanders, but a contest of thinking, interconnected Operational adversaries each trying to triumph over the other.68 For the Canadian Army the military Environment aspects of such warfare are a prescription Manoeuvre doctrine enables a small for manoeuvre philosophy and require professional army to conduct operations mature, experienced leaders, in addition to across the spectrum of conflict, from peace cohesive units, capable of independent oper- support and related activities to kinetic ations.69 The Summary of Conclusions from operations.63 It supplies commanders the CF Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers) with the flexibility to employ military reinforces these ideas and indicates that power in a manner designed to effectively officer professional development will need utilize limited resources in most types to emphasize critical thinking, strategic of situations.64 Nonetheless, it has been conceptualization and effective decision recognized in recent years that, in order to making, as well as the ability to understand be successful, practitioners of manoeuvre and work in diverse cultures.70 philosophy had to place much greater emphasis on the creation of shared aware- The report drew the following conclusions: 36 C h a p t e r 2

 While the prime function of the CF competencies are needed to supple- remains the application of military ment traditional leadership competen- force in support of government policy, cies as defined by another era of war the use of force will be in discrete and fighting. amounts fully integrated with, and usually subordinated to political,  Strategic and operational knowledge diplomatic and economic measures. and skill sets must be created, over and above the excellent tactical training  The need for global security will that historically has characterized the continue to place a great premium CF. on leadership in the future, but new

onclusion CommandC and control arrangements and control” derived from more rigid Cold War practices are influenced by national and C2 arrangements.71 Moreover, this new military culture and historical experi- paradigm of “cooperation and coordina- ence as well as the physical environment tion” appears to emphasize leadership or in which each environment of the Armed influence behaviours among peers over Forces operates. The three major ways of traditional concepts of command involving conceptualizing military operations at the the exercise of authority over subordi- beginning of the 21st century have been nates. Therefore, in coalition operations the shaped by these influences and are reflected leadership concepts of emergent leader- in the approaches to military operations, ship and distributed leadership may be and C2, of the Canadian Army, Navy and more useful than concepts of authority. Air Force. In fact one might see the high reputation that senior Canadian naval officers have The Canadian Army’s post-Cold War expe- earned in certain command positions as a rience has demonstrated that the challenges type of emergent leadership based on three posed by peace support operations in post- subclasses of personal power (i.e., expert, conflict situations are best met with holistic referent, and connection), rather than solutions that identify issues that must be position power.72 Likewise, these leader- addressed simultaneously, in a distributed ship behaviours have stereotypically been fashion, across elements of national power attributed to air force leaders, and it is in order to achieve the desired result. This appropriate, therefore, that the Canadian methodology is achieved best with the Air Force become involved in research into human-centric not the network-centric new approaches to C2. approach, advocated by many in the US military. Nevertheless, doctrinally, the These developments in C2 practice remind Canadian Army is very similar to the US us of the necessity to remain conceptu- Army in that it shares the US Army’s ally flexible when discussing issues related philosophical and command approaches, to command. The reappearance of terms, namely operational art and manoeuvre, the with origins in the Second World War, like continental staff system, and a preference “cooperation and coordination” in the for mission command. C2 lexicon also serve to remind us that past experience and historical accounts Since the end of the Cold War, the predomi- of the evolution of C2 can provide us nance of ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” with valuable insights that can aid us in in many military operations has led some understanding the continuing evolution of to suggest that C2 in coalition opera- command concepts. tions should be re-defined as “cooperation and coordination,” since this expression reflects the reality of C2 in these operations today rather than “command and 37 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context Endnotes 1 By 1917, the original continental staff system had evolved into four principal functions: Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), Logistics (G-4). J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 3rd Edition, 1961), 124. 2 Two major works that discuss the origins of staff systems are Van Creveld, Command in War; and Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development. The authors of this reference manual are grateful to Maj Paul Johnston for his work, summarized in a draft paper “Organization for Canadian Air Force Command and Control” dated April 2005 for some of the ideas presented here. It is interesting to note that the 2005 reorganization of 1 Cdn Air Division HQ had certain characteristics of the operations and support split seen in the Prusso-British approach. 3 See Allan English, “The Operational Art,” in Allan English, et al., eds., The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 14-23, for a discussion of the dominance of US army doctrine in this era. 4 The material that follows is based on Allan English, Richard Gimblett, and Howard Coombs, “Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse: Network Enabled Operations as a Canadian Approach to Transformation,” DRDC Toronto, Contract Report CR 2005-212 (19 July 2005). 5 The concept of manoeuvre as it applies to armies, navies and air forces is discussed in English, “The Operational Art,” in English, et al., eds., The Operational Art, 34-51 and below. 6 These issues are discussed in more detail in English, et al,, “Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse.” 7 For a detailed discussion of naval leadership and command see Allan English, Richard Gimblett, Lynn Mason and Mervyn Berridge Sills, Command Styles in the Canadian Navy (DRDC Toronto, Contract Report CR 2005-096, 31 January 2005). The concept of emergent leadership is discussed in DND, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 8-10, 54, 77-8, 80-1, 125, 130. 8 English et al., “Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse,” 93. 9 Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review 102 (August/September 2003), 3. Available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3448101.html (accessed March 4, 2007). 10 Christopher D. Kolenda, “Transforming How We Fight: A Conceptual Approach,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 2 ( Spring 2003), 103, 114. 11 Frank Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), 199. 12 This paragraph is excerpted from Pigeau and McCann, “Establishing Common Intent: The Key to Co-ordinated Military Action,” in English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command, 104. 13 Michael H. Thomson and Barbara D. Adams, “Network Enabled Operations: A Canadian Perspective,” (Defence Research and Development (DRDC) - Toronto contract report CR-2005-162, 13 May 2005), 5. 14 See for example Joshua Ho, “The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operations” (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Working Paper no. 57, December 2003), 3-4. 15 See Claudio Segre, “Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?” Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (September 1992), 351-66 for a summary of Douhet’s theories. 16 These issues are discussed in detail in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed. The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AL: Air University Press, 1997), Chapters 1-8. 17 Ho, “The Advent of a New Way of War,” 5-10. 18 There is an extensive literature on this topic. See for example Segre, “Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?”; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ Press, 1996); and W. Hays Park, “‘Precision’ and ‘Area’ Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?” Journal of Strategic Studies 18 (March 1995), 145-74. 19 See for example John F. Schmitt, “Command and (out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory,” Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 9 (September 1998), 55-8; John D. 38 C h a p t e r 2

Hall, “Decision making in the information age: moving beyond the MDMP military decision-making process),” Field Artillery (September-October 2000), 28-32; and Christian Rousseau, “Command in a Complex Battlespace,” in English, ed., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command, 55-84. 20 For more details on this issue see Allan English and Howard Coombs, eds., Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, in press). 21 Gary L. Crowder, “Effects-Based Operations: The Impact of Precision Strike Weapons on Air Warfare Doctrines,” Military Technology 27 no. 6 (June 2003), 16-25. 22 Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe, Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington: The National Defense University, 1996), http://manybooks.net/titles/ ullmanhaetext05skawe10.html (accessed October 18, 2007). 23 Excerpt from “Introduction,” Harlan Ullman and James Wade “Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance” in Washington Post (30 March 2003), p. B03. 24 Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 5-8. 25 For a discussion of this issue see Kolenda, “Transforming How We Fight,” 100-21. 26 Ho, “The Advent of a New Way of War,” 23-4. 27 Edward Mann, Gary Endersby, Tom Searle, “Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 3 (Fall 2001). 92-100. Available at http://www.airpower. maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/vorfal01.html (accessed October 18, 2007). 28 US DoD, Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (5 January 2005), ii. Available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_ NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf (accessed February 25, 2008). 29 Gerald M. Pratt, “A Clash of Service Doctrines: Integration Versus Synchronization in Joint Operations,” in English, et al., eds., The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives, 225-48. 30 Kimberly A. Roddy, “Network-Centric Operational Warfare: The New Science of Operational Art,” unpublished research paper, (Newport RI: Naval War College, 16 May 2003), 9. 31 For example, decisions related to a recent intrusion of a civilian aircraft into restricted air space over Washington, DC involved the US Secretary of Defense. Spencer S. Hsu and John Mintz “Military Was Set to Down Cessna: Authority Granted as Plane Strayed Deep Into Capital,” Washington Post, 25 May 2005, A01. 32 Mark G. Davis, “Centralized Control / Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward Reach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 35 (Autumn 2004), 98-9. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ jel/jfq_pubs/issue35.htm 33 Ibid., 98. 34 Crowder, “Effects-Based Operations: The Impact of Precision Strike Weapons on Air Warfare Doctrines,” 16-25. 35 US Department of the Navy, “FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century,” [2005?], 12. 36 Stephen Fought, “The Tale of the C/JFACC: A Long and Winding Road,” RAF Air Power Review 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 10-11. 37 These issues are discussed in more detail in English, et al., “Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse.” 38 Allan English, “The Operational Art,” in English, et al., eds., The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts, 34-51. 39 John A. English, Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 167; and Robert B. Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory — is it relevant to the Army?” Defense Analysis 16, no. 3 (December 2000), 257-8. 40 Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory,” 257-60. For more on Boyd’s ideas see also Grant T. Hammond, “From Air Power to Err Power: John Boyd and the Opponent’s Situational Awareness,” in Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox, eds., Air Power Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: The Stationary Office, 2002), 107-28. 41 Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory,” 271. 39 Command and Control in the 21st Century - Context

42 US DoD, Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of NCW, 5, 7. 43 Pierre Forgues, “Command in a Network-Centric War,” Canadian Military Journal 2, no. 2 (Summer 2001), 29. Available at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no2/home_e.asp. 44 Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory,” 258. 45 Ibid., 265, 267, 270. See Allan English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective, especially chapters 4 and 6 for more detail on dysfunctional aspects of US Army culture. 46 Ibid., 272; and David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AL: Air University Press, 1997), 388-9. 47 For example, the highest casualty rates suffered by the Canadian Corps occurred during the mobile warfare phase of the last “Hundred Days” of the war. The 45,830 casualties it incurred between Amiens and Mons represented 20 percent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s casualties for the entire war and more than the 44,735 casualties suffered by Canadian Army in the Northwest Europe campaign in the Second World War. In addition, in the Second World War, the mobile campaigns on the Eastern front claimed more lives than all the other theatres of that war combined. John English, Marching Through Chaos, 62-4. 48 Michael Wyly believes the two key principles of manoeuvre warfare to be an understanding of the higher commander’s intent and that of the designation of the main effort or “Schwerpunkt” Michael Duncan Wyly, “Teaching Maneuver Warfare,” in Richard D. Hooker, Jr, ed., Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, California: Presido Press, 1993), 257-8. 49 DND, Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 (np, 1998), 87. It has been argued that the history of the Canadian Land Force in the 20th century does not lend itself to the institutionalization of the philosophy required to affect a manoeuvre type doctrine and related concepts such as that delineated in We Stand On Guard For Thee. The experiences of the Boer War, First and Second World Wars, Korea, the Cold War, and peacekeeping, as well as the interludes between major conflicts, have produced a vision of conflict that seems to rely on a symmetrical vision of the battlefield. This perspective is predicated on an understanding of conflict as an orderly and progressive series of engagements, battles, and campaigns that will result in victory. However, it can also be opined that Canadian land operations from the early 1990s onwards have prompted a re-evaluation of the past lessons to embrace the reality of the present – an asymmetric, chaotic environment where decisions are made in minimal time under less than ideal circumstances. In this setting the precepts of manoeuvre warfare, like the principle of subsidiarity, are reinforced. 50 Lieutenant-Colonel Roman J. Jarymowycz, “Doctrine and Canada’s Army – Seduction by Foreign Dogma: Coming to Terms with Who We Are,” in The Army Doctrine & Training Bulletin: Canada’s Professional Journal on Army Issues 2, no. 3 (August 1999), 50. Available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/CAJ/default_e.asp?view=more&issueID=17 51 Joe Strange, Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, Marine Corps University: Perspectives On Warfighting, No. 4 (Quantico, Virginia: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1996 [2nd ed.]), ix. 52 Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Chuck Oliviero, “Response to ‘Doctrine and Canada’s Army – Seduction by Foreign Dogma: Coming to Terms with Who We Are’ by Lieutenant- Colonel Roman J. Jarymowycz, Vol. 2, No. 3, August 1999,” The Army Doctrine & Training Bulletin 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999), 140. Available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/ vol_02/iss_4/CAJ_vol2.4_full_e.pdf 53 Colonel Eric MacArthur (Retired), former Chief of Staff of Canadian Forces College, provided this summary. A more complete version can be found in Canada’s Army, 100-105. 54 DND, Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 (Director of Army Doctrine, 1998). 55 DND, Land Force Tactical Doctrine Volume 2, B-GL-300-002/FP-000 (Director of Army Doctrine, 1997), 1-4 to 1-5. 56 Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory,” 266. 57 Paul Johnston, “The Myth of Manoeuvre Warfare: Attrition in Military History,” in The Changing Face of War, ed. Allan English (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 27-8.

40 C h a p t e r 2

58 Captain Ian Hope, “Manoeuvre Warfare and Directive Control: The Basis for a New Canadian Military Doctrine Part 2 of 2,” The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College Quarterly Review 5 no. 1/2 (Spring 1995), 10. 59 Ibid., 10. 60 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1985; paperback reprint, 2000), 230. 61 Richard Simpkin describes these qualities as the parameters of command. Ibid., 229. Dr. James Schneider has further delineated the psychological domain of command as the ability of commanders to impose their will in order to carry an idea through the planning phase to successful execution while overcoming the inherent friction of combat. Schneider views the physical domain of war as the process of destruction of an army’s ability to operate within the cybernetic and moral realms of conflict, and thus disrupting the cohesion of the organization. James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper No.3: The Theory of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 6-7. 62 Simpkin, Race to the Swift, 206. The concepts of attrition and manoeuvre in this context are discussed in detail in Allan English, “The Operational Art,” in English, et al., eds., The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts, 34-48. 63 Through kinetic or high intensity types of operations one attempts to overwhelm the enemy through all means available (but primarily violence), and the focus is normally on the destruction of the enemy. 64 This was also the case in Operation Desert Storm, as noted in Captain Ian Hope, “Changing a Military Culture: Manouvre Warfare and a Canadian Operational Doctrine, Part 1 of 2,” The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College Quarterly Review 5, no. 1/2 (Spring 1995), 5. 65 John Hillen, “Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager,” Parameters 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 17-34. Available at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/ parameters/96autumn/hillen.htm. 66 Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria and Major Jacob D. Biever, “Warfighting’s Moral Domain,” Military Review 90, no. 2 (March-April 2000), 3-6. 67 William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Military Review 69 (October 1989), 2-21. 68 J. Michael Myatt, “Comments on Maneuver,” Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 10 (October 1998), 40. 69 Echevarria and Biever, “Warfighting’s Moral Domain.” 70 DND, The Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers) (Ottawa: Office of the Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff for Professional Development, May 2001), 26. Available at http:// www.cda.forces.gc.ca/2020/engraph/research/debrief/doc/DebriefLeaders_e.PDF. 71 See English, et al., “Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse,” 30-8 for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 72 See Allan English, et al., “Command Styles in the Canadian Navy,” 95-111, for a discussion of these leadership styles in a Canadian naval context.

he Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace T 1 ChapterCommand and Control3 Arrangements

General While military organizations have much in common, we have also seen that each service (or Environment in the CF) in a nation’s armed forces has its own unique approach to military operations based on the physical environment in which they operate, their historical experience, and their culture. This chapter describes the evolution of current Canadian aerospace C2 arrangements from The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

integration (1968) to 2005 (just prior to General Rick Hillier’s CF transformation initiatives) so that the reader will understand the historical and cultural roots of Canadian C2 arrangements. Historical Overview Command has been one of the most tive command in an extensive training contentious, yet one of the least studied, organization, a few exercised operational- issues throughout the history of Cana- level command in the North American da’s air forces. In both World Wars the theatre, notably in Eastern Air Command. vast majority of Canadian air force However, some of those commanding commanders who commanded during Eastern Air Command were judged by the operations did so at the tactical level.2 A official historians of the RCAF to have very few senior officers commanded at inadequate leadership skills. By the end what might be described, at best, as the of the war, many Canadian senior offi- operational level, notably in No. 6 Group, cers had acquired command experience, RAF Bomber Command, but even these but, as noted by C.P. Stacey, Canada’s officers commanded at a very low opera- pre-eminent military historian, wartime tional level. In the Second World War, the policies “‘broke the back’ of the RCAF” RCAF created a massive training organiza- and prevented it from fielding a “national tion as part of the British Commonwealth air force” with the same higher command Air Training Plan (BCATP) in Canada, opportunities as those enjoyed by the but, unlike the RAF Canada in the First Canadian Army.4 The RCAF’s problem World War, Canadians filled most of of lack of higher command experience in the command positions in this training the Second World War has parallels to the organization. Nevertheless, the Official situation now being faced by the Canadian History of the RCAF noted that Air Force Air Force where, since the disbandment Headquarters was at times “out of its of the functional groups in 1997, there are depth” because RCAF officers who rose to very few command positions for Air Force senior rank in the Second World War “had general officers.5 The Cold War saw the RCAF rise from the ashes of the Second World War demobili- zation to become, from the 1950s until its disbandment in 1968, a relatively large air force focused on conducting operations. The command issues of this era are briefly described elsewhere,6 but this is an era that requires much more research to fully understand how the RCAF, for the first time in its history, created a large operational, as well as administrative, command structure. Even though the unified CF adopted many of the RCAF’s command models in 1968, splitting Canada’s air forces among various organizations with no central body to provide a focus for all not been properly prepared to organize, air operations and doctrine had serious control, supply, and direct a large air repercussions for air force command and force.”3 While most senior RCAF officers control and leadership.7 The current in Canada exercised largely administra- situation where the Air Force command 44 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

structure is the result of a series of ad hoc ency has been the driving principle behind re-organizations, driven by budget cuts most changes to the structure of Canada’s and force reduction targets, is a direct air forces at the end of the 20th and the outcome of this dispersion of Canada’s beginning of the 21st century. This has air forces. Even the formation of Air led to piecemeal, often dysfunctional, C2 Command in 1975 was unable to provide arrangements that continue to afflict the a solution to the Air Force’s command Canadian Air Force to this day. problems, as staff responsibilities were split between Winnipeg and Ottawa, This chapter, therefore, outlines those a situation that continues to this day. historical experiences, since the unifica- Without coherent Air Force doctrine above tion of the CF in 1968, which led to the the tactical level, particularly doctrine Canadian aerospace C2 arrangements at related to command and control, expedi- the beginning of the 21st century.

he CF Air Element and the Fragmentation of CommandT Unification: Canada’s Air Forces968- 1 1975 report identified numerous shortcomings verview of in the administration of defence, including O a dysfunctional committee system, the steady growth of an administrative “tail” Unification in relation to operational “teeth,” and lack Prior to unification, Canada’s national of executive leadership. To rectify these defence organization comprised a single problems, the Commission recommended Department of National Defence. Within that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff the Department were three independent Committee be given executive powers, military services: Royal Canadian Navy provided with an appropriate staff, and (RCN), the Canadian Army and the RCAF. that the position be re-titled “Chief of The head of each service (designated Canadian Defence Staffs.”8 “Chief of Staff ”) reported directly to the Minister of National Defence, and was Major changes in the structure of DND supported by a complete headquarters to occurred in the 1960s culminating, in control and administer his service. Govern- 1968, in the unification of Canada’s armed ments of the day generally viewed this forces under MND Paul Hellyer. A number organization as ineffective because advice of factors influenced these changes. The to the minister was seen as parochial most dramatic one was the Cuban Missile and often too focussed on narrow single Crisis of 1962 during which Canadian service issues; moreover, coordination military forces responded separately to between the three service headquarters their alliance commitments and were was problematic. The senior military “largely responsive to allied commanders” advisor to the Minister of National and not the Canadian government. When Defence (MND), the Chairman of the Prime Minister “John Diefenbaker tried Chiefs of Staff Committee, was responsible to exercise control over the armed forces, for coordinating service issues through he found that the central administra- approximately 200 standing “tri-service” tion in Ottawa had no national plans, no committees, but he had no executive intelligence capabilities, and no reliable authority to implement any committee structure for commanding and controlling recommendations. the forces.” One year later, the next Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, decided to rectify In 1960 the Royal Commission on Govern- this situation and appointed “the tough- ment Organization (the Glassco Commis- minded and ambitious” Paul Hellyer as sion) focussed its attention on DND. Its MND. His reforms to DND have been 45 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

well documented, and, therefore are only Staff and a single defence staff. This will summarized here. be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. The integrated In March 1964, Hellyer, released a new control of all aspects of planning and White Paper on Defence. The paper operations should not only produce a more outlined the objectives of the Liberal effective and coordinated defence posture government’s new defence policy, which, for Canada, but also result in consider- he argued, could not be dissociated from able savings.”10 This latter point appeared foreign policy. These objectives were: “To to be critical to Hellyer, as the Glassco preserve the peace by supporting collective Commission had noted that 43 percent of defence measures to deter military aggres- the 1954 annual defence budget was spent sion; to support Canadian foreign policy on equipment; by 1963 the figure was including that arising out of our participa- 13 percent, and it was projected that by tion in international organizations, and to 1965-66 there would be no money avail- provide for the protection and surveillance able for equipment purchases. Therefore, of our territory, our air-space and our one of the key goals of unification was to coastal waters.” The White Paper noted provide sufficient savings “to permit a goal that: “Our major defence contribution for of 25 percent of the budget to be devoted some time will continue to be participa- to capital equipment being realized in the tion in collective defensive arrangements, years ahead.” 11 namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation.” 9 The White Paper indicated that developing a new unified force structure would be More significantly, the paper went on to “an evolutionary process.” The new CF review the problems in DND identified by structure would group forces according the Glassco Commission and concluded to the major functional roles identified in that: “There is only one adequate solution. the paper: NATO Europe; Mobile Forces It is the integration of the Armed Forces (both in Canada and for NATO); Air of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Forces (including additional resources for

Minister of National Defence Chief of Defence Staff

Vice Chief Chief of Chief of of Comptroller Defence Technical General Staff Personnel Services

Deputy Deputy Deputy Chief Chief Chief of of of Plans Operations Reserves

Director Director Director General General General Maritime Land Air

Figure 3-1 – Canadian Forces Headquarters Organization at Unification (1964)

46 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

direct support of ground forces); North and 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group American Air Defence; Air Transport [4 CIBG]) were initially excluded from the (additional resources to enhance mobility reorganization plan. of ground forces) and Maritime Forces (including helicopters and fixed wing To complete the unification process, Bill aircraft).12 C-243, the “Canadian Forces Reorganiza- tion Act,” was placed before the House As a preliminary move towards total unifi- in November 1966. The Bill was a set of cation, the Government introduced Bill amendments to the National Defence Act, C-90 “Integration of the Headquarters which changed the law establishing three Staffs,” which directed the replacement services, creating instead one service to of the separate service chiefs by a single be called the Canadian Armed Forces. Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and The Bill also directed the adoption of a the creation of an integrated Canadian standard rank system (so-called “army” Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) to replace ranks) and of a new service dress uniform the three separate service headquarters. to be worn by all ranks, irrespective of the Accordingly, as the first step in inte- commands to which they were assigned. grating Canada’s armed forces under Bill The transfer of personnel between units of C-90, Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller was different commands would be facilitated appointed the first CDS on 1 August 1964. by a new unified personnel management At the same time, heads of new functional system. Royal assent was given to the Bill branches within the new CFHQ were also on 8 May 1967 and unification officially appointed.13 occurred on 1 February 1968.15 As the senior officer in the new CFHQ, the The Reorganization Act, while dissolving Chief of the Defence Staff was responsible the three services, did nothing specifically to the MND for control and administra- to affect the units and formations of the tion of the Canadian Forces. Reporting services as they were then constituted. to the CDS were four functional branch At the time the new Canadian Forces heads: the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff came into being, its constituent units (VCDS), the Chief of Personnel, the Chief and elements were the same ones that of Technical Services, and the Comptroller existed within the RCN, Army and RCAF, General. (See Figure 3-1 for the CFHQ but re-distributed to the new unified CF organization.) Responsibility for mili- commands. tary operations was vested in the VCDS, who had three deputies to assist him - the Deputy Chief of Plans, the Deputy Chief of Operations, and the Deputy Chief he CF Organizational of Reserves. Reporting to the Deputy T Chief of Operations were three Directors General, each responsible for supervising Concept for Unification maritime, land or air operations and for The organizational structure adopted for determining operational requirements.14 the unified CF was derived directly from the RCAF model. This new CF structure The new CFHQ staff was given the respon- (illustrated in Figure 3-2) recognized four sibility for determining the makeup of the levels of command: CFHQ (the national new CF command structure, consistent level); commands and formations (gener- with the defence priorities outlined in the ally functional organizations, what might White Paper. Following extensive planning be called the operational level today); bases and review, a new integrated command (regional or local support organizations); structure was announced in June 1965, and units (tactical organizations, like with direction that all separate service squadrons, assigned to specific commands). establishments were to be re-allocated to At each level of command, there was a the appropriate new CF commands by 1 designated commander, responsible for April 1966. In Canada, six new functional the effective and efficient discharge of his commands would replace the existing command responsibilities, as prescribed in eleven service commands. The two Cana- Queen’s Regulations and Orders. Officers dian formations in Europe (1 Air Division commanding commands and formations 47 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

exercised command over all bases, units as required. The units and formations and elements assigned to the command or lodged on a base might be largely self- formation, while commanders of bases and supporting, or totally dependent on the units exercised command over all officers base for support, depending largely on and non-commissioned members at the their requirement for mobility.18 base or unit.16 The range and scale of support services provided by a base was to be especially tailored to each unit’s situation, but would need to cover the services which were CFHQ beyond the capabilities of individual units and which were not provided by external agencies. To assist the base commander Commands in executing his responsibilities, a base & headquarters was created in a structure Formations that replicated the four branches in the command headquarters and in CFHQ. Bases were assigned to the new parent Bases commands according to the primary operational or training functions being performed by units at the base.19 Units Unification and the Figure 3-2 – Four Levels CF “Air Element” o f C o m m a n d In the unified CF there was no component of the organizational structure that Below the national-level CFHQ, the CF replicated the former services and use of was organized into functional commands the terms “navy,” “army” and “air force” which reflected the major commitments was actively discouraged. In their place, assigned by the government. Irrespective terminology reflecting environmental of their service origin, all forces devoted to “elements” (sea, land and air) was intro- a primary mission were to be grouped in a duced. The term “air element” became single command. Command headquarters the approved term to describe the Cana- staffs were to be organized in a structure dian “air force” in the CF context. The corresponding to the four branches of term was never formally defined, but was CFHQ: Operations, Personnel, Tech- generally recognized to encompass all CF nical Services, and Comptroller. Where units (and their personnel) engaged in, or warranted, commands were authorized directly supporting, “air” operations, (e.g., to introduce intermediate headquarters flying squadrons and aircraft maintenance (formations) below the command level.17 units). Also considered part of the “air element” were all other CF personnel in The next level in the vertical organization “air” classifications or occupations (i.e., of the new command structure was the pilots, air navigators, air traffic control) base, which was introduced as the founda- employed in other than “air element” tion for administration and local support. units. This organizational concept was derived from the RCAF “station” model, and The absence of an overarching concept of generally was not found in RCN or Cana- what the “air element” comprised, or of an dian Army force structure. The primary approved definition, limited the usefulness role of the CF base was to support units of the term, except as a generic identifier. or formations lodged on, or otherwise Although attempts were made to portray attached to it, by providing personnel the scattered parts of the “air element” accommodation and messing, and adminis- as the CF equivalent of an air force, the trative, technical and comptroller services inference was incorrect. The CF “air 48 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

element” had no top-down organizational unique personnel policies. In the unified basis, either administratively or operation- CF, universal training and education ally; rather it was a bottom-up aggrega- policies were applied to all personnel of tion of assorted air units and personnel. the “air element,” and because they were CF personnel did not enrol in the “air frequently modelled on RCAF practice element,” nor did the “air element” have they were not necessarily optimized for air formal status in the CF organizational personnel performing functions previously structure. These deficiencies would be the mandate of the RCN or Canadian partially addressed later with the stand- Army aviation. up of Air Command in 1975 and which is described later in this chapter. These operational and administrative considerations influenced “air element” Furthermore, while it was frequently organizations and operations, and continue suggested that the “air element” was to be reflected in issues related to the the direct descendent of the RCAF, this “warfare communities” of today. To prop- was inaccurate. Both the post-war RCN erly understand the derivation of these and Canadian Army possessed their own “warfare community” issues, it is neces- integral aviation forces, and these were sary to appreciate the RCN and Canadian also subsumed by the “air element” during Army lineage of the CF “air element,” not the process of unification. Thus, in addi- merely its RCAF ancestry.20 tion to RCAF units and personnel, the “air element” included all aviation forces previously belonging to the RCN and the Canadian Army. Although more modest in numbers than their RCAF counterparts, perational these RCN and Canadian Army aviation O forces were nonetheless important contrib- and Personnel utors to the make-up of the “air element,” both operationally and administratively. Considerations of Operationally, the pre-unification func- Unification tions and roles of the RCN and Canadian Army aviation forces were different from The “air element” of the unified Cana- (and not duplicated by) those executed by dian Forces was an amalgamation of RCAF units. Following unification, these three different organizations: the RCAF unique RCN and Canadian Army roles (a separate air service), Canadian Army and functions were assigned to the CF aviation (individual air units in a number “air element,” in addition to those carried of army branches), and the RCN Aviation over from the RCAF. Thus, the number of Branch (a major operational component of functions and roles undertaken by the CF the RCN). These organizations had been “air element” was greater in scope than created in the post-war reconstitution of those previously assigned to the RCAF. Canada’s three military services, each with In effect, the breadth of operational some responsibility for operating Canadian functions executed by the “air element,” military aircraft to achieve defence policy and hence its operational capability, was objectives. While all of these organiza- substantially greater than that of the tions carried out various air functions, former RCAF. because the operating environments were different for each service, there was very From an administrative (personnel) little overlap in the functions carried out perspective, the differences in training and by each organization, and the RCAF, education provided to personnel engaged Canadian Army aviation, and the RCN in flying operations in the three services Aviation Branch were inherently different were not accommodated in the unification organizations. process. These differences were in part related to the inherent differences in the At the tactical level, organic army aviation environments in which each of the former units executed their assigned air functions services’ personnel engaged in flying opera- in direct support of the army field forces. tions worked, and were reflected in service- They operated from austere locations in 49 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

the field alongside the army units and In part to accommodate the inherent formations they supported, and, therefore differences in their operational functions army aviation units needed to have an and operating environments, the training inherent capability to deploy and operate and professional development provided with them. When deployed in the field, to officers of the three former services logistics support to army aviation units engaged in flying duties varied consider- was provided through the army logistics ably. While the basic and advanced flying chain. In a similar manner, organic naval training necessary to achieve pilot “wings” aviation forces executed maritime air func- standard was relatively consistent amongst tions in direct support of maritime surface the three services (the RCAF providing and sub-surface operations. They operated much of the flying training to its two sister from surface vessels as part of a ship’s services), post-wings career opportunities company, and were organized to deploy and professional development afforded with and receive support from their parent to junior officers engaged in flying duties ship. In contrast, air force units executed a in the three services was considerably variety of combat and combat support air different. functions, often at some distance and independent from other services or air force Following on aircrew training experi- units. They operated a variety of larger, ence gained with RAF Canada in the primarily fixed wing aircraft, usually from First World War and the BCATP in the fully developed airfields. Support services Second World War, the RCAF focus was on recruiting personnel directly for aircrew were provided at these airfields through positions. Distinct aircrew classification air force logistics organizations and were (pilot, navigator, radio officer) training was individually tailored to each unit. then provided for these direct entry candi- While the three constituents of the former dates, with only limited emphasis on lead- services were amalgamated into a single ership or general military training. This unified CF “air element,” the distinc- was appropriate for the RCAF, as most tive operational functions and operating aircrew were engaged under short-service environments of the former services were (five year) commissions and only a small not (and could not be) similarly unified. percentage (usually university graduates) were offered permanent commissions. Accommodating these inherent differ- Officers with a short-service commission ences dictated that the organization and could generally not progress beyond Flying personnel establishment of units under- Officer (i.e., lieutenant) rank and hence taking army tactical aviation operations in had little opportunity (or need) to exercise the field would be different from those of leadership over other RCAF personnel. units involved in the conduct of maritime Officers with a permanent commission had air operations from shipborne platforms, enhanced career prospects, and following or from air force units involved in opera- an initial period of flying employment tions (whether air defence, counter-surface were afforded the opportunity to develop or air transport) launched from fixed their professional and leadership skills. airfields. Logistics support arrangements This was accomplished through attendance for these different force structures also on staff school and staff college courses needed to be similarly accommodated and through postings to headquarters and specifically tailored to each situa- staff positions. tion. Based in part on the requirement to deploy with the supported land or mari- Unlike the RCAF, the Canadian Army time force, provision of logistics support did not accept direct entry candidates for for tactical aviation and shipborne mari- flying training, but instead took junior time air forces through logistics structures officers qualified in their primary branch of the supported force appeared to be the occupation, (i.e., armour, artillery or most appropriate approach. Likewise, service corps), and “cross-trained” them air force support capabilities deploying as pilots. This is the approach generally with various types of air force opera- favoured by other allied armies, including, tions required capabilities tailored to each until recently, the US Army. In this deployment situation. army construct, aviation is a secondary 50 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

qualification awarded to army officers The RCN and Canadian Army had a more already qualified in a primary occupa- holistic career development approach, tion qualification. In the Canadian Army, emphasizing the development and employ- there was no separate “pilot” branch list, ment of aircrew as professional “naval” or officers were held on their primary corps or “army” officers, in parallel with develop- regimental list, with an additional aviator ment as aircrew. This approach was more qualification. Unlike the RCAF, in which appropriate for these services, recognizing an aviator’s career was irrevocably linked that naval and army aviators would be to flying, the Canadian Army aviator was deployed frequently, working in opera- first and foremost an officer of his branch tional environments where regular interac- or corps. He could spend only a fraction of tion with military personnel from other his military career engaged in flying opera- units was the norm and where professional tions, and these would be directly related competence in all aspects of warfare on to his primary occupation as an artillery, land or at sea was required. In the unified armoured or service corps officer. CF personnel system, assignment of aircrew officers to and between any of the The RCN approach was a combina- commands was the norm; however, the tion of the RCAF and Canadian Army universal (air force) training provided to approaches. The Navy recruited directly all aircrew was not necessarily optimal for into the pilot branch, but personnel those assigned to maritime- or land-centric policies ensured that naval aviators were commands. integrated into the mainstream of naval operations and could aspire to and progress to command positions afloat. After an initial flying tour, junior naval aircrew he New CF officers were normally given extensive T training in general seamanship skills and Command Structure were also required to qualify in naval operations. Once qualified, they would go The new CFHQ defence staff, appointed in August 1964, was given responsibility on to serve tours as members of a ship’s for planning the make-up of the new CF company and ultimately could progress command structure. Their objective was to appointments as captains of surface to create a force structure which would vessels. Admiral R.H. Falls, who became accommodate the roles detailed in the CDS in 1974, was a naval aviator who White Paper. The underlying organiza- progressed to command of not only an tional premise was that all forces devoted RCN air squadron, but also of the carrier to a primary role would be grouped into a HMCS Bonaventure and of the Canadian 21 single command, with sufficient resources Flotilla Atlantic. assigned to allow the commander of that command to discharge his assigned respon- In the unified CF, training and professional sibilities. Following lengthy study and development provided to all “air element” ministerial review, the new CF functional aircrew personnel was generally patterned command structure was approved in June on the RCAF model. This policy was based 1965. on the air force concept of large aircrew classifications (or occupations), focussed Under the new structure, the commands primarily on operating aircraft. Personnel in Canada were reduced to six from eleven. were recruited directly into these classifica- Previously a mixture of regional and tions, extensive training was provided to functional commands, the new CF field achieve “wings” standard and subsequent structure, shown in Figure 3-3, consisted employment operating aircraft was assured of six functional commands: Mobile, Mari- for several years. Emphasis in this early time, Air Defence, Air Transport, Materiel, part of an aircrew officer’s career was and Training. In addition to the six major placed on gaining experience and skill as commands, the CF structure also included an aircraft operator, with limited focus on the Communications System (elevated to professional military and leadership skills command status in 1970), and a Reserves or on obtaining expertise in “air warfare” and National Survival Organization. As functions. noted earlier, the two Canadian formations 51 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

assigned to NATO Europe, 4 CIBG and 1 the responsibility for administering some Air Division, were initially unaffected by 40,000 Regular Army, 40,000 Militia and this CF reorganization. Commencing in 100,000 cadet personnel.23 October 1965, commanders were appointed and headquarters were established to A vital component of Mobile Command fully develop the structure of the new was to be its tactical aviation element, functional commands.22 Each of these is operating under the Chief of Tactical described next. Aviation. Mobile Command was therefore established as a joint (air-land) command, with a force structure integrating both air and land element units. Its command obile Command headquarters organization was equally M joint, headed by a “land element” lieu- The first and largest of the new CF tenant general (three star) commander commands, Mobile Command (MOBCOM), who was supported by two deputy was stood up on 1 October 1965 with head- commanders. An “air element” major quarters at St‑Hubert, Quebec. Its mission general (two star) was Deputy Commander was to maintain combat-ready land and – Operational Support, while a “land tactical air forces (fixed- and rotary-wing) element” major general was Deputy capable of rapid deployment, both for Commander – Operations. Of the 62 NATO service in Europe and for United officers in the headquarters, 20 were “air Nations peacekeeping operations world- element” officers who were assigned not wide. The creation of Mobile Command only to the Chief of Tactical Aviation, but involved the disbandment of four regional also filled positions throughout the orga- Army headquarters: Eastern Command, nization.24 Over the next ten years, as new Quebec Command, Central Command equipment was delivered, a number of new and Western Command, as well as the 11 “air element” units were created and the subordinate area headquarters that had air component of MOBCOM grew considerably, becoming the largest “air force” in the CF. In August 1968, the Chief of Tactical Avia- tion Branch was separated from MOBCOM HQ and reorganized as Headquar- ters, 10 Tactical Maritime Mobile Command Air Group (10 Materiel Command (Halifax) Command (St-Hubert) TAG), the newly (Rockliffe) Air Defence created avia- Command (North Bay) tion formation. The Commander 10 TAG was 25 Training “double-hatted” Command (Winnipeg) as Chief of Staff (Air) to the Commander Air Transport Command MOBCOM and (Trenton) as a commander in his own right Figure 3-3 – Canadian Forces Six of a subordinate Functional Commands formation, 10 TAG. In July 1970, in concert 52 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

with the latest restructuring of CFHQ, Command involved the disbandment 10 TAG Headquarters was completely of the former RCN Atlantic and Pacific separated from MOBCOM headquarters. Commands as well as the RCAF Maritime The original integrated (joint) air-land Air Command. The RCAF contribution to headquarters was slowly disappearing, MARCOM consisted of four squadrons of with MOBCOM focussing more on estab- fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, while lishing itself as a separate “service,” the RCN Naval Aviation contribution was comparable to the former Canadian Army, two squadrons, one fixed-wing maritime but within the context of the unified patrol aircraft and one helicopter. The Canadian Forces.26 primary role of Maritime Command would continue to be anti-submarine warfare, With the creation of the new CF command although there was planning underway to structure, Mobile Command became enhance its capability for general-purpose Canada’s first joint air-land command in tasks.29 1965, charged with providing forces that could be rapidly deployed. Air and land Maritime Command was a joint (air-sea) element officers worked side by side in command, with significant contributions this headquarters and were responsible from the air and sea elements, and a joint for the command and control of this new headquarters staff. Prior to unification command. No detailed assessment of the the RCAF and RCN had instituted a joint success of these command arrangements command structure comprising three has yet been done, but in theory the joint commanders: the Maritime Commander, headquarters should have been able to the Flag Officer Atlantic Coast (FOAC), provide a better capability to conduct joint and the Air Officer Commanding Maritime operations than the previous arrangement Air Command (AOC MAC). In peacetime of single service headquarters. However, the FOAC was designated the Maritime five years into this experiment in joint C2, Commander, with the AOC MAC acting the beginning of the “disintegration” of as his deputy. With unification, only the the integrated command structure can be Maritime Commander remained, a position seen when 10 TAG was completely sepa- filled by a sea element three star equivalent rated from MOBCOM headquarters.27 This officer. Senior air element representation “disintegration” of the CF continued with in MARCOM was retained by having a the formation of Air Command (which two star “air element” general designated will be discussed later) five years after the as Chief of Staff (Operations), the next separation of 10 TAG from MOBCOM. senior position in the headquarters. By Another sign of “disintegration” of the CF 1973, however, the senior air position had was the closure of the Joint Air Training been downgraded to a one star Chief of School at Rivers, Manitoba in September Staff (Air), one of three coequal branch 1971. It is ironic that this joint school, heads in the operations division.30 which was started after the war because of the recognition of the importance of joint training and which was also a precursor to today’s emphasis on joint operations, was closed as part of a unification base consoli- ir Defence Command 28 A dation program designed to save money. In recognition of the importance of air defence during the Cold War and the ongoing Canadian commitments to the North American Air Defense agreement, aritime Command the Air Defence Command (ADC) orga- M nization remained essentially the same as Maritime Command (MARCOM) was it had been within the RCAF. However, formally established on 17 January 1966 economies were to be achieved through and embodied all of Canada’s surface consolidation by moving the Command’s and sub-surface naval forces as well as all headquarters from St-Hubert, Quebec (RCAF and RCN) maritime air units on to North Bay, Ontario where Northern both coasts. Its headquarters was located NORAD Region headquarters was already in Halifax, with a Pacific sub-command located. ADC continued to have respon- in Esquimault. The creation of Maritime sibility for providing airborne intercep- 53 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

tors and ground control facilities to Yukon and a fleet of Hercules aircraft defend North American airspace within for strategic transport and a variety the mandate of NORAD.31 To execute of smaller aircraft for tactical trans- its responsibilities, ADC operated three port, communications and search and rescue.32 In January 1969 the Air Reserve, comprised of six squadrons of Otter aircraft, was transferred from ATC to MOBCOM.

CF101 VOODOO

squadrons of CF101 Voodoo interceptors, as well as two squadrons equipped with the Bomarc surface-to-air missile CC123 OTTER system. These operational forces were directly supported by a number of radars, command and control, and space surveillance facilities. Materiel Command Materiel Command was created on ir Transport 1 August 1965, with headquarters at A Rockliffe, by amalgamating elements of Command the former RCN and Canadian Army logistics organizations with the RCAF’s Air Like ADC, Air Transport Command’s Materiel Command. The Command was (ATC) organization remained essentially responsible for providing necessary supply the same as it had been within the RCAF. and maintenance support to the other With headquarters at Trenton, Ontario, operational commands. Materiel Command was presented with one of the most formi- dable tasks of the integration period, to mould the three disparate service systems into a single automated CF supply system. Because of the complexity and magnitude of the project, it was estimated it would CC106 YUKON take up to five years to implement; in the mean time the three service systems would continue to function to ensure that ATC was responsible for providing the CF logistics support to operational forces was with strategic and tactical airlift capa- in no way diminished. The command had no operational air element units assigned to it.33 Training Command Training Command was formed on CC130 HERCULES 1 January 1965, with headquarters in Winnipeg, by amalgamating training elements of the RCN and Canadian Army bility, as well as air search and rescue with the RCAF’s Training Command. operations within the Canadian areas of It was assigned responsibility for all responsibility. ATC operated a fleet of individual training, including flying and 54 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

ground trades training, for all personnel Division was to be reduced from six to in the CF. A new CF training program was three squadrons, and downgraded from to be developed, which would correspond “command” to “formation” status as 1 to a new CF trades structure which was Canadian Air Group (1 CAG). The three also being developed. Where skills were remaining squadrons would all be based at common to two or more Environments, Baden Soellingen and were to be re-roled it was planned to centralize the training for conventional ground attack.36 On 1 at one facility. It was anticipated that it July 1970, 1 CAG and 4 Canadian Mecha- would take several years to fully imple- nized Brigade Group became formations ment the new CF training program. The within a new CF command, Canadian Command had no operational air element Forces Europe, with headquarters at units assigned to it.34 Lahr. The airfield at Lahr was retained as the airhead for Canadian air transport operations in Europe, and as a deployment airfield for US Air Force “Rapid Reaction” ATO Europe – 1 Air squadrons. DivisionN The European-based 4 CIBG, with head- nification and the quarters at Soest, West Germany, and U 1 Air Division with headquarters at Metz, France were initially not included in the Problems of the Air Element One of the primary objectives of unification was to resolve inter-service rivalries which surfaced when matters of resource allocation or support of one service by another had to be resolved. Prior to unification, the three services functioned CF104 STARFIGHTER independently, sought to maximize their resource allocations and zealously guarded their own service interests. Unification 1965 command reorganization. At the did not directly address resource alloca- time, 1 Air Division comprised eight CF104 tion issues, but moved the decision making squadrons divided among three wings, authority down in the organization. with six squadrons in the nuclear strike Resource allocation issues now had to be role based in Germany and two squadrons resolved internally within the CF, gener- in the reconnaissance role based in France. ally between the CFHQ and command In 1966 the French government announced levels. In comparison with the land and that it was withdrawing its forces from maritime elements, the interests of the air NATO and requested that all NATO forces element were poorly served by the unified be withdrawn from its territory. Canada CF command structure. The two major arranged to take over the French air base joint CF commands, Mobile Command at Lahr, West Germany in exchange for the and Maritime Command, were headed Canadian base at Marville, and No. 1 Wing by three star equivalent officers, who and 1 Air Division headquarters rede- were increasingly stressing their land and ployed to Lahr in April 1967.35 maritime lineage, and championing land and maritime programs respectively. The In 1970, the Government issued a new air element, with forces spread amongst white paper, Defence in the 70’s. This docu- four commands, each headed by two star ment reversed the government defence equivalent commanders, was at a disad- priorities promulgated in the 1964 paper, vantage in advancing its programs. and directed a 50 percent reduction and consolidation of Canada’s NATO forces, This disadvantage had an adverse effect on including the elimination of the nuclear the air element because resource manage- strike role. Under this new policy, 1 Air ment in DND became the critical issue in 55 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

the 1972-75 timeframe. The new Defence senior air positions in these joint White Paper, Defence in the 70’s, published headquarters had been downgraded in 1971, imposed a three year freeze on the over time, with the result that the “air defence budget at $1.8 billion. In the face element” component was no longer of severe fiscal constraint, the operational perceived as a coequal partner with commands were required to significantly the land and sea components, but was reduce their expenditures on operations. increasingly viewed as a subordinate. The air element commands resorted to mothballing operational aircraft and  Lack of strategic oversight and leader- reducing flying rates to achieve the needed ship. Within the CFHQ organization, budget cuts. The joint land and maritime oversight of air element programs was commands chose cost reduction options managed at too low a level, and there which minimized reductions in their was no senior position designated as traditional roles, and offered up reductions the air element advocate. Within the primarily in their air element activities. As VCDS Branch, responsibility for CF a result, air element programs were dispro- military operations was vested in the portionately reduced across the CF.37 Deputy Chief of Operations branch, with air policy and doctrine being the This, and similar, experiences prompted responsibility of the Director General many senior airmen to question the logic Air Forces (DGAF), a brigadier of the unified Canadian Forces structure general. This change was significant given the adverse effect it was having on for the air element, as Canada’s air the CF air element’s interests. Through the forces went from a pre-integration mechanism of the annual Air Commanders position of having a three star Chief Conference, Canada’s senior airmen were of the Air Staff with direct access to able to identify several problems with the the MND to a one star officer with unified structure which were considered three layers of bureaucracy between detrimental to the well-being of the “air himself and the MND. Even though a element,” and which merited concerted 1972 National Defence Headquarters attention. The main five problems, as the (NDHQ) reorganization elevated the senior airmen saw them, were: senior air element officer in NDHQ to the two star level, he was still  Fragmentation of operational air precluded from participating in senior element forces. Each of the opera- (three star level) CFHQ councils or tional CF functional commands had from providing appropriate strategic an air element component, but these leadership to the air element.39 operated in isolation from each other with no overarching coordination or  Declining esprit de corps. Prior to control. In effect, each command had unification, the Chief of Air Staff, (or was) its own mini “air force,” but Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap, voiced his with no supporting structure. This concerns over maintaining air element fragmented organizational structure esprit de corps in a unified force: “One violated two doctrinal principles of air joins the Air Force, not a regiment, power application: unity of effort and not a corps – allegiance and pride is centralized control. Experience has centred in the Air Force as a whole shown, and doctrine confirms, that air – one is willing to make great personal power is most effectively applied when sacrifices for the sake of making the RCAF superior to any other air force it is organized as a unified force, and 40 when control of that force is centrally or, in fact, than any other service.” executed at the highest practicable The two “joint” commands were level.38 increasingly assuming the mantle of successors to the former services,  Subordination of the air element. claiming institutional loyalty and Related to the issue of fragmenta- engendering esprit de corps formerly tion, the growing subordination of associated with the RCN and Cana- the air element within the two “joint” dian Army. The air element had no commands, MARCOM and MOBCOM, similar single institution within which was a matter of concern. The original to develop its own esprit de corps. 56 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

 Professional development and doctrinal deficiencies. Following unification, the orrective Measures land and sea elements had retained C their core educational institutions, the – A Window of Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) and the Cana- Opportunity dian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre (CFMWC), respectively, while the air Having determined the scope of the element lost the resources previously problems facing the air element within the dedicated to professional education unified force structure, Canada’s senior airmen turned their attention to corrective related to air warfare amongst air measures. Several proposals were devel- force personnel. The basic levels of oped, including a suggestion considered by air warfare education that had been some to be extreme – to put all of Cana- provided on entry to the RCAF were da’s military air resources into one orga- not found on the new CF unified basic nization for the first time in its history. In officer or recruit courses, and at more 1974 the senior airmen were provided with senior levels the air force promotion a window of opportunity to advance their and staff college entrance exams ideas. Canada was in the midst of a reces- were phased out. With the conversion, and cabinet had directed that the sion of the RCAF Staff School and DND budget was to remain frozen. DND Staff College in Toronto to unified CF was in a state of financial crisis, opera- institutions, professional education tions were again reduced, capital programs directly related to air warfare almost deferred, and the CF establishment was to disappeared. be reduced from 83,000 to 79,00 in 1975, with possible further reductions to 73,000. Furthermore, with the conversion of its The CDS convened an extraordinary educational institutions in Toronto to meeting with commanders of commands to unified CF institutions, the RCAF exten- seek additional areas for possible expendi- sion program, which provided professional ture reductions. military education to RCAF officers, and the RCAF Staff College Journal, which In response, senior airmen initially was the RCAF’s professional journal, proposed the idea of an Air Command were eliminated. These changes also had based only on an amalgamation of ATC, a detrimental effect on the development ADC and some air-related positions in of Canadian air doctrine as the RCAF Training Command, but did not include 10 Staff College, since its foundation in TAG or Maritime Command air elements. 1943, had been one of the key institu- Lieutenant General W.K Carr, the DCDS tions in the development of Canadian air and an air element officer, actively doctrine. Unification did not affect land supported the proposal and offered and sea warfare professional education up manpower savings of 110 positions or doctrine to the same extent because through consolidating the various air headquarters staffs. As the proposal would have the land and sea elements of the CF kept no impact on MOBCOM or MARCOM, their core educational institutions alive in there was initially no resistance from those the CLFCSC and CFMWC. Therefore, air commanders. General J.A.Dextraze, the doctrine in the 1970s in Canada degener- CDS and a land officer, agreed to take the ated into the views of separate air warfare proposal to government. The MND, James communities cobbled together into one Richardson (a former Second World War volume with little coherence or consis- RCAF pilot), was strongly supportive of tency. It was recognized by senior officers Carr’s proposal, especially as the head- both inside and outside of the Air Force quarters was to be situated in his Winnipeg that this situation was threatening to riding. The proposal was forwarded to fracture Canadian air power and to divide cabinet, with personnel reductions now it into small, divided functional communi- identified as 155 positions.42 ties that, without central direction, would not be able to provide the air capabilities With approval of this partial solu- required by the CF.41 tion seemingly assured, senior airmen 57 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

now worked to incorporate 10 TAG and most instances, the existing command Maritime Command air elements into and control mechanisms were unique, the proposal. Additional arguments were and tailored for individual situations, and prepared to overcome anticipated oppo- therefore had to be replicated in the new sition from MOBCOM and MARCOM command structure. commanders, including the exclusion of land and maritime airmen from air For example, Air Defence and Air Trans- element career progression considerations. port were autonomous commands with Commander MARCOM was approached complete headquarters staffs. Operation- initially with the expanded proposal and ally, Air Defence Command was controlled he was in general agreement, but with the by the NORAD Commander-in-Chief proviso that operational control of mari- (CINC) located in Colorado Springs, time air resources remain with Commander while Air Transport Command responded MARCOM. With this precedent estab- to taskings from NDHQ. 10 TAG was lished, Commander MOBCOM was finally a formation of Mobile Command, with persuaded to accept the proposal, with some units under operational control of similar reservation on retaining operational the Land Combat Groups. 1 Canadian control of 10 TAG forces. With agreement Air Group was a formation of Canadian from these commanders, the CDS agreed Forces Europe, under operational control to support the expanded proposal, and in of NATO’s 4th Allied Tactical Air Force in January 1975 he announced formation of times of tension and war. Also in Europe, the new command.43 444 Tactical Helicopter squadron was an autonomous unit assigned to 4 Canadian As promulgated in CANFORGEN 15/75 Mechanized Brigade Group. The air units “Formation of Air Command,” the CDS of MARCOM and the flying schools of explained the decision: “The purpose of Training Command had no intermediary forming Air Command is to unify all air headquarters formation to report to, resources, regular and reserve, so that and reported through their associated their employment and development can base and/or ship directly to their parent be coordinated in the most effective and command. economical manner to achieve Canadian Defence objectives. Additionally, Air To accommodate these disparate command Command will help to provide a clear and control arrangements, the planning identity and focus for all airmen within the staff developed an initial concept, which Canadian Forces…” The new command organized the command and control of would encompass all air assets of the air resources around a number of func- Canadian Forces, but with operational tional formations, designated “air groups.” control retained by user commands, i.e., Each of the groups would provide air Mobile Command, Maritime Command, support to a specific user command, with and CF Europe. The new command would, split command and control arrangements however, have CF-wide jurisdiction over similar to those existing with NORAD and air doctrine, flight safety and common air NATO assigned forces. Under this plan, policy, including training standards.44 Air Command would exercise administrative control over all groups, bases, and Although the CDS had sanctioned the squadrons, while operational control of creation of Air Command in January 1975, individual groups was assigned to the user detailed establishments and command command. Air Command Headquarters arrangements had not yet been finalized, (AIRCOM HQ) would have a complete and it required considerable effort by plan- staff for administration and technical ners to resolve the concerns of the other support, while the group headquarters commands and NDHQ. In creating the would be small and responsible only for new command structure, air planners had planning operations. In this concept, base to accommodate three primary restrictions commanders were responsible to AIRCOM imposed by the CDS: reorganization costs HQ for the provision of support to had to be minimal, manpower savings assigned units and responsive to the forma- (155 positions) had to be achieved, and tion commanders for operational matters. command and control arrangements had to be agreed to by all parties affected. In 58 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

The initial plan proposed six subordinate as air advice to the air units deployed in groups: Air Defence Group (ADG); Air Europe. It comprised 22,829 military and Transport Group (ATG); Maritime Air 7,838 civilian personnel, making it the Group (MAG); 10 Tactical Air Group largest command of the Canadian Forces.45 (10 TAG); 1 Canadian Air Group (1 CAG); and an Air Training Group. Many of these formations already existed in some form or other, which minimized re-organiza- ummary tion costs. To achieve additional personnel S savings, a subsequent proposal suggested The unification of Canada’s armed forces the elimination of the Air Transport and in 1968 into one service was the culmi- Training Groups, with these functions nation of a process, often referred to as to be controlled directly by AIRCOM integration, which had begun in 1923 with HQ. The elimination of a dedicated Air the creation of a single Department of Transport formation was not supported, National Defence. A number of factors in however, and the final iteration of the plan the 1960s accelerated change in DND and was a compromise, leaving Air Transport precipitated the radical changes that unifi- Group as a separate group but assigning cation brought to Canada’s armed forces. control of air training to AIRCOM HQ. A key factor was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when Canadian military forces Once the group structure had been were perceived by many politicians to have accepted in principle, it remained to been unresponsive to the Canadian govern- finalize headquarters establishments and ment’s wishes in this crisis. The Cuban confirm command and control arrange- Missile Crisis also brought to the forefront ments with the user commands. While the criticisms of a fragmented and inefficient groups recognized that their responsibili- Canadian military command and control ties were limited to operational matters, system based on three separate services— the two former commands were reluctant the Canadian Army, the RCN and the to see existing headquarters support staffs RCAF. Another important factor that dismantled and recreated in AIRCOM HQ. fuelled unification was the perception that The split control of bases was also seen as the military budget was not being spent a matter of concern, as was the proposed prudently because in the mid-1950s close rank (BGen) of the Commander ADG (whose American counterparts were all of to one half of the annual defence budget MGen rank), and the relationship between was spent on capital equipment, yet by the groups and the Director General 1963 only 13 percent was being spent on Aerospace Engineering and Maintenance capital equipment, and there were projec- in NDHQ. Some of these issues remained tions that this amount would drop even unresolved until well after the new further in the near future. Therefore, two command structure was inaugurated. key goals of unification were to provide an effective C2 framework for the CF that On 2 September 1975, Air Command took would ensure its responsiveness to civilian its place as a command of the Canadian government control and to provide enough Forces. With headquarters in Winnipeg savings to allow 25 percent of the defence (occupying facilities previously accommo- budget to be spent on capital equipment dating Training Command Headquarters), purchases. Air Command became responsible for the provision of “operationally ready regular A number of commentators have ques- and reserve air forces to meet Canadian, tioned the wisdom of unification as it was continental and international defence eventually implemented. While few would commitments.” To meet that respon- quibble with the aims of the proponents sibility, it had under its command 29 of unification of providing a mechanism squadrons, 16 bases, 20 radar stations and for coordinating Canada’s defence policy, 4 early warning radar sites. It operated a of integrating common functions, and fleet of some 850 aircraft of 22 different of significant financial savings, many types, flying over 300,000 hours annu- ask whether it was necessary to take the ally. It was also responsible for providing unification process as far as it was taken, trained air personnel for the CF, as well especially with the creation of a novel 59 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

command and control structure in a very some visible characteristics of Canada’s short period of time. armed forces, such as separate services and distinctive (returning to different colours The first major step towards unification for the three different Environments) was the reorganization of the military uniforms, many organizational changes headquarters under Bill C-90, which had already been implemented before that created the new position of Chief of the date. Nevertheless, the unification process Defence Staff to replace the three separate was complex and Hellyer’s original plans service chiefs and an integrated Canadian were modified over the years. Many of Forces Headquarters to replace the three these modifications were caused by factors separate service headquarters. The first that still have relevance today and can be CDS was appointed in August 1964 and seen influencing General Hillier’s recent his CFHQ staff devised a new command transformation efforts. structure for Canada’s armed forces that was announced in June 1965 and was to be Among the new functional commands implemented by 1 April 1966. created in the 1960s, as we have seen, Mobile Command and Maritime Command The new structure was based on the RCAF were true joint commands, in today’s model of functional commands, and it parlance. However, not long after the had four levels of command: the national creation of these commands, the centrif- level (represented by CFHQ); functional ugal “strong service” culture began to organizations, what might be called the pull away parts of their structures so that operational level today (represented by these two commands began to become commands and formations); regional or more like the old army and navy respec- local support organizations (represented tively. From an air force perspective, the by bases); and tactical organizations most visible sign of this “disintegration” (represented by units, like squadrons, occurred when 10 TAG Headquarters was assigned to specific commands). completely separated from MOBCOM Headquarters in July 1970 during a CF The new functional command structure restructuring. The effects of this “disin- was designed to reflect the major commit- tegration” was that Mobile Command ments assigned by the government to and Maritime Command increasingly the armed forces. Therefore, irrespec- became centres of influence for the land tive of their service (i.e., Army, RCN or and sea elements of the CF, both in terms RCAF) origin, all forces with a common of creating cultural centres of gravity primary mission were assigned to a single for those elements and in terms of repre- command. The result was six new func- senting those elements in the higher coun- tional commands in Canada, Mobile, cils of DND. Without a similar centre of Maritime, Air Defence, Air Transport, influence, the CF air element was perceived Materiel, and Training, all stood up before by many to be at a disadvantage in the unification in 1968. bureaucratic struggles that are part of any large organization like the CF. The next level below the functional command level in the new structure was Others believed that unification, between the base, which was introduced as the the years 1968 and 1975, had almost foundation for administration and local destroyed Canada’s air force as an insti- support. The base concept was derived tution. The new CF “air element” was a from the RCAF “station” model, where combination of the RCAF, the RCN Avia- the primary role of this level in the orga- tion Branch and Canadian Army aviation nization was to support units assigned to assets. Without an overarching concept or it, by providing personnel, administra- definition of the “air element” in the CF, tive, technical and comptroller services as it became a loose amalgam of air resources required. The commander of a base, like dispersed throughout the CF. Each of the the commander of a RCAF station, was operational CF functional commands had not in the operational chain of command. an air element component; therefore, each command had (or was) its own mini “air While the official implementation of force,” but there was no central command unification on 1 February 1968 changed or control framework for CF air resources. 60 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

This was reflected in CF air doctrine in tion of the air element relative to the land the 1970s which had little coherence or and sea elements; a lack of strategic-level consistency. The dispersion and diversity oversight and leadership; declining esprit of air element personnel plus the lack of a de corps; and serious professional develop- centralized air element command struc- ment and doctrinal deficiencies. ture, similar to those of Mobile Command and Maritime Command for the land and In 1974, due to severe budget pressures sea elements respectively, caused a number on the CF, a window of opportunity of problems, for example in the training opened for senior air element officers to and professional development as well as attempt to redress these problems. They the employment of this diverse group of used this window of opportunity to tout air element personnel. the creation of Air Command as a way to save money and positions, by consoli- It is ironic that even though the general dating numerous air element headquarters organizational principles and some specific positions into a more rational structure, organizational parts adopted for the as well as to address these problems. The organization and command and control of result was that in September 1975 Air the new unified CF were derived directly from the RCAF model, their applica- Command, composed of all the air assets tion almost destroyed the air force as an and air element personnel from across the institution. The period from unification in CF, became the largest command of the 1968 until the formation of Air Command Canadian Forces. The structure that Air in 1975 was a difficult one for the CF “air Command adopted was not the result of element.” In the new unified CF command a holistic planning exercise, but, much structure, operational “air element” forces like the unification process, the result of and personnel were distributed among compromise and reorganization of struc- the four Canadian commands and one tures already in being. While perhaps European command. As we have seen, this not perfect, it went a long way towards dispersion of air resources had significant addressing the concerns of Canada’s senior effects that included the fragmentation air element officers over the fragmenta- of operational air element forces among tion of air power thought, expertise, and various CF organizations; the subordina- application.

he Struggle to Centralize Air Force Command: Canada’sT Air Force and Air Command 1975 – 2005 commands, Air Defence and Air Trans- ntroduction port Commands, together with the air I elements of Mobile, Maritime and Training The CF’s air resources were dispersed and Commands. Air Command was created fragmented after unification in 1968, and to bring the principal constituents of the as we saw above, this resulted in a number of serious problems in the CF’s “air CF air element together under a single element.” Air Command was formed on commander and to permit a more efficient 2 September 1975 to rectify these prob- and flexible employment of air resources. lems, including the disjointed command With headquarters in Winnipeg, Air and control of the CF air element and the Command’s first commander, Lieutenant- lack of a central focus for all air opera- General W.K. Carr, had jurisdiction over tions and doctrine. The creation of this air doctrine, flight safety and common air new command was brought about by policy matters, such as training standards, the amalgamation of two existing CF for all air units in the Canadian Forces. 61 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

The initial euphoria over the creation of Regular Force personnel today.46 While the Air Command was relatively short-lived as CF Regular Force was reduced by about 20 NDHQ did not decentralize any of its day- percent of its total strength as a result of to-day administrative functions relating to cuts in the 1990s, the Air Force was reduced air resources, for example the Chief of Air by 48 percent in the same time period.47 Operations policy group as well as certain Today’s Air Force consists of about 14,500 air technical and administrative authorities Regular Force military personnel, the remained in Ottawa. Furthermore, while smallest Canadian air force personnel estab- a basic argument for the formation of the lishment since the Second World War.48 command had been the rationalization of While the Air Force was cut by almost one command and control, the organizational half in terms of both personnel and aircraft posture adopted by the command itself in the post-Cold war period, its taskings for seemed to complicate, rather than stream- expeditionary operations doubled.49 During line, command and control of air resources. this same period the CF had the number of its personnel deployed on Increasing Demand vs Falling Capacity operations increase three- Cold War Post-Cold War 100,000 20,000 fold. This situation is depicted 90,000 18,000 graphically in Figure 3-4. 80,000 16,000 During the 30 70,000 14,000 years covered by this section, 60,000 12,000 Air Command 50,000 10,000 changed its organization and 40,000 8,000 command struc- 30,000 6,000 ture frequently Size of Canadian Forces Size Fall of the Berlin Wall Fall in response to 20,000 4,000

Number of Personnel Deployed Number of Personnel internal and external pres- 10,000 2,000 sures. However, 0 0 during the last half of 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 the period Air Fiscal Year Command Total Strength Pers on International Operations Pers on Domestic Operations found itself Figure 3-4 – Personnel Operational tempo increasingly hard-pressed to at Overall Strength 1980-2004 5 1 keep up with the tempo of Changes in the CF’s force structure in operations, and its personnel were adversely response to changes in the international affected by the extremely high personnel environment, in particular détente and the tempo. The Chief of the Air Staff at the end of the Cold War, also had detrimental time, Lieutenant General Ken Pennie, effects on Air Command. From a position summed up the seriousness of the situation as the largest CF command when formed in early 2005: “The air force is ‘beyond the in 1975, as a result of major reductions in point where even constant dedication is the CF during post-Cold War period, Air sufficient to sustain the capabilities needed Command shrank considerably and became to meet assigned Defence tasks,’ [and the the second largest CF command. Because Air Force] ‘remains fragile due to chronic of post-Cold War budget cuts, the CF was underfunding and asymmetric cuts to reduced from to the strength of about personnel. Our Wings and Squadrons are 90,000 Regular Force personnel that it had too hollow to sustain the current tempo of grown to in 1990 to approximately 62,000 operations.’”50 62 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

 Chief of Staff Training and Reserves he Command and (COS T&R) - responsible for air, T technical, and professional air force training and education, as well as Control Structure of Air cadets and reserves; and Command – The First  Command Comptroller (CCompt) - responsible for accounting and 12 Years financial services, as well as for the The role of Air Command when it was organization and establishment of created was to provide operationally ready the Command plus its management air forces to meet Canadian national and consulting services. international defence commitments. The Commander Air Command had jurisdiction over all air activities in the Canadian Forces, except those under command of he Air Group Canadian Forces Europe. The incumbent T was also a designated NORAD Component Structure Commander, responsible for the readiness The basic organizational concept embodied of Canadian Forces resources committed in the Air Command structure was the to the air defence of North America. In doctrinal tenet of centralized control with addition, the incumbent was designated as decentralized execution. This was achieved Commander, Prairie Region, with regional through a functionally-based field organi- responsibilities focussed on provision of zation, with all operational air resources 52 aid of the civil power. organized into formations according to their primary operational function and designated “Groups.” The group headquarters were small, and established to he Headquarters exercise operational command over units T assigned to the group. This functional Structure organization was designed to permit the group commanders to focus primarily on Air Command Headquarters was estab- air operations, while leaving Air Command lished in Winnipeg, in facilities previously Headquarters responsible to provide the occupied by Training Command. The necessary administrative and technical headquarters staff was organized into five support functions. This organizational branches, all reporting to the Commander structure also facilitated the transfer through the Deputy Commander in his of operational control of Air Command capacity as Chief of Staff: forces to the user commands: Maritime Command, Mobile Command, NATO, and  Chief of Staff Operations (COS OPS) NORAD. - responsible for overseeing air operations, plans, requirements, doctrine, As originally established, the Air force structure, intelligence and Command structure, shown in Figure 3-5, security; included:  Chief of Staff Support (COS SUP)  Air Defence Group (ADG) - responsible for providing support to . Previously all air operations, including aircraft an independent CF command (Air maintenance, logistics, telecommuni- Defence Command) with headquar- cations and information services, as ters in North Bay, this Group was well as construction engineering; responsible for providing airborne interceptors and ground control  Chief of Staff Personnel (COS Pers) facilities to defend North American - responsible for military and civilian airspace within the mandate of personnel matters, including chap- NORAD. The Group headquarters lains, doctors, and dentists; was a smaller version of the former Command headquarters, with most 63 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

Forces, as well as air search and rescue operations within the Canadian areas of responsibility. The Group headquarters was a smaller version of the former Command head- Maritime Air Group quarters, with (Halifax) most support 10 Tactical Air Group staff positions (St-Hubert) Air Transport transferred to Group the new Air (Trenton) Air Defence Command Group Headquarters. (North Bay) ATG operated a fleet of Boeing 707 (CC137) and CC130 Hercules transports for strategic transport, and a variety of Figure 3-5 – Air Group Structure smaller aircraft for tactical transport, commu- support staff positions transferred nications and search and rescue. The to the new Air Command Headquar- four primary transport squadrons ters. To execute its responsibilities, were: 437 Sqn at Trenton (CC137), 412 the Group continued to operate Sqn at Uplands (Cosmopolitan, Chal- three squadrons of CF101 Voodoo lenger), 436 Sqn at Trenton (CC130) interceptors: 409 Sqn at Comox, and 435 Sqn at Namao (CC130). Bases 416 Sqn at Chatham and 425 Sqn at assigned to ATG included Edmonton, Bagotville. These operational forces Trenton, Ottawa and Gander. were directly supported by a number of radars, command and control, and space surveillance facilities. Bases  10 Tactical Air Group (10 TAG). assigned to ADG included Cold Lake, Previously a formation of Mobile Bagotville, North Bay and Chatham. Command, 10 TAG was transferred to Air Command, but retained its  Air Transport Group (ATG). Previ- headquarters in St-Hubert co-located ously an independent command (Air with Mobile Command. The role of Transport Command) with headquarters in Trenton, Air Transport Group was responsible for strategic and tactical airlift for the Canadian

CC109 COSMOPOLITAN CF137 BOEING 707 CC144 CHALLENGER 64 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

10 TAG was to provide combat ready  Maritime Air Group (MAG). MAG was tactical aviation (helicopter) and a new formation, comprising all air tactical air (fighter) forces to support assets previously assigned to Maritime the operations and training of Mobile Command (MARCOM). MAG Head- Command. Operational control of quarters was established in Halifax, 10 TAG resources was delegated to co-located with MARCOM Headquar- Commander Mobile Command, and ters. Operational control of MAG Commander 10 TAG was also desig- resources was delegated to Commander nated Chief of Staff (Air) [COS (Air)] MARCOM, and Commander MAG was in the Mobile Command Headquar- designated COS (Air) in the MARCOM ters. The 10 TAG helicopter squad- HQ. MAG was responsible for the oper- rons operated Kiowa, Twin Huey ational tasking of maritime aircraft and Chinook helicopters which were in providing aerial surveillance and co-located with their Mobile Command control of the maritime approaches formations. They included 403 Sqn and 427 Sqn at Petawawa, 422 Sqn

C H 1 3 5 T W I N H U E Y CP107 ARGUS CH136 KIOWA to Canada. To execute this responsi- at Gagetown, 408 Sqn at Edmonton, bility, MAG operated a fleet of Argus, 430 Sqn at Valcartier and 450 Sqn at Tracker and Sea King aircraft. MAG Uplands (Ottawa). The tactical air squadrons included 449 Sqn and 415 Sqn at Summerside, 404 Sqn and 405

CC147 CHINOOK CP121 TRACKER

squadrons operated the CF5 Freedom Sqn at Greenwood, 407 Sqn at Comox, Fighter and included 434 Sqn at Cold and VS 880, 406 Sqn, 423 Sqn and 443 Lake and 433 Sqn at Bagotville. Sqn at Shearwater. Bases assigned to MAG included Comox, Shearwater, Greenwood, and Summerside.

C F 5 F R E E D O M FIGHTER CH124 SEA KING 65 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

Several changes were made to the Air Group, as well as the tactical fighter Command organization in the years function which had been the responsibility following its formation in 1975. The most of 10 Tactical Air Group. Fighter Group important were the creation of two new Headquarters was created by amal- groups, and the restructuring of one of gamating 10 TAG Headquarters fighter the original groups. The first new group staff with Air Defence Group staff. This to be created was Air Reserve Group reorganization was in part a result of the (ARG), formed in 1976 with headquar- acquisition of smaller numbers of one ters at Winnipeg. It was a relatively small formation comprising approximately 950 personnel, and was distinguished by a unique command and control arrangement which catered to the particular needs of reserve personnel. Under this arrangement, ARG Headquarters exercised administrative control over all Air Reserve personnel; however, the Air Reserve units they belonged to remained under the opera- CF18 HORNET tional control of the appropriate functional group headquarters. fighter type, the CF18 Hornet, to replace The second new group to be formed was larger numbers of three fighter types of 14 Training Group, established in August aircraft, CF101 Voodoo, CF104 Starfighter 1981 also with headquarters in Winnipeg. and CF5 Freedom Fighter. With a reduced Since its inception in 1975, Air Command fleet of only one type of aircraft avail- training had been controlled directly able for existing commitments, it was from the Command Headquarters by deemed critical to consolidate control of the Deputy Chief of Staff Training and all fighter resources and operations under Reserves. It became increasingly apparent, one commander to provide for maximum however, that training matters were not flexibility in the use of fighter resources.53 receiving the staff attention that they required, and that the establishment of a distinct training group was warranted. Therefore, 14 Training Group was created he Base Structure and given responsibility for establishing T Air Command training policy and control- While Air Command was organized largely ling all training units, except for the along the functional lines traditionally operational training squadrons which used by air forces, there was an organi- remained under their respective group’s zational anomaly—the base. Positioned control. Coincident with the formation of between the group level and the squadrons this new group, the Central Flying School and units, commanders of Air Command was re-established as the centre of excel- bases were directly responsible to Air lence for flying training methods and the Command for the effective and efficient central Air Command training standard- operation of their bases, and they were ization body. As an economy measure, 14 also responsive to the appropriate group Training Group was disbanded in 1994 commander(s) for the operational readi- and responsibility for control of all air ness of the squadrons and units assigned training reverted back to Air Command to their bases. Since only Air Command Headquarters. Headquarters was established with the requisite administrative and technical A third major change to Air Command’s support staff to address the needs of organization occurred in July 1982 when the bases, the administrative chain of Air Defence Group was disbanded and command went from Air Command replaced by a new formation, Fighter directly to the base commanders by- Group. This new group took over respon- passing the group headquarters. However, sibility for the air defence and air sover- the operational chain of command went eignty functions of the former Air Defence from Air Command directly to the group 66 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

commanders, and then to the individual reorganization was strongly influenced by units, effectively bypassing the base changes in the world security situation commanders. This split chain of command which are described next. was reflected in the early Air Command organizational diagrams where bases were depicted as reporting directly to Air Command Headquarters, while individual units were aligned under the groups to estructuring in 9931 54 R which they were assigned. – The Wing Concept The Air Command base alignment was In part to accommodate the significant consistent with CF organizational policy, reductions in personnel and equipment which was partially derived from the brought about by declining defence RCAF “station” model. For a number of budgets, Air Command initiated planning reasons the CF base structure initially for a major reorganization in 1992. The adopted by Air Command became a most significant aspect of this reorganiza- major irritant to senior Air Command tion was to be the introduction of “wing” personnel. Base commanders were gener- formations throughout the Command. ally dissatisfied with their exclusion This reorganization initiative, based on from the operational chain of command, the wing structure, was approved by the while group commanders were concerned Minister of National Defence effective with their limited ability to influence the 1 April 1993. A commemorative booklet prioritization of support functions by base issued at the time pronounced the reor- commanders, who were not in their chain ganization to be an event of historic of command. To correct these deficiencies significance: “A new chapter has thus been and to bring the organization more in line opened in the rich history of Canada’s with the original RCAF “station” model, military aviation.”56 While perhaps of a minor reorganization was undertaken in historical significance, the operational 1976, which resulted in all operational Air Command bases (excluding training bases) relevance of this major reorganization was being assigned to the most appropriate less apparent. 55 group. The wing had long been a recognized This revised base alignment introduced structure in Canadian air force organiza- a number of organizational inconsisten- tions, first appearing in 1919 with the cies, and continued to be a source of creation of 1 Canadian Wing of the RAF. dissatisfaction. While bases were now It reappeared in various configurations assigned to the air groups, all units at during the Second World War, the post- a base did not necessarily belong to the war reorganization, the unification period group to which the base was assigned. and ultimately during the stand-up of Air For example, CFB Comox was assigned to Command. In each of these iterations, MAG, but supported flying units belonging the wing was an operational organiza- to MAG, ADG and ATG. As a result, base tion, comprising two or more squadrons, commanders could now find themselves usually tasked for the same function (i.e., included in several operational chains air transport, air defence, etc.) and under of command, with competing demands the command of a single commander. from the group commanders concerned. Squadrons comprising a wing might be Although formalized in Air Command assigned to the same base; however, the orders, the role of the base commander primary consideration in establishing in the operational chain of command was wings was command and control efficiency, still not in accordance with CF Organiza- not squadron location. Historically, not all tion Orders, nor was it consistent with air force squadrons were assigned to a wing the original Air Command organizational organization, hence the wing structure concept. These organizational inconsisten- was not originally intended to be a distinct cies remained unresolved until 1992, when level of command, applied across an air the decision was made to reorganize Air force structure, but an organizational Command in accordance with a “wing” expedient designed to accommodate force organizational structure. This next major employment realities. 67 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

Fighter Group Air Transport Group Maritime Air Group 10 Tactical Air Group Air Command Headquarters

5 Wing (Goose Bay)

18 Wing 19 Wing (Edmonton) 3 Wing 9 Wing (Comox) (Bagotville) (Gander) 4 Wing (Cold Lake) 11 Wing (St-Hubert)

1 Wing (Montreal)

7 Wing (Ottawa) 16 Wing 22 Wing (St-Jean) (North Bay)

8 Wing 15 Wing (Trenton) 12 Wing (Moose Jaw) (Shearwater) 17 Wing 14 Wing (Winnipeg) 2 Wing (Greenwood) (Toronto)

Figure 3-6 – Air Command Wing Structure

The 1993 Air Command “wing” reorga- services to units assigned to it. This nization was undertaken to address the support focus did not align with Air ongoing concerns of senior air force officers Command’s view that the primary with the CF base structure, in particular role of an air base was to conduct air with the largely administrative role operations. assigned to air force base commanders and  their lack of involvement in operations. CF organizational orders placed the Although the post-unification CF organi- commander of an air base outside zational structure was generally patterned the operational chain of command. on the RCAF model, with CF “bases” Air Command considered that base replacing RCAF “stations,” the principal commanders were essential command elements in the operational chain of support function of the CF base was command and that the organizational contentious among some senior air force structure should reflect that opera- personnel from the time Air Command was tional role. first established. As noted in the “Master Implementation Plan for the Wing  The CF base concept was an impedi- Concept,” “the underlying philosophy ment to the efficient management of of a ‘base’ as defined in Canadian Forces resources at an air base because Air Organization Orders (CFOOs) has always Command felt the base commander been foreign and inappropriate to Air should be the focal point for command Command.” 57 at an air force base with the authority, responsibility and accountability for From the Air Command perspective at the both operations and support. time, there were five distinct but related problems associated with the CF base  The CF base concept inherently sepa- structure: rated the “operations” and “support” functions. It failed to recognize that  CF organizational orders established support to operations at an air base the role of the base as providing is an integral and vital part of air accommodation and support operations. 68 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

 CF base nomenclature did not reflect base-related terminology (branches, the operational character of an air sections). force base, nor the air force team concept. For the majority of CF  Internal organizational changes were members, the term “base” equated introduced, including the incorpora- to “support,” which was perceived to tion of aircraft maintenance within have little direct relationship to air the operations function. 58 force “operations.” As originally constituted in 1993, the Air To redress these organizational deficien- Command wing structure, illustrated in cies, Air Command initiated a command- Figure 3-6, reflected the following numer- wide reorganization, based on a universal ical designation and group assignment of “wing” structure. The reorganization wings: was to be accomplished by creating 17  Fighter Group numbered wings, primarily by superim- - 3 Wing (Bagotville), posing a “wing” structure over the existing 4 Wing (Cold Lake), 5 Wing (Goose base organizations. The objective was Bay), and 22 Wing (North Bay); to create an organization in which one  Air Transport Group - 7 Wing individual would be “double-hatted” as (Ottawa), 8 Wing (Trenton), 9 Wing both Wing Commander (WComd) and (Gander) and 18 Wing (Edmonton); Base Commander (BComd), and that individual would have clear authority,  Maritime Air Group - 12 Wing (Shear- responsibility and accountability for both water), 14 Wing (Greenwood) and the operational role of the wing, as well as 19 Wing (Comox); for the continuing support role of the base. Within the new Air Command structure,  10 Tactical Air Group - 1 Wing the generic role assigned to a wing was: (Montreal), 2 Wing (Toronto) and “to provide ready air forces to carry out 11 Wing (St-Hubert); and operational missions and tasks or, in some  Air Command Headquarters - 15 Wing instances, to conduct training. Within (Moose Jaw), 16 Wing (St-Jean), and the wing, the role of the base remains to 17 Wing (Winnipeg). provide support.” 59 To assist the WComd in executing their The underlying principle for the new operational and administrative responsi- wing structure was thus “one wing, one bilities, a standardized wing structure was boss,” with the WComd responsible for also to be established. Although each wing conducting air operations, while main- structure could vary somewhat according taining authority over all those support to its composition, role and size, all wings functions and resources essential to the would include four principal branches, successful execution of air operations. generally mirroring those in Air Command The “wing” reorganization introduced Headquarters. Each branch was to be four principal changes to the existing Air under the direction of a senior officer of Command structure: LCol or Maj rank:  All Air Command units and elements  Wing Operations Officer (W Ops O) at a location, including the base – responsible to the WComd for the where applicable, were assigned to a efficient and effective conduct of numbered wing, which in turn was operations; assigned to the appropriate group.  Wing Logistics Officer (W Log O)  The commander of an air force instal- – responsible to the WComd for the lation was designated a formation effective and efficient conduct of logis- commander (the Wing Commander), tics functions; and was placed in the operational chain of command.  Wing Administration Officer (W Adm O) – responsible to the  Wing nomenclature (squadrons, WComd for the efficient and effective flights) was introduced to replace CF

69 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

provision of personnel administration an operational posture which facilitated and personnel services functions; and, transfer of operational control to user commands. The administrative chain of  Wing Comptroller (W Compt) command ran from Air Command to the – responsible to the WComd for finan- bases and then to the units, an adminis- cial, establishment and information trative posture which accommodated the technology functions. absence of administrative staffs in the Within the wing organization, the W Ops group headquarters. Double-hatting base O was to be considered to be “first commanders as wing commanders not amongst equals” of the commanding offi- only added the base commander to the cers of units in the wing. For day-to-day operational chain of command, but also operational matters the unit COs would required that group commanders become report to the W Ops O, who was respon- more actively involved in administra- sible for coordinating the wing’s response tive issues, activities for which they were to meet assigned tasks. However, unit COs neither staffed nor specifically accountable. would continue to have direct access to the WComd for non-operational matters. The wing reorganization effectively added To enhance the team effort in conducting a level of command, which was neither air operations, all aircraft maintenance required nor consistent with CF organi- activities were consolidated under the zational principles. It created two levels purview of the W Ops O, either directly as of formations (groups and wings) below independent maintenance organizations or the Air Command level, with little if any as a distinct maintenance component of an operational benefit. Since there was limited operational squadron. “operational authority” to spread around, if group commanders were already dele- Although widely acclaimed by senior gated “operational command” over units airmen at the time, in retrospect the wing assigned to their group, the extent of oper- structure reorganization seemed more pre- ational authority they might subsequently occupied with addressing perceptions than delegate to the wing commanders below with reality.60 The underlying objective them was debatable. For those groups that centered on enhancing the operational role transferred operational control of their (and perceived importance) of air force units to user commands, the operational base commanders; however, the correlation role of the wing commander was problem- with increasing operational effectiveness atic. Certainly when Air Command units was never made. The secondary objective were deployed on expeditionary opera- was a somewhat abstract undertaking tions, since the (home) base commander to enhance intrinsic bonds between was outside the in-theatre operational “operators” and “support” personnel at chain of command, the role of the (home) a base. These objectives might well have base commander in the command and been accomplished through less drastic control of deployed units was unclear. measures than imposing a “wing” structure throughout the Command. As few Superimposing a wing structure on changes were made to the Air Command or existing base organizations also created group headquarters structures to accom- a regionally-based wing structure, which modate the new wing structure, anomalies did not align with the existing function- were introduced to the original organiza- ally-based group structure. The units tional concept. comprising the newly created wings were merely those currently assigned Within the Air Command structure, the to the base; hence, there was no func- air groups had been established as operational consistency to the wing organizational formations, with little responsibility tion. Although each wing was nominally (or staff) for administration, while Air assigned to a functional air group, the Command Headquarters was established individual units assigned to a particular to handle most administrative matters. wing might well belong to different groups. Accordingly, the operational chain of For example, a CF18 squadron belonging command extended from Air Command to Fighter Group, but based at a Mari- through the groups to the individual units, time Air Group base and hence part of 70 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

that wing (e.g., 19 Wing Comox), would To implement these directed changes, seemingly be operationally responsible to the Department of National Defence the Commander MAG, while operational established a Management Command and taskings would emanate from NORAD/ Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT). Fighter Group HQ, and be directed only to This team consisted of 110 personnel the squadron. devoted to re-engineering activities in all major sectors of the Department. From The Air Command assertion that “the 1995 to 1997 the MCCRT conducted primary role of a base is to conduct air an end-to-end review of management operations” is a simplistic conceptualiza- processes and organizations with a target tion with limited application. Air opera- of reducing the resources dedicated to tions are executed by operational air units headquarters (NDHQ) by 50 percent, well (flying squadrons), which may or may not above the one third reduction mandated by be carried out from a particular air base. government. The team ceased its 30‑month The degree of base involvement with air effort in June 1997, when the remaining operations is directly dependent on the renewal responsibilities were transferred to functions being executed. For example, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.62 for tactical aviation (helicopter) units and shipborne maritime air detachments, As part of the MCCRT process, each of bases in Canada are of little operational the CF commands was given responsi- relevance. For other aerospace functions, bility for conducting companion reviews. including air transport and tactical air The Air Force Command and Control (fighter) operations, air bases can have Reengineering Team (AFCCRT) was significantly more relevance, but focussed therefore established, with a mandate to primarily in the context of providing dramatically reduce resource levels associ- support and protection rather than ated with the headquarters function of the command and control. air force, from a baseline defined by the MCCRT in NDHQ. The objective was to Not long after Air Command had reorga- replace the existing air force headquarters nized according to the “wing” principle, structures with a fully process re-engi- another major reorganization effort was neered, operationally effective command required based on a government mandated and control structure, but with 50 percent CF-wide reorganization. fewer personnel. The foundation for this re-engineering project was the five “core processes” identified by the AFCCRT: strategic direction, force employment, estructuring in 9971 force generation (personnel), force genera- R tion (materiel) and corporate services. These were based on, but not identical to, – the MCCRT the four core processes developed and used In response to the recommendations of by the MCCRT: strategic direction, force the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s employment, force generation and corpo- Defence Policy, the 1994 White Paper rate services. After a lengthy research announced that a new streamlined CF and planning period, new air force stra- command and control structure, based tegic and operational level headquarters on sound military command and control structures were developed, approved, and principles, would be put into place by formally established in June 1997.63 mid-1997, and that, to respond to the need to increase the proportion of operational In implementing the AFCCRT plan, Air personnel in the downsized CF, head- Command Headquarters and the four quarters staff were to be reduced by “at group headquarters were disbanded and least one third.” Under this structure, the replaced by a streamlined command and command of military operations would control structure. This new structure continue to be exercised by the Chief consisted of an “operational-level”64 of the Defence Staff, normally through headquarters in Winnipeg, 1 Canadian Air a designated operational commander, Division (abbreviated as 1 CAD at the time but one layer of headquarters was to be and now abbreviated as 1 Cdn Air Div) eliminated.61 which incorporated Canadian NORAD 71 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

Region Headquarters and was formally  Flight Safety, designated 1 CAD/CANR HQ, and a “strategic-level” staff organization to support  Air Personnel Management and the newly created Chief of the Air Staff Services, position. This new staff, harkening back  Air Civilian Management Services, and to RCAF and RAF tradition, was called the Air Staff, and was to be embedded  Air Reserves. in the MCCRT-redesigned NDHQ structure in Ottawa. Although the Command Headquarters in Winnipeg was disbanded, Air Command continued to exist as a Canadian Air major constituent of the Canadian Forces 1 under command of the Chief of the Air Staff. The former headquarters facility in Division HQ Winnipeg, the Bishop Building, was used Under this new structure, the operational to accommodate the staff of the new 1 control of Air Command forces was dele- CAD/CANR HQ. gated to the Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division headquartered in Winnipeg. Tactical control of air force units was delegated to the 13 wings, equivalent elements he Air Staff at NDHQ and units that comprise 1 Cdn Air Div. The T Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters Under this new structure, strategic-level (CANR) was integrated into the head- direction and command of Air Command quarters in Winnipeg as the Commander was vested in the Chief of the Air Staff, of 1 Cdn Air Div (MGen) also commands who was located in NDHQ and who the CANR and is supported by a Deputy had two distinct mandates: (1) to act as Commander (NORAD Region – a BGen senior advisor to the Chief of the Defence USAF). 1 Cdn Air Div HQ was organized Staff on air force issues; and (2) to be according to the continental staff system, Commander of Air Command. The Chief and includes seven main staff divisions, of the Air Staff (LGen) heads the Air headed by officers of varying ranks: Staff which includes three general officers, an Assistant Chief of the Air Staff  A1 - Personnel and Training (BGen), (MGen), a Director General Air Personnel  (BGen) and a Director General Air Force A2 - Intelligence (LCol), Development (BGen). The rest of the Air  A3 - Operations (BGen), Staff comprises 13 functional directorates, headed primarily by officers of colonel  A4 - Support (BGen), rank (or civilian equivalent), and includes:  A5 - Review and Corporate Services  Air Public Affairs, (Col),  Air Strategic Plans,  A6 - Telecom and Information Services (LCol), and  Air Force Employment,  A7 - Plans and Doctrine (Col).  Air Requirements,  Air Comptrollership and Business Management, ing Headquarters  Air Personnel Production and W Part of the AFCCRT mandate was to Development, determine if, in developing the new  Air Programs, command and control structure, discon- nects with the wings had been introduced.  Air Staff Coordination, It was also tasked to determine the most effective means for the new structure  Air Staff Operational Research, to interface with the wings and ensure optimum generation of mission ready 72 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

air forces. One proposed initiative in this “A‑staff ” designations (A1, A2, etc.), regard was to create “A-staffs,” based on which were not part of the AFCCRT the original 1 CAD HQ model, at each of project. the wings to ensure consistent points of entry for operations-related activities. The Most surprising in this reorganization AFCCRT team was dismantled before this process is the absence of any evidence of initiative was completed, and most wings the application of the air force dictum continued to function with the four-branch of “centralized control and decentral- organization introduced with the 1993 ized execution” in the design of the new “wing” reorganization. command and control structure. This was deemed to be the overriding consideration in the design of the original Air Command / group structure in 1975, but it seems to Critique of the have been ignored in the AFCCRT rede- A signed structure. There is also no evidence of any distinction between the operational AFCCRT and administrative chains of command Considerable effort was expended by in this new structure. In the original Air AFCCRT in studying and re-engineering Command structure, the group headquar- the air force command and control struc- ters were only in the operational chain ture; however, the result has a number of command; however, in the AFCCRT of organizational inconsistencies. For version of this structure 1 Cdn Air Div HQ example, AFCCRT identified five “core is effectively in both. Since Air Command processes” as the foundation of the re- and its subordinate formation 1 Cdn Air engineering effort, but the correlation Div are essentially the same organization, between these and the command and a natural division of responsibility and control structure produced by AFCCRT is authority between their commanders is not readily apparent. If the five AFCCRT not readily apparent. Although the terms processes were indeed “core” to the air “strategic” and “operational” are used to force’s day-to-day operation, then the describe the mandates of the two head- organizational precept of “departmen- quarters, it is unclear whether 1 Cdn Air talization” would dictate that these Div HQ is intended to be an “operational- processes should form the basis of the air level” headquarters or whether it is an force command and control organization. “operational” headquarters in the sense of In effect, there should be five principal a headquarters that directs the conduct of branches in the headquarters, each respon- operations.66 sible for overseeing one of the “core” processes, i.e., Director Strategic Direc- Furthermore, while the former Air tion, Director Force Employment, etc. Command structure reflected the importance of the major operational air force Yet this approach was not taken, and functions, as embodied in the functional neither the 1 CAD HQ “A-staff” structure group headquarters structures, the nor the NDHQ/Chief of the Air Staff AFCCRT-designed headquarters almost (CAS) organization was aligned with the totally ignores them. The operational five AFCCRT core processes. (It should be functions (air transport, SAR, etc.) are the noted that Air Command was not alone primary “outputs” of the air force, and, in this practice, as NDHQ did not reorga- therefore authority and responsibility for nize around the “core” MCCRT processes their provision should be readily identified either.) While the Air Staff structure in at all levels of the Air Command organiza- Ottawa includes some AFCCRT termi- tion. Within the Air Staff, however, there is nology, the organizational model is not no identifiable staff accountability for any directly derived from its core processes. of the air functions, while within 1 Cdn The new 1 Cdn Air Div HQ organization, Air Div HQ, only the A3 Ops Readiness on the other hand, seems to be essentially division has discrete sections dedicated to a “slimmed-down” version of the former each of the air functions. In the absence of Air Command HQ structure, overlaid formal organizational structures focussed with a modified version of an air force on functional capabilities, the Air Force “continental” staff system,65 employing has instituted two ad hoc constructs to 73 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

mitigate this omission: the Air Force Capa-  AF 4 - Air Mobility. Provide routine, bility Framework (AFCF) and Capability and when directed surge, air transport Advisory Groups (CAGs).67 services in support of CF operations at home and worldwide.  AF 5 - Support to National Interests. Provide on-demand search, rescue, he Air Force emergency and utility airlift, juris- T dictional, and air support services in Capability Framework concert with other government agen- At the same time as the Air Force disman- cies and in support of the national tled its functionally-based group structure, well-being and interests within Canada it introduced the Air Force Capability and internationally as required. 68 Framework. First promulgated in the Air  AF 6 - Contingency Support. Provide Command 1996-2001 Business Plan, this specialized air wing support services was primarily a construct to explain how for the collective defence of North the Air Force would structure and prepare America and for CF operations itself for the delivery of air power. It was worldwide. designed to capture the entire spectrum of Air Force operational and support activi- The three support capabilities were: ties and outputs. The AFCF also provided the framework for producing all air force  SC 1 - Command and Control. Operate business plans, and formed the output base a command structure which can line for activity-based costing and resource manage and control all allocated and management across the air force. As such, assigned formations, units and other the AFCF was the single most important elements in the execution of their element of the business planning and respective missions alone or as part of resource management methodology in the a joint headquarters formation, and air force.69 can participate in collective defence arrangements of North America or CF The AFCF was comprised of six opera- operations worldwide. tional capabilities, AFs 1-6, and three support capabilities, SCs 1-3. The six  SC 2 - Force Generation. Operate a operational capabilities were:70 personnel training, infrastructure, and equipment generation capability  AF 1 - Aerospace Control. Provide that yields a capable fighting force national aerospace surveillance, employing assigned resources in the enforcement, offensive air capabilities, execution of their mission elements air-to-air refuelling, and management, in the defence of Canada’s territorial which contribute to the collective sovereignty, the collective defence of defence arrangements of Canada, North America and for CF operations North America and CF operations worldwide. worldwide.  SC 3 - Mandated Programs. Execute a  AF 2 - Air Support to Maritime variety of cross-capability, long-term Component. Provide air support to the activities and short-term initiatives maritime component for the enforce- over the planning period as directed by ment of Canada’s sovereignty over its the Government, NDHQ or as initi- maritime approaches, for the collective ated by Air Command. maritime defence of North America and for CF operations worldwide. The AFCF was first developed in 1995, at approximately the same time as the  AF 3 - Air Support to Land Component. AFCCRT was first established, and yet Provide air support to the land compo- it appears that its use was restricted to nent for the enforcement of Canada’s the business planning process. There is no territorial sovereignty, the collective indication that the AFCF was in any way land defence of North America and for incorporated into the AFCCRT plan- CF operations worldwide. ning deliberations or any evidence that 74 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

it influenced the final design of the new  Aerospace Control Advisory Group Air Command Headquarters structure. (ACAG) – Related to the conduct and Although there may be some debate on the sustainment of aerospace control oper- specific terminology associated with some ations (to include space operations). of the capabilities included in the AFCF, the construct of operational and support  Training Advisory Group (TrgAG) “capabilities” presented in the AFCF – Related to the conduct and delivery appears far more relevant to establishing of training and development activi- an appropriate command and control ties not forming part of other air force structure for the air force than do the capabilities. “core processes” identified by the AFCCRT.  Air Reserve Advisory Group (ARAG) – Related to Reserve issues not forming part of other air force capabilities.  Air Combat Support Advisory Group (ACSAG) – Related to the provision of apability Advisory security, medical, airfield engineering C and logistics support, and command, Groups control and communications opera- With the dissolution of the group struc- tions. Note: In 2003 the A3, 1 Cdn ture in 1997, an informal approach to the Air Division directed that the term governance of the Air Force’s functional Support Capability Advisory Group communities evolved in the form of a (Sp CAG) be used instead of ACSAG.72 number of ad hoc, community/capability- based advisory groups. In line with the The mandate of the CAGs at the time was formalization of the governance structure to provide a recognized mechanism for at the Air Staff level, the development community/capability-based leadership of authoritative terms of reference for consultation and decision making, and to these Capability Advisory Groups (CAGs) enhance the promulgation of direction was undertaken at 1 Cdn Air Div HQ to in support of the Commander 1 Cdn Air formalize their activity, and to ensure that Div. The CAGs supplemented and comple- appropriate linkages and communication mented existing staffing and associated existed between all levels of command and processes by enabling focussed discussion control.71 and decision making by subject matter experts in each of the capability areas. As mandated by 1 Cdn Air Div Orders, the The CAGs had, and still have, three main following eight CAGs were established: areas of interest: personnel, capability  Fighter Capability Advisory Group issues and directed issues. (FCAG) – Related to the conduct and It is noteworthy that, with the excep- sustainment of fighter operations. tion of the Sp CAG, this listing of CAGs  Maritime Air Advisory Group (MAAG) replicates the former functional group – Related to the conduct and structure and closely resembles the sustainment of long-range patrol and capabilities described in the AFCF. This maritime helicopter operations. suggests that there is an inherent “functional” bias in the day to day functioning  Air Mobility Advisory Group (AMAG) of the Air Force, which is not reflected – Related to the conduct and in the AFCCRT-developed headquarters sustainment of transport and search structure. Therefore, in the absence of an and rescue operations. effective functional organizational struc-  Tactical Aviation Advisory Group ture, matrix organizations and frameworks (TAvnAG) – Related to the conduct have been developed to advance functional and sustainment of tactical aviation issues within the headquarters. operations. 75 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

Leversedge has argued, the Air Force’s ystemic Problems strategic planning process “has suffered S from a chronic shortage of both resources with Air Force Re- and procedural rigour [and]…The current NDHQ construct and internal division of organization and responsibilities creates further problems, which compound the existing Air Force Transformation process difficulties.”77 Throughout the period covered by this section, the Air Throughout the 30 years covered by this Force was further handicapped because section, there have been systemic problems it was incapable of producing any mean- that have impeded Air Force re-organization and transformation efforts. First of ingful doctrine to address the challenges all, despite a series of strategic planning it faced. In one notable effort to address and change initiatives over the past 20 the doctrinal problem, the Commander of years, the Air Force has been unable to Air Command, Lieutenant General Paul bring any of them to fruition in a coherent Manson, convened an Air Doctrine Sympo- and effective way.73 Rather, change, as we sium at Canadian Forces Base Trenton have seen, was ad hoc and in reaction to in January 1984. However, it achieved various pressures. very little of a concrete nature, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, attending as Many of these ad hoc change processes an air force officer, criticized the partici- were symptomatic to the CF as a whole pants’ use of self-serving arguments for in this period. As General Ray Henault (a specific doctrine to justify new equipment former Assistance Chief of the Air Staff, acquisitions rather than deal with the Air Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and Force’s fundamental problems.78 Up until Chief of the Defence Staff) observed, 2005 with the creation of the Canadian the CF did not have a responsive lessons Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, the Air learned capability in the 1990s and this hampered the ability of the CF to improve Force has relied on ad hoc methods and its organization, doctrine and procedures.74 temporary working groups “to review This problem was also identified in 2004 and resolve doctrinal issues,” with little 79 by students at the Canadian Forces College success. Finally, Leversedge notes that when they were attempting to research the most recent Air Force transformation recent Canadian Air Force operations. efforts are handicapped by flaws both in They found that information was hard the content and in the process used to to come by and that “[l]essons learned create the latest transformation document, reports concerning operational level issues Strategic Vectors.80 are clearly lacking.”75 While the Air Force was re-structuring Furthermore, during the post-Cold War itself in the post-Cold War era, largely period, the CF C2 structure evolved at in response to budgetary pressures a rapid pace while that structure was and government policy directives, the overseeing ongoing high intensity opera- nature of CF and Air Force operations tions. To add to these challenges, change was changing. For a number of reasons, was carried out in lean times for the CF as not the least of which were the lack of budget cuts in previous years had reduced an effective Air Force (and CF) lessons CF capabilities, and no budget increases learned process and a rigorous doctrine were planned to fund the many new operations that the government committed the development process, the magnitude of CF to undertake in the post-Cold War the change in the nature of operations was world. General Henault described the CF not obvious to those doing the re-struc- change efforts in this era like “changing turing. Nevertheless, the changes occurred, the tires on a moving car.”76 and it is important to understand them because current CF transformation initia- The Canadian Air Force was at a partic- tives are predicated on the reality of CF ular disadvantage compared to the Army and Air Force operations in the current and the Navy in this era because, as “new world disorder.” 76 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

C47 Dakota. In May 1975, 420 Squadron he Air Reserve and was resurrected at Shearwater, subse- T quently moving to Summerside to share 880 Squadron’s Trackers for coastal patrol the Total Force Concept duties. Another Total Force concept, the Throughout the period described above, Air Reserve Augmentation Flight, was the Air Reserve played a vital role as initiated in Moose Jaw in 1975 and then part of the CF air element and later the expanded to all Air Command bases.83 Canadian Air Force. From the 1970s on, the command and control of the Air When Air Command was first established, Reserve underwent a number of significant control of the Air Reserve was exercised changes as a result of the introduction of directly from Air Command Headquar- the “Total Force Concept.” It was formally ters, through the office of the Deputy instituted by the Minister of National Chief of Staff Reserves and Cadets. In Defence in March 1974. National Defence recognition of the increased emphasis on Headquarters subsequently promulgated Reserves in the Total Force structure of Directive D29, which included direction on Air Command, as described above, an Air the expansion of the Air Reserve including Reserve Group was created in 1976, with “twinning” of squadrons, the introduc- headquarters at Winnipeg. Air Reserve tion of new aircraft, the formation of a Group Headquarters exercised adminis- new Air Reserve squadron, the creation trative control of some 950 Air Reserve of Air Reserve Augmentation Flights and personnel; however, operational control changes to the command and control of of units was vested in the commanders of the Air Reserve.81 The Total Force concept operational air groups to which Reserve recognizes that Canada’s total military squadrons were assigned. capability comprises both the full-time Regular military plus the part-time To further enhance the operational capa- Reserves. The Total Force concept does bility of the Air Reserve, Air Command not in itself justify a role or roles for any retired the venerable Otter aircraft, flown particular defence component,82 but it does by a number of Reserve squadrons, in recognize that all components, whatever 1981 and introduced the Kiowa helicopter their structure or size, must be considered into the Reserve squadrons of 1 Wing in when developing defence capabilities. Montreal and 2 Wing in Toronto. After the retirement of the Otter, the two wings Under the “twinning” concept, Air operated equipment compatible with the Reserve units were paired with Regular Regular Force squadrons, and gained an Force units, primarily to give them access operationally active role in support of to the equipment of Regular Force units. Canada’s ground forces. On the support This pairing enhanced the Air Reserve’s side, Nos. 1 and 2 Tactical Aviation ability to augment Regular Force units Support Squadrons (TASS) were formed and eliminated the need to purchase in 1987. These squadrons were composed additional equipment for the Reserves. of one third Regular and two thirds

CC129 DAKOTA CC138 TWIN OTTER Reserve Force personnel. Their role was to In Edmonton 418 Squadron shared provide aircraft maintenance and logis- Twin Otters with 440 Squadron and in tical support to the squadrons of 1 and Winnipeg 402 Squadron was twinned 2 Wings; however, they also provided with the Air Navigation School flying the similar services to Regular Force units 77 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

and to various operations in Canada and Command Headquarters, with responsi- Germany. bility subsequently divided between the Air Staff in Ottawa and 1 Cdn Air Div HQ The new Canadian Defence policy promul- in Winnipeg. gated in 1987 continued to emphasize the Total Force concept, with the Reserve By 1997 it had become evident that the viewed as part of the solution in closing development of the integrated “Total the “commitments-capabilities gap” iden- Force” Air Command establishments had tified in the White Paper. At the time of been started, but had not been completed the 1987 Defence Policy, the establishment or fully implemented. 1 Cdn Air Div HQ of the Air Force comprised 23,050 Regular also expressed concern with the establish- Force positions and 950 Reserve posi- ments in those units that had been created, tions. In an effort to increase operational noting that, “Air Reserve positions, capability, while limiting the increase especially within the Air Reserve Augmen- in personnel costs, most of the growth tation Flight (ARAF) context, have planned to redress the commitments-capa- been informally regulated and in many bilities gap was planned to occur in the instances are seen primarily as ‘office over- Reserves. However, with the post-Cold War load.’ Frequently positions are changed to changes to defence priorities, personnel suit the availability of certain individuals reductions were seen as desirable and or skill sets, rather than to a defined role or possible as a result of the “peace-dividend” mission.” 85 and plans for growth were shelved. To correct this deficiency, the Headquar- In response to the 1994 White Paper, the ters directed that a comprehensive estab- Commander of Air Command sought to lishment review be undertaken and that strengthen the Reserve contribution to appropriate Total Force establishments the Total Force Air Force, and directed his be created. The integrated establishments staff to plan to increase the Air Reserve to were to provide the basis for Air Reserve 3,000 personnel by FY 1999/2000. As part growth plans and for the development and of the increased emphasis on Total Force, authorization of an Air Reserve occupa- the Commander also directed that Air tional structure. The review was to be Reserve and Regular Force personnel be conducted by individual units and inte- fully integrated into Total Force units and grated across the Air Force, employing a that there be a single chain of command. bottom-up approach. The Chief of the Air This was to be accomplished through Staff approved the Air Reserve estab- amalgamation of the Air Reserve Group lishment review in 1998, noting that the Headquarters into the Air Command bottom-up development of the establish- Headquarters and by converting “all Air ment was an important first step, but that Command units to Total Force units with it would be subject to Air Staff review as regular and reserve personnel serving the overall strategic direction for the Air together in integrated establishments.”84 Force evolved. In implementing this direction, three Reserve flying squadrons (Nos. 401, 411 and 418) were disbanded between 1994 and 1996, while No. 420 was “zero-manned” (remaining on the establishment but with no personnel or aircraft assigned to it). In 1996, Nos. 1 and 2 TASS and No. 2 Wing were also disbanded and 1 Wing was CH146 GRIFFON restructured as a Total Force wing. Of the six helicopter squadrons belonging to The mission and roles of the Air Reserves 1 Wing, two (Nos. 400 and 438) were desig- have been studied several times since nated “reserve heavy,” and all squadrons 1995. These studies have formulated received new Griffon helicopters to support and validated numerous principles for army operations. Air Reserve Group the employment of Air Reservists and Headquarters was disbanded in 1996 and provided a number of recommendations control of the Air Reserve returned to Air for the optimal integration of the Air 78 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

Reserve into the Total Force structure. timeframe, in anticipation of a post-Cold However, these recommendations have war “peace dividend,” signalled an end to not been formally validated against the this stability. In an attempt to mitigate evolving Aerospace Capability Framework, the impact of budgetary constraints and nor have Total Force establishments been cuts in personnel and equipment due to created within a comprehensive develop- the anticipated “peace dividend,” Air ment plan. To address these issues, the Command undertook a number of reor- Air Reserve Development Project was ganization initiatives. The first occurred chartered in April 2002 to identify a force in 1993, and centred on implementation structure that would optimize the contri- of the “wing” concept throughout the bution of the Air Reserve within the Total Command. This was accomplished by Force structure of Air Command. This superimposing a “wing” structure on all project is ongoing and it recognizes that existing bases, and appointing (double- the conduct of expeditionary operations hatting) the base commander as wing must be an essential element of any Total commander as well. This reorganization Force structure. established the base commander in the operational chain of command, but also introduced an additional level of command and control. The wing concept enhanced ummary the control of resources at the static S base, but provided little improvement in Air Command was formed in 1975 with the mounting and sustaining expeditionary objective of bringing all CF air element operations. resources under a single commander to address the problem of the disjointed In compliance with 1994 White Paper command and control of the CF air direction that headquarters be reduced element, as well as the lack of a central by at least 33 percent, the MCCRT, which focus for all air operations and doctrine. began in 1997, drove the most significant The organizing principle originally restructuring of the CF and the Air Force adopted by Air Command was similar to in the post-Cold War period. The AFCCRT, the one used by the RCAF and many other a team formed by the Air Force in response air forces and was based on a command to the MCCRT, designed a “streamlined” structure organized by air force functions, command structure, which saw the (e.g., air defence, air transport, maritime disbandment of the four functional groups air, etc.). Therefore, the new Command and the elimination of their headquarters, adopted an organizational structure as well as Air Command Headquarters in comprised of a command headquarters, Winnipeg. The new command structure with subordinate functional air groups. was based on a strategic-level Air Staff This structure minimized headquarters component in NDHQ (with the Chief of resources, and facilitated the transfer the Air Staff [CAS] appointed Commander of operational control of group forces Air Command) and an operational-level to user commands. The major anomaly headquarters – 1 Cdn Air Div Headquar- in this command structure was the base ters in Winnipeg. The wings and units were commander position which was designed unaffected by this reorganization, but in to oversee administrative support to Air the new headquarters construct there was Force units at main operating bases, but little recognition of Air Force functions; was not consistent with the principle of therefore, compensatory capability frame- functionality and was outside the opera- works and Capability Advisory Groups tional chain of command. were established to address functional issues. From 1975 to 1989 Air Command enjoyed a period of relative stability, but change In the post-Cold War period, while the in the defence and security environment, CF’s resources (budget and its personnel beginning with détente and the end of strength) were cut by about 20 percent, the Cold War, necessitated a revised the number of its personnel deployed defence policy. Major reductions in Air on operations increased threefold. This Command’s establishment, force structure organizational and personnel stress has and operating budget in the post-1990 had severe negative impacts on the CF in 79 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

general and the Air Force in particular. In Throughout the period described in this the 1990s, when the CF was reduced by chapter, the lack of coherent Air Force about 20 percent of its Regular Force mili- doctrine above the tactical level, particu- tary personnel, the Air Force was reduced larly doctrine related to command and by 48 percent. The cumulative effects of control, has led to a series of ad hoc, expe- all these factors diminished the Air Force’s dient changes to the structure of Canada’s capability to the point where it could no air forces. In this era, without any over- longer maintain the current tempo of arching model of command and control, operations let alone sustain the long-term a detailed understanding of historical health of the force. models of air force command and control, or the ability to consistently apply During the almost 40 years covered by this modern theories of command and control, chapter, there have been systemic prob- the Canadian Air Force was burdened lems that have impeded Air Force change with disjointed, often dysfunctional, C2 efforts resulting in ad hoc responses to arrangements whose legacy continues to change requirements. Many of these ad plague the Canadian Air Force to this day. hoc change processes were symptomatic to the CF as a whole in this period, and included the lack of an effective lessons learned capability, reduced CF capabilities, and high operational tempo. The sum of these problems, plus chronic problems with the Air Force change process, has hindered the Air Force’s ability to deal effectively with recent challenges. For example, post-Cold War Air Force organizational structures have shown little evidence of addressing command and control issues created by the increased emphasis on expeditionary operations or of implementing the new CF force employment concepts. However, Air Command recognized deficiencies in providing appropriate support forces to sustain expeditionary operations, and changes to the posture of air force support capabilities were initiated. These included the initial development of the Contingency Capability and subsequently the development of the Air Force Support Concept. But progress in this area has been hampered by the dearth of appropriate doctrine and by the absence of any policy guidance on expeditionary operations. While the Air Force’s current (it was released in 2004) vision document, Stra- tegic Vectors, identifies expeditionary capability as one of the components of its transformation goals, the strategy and the detailed plan for achieving this “expeditionary” vision have yet to be provided. This has led to a situation where a significant number of Air Force personnel who had been involved in recent expeditionary operations perceived that there was a lack of effective leadership in some parts of the Air Force. 80 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

ndnotes E 1 This chapter is based on English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, Chapters 2-4. 2 A description of the relationship of major leadership functions to levels of conflict and command can be found in Leadership in the CF, 11-12. 3 W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 372. 4 C.P. Stacey, A Date with History. Ottawa: Deneau, (1982), 257. 5 These issues are discussed in more detail in Major Anne Loesch, et al., “The Development of Air Force Operational Commanders,” in Douglas L. Erlandson and Allan English, eds., Air Force Command and Control (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2002), 40-1. 6 English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 24-30. 7 As explained in the Introduction, the usage of the terms “leadership” and “command” here reflects the inter-relationships and interconnectedness of these terms, as explained in Leadership in the CF, 10. 8 Douglas L. Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2 Defence Organization (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, 1998), 74. 9 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964), 5-21. 10 White Paper on Defence, 19. 11 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University. of Toronto Press, 1999), 236-7; citation from White Paper on Defence, 19. 12 White Paper on Defence, 21. 13 Samuel Kostenuk and John Griffin, RCAF Squadrons and Aircraft 1924-1968 (Toronto: Stevens, Hakkert and Co., 1977), 148. 14 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2, 116. 15 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2, 93-8. 16 Canada, DND, Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, Volume 1, 3.20 – 3.23. Available at http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qr_o/vol1/intro_e.asp. 17 Canada, DND, Organization Concept for the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1967), 9-10. 18 Ibid., 11. 19 Ibid., 12. 20 These issues are described in detail in English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 36-40. 21 S.L. James, “The Formation of Air Command: A Struggle for Survival,” unpublished MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, 1989, 59. 22 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2, 121. 23 John Grodzinski, “Force Mobile Command: The Early Years,” Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 3, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 1. Available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/CAJ/ default_e.asp?view=more&issueID=19 24 Grodzinski, “Force Mobile Command,” 2. 25 “Double-hatted” refers to the organizational practice whereby one individual fills two distinct but related positions in an organization. One is usually a senior staff position, the other a command appointment. 26 Grodzinski, “Force Mobile Command,” 2. 27 See Gosselin, “Unification and the Strong Service Idea,” in English, et al., eds.,The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts, 129-200, for a detailed discussion of how the strong service idea contributed to the “disintegration” of the CF. 81 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements

28 Leo Pettipas, “Tactical Air Power and Canadian Naval Aviation, 1946-1962,” in William March and Robert Thompson, eds. The Evolution of Air Power in Canada, Vol. 2. (Winnipeg, MB: Air Command History and Heritage, 1998),122. 29 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2, 123. 30 James, “The Formation of Air Command,” 33. 31 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Vol. 2, 125. 32 Ibid., 126. 33 Ibid., 127. 34 Ibid., 125. 35 Larry Milberry, Sixty Years: The RCAF and CF Air Command, 1924-84 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1984), 340. 36 DND, Defence in the 70’s (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1971), 35. 37 Milberry, Sixty Years, 391. 38 Canada, Canadian Forces, Air Command, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces (Winnipeg, Kelman and Associates, 1997), 35-6. 39 K.R. Pennie, “The Impact of Unification on the Air Force,” in William March and Robert Thompson, eds. The Evolution of Air Power in Canada, Vol. 1 (Winnipeg, MB: Air Command History and Heritage), 1997, 108. 40 James, “The Formation of Air Command,” 35. 41 Pennie, “The Impact of Unification on the Air Force,” 108-109. 42 James, “The Formation of Air Command,” 73. 43 Ibid., 80. 44 Ibid., 82. 45 Ibid., 101. 46 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), “The National Defence family,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about/family_e.asp (accessed May 4, 2005). 47 In addition to Regular Force personnel cuts, the Air Force was cut so that it had 69 percent fewer civilian employees, 56 percent fewer aircraft and 59 percent fewer flying hours than in 1989. DND, The Aerospace Capability Framework, 45, available at http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/ site/vision/acf_e.asp. (accessed October 17, 2007). 48 DND, “Today’s Air Force, General Information,” http://www.airforce.forces.ca/today5_ e.asp (accessed May 4, 2005). 49 LGen Ken Pennie, Chief of Air Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Issue 11 - Evidence, 7 February 2005. Available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/ senate/Com-e/defe-e/11eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76 (accessed October 17, 2007). 50 Stephen Thorne, “Military money too little, too late: Money in federal budget likely not enough for overstretched military,” Halifax Herald (25 April 2005) http://www.herald.ns.ca/ stories/2005/04/25/fCanada112.raw.html (accessed April 26, 2005). 51 Figure from DND, Defence Policy Statement (19 April 2005) http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/ reports/dps/pdf/dps_e.pdf , 7, (accessed May 1, 2005). 52 Milberry, Sixty Years, 392. 53 Milberry, Sixty Years, 392. 54 Annex A to “Air Command Organization,” 1901-3 (SSO O&E) dated 25 March 1987. 55 Annex B to “Air Command Organization,” 1901-3 (SSO O&E) dated 25 March 1987. 56 Canada, Air Command, “Commemorative Booklet – The Formation of Wings in Air Command,” (Winnipeg: Air Command Headquarters, 1993), 1.

82 The Origins of Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements C h a p t e r 3

57 Canada, Air Command, “Master Implementation Plan for the Wing Concept,” (Winnipeg: Air Command Headquarters, 1993), p. 1-1. 58 Ibid., p. 1-2. 59 Ibid., p. 2-1. 60 In discussing the proposed change, the Commander, LGen David Huddleston stated that: “I view the change as critical to the revitalization of the air force’s self image.” David Huddleston, “Canada’s Air Force – Moving Ahead” (Winnipeg: Air Command Headquarters, 1992), 5. 61 DND, 1994 White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: DND, 1994), Chapter 7. 62 Canada, Report of the Auditor General (Ottawa, December 2000), para 32.46. For a more detailed analysis of the MCCRT see G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post- Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces, 11-17. 63 Canada, Air Command, “Flight Plan 97 - Executive Summary” (Winnipeg: Air Command Headquarters, 1997), 3. 64 Whether or not 1 Canadian Air Division is actually an operational-level headquarters is open to debate. See Allan English, “The Operational Art,” in English, et al., eds., The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts, 6-7 for a discussion of this issue. 65 The continental staff system is organized into six principal functions: Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), Logistics (G-4), Plans (G-5) and Communications (G-6). DND, Canadian Forces Doctrine Development, A-AE-025-000/FP-001 (Ottawa: NDHQ, J7 DLLS 2, 2003), p.1-13. 66 For a discussion of differences in the use of the word “operational” in this context see English, “The Operational Art,” 6-7. 67 CAGs are also referred to as to as “Air Warfare Communities.” 68 The AFCF is also referred to as the “Air Force Capability Structure” in some publications. 69 “Air Force Level 1 Business Plan 2001” (Ottawa: Chief of the Air Staff, 2001), Annex A. 70 As originally promulgated in the “Air Command 1996-2001 Business Plan” (Winnipeg: Air Command Headquarters, April 1996), 3. Descriptions have been modified over time. 71 DND, 1 Canadian Air Division Orders, Vol. 1, “Capability Advisory Groups – Terms of Reference,” p. 1-624. 72 Source for the note is a communication from LCol Marty Playford to Col John Westrop (Retired), September 2006. 73 T.F.J. Leversedge, “Transforming Canada’s Air Force: Creating a Strategic Planning Process,” in Allan D. English, ed., Air Campaigns in the New World Order, Silver Dart Canadian Aerospace Studies Series, Vol. 2 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2005), 130-1. BGen Leversedge wrote this essay when he was a student on the National Security Studies Course. 74 General R.R. Henault, Brigadier-General (retired) Joe Sharpe and Allan English, “Operational-Level Leadership and Command in the CF – General Henault and the DCDS Group at the Beginning of the ‘New World Order,’” in Allan English, ed., Leadership and Command and the Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, in press). General Henault served in a number of important positions in NDHQ during this period including ACAS, DCDS, and CDS. 75 Rachel Lea Heide, “Canadian Air Operations in the New World Order,” in Allan D. English, ed., Air Campaigns in the New World Order, Silver Dart Canadian Aerospace Studies Series, Vol. 2 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2005), 79. 76 Allan English and Joe Sharpe, “Lessons Learned from the Perspective of a Chief of the Defence Staff,” Bravo Defence vol. 5 (Summer 2005), 13. Available at http://www.vcds.forces. gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/bravo/summer05/lessonslearned_e.asp. 77 Leversedge, “Transforming Canada’s Air Force,” 148. 78 General G.C.E. Thériault, (the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time) cited in “Air Doctrine Symposium: Minutes of the Discussion Period,” 1180-3 (SSO C&D) dated 22 February 1984, in Air Doctrine Symposium Summary of Proceedings, copy at CFC Library, 3. 79 Aerospace Doctrine Board: Terms of Reference and SOPs, copy at CFC Library, 1-2, 2-1; and Westrop, “Aerospace Doctrine Study.” 83 80 Leversedge, “Transforming Canada’s Air Force,” 148-9. 81 DND, Director Air Reserve, “Air Reserve Development Strategy” (draft dated 16 Sep 2004), 10. 82 The components of the Canadian Forces are: (a) the Regular Force; (b) Reserve Force; and (c) when established, the Special Force. DND, Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, Volume 1, art 2.0,1 available at: http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qr_o/vol1/intro_e.asp (accessed December 1, 2006). 83 DND, Air Reserve History, Post-Integration, http://www.airforce.forces.ca/air_reserve/ history/post_integration_e.asp (accessed November 26, 2005). 84 DND, “Air Reserve Development Strategy,” 11. 85 Ibid., 12.

84 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and ChapterControl Arrangements 4 - Context and Issues

Introduction In today’s military operations, a vital element of air power is an effective and efficient command and control capability. The aim of this chapter is to provide the context to understand current Canadian aerospace command and control arrangements and to discuss key issues related to these arrangements. These key issues include (1) the importance of the principle Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues

of “unity of command” in aerospace operations; (2) the need to incorporate new C2 concepts into CF and aerospace doctrine; and (3) the desirability of basing changes to Canadian aerospace command and control organizations on comprehensive aerospace doctrine that reflects new concepts of command as well as the traditional principles of command.

The Canadian Forces’ experiences of the command of aerospace forces. The climate 1990s and early 2000s, when resources of restructuring that the Canadian Forces were scarce and the air force was hard is experiencing under recent transforma- pressed to meet the requirements of the tion initiatives has placed significant other Environments, left a legacy of pressure on the senior leadership of the air distrust and a fear among some in the force to defend many fundamental aero- Canadian Army and Navy that air assets space command and control principles. would not be available when they were For example, the “unity of command” required. Many of the officers in senior principle had to be actively defended leadership positions within the Army and during the first round of transformation Navy today were gaining their front line negotiations.3 While this principle has operational experience during that era, been accepted by air forces as fundamental and some of the attitudes they bring to doctrine, this doctrine is not always under- the table during ongoing transformation stood or accepted by officers from non-air activities are based on those experiences. force backgrounds. Furthermore, due to Dealing with these attitudes is one of the problems with Canadian Air Force Profes- more significant challenges faced by the sional Military Education in the past leaders of today’s Air Force in a trans- decade, many Canadian Air Force officers forming CF. are also not aware of this principle.4 Air forces have faced similar challenges Before Air Force leaders can begin to in the past and dealt with them with educate the rest of the Canadian Forces varying degrees of success. A key tenet about Air Force command and control from historical experience for the effective doctrine and establish the confidence command and control of high value-low essential for successful joint operations, density assets like aircraft is that their they must first master the subject them- command and control must be central- selves. It is only then that they can begin ized under the principle of “unity of to articulate it in such a manner that their command.”1 However, even today, this counterparts in the other Environments principle is not well understood in some will begin to understand and appreciate quarters of the CF. For example, the the complexity of aerospace operations Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division and start to develop the trust that is in a recent interview commented that the necessary to ensure the success of joint attitude of the leadership of the Army and and combined operations. It follows that a the Navy was that the air force approach thorough understanding of what consti- to command and control was “self-serving” tutes the effective exercise of C2 within and the air force was not a team player.2 the air force is a requisite competency for all air force personnel. One could argue that Canada’s Air Force is constantly going to face challenging The challenge then for the leadership operational missions, scarce resources, in the air community is to continue to and criticism and pressure from the provide competent, combat capable air other Environments to decentralize the forces to meet the nation’s requirements 86 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues C h a p t e r 4

and to do so in a manner that will enhance Changing Strategic Environment. One the overall operational effectiveness of the factor that complicates a thorough under- CF, while maintaining the autonomy neces- standing of the command and control sary to ensure the appropriate use of the structure for the Air Force as well as the available air assets. Two factors make this Army and Navy, is the rapidly changing challenge more difficult: the traditional strategic environment within which the technological focus of air forces and the Canadian Forces operates. The current changing strategic environment. focus of the CF is on counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan; however, that People, not equipment. For many in the particular focus is not the only operational air force the terms command and control contingency for which the CF must be have referred primarily to communications prepared. as well as communications equipment and networks. As a technology-based organi- A number of the accepted command and zation this is not unusual approach, but it control practices that were developed over is certainly a limiting one. While tech- the many years that NATO command and nology is clearly an important element of control organization evolved have proven controlling air operations, the command less flexible in the theatres of operations function is far more a reflection of the where NATO has actually deployed troops human element of command. The human since the end of the Cold War. Likewise dimension in command is becoming a CF C2 arrangements are in a state of recognized aspect as demonstrated by flux under the current transformation the increasing utilization of the Pigeau- initiatives.5 McCann model of command and control, as we have seen.

Command and Control Definitions Command and control is a fluid subject caveats all the time and therefore in the modern strategic environment, and we don’t argue about operational air force leaders must be open to change command and control, we argue and be prepared to show flexibility and over the caveats. …. While you adaptability as required. Nonetheless, do that, you are missing doing the traditional principles of command something else, which is delivering (including command and control terms effects to get the job done. … At and relationships) are important and must the tactical level you still have to be understood. Even as new concepts make it clear who is in control. emerge, there are many circumstances You don’t want some battalion where the traditional approach will still commander to move an entire be necessary; however, understanding squadron of Hercs to Comox and applying the traditional terms should just because he feels good about never obscure the need for change. In late having it in his back pocket.6 2006, the Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division commented on the restrictive So, while it is clearly important to iden- nature of NATO C2 definitions and termi- tify the authorities and responsibilities nology, while at the same time recognizing inherent in the specific levels of command that at the tactical level, understanding assigned, it serves no useful purpose what is implied in the terms is extremely to dwell on the technicalities of what important: authority is delegated and what responsibility is retained at the tactical level. The I understand command and objective is to identify and allocate the control, OPCON, OPCOM, etc., aerospace assets required to accomplish but the problem is that we don’t the mission. have purity in it. We have these 87 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues

raditional Principles raditional ofT Command CommandT and Control The Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine manual states that “experience has Relationships revealed that there exists certain funda- The Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine mental principles in the Command and manual also specifies the traditional Control of forces which are formally artic- command and control relationships that ulated as the Principles of Command.”7 have been used widely within NATO The principles of command as detailed in and other national and multinational the manual are:8 operations based on the terms full, operational and tactical. While there  Unity of Command. A single, clearly is clearly a movement towards utilizing identified commander must be the terms “supporting” and “supported” appointed for each operation. The commander, as described below, the commander has the authority to plan accepted terminology is still a key compo- and direct operations and will be held nent of understanding what command and responsible for an operation’s success control authorities exist, and of assigning or failure. and delegating those authorities.  Span of Control. Every person has According to the Canadian Forces Aero- a limited capacity and therefore the space Doctrine manual command and assigned resources and activities must control relationships, illustrated in Table be such that one person can exercise 4-1, can be described by the following effective command or control of the terms:9 formation or unit.  Full Command is the military FULL OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON  Chain of Command. The structure of authority and responsibility of a COMMAND the C2 process is hierarchical and must superior officer to issue orders to be respected. Bypassing the chain of subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and adminis- Provide administrative command is justified only in the most and logistics support exceptional circumstances. tration. It is applicable only within  national services and, therefore, alli- Assign separate employment  Delegation of Authority. Commanders ance or coalition commanders cannot of components of have full command over forces of other must be clear when delegating all or units/formations   part of their authority. nations. Assign missions  Operational Command  Freedom of Action. Once the task (OPCOM) is    or mission has been established and the authority granted to a commander the necessary orders have been given, to assign missions or tasks to subor- Assign tasks subordinate commanders must be dinate commanders, to deploy units,     permitted maximum freedom of to reassign forces and to retain or action to take initiative and exercise delegate operational control (OPCON) Delegate equal or lower command status their skills and knowledge of the local and/or tactical control (TACON) as      situation in the planning and conduct necessary. It does not include respon- of the operation. sibility for logistics or administra- Coordinate local tion. A commander assigned OPCOM movement or action      may delegate that authority. While  Continuity of Command. A clear OPCOM allows a commander to assign and well understood succession of separate employment to components Plan and coordinate      command is essential. of assigned units, it cannot be used to disrupt the basic organization of a unit to the extent that the unit cannot Table 4-1 – Traditional Command and Control readily be given a new task or be rede- Relationships 1 0 ployed. A commander will normally 88 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues C h a p t e r 4

exercise OPCOM through commanders  Tactical Command (TACOM) is the of subordinate components of a task authority delegated to a commander force. to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment  Operational Control (OPCON) is the of the mission assigned by higher authority delegated to a commander authority. It is narrower in scope than to direct assigned forces to accom- OPCOM but includes the authority to plish specific missions or tasks, which delegate or retain TACON. are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units  Tactical Control (TACON) is detailed concerned; and to retain or assign and usually restricted to local direction TACON of those units. It does not and control of movements or manoeu- include authority to assign separate vres necessary to accomplish missions employment of components of the or tasks assigned. In general, TACON units concerned. Units are placed is delegated only when two or more under commanders’ OPCON so that units not under the same OPCON are commanders may benefit from the combined to form a cohesive tactical immediate employment of these units unit. in their support, without further reference to a senior authority.

FULL COMMAND OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

Provide administrative and logistics support  Assign separate employment of components of units/formations   Assign missions    Assign tasks     Delegate equal or lower command status      Coordinate local movement or action      Plan and coordinate     

Table 4-1 – Traditional Command and Control Relationships 1 0

89 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues New Command and Control Relationships The traditional command and control defi- “Normally, the TFC will be a supported nitions and terms are important to under- commander. A supporting commander stand and they continue to be widely used provides the supported commander with today. However, traditional approaches to forces or other support and develops a command and control, developed as they supporting plan.”13 were for the more predictable and static command relationships of the Cold War, Due to the newness of these terms, various have not been able to address the more definitions of them are found in the mili- volatile C2 relationships in chaotic contem- tary terminology of our principal coalition porary operations. The Commander of partners; however, accepted Canadian 1 Canadian Air Division raised this issue Department of National Defence defini- in late 2006 and he strongly suggested that tions14 are as follows: more thought be given to the use of the “supporting” and “supported” commander  Supported Command – a command concept.11 Similarly, a Canadian Army that receives forces or other support commander, serving in a NATO command from another command and has position in the International Security primary responsibility for all aspects Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters of a task assigned by the Chief of the in Afghanistan, suggested that he was Defence Staff; essentially using the “supporting” and “supported” commander concept.12  Supported Commander - a commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher military authority and who received upporting/Supported forces or other support from one or S more supporting commanders; Command  Supporting Command – a command Based on the experience of operations that provides forces or other support at the beginning of the 21st century, to a supported command; and four terms have emerged in Western, and Canadian, military command and  Supporting Commander – a control doctrine: supporting command commander who provides a supported and commander as well as supported commander with forces or other command and commander. Formally used support and/or who develops a by the Canadian Forces since late 2004, supporting plan. the terms are used to clearly identify primary responsibility for all aspects The concept of supported/supporting of a task, and are particularly relevant command aligns with the Air Force to operations under command of an doctrine of centralized control and assigned Task Force Commander (TFC). decentralized execution. The command and control relationship described by supporting/supported command assists Comd AIRCOM / in all aspects of the operation, from CAS pre-deployment planning through force employment and redeployment, for it Air Staff clarifies from whom the commander’s intent is drawn, (i.e., it will always be from Comda 1 Cdn Air Div the supported commander).

Figure 4-1 - Simplified Air Command Organization Chart

90 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues C h a p t e r 4

anadian Aerospace Forces Command and Control OrganizationC This section discusses the Canadian Aero- Personnel (DG Air Pers) handles Air Force space Forces C2 organizations down to the personnel issues, and Director General Air operational level, as of the fall of 2007. Force Development (DG Air FD) handles force development issues, primarily at the capability level. In addition, various specialist staff (such as Flight Safety) ir Command report directly to the CAS, through the OrganizationA Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS). As shown in Figure 4-1, the aerospace CAS elements of the Canadian Forces are organized into a command known as Air Command (AIRCOM). The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) is double-hatted as both ACAS CAS and the Commander of AIRCOM, with the powers of a commander of a command specified in the National DG Air Pers DG Air FD Specialists Defence Act. Note that, as a result of recent CF transformation initiatives, the Figure 4-2 - Simplified Chief of CAS is no longer involved in the operational planning process or force employ- the Air Staff Organization Chart ment of aerospace forces in support of operations. These responsibilities have been assigned to the Canada Command (Canada COM) Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC). The 15 Canadian Air role of AIRCOM is to: 1  provide air forces required for the Division Headquarters conduct of air, surface, and sub- surface operations; Organization The Comd 1 Cdn Air Div is also the  provide an air search and rescue capa- Canada COM CFACC and the Commander bility; and Canadian NORAD Region (CANR). Most staff at the 1 Cdn Air Div HQ are also  provide support services to other double- or triple-hatted. The Air Division services as ordered.

Canada COM CFACC / Comd CANR / CFACC Fwd Comd 1 Cdn Air Div hief of Air Staff OrganizationC COS Since it is no longer charged with force DComd FE / DComd FG DComd Msn Sp employment responsibilities, the Air DComd CANR Staff (shown in Figure 4-2 and under the Figure 4-3 - Simplified 1 Canadian Air CAS) is primarily focused upon institu- Division Organization Chart tional issues. The CAS is the principal source of expertise on the deployment, generation and employment of air power. Headquarters has been recently reorga- In this regard, Director General Air nized around three Deputy Commanders, 91 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues

each discharged with specific functions and in Winnipeg, Manitoba, CANR executes each of whom understudy the commander a variety of tasks to defend Canadian and assume command when so appointed airspace which include identifying and in the commander’s absence. Key positions tracking all aircraft entering Canadian in 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters, airspace; exercising operational command as illustrated in Figure 4-3, are described and control of all air defence forces in next. It is important to note that the CANR; as well as operations in support Deputy Commander Force Employ- of other government departments and ment (DComd FE) is also the Deputy agencies. 1 Cdn Air Div is responsible for Commander CANR and that both Deputy providing CANR with combat-ready air Commander Force Generation (DComd forces to meet Canada’s commitment to FG) and Deputy Commander Mission defend North America and maintain the Support (DComd Msn Sp) have force sovereignty of North American airspace. generation responsibilities. Commander 1 Canadian Air Division. The Canada Command Combined Force Air Comd 1 Cdn Air Div has OPCOM of all Component Commander. The Comd 1 Cdn operational air assets and is responsible Air Div is the CFACC for Canada COM. for force generation on behalf of the CAS. The Comd Canada COM has OPCOM, for As the single operational-level air force force employment, of all aerospace forces headquarters in the CF, 1 Cdn Air Div (excluding those assigned to NORAD, has the responsibility for force genera- Canadian Expeditionary Force Command tion to support Canada COM, CEFCOM [CEFCOM] and Canadian Special Opera- and CANSOFCOM in pursuit of their tions Forces Command [CANSOFCOM]) mandates. The Comd 1 Cdn Air Div exer- and, in turn, has delegated OPCOM of cises command and control over a multi- these forces to the CFACC. The CFACC tude of formations and units assigned to maintains situational awareness of aero- the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div / CANR in the space force generation activities, force following capacities: employment activities and asset availability for the Comd Canada COM.  NORAD assigned assets in CANR;

Air assets assigned under OPCOM of  1 Cdn Air Div assigned assets; Comd Canada COM for force employment include, but are not limited to:  Canada COM assigned air assets under OPCOM Comd Canada COM; and  Immediate response aircraft (alert, standby aircraft) less NORAD and  CANSOFCOM assigned aircraft. operational airworthiness authority for all CF air assets including the National Cadet Program air assets.  Aircraft tasked for routine domestic operations when assigned via an air tasking order (ATO). Deputy Commander Force Employment and Deputy Commander Canadian NORAD Region advises the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div  16 Aircraft and other aerospace assets on NORAD matters, leads all the force including base, wing, formation, employment activities of CFACC/CANR or unit infrastructure, equipment, including the combined air operations capabilities and personnel tasked in centre (CAOC). support of domestic or continental contingency operations when assigned Deputy Commander Force Generation is by a strategic initiating directive, accountable to the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div ATO, or warning/operation order. for force generation functions, including air force training, intelligence, aerospace Commander Canadian NORAD Region is and force protection readiness, aviation, responsible to provide aerospace surveil- patrol and transport readiness and force lance, identification, control and warning structure. for the defence of Canada and North America. Headquartered at 1 Cdn Air Div 92 Current Canadian Aerospace Command and Control Arrangements- Context and Issues C h a p t e r 4

Deputy Commander Mission Support is external to the HQ from outside entities accountable to the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div such as CAS, Canada COM, CEFCOM, for mission support functions, including CANSOFCOM, Region Joint Task Forces personnel and Reserves, maintenance, (RJTF), wings and other CF elements Airfield Engineers, Logistics, and telecom- requiring the Commander’s and staff munications and computer information inputs. services. Combined Force Air Component Chief of Staff (COS) ensures the effective Commander Forward (CFACC Fwd) and efficient staffing of all issues within represents the CFACC’s needs in Ottawa 1 Cdn Air Div / CANR HQ – approxima- with the respective Commanders of tely 75% – 80% of those issues deal with Canada COM, CEFCOM and, as required, force generation17 – as well as those issues CANSOFCOM.

ummary HistoricalS experience has demonstrated execution, more work is required before that the most effective way to employ they are clearly understood and reflected high value, low density resources like in CF and aerospace doctrine. Current aerospace forces is through centralized Canadian Aerospace Forces command command based on the principle of “unity and control organizations, as described of command.” Unfortunately for the CF, in this chapter, are constantly changing. this principle has sometimes been ignored, The changes may be more effective if they including during recent CF transforma- were based on comprehensive aerospace tion efforts. In order to ensure that this C2 doctrine that reflects new concepts of key principle is understood and applied in command as well as the traditional prin- practice, the Air Force must ensure that it ciples of command. is included in Air Force and CF professional military eductaion as well as in doctrine. This will be a challenge in today’s changing strategic environment and with ongoing changes in the CF’s command and control structure as a result of CF transformation efforts. In this volatile strategic environment concepts of command and control are in a state of flux. While there is a need to understand the traditional principles of command (including command and control terms and relationships), there is also a requirement to adapt and modify them because of the complex and chaotic nature of contemporary operations. Concepts such as supporting command and commander as well as supported command and commander, as we have seen, are being increasingly used in recent operations. While these concepts are compatible with the Air Force doctrine of centralized control and decentralized

93 Endnotes 1 This issue is discussed in DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 50, and in more detail in English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 112-14. 2 MGen Charlie Bouchard, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, interview by BGen Joe Sharpe (Retired), December 14, 2006. 3 Ibid. 4 Recent problems with Canadian Air Force PME are discussed in English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 89-92. 5 MGen Charlie Bouchard, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, interview by BGen Joe Sharpe (Retired), December 14, 2006. 6 MGen Charlie Bouchard, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, interview by BGen Joe Sharpe (Retired), December 14, 2006. 7 DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 50. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 51-52. 10 Table from DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 52. 11 MGen Charlie Bouchard, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, interview by BGen Joe Sharpe (Retired), December 14, 2006. 12 Discussion between BGen (retired) Joe Sharpe with BGen David Fraser, commander of the Multi-National Brigade (Regional Command South) in Afghanistan 28 February 2006 to November 2006, in April 2007. 13 Canadian Forces Operations (B-GJ-005-300/FP-000), dated 15 August 2005, p. 2-7. 14 Defence Terminology Bank, DND (Ottawa: Director General Information Management Policy, Standards and Architecture), http://terminology.mil.ca/term-eng.asp (accessed March 5, 2008). 15 Canadian Forces Organization Order - Message Text Format UNCLASSIFIED DGSP 9954 131413Z SEP 99 16 For air force assets and capabilities, other than aircraft, the CFACC shall identify to each Regional Joint Task Force Commander (RJTF Comd) those assets and capabilities that may be tasked directly by RJTF Comds, those that may be tasked on the approval of the appropriate tactical-level commander (normally the wing commander) and those that must be approved by CFACC. 17 MGen Charlie Bouchard, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, interview by BGen Joe Sharpe (Retired), December 14, 2006.

94 Principles of Command, Control, and ChapterCommand and Control5

General This chapter will enunciate principles that can assist military professionals in exercising command, in devising and implementing control structures that enable command, and in prac- ticing command and control. These principles are based on the theory, history and context provided in the previous chapters. Principles of Command, Control, and Command and Control

Most traditional articulations of C2 principles only deal with principles that are applicable to control structures. However, the Pigeau-McCann theoretical framework tells us that we should articulate three categories of principles, (i.e., those for command, those for control, and those for C2). Therefore, this chapter will deal with all three categories of principles. As noted in Chapter 4, new C2 concepts are concepts that can be used to complement needed to help the Air Force adapt to the the traditional principles of command that challenges of current and future opera- are articulated in current CF aerospace tions. This chapter provides some new C2 doctrine.

Principles of Command The principles of command, control, and command and control described below are ompetency based on the theories presented in Chapter C 1 of this publication. From an organizational perspective, armed forces generally do a good job in ensuring Command is defined in Chapter 1 as “the that personnel with command potential creative expression of human will necessary have the necessary physical and intellec- to accomplish the mission.” The function tual competencies. However, armed forces of command is “to invent novel solutions are much less successful in ensuring that to mission problems, to provide conditions potential commanders have the required for starting, changing and terminating emotional and interpersonal competen- control, and to be the source of diligent cies. In order to ensure that potential purposefulness.” In military organizations commanders have all four competencies command is based on legitimate authority, in the degree required for a particular and therefore, what Pigeau and McCann command position, organizations must call effective command, which is defined ensure that the training, education and as “the creative and purposeful exercise experience that individuals receive in their of legitimate authority to accomplish the careers provide them with these compe- mission legally, professionally and ethically.” tencies in the desired degree. Recently, due to the increased demands of contem- From a practical perspective, to be effec- porary operations, the CF has increased tive, commanders should be within the physical and educational requirements for balanced command envelope. Individuals its members, thereby addressing aspects with high levels of competency, authority of the physical and intellectual competen- and responsibility should ideally be placed cies. However, structured and coherent in command positions requiring these programs to address emotional and inter- attributes and people with lower levels of personal competencies are lacking. Armed competency, authority and responsibility forces usually rely on a combination of should be assigned correspondingly less education and experience to develop the demanding command positions. Each four competencies in their personnel. of the three command dimensions are summarized in turn. However, the balance between education and experience in this development has often been controversial. Historically, it 96 C h a p t e r 5

has been difficult for senior CF Air Force individual commanders may be aware commanders to get high level command that they should do everything they experience, as we have seen, both during can to increase their personal authority, the Second World War and after the there is little in the way of formal CF disbandment of the functional air groups training or education that helps poten- in 1997. Therefore, from a doctrinal point tial commanders optimize their personal of view, when considering the organiza- authority.1 Therefore, from a doctrinal tion, roles and functions of aerospace point of view, air force professional forces, the opportunity for command development should include opportuni- experience, especially at the senior officer ties for personnel to acquire a thorough level, should be an important consider- conceptual understanding of CF and Air ation. However, experience is not a substi- Force leadership and command doctrine at tute for education, and, from a doctrinal progressively more sophisticated levels as perspective, career plans should take into they progress to higher rank levels. consideration the need for higher levels of professional education as Air Force personnel progress to higher rank levels. Ideally, experience should be acquired in esponsibility parallel with education so that personnel R can benefit from both in developing their The third dimension of command, respon- leader competencies. sibility, addresses the degree to which an individual accepts the legal and moral liability commensurate with command. There are two components to responsi- uthority bility, one externally imposed, and the A other internally generated. The first, The second dimension of command, called extrinsic responsibility, involves the authority, is the degree to which a obligation for public accountability. When commander is empowered to act, the scope a military commander is given legal of this power and the resources available authority, there is a formal expectation by for enacting their will. Legal authority is the superiors that they can be held account- power to act as assigned by a formal agency able for resources assigned and decisions outside the military, typically a government. taken. Extrinsic responsibility taps a It explicitly gives commanders resources person’s willingness to be held account- and personnel for accomplishing the able for resources, and is generally handled mission. Legal authority, which is made through formal checks and balances. explicit through legal documentation, in Intrinsic responsibility, the second compo- the case of Canada through the National nent of responsibility, is the degree of self- Defence Act and the Queen’s Regula- generated obligation that one feels towards tions and Orders, is the one dimension of the military mission. It is a function of authority that armed forces understand the resolve and motivation that an indi- well. While it is not always handled vidual brings to a problem – the amount optimally, for example command relation- of ownership taken and the amount of ships are sometimes poorly defined or the commitment expressed. Intrinsic respon- commander does not receive adequate sibility is associated with the concepts of resources or personnel to accomplish a honour, loyalty and duty, those timeless mission, this dimension of command is qualities linked to military ethos. Of frequently addressed in lessons learned or all the components in the dimensions of after action reports. Personal authority, on command, intrinsic responsibility is the the other hand, is that authority given infor- most fundamental. Without it, very little mally to an individual by peers and subor- would be accomplished. Most commanders dinates. Unlike legal authority, personal understand the need for intrinsic responsi- authority is held tacitly. It is earned bility, but little in CF or Air Force profes- over time through reputation, experi- sional development addresses the nature ence, strength of character and personal of intrinsic responsibility or how it can be example. Personal authority cannot be fostered.2 Therefore, from a doctrinal point formally designated, and it cannot be of view, air force professional develop- enshrined in rules and regulations. While ment should include not just opportunities 97 Principles of Command, Control, and Command and Control

to examine the legal aspects of extrinsic From a doctrinal perspective, therefore, all responsibility, as is the case currently, but command arrangements should be care- also opportunities to examine in detail the fully scrutinized to ensure that there is a moral and psychological dimensions of balance between authority and responsi- intrinsic responsibility. bility. If an imbalance exists, steps should be taken to put these two dimensions of command back into balance. Practical Responsibility Competency steps to achieve balance might include increasing commanding officers’ authority to match their responsibility or reducing the authority of central staffs so that they do not impinge on or take authority away from the commanders, who bear much of the responsibility for the effectiveness of their units and the success of the missions that they lead.

Authority Figure 5-1 – A Balanced ission Command Command Situations M The CF leadership philosophy of mission COMMANDER MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONcommand reflects the army approach to Responsibility Competency Responsibility missionCompetency command, as we have seen in Chapter 1. While, in many circumstances, mission he Balance between command is the preferred leadership style T for CF commanders, this is not always the case. First of all, mission command may be Authority and practised differently by air forces and navies, as described in Chapter 2. Secondly, not all Responsibility subordinates are capable of responding to a Evaluations of command challenges have mission command philosophy, as described in Authorityshown that one of the biggest problems AuthorityChapter 1. Finally, the 21st century security with late 20th and early 21st century environment may mean that the 19th century command in the CF is the imbalance philosophy of mission command is not neces- between authority and responsibility.3 sarily the best command philosophy for today A simplified illustration of a balanced or the future, particularly at command levels command situation is shown in Figure 5-1. above the tactical level. For example, Gosselin tells us that, in the new security environment, An imbalance in the command situation mission command has essentially “disap- can develop when a commander’s legal peared as a command philosophy in the CF.”4 authority is decreased, intentionally or Therefore, commanders of CF aerospace unintentionally, without an appropriate forces require flexibility in their approaches to decrease in responsibility. For example, command. when the authority to approve sick leave for a member is removed from the commanding officer and transferred to the medical organization, the commanding lexibility in officer’s authority is reduced, as illus- F trated in Figure 5-2 below. However, the commander remains fully responsible for Approaches to the morale and welfare of the organization they command. Conversely, the medical Command organization, while assuming the authority While it is almost always preferable to use to determine whether or not a member is command styles that tap into subordi- granted sick leave, is not responsible for nates’ initiative and that leave them the the unit’s ability to field an effectively maximum flexibility, within commander’s manned organization. 98 Responsibility Competency C h a p t e r 5

intent, to complete a mission, there are “command-by-plan,” or “command-by- circumstances, as we have seen, where influence” depending on the circumstances. more rigid approaches to command will be required. For example, when missions have Due to the requirement for flexibility in enormous political consequences, such as approaches to command, Gosselin argues the release of nuclear weapons or shooting Authoritythat the CF needs to create a “Canadian

COMMANDER MEDICAL ORGANIZATION Responsibility Competency Responsibility Competency

Authority Authority Figure 5-2 – Examples of Unbalanced Command Situations down civilian aircraft, “command-by- command framework developed for Cana- direction” may be required. Furthermore, dian national requirements, using contem- highly complex operations involving large porary command principles, and with numbers of aircraft may require detailed the management of risk as the key factor plans, which limit subordinates’ initia- influencing the development of control tive, to be executed effectively. Therefore, structures and processes.”5 Doctrinal issues aerospace commanders should be able related to these control structures and to exercise command using any of, or a processes will be discussed next. combination of, “command-by-direction,”

rinciples of Control ControlP is defined here as those“ struc- First, from a doctrinal point of view, tures and processes devised by command to structures and processes should exist to enable it and to manage risk. The function support command. They should facilitate of control is to enable the creative expres- (or at least not hinder) the potential for sion of will and to manage the mission creative acts of will. They should facili- problem in order to minimize the risk of tate (or at least not hinder) the expression not achieving a satisfactory solution.”6 of competencies (physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal). They should The concrete nature of structures and clarify pathways for legal authority; they processes has led to them being the focus should encourage (not impede) the oppor- of most C2 doctrine to date. In fact most tunity to establish personal authority. of the so-called “principles of C2” are no And finally, they should encourage the more than principles devised to help in willing acceptance of responsibility while the design of structures and processes for at the same time increasing motivation in control. military members. From an organizational perspective, any control system that forces its members off the balanced command 99 Principles of Command, Control, and Command and Control

envelope will, over time, compromise orga- effort of aerospace forces to be concen- nizational effectiveness. trated at the time and place where they will have the greatest effects. The second criteria for guiding the application of control is whether it promotes the  Functional Grouping. For force genera- management of risk. Pigeau and McCann tion purposes, the most efficient way define risk as anything that jeopardizes the to organize aerospace forces is by func- attainment of the mission. This includes tional group, (e.g., fighter, maritime uncertainties due to personnel (including patrol, air transport). the adversary), uncertainties in the environment (e.g., weather, terrain, etc),  Adaptable C2 Organizations. There is equipment failures, miscommunication, no “one size fits all” C2 organization. and the unbridled expression of creativity, Therefore, C2 organizations should be since such expression may lead to chaos. designed to fit not only current circum- Imposing an elaborate control structure stances, but they should also be capable and process is one way to reduce risk; of being adapted to fit changing however, this type of control would come circumstances. It should be noted that at the expense of inhibiting command decentralized C2 organizations, while creativity – creativity that, inevitably, is requiring more effort and resources needed for solving new problems. to develop, are more adaptable. A A tension exists, therefore, between detailed discussion of issues related to the two reasons for creating control: the adaptability of different types of to facilitate creative command and to command and control organizations is control command creativity. Getting the in Chapter 1. balance right is a perennial challenge for most organizations. Pigeau and McCann  Human Requirements of Command. suggest that, as a general principle, mili- Historically, air forces have focussed on taries should give priority to facilitating technology and the technical dimen- creative command, and that mechanisms sions of command and neglected its for controlling command creativity should human dimension. Too often they have then be used wisely and with restraint. acquired equipment without considering whether, as a control structure, As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the new equipment would facilitate what Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine command and help commanders calls “Principles of Command,” are, based manage risk. For example, with many on the analysis presented here, actually new systems’ specifications more principles that largely are applicable to bandwidth and higher data flows are control structures.7The following addi- assumed to be desirable; however, too tional principles of control have been much data, if not managed properly, derived from the historical experience might overwhelm a commander and and theories presented in the previous degrade the commander’s effective- chapters. They should be respected when ness. Therefore, when acquiring or devising control processes and structures modifying equipment, the human for aerospace forces. requirements of command should be pre-eminent and they should drive the  Centralized Command Structures and technical specifications. Processes. Aerospace forces are high value, low density resources; therefore,  Unintended Consequences. At the end like all similar resources, command of the 20th century and the begin- structures and processes should ning of the 21st century, the ad hoc facilitate command at the highest methods used to create many CF C2 practicable level. To ensure optimal arrangements resulted in a number effectiveness, aerospace forces should of unintended consequences that be grouped together and not dispersed adversely affected the effectiveness of among subordinate formations. The commanders. For example, the concen- principle of centralized command tration of numerous control func- structures and processes allows the tions, like policy creation and policy 100 C h a p t e r 5

decisions, in central staffs created an tures and processes should be exam- imbalance between authority and ined for unintended consequences, responsibility and forced some unit particularly those caused by second COs off the BCE, through no fault of and third order effects.8 their own. Therefore, all control struc-

rinciples of C2 CommandP and control is defined here Implicit intent forms the vast majority of as the establishment of common intent to commander’s intent and it takes a great achieve coordinated action. In order to deal of time and effort to establish. In the achieve coordinated action commanders CF, a great deal of effort is expended on must express their intent, which is the set training, education and the publication of of connotations associated with a specific written material that is intended to commu- aim or purpose. Correctly interpreting nicate the organization’s expectations and an aim, purpose or objective—that is, traditions and to shape organization’s ethos correctly inferring intent—is a funda- and subordinates’ behaviours. Therefore, mental concept in military thought. the “military expectations” portion of the The smooth functioning of a military intent pyramid is addressed formally by organization, particularly during opera- the CF. Commanders should also be cogni- tions, depends upon its members correctly zant of the fact that everything that they inferring not only the commander’s intent do, including their personal behaviour, but also one another’s intent, especially in will affect the “personal expectations” unanticipated situations for which plans portion of the pyramid. Any incongruities may not have been prepared. in behaviour, for example “bending the rules,” will have an effect on the creation of implicit intent. This is not to suggest that commanders should slavishly follow all rules ntent because, as we have seen, no organization I works entirely according to explicit rules Commander’s intent consists of two and that a “work to rule” will stop most components explicit intent and implicit organizations from functioning effectively. intent. In the past military organizations However, commanders should explain have devoted a great deal of effort into carefully deviations from rules or inter- communicating explicit intent through the pretations of rules that could be miscon- use of orders, plans, doctrine, briefings, strued so that subordinates will understand questions and backbriefs, which can be their intent. The “cultural expectations” transmitted orally or in writing. But, as portion of the pyramid is probably the least we have seen in Chapter 1, most intent is understood part of the intent pyramid. not published or vocalized, and is, there- Commanders can best be prepared to deal fore, implicit intent, which is derived from with the uncertainties of this aspect of personal expectations, experience due to implicit intent through education and self- military training, tradition and ethos, development to gain a better understanding and from deep cultural values. Implicit of factors like societal values, culture (to intent usually takes a long time to estab- include national, group and military), and lish and is built up over months or even other factors that form the motivation years of interaction, both formal and for group behaviour. Acquiring this type informal, between commanders and their of knowledge is particularly important subordinates. when working with other militaries, other branches of the military, other government From a doctrinal perspective, commanders departments, non-governmental organiza- should understand that the publicly tions and the many different groups one communicated explicit intent forms only might encounter in coalition operations. a very small part of commander’s intent. 101 Principles of Command, Control, and Command and Control

Some of the factors that commanders ommon Intent should consider in their evaluation of C the balance between explicit and implicit For the concept of intent to be useful— intent are: that is, for it to contribute to coordinated action—it must be shared between one or  Language – the degree to which subor- more individuals. Common intent consists dinates share a common language; the of (1) the explicit intent that is shared steps that can be taken to overcome between a commander and subordinates language differences. immediately prior to or during an operation, plus (2) the (much larger) operation-  Training – the degree to which subor- ally-relevant shared implicit intent that dinates have trained together; actions has been developed over the months, and that can be taken to implement even years, prior to the operation. The common training. definition of C2 used here emphasizes the critical importance of establishing  Doctrine – the degree to which common intent among military members subordinates have common or similar that is necessary for achieving coordinated doctrine; actions that can be taken to action. In an ideal world, commanders overcome doctrinal differences (e.g., would command groups where they could assigning different roles to different inculcate a large amount of implicit subordinates or units based on intent. These groups would then be able to doctrinal differences). operate with a minimum of explicit intent and would, consequently, be able to func-  Military Systems – the degree to which tion smoothly during operations, especially subordinates have common or similar in unanticipated situations for which plans military systems (including military may not have been prepared. However, as experiences, equipment, procedures, we have seen, there are many obstacles to etc); actions that can be taken to achieving implicit intent, such as lack of create shared experiences or harmo- time to work together and cultural differ- nize differences (e.g., new procedures ences. Therefore, the section that follows that take differences into account or summarizes those issues that commanders considering equipment differences should consider when determining how when assigning roles). to balance explicit and implicit intent. Throughout this discussion, it should be  kept in mind that the establishment of Culture – the degree to which subor- common intent in C2 is not an end in itself dinates share cultural values, norms, but a means to an end, (i.e., to coordinate practices; actions that can be taken to action in military operations). promote cultural understanding and tolerance of differences.

 Subordinates’ abilities – the types of reasoning ability that exists among alancing Explicit subordinates for making deci- B sions when neither the time nor the and Implicit Intent opportunity is available to obtain The two most important mechanisms for advice from the commander; assign sharing explicit and implicit intent are tasks based on reasoning ability so (1) dialogue for sharing explicit intent, that subordinates with the highest and (2) socialization for sharing implicit reasoning ability are given the most intent, as we have seen. Both mechanisms complex tasks. have advantages and disadvantages, and commanders should carefully evaluate  Subordinates’ motivation and commit- which mechanisms will work best in ment – the level of motivation and different circumstances. commitment to achieve mission objectives that exists among subordinates; actions that can be taken to 102 C h a p t e r 5

increase motivation and commitment have the flexibility to change style to achieve mission objectives; assign according to the circumstances. tasks based on levels of motivation and commitment.  Complexity and risks of the mission – a complex mission, or one with high  Command style – the degree to which a risks and with little margin of error, particular command and/or leadership will require more explicit direction. style facilitates the type of intent that is being inculcated at any particular Once commanders have completed their time; commanders should understand evaluation, they should decide which the utility of command and/or leader- factors are most critical to mission success ship styles in given situations and and allocate resources (including time) accordingly.

onclusion TheC principles of command, control, and practitioners of other professions (such command and control presented in this as medicine, engineering and law) whose chapter are not intended to be prescriptive professional practice continues to evolve or to be used mechanically like a checklist. and change based on new experience and These principles are intended to be used theoretical knowledge, military profes- by commanders at all levels to help them sionals involved in the command and better understand and analyze the chal- control of Canadian aerospace forces are lenges they face. The principles, and the encouraged to apply the theories and prin- theories described in Chapter 1, are also ciples presented in this publication in their presented to give commanders a common practice. Finally, military professionals vocabulary and common analytical are also encouraged to contribute to the framework to use when discussing issues improvement and evolution of these theo- in the domains of command, control, and ries and principles so that future editions command and control. This common basis of this manual will be based on a growing is designed to facilitate the solution of body of knowledge shaped by both theory problems in these domains. and practice. For those who are sceptical that principles and theories can be useful in these domains, recall that Canadian military professionals are required to understand and eventually master “a sophisticated body of theoretical and practical knowledge and skills” that is the foundation of the profession of arms in this country.9 Among the skills and theories in this body of knowledge are those related to the effective exercise of command. It is recognized that the theories and principles of command, control, and command and control presented here are part of an emerging and rapidly developing field of expertise. However, the state of knowledge in this field has now reached a point where these theories and principles can be of practical benefit to practitioners of the profession of arms. Therefore, like the 103 ndnotes E 1 See for example Allan English, “Survey of Current Leader Development in the Air Force,” report written for Defence Research and Development Canada, dated 17 March 2004. 2 See for example English, “Survey of Current Leader Development in the Air Force.” 3 See for example C. McCann, R. Pigeau and A. English, “Analysing Command Challenges Using the Command and Control Framework: Pilot Study Results,” Defence Research and Development Canada Technical Report, # TR-2003-034, 1 February 2003. 4 Major-General Daniel P. Gosselin, “The Loss of Mission Command for Canadian Expeditionary Operations: A Casualty of Modern Conflict?” in Allan English, ed.,Leadership and Command and the Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 193-228. Quote from 223. 5 Gosselin, “The Loss of Mission Command for Canadian Expeditionary Operations,” in Allan English, ed., Leadership and Command and the Operational Art, 223. 6 Pigeau and McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” 56. Emphasis added. 7 DND, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 50. 8 See Allan English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective, 82-4 for an example of unintended consequences caused by second and third order effects. A detailed discussion of these issues is at William F. Bell, “The Impact of Policies on Organizational Values and Culture,” paper presented at the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (January 1999) at http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE99/Bell99.html (accessed December 27, 2006). 9 DND, Duty with Honour, 1, 11, 17.

104 Abbreviations

Abbreviations 1 CAD 1 Canadian Air Division 1 CAG 1 Canadian Air Group 1 Cdn Air Div 1 Canadian Air Division 10 TAG 10 Tactical Air Group 3D defence, diplomacy and development

ACAG Aerospace Control Advisory Group ACAS Assistant Chief of the Air Staff ACC air component commander ACSAG Air Combat Support Advisory Group ADC Air Defence Command ADG Air Defence Group AFCCRT Air Force Command and Control Reengineering Team AFCF Air Force Capability Framework AIRCOM Air Command AMAG Air Mobility Advisory Group AOC air operations centre AOC MAC Air Officer Commanding Maritime Air Command ARAF air reserve augmentation flight ARAG Air Reserve Advisory Group ARG Air Reserve Group ATC Air Transport Command ATG Air Transport Group ATO air tasking order

BCATP British Commonwealth Air Training Plan BCE balanced command envelope BComd base commander

C2 command and control C2I command, control and intelligence C2IS command and control information systems C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance CAG capability advisory group Canada COM Canada Command CANR Canadian NORAD Region CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command CAOC combined air operations centre CAR competency, authority and responsibility CAS Chief of the Air Staff

105 Abbreviations

CCompt Command Comptroller CDS Chief of the Defence Staff CEFCOM Canadian Expeditionary Force Command CF Canadian Forces CFACC Combined Force Air Component Commander CFACC Fwd Combined Force Air Component Commander Forward CFC Canadian Forces College CFHQ Canadian Forces Headquarters CFMWC Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre CFOO Canadian Forces Organization Order CIBG Canadian Infantry Brigade Group CINC or C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CLFCSC Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College CO commanding officer Comd Commander COS chief of staff COS OPS Chief of Staff Operations COS Pers Chief of Staff Personnel COS SUP Chief of Staff Support COS T&R Chief of Staff Training and Reserves

DComd FG Deputy Commander Force Generation DComd Msn Sp Deputy Commander Mission Support DGAF Director General Air Forces DG Air FD Director General Air Force Development DG Air Pers Director General Air Personnel DND Department of National Defence DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada

EBAO effects-based approach to operations EBO effects based operations

FCAG Fighter Capability Advisory Group FOAC Flag Officer Atlantic Coast

G1 personnel G2 intelligence G3 operations G4 logistics

HMCS Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HQ headquarters

106 Abbreviations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

JIMP joint, interagency, multinational, and public

MAAG Maritime Air Advisory Group MAG Maritime Air Group MARCOM Maritime Command MCCRT Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team MND Minister of National Defence MOBCOM Mobile Command

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCW network-centric warfare NDHQ National Defence Headquarters NEOps network enabled operations NORAD North American Air Defence Command

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM OODA observe, orient, decide, act OPCOM operational command OPCON operational control

PME professional military education

RAF Royal Air Force RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force RCN Royal Canadian Navy RDO rapid decisive operations RFC Royal Flying Corps RJTF regional joint task force RJTF regional joint task force commander RN Royal Navy ROE rules of engagement

SAR search and rescue SOP standard operating procedure Sp CAG Support Capability Advisory Group Sqn squadron SSO senior staff officer

TACOM tactical command TACON tactical control

107 Abbreviations

TASS Tactical Aviation Support Squadron TAvnAG Tactical Aviation Advisory Group TFC task force commander TrgAG Training Advisory Group

USAF United States Air Force USMC United States Marine Corps

VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

W Adm O Wing Administration Officer W Compt Wing Comptroller W Log O Wing Logistics Officer W Ops O Wing Operations Officer WComd Wing Commander

108 Bibliography

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114 Recommended Reading List

ecommended Reading List Babcock,R Sandy. “Air Marshal Roy Slemon: The RCAF’s Original.” In Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leadership, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 257- 84.Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001. English, Allan, ed. The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives - Leadership and Command. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006, especially chapters 1, 4, 6 and 9. English, Allan and John Westrop. Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations. Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2007. Forgues, Pierre. “Command in a Network-Centric War.” Canadian Military Journal 2, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 23-30. Goette, Richard. “Squadron Leader N.E. Small: A Study of Leadership in the RCAF’s Eastern Air Command, 1942.” Canadian Military Journal 5, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 43-50. Greenhous, Brereton, et al. The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. 3: The Crucible of War 1939-1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Noakes, Jeff. “Air Force Architect: Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, Chief of the Air Staff, 1947-1953.” In. Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leadership, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 237-56. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001. Peden, Murray. A Thousand Shall Fall. Stittsville, Ont.: Canada’s Wings, 1979. Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control.” Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 53-63. Wakelam, Randall. “Aerospace Power and Leadership Perspectives: The Human Dimension.” Cana- dian Military Journal 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 17-24.

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