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The Constitutional Tribunal in Poland in the Context of Constitutional Judiciary

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The Constitutional Tribunal in Poland in the Context of Constitutional Judiciary BIAŁYSTOK LAW BOOKS BLB 11 To my Parents and Brothers Lech Jamróz THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL IN POLAND IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY Białystok 2014 Editor in Chief of Publishing House Temida 2: Cezary Kosikowski Chief: Emil W. Pływaczewski Scientifi c Board: Members from University of Bialystok: Stanisław Bożyk, Adam Czarnota, Leonard Etel, Ewa M. Guzik-Makaruk, Adam Jamróz, Dariusz Kijowski, Cezary Kulesza, Agnieszka Malare- wicz-Jakubów, Maciej Perkowski, Stanisław Prutis, Eugeniusz Ruśkowski, Walerian Sanetra, Joanna Sieńczyło-Chlabicz, Ryszard Skarzyński, Halina Święczkowska, Mieczysława Zdanowicz National Members: Marian Filar (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń), Edward Gniewek (University of Wrocław), Lech Paprzycki (Supreme Court) Foreign Members: Lidia Abramczyk (Yanka Kupala State University of Grodno, Belarus), Vladimir Babčak (University in Kosice, Slovakia), Renata Almeida da Costa (La Salle University, Brasil), Chris Eskridge (University of Nebrasca, USA), Jose Luis Iriarte Angél (University of Navarra, Spain), Marina Karasjewa (Voronezh State University, Russia), Aleksiej S. Kartsov (Fed- eral Constitutional Tribunal in Sankt Petersburg, Russia), Bernhard Kitous (University of Rennes, France), Jolanta Kren Kostkiewicz (University of Bern, Switzerland), Martin Krygier (University of New South Wales, Australia), Anthony Minnaar (University of South Africa, Republic of South Africa), Antonello Miranda (University in Palermo, Italy), Petr Mrkyvka ( Masaryk Universi- ty, Czech), Marcel Alexander Niggli (University of Fribourg, Switzerland ) Andrei A. Novikov (Saint Petersburg State University Russia), Sławomir Redo (Univerity of Vienna, Austria), Jerzy Sarnecki (Stokholm University, Sweden), Bernd Schünemann (University of Munich, Germany), Kevin Saunders (Michigan State University, USA), Sebastiano Tafaro (University of Bari, Italy), Wiktor Trinczuk (Kyiv University of Tourism, Economics and Law, Ukraine), Keiichi Yamanaka (Kansai Univesrity, Japan). Editor-in-Chief: Jerzy Banasiuk Cover design: Jerzy Banasiuk Publisher: Temida 2, Faculty of Law, University of Białystok Series Editor: Izabela Kraśnicka Reviewer: prof. Marian Grzybowski Copyright © 2014 by Temida 2, Poland. All rights reserved. Printed in Poland. This publication is protected by Copyright and permission should be obtained from the publisher prior to any repro- duction, sortage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, me- chanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. Publication fi nanced within the project – fund of Research of Young Scientists BMN No. 537(2012) ISBN: 978–83–62813–72–8 ISSN: 2083–9790 Temida 2, Mickiewicza 1, 15–213 Białystok, POLAND Tel.: (+48) 85 7457168 • Fax: (+48) 85 7406089 [email protected] www.temida2.pl Table of contents Explanation of abbreviations ................................................................7 Introduction ...........................................................................................9 Chapter I The Constitutional Tribunal as an Authority for Protection of the Constitution and Individual Rigths 1. The genesis of constitutional court. Legitimacy of constitutional tribunals in a democratic state ........................................................11 2. Models of constitutional court ........................................................21 Chapter II The Constitutional Position of the Constitutional Tribunal 1. The origins and evolution of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland ..........................................................................33 2. The Constitutional Tribunal in the Constitution of 1997 ................41 3. Organization of the Constitutional Tribunal ...................................49 3.1. Composition .............................................................................49 3.2. Status of Tribunal judges .........................................................52 3.3. Bodies of the Constitutional Tribunal ......................................55 3.4. The Offi ce of the Constitutional Tribunal ................................57 Chapter III Examination Procedure of Hierarchical Conformity of Legal Regulations (norms) 1. Rules of procedure ..........................................................................61 1.1. The principle of disposition .....................................................62 1.2. The principle falsa demonstration non nocet ..........................63 5 1.3. The principle of the burden of proof ........................................65 1.4. The adversarial principle .........................................................66 1.5. The principle of single-instance ...............................................68 1.6. The principle of collegiality .....................................................68 1.7. The principle of transparency ..................................................70 2. Appropriate application of the Code of Civil Procedure ................70 3. Types of proceedings ......................................................................73 3.1. Adjudicating on constitutionality and legality of legal norms ..........................................................................75 3.1.1. Application ........................................................................75 3.1.2. Constitutional complaint ....................................................81 3.1.3. Legal question (question of law) .......................................99 4. Stages of proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal ............104 4.1. Preliminary proceedings ........................................................105 4.2. Examination proceedings (at the hearing) .............................110 4.3. Adjudicating...........................................................................116 Chapter IV Specifi c Proceedings 1. Adjudication on the constitutionality of purposes and activities of political parties .........................................................................124 2. Resolving competence (power) disputes between central constitutional state authorities ......................................................132 3. The remaining functions of the Constitutional Tribunal: adjudicating on a temporary incapability of the President to hold the offi ce and a signaling function ....................................138 Concluding observations ...................................................................141 Bibliography .....................................................................................149 Appendices ........................................................................................159 6 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CCP - Code of Civil Procedure CCrP - Code of Criminal Procedure CT, the Tribunal - the Constitutional Tribunal Dz.U. - Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] EU - the European Union General - the General Assembly of the Judges Assembly, of the Constitutional Tribunal Assembly l.g.u. - local government unit M.P. - Monitor Polski, Offi cial Journal of the Republic of Poland NCJ - National Council of Judiciary Offi ce - the Offi ce of the Constitutional Tribunal OTK - Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Adjudication (Rulings) of the Constitutional Tribunal] OTK ZU - Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Zbiór Urzędowy [Adjudication (Rulings) of the Constitutional Tribunal. Offi cial Collection] Procedural - the Procedural Rules of the Constitutional rules, the Tribunal of 3 October 2006 Procedural Rules of CT PPR - the Polish People’s Republic PUWP - the Polish United Workers’ Party RP - the Republic of Poland SAC - the Supreme Administrative Court Statute - the Statute of the Offi ce of the Constitutional Tribunal 7 the Act, the Act - the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal on CT the - the Constitution of the Republic of Poland Constitution, of 2 April 1997 the Constitution of RP USSR - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics INTRODUCTION Experts on constitutional law have been analyzing the issues of constitutional judicial system for many years. Also in Poland a great number of excellent academic works in this fi eld have been published. They were both monographs and specifi c papers (articles, studies, glosses, etc.) and were devoted to constitutional judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal. A considerable number of legal comparative and monographic papers have been published, where the functions and activities of constitutional courts in European countries were discussed. It is not surprising since the existence of a body (bodies) controlling the constitutionality of the provisions of law is an indispensable element of a modern democratic rule of law. Also the judicial practice of the constitutional court is very inspiring. Not only is its substantive activity (solving the questions of the constitutionality of regulations) interesting, but its procedural aspects as well. This monograph, The Constitutional Tribunal in Poland in The Context of Constitutional Judiciary was prepared in the English language, for it is possible to notice a considerable disproportion in the number of academic publications in Polish on the Constitutional Tribunal and constitutional judiciary (there are plenty of them), and publications in foreign languages (they are far less numerous). Moreover, publication in English increases the potential number of readers and helps the users of this language collect necessary information on Polish constitutional institutions. This paper is addressed to a wide group of readers; to all who study
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