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- 1 - Minor Interpellation of the Member of the Bundestag Andrej Hunko and further Members and of the Left Party parliamentary group. Security cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia Bundestag printed paper 18/2719 Preliminary remarks of the questioners The European Union (EU) had already come to an agreement with Tunisia in 2013 that it would support the government in "reforming the security sector" (Question Time at the German Bundestag, 20 March 2013). To this end a group of "experts" travelled to Tunisia to take stock of the situation. After this, the consultations were planned on specific measures. The Federal Government also concluded a "transformation partnership in support of the democratisation process" with Tunisia. The cooperation began with training measures by the Federal Police "in the area of airports and maritime security"; the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office) conducted workshops on "crime-scene investigation", "drugs-related crime", Internet analysis and personal security. While the Ben Ali government was still in power, the Federal Ministry of the Interior supplied Tunisia with the IBM police analysis software "i2 Analyst's Notebook". The German domestic secret service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), provided advice to Tunisian partner authorities on 'counterterrorism'. According to information from the Federal Government, since spring 2012 a cooperation project has existed "at the request of Tunisia" on "intelligence services in democratic states governed by the rule of law". The Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences is in charge of this, although the German foreign secret service - the Bundesnachrichtendienst - is also involved. The German Länder (federal states) are also helping Tunisia with cooperation projects. Hesse and the Federal Criminal Police Office provided training on policing at demonstrations and football matches. In Tunisia, but also in Egypt, the Bundeskriminalamt carried out courses on police Internet analysis (Bundestag printed paper 17/12971). The measures were officially directed at combatting "terrorism". In the view of the questioners, however, this is a political and malleable term. The knowledge imparted by the BKA may also have been used to suppress digital dissent. Inter alia, the skills may also have helped in the persecution of unwelcome football fans, whose websites were to be placed under surveillance following a decision by the Ministry of the Interior (Egypt Independent, 14 March 2013). Journalists, too, and the political opposition in general, including the "Muslim Brothers", are being persecuted and in some cases brutally killed (for instance during the alleged attempted escape from a prisoner convoy, AFP, 20 August 2013). Recently it became known that the Egyptian police is still using public sources on the Internet to track down, humiliate, abuse and lock-up homosexuals (www.cairoscene.com, 31 August 2014). Digital activists have long since faced a high degree of risk in Egypt. Military and police repression - 2 - culminated in the murder of the blogger Khaled Mohammed Said, who died after being severely tortured. It is unclear to what extent the German course "Open Source Internet Analysis" helped the since disbanded state security service in arresting the well-known blogger. Numerous other bloggers have been detained and face serious charges. In spite of this, the Federal Government negotiated an agreement on police cooperation with Egypt (Bundestag printed paper 17/14474). The stated aim is "improving cooperation on combating, preventing and prosecuting criminal offences in the field of organised and serious crime, terrorism and in the field of technical support in disaster relief and in the event of serious accidents". According to statements made by the Federal Government, the "Egyptian side" has already submitted "counterproposals" to a German draft (Bundestag printed paper 17/14577). In light of the situation having become "unstable" however, the Federal Government wanted to "therefore closely evaluate the political situation in Egypt prior to the conclusion of an agreement". The Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, it was stated, had since sought to clarify certain terms. According to a more recent answer from the Federal Government, this did not lead to the negotiations on the agreement being suspended, however (Bundestag printed paper 18/226). With Tunisia, too, a "comparable" security agreement was said to be under negotiation. The conclusion of such agreements, it was stated, was necessary "in order to bolster and further develop the cooperation with these countries in the field of police, customs and security". Under the heading "Euromed Police III", the EU is also funding security cooperation projects with Egypt and Tunisia (http://www.euromedpolice3.eu). The aims include combatting "cybercrime and new criminal threats" and detecting unusual financial flows. "Euromed Police" is meant to align the police authorities of the states addressed more closely with the structures of the EU and its Member States. This also includes the police agency EUROPOL. The entire project is aimed at members of the police forces, quasi-military gendarmeries, special units and financial investigations and departments specialised in computer crime. 1. For what reason does the Federal Government currently deem it to be necessary to "bolster and further develop" the cooperation with Egypt and Tunisia in the field of policing, customs and security? On 1. Due to its geographical position between the crisis flashpoints of Libya, Gaza and the direct border to Israel, Egypt attracts radical Islamists. With the current lack of Libyan border controls, weapons circulating freely in Libya are being transported to Sinai and being deployed there both against the Egyptian security forces and Israel. As the attack in Taba in February 2014 illustrates, the terrorists in Sinai have no qualms about attacking Western tourists in the country either. Extremist groups in Egypt are now partly adopting the approach of IS (Islamic State) and are publishing videos showing the decapitation of alleged Israeli spies in Egypt. The bloody attack in North Sinai against military personnel on 24 0ctober 2014 shows how determined and capable terrorist groups in Sinai are. Tunisia faces multifaceted challenges in the scope of its democratisation process; a result of its geostrategic position and the instabilities following the "Arab Spring". In the mountain region - 3 - on the border to Algeria, terrorists from Algeria have joined forces with Tunisian Ansar al- Sharia extremists to carry out attacks above all against state representatives and armed and security forces. Libya is now a largely lawless country in which terrorists groups and weapons are to be found in abundance, in particular also threatening Tunisia, which is barely able defend its long desert border. A disproportionately high number of IS volunteers comes from Tunisia, who in part exit and enter the country via Libya, where they are also trained in part. Tunisian extremists, among others, plan attacks in Tunisia from Libyan soil, which can also be directed against Western interests. The failed attacks in Sousse and Monastir on 30 October 2013 (inter alia against tourist targets) attest to these dangers. It is precisely the comparatively successful democratisation process and the many Western interests/targets on the ground there that make Tunisia a preferred target for potential extremist attacks. 2. What current European Union endeavours relating to Egypt and Tunisia to support the governments in "reforming the security sector" or similar measures for police forces, secret services or customs authorities are known to the Federal Government? On 2. The Federal Government knows that the European Union (EU) intends to carry out a project on the issue of combatting terrorism in the Maghreb/North Africa region as of 2016 in the scope of the stability instrument (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (lcSP)). The Federal Government is not aware of the exact contents or beneficiary countries. A Danish consortium is currently conducting a study on the development of the project. Please also refer to the answer to question 39. 3. When did or when will the EU initiatives begin to the knowledge of the Federal Government and which authorities from which countries will be taking part assuming which tasks? On 3. Please refer to the answer to question 2. 4. What other EU projects are to be launched in 2014 or 2015 to the knowledge of the Federal Government and which authorities from which countries will be taking part assuming which tasks? On 4. Please refer to the answer to question 2. The Federal Government has no information beyond this. 5. In the scope of which projects is the Federal Government currently active in Tunisia as part of a "transformation partnership in support of the democratisation process"? On 5. In the scope of the German-Tunisian Transformation Partnership (TP), the Federal Government is currently active with numerous projects in the areas of democratisation, building a constitutional state, decentralisation and vocational training. This year the focal point was above all the elections conducted in Tunisia. 6. To what extent is this transformation partnership also addressing the security sector and which - 4 - authorities are concerned here? On 6. In the context of TP, three initiatives are currently being funded in the field of security sector