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The United States' Decision to Ignore the Use Of CML 4108 JD Studies in International Relations: The Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Professor Daniel Joyner The United States’ Decision to Ignore the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War: An Involvement that Remains Unpunished Jennifer Kiss February 1, 2014 Kiss 1 Table of Contents I. Introduction ..................................................................................................... Page 2 II. A Brief History of the Iran-Iraq War a. Primary Causes of the War ................................................................... Page 4 b. The American Role in the War ............................................................ Page 5 c. Iranian-American Relations in the War ............................................... Page 6 III. Iraq’s Decision to Make and Use WMDs ........................................................ Page 8 IV. Shared Responsibility: How it may apply to U.S. involvement in the War.... Page 11 V. Conclusion: Unanswered Questions ................................................................ Page 16 Kiss 2 I. INTRODUCTION Known as one of the most violent conflicts since World War II in the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq War commenced on September 22, 1980 with the air and land invasion of Iran by Iraqi forces. Lasting approximately eight years, the war claimed the lives of over one and a half million Iranian and Iraqi soldiers and civilians, leaving over half a million severely wounded and even more turned into refugees.1 The war concluded in 1988 when Iran accepted the United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 598, which eventually, led to a cease-fire on August 20.2 The significance of the Iran-Iraq War is two-fold. Not only is it recognized as one of bloodiest wars since World War II, it is also known for Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilian population. The use of these weapons breached Iraq’s obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the “use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.”3 Even though Iraq signed the Geneva Protocol in 1931, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein used these weapons as early as 1980 and continued to use them in mass quantities until the end of the war in 1988.4 In 2013, a series of declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents revealed the extent of American involvement and intelligence surrounding the chemical weapons situation in the war. These documents provided proof that the U.S. not only knew about the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by Iraq, but that it did nothing to stop the use 1 Stephen R Shalom, The United States and the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, online: Iranian Chamber Society < 2 History of Iran, Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, online: Iranian Chamber Society < http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php> [Iran-Iraq War]. 3 Julian Perry Robinson & Jozef Goldblat, “Chemical Warfare in the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet (May 1984), online: Iran Chamber Society < http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php> [Robinson]. 4 Daniel Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 7 at 264 [Joyner]. Kiss 3 of those weapons. The decision to ignore Iraq’s use of WMDs against Iran stemmed from the U.S. governments’ desire to ensure American interests prevailed. The decision to ignore Iraq’s use of chemical weapons by the United States brings to light many serious questions that have yet to be resolved by the international community. Some of these questions include: why did the Reagan administration get away with aiding, supplying and even allowing the Iraqis to continue their use of chemical weapons against the Iranians? Is it plausible to argue that American interests are more important than the interests of the Iranian peoples, therefore rendering it acceptable for the U.S. to turn a blind eye to use of chemical weapons? And lastly, why has no one been punished for using illegal war tactics, which clearly breach accepted international law? These are only some of the unanswered questions still existing today. The United States should be held accountable for their involvement in the Iran-Iraq War for many reasons. By focusing primarily on the U.S. government’s decision to ignore Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, this paper will attempt to prove that the U.S. should share in the responsibility of the wrongfully committed act by first, providing a brief summary of the primary causes of the Iran-Iraq War, of the U.S.’s role in the war and of Iranian-American relations during the war. It will then move to discus the developments of Iraq’s WMD program and its effect on diplomatic relations between all three countries. And lastly, it will apply the concept of shared responsibility to the Iran-Iraq War as a way to explain why it is essential that the United States of American be held accountable for their active involvement in the war. Kiss 4 II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR a. Primary Causes of the War The outbreak of the war occurred as a result of a number of long-term and short-term causes. Some of these primary causes included Iranian and Iraqi disputes over border territories, the exchange of personal animosity between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, and the Iranian theocratic ruler, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Hussein’s fear that the Islamic Revolution in Iran would threaten the already delicate balance between Sunni and Shia sects of the Muslim faith and lastly, as a result of over five centuries of conflict between the Persian and Arab peoples in their quest to be the dominant regional power in the Middle East.5 When Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq in 1978, he vowed to retrieve the land Iraq lost when Iran and Iraq agreed to the Treaty of 1975 which ended the war between Iraq and Kurdistan, the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway, and to restore Iraqi national pride.6 Upon realizing the gravity of the situation in Iran due to the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, Hussein decided to strike against Iran in order to regain the waterway and to show the rest of the Arab nations the strength of Iraq.7 Along with the goal of reclaiming the waterway, most of the border issues with Iran centered on the fact that the Iraqi oil fields were next to the Iranian border and that Iran held control of most of the Persian Gulf making it difficult for Iraq to use the Gulf to ship its oil. Border skirmishes between Iran and Iraq were constantly occurring and in September of 1980, the skirmishes erupted when Hussein announcement that the waterway would be returning to Iraqi sovereignty, which Iran rejected. Hostilities escalated resulting in Iraqi forces launching a full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22. Iran retaliated by matching Iraq’s declaration of war, 5 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3d ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 203-204. 6 Ibid. 7 Will B Swearingen, “Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War” (1998) 78 Geographical Review 405 at 405 and 411-412 [Swearingen]. Kiss 5 a move that united the Iranian people against a common enemy, Iraq, during a time of civil unrest.8 Hussein’s initial belief that the war would be easily won vanished as the Iranians fought back vigorously, turning the war into a war of attrition.9 A stalemate resulted between the two sides and in order to end the stalement, Hussein order the use of chemical weapons against Iranian infantry lines. b. The American Role in the War Besides the devastating realization that the Iraqi forces deployed the use of chemical weapons against the Iranians, it is vital to understand what role the United States of America played in the war, as it is their role that inevitably stigmatized the reputation of the U.S. government in the Middle East and led to future conflicts. When the war began, the United States expressed its neutrality stating that it would remain out of the conflict mainly because no diplomatic ties existed between the United States and Iraq or Iran, leaving Washington’s relations with both countries weak. Notwithstanding American’s neutrality claim, both the Carter administration and the Reagan administration proceeded to aid both sides of the war in order to further American interests in the Middle East, whether those interests focused on the release of American hostages, first in Tehran in 1979 and then in Lebanon in 1983, or oil. In order to accomplish their goals, the United States provided both sides with aid, military intelligence and weapons.10 In the early years of the Iran-Iraq War, the CIA received military intelligence, revealing that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran started as early as 1980. Even though the United States knew about the use of these weapons, the United States continued to arm and aid Iraq. As Colonel Walter P. Lang, a senior Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) officer at the time, stated, “The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern…[the 8 Swearingen, supra note 10 at 405 and 411-412. See also Iran-Iraq War, supra note 2. 9 Joyner, supra note 4 at 255. See also Shalom, supra note 1. 10 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991) at 71-72. Kiss 6 DIA] would never have accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival.”11 Another DIA officer stated that “They [the Iraqis] had gotten better and better’ and after a while chemical weapons ‘were integrated into their fire plan for any large operation.”12 In fact, in November 1984, the United States and Iraq restored diplomatic relations and removed Iraq from its list of nations supporting international terrorism.13 President Reagan made it very clear in his policy that an Iraqi victory in the war must be ensured, whatever the cost, therefore it chose to ignore the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.14 c.
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